

# SUMMA THEOLOGICA

## VOL. 6 - SUPPLEMENT

*by Thomas Aquinas*

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## AQUINAS FOR TODAY

It would be very difficult for someone born in the 13th century to grasp the style of life, the speed of travel and the unparalleled access to information experienced by mankind at the close of the 20th. Thomas Aquinas, were he to appear today, would, however, be dismayed at the lack of contemplation and the inadequate grasp of the long view of anything save perhaps material wealth. He would no doubt be perplexed over the pleas from laypersons and scholars alike for relevance and immediacy from every piece of information provided – especially theology. How could anything be more relevant than theology, more immediate than the contemplation of the ways and works of God?

By any standard, *Summa* is a masterpiece on the theme of theology and a magnum opus on spiritual immediacy. From the curious child's question "How many angels are there?" [ P(1)-Q(50)-A(1) ] to the more esoteric and scholarly issue: "Are there any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?" [P(1)-Q(115)-A(2) ], *Summa* explains the faith and defends it with amazing practicality and depth. It has a permanent place in the history of theology and merits serious study even after 700 years:

"The time is overdue for all secret believers to join in a positive word of gratitude for the masterful expression and defense of the historic Christian faith bequeathed to us by this humble giant of the faith. As for myself, I gladly confess that the highest compliment that could be paid to me as a Christian philosopher, apologist, and theologian is to call me "Thomistic." This, of course, does not mean I accept everything Aquinas wrote naively and uncritically. It does mean that I believe he was one of the greatest systematic minds the Christian church has ever had, and that I can see a lot farther standing on his shoulders than by attacking him in the back. No, I do not agree with everything he ever wrote. On the other hand, neither do I agree with everything I ever wrote. But seven hundred years from now no one will even recognize my name, while Aquinas's works will still be used with great profit." [Norman Geisler, *Thomas Aquinas; An Evangelical Appraisal*. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House Company, 1991, p. 14.]

## EDITOR'S NOTE:

After writing these few questions of the treatise on Penance, St. Thomas was called to the heavenly reward which he had merited by writing so well of his Divine Master. The remainder of the Summa Theologica, known as the Supplement, was compiled probably by Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and was gathered from St. Thomas's commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. This commentary was written in the years 1235-1253, while St. Thomas was under thirty years of age. Everywhere it reveals the influence of him whom St. Thomas always called the Master. But that influence was not to be always supreme. That the mind of the Angelic Doctor moved forward to positions which directly contradicted the Master may be seen by any student of the Summa Theologica. The compiler of the Supplement was evidently well acquainted with the commentary on the Sentences, which had been in circulation for some twenty years or more, but it is probable that he was badly acquainted with the Summa Theologica. This will be realized and must be borne in mind when we read the Supplement, notably **P(3), Q(62), A(1)**; also **Q(43), A(3)**, ad 2 of the Supplement.

# SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS  
Gathered From His Commentary On  
Book 4 Of The Sentences Of Peter Lombard

## QUESTIONS 1-99

### QUESTION 1

## OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider each single part of Penance, and

- (1) Contrition
- (2) Confession;
- (3) Satisfaction.

The consideration about Contrition will be fourfold:

- (1) What is it?
- (2) What should it be about?
- (3) How great should it be?
- (4) Of its duration;
- (5) Of its effect.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined?
- (2) Whether it is an act of virtue?
- (3) Whether attrition can become contrition?

### **P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)**

*Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins,  
together with the purpose of confessing them  
and of making satisfaction for them?*

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that contrition is not “an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them,” as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6), “sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.” But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not sorrow for sins.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition. But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not always necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, stands the definition.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, As stated in Ecclus. 10:15, “pride is the beginning of all sin,” because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments. Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his own judgment, is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But, in material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as

stated in Meteor. iv, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.

In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the substance of the act, we have the definition given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz. "sorrow," its object by the words "for sins," and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word "assumed": while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words "together with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction."

There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: "Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done," because the addition of the word "punishes" defines the definition to a special virtue. Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono ii, 12) as follows: "Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment." Here we have an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is "humility of the mind," because just as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated by the word "tearful," and the origin of contrition, by the words, "arising from remembrance of sin," etc. Another definition is taken from the words of Augustine [\*Implicitly on ~~Psalm~~ Psalm 46], and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: "Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin." Yet another is gathered from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as follows: "Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and fear." Here the derivation is indicated by

saying that contrition is “humility of the soul”; the effect, by the words, “crushing sin”; and the origin, by the words, “between hope and fear.” Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which, fear might lead to despair.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which we have now, so as to wish they had never been.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Contrition is from God alone as to the form that quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of will.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and makes not satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)**

### *Whether contrition is an act of virtue?*

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since “they bring us neither praise nor blame” (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one's own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to wit, of penance, as is evident from what was said above (Sent. iv, D, 14, **Q(1), A(1); P(3), Q(85), AA(2),3**).

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, **Q(1), A(5); P(2a), Q(22), A(3), ad 3**). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.



## P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)

### *Whether attrition can become contrition?*

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 27, **Q(2)**, **A(4)**; **P(2a)**, **Q(65)**, **A(4)**). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that attrition can nowise become attrition: and this is the other opinion.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)-RO(1)** — There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(1)-A(3)-RO(2)** — When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be quickened.

It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the habit which quickens it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby it was not quickened previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.

## QUESTION 2

### OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION

#### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment?
- (2) Whether, on account of original sin?
- (3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed?
- (4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit?
- (5) Whether, for the sins of others?
- (6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?

#### P(4)-Q(2)-A(1)

*Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin?*

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine says in *De Poenitentia* [\*Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1]: “No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life.” But the morality of this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his punishments also.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the Master says (*Sent. iv, D, 16, cap. i*), quoting Augustine (*De vera et falsa Poenitentia* [\*Work of an unknown author]), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment. Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to his punishment [\*"Poenitens," i.e. "poenam tenens"]. Therefore he is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition which is penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(1) — *I answer that***, As stated above (**Q(1), A(1)**), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground\*, and refuses to yield to the precept of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil is called metaphorically "contrition." [\*There is a play on the words here — 'integer' (whole) and 'in suis terminis' (to its own ground)]. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(1)-RO(1)** — According to St. Augustine, penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless penance be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this life.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as we are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something on account of the evil accruing to us therefrom.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(2)**

### ***Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?***

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that contrition should be on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin; not by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the act, regarded in its substance, is a good, and is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has. Therefore we should be contrite on its account also.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, by original sin man has been turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God. But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God. Therefore man should be displeased at original sin; and so he ought to have contrition for it.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, The medicine should be proportionate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so. Therefore it is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as contrition is.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Contrition is sorrow, as stated above (**Q(1), AA(1),2**), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil therefrom; nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will; and this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not apply to it.

The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is due to aversion of the will.

### **P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)**

#### *Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?*

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that we have no need to have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by their contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow, such as contrition is, but joy.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we have no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition for them.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away voluntariness, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition, e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore there is no need to have contrition for all one's past sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for it is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one's past sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)** — Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. But justification requires contrition, as stated above (**Q(1)**, **A(1)**; **P(2a)**, **Q(113)**). Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all one's sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God's law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which crushes it.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-RO(1)** — As clearly shown above (**A(2)**, ad 1), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will that had failed to obey the command of God's law, and not as regards the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice of the will falls. Now the will's choice falls not only on the acts of the other powers, which the will uses for its own end, but also on the will's own proper act: for the will wills to will something. Accordingly the will's choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the like,

whether such pain be in the senses or in the will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-RO(2)** — One may forget a thing in two ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for it; or so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember having heard something in general, but know not what it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover it.

Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten in two ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a particular remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to have contrition for each individual mortal sin. And if he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it is enough that he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether, then he is excused from his duty through being unable to fulfill it, and it is enough that he be contrite in general for everything wherein he has offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man, who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to, as soon as he can.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-RO(3)** — If ignorance were to remove altogether the will to do evil, it will excuse, and there would be no sin: and sometimes it does not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound to be contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(3)-RO(4)** — A venial sin can remain after contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore contrition should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 16, **Q(2)**, **A(2)**, qu. 2; **P(4)**, **Q(87)**, **A(1)**).

## P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)

### *Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?*

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will: and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about future contingents, as stated in Ethic. 3: Therefore contrition is about future sins rather than about past sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says [\*St. Basil asserts this implicitly in De Vera Virgin.] that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if he has committed a murderous assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought to be contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to be proportionate not only to his past act, but also to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently is not for a future sin.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement, and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its proper movement is towards its proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone; but,



inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards future sins indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which is a part of prudence conjoined to penance.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The free-will is said to regard future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the object of acts: because, of his own free-will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so far as it is subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something past.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome [\*Basil] speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than past sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5)**

*Whether a man ought to have contrition for another's sin?*

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for another's sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another's sin in <sup>1813</sup>Psalm 18:13: "From those of others spare thy servant." Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another's sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves, it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing

else than sorrow for sins. Therefore man should be contrite for the sins of others.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5) — *On the contrary***, Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is contrite for others' sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5) — *I answer that***, The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (~~Psalm~~ Psalm 17:27):

“With the perverse thou wilt be perverted.”

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(5)-RO(2)** — We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition, as is evident for what has been said already.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6)**

***Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?***

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning to creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition for all is sufficient.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another, than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all

sins both actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6) — *On the contrary***, For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since “what heals the eye will not heal the foot,” as Jerome says (Super Marc. ix, 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins does not suffice.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6) —** Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6) — *I answer that***, Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding dispositions.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6)-RO(2) —** Although all mortal sins agree in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different ways in which they turn us to creatures.

**P(4)-Q(2)-A(6)-RO(3) —** Baptism acts in virtue of Christ’s merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.

It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the accidents of the thing

corrupted, are removed by the one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life; whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to confess each sin.

## QUESTION 3

### OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
- (2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
- (3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?

#### **P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)**

*Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?*

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is very slight.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of hell

rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), “all sorrow is based on love.” Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1) —** Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses all other sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** As stated above (Q(1), A(2), ad 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former sorrow either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through redundancy from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more do the latter follow the movement of the former. Consequently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corporeal things, is greater than that which redounds from the reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which results in the sensitive part from the reason’s displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than other sorrows — both because the lower appetite does not obey the higher

appetite infallibly, as though in the lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain — and because the passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does not observe, but exceeds.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt by the interior sense or reason.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Affections of the body are the immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated in *Ethic.* x, 5. Thus he who delights in learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the reason in the sensitive part.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The degree of displeasure at a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offense against God, more than as being hurtful to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less hated), but less than the sin, as an offense against God. Again, among all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to the degree of the hurt. Consequently,

since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest of all punishments will be separation from God.

Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over again rather than commit the same sin.

We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e.g. separation from God; and some also are everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense of God is to be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an offense against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.

We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us.



## P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)

### *Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?*

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says (Orat. lii): “Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body”; and Augustine [\*De Contritione Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that “he deserves to blind his eyes with tears.” Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither, therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)-O(3)** — *On the contrary*, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz. penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one’s duties; hence it is written (✠Romans 12:1):

“Let your sacrifice be reasonable [\*Vulg.: ‘Present your bodies... a reasonable sacrifice’].”

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor, but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although

Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be blinded.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(2)-RO(2)** — This objection considers the sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.

### **P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)**

*Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?*

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that “she deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones.” Therefore one need not be more sorry for one sin than for another.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for another.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God, since they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God. Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3) — *On the contrary***, It is written (~~Exo~~ Deuteronomy 25:2):

“According to the measure of the sin,  
shall the measure also of the stripes be.”

Now, in contrition, the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition should be for one sin more than for another.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)** — Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other. Therefore,

in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the more grievous, than for the other.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3) — *I answer that,*** We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.

Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all one's sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for another.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)-RO(1) —** Paula is commended, not for deploring all her sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much more.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)-RO(2) —** In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is

sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.

**P(4)-Q(3)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although each mortal sin turns us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.

## QUESTION 4

### OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
- (2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?
- (3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?

#### **P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)**

##### *Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?*

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose sin is forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of." Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last all one's life, since it is sorrow for sin.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>GLIMS</sup>1 John 4:18) that "perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain." But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, it is written (~~Ecclus~~ Romans 8:28) that “to them that love God all things work together unto good,” even sins as a gloss declares [\*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction. Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine in De Poenitentia [\*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that “when sorrow ceases, penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains.” Therefore, since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one’s sins.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without fear about sin forgiven.” Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (**Q(3)**, **A(1)**), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man’s eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says [\*Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that “when God absolves a man from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin.”

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but also as having a hurt connected with it.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above (**Q(3)**, **A(2)**): wherefore the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always remains from his past sin.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)**

### *Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?*

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident

from <sup><1000</sup>Philippians 4:4, where the gloss on the words, “Rejoice in the Lord always,” says that “it is necessary to rejoice.” Now it is not possible to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Drive away sadness far from thee,” and the reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): “For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve any longer.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): “Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with wormwood.” Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine [\*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says: “The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief.”

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)** — Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of <sup><1000</sup>Matthew 5:5, “Blessed are they that mourn.” Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to.



On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself for object.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)**

### *Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?*

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin. Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since “charity never falleth away.” Therefore the displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they committed.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition. Therefore contrition remains after this life.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does contrition.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)** — Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition, it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered from their sensible pain, which is false.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three can be found.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no contrition.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.

**P(4)-Q(4)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due may be called satisfaction.

## QUESTION 5

### OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?
- (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
- (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

#### P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)

#### *Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?*

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, a gloss on <sup>488</sup>Psalm 50:19, “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit,” says: “A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed.”

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)** — Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed

through the heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, **Q(1)**, **A(4)**: **P(3)**, **Q(62)**, **A(1)**); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)-RO(1)** — God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby sins are forgiven.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)**

*Whether contrition can take away  
the debt of punishment entirely?*

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are

ordained for man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction. Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that “by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart's affections, such as contrition is.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)** — Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said (<sup>236</sup>Luke 23:43): “This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise,” on account of his one act of repentance.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)** — As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv, D, 14, **Q(2)**, **AA(1),2**; **P(3)**, **Q(86)**, **A(4)**), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)-RO(1)** — A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members: wherefore it is written (<sup>3172</sup>Proverbs 17:22):

“A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones.”

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)**

### *Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?*

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out very great sins.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it was stated above (**Q(3), A(3)**) that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, As we have often said (**Q(1), A(2)**, ad 1; **Q(3), A(1); Q(4), A(1)**), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in

the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.

**P(4)-Q(5)-A(3)-RO(2)** — It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would suffice for the remission of the sin.

## QUESTION 6

# OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY

### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration:

- (1) The necessity of confession;
- (2) Its nature;
- (3) Its minister;
- (4) Its quality;
- (5) Its effect;
- (6) The seal of confession.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
- (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?
- (3) Whether all are bound to confession?
- (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?
- (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?
- (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?

### P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)

#### *Whether confession is necessary for salvation?*

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace.



Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for one's sins.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore confession is not necessary for salvation.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Boethius says (De Consol. i): “If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to him.” But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man should make his disease known by means of confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)** — Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just as Baptism, whereby

original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament without using the things which belong to the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it

turns, in which respect the sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from someone else, because “that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention” (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin’s punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)**

### *Whether confession is according to the natural law?*

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed in the Old Law, as may be gathered from <sup>288B</sup>Isaiah 43:26: “Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself.” Therefore it is according to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words (<sup>288B</sup>Job 31:33) “If, as a man, I have hid my sin.” Therefore confession is according to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2) — *On the contrary***, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since “the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power,” as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is according to Divine, but not according to natural law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment of one’s sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply that in such a case confession of one’s sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of one’s sins, is not according to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one’s sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather from a gloss [<sup>\*</sup>Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.

## **P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)**

### *Whether all are bound to confession?*

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on <sup><280></sup>Isaiah 3:9 (“They have proclaimed abroad”), “their sin,” etc.: “Penance is the second plank after shipwreck.” But some have not suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of Penance.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not bound to confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all are bound to confession also.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)** — Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii), where it is stated that “all of either sex are bound to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion.”

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because “all have sinned and need the grace of God” (<sup><412></sup>Romans 3:23); and that the

Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)-RO(2)** — All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is the minister of Christ.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(3)-RO(3)** — A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)**

***Whether it is lawful for a man to confess  
a sin which he has not committed?***

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), “it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none.” Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised. But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous sin than one has.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore he can also confess a sin which he has not done.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)** — Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-RO(1)** — To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus it is written (<sup>Job</sup>)

9:28): “I feared all my works.” Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.

From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-RO(3)** — When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(4)-RO(4)** — A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)**

### *Whether one is bound to confess at once?*

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): “The contempt of confession is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay.” But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as soon as possible.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man’s



health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at once.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus: De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he does not confess before that time.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)** — Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition, viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.

But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that time.

Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism. Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (~~James~~ James 5:14,16). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it is dangerous to delay.

Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes

urgent for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.

Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)-RO(2)** — It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(5)-RO(3)** — The retaining of another's property against the owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfill it at once.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6)**

### *Whether one can be dispensed from confession?*

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above (**A(3)**). Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by God, but by a man (<sup>cf. 1</sup>James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another." Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted

by the apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6) — *On the contrary***, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6) — *I answer that***, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.

Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.

**P(4)-Q(6)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.

## QUESTION 7

### OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
- (2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?
- (3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

#### **P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)**

#### *Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?*

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that Augustine defines confession unfittingly, when he says (Super Psalm 21) that confession “lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of pardon.” For the disease against which confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a “hidden” disease.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than “hope” should be set down as the cause of confession.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, other definitions are to be found differing from the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang.) that confession is “the uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound.” Others say that “confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a priest.” Others define it thus: “Confession is the sinner’s

sacramental self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to perform the penance imposed on him.” Therefore it seems that the definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all that these include.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest; fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz. release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that “it lays bare” — the matter of confession, by saying that it is a “hidden disease” — its cause, which is “the hope of pardon”; while the other definitions include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent’s sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Confession presupposes charity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of confession.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-RO(3)** — In every confession sin is laid bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(1)-RO(4)** — It is not necessary that every definition should include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this reason we

find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that indicate another.

## P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)

### *Whether confession is an act of virtue?*

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since “we are naturally capable of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for “it opens the gate of heaven,” as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (**P(2a)**, **Q(18)**, **AA(6),7**; **P(2b)**, **Q(80)**; **P(2b)**, **Q(85)**, **A(3)**; **P(2b)**, **Q(109)**, **A(3)**), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one’s thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently,

confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to the positive law.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although an innocent man may have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act, so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man, though it is an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Though the grace of the sacraments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a remedy for sin.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)**

### *Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?*

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given above (**A(1)**). Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope and not of penance.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (**A(1)**, **O(4)**). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.



**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and not of penance.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God's favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many virtues.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting but as commanding.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-RO(2)** — In that definition shame is not mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-RO(3)** — By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil — confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of the truth — and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.

**P(4)-Q(7)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Since confession results from hope rather than from fear, as stated above (**A(1)**, ad 2), it is based on the article about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been said.

## QUESTION 8

### OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION

#### (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
- (2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
- (3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins?
- (4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?
- (5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior?
- (6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any priest?
- (7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin?

#### P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)

#### *Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?*

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us (~~CONF~~ James 5:16): “Confess your sins, one to another,” where there is no mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession

should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to confess to anyone.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not always be made to a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)** — Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus (~~John~~ John 11:44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a ministry over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-RO(1)** — James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, to forgive sins, as related in ~~John~~ John 20:23, we must take the words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-RO(3)** — In satisfaction we must consider not only the quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(1)-RO(4)** — It may be necessary for two reasons to know the sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ's flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.

## **P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)**

### ***Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?***

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as appears from the definition given above (**Q(7), A(1)**). But the dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it seems that confession should be made to no one else.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should

be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no one else.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest, when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)-RO(1)** — In the sacrament of Penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack\* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs to the priest. [\*Here and in the Reply to **O(2)** the Leonine edition reads “through desire for a priest”.]

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although a layman is not the judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(2)-RO(3)** — By means of the sacraments man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by “the word of life” (~~CHR~~ Ephesians 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he conceived in accordance with God’s command, he is not yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful effect, and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(3)**

*Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confession of venial sins?*

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of

necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore it is not committed to a layman.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as appears from <sup>384</sup>James 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins be made to a layman.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, is the authority of Bede (on <sup>385</sup>James 5:16, “Confess... one to another”) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating of one’s breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf. **P(3), Q(87), A(3)**).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins. and a sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.

## **P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)**

### *Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one’s own priest?*

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to one’s own priest. For Gregory [\*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, **Q(1)**] says: “By our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex. ample of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sins.” Now monks are not the proper priests of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore



confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be made to any priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist. Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to confess to one's own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in *De vera et falsa Poenitentia* [\*Work of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind." Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, "That which is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity," as Bernard observes (*De Praecept. et Dispens. ii*). Now confession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were bound to confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need not always confess to one's own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-O(6)** — Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession, through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4) — *On the contrary***, stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed “all of either sex to confess once a year to their own priest.”

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4) —** Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus primas ix, **Q(2)**; Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi, **Q(5)**), for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another’s parishioner.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4) — *I answer that***, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity, in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest, but to one’s own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-RO(1) —** Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or impose penance, which is false.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-RO(2) —** The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not lawful to

receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest, although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the permission of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by law (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's superior; even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a patient.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-RO(5)** — In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is charity, according to the Apostle (<sup>500</sup>1 Timothy 1:5). Nor is any slur cast on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the power intrusted to him.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(4)-RO(6)** — The necessity of confessing to one's own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently. A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and consequently for themselves.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)*****Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?***

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject's own priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be allowed by a superior's privilege, permission, or command.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man. Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to "know the countenance of their own cattle" (<sup>172</sup>Proverbs 27:23); and this is hindered if another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, he that hears another's confession is the latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another than one's own priest, even with the superior's permission.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5) — *On the contrary***, He that can perform the actions of an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order. Now a superior, such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest's parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases to

himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another priest to hear that man.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)** — Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess to another. Much more, therefore, can his superior do this.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)** — Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he can hear confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the same power.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man's confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; secondly, through being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction, can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man's confession through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man, priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that impediment can permit him to hear confessions.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-RO(1)** — No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people's salvation and God's glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction to others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who

“seek the things that are their own;  
not the things that are Jesus Christ's” (<sup>3122</sup>Philippians 2:21),

and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The rector of a church should “know the countenance of his own cattle” in two ways. First, by an assiduous attention to their external conduct, so as to watch over the flock

committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts. Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his subject's conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of confession, the penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself, but not in the court of external judgment: wherefore it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has confessed to one who could absolve him. It is therefore clear that this knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to hear confessions.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-RO(3)** — It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed immediately over the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher superior delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the latter takes the superior's place, as when the Pope or a bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is higher than the inferior prelate, as the Pope's penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop's penitentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is bound to obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest; and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is not so bound to obey him as his own priest.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(5)-RO(4)** — No man is bound to confess sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop's penitentiary, or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical precept (*De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque*) which prescribes confession to be made once a year to one's own priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has committed none but venial sins. For such a one, according to some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and the priest, in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to

believe him. If, however, he were bound to confess again, his first confession would not be useless, because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remitted, both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of the power of the keys: so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament, except in those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of a character, or by the consecration of the matter, neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who hears confessions by the bishop's authority, to advise the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so.

### **P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)**

#### ***Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?***

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that a penitent, at the point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction, as stated above (**A(5)**). Now a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve him.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need to be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a man who is in danger of death, the penitent, if he survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, since otherwise the priest would not “know the countenance of his cattle.”

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not a priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve a man who is not his subject, when he is in danger of death.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man

to make use of another's property, even against the owner's will, in order to supply a bodily need. Therefore in danger of death, a man may be absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual need.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)** — Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (Sent. iv, D, 20, Cap. Non Habet).

I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the fact that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since "necessity knows no law" [\*Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg. jur. (v, Decretal)] in cases of necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if he had been absolved by his own. Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church is confined within certain limits.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)-RO(1)** — One person may act on the jurisdiction of another according to the latter's will, since matters of jurisdiction can be deputed. Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest has the use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)-RO(2)** — He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in danger of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, but in order to offer satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Baptism derives its efficacy from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the sacrament whosoever baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by the minister, so that if a man



confess to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental absolution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of his punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to his repentance. but he does not receive that diminution of his punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently he must confess again to a priest; and one who has confessed thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.

### **P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)**

#### ***Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault?***

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that the temporal punishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree of fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, as appears from ~~Revelation~~ Revelation 18:7:

“As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies,  
so much torment and sorrow give ye her.”

Yet sometimes where there is greater pleasure, there is less fault, since “carnal sins, which afford more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty,” according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 2). Therefore the punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law the punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin. Since therefore, in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which is taken from the species of a sin, is more aggravating than that which is taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment of seven

years' duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for fornication a priest is punished for ten years, according to Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-O(4)** — Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against, the more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or a little more is enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, according to the Canons (Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii). Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~2078~~ Isaiah 27:8):

“In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off,  
thou shalt judge it.”

Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated for sin answers the degree of fault.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)** — Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity of the fault and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment, the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man's sin is more difficult to resist than another's (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication, than on an old man, though the

former's sin be less grievous), or because one man's sin; for instance, a priest's, is more dangerous to others, than another's sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the punishment of the one man to deter others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to be imposed with due regard to both these things: and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. on the other hand, the punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that this punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due consideration however for the degree of contrition, and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction should bear them in mind.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-RO(1)** — In the words quoted two things are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. “glorification” and “delicacies” or “delectation”; the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin: and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-RO(2)** — This punishment of seven days did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices expiated. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of the more powerful blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from ~~Heb~~ Hebrews 29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments,” etc. And yet it is not universally true that a seven years' penance is exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the majority of cases, which must, nevertheless, be disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of sins and penitents.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-RO(3)** — A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw

him from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment is not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(8)-A(7)-RO(4)** — This punishment refers to the case when this happens against the priest's will: for if he spilled it willingly he would deserve a much heavier punishment.

## QUESTION 9

### OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether confession can be lacking in form?
- (2) Whether confession ought to be entire?
- (3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing?
- (4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession?

#### **P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)**

#### *Whether confession can be lacking in form?*

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession cannot be lacking in form. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:26): “Praise [confession] perisheth from the dead as nothing.” But a man without charity is dead, because charity is the life of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without charity.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, confession is condivided with contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, it is necessary in confession that the word should agree with the thought for the very name of confession requires this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with his thought, since in his heart he holds to sin, while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not confess.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess the same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore it is not necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1) — *I answer that***, Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments: wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)-RO(1)** — These words must be understood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is not in the state of charity.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and satisfaction, but not to confession, that man should be united to God by charity.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(1)-RO(3)** — He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the substance of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of confession.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)**

### *Whether confession should be entire?*

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not necessary for confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one

priest. For shame conduces to the diminution of punishment. Now the greater the number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater his shame. Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several priests.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of the priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary to confess all one's sins to one priest.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it may happen that a man after going to confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which escaped his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only confess that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to different priests.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the sole reason for confessing one's sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest who hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such a case at all events the confession need not be entire.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. But it savors of hypocrisy to divide one's confession, as Augustine says [\*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author]. Therefore confession should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance. But Penance should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would be adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence it is necessary for confession that man confess all

the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of confession.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Although a man's shame is multiplied when he makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his different shames together are not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself does not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The punishment imposed by different priests would not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself, and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that confession should be made to him just as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be no contrition unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so is there no confession unless one confess all the sins that one remembers committing.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he had confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to whom his previous confession was made, in order that the total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its quantity both from itself and from the conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he confessed he had already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while as to the sin which he had forgotten, in order that the priest may know the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare it explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but had forgotten this particular one.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Although the priest may be unable to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is bound to confess all to him,



that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot absolve him.

### **P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?***

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that one may confess through another, or by writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent's conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing. Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, some are not understood by their own priests on account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone confesses through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said (**Q(8), A(5)**). Now sometimes a man's own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing to him.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made "with the mouth," as appears from <sup><500></sup>Romans 10:10: therefore confession of sins should also.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3) —** Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent should confess his own sins.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act,

just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one's sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)-RO(2)** — It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another: whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess as we can.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(3)-RO(3)** — In the absence of one's own priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess in writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the person to whom confession is made.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)**

***Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned  
are necessary for confession?***

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the conditions assigned by masters, and contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession:

Simple, humble, pure, faithful,

Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary, shamefaced,

Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed,

Courageously accusing, ready to obey.

For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, a thing is “pure” when it is not mixed with anything else: and “simplicity,” in like manner, removes composition and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit a sin again, his penance need not be “frequent.”

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, confession is directed to satisfaction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not always be “secret.”

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, that which is not in our power is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed “tears.” Therefore it is not required of those who confess.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, We have the authority of the masters who assigned the above.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way, it is either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which it is the act, or by reason of the act itself. Now there are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. The first is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be “discreet,” inasmuch as prudence is required in every act of virtue: and this discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condition is choice, because acts of virtue should be voluntary, and in this respect confession is said to be “voluntary.” The third condition is that the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession is said to be “pure,” i.e. with a right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should be “courageous,” viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.

Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be “full of shame,” so as not to be a boastful account of one’s sins, by reason of some worldly vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed, and in this respect it is said to be “tearful.” Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be “humble,” so that one confesses one’s misery and weakness.

By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four things: first, by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be “faithful,” i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague words, and against this confession is said to be “open,” so as not to be wrapped up in vague words; thirdly, by “multiplicity” of words, in which respect it is said to be “simple” indicating that the penitent should relate only such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known, and in this respect confession should be “entire.”

In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament. Wherefore it should be an “accusation” on the part of the penitent, should manifest his “readiness to obey” the priest, should be “secret” as regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are tried.

The well-being of confession requires that it should be “frequent”; and “not delayed,” i.e. that the sinner should confess at once.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-RO(1)** — There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being commanded by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The condition “pure” excludes perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition “simple” excludes the introduction of unnecessary matter.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-RO(3)** — This is not necessary for confession, but is a condition of its well-being.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Confession should be made not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through hearing the sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at all.

**P(4)-Q(9)-A(4)-RO(5)** — We must understand this to refer to tears of the heart.

## QUESTION 10

### OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?
- (2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment?
- (3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us?
- (4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation?
- (5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten?

#### P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)

#### *Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?*

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession does not deliver one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death of sin.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial. Now confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore confession does also.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has

the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in Baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of the absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of Baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized, grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace. Consequently just as it is said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Contrition has the desire of confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way as the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(1)-RO(2)** — In the text venial does not designate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated. and so it does not follow that one guilt is changed into another but that it is wholly done away. For “venial” is taken in three senses [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(88)**, **A(2)**]: first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. having within itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly, for what is venial in the result, in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession is that man’s past guilt is pardoned.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(2)**

*Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?*

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession nowise delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and

temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing of the punishment is remitted by confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, “the will is taken for the deed” [\*Cf. Can. Magna Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess. wherefore his intention avails him as though he had already confessed, and so the confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Confession is a penal work. But all penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment, in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of the keys, that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this life. Secondly, confession diminishes the punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the one who confesses, for this act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment diminished.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The will is not taken for the deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive Baptism is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man’s will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done by him, entirely. Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not of the removal of punishment and the like, which come under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has confessed and received



absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone no further than contrition.

### **P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether confession opens paradise?***

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that confession does not open Paradise. For different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect of Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles, as shown above (**AA(1),2**), it is said to open Paradise.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although Baptism and Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ's one Passion, whereby a way was opened unto Paradise.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(3)-RO(2)** — If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin, although afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before confession and satisfaction.

## P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)

### *Whether confession gives hope of salvation?*

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that hope of salvation should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears from <sup>◀818▶</sup>Romans 5:3,4. Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)** — *On the contrary,*” Confession makes a man more humble and more wary,” as the Master states in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). But the result of this is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of confession to give hope of salvation.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)** — *I answer that,* We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys of the Church which derive their power from Christ’s Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)-RO(1)** — It is not our actions, but the grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and since confession relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment: while confession does so also in the way mentioned above.

## P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)

### *Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?*

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that a general confession does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to

confess again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession, there would be no need to confess them when they are called to mind.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins are forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal sin, whenever he makes a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says (~~400~~ 1 Corinthians 4:4),

“I am not conscious to myself of anything,  
yet am I not hereby justified.”

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him. Therefore he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now a general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else heretics, who are not aware that certain things they have done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore a general confession does not take away forgotten sins.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~400~~ Psalm 33:6):

“Come ye to Him and be enlightened,  
and your faces shall not be confounded.”

Now he who confesses all the sins of which he is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor can more be required for him. Therefore he will not be confounded by being repelled, but will be forgiven.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)** — Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is not insincere through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives forgiveness, and then

the sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope for half a pardon.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the power of the keys to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned: but so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the sin for which a man does not express his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, is not diminished.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-RO(1)** — In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to supply what was wanting to the sacramental confession.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-RO(2)** — As stated above, confession does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can know whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for certain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession, although he may think so on account of certain conjectural signs.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-RO(3)** — He does not profit by his neglect, since he does not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor is his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it to mind.

**P(4)-Q(10)-A(5)-RO(4)** — Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a man omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin, through

ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from insincerity. on the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular circumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another's wife, thinking her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin of insincerity in confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession.

## QUESTION 11

### OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession?
- (2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?
- (3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?
- (4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession?
- (5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides?

#### P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)

*Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession?*

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For, as Bernard says (De Procep. et Dispens. ii), “that which is instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against charity.” Now the secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases: for instance, if a man knew through confession that a certain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading the people; or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain people who wish to marry

are related to one another. Therefore such ought to reveal what they know through confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such knowledge through confession would be bound to speak.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather than the good name of another, because there is order in charity. Now it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience — for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to swear to tell the truth — or when an abbot knows through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an occasion of ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of confession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful to reveal a confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising an objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to divulge a confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque): “Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word, or sign, or in any other way whatever.”

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)** — Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made known to Him in confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession, whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the penitent promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous, since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism is a sacrament, and there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on that account, so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate against charity on that account, because charity does not require a man to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The precept concerning the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of making a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no man can be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain of excommunication to be incurred “*ipso facto*,” to say whether he knows anything about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he



should assume that the intention of the person in commanding him thus, was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God knows it.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-RO(3)** — A man is not called upon to witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he knows not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except according as it comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from the priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(1)-RO(4)** — A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge, age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.

## **P(4)-Q(11)-A(2)**

*Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?*

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other matters besides those which have reference to confession. For sins alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other matters are told which have no reference to confession. Therefore, since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the seal of confession extends to them also.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, The seal of confession is connected with sacramental confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession does not extend to matters other than those which have reference to sacramental confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through their becoming familiar with it.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(2)-RO(2)** — A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way promised, as though one had the secret through confession, though not through the seal of confession.

### **P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?*

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with

regard to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience: and it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)** — Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, not as man but as God knows them. But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular case has a kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confession.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

#### **P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)**

*Whether by the penitent's permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession?*

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent's permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which he

knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him such a permission.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, that which is instituted for the common good of the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men might have greater confidence in approaching the confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge his confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they might pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the penitent cannot grant this permission.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish a sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission cannot be granted.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)** — Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his own authority reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.

I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken the seal.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed it, can.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-RO(2)** — When that is told which was known through another source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away with, because the seal of confession is not broken.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-RO(3)** — This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the penitent's permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of the contrary.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(4)-RO(4)** — He that is informed of a sin through the priest with the penitent's consent, shares in an act of the priest's, so that the same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.

### **P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)**

#### ***Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some other source besides?***

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the seal.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, whoever hears someone's confession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man is bound to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God

knows it, is stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as God knows it.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession. But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can nowise say what he has heard.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, No one can put another under a new obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew of a sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)** — Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred on account of some sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he has heard in confession, but knows from some other source.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth and to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could not bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a

declaration, if this made him free to divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows through another source either before or after confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as a man, for he can say: “I know so and so since I saw it.” But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for he cannot say: “I heard so and so in confession.” Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless there is an urgent reason.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-RO(1)** — If a man says that he has seen what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, save indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break the seal of confession.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he allowed to say that he has heard it in the confessional.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-RO(3)** — This is true of things that are in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as man knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves nothing.

**P(4)-Q(11)-A(5)-RO(4)** — It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of scandal. Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far as he is able.

## QUESTION 12

### OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered:

- (1) Its nature;
- (2) Its possibility;
- (3) Its quality;
- (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?
- (2) Whether it is an act of justice?
- (3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable?

#### **P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)**

#### *Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?*

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas, seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as when anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.



**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13): “Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue.” But satisfaction is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)** — Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not forfeited.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)-RO(2)** — An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The chief element of virtue can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and thus

the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such and such an act. Thus it is that external acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.

### **P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?***

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of justice.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not an act of justice.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to satisfaction, “to give no opening to the suggestions of sin” Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states (Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)** — Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes

equality between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2) — *I answer that,*** According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb “satis” [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense, except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called penance.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another's marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue, since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6.

### **P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?*

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [\*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable — viz. that “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof.” For the cause of actual sin is the fomes. [\*“Fomes” signifies literally “fuel,” and metaphorically, “incentive.” As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of “concupiscence,” Cf. **P(2a), Q(82), A(3).**] But we cannot remove the “fomes” in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the causes of sins.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now “to give no opening to the suggestions of sin” regards the future. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is unsuitable.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo i): “Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor,” wherein no reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [\*Gennadius, O(1)] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore Anselm’s definition is faulty.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) “punishments are medicinal.” Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making compensation, and thus it is defined as “compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice.” The definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that “satisfaction consists in giving God due honor”; where duty is considered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. O(1)) defines it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the

definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-RO(1)** — By “causes” we must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the “fomes,” which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this life though it is weakened.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Since the cause of evil or of privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good, and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good, as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible without charity, as we shall state further on (**Q(14), A(2)**).

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although Penance was primarily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Augustine [\*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-RO(5)** — There is no reason why the same thing should not be described in different ways according to the various things found in it: and such is the case here, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(12)-A(3)-RO(6)** — By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as stated above (**A(2)**).

## QUESTION 13

### OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION

#### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
- (2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?

#### **P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)**

#### *Whether man can make satisfaction to God?*

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above (**Q(12)**, **AA(2),3**). But an offense against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make satisfaction to God.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt, since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God, and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to God.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (<sup>2306</sup>Isaiah 40:16) that



“the wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering  
[\*Vulg.: ‘Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts  
thereof for a burnt offering’].”

Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for the debt resulting from the offense committed.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Jerome [\*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says: “Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let him be anathema.” But satisfaction is commanded (~~Q(13)~~ Luke 3:8): “Bring forth... fruits worthy of penance.” Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)** — Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)** — Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the fault, since “justice is the same as counterpassion,” as the Pythagoreans said [\*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. **P(2b), Q(61), A(4)**]. Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Man becomes God’s debtor in two ways; first, by reason of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in giving honor to one’s parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for

friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible. Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to God if “satis” [enough] denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality, as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Just as the offense derived a certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of Christ’s merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Man, who was made to God’s image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-RO(3)** — This argument proves that it is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put forth his whole power into

any one single thing, since he has to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Though man cannot recover the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Though original sin has less of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)**

***Whether one man can fulfill  
satisfactory punishment for another?***

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction. Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written (~~Psalm~~ Psalm 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another. Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, by praying for another one merits also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else, if he

be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~ROM~~ Galatians 6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens.” Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment laid upon another.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2) —** Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before man, one can pay another’s debt for love of him. Much more, therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by another’s fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another, since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by his own punishment than by another’s), because punishment derives its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there be evidence of some

defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The essential reward is bestowed on a man according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity whereby we are "all one in Christ" (~~AR~~ Galatians 3:28).

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Contrition is ordained against the guilt which affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-RO(3)** — In the payment of the debt we consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release from punishment, viz. eternal life.

**P(4)-Q(13)-A(2)-RO(4)** — If this man bound himself to undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it: wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that one sin is twice punished.

## QUESTION 14

### OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?
- (2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition?
- (3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity?
- (4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?
- (5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

#### P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)

#### *Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?*

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to the suggestions thereof.” Now this can be done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfying for another.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** The fast of those who fasted “for debates and strifes” (<sup>2804</sup>Isaiah 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make satisfaction to God.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1) —** Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above (**Q(12), A(3)**). But without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore, every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing himself at his feet he were to give him another.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)-RO(1) —** As sins are not connected together in some single one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot be made for one and not for another.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)-RO(2)** — When a man is under obligation to another by reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction, not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to friendship remains.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(1)-RO(3)** — By its weight, one sin drags us down to another, as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.

## **P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)**

*Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he was previously contrite?*

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (<sup>2004</sup>Daniel 4:24): “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a state of sin.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, “Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred” (<sup>2004</sup>Ecclesiastes 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a man’s entire action takes its form from the intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens his intention.



**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, “Charity covereth all sins” (<sup>2102</sup>Proverbs 10:12). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is powerless without charity.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)** — Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated <sup>461B</sup>1 Corinthians 13:3,

“If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor...  
and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”

Therefore there can be no satisfaction with mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Some have said that if, when all a man’s sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.

But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on equivalence but rather on God’s acceptance: so that, although the offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Daniel’s advice meant that he should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Even as man knows not for certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without fear about sin forgiven.” And yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not have expiated his

punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-RO(3)** — His intention was interrupted by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to the Divine acceptance and as to equivalence: so that the argument proves nothing.

### **P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)**

#### *Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity?*

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on ~~1855~~ Leviticus 25:25, “If thy brother being impoverished,” etc., says that “the fruit of a man’s good works should be counted from the time when he sinned.” But they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers charity.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is taken away.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through his subsequent repentance.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Works done without charity were not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance. Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)** — Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count towards satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither can it make them pleasing in the other respect.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not man's

deed but God's, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on. In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise quickened, and must be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4)**

*Whether works done without charity merit any,  
at least temporal, good?*

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that works done without charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed merits some good.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written (~~and~~ Matthew 6:2,5,16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that "they have received their reward." Therefore those works merit some good.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances, while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception of good things from God else the latter need not be advised to do any good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His

good things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some good from God.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** Augustine says that “the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats.” Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4) —** Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according to ~~1~~1 Corinthians 13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the “fitness of the Divine goodness” is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that “God is just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting.” And in this way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called merit of “condignity.” The second is an act the result of which is that there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of “congruity.” Now since in all gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace, habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any good, rather than that they are.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4)-RO(1)** — As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity, which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity does not merit condign reward.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(4)-RO(2,3)** — These arguments consider merit of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of condignity.

### **P(4)-Q(14)-A(5)**

#### *Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?*

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do they lessen the pains of hell.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous, that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is false.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine

(Enchiridion cx), “the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned in hell.” Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done without charity.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(5) — *On the contrary***, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): “Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself more tolerable.”

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(5) —** Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment.

**P(4)-Q(14)-A(5) — *I answer that***, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of hell — first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of omitting them — secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins thereby.

These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab (<sup><1027></sup>1 Kings 21:27, seqq.), as also the acquisition of temporal goods.

Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject, so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.

Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this stand,

because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one applies to the other.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.



## QUESTION 15

### OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
- (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory?
- (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?

#### P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)

#### *Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?*

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as appears from Tobias 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for “charity hath no pain [\*Vulg.: ‘Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain’]” according to <sup>GENES</sup>1 John 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they be: which is false.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, “Satisfaction,” as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo i) “consists in giving due honor to God.” But this can be done

by other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): “It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin.”

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1) —** Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** As stated above (**Q(12), A(3)**), satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning as stated above (**Q(12), AA(3),4**). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may conduce to God’s honor, and it must be penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penalty of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution of the penalty of a work, on account of the will being made more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(1)-RO(3)** — That which is due for sin is compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is of this debt that Anselm speaks.

## **P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)**

### *Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?*

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said (**Q(14), A(2)**). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (✠ Romans 5:3,4)

“Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial,  
i.e. deliverance from sin,”

as a gloss explains it.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)** — Further, Ambrose says (Super ~~HB~~ Psalm 118):  
“Although faith,” i.e. the consciousness of sin, “be lacking, the  
punishment satisfies.” Therefore the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Compensation for a past offense can be  
enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by  
another, such compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory  
nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory.  
Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of  
sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a satisfactory  
character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so far as he accepts  
them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently.  
If, however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they do not  
become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but  
merely of a vindictive character.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Although these scourges are not altogether in  
our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them  
patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things  
can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)-RO(2)** — As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8),  
even as “the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek,” so by the same  
scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of  
their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both,  
satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(2)-RO(3)** — These scourges always regard past guilt, not  
always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had  
there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no  
punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted by  
God on a person without the person’s fault, that his virtue may be  
meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two things  
are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be meritorious, that

honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.

### **P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?*

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (<sup><5063></sup>James 5:13): “Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing.” Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as Jerome says on <sup><4195></sup>Mark 9:28, “This kind” of demons “can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases of the mind, by prayer.” Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according to <sup><2141></sup>Luke 11:41: “Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.” Therefore the other two are in excess.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-O(4)** — On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore they are not sufficiently enumerated.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the

soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (<sup>(1316)</sup>1 John 2:16), viz. “concupiscence of the flesh,” “concupiscence of the eyes,” and “pride of life.” Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the “flesh,” alms-deeds against concupiscence of the “eyes,” and “prayer” against “pride of life,” as Augustine says (Enarr. in Psalm 42).

This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by “prayer,” or against our neighbor, and this is remedied by “alms-deeds,” or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by “fasting.”

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-RO(1)** — According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose “conversation is in heaven”: and this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a part of satisfaction.

It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), “doubtless, when our soul’s love is strengthened, our body’s strength is weakened”; hence we read (<sup>(1325)</sup>Genesis 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob’s thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and

that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

**P(4)-Q(15)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in several ways.

## QUESTION 16

# OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?
- (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?
- (3) Whether in the good or bad angels?

#### P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)

#### *Whether penance can be in the innocent?*

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment. Therefore penance is not in them.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice. Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the innocent.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent at Baptism, penance is infused with them.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)** — Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been



sick spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the disease of sin, has the habit of penance.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act — thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve to be punished.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(1)-RO(3)** — So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act, if there were no actual sins.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)**

### *Whether the saints in glory have penance?*

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), “the blessed remember their sins, even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been

healed.” But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in heaven have not penance.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-O(4)** — On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But justice is “perpetual and immortal” (Wis. 1:15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will also.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life, will have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning his sins.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially: so that there is no comparison between Him and others.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet the habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(2)-RO(4,5)** — We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance in heaven as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly calls penance.

### **P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)**

#### *Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?*

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is in the angels, according to <sup>STEP</sup>James 2:19: “The devils... believe and tremble.” Therefore there can be penance in them.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that “evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them.” Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they can repent.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is according to its nature than to that which is against its nature: thus water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which is contrary to their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. Therefore they are susceptible to penance.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the angels.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3) — *On the contrary***, By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not subjects of penance.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)** — Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of his body. But the angels are not united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating the evil, or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil befits a person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any creature, it remains even in the damned, and consequently the passion of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in Wis. 5:3 “(saying) within themselves, repenting,” etc. This repentance, as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), “death is to men what sin is to an angel.” But no forgiveness is possible for the sin of an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we call penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the virtue of penance.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-RO(1)** — A certain movement of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the movement of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements of virtue in

them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined to good by nature.

**P(4)-Q(16)-A(3)-RO(4)** — There is no parity between the holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have been a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that though they are like as to their present state, they differ as to their previous states, which penance regards directly.

## QUESTION 17

### OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold:

- (1) the nature and meaning of the keys.
- (2) the use of the keys;
- (3) the ministers of the keys;
- (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be exercised.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church?
- (2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?
- (3) Whether there are two keys or only one?

#### **P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)**

#### *Whether there should be keys in the Church?*

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house the door of which is open. But it is written (~~and~~ Revelation 4:1): “I looked and behold a door was opened in heaven,” which door is Christ, for He said of Himself (~~and~~ John 10:7): “I am the door.” Therefore the Church needs no keys for the entrance into heaven.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, “Who openeth and no man shutteth, shutteth and no man openeth” (~~401~~ Revelation 3:7). Therefore the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has she the keys of heaven.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~402~~ Matthew 16:19):

“To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)** — Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the divine mysteries, as appears from ~~403~~ 1 Corinthians 4:1. Therefore they ought to have the keys.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of “authority.” But Christ Man had the power to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open the door; hence some say that He has the keys of “excellence.” And since “the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross” [\*Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm 138], the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church. Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church’s key, and is the key of “ministry.”

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man was

removed by Christ's Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)-RO(2)** — This refers to His closing Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle of nature being removed by His Passion.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the kingdom. Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.

It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)**

*Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?*

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby “the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy” therefrom, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore the key is not a power.



**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33), “powers are defined from their acts.” Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above (**A(1)**, ad 1), but for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz. “power,” the subject of the power, viz. the “ecclesiastical judge,” and the act, viz. “of excluding or admitting,” corresponding to the two acts of a material key which are to open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the words “from the kingdom,” and the mode, in the words, “worthy” and “unworthy,” because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. And because the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-RO(2)** — All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet the use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to jurisdiction.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-RO(3)** — A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy has heaven already opened to him — or so that it is meet that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has already removed it. [\*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. **P(3), Q(62), A(1); P(3), Q(64), A(1); P(3), Q(86), A(6).**] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there may be room for the priest's absolution.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(2)-RO(5)** — The priest's act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom.

## P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)

### *Whether there are two keys or only one?*

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require two keys for one sin.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's true body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but one. Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body is but one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-O(4)** — On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be counted as a key.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins. Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power;

nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is exercised — because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, “admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy,” as may be seen from the definition given above (**A(2)**) — therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of receiving (that man’s confession); and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution.

These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-RO(1)** — One key is ordained immediately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that lock should be opened.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-RO(2)** — There are two opinions about the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key: so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion call a little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet with the conferring of orders the knowledge becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 19).

But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter (~~~4169~~ Matthew 16:19), so that not only one but two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the law, while another man, *on the contrary*, has knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to which a man is bound through the authority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge; whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The power of consecrating is directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is but one, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.

**P(4)-Q(17)-A(3)-RO(5)** — All three Persons remit sins in the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as stated above (ad 4).

## QUESTION 18

### OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?
- (2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?
- (3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys?
- (4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?

#### **P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)**

#### *Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?*

[\*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. **P(3), Q(62), A(1); P(3), Q(64), A(1); P(3), Q(86), A(6)**]

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (~~John~~ John 20:23): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Now this was not said in reference to the declaration only, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would have no more power than the priest of the Old Testament. Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the guilt.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue of the keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the priest receives more power by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the baptismal water receives the power “to touch the body and cleanse the heart,” as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore, does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the heart from the stain of sin.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)** — Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said above (Sent. i, D, 14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), “the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace.” Now this sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of Penance, since the acts of the recipient are as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacramental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by Baptism children receive grace and remission of

sin without any previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be disposed by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth and have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism by a priority of time, but is simultaneous with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed either simultaneously or before. Hence the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through being actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even instrumentally [\*See note at beginning of this article], but merely disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it with the power of the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an inanimate instrument, and the priest as an animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. viii, 11*): and consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the remission of guilt, not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently if a man, before receiving absolution, were not perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of sacramental confession and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle. For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys in order to have one's sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacraments which are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on the part of the recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given save to adults.



**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)-RO(1)** — As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they may declare [\*See note at the beginning of this article] the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three ways. First, by a declaration, not of present, but of future forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are conferred, without the sacraments containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the power of the keys would merely declare the Divine operation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from guilt, because in speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already sanctified.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission of guilt, directly, but only dispositively [\*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. **P(3), Q(62), A(1); P(3), Q(64), A(1); P(3), Q(86), A(6)**]. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)*****Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?***

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But after the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the priest does not remit the punishment in any way.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have to undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed a graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater than that which has been remitted for the graver sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due for the slight sin: which is false.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something is taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more to be taken away by a second absolution, so that the absolution can be so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will be taken away, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be altogether unpunished, which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from punishment.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)** — Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [\*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(62)**, **A(1)**;

**P(3), Q(64), A(1); P(3), Q(86), A(6)]**, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he cannot remit sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether contrary to the words of the Gospel.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2) — *I answer that,*** Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, through contrition, has received the pardon of his sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting out of all punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal punishment, the debt of which could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in Purgatory, so that one

who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died before receiving absolution.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The priest does not remit the entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains obliged to undergo satisfactory punishment.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine justice something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches him through the sacraments of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is remitted, it does not follow that the same measure of punishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain without any punishment at all: but, by virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are remitted in due proportion.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Some say that at the first absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on account of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.

But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason for repeating the confession, there would be no reason for repeating the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his previous absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has been done once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for the confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no effect therein.

For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the keys, because when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the greater the

grace received, the less there remains of the blemish of the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is remitted, as we have already stated (**Q(5), A(2)**). Consequently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.

### **P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?*

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a remedy against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot bind.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~419~~ Matthew 16:19): "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven."

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)** — Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion connected with it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The operation of the priest in using the keys, is conformed to God's operation, Whose minister he is. Now God's

operation extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends to punishment directly, in both respects, because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest, in absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way mentioned above (**A(1)**), nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways — first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The remainder of the punishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter from the blemish of sin.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said in the article.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.

## **P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)**

### ***Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?***

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)-O(1)** — It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome [\*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit. Dist. i] says: “The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended, but leave the decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest.” Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own judgment.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, “The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely” (<sup>246B</sup> Luke 16:5), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his master’s debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be commended.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, Christ’s every action is our instruction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life, as in the case of the adulterous woman (<sup>246B</sup> John 8). Therefore it seems that the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or in part.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** Gregory VII [\*Cf. Act. Concil. Romans v, Can. 5] says: “We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin.” Therefore it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4) —** Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance, he would have no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act, except in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult.) that “priests should use their hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God.” A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter (<sup>246B</sup> Matthew 16:19) mention is made of the revelation vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby “the sons of God are led” (<sup>246B</sup> Romans 8:14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., cap. ult.), and, besides, he would be turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medicinal, just as the

medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all, but have to be changed according to the judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness of nature so the priest, moved by Divine instinct, some times refrains from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair and turn away altogether from repentance.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)-RO(1)** — This judgment should be guided entirely by the Divine instinct.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The steward is commended also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need for discretion.

**P(4)-Q(18)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Christ had the power of “excellence” in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the punishment wholly or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.



## QUESTION 19

### OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS

#### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?
- (2) Whether Christ had the keys?
- (3) Whether priests alone have the keys?
- (4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use?
- (5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys?
- (6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?

#### P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)

#### *Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?*

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they had orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But the priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly power would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore the priest of the Law had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacraments, so that the priests who administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Leviticus 5, which right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed by Christ on the priests of the New Law.

But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (<sup><3011</sup>Hebrews 9:11-12). For there the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, "a high priest of the good things to come," and brought us "by His own blood" into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the priesthood of the Old Law brought men "by the blood of goats and of oxen." Hence it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with others that they had not the keys, but that the keys were foreshadowed in them.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)-RO(1) —** The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly tabernacle.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)-RO(2) —** The priests of the Old Law had authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but only into the shadow of heavenly things.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(1)-RO(3) —** They had no spiritual power, since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from irregularities, so that those who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle which was "made with hand."

## P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)

### *Whether Christ had the key?*

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that Christ did not have the key. For the key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a character. Therefore He had not the key.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Christ had power of “excellence” in the sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (Apoc. 3:7):

“These things saith... He that hath the key of David,” etc.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [\*For St. Thomas’ later teaching on this point, Cf. **P(3), Q(48), A(6); P(2a), Q(112), A(1), AD 1]**. But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have the key of “excellence.”

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)-RO(1)** — A character implies the notion of something derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the principal form.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The key, which Christ had was not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key.

## P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)

### *Whether priests alone have the keys?*

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the “doorkeepers have to tell the good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad.” Now this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said (**Q(17)**, **A(2)**). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers have the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not only priests have the key.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the Apostle (<sup>436t</sup>1 Corinthians 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): “This right,” viz. of binding and loosing, “is granted to priests alone.”

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)** — Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is

“ordained... in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins” (<sup>380t</sup>Hebrews 5:1).

Therefore only priests have the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of “order.” Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of “jurisdiction” in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have this key, e.g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a disposition thereto.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but in pursuance to the priest’s judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from God, as appears from <sup>4811</sup>Romans 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over the Christian people.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Just as in civil matters the whole power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they have not all together the key of order.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(3)-RO(4)** — According to the Apostle (<sup>4811</sup>1 Timothy 2:11; <sup>4811</sup>Titus 2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii) that it is

a corruption of public life when the government comes into the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell under the same roof.

## **P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)**

### ***Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?***

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that holy men, even those who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and loose.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>8000</sup>Hebrews 7:7): "Without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']." Now "in spiritual matters," according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater." Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect, its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,\* it follows that on account of the

very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act of the keys. [\*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf. **P(3), Q(48), A(6); P(2a), Q(112), A(1)**, ad 1]. But another man is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Just as between instrument and effect there is need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and not of virtue.

## **P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)**

### *Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?*

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the apostles (✠John 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in

dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself. Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God “gives the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only by Himself or through His saints.” Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not “members of the Dove,” have not the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), “if an unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet greater severity.” But the use of the keys implies a kind of intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the keys effectively.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, No man can know whether another man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, which would be very unfitting.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)** — Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given through him.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he that submits to them receives their effect.



**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-RO(2)** — An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some, for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through “members of the Dove,” i.e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their intercession.

We might also reply that by “members of the Dove” he means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(5)-RO(4)** — The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the priest’s prayer should profit those who are subject to him.

## **P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)**

***Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys?***

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it when they will.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of the aforesaid.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan.) that the “charity of the Church forgives sins.” Now it is the charity of the Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the keys in remitting sins.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)** — Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above (**Q(17), A(2)**, ad 2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one’s authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the use of the keys.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread, and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a

heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The assertion is true, provided matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point.

**P(4)-Q(19)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.

## QUESTION 20

# OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED

### (THREE ARTICLES)


We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?
- (2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
- (3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?

#### P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)

### *Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?*

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine authority in the words:

“Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive,  
they are forgiven them” ( John 20:22,23).

But this was said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it on any without restriction.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for all others.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between

different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to all.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: “It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest’s parishioner.” Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1) —** Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard to everyone.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained above (**P(1), Q(113), AA(1),2**). Consequently there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)-RO(1) —** A twofold power is required in order to absolve from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when our Lord (☞<sup>813</sup> John 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power

of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins (~~466~~ Matthew 16:19), that we may understand that he has the power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders, considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our Lord said indeterminately, “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them,” on the understanding that this power should be used in dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)-RO(2)** — A material key can open only its own lock. nor can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not jurisdiction.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The people of Israel were one people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various peoples and nations.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)**

### *Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?*

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [\*Work of an unknown author]), “no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others.” But a priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in the above manner.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had recourse to the higher judges, according to <sup>124</sup>Exodus 24:14: “If any question shall arise” among you, “you shall refer it to them.” It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his superior.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate [\*Cf. **Q(17), A(2)**, ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)** — Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)-RO(1)** — In this case the priest should not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but must

refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid\*: because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament. [\*Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice “in materia turpi” to be invalid.]

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(2)-RO(3)** — This objection considers those cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.

### **P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)**

#### *Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?*

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above (**Q(19)**, **A(6)**). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in respect of one who is not his subject.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as absolution.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the judgment of Penance should be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external



court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** The higher prelate is also “compassed with infirmity,” and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin. Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can use the power of the keys on him.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3) —** Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above (**A(2)**): and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)-RO(1) —** Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as he submits himself as a sinner to him.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)-RO(2) —** In the angels there can be no defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.

**P(4)-Q(20)-A(3)-RO(3) —** External judgment is according to men, whereas the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that power himself.

It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of orders, all are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no comparison.

## QUESTION 21

# OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider:

- (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication;
- (2) who has the power to excommunicate;
- (3) communication with excommunicated persons;
- (4) absolution from excommunication.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?
- (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
- (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?
- (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

### P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)

*Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?*

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: “Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages.” For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated,

since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for them.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor\*, by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [\*Minor excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this definition is unsuitable.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments. Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of —

*“os, orare, vale, communio, mensa.”*

“Os,” i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; “orare,” i.e. we must not pray with them; “vale,” we must not give them marks of respect;

“communio,” i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; “mensa,” i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words “as to the fruit,” and from partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, “and the general prayers of the Church.”

Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: “Excommunication is the privation of all lawful communion with the faithful.”

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-RO(2)** — One man’s prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to ~~1180~~ Psalm 118:63: “I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee.” Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church as speaking in the Church’s name, although a private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the faithful dwelling together.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The minor excommunication does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.

## **P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)**

### *Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?*

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden to curse (<sup><6124></sup>Romans 12:14). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that “when Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, but said: The Lord command thee.” Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from <sup><4085></sup>1 Corinthians 5:5. Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** The Apostle (<sup><4085></sup>1 Corinthians 5:5) ordered a man to be excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2) —** Further, it is written (<sup><4087></sup>Matthew 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: “Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican.” But heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)-RO(1)** — A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him from his sickness.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(2)-RO(3)** — From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God is taken away by excommunication." They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that "the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally." Hence in the early Church, when men had to be enticed to the faith by

means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.

### **P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?***

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (<sup>5127</sup>Romans 12:17). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land (<sup>4811</sup>Acts 5:1-10). Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys (**Q(17), A(2)**), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted



temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)-RO(1)** — A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(3)-RO(2)** — When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated above.

### **P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)**

#### *Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?*

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, Jerome says (on ~~4069~~ Matthew 16:19: “I will give to thee the keys”): “It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly.” But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), “the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or

unjust.” Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to condemn the sentence, he would “ipso facto” sin mortally.

But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Although a man cannot lose God’s grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is said to deprive a man of God’s grace, as was explained above (**A(2)**, ad 3).

**P(4)-Q(21)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.

## QUESTION 22

# OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED

### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?
- (2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?
- (3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?
- (4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior?
- (5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?
- (6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again?

### P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)

#### *Whether every priest can excommunicate?*

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys. Therefore every priest can excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can excommunicate his subjects.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Matters fraught with danger should be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment of

excommunication is fraught with many dangers, unless it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be entrusted to every priest.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man. Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal. Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority, only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate. Others, however, have maintained that even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more reasonable.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Excommunication is an act of the keys not directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of excommunication, however, though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate, can be called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the key of orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges of the external tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (~~and~~ Matthew 16:19), from whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial tribunal, for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal of Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to man.

## P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)

### *Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate?*

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that those who are not priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated in Sent. iv, D, 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys. Therefore they cannot excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Archdeacons, legates and bishops-elect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests can excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in the tribunal of Penance. On the other hand excommunication regards grace, not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives a man of the Church's prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Though they have not the key of orders, they have the key of jurisdiction.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(2)-RO(2)** — These two are related to one another as something exceeding and something exceeded [\*Cf. **A(1), a(2); Q(24), A(1)**, ad 1], and consequently one of them may be within the competency of someone while the other is not.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)*****Whether a man who is excommunicated  
or suspended can excommunicate another?***

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither orders nor jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication requires nothing more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate. Therefore they can excommunicate.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, one whose body is bound cannot bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spiritual chain.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if he be suspended from orders only, then he cannot exercise his order, but he can use his jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and not from orders, he cannot use his jurisdiction, though he can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, he can exercise neither.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although an excommunicated or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The power of consecration results from the power of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that a man has the character of order, he can always consecrate, though not

always lawfully. It is different with the power of excommunication which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.

### **P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)**

#### ***Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?***

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul, according to <sup>41111</sup>Matthew 11:11:

“He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven  
is greater than he, a greater”

than whom “hath not risen among men that are born of women.” Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven (<sup>41111</sup>Galatians 1:8). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or his equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject, or one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excommunicate his superior, or his equal.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and defendant in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal, or himself.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either himself, or his superior, or his equal.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher than the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence be impossible also.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)-RO(2)** — In that case no one would be excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which a man does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless, even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his superior, or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply to venial sins, because they can be remitted through any sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows the power of orders.

## **P(4)-Q(22)-A(5)**

### ***Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?***

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wickedness he should be excommunicated. Therefore a body of men can be excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(5) — *On the contrary***, A gloss of Augustine [\*Cf. Ep. ccl] on Matthew 12 asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.



**P(4)-Q(22)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities, but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none of them could draw by himself, yet it is not probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil that there would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked (<sup><del>GEN</sup>Genesis 18:25). Therefore the Church, who should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community should not be excommunicated, lest the wheat be uprooted together with the tares and cockle.

The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the prayers of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king's crime. Hence there is no comparison between excommunication and suspension.

## **P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)**

### ***Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommunication?***

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man who is already under sentence of excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle says (<sup><del>1COR</sup>1 Corinthians 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church. Therefore the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them again.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, excommunication is privation of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived of a thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, Excommunication is a punishment and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary. Therefore excommunication can be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication, for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications, as there are causes for his being excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are numbered among the people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby a man is numbered among God's people, is indelible, one who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judgment on him.

**P(4)-Q(22)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Although privation does not receive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an excommunication can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further from the Church's prayers than one who has been excommunicated only once.

## QUESTION 23

# OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated?
- (2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated?
- (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?

#### P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)

*Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person?*

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent one from communicating with another in matters corporal.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, “What is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity” (Cf. **Q(11), A(1), O(1)**). But we are bound by the precept of charity to succor our enemies, which is impossible without some sort of communication. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 5:11):

“With such an one not so much as to eat.”

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication which deprives a man of the sacraments of the Church and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to communicate with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy, exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation, for one is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and one may even speak of other matters so as to put him at his ease and to make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made in favor of certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal or subordinate. This, however, is to be understood of children who have not attained their majority, else they are forbidden to communicate with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them if they have entered his service before his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards.

Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that the master can communicate with his subjects: while others hold the contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters wherein they are under an obligation to them, for just as subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to look after his subjects. Again certain cases are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of strangers or travelers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are allowed to buy from them, or to receive alms from them. Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress: for then he would be bound by the precept of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the following line: “Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity,” where “utility” refers to salutary words, “law” to marriage, “lowliness” to subjection. The others need no explanation.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can also extend to matters touching the body: even as the art which considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(1)-RO(2)** — In a case where one is bound by the precept of charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)**

***Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated?***

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a person does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated. For a heathen or a Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for communicating with an excommunicated Christian.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if a man incurs excommunication for communicating with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would incur excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore one does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, An excommunicated person is banished from communion. Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help or favor,

in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The Church has no intention of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she does not sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over whom she exercises a certain power.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(2)-RO(2)** — It is lawful to hold communion with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass on to a third person.

### **P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)**

#### *Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?*

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metue, etc.) declares that “not even through fear of death should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal sin.” But this would be no reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, no man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs a minor

excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases in which it is allowed.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, no one should incur a major excommunication save for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (Can. Praecipue, seqq., caus. xi) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)** — Further, the measure of the penalty should be according to the measure of the sin, as stated in <sup>EX</sup>Deuteronomy 25:3. Now the punishment appointed by common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is not that which is inflicted for mortal sin, but rather that which is due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden ways mentioned above (**A(2)**), except in those cases allowed by law (Cap. Quoniam). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would endanger the salvation of many, and lay a snare which might turn to one's own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This decretal is speaking of holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies both to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a venial sin: so that just as it is a man's duty to suffer death rather than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so sooner than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The commandment of the Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by holding communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended or under an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.

**P(4)-Q(23)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Although it is a venial sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the law.



## QUESTION 24

# OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?
- (2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will?
- (3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another?

#### P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)

### *Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?*

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin. Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, if the cause is removed the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since any priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin

of another. But in the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve — or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in the Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should not be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the command of the judge who pronounced the excommunication on him.

There are however eight exceptions to the first case:

- (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest from any excommunication;
- (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in authority, and the blow be given neither through hatred nor of set purpose;
- (3) if the striker be a woman;
- (4) if the striker be a servant, whose master is not at fault and would suffer from his absence;
- (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him very grievously;
- (6) if the striker be a poor man;
- (7) if he be a minor, an old man, or an invalid;
- (8) if there be a deadly feud between them.

There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication:

- (1) if he do it for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a superior;
- (2) if it be done for fun;
- (3) if the striker find the cleric behaving with impropriety towards his wife his mother, his sister or his daughter;
- (4) if he return blow for blow at once;
- (5) if the striker be not aware that he is striking a cleric;
- (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple admonition;
- (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier, or if he be guilty of bigamy

[\*Namely, that which is known by canonists as “similar bigamy”].

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the chains of sin are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the chains of excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor is there need of giving one’s word by oath, as in the case of absolution from excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (<sup>scilicet</sup> Hebrews 6:16), controversies between men are decided by oath.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(1)-RO(2)** — As an excommunicated person has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt, unless he be first absolved from excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)**

### *Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?*

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that no man can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling to be absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be absolved.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune. Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against his will.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so can he be absolved therefrom.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The assertion is true of those spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly; for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(2)-RO(2)** — It is possible for excommunication to be removed from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the good of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine.

### **P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)**

*Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all?*

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication

is a sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin without being absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication is outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed from another.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain under another.

It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when he is absolved from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excommunication on one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the other hand sometimes a man lies under several sentences of excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or unless they all depute one to absolve him.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)-RO(1)** — All sins are connected together in aversion from God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated above (**A(2)**). Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(24)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Just as such a man was for several reasons outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed on one count and to remain on another.

## QUESTION 25

### OF INDULGENCES

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider indulgence:

- (1) in itself;
- (2) those who grant indulgence;
- (3) those who receive it.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?
- (2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?
- (3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?

#### P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)

*Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?*

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss on <sup><REP></sup>2 Timothy 2:13, “He cannot deny Himself,” says: “He would do this if He did not keep His word.” Now He said (<sup><EXP></sup>Deuteronomy 25:2):

“According to the measure of the sin  
shall the measure also of the stripes be.”

Therefore nothing can be remitted from the satisfactory punishment which is appointed according to the measure of sin.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds us to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum. Sent. [\*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no man can absolve from that punishment, by remitting any part of it.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was given them, not “unto destruction,” but “unto edification” (<sup>4008</sup>2 Corinthians 10:8). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does not extend to this.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>4010</sup>2 Corinthians 2:10):

“For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ,”

and a gloss adds: i.e. “as though Christ Himself had pardoned.” But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (<sup>4011</sup>John 8). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church is not less than Paul’s.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1) —** Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who “was heard for His reverence” (<sup>4012</sup>Hebrews 5:7) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded (<sup>4013</sup>Luke 22:32): “I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not.” Now the universal Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of

punishment which he has deserved in Purgatory according to God's judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it was said (~~106~~ Matthew 16:19) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in the court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more severely in Purgatory.

Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church's court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ: for though He acts through the sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy.

Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above (**Q(13), A(2)**). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up "those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ... for His body, which is the Church" to whom he wrote (~~107~~ Colossians 1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a number are distributed to the various individuals according to the judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would obtain the remission of his punishment if



another were to satisfy for him, so would he too if another's satisfactions be applied to him by one who has the power to do so.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The remission which is granted by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin, since someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due for another's guilt, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-RO(2)** — He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means whereby he may pay it.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The effect of sacramental absolution is the removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by indulgences. But he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an indulgence is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on this account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think.

## **P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)**

### *Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?*

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power of the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since

then indulgences depend on the mere will of the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they claim to be.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now, if indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain indulgences might become immune from all debt of temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote himself to gain indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if he contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment due for his sins, which seems absurd.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then, an indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go there every day, obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, to remit a man's punishment beyond a just estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason; because in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause remit a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to say to anyone: "I remit to all the punishment you owe for your sins." Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed for them.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~scilicet~~ Job 13:7):

“Hath God any need of your lie,  
that you should speak deceitfully for Him?”

Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences, does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for them.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)** — Further, the Apostle says (~~1~~ 1 Corinthians 15:14): “If... our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain.” Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be, all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, on this point there are many opinions. For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this, say that the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous assertion to make. For as Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), “if any error were discovered in Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish.” In like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church’s preaching, her doctrine would have no authority in settling questions of faith.

Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of him who grants it — who perhaps puts too high a value on it — nor of the recipient — for he may prize too highly the gift he receives, but a just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the condition of the person affected, and the utility and needs of the Church, for the Church’s needs are greater at one time than at another. Yet, neither, seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted far in excess of the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid conditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years, which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.

Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient, as the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is given, as the second opinion held; but according to the cause for which the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus according as a man approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or in part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause: thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remission granted by the indulgence is not to be measured by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.

We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause of the remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance suffices for the remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then, estimate the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church — and these are always superabundant. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union between the recipient and Him Who merited it — and this is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the intention, namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.

Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority, that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honor of God and the profit of our neighbor. Nor in this view

have we “too great a market of the Divine mercy” [\*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted, but the punishment of one is imputed to another.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-RO(1)** — As stated above (**Q(19), A(3)**) there are two keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders is a sacramental: and as the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of orders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the other hand the key of jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man’s decision. The remission granted through indulgences is the effect of this key, since it does not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the distribution of the common property of the Church: hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences. Consequently the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although indulgences avail much for the remission of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in respect of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of temporal punishment.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-RO(3)** — When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully. Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not be said to help a man if he gave him an “obol.”

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-RO(4)** — A person who lives near the church, and the priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those who

come perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those cases in which an indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who come from across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of indulgence, because sometimes it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, "Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such a day, shall gain so much indulgence," we must understand that it can be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual indulgence in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the indulgence as often as he visits the church.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(2)-RO(5)** — An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of those whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways: first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in this way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who has done something for the profit of the Church, may reach to some individual through indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(3)**

*Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?*

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony. Therefore this ought not to be done.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual

assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal help.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, stands the common custom of the Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual things. Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

**P(4)-Q(25)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an indulgence of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.

## QUESTION 26

### OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?
- (2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences?
- (3) Whether a bishop can grant them?
- (4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

#### P(4)-Q(26)-A(1)

#### *Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?*

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that every parish priest can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the superabundance of the Church's merits. Now there is no congregation without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner, so can every prelate.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his own goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person. Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude subject to him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the latter.



**P(4)-Q(26)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now a person's intention may be directed to another in three ways, specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this or that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention of private good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he who presides over the Church can communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he who presides over a congregation can communicate what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the first nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although those communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the Church; whereas the third communication frees man even from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and consequently the individual is not freed from the entire debt of punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the very amount that he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation of the faithful, and since a congregation of men

is of two kinds, the domestic, composed of members of the same family, and the civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people themselves are called the Church; while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in the various families and services. Hence a bishop alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone, like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in consecrating priests the bishop says: “The more fragile we are, the more we need these assistants”: and for this reason they do not dispense all the sacraments. Hence parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant indulgences.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

#### **P(4)-Q(26)-A(2)**

### ***Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?***

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect of the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, The distribution of the Church’s treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is entrusted sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of the Church’s treasury.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above (**Q(25), A(2)**). And since deacons and

others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of orders.

### **P(4)-Q(26)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?***

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the whole Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church. Therefore the Pope alone can grant indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punishments, since he is the maker of the law.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, stands the custom of the Church in accordance with which bishops grant indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as “brethren,” whereas he calls all others his “sons.” Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this power resides subject to the Pope’s ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)*****Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?***

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off from its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing to others by granting indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an indulgence, as we shall show presently (**Q(27), A(1)**). Neither, therefore, can he grant one.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not power but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently indulgences are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church's treasury.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so it is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.

**P(4)-Q(26)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider the personal profit.

## QUESTION 27

### OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin?
- (2) Whether they avail religious?
- (3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for which the indulgence is given?
- (4) Whether they avail him who grants them?

#### P(4)-Q(27)-A(1)

*Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?*

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits to an individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, A dead member receives no inflow from the other members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead member. Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living members.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the

remission of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God's operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of the Church neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance.

But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly avail a person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they are applied, but for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the merits were applied by such a form as this: "I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church — or of one congregation, or of one specified person," then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion holds.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2)**

### *Whether indulgences avail religious?*

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others out of their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious, this would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2) — *On the contrary***, Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit to be derived from indulgences.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2) — *I answer that***, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Although religious are in the state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they are liable to punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one who is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what he lacks. Hence it is written (~~ROM~~ Galatians 6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens.”

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(2)-RO(2)** — There is no reason why indulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of eternal life, religious merit more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)**

***Whether an indulgence can ever be granted  
to one who does not fulfill the conditions required?***

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when a person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly. Therefore he can gain the indulgence.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the indulgence is given.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted, and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This is true of the essential reward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the like.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(3)-RO(2)** — A person can by his intention apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for whomever he chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor. Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to another. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: “Whosoever does this, or for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence,” it would avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the indulgence in this form.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)**

### *Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?*

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction. Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can



excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in an indulgence granted by himself.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, if this were possible, he who grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins for some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems senseless.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore he cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, He would be worse off than others if he could not make use of the Church's treasury which he dispenses to others.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's good and of the furthering of God's honor, does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)-RO(1)** — A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are granted to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction, is the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.

The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.

**P(4)-Q(27)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence, which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On

the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.

## QUESTION 28

### OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized?
- (2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?
- (3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?

#### P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)

#### *Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?*

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a penance should not be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear, to divulge anyone's sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should not be solemnized.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal. Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, "Every deficiency is made good by penance" as Ambrose [\*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to St. Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a layman cannot be promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, after doing solemn penance. Therefore Penance should not be solemnized.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity in Penance.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)** — Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore the penance which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give edification to many.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; secondly, because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The priest does not divulge the confession by imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of having committed some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, did penance together with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by fulfilling his penance, shows that he has been to confession.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)-RO(2)** — A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the confession is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always restore him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover the honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to be eligible for the clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to be deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require it. In

that case such a one would be admitted to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might take through recollection of his former sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity of his own sin.

## **P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)**

### ***Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?***

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized a second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solemnized over again.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may commit the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the solemn penance should be imposed again.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance should be imposed once only.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Secondly, on account of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not precluded from doing penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)-RO(1)** — In those sacraments which are solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in the present case. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not becoming, for the reasons stated above.

### **P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any priest can impose it?***

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that solemn penance should not be imposed on women. Because, when this penance is imposed on a man, he has to cut his hair off. But this becomes not a woman, according to <sup>1</sup> ~~1115~~ 1 Corinthians 11:15. Therefore she should not do solemn penance.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)-O(2)** — It also seems that it ought to be imposed on clerics. For it is enjoined on account of a grievous crime. Now the same sin is more grievous in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed on a cleric more than on a layman.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)-O(3)** — It also seems that it can be imposed by any priest. Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance belongs to one who has the keys. Now an ordinary priest has the keys. Therefore he can administer this penance.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: “On the first day of Lent, these penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their priests, present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church. Having brought them into the church the bishop with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully announces to them that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the church. He then orders the ministers to put them out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the responsory: ‘In the sweat of thy brow,’ etc. Every year on the day of our Lord’s Supper they are brought back into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the octave day of Easter, without

however being admitted to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long as entrance into the church is forbidden them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn penance” [\*Cap. lxiv, dist. 50].

This penance can be imposed on men and women; but not on clerics, for fear of scandal. Nor ought such a penance to be imposed except for a crime which has disturbed the whole of the city.

On the other hand public but not solemn penance is that which is done in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing solemnity, such as a pilgrimage throughout the world with a staff. A penance of this kind can be repeated, and can be imposed by a mere priest, even on a cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to signify a public one: so that authorities speak of solemn penance in different senses.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The woman’s hair is a sign of her subjection, a man’s is not. Hence it is not proper for a woman to put aside her hair when doing penance, as it is for a man.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Although in the same kind of sin, a cleric offends more grievously than a layman, yet a solemn penance is not imposed on him, lest his orders should be an object of contempt. Thus deference is given not to the person but to his orders.

**P(4)-Q(28)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Grave sins need great care in their cure. Hence the imposition of a solemn penance, which is only applied for the most grievous sins, is reserved to the bishop.

# EXTREME UNCTION

## QUESTIONS 29-33

### QUESTION 29

## OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION

### (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of which five points have to be considered:

- (1) Its essentials and institution;
- (2) Its effect;
- (3) Its minister;
- (4) on whom should it be conferred and in what parts;
- (5) Its repetition.

Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?
- (2) Whether it is one sacrament?
- (3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?
- (4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?
- (5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?
- (6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a bishop?
- (7) Whether this sacrament has any form?



(8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a deprecatory phrase?

(9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament?

### P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)

#### *Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that Extreme Unction is not a sacrament. For just as oil is used on sick people, so is it on catechumens. But anointing of catechumens with oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is the Extreme Unction of the sick with oil.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But there was no figure of Extreme Unction in the Old Law. Therefore it is not a sacrament of the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii, v) every sacrament aims at either cleansing, or enlightening, or perfecting. Now Extreme Unction does not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for this is ascribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting, for according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), this belongs to Confirmation and the Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The sacraments of the Church supply man's defects sufficiently with respect to every state of life. Now no other than Extreme Unction does this for those who are departing from this life. Therefore it is a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)** — Further, the sacraments are neither more nor less than spiritual remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual remedy, since it avails for the remission of sins, according to <sup><sup>SARS</sup>James 5:15. Therefore it is a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Among the visible operations of the Church, some are sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacramentals, as Exorcism. The difference between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches to the principal effect intended in the

administration of the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed towards that principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration of the sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written (<sup><3719></sup>Isaiah 27:9): “This is all the fruit, that the sin... should be taken away.” Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that Extreme Unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The oil with which catechumens are anointed does not convey the remission of sins to them by its unction, for that belongs to Baptism. It does, however, dispose them to receive Baptism, as stated above (**P(3)**, **Q(71)**, **A(3)**). Hence that unction is not a sacrament as Extreme Unction is.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)-RO(2)** — This sacrament prepares man for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this life. And as, under the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into glory, because “the Law brought nobody [Vulg.: ‘nothing’] to perfection” (<sup><3719></sup>Hebrews 7:19), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same kind. Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by all the healings related in the Old Testament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Dionysius makes no mention of Extreme Unction, as neither of Penance, nor of Matrimony, because he had no intention to decide any question about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve to illustrate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients. Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and remission of sins, there is no doubt that it possesses an enlightening and cleansing power, even as Baptism, though not so copious.

## P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)

### *Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that Extreme Unction is not one sacrament. Because the oneness of a thing depends on its matter and form, since being and oneness are derived from the same source. Now the form of this sacrament is said several times during the one administration, and the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect of various parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the unction itself is a sacrament, for it would be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. But there are several unctions. Therefore there are several sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, one sacrament should be performed by one minister. But the case might occur that Extreme Unction could not be conferred by one minister: thus if the priest die after the first unction, another priest would have to proceed with the others. Therefore Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, As immersion is in relation to Baptism, so is unction to this sacrament. But several immersions are but one sacrament of Baptism. Therefore the several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)** — Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the first unction, it would not be essential for the perfection of the sacrament that the second unction should be performed, since each sacrament has perfect being of itself. But that is not true. Therefore it is one sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Strictly speaking, a thing is one numerically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor potentially several — as a point, and unity. Secondly, as something continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several — as a line. Thirdly, as something complete, that is composed of several parts — as a house, which is, in a way, several things, even actually, although those several things go together towards making one. In this way each sacrament is said to be one thing, in as much as the many things which are

contained in one sacrament, are united together for the purpose of signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the effect it produces. Hence when one action suffices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only, as may be seen in Confirmation. When, however, the signification of the sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the sacrament can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as Baptism in one immersion and in three, since washing which is signified in Baptism, can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect signification cannot be expressed except by means of several actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of the sacrament, as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment of the body which signifies that of the soul, can only be attained by means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly signified save by the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential to the perfection of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The unity of a complete whole is not destroyed by reason of a diversity of matter or form in the parts of that whole. Thus it is evident that there is neither the same matter nor the same form in the flesh and in the bones of which one man is composed. In like manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not destroy the unity of the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although those actions are several simply, yet they are united together in one complete action, viz. the anointing of all the external senses, whence arises the infernal malady.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although, in the Eucharist, if the priest die after the consecration of the bread, another priest can go on with the consecration of the wine, beginning where the other left off, or can begin over again with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction he cannot begin over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the same part a second time would produce as much effect as if one were to consecrate a host a second time, which ought by no means to be done. Nor does the plurality of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because they only act as

instruments, and the unity of a smith's work is not destroyed by his using several hammers.

## P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)

### *Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?*

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament was not instituted by Christ. For mention is made in the Gospel of the institution of those sacraments which Christ instituted, for instance the Eucharist and Baptism. But no mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore it was not instituted by Christ.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the Master says explicitly (Sent. iv, D, 23) that it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Christ did not institute it Himself.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, Christ showed forth the sacraments which He instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist and Baptism. But He did not bestow this sacrament on anyone. Therefore He did not institute it Himself.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, The sacraments of the New Law are more excellent than those of the Old Law. But all the sacraments of the Old Law were instituted by God. Therefore much more do all the sacraments of the New Law owe their institution to Christ Himself.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)** — Further, to make an institution and to remove it belongs to the same authority. Now the Church, who enjoys the same authority in the successors of the apostles, as the apostles themselves possessed, cannot do away with the sacrament of Extreme Unction. Therefore the apostles did not institute it, but Christ Himself.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that this sacrament and Confirmation were not instituted by Christ Himself, but were left by Him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude of grace conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they are sacraments of the New

Law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the Old Law. But this argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion, promised the mission of the Holy Ghost in His plenitude, so could He institute these sacraments.

Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted all the sacraments, but that He Himself published some, which present greater difficulty to our belief, while he reserved some to be published by the apostles, such as Extreme Unction and Confirmation. This opinion seems so much the more probable, as the sacraments belong to the foundation of the Law, wherefore their institution pertains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which efficacy is given them by God alone.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Our Lord did and said many things which are not related in the Gospel. For the evangelists were intent on handing down chiefly those things that were necessary for salvation or concerned the building of the ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related the institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist and orders, rather than of Extreme Unction and Confirmation, which are not necessary for salvation, nor do they concern the building or division of the Church. As a matter of fact however an anointing done by the apostles is mentioned in the Gospel (~~an~~ Mark 6:13) where it is said that they “anointed the sick with oil.”

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The Master says it was instituted by the apostles because its institution was made known to us by the teaching of the apostles.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Christ did not show forth any sacrament except such as He received by way of example: but He could not be a recipient of Penance and Extreme Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He did not show them forth.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)**

### *Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that olive oil is not a suitable matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained immediately to

the state of incorruption. Now incorruption is signified by balsam which is contained in chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more suitable matter for this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, this sacrament is a spiritual healing. Now spiritual healing is signified by the use of wine, as may be gathered from the parable of the wounded man (<sup>2031</sup> Luke 10:34). Therefore wine also would be more suitable a matter for this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, where there is the greater danger, the remedy should be a common one. But olive oil is not a common remedy, since the olive is not found in every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is given to the dying, who are in the greatest danger, it seems that olive oil is not a suitable matter.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, oil is appointed (<sup>2034</sup> James 5:14) as the matter of this sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is none but olive oil. Therefore this is the matter of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)** — Further, spiritual healing is signified by anointing with oil, as is evident from <sup>2000</sup> Isaiah 1:6 where we read: "... swelling sores: they are not... dressed nor fomented with oil." Therefore the suitable matter for this sacrament is oil.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The spiritual healing, which is given at the end of life, ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening effect, it penetrates to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable matter for this sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid extract of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the matter which should be employed in this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The incorruption of glory is something not contained in this sacrament: and there is no need for the matter to signify such a thing. Hence it is not necessary for balsam to be included in the matter of this sacrament, because on account of its fragrance it is indicative of a good name, which is no longer necessary, for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a clear conscience which is signified by oil.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Wine heals by its roughness, oil by its softness, wherefore healing with wine pertains to Penance rather than to this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Though olive oil is not produced everywhere, yet it can easily be transported from one place to another. Moreover this sacrament is not so necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation without it.

### **P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)**

#### ***Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?***

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the oil need not be consecrated. Because there is a sanctification in the use of this sacrament, through the form of words. Therefore another sanctification is superfluous if it be applied to the matter.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the efficacy and signification of the sacraments are in their very matter. But the signification of the effect of this sacrament, is suitable to oil on account of its natural properties, and the efficacy thereof is due to the Divine institution. Therefore its matter does not need to be sanctified.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacrament than Extreme Unction. But, so far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned, the baptismal matter needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does the matter of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, In all other anointings the matter is previously consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is an anointing, it requires consecrated matter.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of the oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false since we proved when treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone consists in the consecration of the matter (**Q(2), A(1)**, ad 2).



We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in the anointing itself, just as Baptism consists in the washing, and that the matter of this sacrament is consecrated oil. Three reasons may be assigned why consecrated matter is needed in this sacrament and in certain others. The first is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ: wherefore those sacraments which He Himself used, derived their efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the contact of His flesh, He bestowed the force of regeneration on the waters. But He did not use this sacrament, nor any bodily anointing, wherefore in all anointings a consecrated matter is required. The second reason is that this sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so as to take away not only sin but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sickness. The third reason is that its effect on the body, viz. bodily health, is not caused by a natural property of the matter. wherefore it has to derive this efficacy from being consecrated.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The first consecration sanctifies the matter in itself, but the second regards rather the use of the matter considered as actually producing its effect. Hence neither is superfluous, because instruments also receive their efficacy from the craftsman, both when they are made, and when they are used for action.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The efficacy which the sacrament derives from its institution, is applied to this particular matter when it is consecrated.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(5)-RO(2)**

The Reply to the Third Objection is gathered from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)**

***Whether the matter of this sacrament  
need be consecrated by a bishop?***

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that the matter of this sacrament need not be consecrated by a bishop. Because the consecration of the Eucharistic elements surpasses that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest can consecrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore he can do so in this sacrament also.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, in material works the higher art never prepares the matter for the lower, because the art which applies the matter is more excellent than that which prepares it, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 25. Now a bishop is above a priest. Therefore he does not prepare the matter of a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest dispenses this sacrament, as we shall state further on (**Q(31)**). Therefore the consecration of the matter does not belong to a bishop.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, In other anointings also the matter is consecrated by a bishop. Therefore the same applies to this.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from Christ, and from Him flows down to others in due order, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower ministers through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Wherefore, in all the sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is performed by a bishop, and the application thereof sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest's power is derived from the bishop's, according to <sup><H1></sup>Psalm 132:2: "Like the precious ointment on the head," i.e. Christ, "that ran down upon the beard of Aaron" first, and then "to the skirt of his garment."

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the consecration of the matter and not in its use. Consequently, strictly speaking, that which is the matter of the sacrament is not a consecrated thing. Hence no consecration of the matter by a bishop is required beforehand: but the altar and such like things, even the priest himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done by none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the priest's power is shown to be derived from the bishop's, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). The reason why a priest can perform that consecration of matter which is a sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a sacramental, is directed to a sacrament consisting in something used by the faithful, is that in respect of Christ's true body no order is above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ's mystic body

the episcopate is above the priesthood, as we shall state further on (Q(40), A(4)).

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The sacramental matter is not one that is made into something else by him that uses it, as occurs in the mechanical arts: it is one, in virtue of which something is done, so that it partakes somewhat of the nature of an efficient cause, in so far as it is the instrument of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to acquire this virtue from a higher art or power, since among efficient causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it is, whereas in material causes, the more prior the matter, the more imperfect it is.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)**

### *Whether this sacrament has a form?*

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament has no form. Because, since the efficacy of the sacraments is derived from their institution, as also from their form, the latter must needs be appointed by the institutor of the sacrament. But there is no account of the form of this sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apostles. Therefore this sacrament has no form.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, whatever is essential to a sacrament is observed everywhere in the same way. Now nothing is so essential to a sacrament that has a form, as that very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament there is no form commonly used by all, since various words are in use, it seems that this sacrament has no form.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, in Baptism no form is needed except for the sanctification of the matter, because the water is “sanctified by the word of life so as to wash sin away,” as Hugh states (De Sacram. ii). Now the matter of this sacrament is already consecrated. Therefore it needs no form of words.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7) — *On the contrary*,** The Master says (Sent. iv, D, 1) that every sacrament of the New Law consists in things and words. Now the words are the sacramental form. Therefore, since this is a sacrament of the New Law, it seems that it has a form.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)** — Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Church, who uses certain words in the bestowal of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, Some have held that no form is essential to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this sacrament, since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the sacraments of the New Law, since they effect what they signify, there must needs be things and words. Moreover James (~~5:14~~<sup>5:14,15</sup>) seems to ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall state further on (ad 2: **AA(8),9**). Wherefore the foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason we should hold with the common opinion that this, like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)-RO(1)** — Holy Writ is proposed to all alike: and so, the form of Baptism, which can be conferred by all, should be expressed in Holy Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament, expresses faith which is necessary for salvation. Now the forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the apostles, who received them from our Lord, as the Apostle declares (~~1~~<sup>4123</sup> 1 Corinthians 11:23):

“For I have received of the Lord that which also  
I delivered to you,” etc.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)-RO(2)** — The words which are essential to the form, viz. the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; but other words which pertain to the well-being thereof, are not said by all.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(7)-RO(3)** — The matter of Baptism has a certain sanctification of its own from the very contact of our Saviour’s flesh; but the form of words sanctifies it so that it has a sanctifying force. In like manner when the matter of this sacrament has been sanctified in itself, it requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify actually.

## P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)

### *Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion or of petition?*

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion rather than of petition. Because all the sacraments of the New Law have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is not expressed in the sacramental forms except by way of assertion, as when we say: “This is My body” or “I baptize thee.” Therefore the form of this sacrament should be expressed as an assertion.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, the intention of the minister should be expressed in the sacramental forms because it is essential to the sacrament. But the intention of conferring a sacrament is not expressed except by an assertion. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)-O(3)** — Further, in some churches the following words are said in the conferring of this sacrament: “I anoint these eyes with consecrated oil in the name of the Father,” etc., which is in keeping with the forms of the other sacraments. Therefore it seems that such is the form of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8) — *On the contrary*,** The form of a sacrament must needs be one that is observed everywhere. Now the words employed according to the custom of all the churches are not those quoted above, but take the form of a petition viz.: “Through this holy unction, and His most tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed, by sight,” etc. Therefore the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.

Further, this seems to follow from the words of James, who ascribes the effect of this sacrament to prayer: “The prayer of faith,” says he (5:15), “shall save the sick man.” Since then a sacrament takes its efficacy from its form, it seems that the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8) — *I answer that*,** The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of the Roman Church, who uses no other than words of supplication in conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned for

this: first, because the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers; secondly, because it is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the courts of the Church, and rest in the hands of God alone, for which reason they are committed to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the effect of this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's prayer, even when all essentials have been duly observed, as is the case with the character in Baptism and Confirmation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, remission of sin in Penance (given contrition) which remission is essential to the sacrament of Penance but not to this sacrament. Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be expressed in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just mentioned.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)-RO(1)** — This sacrament, like the others mentioned, considered in itself, is sure of its effect. yet this effect can be hindered through the insincerity of the recipient (though by his intention he submit to the sacrament), so that he receives no effect at all. Hence there is no parity between this sacrament, and the others wherein some effect always ensues.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)-RO(2)** — The intention is sufficiently expressed by the act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: "By this holy unction."

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(8)-RO(3)** — These words in the indicative mood, which some are wont to say before the prayer, are not the sacramental form, but are a preparation for the form, in so far as they determine the intention of the minister.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)**

***Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable  
form for this sacrament?***

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)-O(1)** — It would seem that the foregoing prayer is not a suitable form for this sacrament. For in the forms of the other sacraments mention is made of the matter, for instance in Confirmation, whereas this is not done in the aforesaid words. Therefore it is not a suitable form.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, just as the effect of this sacrament is bestowed on us by the mercy of God, so are the effects of the other sacraments. But mention is made in the forms of the other sacraments, not of the Divine mercy, but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion. Therefore the same should be done here.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)-O(3)** — Further, this sacrament is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 23) to have a twofold effect. But in the foregoing words mention is made of only one effect, viz. the remission of sins, and not of the healing of the body to which end James directs the prayer of faith to be made (<sup>scribes</sup> James 5:15): “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.” Therefore the above form is unsuitable.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)** — *I answer that,* The prayer given above (**A(8)**) is a suitable form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: “By this holy unction,” and that which works in the sacrament, viz. “the mercy of God,” and the effect, viz. “remission of sins.”

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)-RO(1)** — The matter of this sacrament may be understood in the act of anointing, whereas the matter of Confirmation cannot be implied by the act expressed in the form. Hence there is no parity.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)-RO(2)** — The object of mercy is misery: and because this sacrament is given when we are in a state of misery, i.e. of sickness, mention of mercy is made in this rather than in other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(29)-A(9)-RO(3)** — The form should contain mention of the principal effect, and of that which always ensues in virtue of the sacrament, unless there be something lacking on the part of the recipient. Now bodily health is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state further on (**Q(30)**, **AA(1),2**), though it does ensue at times, for which reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the form of this sacrament.

## QUESTION 30

### OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?
- (2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?
- (3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character?

#### **P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)**

#### *Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?*

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that Extreme Unction does not avail for the remission of sins. For when a thing can be attained by one means, no other is needed. Now repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme Unction for the remission of his sins. Therefore sins are not remitted by Extreme Unction.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, there are no more than three things in sin, the stain, the debt of punishment, and the remnants of sin. Now Extreme Unction does not remit the stain without contrition, and this remits sin even without Unction; nor does it remit the punishment, for if the recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfill the satisfaction enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of sin, since the dispositions remaining from preceding acts still remain, as may easily be seen after recovery. Therefore remission of sins is by no means the effect of Extreme Unction.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, remission of sins takes place, not successively, but instantaneously. On the other hand, Extreme Unction is not done all at once, since several anointings are required. Therefore the remission of sins is not its effect.



**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>scribes</sup> James 5:15): “If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him.”

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1) —** Further, every sacrament of the New Law confers grace. Now grace effects the forgiveness of sins. Therefore since Extreme Unction is a sacrament of the New Law, its effect is the remission of sins.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification. Now this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as Baptism is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose of a medicament is to expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the institution of this sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and Penance, a spiritual resurrection, so Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily cure presupposes bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely. original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigor for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist in nothing else but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin. against which weakness man is strengthened by this sacrament. Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is incompatible with sin, it follows that. in consequence, if it finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far as the guilt is concerned, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the Eucharist and Confirmation (**P(3), Q(73), A(7); P(3), Q(79), A(3)**). Hence, too, James speaks of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says: “If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him,” viz. as to the guilt. Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does not always find any: but it always remits in respect of the aforesaid weakness which some call the remnants of sin. Some, however, maintain that it is instituted chiefly as a remedy for venial sin which cannot be cured perfectly in this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying is ordained specially against venial sin. But this does not seem to be true, since Penance also blots out venial sins

sufficiently during this life as to their guilt, and that we cannot avoid them after doing penance, does not cancel the effect of the previous penance; moreover this is part of the weakness mentioned above.

Consequently we must say that the principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sin, as to its remnants, and, consequently, even as to its guilt, if it find it.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the principal effect of a sacrament can be obtained without actually receiving that sacrament (either without any sacrament at all, or indirectly by means of some other sacrament), yet it never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving that sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted chiefly against actual sin, whichever other sacrament may blot out sin indirectly, it does not exclude the necessity of Penance.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Extreme Unction remits sin in some way as to those three things. For, although the stain of sin is not washed out without contrition, yet this sacrament, by the grace which it bestows, makes the movement of the free will towards sin to be one of contrition, just as may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again it diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and this indirectly, in as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong man bears the same punishment more easily than a weak man. Hence it does not follow that the measure of satisfaction is diminished. As to the remnants of sin, they do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and are inchoate habits so to speak, but a certain spiritual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, though such like habits or dispositions remain, the mind is not so easily prone to sin.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(1)-RO(3)** — When many actions are ordained to one effect, the last is formal with respect to all the others that precede, and acts by virtue of them: wherefore by the last anointing is infused grace which gives the sacrament its effect.

## P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)

### *Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Now a spiritual remedy is ordained to spiritual health, just as a bodily remedy is ordained to health of the body. Therefore bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the sacraments always produce their effect in those who approach them in the proper dispositions. Now sometimes the recipient of this sacrament does not receive bodily health, no matter how devoutly he receives it. Therefore bodily health is not its effect.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the efficacy of this sacrament is notified to us in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing is ascribed there as the effect, not of the anointing, but of the prayer, for he says: “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.” Therefore bodily healing is not an effect of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** The operation of the Church is more efficacious since Christ’s Passion than before. Now, before the Passion, those whom the apostles anointed with oil were healed ( ~~and~~ Mark 6:13). Therefore unction has its effect now in healing bodies.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)** — Further, the sacraments produce their effect by signifying it. Now Baptism signifies and effects a spiritual washing, through the bodily washing in which it consists outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction signifies and causes a spiritual healing through the bodily healing which it effects externally.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** Just as Baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily washing, since it effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely a healing of the body. But there

is a difference, for as much as the bodily washing causes a bodily cleansing by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, whereas Extreme Unction causes a bodily healing, not by a natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power which works reasonably. And since reasonable working never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a bodily healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then it produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This objection proves that bodily health is not the principal effect of this sacrament: and this is true.

The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what has been said above (cf. **Q(29), A(8)**).

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(2)-RO(3)** — This prayer is the form of this sacrament as stated above (**Q(29), AA(8),9**). Hence, so far as its form is concerned, this sacrament derives from it its efficacy in healing the body.

### **P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)**

#### *Whether this sacrament imprints a character?*

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament imprints a character. For a character is a distinctive sign. Now just as one who is baptized is distinguished from one who is not so is one who is anointed, from one who is not. Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a character so does Extreme Unction.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, there is an anointing in the sacraments of order and Confirmation, as there is in this sacrament. But a character is imprinted in those sacraments. Therefore a character is imprinted in this one also.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, every sacrament contains something that is a reality only, something that is a sacrament only, and something that is both reality and sacrament. Now nothing in this sacrament can be

assigned as both reality and sacrament except a character. Therefore in this sacrament also, a character is imprinted.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, No sacrament that imprints a character is repeated. But this sacrament is repeated as we shall state further on (**Q(33)**). Therefore it does not imprint a character.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)** — Further, a sacramental character causes a distinction among those who are in the present Church. But Extreme Unction is given to one who is departing from the present Church. Therefore it does not imprint a character.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is for no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint a character.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)-RO(1)** — A character marks a distinction of . states with regard to duties which have to be performed in the Church, a distinction which a man does not receive by being anointed.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The unction of orders and Confirmation, is the unction of consecration whereby a man is deputed to some sacred duty, whereas this unction is remedial. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(30)-A(3)-RO(3)** — In this sacrament, that which is both reality and sacrament is not a character, but a certain inward devotion which is a kind of spiritual anointing.

## QUESTION 31

# OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?
- (2) Whether a deacon can?
- (3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it?

#### P(4)-Q(31)-A(1)

#### *Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that even a layman can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament derives its efficacy from prayer, as James declares (<sup>SINS</sup> James 5:15). But a layman's prayer is sometimes as acceptable to God as a priest's. Therefore he can confer this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, we read of certain fathers in Egypt that they sent the oil to the sick, and that these were healed. It is also related of the Blessed Genevieve that she anointed the sick with oil. Therefore this sacrament can be conferred even by lay people.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** Remission of sins is given in this sacrament. But laymen have not the power to forgive sins. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only. Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can baptize in cases of necessity, is due to the Divine dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual regeneration.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(1)-RO(1)** — This prayer is not said by the priest in his own person, for since sometimes he is in sin, he would not in that case be heard. But it is said in the person of the whole Church, in whose person he can pray as a public official, whereas a layman cannot, for he is a private individual.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(1)-RO(2)** — These unctions were not sacramental. It was due to the devotion of the recipients of the unction, and to the merits of those who anointed them that they procured the effects of bodily health, through the “grace of healing” (~~429~~ 1 Corinthians 12:9) but not through sacramental grace.

## **P(4)-Q(31)-A(2)**

### ***Whether deacons can confer this sacrament?***

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that deacons can confer this sacrament. For, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) “deacons have the power to cleanse.” Now this sacrament was instituted precisely to cleanse from sickness of the mind and body. Therefore deacons also can confer it.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Baptism is a more excellent sacrament than the one of which we are speaking. But deacons can baptize, as instanced by the Blessed Laurence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~5154~~ James 5:14):

“Let him bring in the priests of the Church.”

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is bestowed therein.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This sacrament cleanses by enlightening through the bestowal of grace: wherefore a deacon is not competent to confer it.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(2)-RO(2)** — This is not a necessary sacrament, as Baptism is. Hence its bestowal is not committed to all in cases of necessity, but only to those who are competent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor are deacons competent to baptize in virtue of their office.

## **P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)**

### *Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that none but a bishop can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament consists in an anointing, just as Confirmation does. Now none but a bishop can confirm. Therefore only a bishop can confer this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, he who cannot do what is less cannot do what is greater. Now the use of consecrated matter surpasses the act of consecrating the matter, since the former is the end of the latter. Therefore since a priest cannot consecrate the matter, neither can he use the matter after it has been consecrated.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, The minister of this sacrament has to be brought in to the recipient, as is clear from <sup>3154</sup>James 5:14. Now a bishop cannot go to all the sick people of his diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the only one who can confer this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to enlighten. Wherefore those sacraments are reserved to a bishop's dispensation, which place the recipient in a state of perfection above others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Confirmation imprints a character, whereby man is placed in a state of perfection, as stated above (**P(3)**, **Q(63)**, **AA(1)**, 2,6). But this does not take place in this sacrament; hence there is no comparison.

**P(4)-Q(31)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Although the use of consecrated matter is of more importance than the consecration of the matter, from the point of



view of the final cause; nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient cause, the consecration of the matter is the more important, since the use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its active cause: hence the consecration of the matter demands a higher power than the use of the matter does.

## QUESTION 32

# ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY?

### (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on what part of the body: under which head there are seven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good health?
- (2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness?
- (3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles?
- (4) Whether it should be given to children?
- (5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed?
- (6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed?
- (7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be anointed thereon?

### P(4)-Q(32)-A(1)

*Whether this sacrament ought to be  
conferred on those who are in good health?*

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament should be conferred even on those who are in good health. For the healing of the mind is a more important effect of this sacrament than the healing of the body, as stated above (**Q(30)**, **A(2)**). Now even those who are healthy in body need to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them also.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, this is the sacrament of those who are departing this life, just as Baptism is the sacrament of those who are entering this life. Now Baptism is given to all who enter. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all who are departing. But sometimes those who are near departure are in good health, for instance those who are to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~584~~ James 5:14): “Is any man sick among you,” etc. Therefore none but the sick are competent to receive this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above (**Q(30), AA(1),2**), and is signified by way of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects for bodily healing, those namely, who are in good health.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although spiritual health is the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be signified by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by this sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing, viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism who is capable of a bodily washing, and not a child yet in its mother’s womb.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Even those who are entering into life cannot receive Baptism unless they are capable of a bodily washing. And so those who are departing this life cannot receive this sacrament, unless they be subjects for a bodily healing.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)**

***Whether this sacrament ought to be given  
in any kind of sickness?***

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament should be given in any kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is determined in the fifth chapter of James where this sacrament is delivered to us. Therefore this sacrament should be given in all kinds of sickness.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the more excellent a remedy is, the more generally should it be available. Now this sacrament is more excellent than bodily medicine. Since then bodily medicine is given to all manner of sick persons, it seems that this sacrament should be given in like manner to all.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, This sacrament is called by all Extreme Unction. Now it is not every sickness that brings man to the extremity of his life, since some ailments prolong life, according to the Philosopher (De Long. et Brev. Vitae i). Therefore this sacrament should not be given in every case of sickness.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Any sickness can cause death, if it be aggravated. Hence if we consider the different kinds of disease, there is none in which this sacrament cannot be given; and for this reason the apostle does not determine any particular one. But if we consider the degree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should not be given to every sick person.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The principal effect of bodily medicine is bodily health, which all sick people lack, whatever be the stage of their sickness. But the principal effect of this sacrament is that immunity from disorder which is needed by those who are taking their departure from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)**

***Whether this sacrament ought to be given  
to madmen and imbeciles?***

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament should be given to madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are full of danger and cause death quickly. Now when there is danger it is the time to apply the

remedy. Therefore this sacrament, which was intended as a remedy to human weakness, should be given to such people.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament than this. Now Baptism is conferred on mad people as stated above (**P(3)**, **Q(68)**, **A[12]**). Therefore this sacrament also should be given to them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, This sacrament should be given to none but such as acknowledge it. Now this does not apply to madmen and imbeciles. Therefore it should not be given to them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the whole Church, are of great account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament is pronounced by way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and imbeciles, who might dishonor the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have lucid intervals, when they would be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the sacrament should be given to children the same in that state.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although such people are sometimes in danger of death; yet the remedy cannot be applied to them, on account of their lack of devotion. Hence it should not be given to them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Baptism does not require a movement of the free-will, because it is given chiefly as a remedy for original sin, which, in us, is not taken away by a movement of the free-will. On the other hand this sacrament requires a movement of the free-will; wherefore the comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary sacrament, while Extreme Unction is not.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)**

### *Whether this sacrament should be given to children?*

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament ought to be given to children. Because children suffer from the same ailments

sometimes as adults. Now the same disease requires the same remedy. Therefore this sacrament should be given to children the same as to adults.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, this sacrament is given in order to remove the remnants of sin, whether original or actual, as stated above (**Q(30)**, **A(1)**). Now the remnants of original sin are in children. Therefore this sacrament should be given to them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, This sacrament should be given to none but those to whom the form applies. But the form of this sacrament does not apply to children, since they have not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed in the form. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to them.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Children's infirmities are not caused by actual sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is given chiefly as a remedy for infirmities that result from sins, being the remnants of sin, as it were.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(4)-RO(2)** — This sacrament is not given as a remedy for the remnants of original sin, except in so far as they gather strength, so to speak, from actual sins. Hence from the very form it appears that it is given chiefly as a remedy for actual sins, which are not in children.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)**

***Whether the whole body should be anointed  
in this sacrament?***

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 6), "the whole soul is in every part of the body." Now this sacrament is given chiefly in order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole body ought to be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the remedy should be applied to the part affected by the disease. But sometimes the disease is general, and affects the whole body, as a fever does. Therefore the whole body should be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, in Baptism the whole body is dipped under the water. Therefore in this sacrament the whole body should be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, stands the rite observed throughout the Church, according to which in this sacrament the sick man is anointed, only in certain fixed parts of the body.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected, by applying the remedy, not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. Consequently the sacramental unction also ought to be applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Although the whole soul is, as to its essence, in each part of the body, it is not as to its powers which are the roots of sinful acts. Hence certain fixed parts have to be anointed, those, namely, in which powers have their being.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The remedy is not always applied to the part affected by the disease, but, with greater reason, to the part where the root of the disease is seated.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Baptism is given under the form of washing: and a bodily washing cleanses only the part to which it is applied; for this reason Baptism is applied to the whole body. It is different with Extreme Unction for the reason given above.

## **P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)**

### *Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned?*

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that these parts are unsuitably assigned, namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, hands, and feet should be anointed. For a wise physician heals the disease in its root. Now “from the

heart come forth thoughts... that defile a man” (<sup>4159</sup>Matthew 15:19,20). Therefore the breast ought to be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, purity of mind is not less necessary to those who are departing this life than to those who are entering therein. Now those who are entering are anointed with chrism on the head by the priest, to signify purity of mind. Therefore in this sacrament those who are departing should be anointed on the head.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, the remedy should be applied where the disease is most virulent. Now spiritual sickness is most virulent in the loins in men, and in the navel in women, according to <sup>4801</sup>Job 40:11: “His strength is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly,” as Gregory expounds the passage (Moral. xxxii, 11). Therefore these parts should be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, sins are committed with other parts of the body, no less than with the feet. Therefore, as the feet are anointed, so ought other members of the body to be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)** — *I answer that,* The principles of sinning are the same in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three principles of action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle, namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the motive power.

Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates in us first, for that reason the places of the five senses are anointed. the eyes, to wit, on account of the sight, the ears on account of hearing, the nostrils on account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste, the hands on account of the touch which is keenest in the finger tips, (in some places too the loins are anointed on account of the appetite), and the feet are anointed on account of the motive power of which they are the chief instrument. And since the cognitive power is the first principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is observed by all, as being essential to the sacrament. But some do not observe the other unctions — some also anoint the feet but



not the loins — because the appetitive and motive powers are secondary principles.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-RO(1)** — No thought arises in the heart without an act of the imagination which is a movement proceeding from sensation (De Anima ii). Hence the primary root of thought is not the heart, but the sensory organs, except in so far as the heart is a principle of the whole body, albeit a remote principle.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Those who enter have to receive purity of the mind, whereas those who are departing have to cleanse the mind. Hence the latter need to be anointed in those parts in respect of which the mind's purity may be sullied.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Some are wont to anoint the loins, because they are the chief seat of the concupiscible appetite: however, as stated above, the appetitive power is not the primary root.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(6)-RO(4)** — The bodily organs which are the instruments of sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all of which are anointed, and the organs of generation which it would be unbecoming to anoint, on account of their uncleanness, and out of respect for the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(7)**

***Whether those who are deformed in those parts  
should be anointed?***

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that those who are deformed should not be anointed in those parts. For just as this sacrament demands a certain disposition on the part of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick, so it demands that he should be anointed in a certain part of the body. Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore neither can he be anointed who lacks the part to be anointed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, a man born blind does not sin by his sight. Yet in the anointing of the eyes mention is made of sins by sight. Therefore this anointing ought not to be applied to one born blind, and in like manner as regards the other senses.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(7) — *On the contrary***, Bodily deformity is not an impediment to any other sacrament. Therefore it should not be an impediment to this one. Now each of the anointings is essential to the sacrament. Therefore all should be applied to those who are deformed.

**P(4)-Q(32)-A(7) — *I answer that***, Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed. For though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least radically, the powers of the soul, corresponding to those members, and they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though they cannot outwardly.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

## QUESTION 33

### OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT

#### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?
- (2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness?

#### P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)

#### *Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?*

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater import than the anointing of a stone. But the anointing of an altar is not repeated, unless the altar be shattered. Neither, therefore, should Extreme Unction, whereby a man is anointed, be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, nothing comes after what is extreme. But this unction is called extreme. Therefore it should not be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, This sacrament is a spiritual healing applied under the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure is repeated. Therefore this sacrament also can be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, No sacramental or sacrament, having an effect that lasts for ever, can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament. On the other hand a sacrament whose effect does not last for ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that the lost effect may be recovered. And since health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost after it has been

effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The stone is anointed in order that the altar may be consecrated, and the stone remains consecrated, as long as the altar remains, hence it cannot be anointed again. But a man is not consecrated by being anointed, since it does not imprint a character on him. Hence there is no comparison.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(1)-RO(2)** — What men think to be extreme is not always extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacrament is called Extreme Unction, because it ought not to be given save to those whose death men think to be nigh.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(2)**

***Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated  
during the same sickness?***

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated during the same sickness. For one disease demands one remedy. Now this sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated for one sickness.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if a sick man could be anointed more than once during one disease, this might be done for a whole day: which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Sometimes a disease lasts long after the sacrament has been received, so that the remnants of sin, against which chiefly this sacrament is given, would be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given again.

**P(4)-Q(33)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except to those sick people who seem, in man's estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this sacrament is given at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does not leave that state except the disease be cured, and thus he

needs not to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it will be a second sickness, and he can be anointed again. on the other hand some diseases are of long duration, as hectic fever, dropsy and the like, and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in danger of death. And if the sick man escape that danger while the disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not another sickness. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

# HOLY ORDERS

## QUESTIONS 34-40

### QUESTION 34

## OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the sacrament of Order:

- (1) Order in general;
- (2) the difference of Orders;
- (3) those who confer Orders;
- (4) the impediments to receiving Orders;
- (5) things connected with Orders.

Concerning Order in general three points have to be considered:

- (1) Its essence, quiddity, and parts;
- (2) Its effect;
- (3) The recipients of Orders.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether there should be Order in the Church?
- (2) Whether it is fittingly defined?
- (3) Whether it is a sacrament?
- (4) Whether its form is expressed properly?

(5) Whether this sacrament has any matter?

### P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)

#### *Whether there should be Order in the Church?*

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that there should not be Order in the Church. For Order requires subjection and preeminence. But subjection seemingly is incompatible with the liberty whereunto we are called by Christ. Therefore there should not be Order in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, he who has received an Order becomes another's superior. But in the Church everyone should deem himself lower than another (<sup><1000></sup>Philippians 2:3): "Let each esteem others better than themselves." Therefore Order should not be in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, we find order among the angels on account of their differing in natural and gratuitous gifts. But all men are one in nature, and it is not known who has the higher gifts of grace. Therefore Order should not be in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, "Those things that are of God, are in order [\*Vulg: 'Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.']. " Now the Church is of God, for He Himself built it with His blood. Therefore there ought to be Order in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1) —** Further, the state of the Church is between the state of nature and the state of glory. Now we find order in nature, in that some things are above others, and likewise in glory, as in the angels. Therefore there should be Order in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1) — *I answer that***, God wished to produce His works in likeness to Himself, as far as possible, in order that they might be perfect, and that He might be known through them. Hence, that He might be portrayed in His works, not only according to what He is in Himself, but also according as He acts on others, He laid this natural law on all things, that last things should be reduced and perfected by middle things, and middle things by the first, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). Wherefore that this beauty might not be lacking to the Church, He established Order

in her so that some should deliver the sacraments to others, being thus made like to God in their own way, as co-operating with God; even as in the natural body, some members act on others.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The subjection of slavery is incompatible with liberty; for slavery consists in lording over others and employing them for one's own profit. Such subjection is not required in Order, whereby those who preside have to seek the salvation of their subjects and not their own profit.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Each one should esteem himself lower in merit, not in office; and orders are a kind of office.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Order among the angels does not arise from difference of nature, unless accidentally, in so far as difference of grace results in them from difference of nature. But in them it results directly from their difference in grace; because their orders regard their participation of divine things, and their communicating them in the state of glory, which is according to the measure of grace, as being the end and effect, so to speak, of grace. On the other hand, the Orders of the Church militant regard the participation in the sacraments and the communication thereof, which are the cause of grace and, in a way, precede grace; and consequently our Orders do not require sanctifying grace, but only the power to dispense the sacraments; for which reason order does not correspond to the difference of sanctifying grace, but to the difference of power.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)**

### *Whether Order is properly defined?*

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that order is improperly defined by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 53), where it is said "Order is a seal of the Church, whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained." For a part should not be described as the genus of the whole. Now the character which is denoted by the seal in a subsequent definition is a part of order, since it is placed in contradistinction with that which is either



reality only, or sacrament only, since it is both reality and sacrament. Therefore seal should not be mentioned as the genus of Order.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, just as a character is imprinted in the sacrament of order, so is it in the sacrament of Baptism. Now character was not mentioned in the definition of Baptism. Therefore neither should it be mentioned in the definition of Order.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, in Baptism there is also given a certain spiritual power to approach the sacraments; and again it is a seal, since it is a sacrament. Therefore this definition is applicable to Baptism; and consequently it is improperly applied to Order.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, Order is a kind of relation, and relation is realized in both its terms. Now the terms of the relation of order are the superior and the inferior. Therefore inferiors have order as well as superiors. Yet there is no power of preeminence in them, such as is mentioned here in the definition of Order, as appears from the subsequent explanation (Sent. iv, D, 53), where promotion to power is mentioned. Therefore Order is improperly defined there.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The Master's definition of Order applies to Order as a sacrament of the Church. Hence he mentions two things, namely the outward sign, a "kind of seal," i.e. a kind of sign, and the inward effect, "whereby spiritual power," etc.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Seal stands here, not for the inward character, but for the outward action, which is the sign and cause of inward power; and this is also the sense of character in the other definition. If, however, it be taken for the inward character, the definition would not be unsuitable; because the division of a sacrament into those three things is not a division into integral parts, properly speaking; since what is reality only is not essential to the sacrament, and that which is the sacrament is transitory; while that which is sacrament and reality is said to remain. Wherefore it follows that inward character itself is essentially and principally the sacrament of Order.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although in Baptism there is conferred a spiritual power to receive the other sacraments, for which reason it imprints a character, nevertheless this is not its principal effect, but the

inward cleansing; wherefore Baptism would be given even though the former motive did not exist. On the other hand, order denotes power principally. Wherefore the character which is a spiritual power is included in the definition of Order, but not in that of Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-RO(3)** — In Baptism there is given a certain spiritual potentiality to receive, and consequently a somewhat passive potentiality. But power properly denotes active potentiality, together with some kind of preeminence. Hence this definition is not applicable to Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The word “order” is used in two ways. For sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and thus it is both in the inferior and in the superior, as the objection states; but it is not thus that we use the word here. On the other hand, it denotes the degree which results in the order taken in the first sense. And since the notion of order as relation is observed where we first meet with something higher than another, it follows that this degree of pre-eminence by spiritual power is called Order.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)**

### *Whether Order is a sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that Order is not a sacrament. For a sacrament, according to Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) “is a material element.” Now Order denotes nothing of the kind, but rather relation or power; since Order is a part of power according to Isidore. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the sacraments do not concern the Church triumphant. Yet Order is there, as in the angels. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, just as spiritual authority, which is Order, is given by means of consecration, so is secular authority, since kings also are anointed, as stated above (**Q(19), A(3)**, ad 2). But the kingly power is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is order of which we speak now.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is mentioned by all among the seven sacraments of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)** — Further, “the cause of a thing being such, is still more so.” Now Order is the cause of man being the dispenser of the other sacraments. Therefore Order has more reason for being a sacrament than the others.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (**Q(29)**, **A(1)**; **P(3)**, **Q(60)**), a sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred on man with some outward sign. Wherefore, since by receiving orders a consecration is conferred on man by visible signs, it is clear that Order is a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although Order does not by its name express a material element, it is not conferred without some material element.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Power must needs be proportionate to the purpose for which it is intended. Now the communication of divine things, which is the purpose for which spiritual power is given, is not effected among the angels by means of sensible signs, as is the case among men. Hence the spiritual power that is Order is not bestowed on the angels by visible signs, as on men. Wherefore Order is a sacrament among men, but not among angels.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Not every blessing or consecration given to men is a sacrament, for both monks and abbots are blessed, and yet such blessings are not sacraments, and in like manner neither is the anointing of a king; because by such blessings men are not ordained to the dispensing of the divine sacraments, as by the blessing of Order. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)**

*Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed?*

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the form of this sacrament is unsuitably set forth in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because the sacraments take their efficacy from their form. Now the efficacy of the sacraments is

from the divine power, which works our salvation in them in a most hidden manner. Therefore the form of this sacrament should include a mention of the divine power by the invocation of the Trinity, as in the other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, to command pertains to one who has authority. Now the dispenser of the sacrament exercises no authority, but only ministry. Therefore he should not use the imperative mood by saying: “Do” or “Receive” this or that, or some similar expression.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, mention should not be made in the sacramental form, except of such things as are essential to the sacrament. But the use of the power received is not essential to this sacrament, but is consequent upon it. Therefore it should not be mentioned in the form of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, all the sacraments direct us to an eternal reward. But the forms of the other sacraments make no mention of a reward. Therefore neither should any mention be made thereof in the form of this sacrament, as in the words: “Since thou wilt have a share, if faithfully,” etc.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, This sacrament consists chiefly in the power conferred. Now power is conferred by power, as like proceeds from like; and again power is made known by its use, since powers are manifested by their acts. Wherefore in the form of order the use of order is expressed by the act which is commanded; and the conferring of power is expressed by employing the imperative mood.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The other sacraments are not ordained chiefly to effects similar to the power whereby the sacraments are dispensed, as this sacrament is. Hence in this sacrament there is a kind of universal communication. Wherefore in the other sacraments something is expressed on the part of the divine power to which the effect of the sacrament is likened, but not in this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-RO(2)** — [There is a special reason why this sacrament, rather than the others, is conferred by employing the imperative mood. For]\* although the bishop who is the minister of this sacrament has no authority in respect of the conferring of this sacrament, nevertheless he

has some power with regard to the power of Order, which power he confers, in so far as it is derived, from his. [\*The sentence in brackets is not in the Leonine edition.]

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The use of power is the effect of power in the genus of efficient cause, and from this point of view it has no reason to be mentioned in the definition of Order. But it is somewhat a cause in the genus of final cause, and from this point of view it can be placed in the definition of order.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(4)-RO(4)** — There is here a difference between this and the other sacraments. Because by this sacrament an office or the power to do something is conferred; and so it is fitting that mention be made of the reward to be obtained if it be administered faithfully. But in the other sacraments no such office or power to act is conferred, and so no mention of reward is made in them. Accordingly the recipient is somewhat passive in relation to the other sacraments, because he receives them for the perfecting of his own state only, whereas in relation to this sacrament he holds himself somewhat actively, since he receives it for the sake of exercising hierarchical duties in the Church. Wherefore although the other sacraments, from the very fact that they give grace, direct the recipient to salvation, properly speaking they do not direct him to a reward, in the same way as this sacrament does.

## **P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)**

### ***Whether this sacrament has any matter?***

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that this sacrament has no matter. Because in every sacrament that has a matter the power that works in the sacrament is in the matter. But in the material objects which are used here, such as keys, candlesticks, and so forth, there is not apparently any power of sanctification. Therefore it has no matter.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, in this sacrament the fulness of sevenfold grace is conferred, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), just as in Confirmation. But the matter of Confirmation requires to be consecrated beforehand. Since then the things which appear to be material in this

sacrament are not consecrated beforehand, it would seem that they are not the matter of the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, in any sacrament that has matter there needs to be contact of matter with the recipient of the sacrament. Now, as some say, it is not essential to this sacrament that there be contact between the aforesaid material objects and the recipient of the sacrament, but only that they be presented to him. Therefore the aforesaid material objects are not the matter of this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, Every sacrament consists of things and words. Now in any sacrament the thing is the matter. Therefore the things employed in this sacrament are its matter.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)** — Further, more is requisite to dispense the sacraments than to receive them. Yet Baptism, wherein the power is given to receive the sacraments, needs a matter. Therefore order also does, wherein the power is given to dispense them.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, The matter employed outwardly in the sacraments signifies that the power which works in the sacraments comes entirely from without. Wherefore, since the effect proper to this sacrament, namely the character, is not received through any operation of the one who approaches the sacrament, as was the case in Penance, but comes wholly from without, it is fitting that it should have a matter, yet otherwise than the other sacraments that have matter; because that which is bestowed in the other sacraments comes from God alone, and not from the minister who dispenses the sacrament; whereas that which is conferred in this sacrament, namely the spiritual power, comes also from him who gives the sacrament, as imperfect from perfect power. Hence the efficacy of the other sacraments resides chiefly in the matter which both signifies and contains the divine power through the sanctification applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of this sacrament resides chiefly with him who dispenses the sacrament. And the matter is employed to show the powers conferred in particular by one who has it completely, rather than to cause power; and this is clear from the fact that the matter is in keeping with the use of power. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)-RO(2)** — It is necessary for the matter to be consecrated in the other sacraments, on account of the power it contains; but it is not so in the case in point.

**P(4)-Q(34)-A(5)-RO(3)** — If we admit this assertion, the reason for it is clear from what we have said; for since the power of order is received from the minister and not from the matter, the presenting of the matter is more essential to the sacrament than contact therewith. However, the words themselves of the form would seem to indicate that contact with the matter is essential to the sacrament, for it is said: “Receive” this or that.

## QUESTION 35

### OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the effect of this sacrament. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?
- (2) Whether a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?
- (3) Whether the character of Order presupposes of necessity the character of Baptism?
- (4) Whether it presupposes of necessity the character of Confirmation?
- (5) Whether the character of one Order presupposes of necessity the character of another Order?

#### P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)

#### *Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?*

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that sanctifying grace is not conferred in the sacrament of Order. For it is commonly agreed that the sacrament of Order is directed to counteract the defect of ignorance. Now not sanctifying grace but gratuitous grace is given to counteract ignorance, for sanctifying grace has more to do with the will. Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in the sacrament of Order.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, Order implies distinction. Now the members of the Church are distinguished, not by sanctifying but by gratuitous grace, of which it is said (1<sup>st</sup> Corinthians 12:4): “There are diversities of graces.” Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in order.



**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, no cause presupposes its effect. But grace is presupposed in one who receives orders, so that he may be worthy to receive them. Therefore this same grace is not given in the conferring of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The sacraments of the New Law cause what they signify. Now Order by its sevenfold number signifies the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are not apart from sanctifying grace, are given in Orders.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)** — Further, Order is a sacrament of the New Law. Now the definition of a sacrament of that kind includes the words, “that it may be a cause of grace.” Therefore it causes grace in the recipient.

I answer that The works of God are perfect (<sup>from</sup> Deuteronomy 32:4); and consequently whoever receives power from above receives also those things that render him competent to exercise that power. This is also the case in natural things, since animals are provided with members, by which their soul’s powers are enabled to proceed to their respective actions unless there be some defect on the part of matter. Now just as sanctifying grace is necessary in order that man receive the sacraments worthily, so is it that he may dispense them worthily. Wherefore as in Baptism, whereby a man is adapted to receive the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is given, so is it in the sacrament of Order whereby man is ordained to the dispensation of the other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Order is given as a remedy, not to one person but to the whole Church. Hence, although it is said to be given in order to counteract ignorance, it does not mean that by receiving Orders a man has his ignorance driven out of him, but that the recipient of Orders is set in authority to expel ignorance from among the people.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although the gifts of sanctifying grace are common to all the members of the Church, nevertheless a man cannot be the worthy recipient of those gifts, in respect of which the members of the Church are distinguished from one another, unless he have charity, and this cannot be apart from sanctifying grace.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The worthy exercise of Orders requires not any kind of goodness but excellent goodness, in order that as they who receive orders are set above the people in the degree of Order, so may they be above them by the merit of holiness. Hence they are required to have the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of Christ's people, but when they receive Orders they are given a yet greater gift of grace, whereby they are rendered apt for greater things.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)**

*Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?*

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that in the sacrament of Order a character is not imprinted in connection with all the Orders. For the character of Order is a spiritual power. Now some Orders are directed only to certain bodily acts, for instance those of the doorkeeper or of the acolyte. Therefore a character is not imprinted in these Orders.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, every character is indelible. Therefore a character places a man in a state whence he cannot withdraw. Now those who have certain Orders can lawfully return to the laity. Therefore a character is not imprinted in all the Orders.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, by means of a character a man is appointed to give or to receive some sacred thing. Now a man is sufficiently adapted to the reception of the sacraments by the character of Baptism, and a man is not appointed to dispense the sacraments except in the Order of priesthood. Therefore a character is not imprinted in the other Orders.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Every sacrament in which a character is not imprinted can be repeated. But no Order can be repeated. Therefore a character is imprinted in each Order.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)** — Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now there is something distinct in every Order. Therefore every Order imprints a character.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* There have been three opinions on this point. For some have said that a character is imprinted only in the Order of priesthood; but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not. For this reason others have said that a character is impressed in the sacred, but not in the minor, Orders. But this again comes to nothing, since each Order sets a man above the people in some degree of authority directed to the dispensation of the sacraments. Wherefore since a character is a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it follows that a character is imprinted in each Order. And this is confirmed by the fact that they remain for ever and are never repeated. This is the third and more common opinion.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Each Order either has an act connected with the sacrament itself, or adapts a man to the dispensation of the sacraments; thus doorkeepers exercise the act of admitting men to witness the Divine sacraments, and so forth; and consequently a spiritual power is required in each.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(2)-RO(2)** — For all that a man may return to the laity, the character always remains in him. This is evident from the fact that if he return to the clerical state, he does not receive again the order which he had already.

The Reply to the Third Objection is the same as to the First.

### **P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character?*

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the character of Order does not presuppose the character of Baptism. For the character of Order makes a man a dispenser of the sacraments; while the character of Baptism makes him a recipient of them. Now active power does not necessarily presuppose passive power, for it can be without it, as in God. Therefore

the character of Order does not necessarily presuppose the character of Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it may happen that a man is not baptized, and yet think with probability that he has been baptized. If therefore such a person present himself for Orders, he will not receive the character of Order, supposing the character of Order to presuppose the character of Baptism; and consequently whatever he does by way of consecration or absolution will be invalid, and the Church will be deceived therein, which is inadmissible.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore since Order is a sacrament, it presupposes Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, No one can receive what he has not the power to receive. Now the character of Baptism gives a man the power to receive the other sacraments. Wherefore he that has not the baptismal character, can receive no other sacrament; and consequently the character of Order presupposes the character of Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)-RO(1)** — In one who has active power of himself, the active does not presuppose the passive power; but in one who has active power from another, passive power, whereby he is enabled to receive the active power, is prerequisite to active power.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Such a man if he be ordained to the priesthood is not a priest, and he can neither consecrate, nor absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Wherefore according to the canons he must be baptized, and reordained (Extra De Presbyt. non Bapt., cap. Si quis; cap. Veniens). And even though he be raised to the episcopate, those whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may piously be believed that as regards the ultimate effects of the sacraments, the High Priest will supply the defect, and that He would not allow this to be so hidden as to endanger the Church.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)*****Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation?***

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation. For in things subordinate to one another, as the middle presupposes the first, so does the last presuppose the middle. Now the character of Confirmation presupposes that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character of Order presupposes that of Confirmation as being in the middle.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, those who are appointed to confirm should themselves be most firm. Now those who receive the sacrament of Order are appointed to confirm others. Therefore they especially should have received the sacrament of Confirmation.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, The apostles received the power of order before the Ascension (<sup>cf.</sup> John 20:22), where it is said: “Receive the Holy Ghost.” But they were confirmed after the Ascension by the coming of the Holy Ghost. Therefore order does not presuppose Confirmation.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, For the reception of Orders something is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one who presents himself for Orders should be capable of receiving them, and this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the baptismal character is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, so that the sacrament of Order cannot be conferred without it. On the other hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise of Orders, and one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of Order presupposes the character of Confirmation as congruous but not as necessary.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)-RO(1)** — In this case the middle does not stand in the same relation to the last as the first to the middle, because the character of Baptism enables a man to receive the sacrament of Confirmation, whereas

the character of Confirmation does not enable a man to receive the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(4)-RO(2)** — This argument considers aptness by way of congruity.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5)**

***Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order?***

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order. For there is more in common between one Order and another, than between Order and another sacrament. But the character of Order presupposes the character of another sacrament, namely Baptism. Much more therefore does the character of one Order presuppose the character of another.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the Orders are degrees of a kind. Now no one can reach a further degree, unless he first mount the previous degree. Therefore no one can receive the character of a subsequent Order unless he has first received the preceding Order.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5) — *On the contrary,*** If anything necessary for a sacrament be omitted in that sacrament, the sacrament must be repeated. But if one receive a subsequent Order, without receiving a preceding Order, he is not reordained, but he receives what was lacking, according to the canonical statutes (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.). Therefore the preceding Order is not necessary for the following.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5) — *I answer that,*** It is not necessary for the higher Orders that one should have received the minor Orders, because their respective powers are distinct, and one, considered in its essentials, does not require another in the same subject. Hence even in the early Church some were ordained priests without having previously received the lower Orders and yet they could do all that the lower Orders could, because the lower power is comprised in the higher, even as sense in understanding, and dukedom in kingdom. Afterwards, however, it was decided by the legislation of the Church that no one should present himself to the higher orders who

had not previously humbled himself in the lower offices. And hence it is that according to the Canons (cap. Tuæ literæ, De clerico per salt. prom.) those who are ordained without receiving a preceding Order are not reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the preceding Order.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Orders have more in common with one another as regards specific likeness, than order has with Baptism. But as regards proportion of power to action, Baptism has more in common with Order, than one Order with another, because Baptism confers on man the passive power to receive Orders, whereas a lower Order does not give him the passive power to receive higher Orders.

**P(4)-Q(35)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Orders are not degrees combining in one action or in one movement, so that it be necessary to reach the last through the first; but they are like degrees consisting in things of different kinds, such as the degrees between man and angel, and it is not necessary that one who is an angel be first of all a man. Such also are the degrees between the head and all members of the body; nor is it necessary that that which is the head should be previously a foot; and thus it is in the case in point.

## QUESTION 36

# OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the qualities required of those who receive the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive this sacrament?
- (2) Whether the knowledge of the whole of Sacred Writ is required?
- (3) Whether the degree of Orders is obtained by mere merit of life?
- (4) Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders sins?
- (5) Whether one who is in sin can without committing a sin exercise the Order he has received?

### P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)

#### *Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders?*

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that goodness of life is not required of those who receive Orders. For by Orders a man is ordained to the dispensation of the sacraments. But the sacraments can be administered by good and wicked. Therefore goodness of life is not requisite.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the service of God in the sacraments is no greater than service offered to Him in the body. Now our Lord did not cast aside the sinful and notorious woman from rendering Him a bodily service (☞ Luke 7). Therefore neither should the like be debarred from His service in the sacraments.



**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, by every grace a remedy is given against sin. Now those who are in sin should not be refused a remedy that may avail them. Since then grace is given in the sacrament of order, it would seem that this sacrament ought also to be conferred on sinners.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)** — *On the contrary,*

“Whosoever of the seed of Aaron throughout their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God neither shall he approach to minister to him [\*Vulg.: ‘Say to Aaron: Whosoever of thy seed,’ etc.]” (<sup>48217</sup>Leviticus 21:17,18).

Now “blemish signifies all kinds of vice” according to a gloss. Therefore he who is shackled by any vice should not be admitted to the ministry of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)** — Further, Jerome commenting on the words of <sup>48193</sup>Titus 2:15, “Let no man despise thee,” says that “not only should bishops, priests, and deacons take very great care to be examples of speech and conduct to those over whom they are placed, but also the lower grades, and without exception all who serve the household of God, since it is most disastrous to the Church if the laity be better than the clergy.” Therefore holiness of life is requisite in all the Orders.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), “even as the more subtle and clear essences, being filled by the outpouring of the solar radiance, like the sun enlighten other bodies with their brilliant light, so in all things pertaining to God a man must not dare to become a leader of others, unless in all his habits he be most deiform and godlike.” Wherefore, since in every order a man is appointed to lead others in Divine things, he who being conscious of mortal sin presents himself for Orders is guilty of presumption and sins mortally. Consequently holiness of life is requisite for Orders, as a matter of precept, but not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be ordained, he receives the Order none the less, and yet with sin withal.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Just as the sinner dispenses sacraments validly, so does he receive validly the sacrament of Orders, and as he dispenses unworthily, even so he receives unworthily.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The service in point consisted only in the exercise of bodily homage, which even sinners can offer lawfully. It is different with the spiritual service to which the ordained are appointed, because thereby they are made to stand between God and the people. Wherefore they should shine with a good conscience before God, and with a good name before men.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Certain medicines require a robust constitution, else it is mortally dangerous to take them; others can be given to the weakly. So too in spiritual things certain sacraments are ordained as remedies for sin, and the like are to be given to sinners, as Baptism and Penance, while others, which confer the perfection of grace, require a man made strong by grace.

## **P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)**

### *Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required?*

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that knowledge of all Holy Writ is required. For one from whose lips we seek the law, should have knowledge of the law. Now the laity seek the law at the mouth of the priest (<sup>311</sup>Malachi 2:7). Therefore he should have knowledge of the whole law.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, “being always ready to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope in you [\*Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you; St. Thomas apparently took his reading from Bede].” Now to give a reason for things pertaining to faith and hope belongs to those who have perfect knowledge of Holy Writ. Therefore the like knowledge should be possessed by those who are placed in Orders, and to whom the aforesaid words are addressed.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, no one is competent to read what he understands not, since to read without intelligence is “negligence,”\* as Cato declares (Rudiment.). [\*”Legere et non intelligere est negligere.” The play on the words is more evident in Latin.] Now it belongs to the reader (which is the lower Order) to read the Old Testament, as stated in the text

(Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore he should understand the whole of the Old Testament; and much more those in the higher Orders.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Many are raised to the priesthood even who know nothing at all of these things, even in many religious Orders. Therefore apparently this knowledge is not required.

Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that some who were monks were raised to the priesthood, being of a most holy life. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge is not required in those to be ordained.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** For any human act to be rightly ordered there must needs be the direction of reason. Wherefore in order that a man exercise the office of an Order, it is necessary for him to have as much knowledge as suffices for his direction in the act of that Order. And consequently one who is to be raised to Orders is required to have that knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred Scripture, not the whole, but more or less, according as his office is of a greater or lesser extent — to wit, that those who are placed over others, and receive the care of souls, know things pertaining to the doctrine of faith and morals, and that others know whatever concerns the exercise of their Order.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)-RO(1) —** A priest exercises a twofold action: the one, which is principal, over the true body of Christ; the other, which is secondary, over the mystical body of Christ. The second act depends on the first, but not conversely. Wherefore some are raised to the priesthood, to whom the first act alone is deputed, for instance those religious who are not empowered with the care of souls. The law is not sought at the mouth of these, they are required only for the celebration of the sacraments; and consequently it is enough for them to have such knowledge as enables them to observe rightly those things that regard the celebration of the sacrament. Others are raised to exercise the other act which is over the mystical body of Christ, and it is at the mouth of these that the people seek the law; wherefore they ought to possess knowledge of the law, not indeed to know all the difficult points of the law (for in these they should have recourse to their superiors), but to know what the people have to believe and fulfill in the law. To the higher priests, namely the bishops, it belongs to know even those points of the law which may offer some

difficulty, and to know them the more perfectly according as they are in a higher position.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The reason that we have to give for our faith and hope does not denote one that suffices to prove matters of faith and hope, since they are both of things invisible; it means that we should be able to give general proofs of the probability of both, and for this there is not much need of great knowledge.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The reader has not to explain Holy Writ to the people (for this belongs to the higher orders), but merely to voice the words. Therefore he is not required to have so much knowledge as to understand Holy Writ, but only to know how to pronounce it correctly. And since such knowledge is obtained easily and from many persons, it may be supposed with probability that the ordained will acquire that knowledge even if he have it not already, especially if it appear that he is on the road to acquire it.

### **P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)**

#### *Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one's life?*

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man obtains the degrees of order by the mere merit of his life. For, according to Chrysostom [\*Hom. xliii in the Opus Imperfectum, wrongly ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], “not every priest is a saint, but every saint is a priest.” Now a man becomes a saint by the merit of his life. Consequently he thereby also becomes a priest, and “a fortiori” has he the other Orders.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, in natural things, men obtain a higher degree from the very fact that they are near God, and have a greater share of His favors, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv). Now it is by merit of holiness and knowledge that a man approaches nearer to God and receives more of His favors. Therefore by this alone he is raised to the degree of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Holiness once possessed can be lost. But when once a man is ordained he never loses his order. Therefore order does not consist in the mere merit of holiness.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A cause should be proportionate to its effect. And consequently as in Christ, from Whom grace comes down on all men, there must needs be fulness of grace; so in the ministers of the Church, to whom it belongs, not to give grace, but to give the sacraments of grace, the degree of order does not result from their having grace, but from their participating in a sacrament of grace.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Chrysostom is speaking of the priest in reference to the reason for which he is so called, the word “sacerdos” signifying dispenser of holy things [sacra dans]: for in this sense every righteous man, in so far as he assists others by the sacraments, may be called a priest. But he is not speaking according to the actual meaning of the words; for this word “sacerdos” [priest] is employed to signify one who gives sacred things by dispensing the sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Natural things acquire a degree of superiority over others, from the fact that they are able to act on them by virtue of their form; wherefore from the very fact that they have a higher form, they obtain a higher degree. But the ministers of the Church are placed over others, not to confer anything on them by virtue of their own holiness (for this belongs to God alone), but as ministers, and as instruments, so to say, of the outpouring from the Head to the members. Hence the comparison fails as regards the dignity of Order, although it applies as to congruity.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)**

*Whether he who raises the unworthy to orders commits a sin?*

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that he who raises the unworthy to orders commits no sin. For a bishop needs assistants appointed to the lesser offices. But he would be unable to find them in sufficient number, if he were to require of them such qualifications as the saints enumerate.

Therefore if he raise some who are not qualified, he would seem to be excusable.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the Church needs not only ministers for the dispensation of things spiritual, but also for the supervision of temporalities. But sometimes men without knowledge or holiness of life may be useful for the conduct of temporal affairs, either because of their worldly power, or on account of their natural industry. Therefore seemingly the like can be promoted without sin.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, everyone is bound to avoid sin, as far as he can. If therefore a bishop sins in promoting the unworthy, he is bound to take the utmost pains to know whether those who present themselves for Orders be worthy, by making a careful inquiry about their morals and knowledge, and yet seemingly this is not done anywhere.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, It is worse to raise the wicked to the sacred ministry, than not to correct those who are raised already. But Heli sinned mortally by not correcting his sons for their wickedness; wherefore “he fell backwards... and died” (<sup>1</sup>1 Kings 4:18). Therefore he who promotes the unworthy does not escape sin.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)** — Further, spiritual things must be set before temporal things in the Church. Now a man would commit a mortal sin were he knowingly to endanger the temporalities of the Church. Much more therefore is it a mortal sin to endanger spiritual things. But whoever promotes the unworthy endangers spiritual things, since according to Gregory (Hom. xii in Evang.) “if a man’s life is contemptible, his preaching is liable to be despised”; and for the same reason all the spiritual things that he dispenses. Therefore he who promotes the unworthy sins mortally.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Our Lord describes the faithful servant whom He has set “over His household to give them their measure of wheat.” Hence he is guilty of unfaithfulness who gives any man Divine things above his measure: and whoso promotes the unworthy does this. Wherefore he commits a mortal crime, as being unfaithful to his sovereign Lord, especially since this is detrimental to the Church and to the Divine honor which is promoted by good ministers. For a man would be

unfaithful to his earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in his offices.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)-RO(1)** — God never so abandons His Church that apt ministers are not to be found sufficient for the needs of the people, if the worthy be promoted and the unworthy set aside. And though it were impossible to find as many ministers as there are now, it were better to have few good ministers than many bad ones, as the blessed Clement declares in his second epistle to James the brother of the Lord.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Temporal things are not to be sought but for the sake of spiritual things. Wherefore all temporal advantage should count for nothing, and all gain be despised for the advancement of spiritual good.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(4)-RO(3)** — It is at least required that the ordainer know that nothing contrary to holiness is in the candidate for ordination. But besides this he is required to take the greatest care, in proportion to the Order or office to be enjoined, so as to be certain of the qualifications of those to be promoted, at least from the testification of others. This is the meaning of the Apostle when he says (<sup>5472</sup>1 Timothy 5:22): “Impose not hands lightly on any man.”

## **P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)**

### ***Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has received?***

[\*Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(64)**, **A(6)**]

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that one who is in sin can without sin exercise the order he has received. For since, by virtue of his office, he is bound to exercise his order, he sins if he fails to do so. If therefore he sins by exercising it, he cannot avoid sin: which is inadmissible.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, a dispensation is a relaxation of the law. Therefore although by rights it would be unlawful for him to exercise the order he has received, it would be lawful for him to do so by dispensation.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, whoever co-operates with another in a mortal sin, sins mortally. If therefore a sinner sins mortally by exercising his order, he who receives or demands any Divine thing from him also sins mortally: and this seems absurd.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, if he sins by exercising his order, it follows that every act of his order that he performs is a mortal sin; and consequently since many acts concur in the one exercise of his order, it would seem that he commits many mortal sins: which seems very hard.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Demophil.): “It seems presumptuous for such a man, one to wit who is not enlightened, to lay hands on priestly things; he is not afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is to take part in Divine things, with the thought that God does not see what he sees in himself; he thinks, by false pretense, to cheat Him Whom he falsely calls his Father; he dares to utter in the person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will not call them prayers, over the Divine symbols.” Therefore a priest is a blasphemer and a cheat if he exercises his order unworthily, and thus he sins mortally: and in like manner any other person in orders.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)** — Further, holiness of life is required in one who receives an order, that he may be qualified to exercise it. Now a man sins mortally if he present himself for orders in mortal sin. Much more therefore does he sin mortally whenever he exercises his order.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, The law prescribes (<sup>cf. Deuteronomy</sup> 16:20) that “man should follow justly after that which is just.” Wherefore whoever fulfills unworthily the duties of his order follows unjustly after that which is just, and acts contrary to a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now anyone who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin, without doubt does so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins mortally.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-RO(1)** — He is not perplexed as though he were in the necessity of sinning; for he can renounce his sin, or resign his office whereby he was bound to the exercise of his order.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The natural law allows of no dispensation; and it is of natural law that man handle holy things holily. Therefore no one can dispense from this.



**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-RO(3)** — So long as a minister of the Church who is in mortal sin is recognized by the Church, his subject must receive the sacraments from him, since this is the purpose for which he is bound to him. Nevertheless, outside the case of necessity, it would not be safe to induce him to an execution of his Order, as long as he is conscious of being in mortal sin, which conscience, however, he can lay aside since a man is repaired in an instant by Divine grace.

**P(4)-Q(36)-A(5)-RO(4)** — When any man performs an action as a minister of the Church while in a state of mortal sin, he sins mortally, and as often as he performs that action, since, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i), “it is wrong for the unclean even to touch the symbols,” i.e. the sacramental signs. Hence when they touch sacred things in the exercise of their office they sin mortally. It would be otherwise if they were to touch some sacred thing or perform some sacred duty in a case of necessity, when it would be allowable even to a layman, for instance if they were to baptize in a case of urgency, or gather up the Lord’s body should it be cast to the ground.

## QUESTION 37

# OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING OF THE CHARACTER

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the distinction of the orders and their acts, and the imprinting of the character. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Order should be divided into several kinds?
- (2) How many are there?
- (3) Whether they ought to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?
- (4) Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?
- (5) When are the characters of the Orders imprinted?

### P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)

#### *Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders?*

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that we ought not to distinguish several Orders. For the greater a power is, the less is it multiplied. Now this sacrament ranks above the others in so far as it places its recipients in a degree above other persons. Since then the other sacraments are not divided into several of which the whole is predicated, neither ought this sacrament to be divided into several Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, if it be divided, the parts of the division are either integral or subjective. But they are not integral, for then the whole would not be predicated of them. Therefore it is a division into subjective parts. Now subjective parts can have the remote genus

predicated of them in the plural in the same way as the proximate genus; thus man and ass are several animals, and are several animated bodies. Therefore also priesthood and diaconate, as they are several Orders, even so are several sacraments, since sacrament is the genus, so to speak, in respect of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10) the form of authority in which one alone governs is a better government of the common weal than aristocracy, where different persons occupy different offices. But the government of the Church should be the best of all. Therefore in the Church there should be no distinction of Orders for different acts, but the whole power should reside in one person; and consequently there ought to be only one Order.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The Church is Christ's mystical body, like to our natural body, according to the Apostle (<sup>491B</sup>Romans 12:5; <sup>492C</sup>1 Corinthians 12:12,27; <sup>492D</sup>Ephesians 1:22,23; <sup>492E</sup>Colossians 1:24). Now in the natural body there are various offices of the members. Therefore in the Church also there should be various Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)** — Further, the ministry of the New Testament is superior to that of the Old Testament (<sup>493A</sup>2 Corinthians 3). Now in the Old Testament not only the priests, but also their ministers, the Levites, were consecrated. Therefore likewise in the New Testament not only the priests but also their ministers should be consecrated by the sacrament of Order; and consequently there ought to be several Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Multiplicity of Orders was introduced into the Church for three reasons. First to show forth the wisdom of God, which is reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and spiritual. This is signified in the statement of <sup>494A</sup>1 Kings 10:4,[5] that "when the queen of Saba saw... the order of" Solomon's "servants... she had no longer any spirit in her," for she was breathless from admiration of his wisdom. Secondly, in order to succor human weakness, because it would be impossible for one man, without his being heavily burdened, to fulfill all things pertaining to the Divine mysteries; and so various orders are severally appointed to the various offices; and this is shown by the Lord giving Moses seventy ancients to assist him. Thirdly, that men may be given a broader way for advancing (to perfection), seeing that the

various duties are divided among many men, so that all become the co-operators of God; than which nothing is more God-like, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii).

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The other sacraments are given that certain effects may be received; but this sacrament is given chiefly that certain acts may be performed. Hence it behooves the sacrament of Order to be differentiated according to the diversity of acts, even as powers are differentiated by their acts.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The division of Order is not that of an integral whole into its parts, nor of a universal whole, but of a potential whole, the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation thereof. Thus it is here: for the entire fulness of the sacrament is in one Order, namely the priesthood, while in the other sacraments there is a participation of Order. And this is signified by the Lord saying (<sup>9117</sup>Numbers 11:17):

“I will take of thy spirit and give to them,  
that they may bear with thee the burden of the people.”

Therefore all the Orders are one sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(1)-RO(3)** — In a kingdom, although the entire fulness of power resides in the king, this does not exclude the ministers having a power which is a participation of the kingly power. It is the same in Order. In the aristocratic form of government, *on the contrary*, the fulness of power resides in no one, but in all.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)**

### *Whether there are seven Orders?*

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that there are not seven Orders. For the Orders of the Church are directed to the hierarchical acts. But there are only three hierarchical acts, namely “to cleanse, to enlighten, and to perfect,” for which reason Dionysius distinguishes three Orders (Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore there are not seven.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, all the sacraments derive their efficacy and authenticity from their institution by Christ, or at least by His apostles. But no mention except of priests and deacons is made in the teaching of Christ and His apostles. Therefore seemingly there are no other Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, by the sacrament of Order a man is appointed to dispense the other sacraments. But there are only six other sacraments. Therefore there should be only six Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-O(4)** — On the other hand, It would seem that there ought to be more. For the higher a power is, the less is it subject to multiplication. Now the hierarchical power is in the angels in a higher way than in us, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i). Since then there are nine Orders in the angelic hierarchy, there should be as many, or more, in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, the prophecy of the Psalms is the most noble of all the prophecies. Now there is one Order, namely of readers, for reading the other prophecies in the Church. Therefore there ought to be another Order for reading the Psalms, especially since (Decretals, Dist. xxi, cap. Cleros) the “psalmist” is reckoned as the second Order after the doorkeeper.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* Some show the sufficiency of the orders from their correspondence with the gratuitous graces which are indicated <sup>401</sup>1 Corinthians 12. For they say that the “word of wisdom” belongs to the bishop, because he is the ordainer of others, which pertains to wisdom; the “word of knowledge” to the priest, for he ought to have the key of knowledge; “faith” to the deacon, for he preaches the Gospel; the “working of miracles” to the subdeacon, who sets himself to do deeds of perfection by the vow of continency; “interpretation of speeches” to the acolyte, this being signified by the light which he bears; the “grace of healing” to the exorcist; “diverse kinds of tongues” to the psalmist; “prophecy” to the reader; and the “discerning of spirits” to the doorkeeper, for he excludes some and admits others. But this is of no account, for the gratuitous graces are not given, as the Orders are, to one same man. For it is written (<sup>401</sup>1 Corinthians 12:4): “There are distributions [Douay: ‘diversities’] of graces.” Moreover the episcopate

[\*Cf. **Q(40)**, **A(5)**] and the office of psalmist are included, which are not Orders. Wherefore others account for the Orders by likening them to the heavenly hierarchy, where the Orders are distinguished in reference to cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting. Thus they say that the doorkeeper cleanses outwardly, by separating even in the body the good from the wicked; that the acolyte cleanses inwardly, because by the light which he bears, he signifies that he dispels inward darkness; and that the exorcist cleanses both ways, for he casts out the devil who disturbs a man both ways. But enlightening, which is effected by teaching, is done by readers as regards prophetic doctrine; by subdeacons as to apostolic doctrine; and by deacons as to the gospel doctrine; while ordinary perfection, such as the perfection of Penance, Baptism, and so forth is the work of the priest; excellent perfection, such as the consecration of priests and virgins, is the work of the bishop; while the most excellent perfection is the work of the Sovereign Pontiff in whom resides the fulness of authority. But this again is of no account; both because the orders of the heavenly hierarchy are not distinguished by the aforesaid hierarchical actions, since each of them is applicable to every Order; and because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), perfecting belongs to the bishops alone, enlightening to the priests, and cleansing to all the ministers. Wherefore others suit the orders to the seven gifts, so that the priesthood corresponds to the gift of wisdom, which feeds us with the bread of life and understanding, even as the priest refreshes us with the heavenly bread; fear to the doorkeeper, for he separates us from the wicked; and thus the intermediate Orders to the intermediate gifts. But this again is of no account, since the sevenfold grace is given in each one of the Orders. Consequently we must answer differently by saying that the sacrament of Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of sacraments, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). For just as temple, altar, vessels, and vestments need to be consecrated, so do the ministers who are ordained for the Eucharist; and this consecration is the sacrament of Order. Hence the distinction of Orders is derived from their relation to the Eucharist. For the power of Order is directed either to the consecration of the Eucharist itself, or to some ministry in connection with this sacrament of the Eucharist. If in the former way, then it is the Order of priests; hence when they are ordained, they receive the chalice with wine, and the paten with the bread, because they are receiving the power to consecrate the body and

blood of Christ. The co-operation of the ministers is directed either to the sacrament itself, or to the recipients. If the former, this happens in three ways. For in the first place, there is the ministry whereby the minister co-operates with the priest in the sacrament itself, by dispensing, but not by consecrating, for this is done by the priest alone; and this belongs to the deacon. Hence in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is said that it belongs to the deacon to minister to the priests in whatever is done in Christ's sacraments, wherefore he dispenses Christ's blood. Secondly, there is the ministry directed to the disposal of the sacramental matter in the sacred vessels of the sacrament. and this belongs to subdeacons. Wherefore it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that they carry the vessels of our Lord's body and blood, and place the oblation on the altar; hence, when they are ordained, they receive the chalice, empty however, from the bishop's hands. Thirdly, there is the ministry directed to the proffering of the sacramental matter, and this belongs to the acolyte. For he, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), prepares the cruet with wine and water; wherefore he receives an empty cruet. The ministry directed to the preparation of the recipients can be exercised only over the unclean, since those who are clean are already apt for receiving the sacraments. Now the unclean are of three kinds, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). For some are absolute unbelievers and unwilling to believe; and these must be altogether debarred from beholding Divine things and from the assembly of the faithful; this belongs to the doorkeepers. Some, however, are willing to believe, but are not as yet instructed, namely catechumens, and to the instruction of such persons the Order of readers is directed, who are therefore entrusted with the reading of the first rudiments of the doctrine of faith, namely the Old Testament. But some are believers and instructed, yet lie under an impediment through the power of the devil, namely those who are possessed: and to this ministry the order of exorcists is directed. Thus the reason and number of the degrees of Orders is made clear.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Dionysius is speaking of the orders not as sacraments, but as directed to hierarchical actions. Wherefore he distinguishes three Orders corresponding to those actions. The first of these Orders, namely the bishop, has all three actions; the second, namely the priest, has two; while the third has one, namely to cleanse; this is the deacon who is called a minister: and under this last all the lower Orders are

comprised. But the Orders derive their sacramental nature from their relation to the greatest of the sacraments, and consequently the number of Orders depends on this.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-RO(2)** — In the early Church, on account of the fewness of ministers, all the lower ministries were entrusted to the deacons, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), where he says: “Some of the ministers stand at the closed door of the Church, others are otherwise occupied in the exercise of their own order; others place the sacred bread and the chalice of benediction on the altar and offer them to the priests.” Nevertheless all the power to do all these things was included in the one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the Divine worship developed, and the Church committed expressly to several persons that which had hitherto been committed implicitly in one Order. This is what the Master means, when He says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that the Church instituted other Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The orders are directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist chiefly, and to the other sacraments consequently, for even the other sacraments flow from that which is contained in that sacrament. Hence it does not follow that the orders ought to be distinguished according to the sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The angels differ specifically [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(50), A(4)**]: for this reason it is possible for them to have various modes of receiving Divine things, and hence also they are divided into various hierarchies. But in men there is only one hierarchy, because they have only one mode of receiving Divine things, which results from the human species, namely through the images of sensible objects. Consequently the distinction of orders in the angels cannot bear any relation to a sacrament as it is with us, but only a relation to the hierarchical actions which among them each Order exercises on the Orders below. In this respect our Orders correspond to theirs; since in our hierarchy there are three Orders, distinguished according to the three hierarchical actions, even as in each angelic hierarchy.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(2)-RO(5)** — The office of psalmist is not an Order, but an office annexed to an Order. For the psalmist is also styled precentor because the psalms are recited with chant. Now precentor is not the name



of a special Order, both because it belongs to the whole choir to sing, and because he has no special relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Since, however, it is a particular office, it is sometimes reckoned among the Orders, taking these in a broad sense.

### **P(4)-Q(37)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?***

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the Orders ought not to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not. For all the Orders are sacraments, and all the sacraments are sacred. Therefore all the Orders are sacred.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, by the Orders of the Church a man is not appointed to any other than Divine offices. Now all these are sacred. Therefore all the Orders also are sacred.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** The sacred Orders are an impediment to the contracting of marriage and annul the marriage that is already contracted. But the four lower orders neither impede the contracting nor annul the contract. Therefore these are not sacred Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** An Order is said to be sacred in two ways. First, in itself, and thus every order is sacred, since it is a sacrament. Secondly, by reason of the matter about which it exercises an act, and thus an Order is called sacred, if it exercises an act about some consecrated thing. In this sense there are only three sacred Orders, namely the priesthood and diaconate, which exercise an act about the consecrated body and blood of Christ, and the subdiaconate, which exercises an act about the consecrated vessels. Wherefore continency is enjoined them, that they who handle holy things may themselves be holy and clean.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)*****Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?***

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the acts of the Orders are not rightly assigned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because a person is prepared by absolution to receive Christ's body. Now the preparation of the recipients of a sacrament belongs to the lower Orders. Therefore absolution from sins is unfittingly reckoned among the acts of a priest.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, man is made like to God immediately in Baptism, by receiving the character which causes this likeness. But prayer and the offering of oblations are acts directed immediately to God. Therefore every baptized person can perform these acts, and not priests alone.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, different Orders have different acts. But it belongs to the subdeacon to place the oblations on the altar, and to read the epistle; and subdeacons carry the cross before the Pope. Therefore these acts should not be assigned to the deacon.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, the same truth is contained in the Old and in the New Testament. But it belongs to the readers to read the Old Testament. Therefore it should belong to them likewise, and not to deacons, to read the New Testament.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, the apostles preached naught else but the gospel of Christ (Romans 1:15). But the teaching of the apostles is entrusted to subdeacons to be read by them. Therefore the Gospel teaching should be also.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(6)** — Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) that which belongs to a higher Order should not be applicable to a lower Order. But it is an act of subdeacons to minister with the cruets. Therefore it should not be assigned to acolytes.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(7)** — Further, spiritual actions should rank above bodily actions. But the acolyte's act is merely corporeal. Therefore the

exorcist has not the spiritual act of casting out devils, since he is of inferior rank.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(8)** — Further, things that have most in common should be placed beside one another. Now the reading of the Old Testament must needs have most in common with the reading of the New Testament, which latter belongs to the higher ministers. Therefore the reading of the Old Testament should be reckoned the act, not of the reader, but rather of the acolyte; especially since the bodily light which the acolytes carry signifies the light of spiritual doctrine.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-O(9)** — Further, in every act of a special Order, there should be some special power, which the person ordained has to the exclusion of other persons. But in opening and shutting doors the doorkeeper has no special power that other men have not. Therefore this should not be reckoned their act.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)** — *I answer that,* Since the consecration conferred in the sacrament of orders is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, as stated above (**A(2)**), the principal act of each order is that whereby it is most nearly directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. In this respect, too, one order ranks above another, in so far as one act is more nearly directed to that same sacrament. But because many things are directed to the Eucharist, as being the most exalted of the sacraments, it follows not unfittingly that one Order has many acts besides its principal act, and all the more, as it ranks higher, since a power extends to the more things, the higher it is.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The preparation of the recipients of a sacrament is twofold. One is remote and is effected by the ministers: another is proximate, whereby they are rendered apt at once for receiving the sacraments. This latter belongs to priests, since even in natural things matter receives from one and the same agent both the ultimate disposition to the form, and the form itself. And since a person acquires the proximate disposition to the Eucharist by being cleansed from sin, it follows that the priest is the proper minister of all those sacraments which are chiefly instituted for the cleansing of sins, namely Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Acts are directed immediately to God in two ways; in one way on the part of one person only, for instance the prayers of individuals, vows, and so forth: such acts befit any baptized person. In another way on the part of the whole Church, and thus the priest alone exercises acts immediately directed to God; because to impersonate the whole Church belongs to him alone who consecrates the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the universal Church.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The offerings made by the people are offered through the priest. Hence a twofold ministry is necessary with regard to offerings. One on the part of the people: and this belongs to the subdeacon who receives the offerings from the people and places them on the altar or offers them to the deacon. the other is on the part of the priest, and belongs to the deacon, who hands the offerings to the priest. This is the principal act of both Orders, and for this reason the deacon's Order is the higher. But to read the epistle does not belong to a deacon, except as the acts of lower Orders are ascribed to the higher; and in like manner to carry the cross. Moreover, this depends on the customs of Churches, because in secondary acts it is not unfitting for customs to vary.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Doctrine is a remote preparation for the reception of a sacrament; wherefore the announcement of doctrine is entrusted to the ministers. But the doctrine of the Old Testament is more remote than that of the New Testament, since it contains no instruction about this sacrament except in figures. Hence announcing of the New Testament is entrusted to the higher ministers, and that of the Old Testament to the lower ministers. Moreover the doctrine of the New Testament is more perfect as delivered by our Lord Himself, than as made known by His apostles. Wherefore the Gospel is committed to deacons and the Epistle to subdeacons.

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(6)** — Acolytes exercise an act over the cruets alone, and not over the contents of the cruets; whereas the subdeacon exercises an act over the contents of the cruets, because he handles the water and wine to the end that they be put into the chalice,\* and again he pours the water over the hands of the priest; and the deacon, like the subdeacon, exercises an act over the chalice only, not over its contents, whereas the priest

exercises an act over the contents. [\*The wording of St. Thomas is sufficiently vague to refer either to the Roman rite, where the priest pours the wine and water into the chalice, or to the Dominican rite, where this is done by the subdeacon.] Wherefore as the subdeacon at his ordination receives an empty chalice, while the priest receives a full chalice, so the acolyte receives an empty cruet, but the subdeacon a full one. Thus there is a certain connection among the Orders.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(7)** — The bodily acts of the acolyte are more intimately connected with the act of Holy orders than the act of the exorcist, although the latter is, in a fashion, spiritual. For the acolytes exercise a ministry over the vessels in which the sacramental matter is contained, as regards the wine, which needs a vessel to hold it on account of its humidity. Hence of all the minor orders the Order of acolytes is the highest.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(8)** — The act of the acolyte is more closely connected with the principal acts of the higher ministers, than the acts of the other minor Orders, as is self-evident; and again as regards the secondary acts whereby they prepare the people by doctrine. For the acolyte by bearing a light represents the doctrine of the New Testament in a visible manner, while the reader by his recital represents it differently, wherefore the acolyte is of higher rank. It is the same with the exorcist, for as the act of the reader is compared with the secondary act of the deacon and subdeacon, so is the act of the exorcist compared with the secondary act of the priest, namely to bind and to loose, by which man is wholly freed from the slavery of the devil. This, too, shows the degrees of Order to be most orderly. since only the three higher Orders co-operate with the priest in his principal act which is to consecrate the body of Christ, while both the higher and lower Orders co-operate with him in his secondary act, which is to loose and bind.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(4)-RO(9)** — Some say that in receiving the Order the doorkeeper is given a Divine power to debar others from entering the Church, even as Christ had, when He cast out the sellers from the Temple. But this belongs to a gratuitous grace rather than to a sacramental grace. Wherefore we should reply that he receives the power to do this by virtue of his office, although others may do so, but not officially. It is the case in

all the acts of the minor Orders, that they can be lawfully exercised by others, even though these have no office to that effect: just as Mass may be said in an unconsecrated building, although the consecration of a church is directed to the purpose that Mass be said there.

## **P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)**

### ***Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed to him?***

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the character is not imprinted on the priest at the moment when the chalice is handed to him. For the consecration of a priest is done by anointing as in Confirmation. Now in Confirmation the character is imprinted at the moment of anointing; and therefore in the priesthood also and not at the handing of the chalice.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power when He said (~~John~~ John 20:22,23): “Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive,” etc. Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands. Therefore the character of order is given at the moment of the imposition of hands.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, as the ministers are consecrated, even so are the ministers’ vestments. Now the blessing alone consecrates the vestments. Therefore the consecration of the priest also is effected by the mere blessing of the bishop.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, as a chalice is handed to the priest, even so is the priestly vestment. Therefore if a character is imprinted at the giving of the chalice, so likewise is there at the giving of the chasuble, and thus a priest would have two characters: but this is false.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, the deacon’s order is more closely allied to the priest’s Order than is the subdeacon’s. But if a character is imprinted on the priest at the moment of the handing of the chalice, the subdeacon would be more closely allied to the priest than the deacon; because the subdeacon receives the character at the handing of the chalice

and not the deacon. Therefore the priestly character is not imprinted at the handing of the chalice.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-O(6)** — Further, the Order of acolytes approaches nearer to the priestly act by exercising an act over the cruet than by exercising an act over the torch. Yet the character is imprinted on the acolytes when they receive the torch rather than when they receive the cruet, because the name of acolyte signifies candle-bearer. Therefore the character is not imprinted on the priest when he receives the chalice.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, The principal act of the priest's Order is to consecrate Christ's body. Now he receives the power to this effect at the handing of the chalice. Therefore the character is imprinted on him then.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (**A(4)**, ad 1), to cause the form and to give the matter its proximate preparation for the form belong to the same agent. Wherefore the bishop in conferring orders does two things; for he prepares the candidates for the reception of orders, and delivers to them the power of order. He prepares them, both by instructing them in their respective offices and by doing something to them, so that they may be adapted to receive the power. This preparation consists of three things, namely blessing, imposition of hands, and anointing. By the blessing they are enlisted in the Divine service, wherefore the blessing is given to all. By the imposition of hands the fulness of grace is given, whereby they are qualified for exalted duties, wherefore only deacons and priests receive the imposition of hands, because they are competent to dispense the sacraments, although the latter as principal dispensers, the former as ministers. But by the anointing they are consecrated for the purpose of handling the sacrament, wherefore the anointing is done to the priests alone who touch the body of Christ with their own hands; even as a chalice is anointed because it holds the blood, and the paten because it holds the body.

The conferring of power is effected by giving them something pertaining to their proper act. And since the principal act of a priest is to consecrate the body and blood of Christ, the priestly character is imprinted at the very giving of the chalice under the prescribed form of words.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-RO(1)** — In Confirmation there is not given the office of exercising an act on an exterior matter, wherefore the character is not imprinted in that sacrament at the handing of some particular thing, but at the mere imposition of hands and anointing. But it is otherwise in the priestly Order, and consequently the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power, as regards the principal act, before His passion at the supper when He said: “Take ye and eat” (<sup>413</sup>Matthew 26:26), wherefore He added: “Do this for a commemoration of Me” (<sup>422</sup>Luke 22:19). After the resurrection, however, He gave them the priestly power, as to its secondary act, which is to bind and loose.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Vestments require no other consecration except to be set aside for the Divine worship, wherefore the blessing suffices for their consecration. But it is different with those who are ordained, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-RO(4)** — The priestly vestment signifies, not the power given to the priest, but the aptitude required of him for exercising the act of that power. Wherefore a character is imprinted neither on the priest nor on anyone else at the giving of a vestment.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-RO(5)** — The deacon’s power is midway between the subdeacon’s and the priest’s. For the priest exercises a power directly on Christ’s body, the subdeacon on the vessels only, and the deacon on Christ’s body contained in a vessel. Hence it is not for him to touch Christ’s body, but to carry the body on the paten, and to dispense the blood with the chalice. Consequently his power, as to the principal act, could not be expressed, either by the giving of the vessel only, or by the giving of the matter; and his power is expressed as to the secondary act alone, by his receiving the book of the Gospels, and this power is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character is impressed at the handing of the book.

**P(4)-Q(37)-A(5)-RO(6)** — The act of the acolyte whereby he serves with the cruet ranks before his act of carrying the torch; although he takes his name from the secondary act, because it is better known and more proper



to him. Hence the acolyte receives the character when he is given the cruet, by virtue of the words uttered by the bishop.

## QUESTION 38

### OF THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT

#### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who confer this sacrament. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a bishop alone can confer this sacrament?
- (2) Whether a heretic or any other person cut off from the Church can confer this sacrament?

#### **P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)**

#### *Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order?*

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order. For the imposition of hands has something to do with the consecration. Now not only the bishop but also the assisting priests lay hands on the priests who are being ordained. Therefore not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a man receives the power of Order, when that which pertains to the act of his Order is handed to him. Now the cruet with water, bowl\* and towel, are given to the subdeacon by the archdeacon; as also the candlestick with candle, and the empty cruet to the acolyte. [\*”Bacili.” The rubric has “aquamanili.” Some texts of the Summa have “mantili” (“maniple”), but the archdeacon does not give the maniple to the subdeacon.] Therefore not only the bishop confers the sacrament of Order.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, that which belongs to an Order cannot be entrusted to one who has not the Order. Now the conferring of minor Orders is entrusted to certain persons who are not bishops, for instance to Cardinal priests. Therefore the conferring of Orders does not belong to the episcopal Order.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, whoever is entrusted with the principal is entrusted with the accessory also. Now the sacrament of Order is directed to the Eucharist, as accessory to principal. Since then a priest consecrates the Eucharist, he can also confer Orders.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, there is a greater distinction between a priest and a deacon than between bishop and bishop. But a bishop can consecrate a bishop. Therefore a priest can ordain a deacon.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Ministers are applied by their Orders to the Divine worship in a more noble way than the sacred vessels. But the consecration of the vessels belongs to a bishop only. Much more therefore does the consecration of ministers.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)** — Further, the sacrament of Order ranks higher than the sacrament of Confirmation. Now a bishop alone confirms. Much more therefore does a bishop alone confer the sacrament of Order.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)** — Further, virgins are not placed in a degree of spiritual power by their consecration, as the ordained are. Yet a bishop alone can consecrate a virgin. Therefore much more can he alone ordain.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, The episcopal power stands in the same relation to the power of the lower Orders, as political science, which seeks the common good, to the lower acts and virtues which seek some special good, as appears from what was said above (**Q(37), A(1)**). Now political science, as stated in Ethic. i, 2, lays down the law to lower sciences, namely what science each one ought to cultivate, and how far he should pursue it and in what way. Wherefore it belongs to a bishop to assign others to places in all the Divine services. Hence he alone confirms, because those who are confirmed receive the office, as it were, of confessing the faith; again he alone blesses virgins who are images of the Church, Christ's spouse, the care of which is entrusted chiefly to him; and he it is who consecrates the candidates for ordination to the ministry of Orders, and, by his consecration, appoints the vessels that they are to use; even as secular offices in various cities are allotted by him who holds the highest power, for instance by the king.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-RO(1)** — As stated above (**Q(37), A(5)**), at the imposition of hands there is given, not the character of the priestly Order,

but grace which makes a man fit to exercise his Order. And since those who are raised to the priesthood need most copious grace, the priests together with the bishop lay hands on them, but the bishop alone lays hands on deacons.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Since the archdeacon is as it were minister-in-chief, all things pertaining to the ministry are handed by him, for instance the candle with which the acolyte serves the deacon by carrying it before him at the Gospel, and the cruet with which he serves the subdeacon; and in like manner he gives the subdeacon the things with which the latter serves the higher Orders. And yet the principal act of the subdeacon does not consist in these things, but in his co-operation as regards the matter of the sacrament; wherefore he receives the character through the chalice being handed to him by the bishop. On the other hand, the acolyte receives the character by virtue of the words of the bishop when the aforesaid things — the cruet rather than the candlestick — are handed to him by the archdeacon. Hence it does not follow that the archdeacon ordains.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The Pope, who has the fulness of episcopal power, can entrust one who is not a bishop with things pertaining to the episcopal dignity, provided they bear no immediate relation to the true body of Christ. Hence by virtue of his commission a simple priest can confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is not a priest. Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders which bear an immediate relation to Christ's body, over the consecration of which the Pope's power is no greater than that of a simple priest.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Although the Eucharist is in itself the greatest of the sacraments, it does not place a man in an office as does the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(1)-RO(5)** — In order to bestow what one has on another, it is necessary not only to be near him but also to have fulness of power. And since a priest has not fulness of power in the hierarchical offices, as a bishop has, it does not follow that he can raise others to the diaconate, although the latter Order is near to his.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)*****Whether heretics and those who are cut off  
from the Church can confer Orders?***

[\*Cf. P(3), Q(64), AA(5),9]

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that heretics and those who are cut off from the Church cannot confer Orders. For to confer Orders is a greater thing than to loose or bind anyone. But a heretic cannot loose or bind. Neither therefore can he ordain.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a priest that is separated from the Church can consecrate, because the character whence he derives this power remains in him indelibly. But a bishop receives no character when he is raised to the episcopate. Therefore he does not necessarily retain the episcopal power after his separation from the Church.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, in no community can one who is expelled therefrom dispose of the offices of the community. Now Orders are offices of the Church. Therefore one who is outside the Church cannot confer Orders.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's passion. Now a heretic is not united to Christ's passion; neither by his own faith, since he is an unbeliever, nor by the faith of the Church, since he is severed from the Church. Therefore he cannot confer the sacrament of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, a blessing is necessary in the conferring of Orders. But a heretic cannot bless; in fact his blessing is turned into a curse, as appears from the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). Therefore he cannot ordain.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** When a bishop who has fallen into heresy is reconciled he is not reconsecrated. Therefore he did not lose the power which he had of conferring Orders.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)** — Further, the power to ordain is greater than the power of Orders. But the power of Orders is not forfeited on account of heresy and the like. Neither therefore is the power to ordain.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)** — Further, as the one who baptizes exercises a merely outward ministry, so does one who ordains, while God works inwardly. But one who is cut off from the Church by no means loses the power to baptize. Neither therefore does he lose the power to ordain.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, on this question four opinions are mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). For some said that heretics, so long as they are tolerated by the Church, retain the power to ordain, but not after they have been cut off from the Church; as neither do those who have been degraded and the like. This is the first opinion. Yet this is impossible, because, happen what may, no power that is given with a consecration can be taken away so long as the thing itself remains, any more than the consecration itself can be annulled, for even an altar or chrism once consecrated remains consecrated for ever. Wherefore, since the episcopal power is conferred by consecration, it must needs endure for ever, however much a man may sin or be cut off from the Church. For this reason others said that those who are cut off from the Church after having episcopal power in the Church, retain the power to ordain and raise others, but that those who are raised by them have not this power. This is the fourth opinion. But this again is impossible, for if those who were ordained in the Church retain the power they received, it is clear that by exercising their power they consecrate validly, and therefore they validly confer whatever power is given with that consecration, and thus those who receive ordination or promotion from them have the same power as they. Wherefore others said that even those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders and the other sacraments, provided they observe the due form and intention, both as to the first effect, which is the conferring of the sacrament, and as to the ultimate effect which is the conferring of grace. This is the second opinion. But this again is inadmissible, since by the very fact that a person communicates in the sacraments with a heretic who is cut off from the Church, he sins, and thus approaches the sacrament insincerely and cannot obtain grace, except perhaps in Baptism in a case of necessity. Hence others say that they confer the sacraments validly, but do not confer grace with them, not that

the sacraments are lacking in efficacy, but on account of the sins of those who receive the sacraments from such persons despite the prohibition of the Church. This is the third and the true opinion.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The effect of absolution is nothing else but the forgiveness of sins which results from grace, and consequently a heretic cannot absolve, as neither can he confer grace in the sacraments. Moreover in order to give absolution it is necessary to have jurisdiction, which one who is cut off from the Church has not.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-RO(2)** — When a man is raised to the episcopate he receives a power which he retains for ever. This, however, cannot be called a character, because a man is not thereby placed in direct relation to God, but to Christ's mystical body. Nevertheless it remains indelibly even as the character, because it is given by consecration.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Those who are ordained by heretics, although they receive an Order, do not receive the exercise thereof, so as to minister lawfully in their Orders, for the very reason indicated in the Objection.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-RO(4)** — They are united to the passion of Christ by the faith of the Church, for although in themselves they are severed from it, they are united to it as regards the form of the Church which they observe.

**P(4)-Q(38)-A(2)-RO(5)** — This refers to the ultimate effect of the sacraments, as the third opinion maintains.

## QUESTION 39

# OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THIS SACRAMENT

### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediments to this sacrament. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving this sacrament?
- (2) Whether lack of the use of reason is?
- (3) Whether the state of slavery is?
- (4) Whether homicide is?
- (5) Whether illegitimate birth is?
- (6) Whether lack of members is?

### P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)

#### *Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?*

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to receiving Orders. For the office of prophet is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just as the priest does between God and people. Now the office of prophet was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from <sup>1224</sup>2 Kings 22:14. Therefore the office of priest also may be competent to them.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, just as Order pertains to a kind of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority as well as martyrdom and the religious state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as in the



case of Debbora, who judged Israel (<sup><1000></sup>Judges 2). Moreover martyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the Church are also competent to them.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference to the reception of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is said (<sup><502></sup>1 Timothy 2:12):

“I suffer not a woman to teach (in the Church),\* nor to use authority over the man.”

[\*The words in parenthesis are from <sup><434></sup>1 Corinthians 14:34, “Let women keep silence in the churches.”]

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)** — Further, the crown is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown or tonsure [i.e., a shaving of the top of the head as required by certain priestly orders] is not befitting to women according to <sup><411></sup>1 Corinthians 11. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Certain things are required in the recipient of a sacrament as being requisite for the validity of the sacrament, and if such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are required, not for the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being congruous to the sacrament; and without these one receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must say that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the second, but also in the first way. Wherefore even though a woman were made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was stated above (**Q(32), A(2)**) that in Extreme Unction it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify the need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is in the state of subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that the male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even in the

Decretals (cap. Mulieres dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i) mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But deaconess there denotes a woman who shares in some act of a deacon, namely who reads the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow, for the word “presbyter” means elder.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God. Wherefore there it is not the signification, but only the thing which is necessary. And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found to be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not the sacrament of Orders.

And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men and women living together. But Debbora exercised authority in temporal, not in priestly matters, even as now woman may have temporal power.

## **P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)**

### ***Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders?***

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that boys and those who lack the use of reason cannot receive Orders. For, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25), the sacred canons have appointed a certain fixed age in those who receive Orders. But this would not be if boys could receive the sacrament of Orders. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the sacrament of Orders ranks above the sacrament of matrimony. Now children and those who lack the use of reason cannot contract matrimony. Neither therefore can they receive Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, act and power are in the same subject, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vigil. i). Now the act of Orders requires the use of reason. Therefore the power of Orders does also.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, one who is raised to Orders before the age of discretion is sometimes allowed to exercise them without being reordained, as appears from Extra., De Cler. per salt. prom. But this would not be the case if he had not received Orders. Therefore a boy can receive Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)** — Further, boys can receive other sacraments in which a character is imprinted, namely Baptism and Confirmation. Therefore in like manner they can receive Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Boyhood and other defects which remove the use of reason occasion an impediment to act. Wherefore the like are unfit to receive all those sacraments which require an act on the part of the recipient of the sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so forth. But since infused powers like natural powers precede acts — although acquired powers follow acts — and the removal of that which comes after does not entail the removal of what comes first, it follows that children and those who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which an act on the part of the recipient is not required for the validity of the sacrament, but some spiritual power is conferred from above; with this difference, however, that in the minor orders the age of discretion is required out of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not for its lawfulness, nor for its validity. Hence some can without sin be raised to the minor orders before the years of discretion, if there be an urgent reason for it and hope of their proficiency. and they are validly ordained; for although at the time they are not qualified for the offices entrusted to them, they will become qualified by being habituated thereto. For the higher Orders, however, the use of reason is required both out of respect for, and for the lawfulness of the sacrament, not only on account of the vow of continency annexed thereto, but also because the handling of the sacraments is entrusted to them [\*See Acts of the Council of Trent: De Reform., Sess. xxii, cap. 4,11,12]. But for the episcopate whereby a man receives power also over the mystical body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is required; wherefore the use of reason is necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration. Some, however, maintain that the use of reason is necessary for the validity of the sacrament in all the Orders. but this statement is not confirmed either by authority or by reason.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)-RO(1)** — As stated in the Article, not all that is necessary for the lawfulness of a sacrament is required for its validity.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The cause of matrimony is consent, which cannot be without the use of reason. Whereas in the reception of Orders no act is required on the part of the recipients since no act on their part is expressed in their consecration. Hence there is no comparison.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Act and power are in the same subject; yet sometimes a power, such as the free-will, precedes its act; and thus it is in the case in point.

### **P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders?***

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the state of slavery is not an impediment to receiving Orders. For corporal subjection is not incompatible with spiritual authority. But in a slave there is corporal subjection. Therefore he is not hindered from receiving the spiritual authority which is given in orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, that which is an occasion for humility should not be an impediment to the reception of a sacrament. Now such is slavery, for the Apostle counsels a man, if possible, rather to remain in slavery (<sup>1172</sup>1 Corinthians 7:21). Therefore it should not hinder him from being raised to Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to become a slave than for a slave to be made a cleric. Yet a cleric may lawfully be sold as a slave; for a bishop of Nola, Paulinus, to wit, sold himself as a slave as related by Gregory (Dial. iii). Much more therefore can a slave be made a cleric.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-O(4)** — *On the contrary*, It would seem that it is an impediment to the validity of the sacrament. For a woman, on account of her subjection, cannot receive the sacrament of Orders. But greater still is the subjection in a slave; since woman was not given to man as his

handmaid (for which reason she was not made from his feet). Therefore neither can a slave receive this sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, a man, from the fact that he receives an Order, is bound to minister in that Order. But he cannot at the same time serve his carnal master and exercise his spiritual ministry. Therefore it would seem that he cannot receive Orders, since the master must be indemnified.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, By receiving Orders a man pledges himself to the Divine offices. And since no man can give what is not his, a slave who has not the disposal of himself, cannot be raised to Orders. If, however, he be raised, he receives the Order, because freedom is not required for the validity of the sacrament, although it is requisite for its lawfulness, since it hinders not the power, but the act only. The same reason applies to all who are under an obligation to others, such as those who are in debt and like persons.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The reception of spiritual power involves also an obligation to certain bodily actions, and consequently it is hindered by bodily subjection.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-RO(2)** — A man may take an occasion for humility from many other things which do not prove a hindrance to the exercise of Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The blessed Paulinus did this out of the abundance of his charity, being led by the spirit of God; as was proved by the result of his action, since by his becoming a slave, many of his flock were freed from slavery. Hence we must not draw a conclusion from this particular instance, since “where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (~~4ENT~~ 2 Corinthians 3:17).

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-RO(4)** — The sacramental signs signify by reason of their natural likeness. Now a woman is a subject by her nature, whereas a slave is not. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(3)-RO(5)** — If he be ordained, his master knowing and not dissenting, by this very fact he becomes a freedman. But if his master be in ignorance, the bishop and he who presented him are bound to pay the

master double the slave's value, if they knew him to be a slave. Otherwise if the slave has possessions of his own, he is bound to buy his freedom, else he would have to return to the bondage of his master, notwithstanding the impossibility of his exercising his Order.

## **P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)**

### ***Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide?***

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide. Because our Orders originated with the office of the Levites, as stated in the previous Distinction (Sent. iv, D, 24). But the Levites consecrated their hands by shedding the blood of their brethren (<sup>(1329)</sup>Exodus 32:29). Therefore neither should anyone in the New Testament be debarred from receiving Orders on account of the shedding of blood.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, no one should be debarred from a sacrament on account of an act of virtue. Now blood is sometimes shed for justice' sake, for instance by a judge; and he who has the office would sin if he did not shed it. Therefore he is not hindered on that account from receiving Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now sometimes a person commits homicide without fault, for instance by defending himself, or again by mishap. Therefore he ought not to incur the punishment of irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Against this there are many canonical statutes [\*Cap. Miror; cap. Clericum; cap. De his Cler., dist. 1; cap. Continebatur, De homic. volunt.], as also the custom of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, All the Orders bear a relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the peace vouchsafed to us by the shedding of Christ's blood. And since homicide is most opposed to peace, and those who slay are conformed to Christ's slayers rather than to Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of the

aforesaid sacrament ought to be conformed, it follows that it is unlawful, although not invalid, for homicides to be raised to Orders.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The Old Law inflicted the punishment of blood, whereas the New Law does not. Hence the comparison fails between the ministers of the Old Testament and those of the New, which is a sweet yoke and a light burden (<sup>4113</sup>Matthew 11:30).

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Irregularity is incurred not only on account of sin, but chiefly on account of a person being unfit to administer the sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence the judge and all who take part with him in a cause of blood, are irregular, because the shedding of blood is unbecoming to the ministers of that sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(4)-RO(3)** — No one does a thing without being the cause thereof, and in man this is something voluntary. Hence he who by mishap slays a man without knowing that it is a man, is not called a homicide, nor does he incur irregularity (unless he was occupying himself in some unlawful manner, or failed to take sufficient care, since in this case the slaying becomes somewhat voluntary). But this is not because he is not in fault, since irregularity is incurred even without fault. Wherefore even he who in a particular case slays a man in self-defense without committing a sin, is none the less irregular [\*St. Thomas is speaking according to the canon law of his time. This is no longer the case now.].

## **P(4)-Q(39)-A(5)**

### ***Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving Orders?***

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that those who are of illegitimate birth should not be debarred from receiving Orders. For the son should not bear the iniquity of the father (<sup>4114</sup>Ezekiel 18:20); and yet he would if this were an impediment to his receiving Orders. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, one's own fault is a greater impediment than the fault of another. Now unlawful intercourse does not always debar a man from receiving Orders. Therefore neither should he be debarred by the unlawful intercourse of his father.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>421</sup>Deuteronomy 23:2):

“A mamzer, that is to say, one born of a prostitute, shall not enter into the Church of the Lord until the tenth generation.”

Much less therefore should he be ordained.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** Those who are ordained are placed in a position of dignity over others. Hence by a kind of propriety it is requisite that they should be without reproach, not for the validity but for the lawfulness of the sacrament, namely that they should be of good repute, bedecked with a virtuous life, and not publicly penitent. And since a man's good name is bedimmed by a sinful origin, therefore those also who are born of an unlawful union are debarred from receiving orders, unless they receive a dispensation; and this is the more difficult to obtain, according as their origin is more discreditable.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(5)-RO(1) —** Irregularity is not a punishment due for sin. Hence it is clear that those who are of illegitimate birth do not bear the iniquity of their father through being irregular.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(5)-RO(2) —** What a man does by his own act can be removed by repentance and by a contrary act; not so the things which are from nature. Hence the comparison fails between sinful act and sinful origin.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(6)**

### ***Whether lack of members should be an impediment?***

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(6)-O(1) —** It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of a lack of members. For one who is afflicted should not receive additional affliction. Therefore a man ought not to be deprived of the degree of Orders on account of his suffering a bodily defect.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(6)-O(2) —** Further, integrity of discretion is more necessary for the act of orders than integrity of body. But some can be ordained before the years of discretion. Therefore they can also be ordained though deficient in body.



**P(4)-Q(39)-A(6) — *On the contrary*,** The like were debarred from the ministry of the Old Law (<sup>(~~Q(21)~~)</sup>Leviticus 21:18, seqq.). Much more therefore should they be debarred in the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(6) —** We shall speak of bigamy in the treatise on Matrimony (**Q(66)**).

**P(4)-Q(39)-A(6) — *I answer that*,** As appears from what we have said above (**AA(3),4,5**), a man is disqualified from receiving Orders, either on account of an impediment to the act, or on account of an impediment affecting his personal comeliness. Hence he who suffers from a lack of members is debarred from receiving Orders, if the defect be such as to cause a notable blemish, whereby a man's comeliness is bedimmed (for instance if his nose be cut off) or the exercise of his Order imperilled; otherwise he is not debarred. This integrity, however, is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

## QUESTION 40

### OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER

#### (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the things that are annexed to the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are seven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether those who are ordained ought to be shaven and tonsured in the form of a crown?
- (2) Whether the tonsure is an Order?
- (3) Whether by receiving the tonsure one renounces temporal goods?
- (4) Whether above the priestly Order there should be an episcopal power?
- (5) Whether the episcopate is an Order?
- (6) Whether in the Church there can be any power above the episcopate?
- (7) Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted by the Church?

#### P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)

#### *Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure?*

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that those who are ordained ought not to wear the tonsure in the shape of a crown. For the Lord threatened captivity and dispersion to those who were shaven in this way: “Of the captivity of the bare head of the enemies” (<sup>4530</sup>Deuteronomy 32:42), and: “I will scatter into every wind them that have their hair cut round” (<sup>2482</sup>Jeremiah 49:32). Now the ministers of Christ should not be

captives, but free. Therefore shaving and tonsure in the shape of a crown does not become them.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the truth should correspond to the figure. Now the crown was prefigured in the Old Law by the tonsure of the Nazarenes, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore since the Nazarenes were not ordained to the Divine ministry, it would seem that the ministers of the Church should not receive the tonsure or shave the head in the form of a crown. The same would seem to follow from the fact that lay brothers, who are not ministers of the Church, receive a tonsure in the religious Orders.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the hair signifies superabundance, because it grows from that which is superabundant. But the ministers of the Church should cast off all superabundance. Therefore they should shave the head completely and not in the shape of a crown.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, According to Gregory, “to serve God is to reign” (Super <sup>Psalm</sup> Psalm 101:23). Now a crown is the sign of royalty. Therefore a crown is becoming to those who are devoted to the Divine ministry.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)** — Further, according to <sup>1</sup>1 Corinthians 11:15, hair is given us “for a covering.” But the ministers of the altar should have the mind uncovered. Therefore the tonsure is becoming to them.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, It is becoming for those who apply themselves to the Divine ministry to be shaven or tonsured in the form of a crown by reason of the shape. Because a crown is the sign of royalty; and of perfection, since it is circular; and those who are appointed to the Divine service acquire a royal dignity and ought to be perfect in virtue. It is also becoming to them as it involves the hair being taken both from the higher part of the head by shaving, lest their mind be hindered by temporal occupations from contemplating Divine things, and from the lower part by clipping, lest their senses be entangled in temporal things.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The Lord threatens those who did this for the worship of demons.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The things that were done in the Old Testament represent imperfectly the things of the New Testament. Hence things pertaining to the ministers of the New Testament were signified not only by the offices of the Levites, but also by all those persons who professed some degree of perfection. Now the Nazarenes professed a certain perfection by having their hair cut off, thus signifying their contempt of temporal things, although they did not have it cut in the shape of a crown, but cut it off completely, for as yet it was not the time of the royal and perfect priesthood. In like manner lay brothers have their hair cut because they renounce temporalities. but they do not shave the head, because they are not occupied in the Divine ministry, so as to have to contemplate Divine things with the mind.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Not only the renunciation of temporalities, but also the royal dignity has to be signified by the form of a crown; wherefore the hair should not be cut off entirely. Another reason is that this would be unbecoming.

## **P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)**

### *Whether the tonsure is an Order?*

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the tonsure is an Order. For in the acts of the Church the spiritual corresponds to the corporal. Now the tonsure is a corporal sign employed by the Church. Therefore seemingly there is some interior signification corresponding thereto; so that a person receives a character when he receives the tonsure, and consequently the latter is an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, just as Confirmation and the other Orders are given by a bishop alone, so is the tonsure. Now a character is imprinted in Confirmation, and the other Orders. Therefore one is imprinted likewise in receiving the tonsure. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Order denotes a degree of dignity. Now a cleric by the very fact of being a cleric is placed on a degree above the people. Therefore the tonsure by which he is made a cleric is an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** No Order is given except during the celebration of Mass. But the tonsure is given even outside the office of the Mass. Therefore it is not an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2) —** Further, in the conferring of every Order mention is made of some power granted, but not in the conferring of the tonsure. Therefore it is not an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** The ministers of the Church are severed from the people in order that they may give themselves entirely to the Divine worship. Now in the Divine worship are certain actions that have to be exercised by virtue of certain definite powers, and for this purpose the spiritual power of order is given; while other actions are performed by the whole body of ministers in common, for instance the recital of the Divine praises. For such things it is not necessary to have the power of Order, but only to be deputed to such an office; and this is done by the tonsure. Consequently it is not an Order but a preamble to Orders.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)-RO(1) —** The tonsure has some spiritual thing inwardly corresponding to it, as signate corresponds to sign; but this is not a spiritual power. Wherefore a character is not imprinted in the tonsure as in an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)-RO(2) —** Although a man does not receive a character in the tonsure, nevertheless he is appointed to the Divine worship. Hence this appointment should be made by the supreme minister, namely the bishop, who moreover blesses the vestments and vessels and whatsoever else is employed in the Divine worship.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(2)-RO(3) —** A man through being a cleric is in a higher state than a layman; but as regards power he has not the higher degree that is required for Orders.

## P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)

### *Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods?*

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that men renounce temporal goods by receiving the tonsure, for when they are tonsured they say: “The Lord is the portion of my inheritance.” But as Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.), “the Lord disdains to be made a portion together with these temporal things.” Therefore he renounces temporalities.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the justice of the ministers of the New Testament ought to abound more than that of the ministers of the Old Testament (<sup><4150></sup>Matthew 5:20). But the ministers of the Old Testament, namely the Levites, did not receive a portion of inheritance with their brethren (<sup><6800></sup>Deuteronomy 10; <sup><6800></sup>Deuteronomy 18). Therefore neither should the ministers of the New Testament.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, Hugh says (De Sacram. ii) that “after a man is made a cleric, he must from thenceforward live on the pay of the Church.” But this would not be so were he to retain his patrimony. Therefore he would seem to renounce it by becoming a cleric.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** Jeremias was of the priestly order (<sup><2000></sup>Jeremiah 1:1). Yet he retained possession of his inheritance (<sup><2600></sup>Jeremiah 32:8). Therefore clerics can retain their patrimony.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)** — Further, if this were not so there would seem to be no difference between religious and the secular clergy.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** Clerics by receiving the tonsure, do not renounce their patrimony or other temporalities; since the possession of earthly things is not contrary to the Divine worship to which clerics are appointed, although excessive care for such things is; for as Gregory says (Moral. x, 30), “it is not wealth but the love of wealth that is sinful.”

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The Lord disdains to be a portion as being loved equally with other things, so that a man place his end in God and the things of the world. He does not, however, disdain to be the portion of

those who so possess the things of the world as not to be withdrawn thereby from the Divine worship.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)-RO(2)** — In the Old Testament the Levites had a right to their paternal inheritance; and the reason why they did not receive a portion with the other tribes was because they were scattered throughout all the tribes, which would have been impossible if, like the other tribes, they had received one fixed portion of the soil.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Clerics promoted to holy orders, if they be poor, must be provided for by the bishop who ordained them; otherwise he is not so bound. And they are bound to minister to the Church in the Order they have received. The words of Hugh refer to those who have no means of livelihood.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)**

***Whether above the priestly Order there  
ought to be an episcopal power?***

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that there ought not to be an episcopal power above the priestly Order. For as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) “the priestly Order originated from Aaron.” Now in the Old Law there was no one above Aaron. Therefore neither in the New Law ought there to be any power above that of the priests.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, powers rank according to acts. Now no sacred act can be greater than to consecrate the body of Christ, whereunto the priestly power is directed. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the priest, in offering, represents Christ in the Church, Who offered Himself for us to the Father. Now no one is above Christ in the Church, since He is the Head of the Church. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, A power is so much the higher according as it extends to more things. Now the priestly power, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), extends only to cleansing and enlightening,

whereas the episcopal power extends both to this and to perfecting. Therefore the episcopal should be above the priestly power.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)** — Further, the Divine ministries should be more orderly than human ministries. Now the order of human ministries requires that in each office there should be one person to preside, just as a general is placed over soldiers. Therefore there should also be appointed over priests one who is the chief priest, and this is the bishop. Therefore the episcopal should be above the priestly power.

I answer that, A priest has two acts: one is the principal, namely to consecrate the body of Christ. the other is secondary, namely to prepare God's people for the reception of this sacrament, as stated above (**Q(37), AA(2),4**). As regards the first act, the priest's power does not depend on a higher power save God's; but as to the second, it depends on a higher and that a human power. For every power that cannot exercise its act without certain ordinances, depends on the power that makes those ordinances. Now a priest cannot loose and bind, except we presuppose him to have the jurisdiction of authority, whereby those whom he absolves are subject to him. But he can consecrate any matter determined by Christ, nor is anything else required for the validity of the sacrament; although, on account of a certain congruousness, the act of the bishop is pre-required in the consecration of the altar, vestments, and so forth. Hence it is clear that it behooves the episcopal to be above the priestly power, as regards the priest's secondary act, but not as regards his primary act.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Aaron was both priest and pontiff, that is chief priest. Accordingly the priestly power originated from him, in so far as he was a priest offering sacrifices, which was lawful even to the lesser priests; but it does not originate from him as pontiff, by which power he was able to do certain things; for instance, to enter once a year the Holy of Holies, which it was unlawful for the other priests to do.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)-RO(2)** — There is no higher power with regard to this act, but with regard to another, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Just as the perfections of all natural things pre-exist in God as their exemplar, so was Christ the exemplar of all ecclesiastical offices. Wherefore each minister of the Church is, in some



respect, a copy of Christ, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Yet he is the higher who represents Christ according to a greater perfection. Now a priest represents Christ in that He fulfilled a certain ministry by Himself, whereas a bishop represents Him in that He instituted other ministers and founded the Church. Hence it belongs to a bishop to dedicate a thing to the Divine offices, as establishing the Divine worship after the manner of Christ. For this reason also a bishop is especially called the bridegroom of the Church even as Christ is.

### **P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)**

#### ***Whether the episcopate is an Order?***

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the episcopate is an Order. First of all, because Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) assigns these three orders to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the bishop, the priest, and the minister. In the text also (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is stated that the episcopal Order is fourfold.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, Order is nothing else but a degree of power in the dispensing of spiritual things. Now bishops can dispense certain sacraments which priests cannot dispense, namely Confirmation and Order. Therefore the episcopate is an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, in the Church there is no spiritual power other than of Order or jurisdiction. But things pertaining to the episcopal power are not matters of jurisdiction, else they might be committed to one who is not a bishop, which is false. Therefore they belong to the power of Order. Therefore the bishop has an Order which a simple priest has not; and thus the episcopate is an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, One Order does not depend on a preceding order as regards the validity of the sacrament. But the episcopal power depends on the priestly power, since no one can receive the episcopal power unless he have previously the priestly power. Therefore the episcopate is not an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)** — Further, the greater Orders are not conferred except on Saturdays [\*The four Ember Saturdays]. But the episcopal power is

bestowed on Sundays [\*Dist. lxxv, can. Ordinationes]. Therefore it is not an Order.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Order may be understood in two ways. In one way as a sacrament, and thus, as already stated (**Q(37)**, **AA(2),4**), every Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Wherefore since the bishop has not a higher power than the priest, in this respect the episcopate is not an Order. In another way Order may be considered as an office in relation to certain sacred actions: and thus since in hierarchical actions a bishop has in relation to the mystical body a higher power than the priest, the episcopate is an Order. It is in this sense that the authorities quoted speak.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Order considered as a sacrament which imprints a character is specially directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which Christ Himself is contained, because by a character we are made like to Christ Himself [\*Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(63)**, **A(3)**]. Hence although at his promotion a bishop receives a spiritual power in respect of certain sacraments, this power nevertheless has not the nature of a character. For this reason the episcopate is not an Order, in the sense in which an Order is a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(5)-RO(3)** — The episcopal power is one not only of jurisdiction but also of Order, as stated above, taking Order in the sense in which it is generally understood.

## **P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)**

### *Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops?*

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that there cannot be anyone in the Church higher than the bishops. For all the bishops are the successors of the apostles. Now the power so given to one of the apostles, namely Peter (~~Q(18)~~ Matthew 16:19), was given to all the apostles (~~Q(18)~~ John 20:23). Therefore all bishops are equal, and one is not above another.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, the rite of the Church ought to be more conformed to the Jewish rite than to that of the Gentiles. Now the distinction of the episcopal dignity and the appointment of one over another, were introduced by the Gentiles. as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24); and there was no such thing in the Old Law. Therefore neither in the Church should one bishop be above another.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, a higher power cannot be conferred by a lower, nor equal by equal, because “without all contradiction that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: ‘better’]”; hence a priest does not consecrate a bishop or a priest, but a bishop consecrates a priest. But a bishop can consecrate any bishop, since even the bishop of Ostia consecrates the Pope. Therefore the episcopal dignity is equal in all matters, and consequently one bishop should not be subject to another, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24).

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, We read in the council of Constantinople: “In accordance with the Scriptures and the statutes and definitions of the canons, we venerate the most holy bishop of ancient Rome the first and greatest of bishops, and after him the bishop of Constantinople.” Therefore one bishop is above another.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)** — Further, the blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, says: “That we may remain members of our apostolic head, the throne of the Roman Pontiffs, of whom it is our duty to seek what we are to believe and what we are to hold, venerating him, beseeching him above others; for his it is to reprove, to correct, to appoint, to loose, and to bind in place of Him Who set up that very throne, and Who gave the fulness of His own to no other, but to him alone, to whom by divine right all bow the head, and the primates of the world are obedient as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.” Therefore bishops are subject to someone even by divine right.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, Wherever there are several authorities directed to one purpose, there must needs be one universal authority over the particular authorities, because in all virtues and acts the order is according to the order of their ends (Ethic. i, 1,2). Now the common good is more Godlike than the particular good. Wherefore above the governing power which aims at a particular good there must be a universal governing power in respect of the common good, otherwise there would be no

cohesion towards the one object. Hence since the whole Church is one body, it behooves, if this oneness is to be preserved, that there be a governing power in respect of the whole Church, above the episcopal power whereby each particular Church is governed, and this is the power of the Pope. Consequently those who deny this power are called schismatics as causing a division in the unity of the Church. Again, between a simple bishop and the Pope there are other degrees of rank corresponding to the degrees of union, in respect of which one congregation or community includes another; thus the community of a province includes the community of a city, and the community of a kingdom includes the community of one province, and the community of the whole world includes the community of one kingdom.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)-RO(1)** — Although the power of binding and loosing was given to all the apostles in common, nevertheless in order to indicate some order in this power, it was given first of all to Peter alone, to show that this power must come down from him to the others. For this reason He said to him in the singular: “Confirm thy brethren” (<sup>4078</sup>Luke 22:32), and: “Feed My sheep” (<sup>4017</sup>John 21:17), i.e. according to Chrysostom: “Be thou the president and head of thy brethren in My stead, that they, putting thee in My place, may preach and confirm thee throughout the world whilst thou sittest on thy throne.”

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The Jewish rite was not spread abroad in various kingdoms and provinces, but was confined to one nation; hence there was no need to distinguish various pontiffs under the one who had the chief power. But the rite of the Church, like that of the Gentiles, is spread abroad through various nations; and consequently in this respect it is necessary for the constitution of the Church to be like the rite of the Gentiles rather than that of the Jews.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(6)-RO(3)** — The priestly power is surpassed by the episcopal power, as by a power of a different kind; but the episcopal is surpassed by the papal power as by a power of the same kind. Hence a bishop can perform every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas a priest cannot perform every act that a bishop can in conferring the sacraments. Wherefore as regards matters pertaining to the episcopal

Order, all bishops are equal, and for this reason any bishop can consecrate another bishop.

### **P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)**

#### ***Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the Church?***

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that the vestments of the ministers are not fittingly instituted in the Church. For the ministers of the New Testament are more bound to chastity than were the ministers of the Old Testament. Now among the vestments of the Old Testament there were the breeches as a sign of chastity. Much more therefore should they have a place among the vestments of the Church's ministers.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more worthy than the priesthood of the Old. But the priests of the Old Testament had mitres, which are a sign of dignity. Therefore the priests of the New Testament should also have them.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, the priest is nearer than the episcopal Order to the Orders of ministers. Now the bishop uses the vestments of the ministers, namely the dalmatic, which is the deacon's vestment, and the tunic, which is the subdeacon's. Much more therefore should simple priests use them.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(4)** — Further, in the Old Law the pontiff wore the ephod [\*Superhumerales, i.e. over-the-shoulders], which signified the burden of the Gospel, as Bede observes (De Tabernac. iii). Now this is especially incumbent on our pontiffs. Therefore they ought to wear the ephod.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(5)** — Further, "Doctrine and Truth" were inscribed on the "rational" which the pontiffs of the Old Testament wore. Now truth was made known especially in the New Law. Therefore it is becoming to the pontiffs of the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(6)** — Further, the golden plate on which was written the most admirable name of God, was the most admirable of the

adornments of the Old Law. Therefore it should especially have been transferred to the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(7)** — Further, the things which the ministers of the Church wear outwardly are signs of inward power. Now the archbishop has no other kind of power than a bishop, as stated above (**A(6)**). Therefore he should not have the pallium which other bishops have not.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-O(8)** — Further, the fulness of power resides in the Roman Pontiff. But he has not a crozier. Therefore other bishops should not have one.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)** — *I answer that,* The vestments of the ministers denote the qualifications required of them for handling Divine things. And since certain things are required of all, and some are required of the higher, that are not so exacted of the lower ministers, therefore certain vestments are common to all the ministers, while some pertain to the higher ministers only. Accordingly it is becoming to all the ministers to wear the “amice” which covers the shoulders, thereby signifying courage in the exercise of the Divine offices to which they are deputed; and the “alb,” which signifies a pure life, and the “girdle,” which signifies restraint of the flesh. But the subdeacon wears in addition the “maniple” on the left arm; this signifies the wiping away of the least stains, since a maniple is a kind of handkerchief for wiping the face; for they are the first to be admitted to the handling of sacred things. They also have the “narrow tunic,” signifying the doctrine of Christ; wherefore in the Old Law little bells hung therefrom, and subdeacons are the first admitted to announce the doctrine of the New Law. The deacon has in addition the “stole” over the left shoulder, as a sign that he is deputed to a ministry in the sacraments themselves, and the “dalmatic” (which is a full vestment, so called because it first came into use in Dalmatia), to signify that he is the first to be appointed to dispense the sacraments: for he dispenses the blood, and in dispensing one should be generous.

But in the case of the priest the “stole” hangs from both shoulders, to show that he has received full power to dispense the sacraments, and not as the minister of another man, for which reason the stole reaches right down. He also wears the “chasuble,” which signifies charity, because he it is who consecrates the sacrament of charity, namely the Eucharist.

Bishops have nine ornaments besides those which the priest has; these are the “stockings, sandals, succinctory, tunic, dalmatic, mitre, gloves, ring, and crozier,” because there are nine things which they can, but priests cannot, do, namely ordain clerics, bless virgins, consecrate bishops, impose hands, dedicate churches, depose clerics, celebrate synods, consecrate chrism, bless vestments and vessels.

We may also say that the “stockings” signify his upright walk; the “sandals” which cover the feet, his contempt of earthly things; the “succinctory” which girds the stole with the alb, his love of probity; the “tunic,” perseverance, for Joseph is said (<sup>43723</sup>Genesis 37:23) to have had a long tunic — “talaric,” because it reached down to the ankles [talos], which denote the end of life; the “dalmatic,” generosity in works of mercy; the “gloves,” prudence in action; the “mitre,” knowledge of both Testaments, for which reason it has two crests; the “crozier,” his pastoral care, whereby he has to gather together the wayward (this is denoted by the curve at the head of the crozier), to uphold the weak (this is denoted by the stem of the crozier), and to spur on the laggards (this is denoted by the point at the foot of the crozier). Hence the line:

*“Gather, uphold, spur on  
The wayward, the weak, and the laggard.”*

The “ring” signifies the sacraments of that faith whereby the Church is espoused to Christ. For bishops are espoused to the Church in the place of Christ. Furthermore archbishops have the “pallium” in sign of their privileged power, for it signifies the golden chain which those who fought rightfully were wont to receive.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(1)** — The priests of the Old Law were enjoined continency only for the time of their attendance for the purpose of their ministry. Wherefore as a sign of the chastity which they had then to observe, they wore the breeches while offering sacrifices. But the ministers of the New Testament are enjoined perpetual continency; and so the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(2)** — The mitre was not a sign of dignity, for it was a kind of hat, as Jerome says (Ep. ad Fabiol.). But the diadem which was a sign of dignity was given to the pontiffs alone, as the mitre is now.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(3)** — The power of the ministers resides in the bishop as their source, but not in the priest, for he does not confer those Orders. Wherefore the bishop, rather than the priest, wears those vestments.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(4)** — Instead of the ephod, they wear the stole, which is intended for the same signification as the ephod.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(5)** — The pallium takes the place of the “rational.”

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(6)** — Instead of that plate our pontiff wears the cross, as Innocent III says (*De Myst. Miss.* i), just as the breeches are replaced by the sandals, the linen garment by the alb, the belt by the girdle, the long or talaric garment by the tunic, the ephod by the amice, the “rational” by the pallium, the diadem by the mitre.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(7)** — Although he has not another kind of power he has the same power more fully. and so in order to designate this perfection, he receives the pallium which surrounds him on all sides.

**P(4)-Q(40)-A(7)-RO(8)** — The Roman Pontiff does not use a pastoral staff because Peter sent his to restore to life a certain disciple who afterwards became bishop of Treves. Hence in the diocese of Treves the Pope carries a crozier but not elsewhere; or else it is a sign of his not having a restricted power denoted by the curve of the staff.



# MATRIMONY

## QUESTIONS 41-67

### QUESTION 41

## OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it

- (1) as directed to an office of nature;
- (2) as a sacrament;
- (3) as considered absolutely and in itself.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is of natural law?
- (2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
- (3) Whether its act is lawful?
- (4) Whether its act can be meritorious?

### P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)

#### *Whether matrimony is of natural law?*

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because “the natural law is what nature has taught all animals” [\*Digest. I, i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural law.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-O(1)** — Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), “at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any marriage tie,” wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, natural things are the same among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends the preservation of the species by generation which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony is not natural.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: “The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law.”

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)** — Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that “man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political society.” But “man is naturally a political and gregarious animal,” as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our parents, namely

“existence,” “nourishment,” and “education.” Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii, 11,12).

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Man’s nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the generic nature, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man’s nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii, 11,12; *Polit.* i) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The assertion of Tully may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for

that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the human race.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-RO(3)** — According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) “human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is.” Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things Divine nowise vary.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above.

## **P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)**

### *Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?*

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (<sup>419b</sup> Matthew 19:6): “What... God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above (**A(1)**). Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, “for the good of the State is more Godlike than the good of one man” (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason

why men were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since then the result would be the same, if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~4178~~ 1 Corinthians 7:38):

“He that giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better [\*Vulg.: ‘He that giveth his virgin in marriage doth well, and he that giveth her not doth better’],”

namely than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage is not now a matter of precept.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2) —** Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [\*Cf. **Q(96), A(5)**]. Therefore matrimony does not come under a precept.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** Nature inclines to a thing in two ways.

In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to that which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals.

Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)-RO(1) —** This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.

The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to Divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative. Wherefore no danger threatens.

### **P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the marriage act is always sinful?*

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For it is written (<sup>(4129)</sup>1 Corinthians 7:29): “That they... who have wives, be as if they had none.” But those who are not married do not perform the marriage act. Therefore even those who are married sin in that act.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, “Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” Now the marriage act divides man from God wherefore the people who were to see God (<sup>(1291)</sup>Exodus 19:11) were commanded not to go near their wives (<sup>(1292)</sup>Exodus 19:20); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Contra Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act “the Holy Ghost touches not the hearts of the prophets.” Therefore it is sinful.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with concupiscence, which is always shameful. Therefore it is always sinful.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin. Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is a sin.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, things alike in species are judged alike. But marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery, since

its end is the same, namely the human species. Therefore since the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue. Now there is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that it absorbs the reason which is man's principal good, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "in that act it is impossible to understand anything." Therefore the marriage act is always a sin.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>4173</sup>1 Corinthians 7:28): "If a virgin marry she hath not sinned," and (<sup>5154</sup>1 Timothy 5:14): "I will... that the younger should marry," and "bear children." But there can be no bearing of children without carnal union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin; else the Apostle would not have approved of it.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)** — Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a matter of precept (<sup>4173</sup>1 Corinthians 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to his life." Therefore it is not a sin.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the good God we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the preservation of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines, are altogether evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue therein; unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created by an evil god, whence perhaps the opinion mentioned in the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a most wicked heresy.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-RO(1)** — By these words the Apostle did not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he said (<sup>4173</sup>1 Corinthians 7:31): "They that use this world" (let them be) "as if they used it not." In each case he forbade enjoyment [\*"Fruitionem," i.e. enjoyment of a thing sought as one's last end]; which is clear from the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not say "let them not use it," or "let them not have them," but let them be "as if they used it not" and "as if they had none."

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-RO(2)** — We are united to God by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore whatever severs the former of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things distracts the mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially the case in carnal intercourse wherein the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who have to contemplate Divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with their wives for that particular time; and it is in this sense that the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did not touch the hearts of the prophets at the time of the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The shamefulfulness of concupiscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulfulness not of guilt, but of punishment inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as evil as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Although they are the same as to their natural species, they differ as to their moral species, which differs in respect of one circumstance, namely intercourse with one's wife and with another than one's wife; just as to kill a man by assault or by justice differentiates the moral species, although the natural species is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other unlawful.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(3)-RO(6)** — The excess of passions that corrupts virtue not only hinders the act of reason, but also destroys the order of reason. The intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the moment man is not being directed, he was previously directed by his reason.



## P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)

### *Whether the marriage act is meritorious?*

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom [\*Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says in his commentary on Matthew: “Although marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it affords them no meed.” Now merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is praiseworthy. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit by receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty. But the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore it is not meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a venial sin. Therefore the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act, for it is said (~~1~~<sup>2</sup> 1 Corinthians 7:3): “Let the husband render the debt to his wife.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)** — Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of a debt. Therefore it is meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40,

**Q(1), A(3); P(2a), Q(18), A(9)**), the marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage act be a virtue, whether of justice that they may render the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship of God, it is meritorious. But if the motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings, namely that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman, it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman, it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue, or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The root of merit, as regards the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the reason for merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The difficulty required for merit of the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required for the essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(41)-A(4)-RO(3)** — First movements in so far as they are venial sins are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of pleasure. This is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently the argument does not prove.

## QUESTION 42

# OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament?
- (2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?
- (3) Whether it confers grace?
- (4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony?

#### **P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)**

#### *Whether matrimony is a sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony is not a sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has a form that is essential to the sacrament. But the blessing given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to matrimony. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a sacrament according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) is “a material element.” But matrimony has not a material element for its matter. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion. But matrimony, since it has pleasure annexed to it, does not conform man to Christ’s Passion, which was painful. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, every sacrament of the New Law causes that which it signifies. Yet matrimony does not cause the union of Christ with the Church, which union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, in the other sacraments there is something which is reality and sacrament. But this is not to be found in matrimony, since it does not imprint a character, else it would not be repeated. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~cf~~ Ephesians 5:32): “This is a great sacrament.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)** — Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But such is Matrimony. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, A sacrament denotes a sanctifying remedy against sin offered to man under sensible signs [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(61), A(1); P(3), Q(65), A(1)**]. Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony, it is reckoned among the sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The words whereby the marriage consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, and not the priest’s blessing, which is a sacramental.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The sacrament of Matrimony, like that of Penance, is perfected by the act of the recipient. Wherefore just as Penance has no other matter than the sensible acts themselves, which take the place of the material element, so it is in Matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although Matrimony is not conformed to Christ’s Passion as regards pain, it is as regards charity, whereby He suffered for the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The union of Christ with the Church is not the reality contained in this sacrament, but is the reality signified and not contained — and no sacrament causes a reality of that kind — but it has another both contained and signified which it causes, as we shall state further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), asserts that it is a non-contained reality, because he was of opinion that Matrimony has no reality contained therein.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(1)-RO(5)** — In this sacrament also those three things [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(66), A(1)**] are to be found, for the acts externally apparent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and wife resulting from those acts is reality and sacrament; and the ultimate reality contained is the

effect of this sacrament, while the non-contained reality is that which the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D, 26).

## **P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)**

### ***Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?***

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that Matrimony ought not to have been instituted before sin. Because that which is of natural law needs not to be instituted. Now such is Matrimony, as stated above (**Q(41), A(1)**). Therefore it ought not to have been instituted.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, sacraments are medicines against the disease of sin. But a medicine is not made ready except for an actual disease. Therefore it should not have been instituted before sin.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, one institution suffices for one thing. Now Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not instituted before sin.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the institution of a sacrament must come from God. Now before sin, the words relating to Matrimony were not definitely said by God but by Adam; the words which God uttered (<sup><002></sup>Genesis 1:22), “Increase and multiply,” were addressed also to the brute creation where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was not instituted before sin.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law. But the sacraments of the New Law took their origin from Christ. Therefore it ought not to have been instituted before sin.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is said (<sup><004></sup>Matthew 19:4):

“Have ye not read that He Who made man  
from the beginning ‘made them male and female’”?

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)** — Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of children. But the begetting of children was necessary to man before sin. Therefore it behooved Matrimony to be instituted before sin.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Nature inclines to marriage with a certain good in view, which good varies according to the different states of man, wherefore it was necessary for matrimony to be variously instituted in the various states of man in reference to that good. Consequently matrimony as directed to the begetting of children, which was necessary even when there was no sin, was instituted before sin; according as it affords a remedy for the wound of sin, it was instituted after sin at the time of the natural law; its institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards personal disqualifications; and it was instituted in the New Law in so far as it represents the mystery of Christ's union with the Church, and in this respect it is a sacrament of the New Law. As regards other advantages resulting from matrimony, such as the friendship and mutual services which husband and wife render one another, its institution belongs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament is essentially a sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature of sacrament applies to matrimony as regards the intermediate institution; that it is fittingly intended to fulfill an office of nature as regards the first institution; and, as regards the last-mentioned institution, that it is directed to fulfill an office of society.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Things which are of natural law in a general way, need to be instituted as regards their determination which is subject to variation according to various states; just as it is of natural law that evil-doers be punished, but that such and such a punishment be appointed for such and such a crime is determined by positive law.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Matrimony is not only for a remedy against sin, but is chiefly for an office of nature; and thus it was instituted before sin, not as intended for a remedy.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-RO(3)** — There is no reason why matrimony should not have had several institutions corresponding to the various things that had to be determined in connection with marriage. Hence these various institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Before sin matrimony was instituted by God, when He fashioned a helpmate for man out of his rib, and said to them: "Increase and multiply." And although this was said also to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by men. As

to Adam's words, he uttered them inspired by God to understand that the institution of marriage was from God.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(2)-RO(5)** — As was clearly stated, matrimony was not instituted before Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)**

### *Whether matrimony confers grace?*

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony does not confer grace. For, according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) "the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, confer an invisible grace." But matrimony has no sanctification essential to it. Therefore grace is not conferred therein.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by virtue of its matter and form. Now the acts which are the matter in this sacrament are not the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy of Pelagius to assert that our acts cause grace); and the words expressive of consent are not the cause of grace, since no sanctification results from them. Therefore grace is by no means given in matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the grace that is directed against the wound of sin is necessary to all who have that wound. Now the wound of concupiscence is to be found in all. Therefore if grace were given in matrimony against the wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract marriage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, sickness does not seek a remedy where it finds aggravation. Now concupiscence is aggravated by concupiscence, because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), "the desire of concupiscence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions." Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in matrimony, as a remedy for concupiscence.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Definition and thing defined should be convertible. Now causality of grace is included in the definition of a sacrament. Since, then, matrimony is a sacrament, it is a cause of grace.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)** — Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Genesis ad lit. ix, 7) that “matrimony affords a remedy to the sick.” But it is not a remedy except in so far as it has some efficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for the repression of concupiscence. Now concupiscence is not repressed except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There have been three opinions on this point. For some [\*Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2] said that matrimony is nowise the cause of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be maintained, for in that case it would in no respect surpass the sacraments of the Old Law. Wherefore there would be no reason for reckoning it among the sacraments of the New Law; since even in the Old Law by the very nature of the act it was able to afford a remedy to concupiscence lest the latter run riot when held in too strict restraint.

Hence others [\*St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26] said that grace is conferred therein as regards the withdrawal from evil, because the act is excused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matrimony. But this would be too little, since it had this also in the Old Law. And so they say that it makes man withdraw from evil, by restraining the concupiscence lest it tend to something outside the marriage blessings, but that this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But this cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders sin and inclines to good, just as the same heat expels cold and gives heat.

Hence others [\*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26] say that matrimony, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer the grace which enables us to do those works which are required in matrimony. and this is more probable, since wherever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He gives also the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use of that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the soul's powers there correspond bodily members by which they can proceed to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man receives by Divine institution the faculty to use his wife for the begetting of children, he also receives the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so; just as we have said of the sacrament of orders (**Q(35), A(1)**). And thus this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this sacrament.



**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Just as the baptismal water by virtue of its contact with Christ's body [\*Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(66)**, **A(3)**, ad 4] is able to "touch the body and cleanse the heart" [\*St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx in Joan.], so is matrimony able to do so through Christ having represented it by His Passion, and not principally through any blessing of the priest.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Just as the water of Baptism together with the form of words results immediately not in the infusion of grace, but in the imprinting of the character, so the outward acts and the words expressive of consent directly effect a certain tie which is the sacrament of matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine institution works dispositively [\*Cf. **Q(18)**, **A(1)**, where St. Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor's notes at the beginning of the Supplement and on that Article] to the infusion of grace.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-RO(3)** — This argument would hold if no more efficacious remedy could be employed against the disease of concupiscence; but a yet more powerful remedy is found in spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who make no use of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(3)-RO(4)** — A remedy can be employed against concupiscence in two ways. First, on the part of concupiscence by repressing it in its root, and thus matrimony affords a remedy by the grace given therein. Secondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first, by depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of its outward shamefulness, and this is done by the marriage blessings which justify carnal concupiscence; secondly, by hindering the shameful act, which is done by the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline so much to other wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says (<sup>419</sup>1 Corinthians 7:9): "It is better to marry than to burn." For though the works congenial to concupiscence are in themselves of a nature to increase concupiscence, yet in so far as they are directed according to reason they repress concupiscence, because like acts result in like dispositions and habits.

## P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)

### *Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that carnal intercourse is an integral part of marriage. For at the very institution of marriage it was declared (<sup>(402)</sup>Genesis 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” Now this is not brought about save by carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, that which belongs to the signification of a sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as we have stated above (A(2); Q(9), A(1)). Now carnal intercourse belongs to the signification of matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, this sacrament is directed to the preservation of the species. But the species cannot be preserved without carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inasmuch as it affords a remedy against concupiscence; according to the Apostle’s saying (<sup>(419)</sup>1 Corinthians 7:9): “It is better to marry than to burn.” But it does not afford this remedy to those who have no carnal intercourse. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4) — *On the contrary,*** There was matrimony in Paradise, and yet there was no carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is not an integral part of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4) —** Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanctification. But matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse, according to the text (Sent. D, 26). Therefore carnal intercourse is not necessary for the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4) — *I answer that,*** Integrity is twofold. One regards the primal perfection consisting in the very essence of a thing; the other regards the secondary perfection consisting in operation. Since then carnal intercourse is an operation or use of marriage which gives the faculty for

that intercourse, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to the latter, and not to the former integrity of marriage [\*Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(29)**, **A(2)**].

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Adam expressed the integrity of marriage in regard to both perfections, because a thing is known by its operation.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Signification of the thing contained is necessary for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse belongs not to this signification, but to the thing not contained, as appears from what was said above (**A(1)**, ad 4,5).

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-RO(3)** — A thing does not reach its end except by its own act. Wherefore, from the fact that the end of matrimony is not attained without carnal intercourse, it follows that it belongs to the second and not to the first integrity.

**P(4)-Q(42)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Before carnal intercourse marriage is a remedy by virtue of the grace given therein, although not by virtue of the act, which belongs to the second integrity.

## QUESTION 43

# OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL

### (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we must treat

- (1) of the betrothal;
- (2) of the nature of matrimony;
- (3) of its efficient cause, namely the consent;
- (4) of its blessings;
- (5) of the impediments thereto;
- (6) of second marriages;
- (7) of certain things annexed to marriage.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) What is the betrothal?
- (2) Who can contract a betrothal?
- (3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled?

### P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)

#### *Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a betrothal is not rightly defined “a promise of future marriage,” as expressed in the words of Pope Nicholas I (Resp. ad Consul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), “a man is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving his troth [spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores]”. Now a person is said to be

betrothed by reason of his betrothal. Therefore it is wrongly described as a promise.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whoever promises a thing must be compelled to fulfill his promise. But those who have contracted a betrothal are not compelled by the Church to fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a promise.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, sometimes a betrothal does not consist of a mere promise, but an oath is added, as also certain pledges. Therefore seemingly it should not be defined as a mere promise.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, marriage should be free and absolute. But a betrothal is sometimes expressed under a condition even of money to be received. Therefore it is not fittingly described as a promise of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, promising about the future is blamed in <sup>3043</sup>James 4:13, seqq. But there should be nothing blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore one ought not to make a promise of future marriage.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, no man is called a spouse except on account of his espousals. But a man is said to be a spouse on account of actual marriage, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals are not always a promise of future marriage.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Consent to conjugal union if expressed in words of the future does not make a marriage, but a promise of marriage; and this promise is called “a betrothal from plighting one’s troth,” as Isidore says (Etym. iv). For before the use of writing-tablets, they used to give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mutual consent under the marriage code, and they provided guarantors. This promise is made in two ways, namely absolutely, or conditionally. Absolutely, in four ways: firstly, a mere promise, by saying: “I will take thee for my wife,” and conversely; secondly, by giving betrothal pledges, such as money and the like; thirdly, by giving an engagement ring; fourthly, by the addition of an oath. If, however, this promise be made conditionally, we must draw a distinction; for it is either an honorable condition, for instance if we say: “I will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and then the promise holds if the condition is fulfilled, and does not hold if the condition is not

fulfilled; or else the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: for either it is contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we were to say: “I will take thee if thou promise means of sterility,” and then no betrothal is contracted; or else it is not contrary to the marriage blessings, as were one to say: “I will take thee if thou consent to my thefts,” and then the promise holds, but the condition should be removed.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The betrothal itself and giving of sureties are a ratification of the promise, wherefore it is denominated from these as from that which is more perfect.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-RO(2)** — By this promise one party is bound to the other in respect of contracting marriage; and he who fulfills not his promise sins mortally, unless a lawful impediment arise; and the Church uses compulsion in the sense that she enjoins a penance for the sin. But he is not compelled by sentence of the court, because compulsory marriages are wont to have evil results; unless the parties be bound by oath, for then he ought to be compelled, in the opinion of some, although others think differently on account of the reason given above, especially if there be fear of one taking the other’s life.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Such things are added only in confirmation of the promise, and consequently they are not distinct from it.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The condition that is appended does not destroy the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlawful, it should be renounced; and if it be lawful, it is either about things that are good simply, as were one to say, “I will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and such a condition does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives it an increase of rectitude. or else it is about things that are useful, as were one to say: “I will marry thee if thou pay me a hundred pounds,” and then this condition is appended, not as asking a price for the consent of marriage, but as referring to the promise of a dowry; so that the marriage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the condition appended is the payment of a sum of money by way of penalty, and then, since marriage should be free, such a condition does not hold, nor can such a penalty be exacted from a person who is unwilling to fulfill the promise of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-RO(5)** — James does not intend to forbid altogether the making of promises about the future, but the making of promises as though one were certain of one's life; hence he teaches that we ought to add the condition. "If the Lord will," which, though it be not expressed in words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(1)-RO(6)** — In marriage we may consider both the marriage union and the marriage act; and on account of his promise of the first as future a man is called a "spouse" from his having contracted his espousals by words expressive of the future; but from the promise of the second a man is called a "spouse," even when the marriage has been contracted by words expressive of the present, because by this very fact he promises [spondet] the marriage act. However, properly speaking, espousals are so called from the promise [sponsione] in the first sense, because espousals are a kind of sacramental annexed to matrimony, as exorcism to baptism.

## **P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)**

### *Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?*

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge of either of the persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be arranged before the age of seven years as well as after.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin. Now, as Gregory says (Dial. iv), a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore a betrothal can take place before the age of seven years.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future marriage can be agreeable to one. Now signs of this agreeableness are

often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore they can become betrothed before that age.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before the age of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present, they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is not by virtue of the second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue of the first; and thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those who row a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the contracting parties. Therefore if one be of mature age, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced in the other.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-O(7)** — Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the present are reputed to be married. Therefore in like manner if they contract marriage by words expressive of the future, before yet close on the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise of the future, as already stated (**A(1)**), it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is only for those who can have some foresight of the future, and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from another; the second stage is when a man can learn from another but is incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in man by little and little, in proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first stage of reason before his seventh year; and consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and therefore for betrothal. But he begins to reach



the second stage at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent to school. But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when his natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end of his third seven years. Hence before his first seven years a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he begins to be fit to make certain promises for the future, especially about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted. But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion or to wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also; and according to the laws he is given the power of disposing of his property after his twenty-second year.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(1)** — If the parties are betrothed by another person before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur; wherefore in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made between certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur when they reach the proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what others have done.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this story was not lost, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this vision was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this is contrary to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that “the boy’s father having neglected the soul of his little son, fostered no little sinner for the flames of hell.” Consequently it must be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is to something future; and greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than for consenting to one present act. Wherefore a man can sin mortally before he can bind himself to a future obligation.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Regarding the age for the marriage contract a disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to

procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for the act of procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist. Anim. vii), whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason which is the sole condition for betrothal, hence it is that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards marriage.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(4)** — This agreeableness in regard to boys under the age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they are not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather from the movement of nature than from any process of reason. Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a betrothal.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(5)** — In this case, although the second contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify their former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(6)** — Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another. But those who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal can only be between two parties; wherefore it is necessary for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it be supplied by the other.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(2)-RO(7)** — It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of betrothal is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56), “when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking.” Some fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it according to the condition of the contracting parties, since the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)**

### *Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?*

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing

to someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore he cannot make a further offering of himself to God in religion.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(2)** — Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for him. Therefore she is bound to wait for him.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(3)** — Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed to him. Therefore a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily infirmity.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(4)** — Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, for instance if the spouse were to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affianced bride would be penalized for the sin of her affianced spouse, which is unreasonable.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(5)** — Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together and then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(6)** — Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would seem that they nowise sin against one another if meanwhile they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal should not be dissolved on that account.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(7)** — Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore neither should a second contract void a previous one.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-O(8)** — Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore it cannot be dissolved.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of them — namely when a party enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses contracts with another party by words expressive of the present — the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other cases it has to be dissolved according to the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The like promise is dissolved by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on (**Q(61), A(2)**).

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(2)** — This doubt is solved by either party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage. Wherefore if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if he or she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance for the broken promise — or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath — and he or she can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(3)** — If either of the betrothed parties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which is wont to be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the betrothed be displeasing to one another, and the marriage thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from one's penalty, and this is not unreasonable.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(4)** — If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or “vice versa,” the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature in the future are voided of their effects, not only by what actually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence just as affinity, had it existed at the

time of the betrothal, would have prevented that contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of its effect. Nor does the other party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, being set free from one who has become hateful to God by committing fornication.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Some do not admit this case. Yet they have against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, De spons. et matr.) which says expressly: “Just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back, so it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one another should set one another free.” Yet to this they say that the Church allows this lest worse happen rather than because it is according to strict law. But this does not seem to agree with the example quoted by the Decretal.

Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof of fickleness to rescind an agreement, since “our counsels are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14).

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(6)** — Although when they become betrothed they have not yet given one another power over one another’s body, yet if this [\*Referring to the contention of the Objection] were to happen it would make them suspicious of one another’s fidelity; and so one can ensure himself against the other by breaking off the engagement.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(7)** — This argument would hold if each contract were of the same kind; whereas the second contract of marriage has greater force than the first, and consequently dissolves it.

**P(4)-Q(43)-A(3)-RO(8)** — Although it was not a true betrothal, there was a betrothal of a kind; and consequently, lest approval should seem to be given when they come to the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution of the betrothal by the judgment of the Church, for the sake of a good example.

## QUESTION 44

### OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?
- (2) Whether it is fittingly named?
- (3) Whether it is fittingly defined?

#### P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)

#### *Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?*

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony is not a kind of joining. Because the bond whereby things are tied together differs from their joining, as cause from effect. Now matrimony is the bond whereby those who are joined in matrimony are tied together. Therefore it is not a kind of joining.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, it is not a kind of relation, and consequently neither is it a kind of joining.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, a joining is a relation of equiparance as well as of equality. Now according to Avicenna the relation of equality is not identically the same in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an identically same joining; and consequently if matrimony is a kind of joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and wife.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is by relation that things are related to one another. Now by matrimony certain things are related to one another; for the husband is the wife's husband, and the wife is the

husband's wife. Therefore matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it other than a joining.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)** — Further, the union of two things into one can result only from their being joined. Now such is the effect of matrimony (<sup><102></sup>Genesis 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, A joining denotes a kind of uniting, and so wherever things are united there must be a joining. Now things directed to one purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in following one military calling or in pursuing one business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or business partners. Hence, since by marriage certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining, through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Matrimony is the bond by which they are tied formally, not effectively, and so it need not be distinct from the joining.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although relation is not itself a sensible accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it necessary in a sacrament for that which is both reality and sacrament [<sup>\*</sup>Cf. **P(3), Q(66), A(1)**] to be sensible (for such is the relation of the aforesaid joining to this sacrament), whereas the words expressive of consent, which are sacrament only and are the cause of that same joining, are sensible.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(1)-RO(3)** — A relation is founded on something as its cause — for instance likeness is founded on quality — and on something as its subject — for instance in the things themselves that are like; and on either hand we may find unity and diversity of relation. Since then it is not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness, but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects, and since, moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in number, and the same applies to equality, it follows that both equality and likeness are in every way numerically distinct in either of the like or equal subjects. But the relations of matrimony, on the

one hand, have unity in both extremes, namely on the part of the cause, since it is directed to the one identical begetting; whereas on the part of the subject there is numerical diversity. The fact of this relation having a diversity of subjects is signified by the terms “husband” and “wife,” while its unity is denoted by its being called matrimony.

## **P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)**

### ***Whether matrimony is fittingly named?***

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly named. Because a thing should be named after that which ranks higher. But the father ranks above the mother. Therefore the union of father and mother should rather be named after the father.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a thing should be named from that which is essential to it, since a “definition expresses the nature signified by a name” (Metaph. iv, 28). Now nuptials are not essential to matrimony. Therefore matrimony should not be called nuptials.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a species cannot take its proper name from that which belongs to the genus. Now a joining [conjunctio] is the genus of matrimony. Therefore it should not be called a conjugal union.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, stands the common use of speech.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Three things may be considered in matrimony. First, its essence, which is a joining together, and in reference to this it is called the “conjugal union”; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding, and in reference to this it is called the “nuptial union” from “nubo” [\*The original meaning of ‘nubo’ is ‘to veil’], because at the wedding ceremony, whereby the marriage is completed, the heads of those who are wedded are covered with a veil [\*This is still done in some countries]; thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this it is called “matrimony,” as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), because “a woman’s sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood.” Matrimony may also be resolved into “matris munium” [\*i.e. munus], i.e. a mother’s duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly devolves on the women; or into “matrem muniens,” because it provides



the mother with a protector and support in the person of her husband; or into “matrem monens,” as admonishing her not to leave her husband and take up with another man; or into “materia unius,” because it is a joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived from {monos} and “materia”; or into “matre” and “nato,” as Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a woman the mother of a child.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. or we may say that woman was made chiefly in order to be man’s helpmate in relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this purpose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of marriage than the father has.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, wherefore some things can be named even after their accidentals, since a name is given to a thing for the purpose that it may become known.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Sometimes a species is named after something pertaining to the genus on account of an imperfection in the species, when namely it has the generic nature completely, yet adds nothing pertaining to dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name of property, which is common to it and to the definition. Sometimes, however, it is on account of a perfection, when we find the generic nature completely in one species and not in another; thus animal is named from soul [anima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is the genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly in those animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with the case in point. for the joining of husband and wife by matrimony is the greatest of all joinings, since it is a joining of soul and body, wherefore it is called a “conjugal” union.

## P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)

### *Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?*

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly defined in the text\* (Sent. iv, D, 27). [\*The definition alluded to is as follows: “Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living together in undivided partnership.”] For it is necessary to mention matrimony in defining a husband, since it is the husband who is joined to the woman in matrimony. Now “marital union” is put in the definition of matrimony. Therefore in these definitions there would seem to be a vicious circle.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, matrimony makes the woman the man’s wife no less than it makes the man the woman’s husband. Therefore it should not be described as a “marital union” rather than an uxorial union.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to morals. Yet it often happens that married persons differ very much in habit. Therefore the words “involving their living together [consuetudinem] in undivided partnership” should have no place in the definition of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, we find other definitions given of matrimony, for according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), “matrimony is the lawful consent of two apt persons to be joined together.” Also, according to some, “matrimony is the fellowship of a common life and a community regulated by Divine and human law”; and we ask how these definitions differ.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (A(2)), three things are to be considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its essence, and its effect; and accordingly we find three definitions given of matrimony. For the definition of Hugh indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this definition is self-evident. The definition given in the text indicates the essence of matrimony, namely the “union,” and adds determinate subjects by the words “between lawful persons.” It also points to the difference of the contracting parties in reference to the species, by the word “marital,” for since matrimony is a joining together for the purpose of some one

thing, this joining together is specified by the purpose to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to the husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this joining — for it is indissoluble — by the words “involving,” etc.

The remaining definition indicates the effect to which matrimony is directed, namely the common life in family matters. And since every community is regulated by some law, the code according to which this community is directed, namely Divine and human law, finds a place in this definition. while other communities, such as those of traders or soldiers, are established by human law alone.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Sometimes the prior things from which a definition ought to be given are not known to us, and consequently certain things are defined from things that are posterior simply, but prior to us; thus in the definition of quality the Philosopher employs the word “such” [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that “quality is that whereby we are said to be such.” Thus, too, in defining matrimony we say that it is a “marital union,” by which we mean that matrimony is a union for the purpose of those things required by the marital office, all of which could not be expressed in one word.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-RO(2)** — As stated (**A(2)**), this difference indicates the end of the union. And since, according to the Apostle (<sup>419</sup>1 Corinthians 11:9), the “man is not [Vulg.: ‘was not created’] for the woman, but the woman for the man,” it follows that this difference should be indicated in reference to the man rather than the woman.

**P(4)-Q(44)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Just as the civic life denotes not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular kind of companionship pertaining to that common action. wherefore as regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always indivisible, although it is divisible as regards the act belonging to each party.

The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what has been said above.

## QUESTION 45

# OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent; and the fourth is the object of the consent.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?
- (2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?
- (3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?
- (4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly?
- (5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage?

### P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)

#### *Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?*

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on the Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2; **P(3), Q(64), A(2)**). But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which signifies the union of Christ with the Church.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, of one thing there should be one cause. Now there is one marriage between two persons, as stated above (**Q(44)**, **A(1)**); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they are given by different persons and to different things, since on the one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent is not the cause of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Chrysostom [\*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “It is not coition but consent that makes a marriage.”

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)** — Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter’s consent. Now by marriage each of the married parties receives power over the other’s body (<sup>4TH</sup>1 Corinthians 7:4), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, In every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing. Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material joining together, in so far as it is directed to an office of nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the effect of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material contracts are effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or instrumental causes are material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above (**Q(44)**, **A(1)**), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the consent,

properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband.

### **P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)**

#### *Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?*

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that there is no need for the consent to be expressed in words. For a man is brought under another's power by a vow just as he is by matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God's sight, even though it be not expressed in words. Therefore consent also makes a marriage binding even without being expressed in words.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, there can be marriage between persons who are unable to express their mutual consent in words, through being dumb or of different languages. Therefore expression of the consent by words is not required for matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, if that which is essential to a sacrament be omitted for any reason whatever, there is no sacrament. Now there is a case of marriage without the expression of words if the maid is silent through bashfulness when her parents give her away to the bridegroom. Therefore the expression of words is not essential to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a sensible sign is required in every sacrament. Therefore it is also required in matrimony, and consequently there must needs be at least words by which the consent is made perceptible to the senses.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)** — Further, in matrimony there is a contract between husband and wife. Now in every contract there must be expression of the

words by which men bind themselves mutually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also the consent must be expressed in words.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* As stated above (**A(1)**), the marriage union is effected in the same way as the bond in material contracts. And since material contracts are not feasible unless the contracting parties express their will to one another in words, it follows that the consent which makes a marriage must also be expressed in words, so that the expression of words is to marriage what the outward washing is to Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)-RO(1)** — In a vow there is not a sacramental but only a spiritual bond, wherefore there is no need for it to be done in the same way as material contracts, in order that it be binding, as in the case of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although the like cannot plight themselves to one another in words, they can do so by signs, and such signs count for words.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(2)-RO(3)** — According to Hugh of S. Victor (Tract. vii, Sum. Sent.), persons who are being married should give their consent by accepting one another freely. and this is judged to be the case if they show no dissent when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such a case the words of the parents are taken as being the maid's, for the fact that she does not contradict them is a sign that they are her words.

### **P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?***

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage. For as present is to present, so is future to future. But consent given in words expressive of the present makes a marriage in the present. Therefore consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage in the future.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, in other civil contracts, just as in matrimony, a certain obligation results from the words expressing consent. Now in other contracts it matters not whether the obligation is effected by words of the present or of the future tense. Therefore neither does it make any difference in matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, by the religious vow man contracts a spiritual marriage with God. Now the religious vow is expressed in words of the future tense, and is binding. Therefore carnal marriage also can be effected by words of the future tense.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, A man who consents in words of the future tense to take a particular woman as his wife, and after, by words of the present tense, consents to take another, according to law must take the second for his wife (cap. Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et matr.). But this would not be the case if consent given in words of the future tense made a marriage, since from the very fact that his marriage with the one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, marry another. Therefore consent given in words of the future tense does not make a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)** — Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does it not yet. Now he who consents in words of the future tense, promises to marry a certain woman. Therefore he does not marry her yet.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The sacramental causes produce their effect by signifying it; hence they effect what they signify. Since therefore when a man expresses his consent by words of the future tense, he does not signify that he is marrying, but promises that he will marry, it follows that a consent expressed in this manner does not make a marriage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage, and this promise is known as a betrothal [sponsalia].

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)-RO(1)** — When consent is expressed in words of the present tense, not only are the words actually present, but consent is directed to the present, so that they coincide in point of time; but when consent is given in words of the future tense, although the words are actually present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence they do not coincide in point of time. For this reason the comparison fails.



**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Even in other contracts, a man who uses words referring to the future, does not transfer the power over his property to another person — for instance if he were to say “I will give thee” — but only when he uses words indicative of the present.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(3)-RO(3)** — In the vow of religious profession it is not the spiritual marriage itself that is expressed in words which refer to the future, but an act of the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or observance of the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual marriage in the future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not become a monk by taking such a vow, but promises to become one.

### **P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)**

#### ***Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in words of the present?***

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that even in the absence of inward consent a marriage is made by consent expressed in words of the present. For “fraud and deceit should benefit no man,” according to the law (cap. Ex Tenore, De Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.). Now he who gives consent in words without consenting in heart commits a fraud. Therefore he should not benefit by it, through being released of the bond of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the mental consent of one person cannot be known to another, except in so far as it is expressed in words. If then the expression of the words is not enough, and inward consent is required in both parties, neither of them will be able to know that he is truly married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses marriage he will commit fornication.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, if a man is proved to have consented to take a certain woman to wife in words of the present tense, he is compelled under pain of excommunication to take her as his wife, even though he should say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstanding that afterwards he may have contracted marriage with another woman by words expressive of consent in the present. But this

would not be the case if mental consent were requisite for marriage. Therefore it is not required.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap. Tua Nos, De Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: “Other things cannot complete the marriage bond in the absence of consent.”

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4) —** Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments. Now he who consents not in his heart has no intention of contracting marriage; and therefore he does not contract a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** The outward cleansing stands in the same relation to baptism as the expression of words to this sacrament, as stated above (**A(2)**). Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the intention, not of receiving the sacrament, but of acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of words without inward consent makes no marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)-RO(1) —** There are two things here, namely the lack of consent — which benefits him in the tribunal of his conscience so that he is not bound by the marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the Church where judgment is pronounced according to the evidence — and the deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, neither in the tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of the Church, since in both he is punished for this.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)-RO(2) —** If mental consent is lacking in one of the parties, on neither side is there marriage, since marriage consists in a mutual joining together, as stated above (**Q(44)**, **A(1)**). However one may believe that in all probability there is no fraud unless there be evident signs thereof; because we must presume good of everyone, unless there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party in whom there is no fraud is excused from sin on account of ignorance.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(4)-RO(3) —** In such a case the Church compels him to hold to his first wife, because the Church judges according to outward appearances; nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she is deceived in the facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the excommunication rather than return to his first wife; or else he should go far away into another country.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)*****Whether consent given secretly in words  
of the present makes a marriage?***

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that consent given secretly in words of the present does not make a marriage. For a thing that is in one person's power is not transferred to the power of another without the consent of the person in whose power it was. Now the maid is in her father's power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to a husband's power without her father's consent. Wherefore if consent be given secretly, even though it should be expressed in words of the present, there will be no marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, in penance, just as in matrimony, our act is as it were essential to the sacrament. But the sacrament of penance is not made complete except by means of the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither can marriage be perfected without the priest's blessing.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the Church does not forbid baptism to be given secretly, since one may baptize either privately or publicly. But the Church does forbid the celebration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum inhibito, De clandest. despons.). Therefore they cannot be done secretly.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, marriage cannot be contracted by those who are related in the second degree, because the Church has forbidden it. But the Church has also forbidden clandestine marriages. Therefore they cannot be valid marriages.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, Given the cause the effect follows. Now the sufficient cause of matrimony is consent expressed in words of the present. Therefore whether this be done in public or in private the result is a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)** — Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due form of a sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a secret marriage there is the due matter, since there are persons who are able lawfully to contract

— and the due form, since there are the words of the present expressive of consent. Therefore there is a true marriage.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Just as in the other sacraments certain things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted there is no sacrament, while certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless validly performed, although it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent expressed in words of the present between persons lawfully qualified to contract makes a marriage, because these two conditions are essential to the sacrament; while all else belongs to the solemnization of the sacrament, as being done in order that the marriage may be more fittingly performed. Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage, although the contracting parties sin, unless they have a lawful motive for being excused. [\*Clandestine marriages have since been declared invalid by the Council of Trent (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law of his time.]

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The maid is in her father's power, not as a female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for the purpose of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into another's power without her father's consent, even as a son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion without their parent's consent.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-RO(2)** — In penance our act, although essential to the sacrament, does not suffice for producing the proximate effect of the sacrament, namely forgiveness of sins, and consequently it is necessary that the act of the priest intervene in order that the sacrament be perfected. But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the production of the proximate effect, which is the marriage bond, because whoever has the right to dispose of himself can bind himself to another. Consequently the priest's blessing is not required for matrimony as being essential to the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-RO(3)** — It is also forbidden to receive baptism otherwise than from a priest, except in a case of necessity. But matrimony is not a necessary sacrament: and consequently the comparison fails. However, clandestine marriages are forbidden on account of the evil results

to which they are liable, since it often happens that one of the parties is guilty of fraud in such marriages; frequently, too, they have recourse to other nuptials when they repent of having married in haste; and many other evils result therefrom, besides which there is something disgraceful about them.

**P(4)-Q(45)-A(5)-RO(4)** — Clandestine marriages are not forbidden as though they were contrary to the essentials of marriage, in the same way as the marriages of unlawful persons, who are undue matter for this sacrament; and hence there is no comparison.

## QUESTION 46

# OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED


### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse is appended. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?
- (2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a marriage?

### P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)

#### *Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that if an oath be added to a consent that is expressed in words of the future tense it makes a marriage. For no one can bind himself to act against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling of an oath is of Divine law according to  Matthew 5:33, “Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.” Consequently no subsequent obligation can relieve a man of the obligation to keep an oath previously taken. If, therefore, after consenting to marry a woman by words expressive of the future and confirming that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to another woman by words expressive of the present, it would seem that none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. But this would not be the case unless that oath made the marriage complete. Therefore an oath affixed to a consent expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, Divine truth is stronger than human truth. Now an oath confirms a thing with the Divine truth. Since then

words expressive of consent in the present in which there is mere human truth complete a marriage, it would seem that much more is this the case with words of the future confirmed by an oath.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, according to the Apostle (<sup>scrip</sup> Hebrews 6:16), “An oath for confirmation is the end of all... controversy”; wherefore in a court of justice at any rate one must stand by an oath rather than by a mere affirmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman by a simple affirmation expressed in words of the present, after having consented to marry another in words of the future confirmed by oath, it would seem that in the judgment of the Church he should be compelled to take the first and not the second as his wife.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the simple uttering of words relating to the future makes a betrothal. But the addition of an oath must have some effect. Therefore it makes something more than a betrothal. Now beyond a betrothal there is nothing but marriage. Therefore it makes a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, What is future is not yet. Now the addition of an oath does not make words of the future tense signify anything else than consent to something future. Therefore it is not a marriage yet.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)** — Further, after a marriage is complete, no further consent is required for the marriage. But after the oath there is yet another consent which makes the marriage, else it would be useless to swear to a future marriage. Therefore it does not make a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, An oath is employed in confirmation of one's words; wherefore it confirms that only which is signified by the words, nor does it change their signification. Consequently, since it belongs to words of the future tense, by their very signification, not to make a marriage, since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even though an oath be added to the promise, the marriage is not made yet, as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The fulfilling of a lawful oath is of Divine law, but not the fulfilling of an unlawful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent obligation makes that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he who does not keep the oath he took previously does not disobey the Divine

law. And so it is in the case in point; since he swears unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and a promise about another's property is unlawful. Consequently the subsequent consent by words of the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to another woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which was lawful before.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The Divine truth is most efficacious in confirming that to which it is applied. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The oath has some effect, not by causing a new obligation, but confirming that which is already made, and thus he who violates it sins more grievously.

### **P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)**

#### *Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage. For consent by deed is greater than consent by word. But he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the promise he has previously made. Therefore it would seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he were to consent to mere words referring to the present.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, not only explicit but also interpretive consent makes a marriage. Now there can be no better interpretation of consent than carnal intercourse. Therefore marriage is completed thereby.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, all carnal union outside marriage is a sin. But the woman, seemingly, does not sin by admitting her betrothed to carnal intercourse. Therefore it makes a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, “Sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made,” as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.). Now a man cannot reinstate a woman whom he has violated under the pretense of marriage unless he marry her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after his carnal intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words of the present



tense, he is bound to return to the first; and this would not be the case unless he were married to her. Therefore carnal intercourse after consent referring to the future makes a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Consult. Bulg. iii; Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), “Without the consent to marriage, other things, including coition, are of no effect.”

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2) —** Further, that which follows a thing does not make it. But carnal intercourse follows the actual marriage, as effect follows cause. Therefore it cannot make a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** We may speak of marriage in two ways. First, in reference to the tribunal of conscience, and thus in very truth carnal intercourse cannot complete a marriage the promise of which has previously been made in words expressive of the future, if inward consent is lacking, since words, even though expressive of the present, would not make a marriage in the absence of mental consent, as stated above (**Q(45), A(4)**). Secondly, in reference to the judgment of the Church; and since in the external tribunal judgment is given in accordance with external evidence, and since nothing is more expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that in the judgment of the Church carnal intercourse following on betrothal is declared to make a marriage, unless there appear clear signs of deceit or fraud [\*According to the pre-Tridentine legislation] (De sponsal. et matrim., cap. Is qui fidem).

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-RO(1) —** In reality he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the act of sexual union, and does not merely for this reason consent to marriage except according to the interpretation of the law.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-RO(2) —** This interpretation does not alter the truth of the matter, but changes the judgment which is about external things.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-RO(3) —** If the woman admit her betrothed, thinking that he wishes to consummate the marriage, she is excused from the sin, unless there be clear signs of fraud; for instance if they differ considerably in birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear. Nevertheless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and should be punished for this fraud he has committed.

**P(4)-Q(46)-A(2)-RO(4)** — In a case of this kind the affianced husband, before his marriage with the other woman, is bound to marry the one to whom he was betrothed, if she be his equal or superior in rank. But if he has married another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill his obligation, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. Nor is he bound even to do this, according to some, if her affianced husband is of much higher rank than she, or if there be some evident sign of fraud, because it may be presumed that in all probability she was not deceived but pretended to be.

## QUESTION 47

### OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT

#### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether compulsory consent is possible?
- (2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?
- (3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage?
- (4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party using compulsion?
- (5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?
- (6) Whether one can be compelled by one's father to marry?

#### P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)

##### *Whether a compulsory consent is possible?*

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [**\*P(2a), Q(6), A(4)**]) the free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore it cannot be compulsory.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, violent is the same as compulsory. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), “a violent action is one the principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all.” But the principle of consent is always within. Therefore no consent can be compulsory.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to

Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18), “no one sins in what he cannot avoid.” Since then violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod vi metusve) as the “force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed,” it would seem that consent cannot be compulsory or violent.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully’s in which he says that “compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to detain a thing outside its proper bounds.” Therefore the free-will cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an act thereof.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)** — Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which reason the law adjudges that restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify “that which was done under compulsion or fear” (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls (Ethic. iii, 1) “violent simply,” as when by bodily strength one forces a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity, and the Philosopher calls this a “mixed violence,” as when a person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save himself. In the latter kind of violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in itself, yet taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf. **P(2a), Q(6), A(6)**). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion results from one’s fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with fear which, in a manner, compels the will, whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover, since the law considers not merely internal actions, but rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute compulsion, for which reason it draws a distinction

between violence and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which cannot be influenced by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same. Now, according to lawyers fear is “the agitation of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or future” (Ethic. iii, 1).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and the second set of arguments consider the second.

### **P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?***

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that “a constant man” [\*Cap. Ad audientiam, De his quae vi.] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature of a constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then fear is “agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent danger,” it would seem that he is not compelled by fear.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, “Of all fearsome things death is the limit,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal dangers. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo quod metus, etc.), “fear of disgrace is not included under the ordinance, ‘That which is done through fear’” [\*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus causa]. Therefore neither does any other kind of fear influence a constant man.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and thus it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Abraham and Isaac were constant. Yet they were influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife was his sister (<sup><1127</sup>Genesis 12:12; <sup><1215</sup>26:7).

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2) —** Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But however constant a man may be he may suffer violence of that kind, for if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced with shipwreck. Therefore fear can influence a constant man.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise he would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects. First, in respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man follows right reason, whereby he knows whether to omit this rather than that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the lesser evil or the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore the constant man is compelled to bear with the lesser evil through fear of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater evil in order to avoid the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to commit sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the constant man is a mean between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly, they differ as to their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not compelled unless for grave and probable reasons, while the inconstant man is compelled by trifling motives: “The wicked man seeth when no man pursueth” (<sup><1215</sup>Proverbs 28:1).

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-RO(1) —** The constant man, like the brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is altogether without fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-RO(2) —** Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die rather than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain others; and chief

among them are those which relate to the person, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily injuries. They are contained in the verse: “Rape, status, blows, and death.” Nor does it matter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person of his wife or children, or the like.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man according to law.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The constant man is not compelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution, or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled thereto, namely to act against justice.

### **P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)**

#### *Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so is intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is compelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary than involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence. Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the marriage is valid.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because to promise and not to fulfill has an “appearance of evil,” and the Apostle wishes us to refrain from all such things ( ~~1~~<sup>2</sup>1 Thessalonians

5:22). But that would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et matrim.): “Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters in, it follows that where a person’s consent is required, every pretext for compulsion must be set aside.” Now mutual contract is necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3) —** Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore it cannot be the result of compulsory consent.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear which compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity, since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man is reckoned a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a measure in all human actions.

However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the marriage is valid in conscience and in God’s sight, but not in the eyes of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account of the fear. But this is of no account, because the Church should not presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said that he consented whereas he did not consent. Wherefore the Church presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent to be insufficient for a valid marriage.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)-RO(1) —** The intention is not the efficient cause of the sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of the agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)-RO(2) —** Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be perpetual; and consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed nature.



**P(4)-Q(47)-A(3)-RO(3)** — He ought not always to be advised to stand to that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its dissolution. Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made unwillingly.

### **P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)**

#### *Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?*

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with one who wills it not.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave before.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common saying that “marriage is not lame.”

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Marriage does not result from the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would be no marriage.

## **P(4)-Q(47)-A(5)**

### *Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made subject to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no marriage.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a like consent makes no marriage.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** In other contracts an obligation is undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore since marriage is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a conditional consent.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** The condition made is either of the present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage, whether it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified. If, however, it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we have also said in reference to betrothals (**Q(43), A(1)**). But if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, as that the sun will rise tomorrow — and then the marriage is valid, because such future things are present in their causes — or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it makes no marriage.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

## P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)

### *Whether one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry?*

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry. For it is written (<sup><SRI></sup>Colossians 3:20): "Children, obey your parents in all things." Therefore they are bound to obey them in this also.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, Isaac charged Jacob (<sup><ORI></sup>Genesis 28:1) not to take a wife from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus unless he had the right to command it. Therefore a son is bound to obey his father in this.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath, for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep that promise.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept a bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6) — *On the contrary*,** A son may lawfully enter religion though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)** — Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the parents would hold good without their children's consent. But this is against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub.). Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6) — *I answer that*,** Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service, as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry, since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by his father's command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the

cause be compelling as indicating either obligation or fitness, his father's command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise he may not compel him.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The words of the Apostle do not refer to those matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is marriage by which the son also becomes a father.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-RO(2)** — There were other motives why Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those women, and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. Hence Isaac could command this.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-RO(3)** — They do not swear except with the implied condition “if it please them”; and they are bound to induce them in good faith.

**P(4)-Q(47)-A(6)-RO(4)** — Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be granted there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the Church could not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the purpose are unwilling to accept unless they be compelled. Therefore we must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is no bodily service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage; because the spiritual marriage is a kind of office for dispensing the public weal:

“Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God” (~~401~~1 Corinthians 4:1).

## QUESTION 48

### OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT

#### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?
- (2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a marriage?

#### P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)

#### *Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?*

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [\*The words quoted are found implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that “for those who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to virginity, and marriage is not contrary to virginity except by reason of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will’s consent in marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse. But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them. Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, if the woman say to the man: “I consent to take thee provided however that you know me not,” it is not a marriage consent, because it contains something against the essence of that

consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage consent were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the consent is to carnal intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting to marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not consent to carnal intercourse.

Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not essential to marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed. Wherefore, according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse. Now, as stated above (**Q(44)**, **A(1)**; **Q(45)**, **AA(1),2**), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife, in so far as they each receive power over the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond. Hence it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly and not explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, for the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power to use one's own property is the cause of the use.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The reason why consent to marriage after taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power to do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and not only by actually

delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. iv, D, 3; **P(3), Q(29), A(2)**).

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Between brother and sister there can be no power of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as neither can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Such an explicit condition is contrary not only to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore it is contrary to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Marriage begun corresponds to marriage consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is operation.

The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.

## **P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)**

### *Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive?*

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that marriage cannot result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but one reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it cannot result from the intention of any other end than that for which it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the marriage union is from God, according to ~~CHR~~ Matthew 19:6, "What... God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God. Therefore it is not a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention of the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for a base purpose, it will not be a valid marriage.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., Topic. ii) “a thing is good if its end be good.” But matrimony is always good. Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore can marriage be contracted for a base motive.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain it is a valid marriage.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)** — Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting parties intend as the result of marriage. And since that which is intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage, and since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but conversely; marriage does not become good or evil by reason of that cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some of which are good and some bad.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This is true of the essential and principal cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have several secondary essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental ends.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The joining together can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is good, whatever be its cause; or for the act of those who are being joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God simply. Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not from that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from God, although it is not from God simply.



**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The intention of the Church whereby she intends to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be not observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament belongs to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is none the less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism one intend not the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who intends to marry, although he fail to direct it to the end which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-RO(4)** — This evil which is intended is the end not of marriage, but of the contracting parties.

**P(4)-Q(48)-A(2)-RO(5)** — The union itself, and not the action of those who are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

## QUESTION 49

### OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS\*

#### (SIX ARTICLES)

[\*\*"Bona matrimonii," variously rendered marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages of marriage.]

In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage?
- (2) Whether those assigned are sufficient?
- (3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods?
- (4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid goods?
- (5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them?
- (6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?

#### P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)

#### *Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the individual which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected by marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is better and more exalted than the good of the individual. But no goods are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should any goods be assigned for the excuse of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an office, as stated above (**Q(42), A(2)**). Now it needs no excuse in so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have needed an excuse in paradise, which is false, for there, as Augustine says, “marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed without stain” (Genesis ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need an excuse in so far as it is intended as a remedy, any more than the other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore matrimony does not need these excuses.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods whereby it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues direct us.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity “by indulgence” (~~1~~ 1 Corinthians 7:6). Therefore it needs to be excused by certain goods.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)** — Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the same species as regards the species of nature. But the intercourse of fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage intercourse be not wrong, something must be added to it to make it right, and draw it to another moral species.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good. Wherefore for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating for that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman, both because

the reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again because of the tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from solicitude for temporal things (~~4178~~ 1 Corinthians 7:28). Consequently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations whereby that same union is righted. and these are the goods which excuse marriage and make it right.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-RO(1)** — In the act of eating there is not such an intense pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both because the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which original sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again because each one feels in himself a defect of the individual more than a defect of the species. Hence, in order to entice a man to take food which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel this defect; but in order to entice him to the act whereby a defect of the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that act, which moves even irrational animals in which there is not the stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-RO(2)** — These goods which justify marriage belong to the nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic causes of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which belongs to it by nature.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-RO(3)** — From the very fact that marriage is intended as an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and right; nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a remedy to concupiscence.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(1)-RO(4)** — An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances as its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it to those circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)*****Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?***

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the goods of marriage are insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely “faith, offspring, and sacrament.” For the object of marriage among men is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the partnership of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore as the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the communication of works.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather than faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the one pay the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore justice should also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment of the debt.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity, whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility. Therefore there should be something else pertaining to unity.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(5)** — On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many. For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one virtue. Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage right.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from

the offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned among the goods that make marriage virtuous.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-O(7)** — Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed by two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on the part of the agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the “offspring” is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on the part of the act, which is good generically through being about a due matter; and thus we have “faith,” whereby a man has intercourse with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain goodness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word “sacrament.”

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the entire communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally “lay up” for their “children” (¶1242 Corinthians 12:14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as it were, secondary end.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue, but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the suiting of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one’s promises; for since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this man is assigned to this woman.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Just as the marriage promise means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require that they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which each receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that which is the less manifest.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(4)** — By sacrament we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of Christ's union with the Church. We may also reply that the unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the name of faith.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(6)** — Just as the right use of a useful good derives its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the right use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction; and in this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful, and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is directed aright.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(2)-RO(7)** — As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is a sign of the same thing as matrimony is.

We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament, since it was instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect is a condition added to marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude. Hence its sacramentality, if I may use the term, is reckoned among the goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility, but also whatever pertains to its signification.

### **P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?*

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the “sacrament” is not the chief of the marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the end of marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief marriage good.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, in the specific nature the difference is more important than the genus, even as the form is more important than matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now “sacrament” refers to marriage on the part of its genus, while “offspring” and “faith” refer thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of sacrament. Therefore these other two are more important than sacrament in reference to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, just as we find marriage without “offspring” and without “faith,” so do we find it without indissolubility, as in the case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is consummated. Therefore neither from this point of view is “sacrament” the most important marriage good.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, an effect cannot be more important than its cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed. Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony. Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability. Consequently just as there is marriage without “offspring” so is there marriage without “sacrament,” and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3) — *On the contrary,*** That which has a place in the definition of a thing is most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to sacrament, is placed in the definition of marriage (**Q(44), A(3)**), while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3) —** Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more efficacious than human power. But “offspring” and “faith” pertain to matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas “sacrament” pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore sacrament takes a more important part in marriage than the other two.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3) — *I answer that,*** This or that may be more important to a thing in two ways, either because it is more essential or because it is



more excellent. If the reason is because it is more excellent, then “sacrament” is in every way the most important of the three marriage goods, since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace; while the other two belong to it as an office of nature; and a perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If, however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential, we must draw a distinction; for “faith” and “offspring” can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the use of matrimony in begetting children and observing the marriage compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by “sacrament,” regards the very sacrament considered in itself, since from the very fact that by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one over the other in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas there is matrimony without “faith” and “offspring,” because the existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense “sacrament” is more essential to matrimony than “faith” and “offspring.” Secondly, “faith” and “offspring” may be considered as in their principles, so that “offspring” denote the intention of having children, and “faith” the duty of remaining faithful, and there can be no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself, so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be invalid. Taking “faith” and “offspring” in this sense, it is clear that “offspring” is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly “faith,” and thirdly “sacrament”; even as to man it is more essential to be in nature than to be in grace, although it is more excellent to be in grace.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The end as regards the intention stands first in a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same with “offspring” among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the most important and in another way it is not.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Sacrament, even as holding the third place among the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference; for it is called “sacrament” from its signification of that particular sacred thing which matrimony signifies.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-RO(3)** — According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix), marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection “they shall neither marry nor be married” (<sup>4123</sup>Matthew 22:30). Hence the marriage bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and consequently it is said to be inseparable, because it cannot be sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union, or by spiritual death after a merely spiritual union.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Although the consent which makes a marriage is not everlasting materially, i.e. in regard to the substance of the act, since that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent to an ever lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes its species from its object; and thus it is that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(3)-RO(5)** — In those sacraments wherein a character is imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in matrimony, to perform bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet it differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it does not confer a spiritual character.

## **P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)**

### *Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?*

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows himself to lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins because he allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which is prejudiced in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice to excuse marriage intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the sum total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an action evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now the marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need no excuse. Therefore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in that act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a sin.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the marriage goods do not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it from sin.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, The marriage act differs not from fornication except by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to excuse it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was stated above (**Q(41)**, **A(3)**).

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)** — Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due circumstances, as stated above (**A(1)**, ad 4). Now the like circumstances are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil. Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on the part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed as sin to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly, an act is said to be excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus that the aforesaid goods are said to excuse the marriage act. Now it is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and that it is good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40; **P(2a)**, **Q(18)**, **A(9)**). Now a human act is said to be good in two ways. In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness from those things which place it in the mean. This is what “faith” and “offspring” do in the marriage act, as stated above (**A(2)**). In another way, by goodness of the “sacrament,” in which way an act is said

to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of the union, in respect of which it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods sufficiently excuse the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-RO(1)** — By the marriage act man does not incur harm to his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting that a certain act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted for some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin, as in the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order meanwhile to devote himself to action.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-RO(2)** — This argument would avail if the evil that is inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this case it is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently the conclusion does not follow.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The excess of passion that amounts to a sin does not refer to the passion's quantitative intensity, but to its proportion to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now the pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously appointed by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is unable to regulate them during the pleasure itself.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(4)-RO(4)** — The turpitude that always accompanies the marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment, not of sin, for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)**

***Whether the marriage act can be excused  
without the marriage goods?***

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods. For he who is moved by nature alone to the marriage act, apparently does not intend any of the marriage

goods, since the marriage goods pertain to grace or virtue. Yet when a person is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, seemingly he commits no sin, for nothing natural is an evil, since “evil is contrary to nature and order,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, he who has intercourse with his wife in order to avoid fornication, does not seemingly intend any of the marriage goods. Yet he does not sin apparently, because marriage was granted to human weakness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication (<sup>1</sup> ~~1~~ Corinthians 7:2,6). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, he who uses as he will that which is his own does not act against justice, and thus seemingly does not sin. Now marriage makes the wife the husband’s own, and “vice versa.” Therefore, if they use one another at will through the instigation of lust, it would seem that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, that which is good generically does not become evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now the marriage act whereby a husband knows his wife is generically good. Therefore it cannot be evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now it can be done with a good intention, even without intending any marriage good, for instance by intending to keep or acquire bodily health. Therefore it seems that this act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** If the cause be removed the effect is removed. Now the marriage goods are the cause of rectitude in the marriage act. Therefore the marriage act cannot be excused without them.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5) —** Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act of fornication except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of fornication is always evil. Therefore the marriage act also will always be evil unless it be excused by the aforesaid goods.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they are in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage act. Hence

when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another (which pertains to “faith”) they are wholly excused from sin. But the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above (**A(3)**); wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being done on account of some signification. Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial sin.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The offspring considered as a marriage good includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature. For nature intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention of nature which intends the offspring must needs be referred either actually or habitually to the intention of having an offspring, as a good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than a creature; and this is always a sin. Consequently whenever nature alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not wholly excused from sin, except in so far as the movement of nature is further directed actually or habitually to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor does it follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage good.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-RO(2)** — If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes under the good of “faith.” But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which regards venial sins.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-RO(3)** — One due circumstance does not suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one use one’s own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according to all the circumstances.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(5)-RO(4)** — Although it is not evil in itself to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend health by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that

purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the sacrament of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at issue.

### **P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)**

*Whether it is a mortal sin for a man  
to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention  
not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure?*

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure, he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in <sup>485</sup>Ephesians 5:25), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), “the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband.” Now nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one’s wife for mere pleasure.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man sins mortally.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6) — *On the contrary*,** As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.), carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the “Our Father.” Now these are not mortal sins. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)** — Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to use his wife merely to satisfy his desire.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect motive it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure altogether and is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial sin; so that it would be a mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the pleasure when offered, but that perfection requires one to detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is good, and in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil in itself, neither will it be always a mortal sin to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-RO(1)** — A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when he sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the consent to the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Although he does not actually refer the pleasure to God, he does not place his will's last end therein; otherwise he would seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not follow that he enjoys a creature; but he uses a creature actually for his own sake, and himself habitually, though not actually, for God's sake.

**P(4)-Q(49)-A(6)-RO(4)** — The reason for this statement is not that man deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders himself



unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes flesh and nothing more.

## QUESTION 50

# OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL

### (ONE ARTICLE)

In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage:

- (1) In general;
- (2) In particular.

#### P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)

*Whether it is fitting that impediments  
should be assigned to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others. But no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore should they be assigned to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments. Therefore it should have either no impediments or very few.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary to have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for which is permitted in matrimony (<sup>4006</sup>1 Corinthians 7:6), is in all. Therefore there should not be any impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular person to marry.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition at one time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments

against marriage, since marriage, like the other sacraments, is not of human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should not be assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage, placing a person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who are unlawful subjects of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved. Therefore if anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will “de facto” dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments should not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted, and dissolve it after it has been contracted.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(7)** — Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that which is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the definition of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments which annul a marriage already contracted.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(8)** — On the other hand, it would seem that there should be an infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a good. Now good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number of impediments to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-O(9)** — Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in number. Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are certain things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its solemnization. And since even without the things that pertain to its solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not derogate from the validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder the contracting of

marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the holy seasons. Hence the verse:

***“The veto of the Church and holy tide  
Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied.”***

On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are said not only to hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted; and they are contained in the following verse:

***“Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,  
Difference of worship, force, holy orders,  
Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence,  
All these forbid marriage, and annul it though contracted.”***

The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may be hindered either on the part of the contract or in regard to the contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract is made by voluntary consent, and this is incompatible with either ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage, namely “force,” i.e. compulsion, and “error” in reference to ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments when treating of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the impediments as arising from the contracting parties, and these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be hindered from contracting marriage either simply, or with some particular person. If simply, so that he be unable to contract marriage with any woman, this can only be because he is hindered from performing the marriage act. This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot “de facto,” either through being altogether unable — and thus we have the impediment of “impotence” — or through being unable to do so freely, and thus we have the impediment of the “condition of slavery.” Secondly, because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because he is bound to continence, which happens in two ways, either through his being bound on account of the office he has undertaken to fulfill — and thus we have the impediment of “Order” — or on account of his having taken a vow — and thus “Vow” is an impediment.

If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in reference to a particular person, this is either because he is bound to

another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry another, which constitutes the impediment of the “bond of marriage” — or through lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three reasons. First, on account of too great a distance separating them, and thus we have “difference of worship”; secondly, on account of their being too closely related, and thus we have three impediments, namely “kinship,” then “affinity,” which denotes the close relationship between two persons, in reference to a third united to one of them by marriage, and the “justice of public honesty,” where we have a close relationship between two persons arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a third person; thirdly, on account of a previous undue union between him and the woman, and thus the “crime of adultery” previously committed with her is an impediment.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(1)** — There may be impediments to the other sacraments also in the omission either of that which is essential, or of that which pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated above. However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than to the other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony consists of two persons, and consequently can be impeded in more ways than the other sacraments which refer to one person taken individually; secondly, because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone. Wherefore penance which in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such as hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command or counsel, as being more perfect goods, whereas marriage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less perfect good (~~4000~~ 1 Corinthians 7:6). Wherefore, in order to afford an opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more impediments are assigned to matrimony than to the other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The more perfect things can be hindered in more ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if an imperfect thing requires more conditions, there will be more impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(3)** — This argument would hold, were there no other and more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence; which is false.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is established. Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold, for they are sacraments only. And since the natural law is particularized in various ways according to the various states of mankind, and since positive law, too, varies according to the various conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that at various times various persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(5)** — The law may forbid a thing either altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which is altogether according to the law and that which is altogether against the law (which are opposed by contrariety and not according to affirmation and negation), that which is somewhat according to the law and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this reason certain persons hold a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects and those who are simply unlawful.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(6)** — Those impediments which do not annul a marriage already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being contracted, by rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is a true marriage although the contracting parties sin; just as by consecrating after breaking one's fast one would sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, and yet it would be a valid sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament that the consecrator be fasting.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(7)** — When we say that the aforesaid impediments annul marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a marriage contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage contracted "de facto" and not "de jure." Wherefore if an impediment supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, it cannot dissolve the marriage.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(8)** — The impediments that hinder a good accidentally are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But the causes which of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed to that effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce that good; for the

causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by which it is made are either contrary to one another, or the same but taken in a contrary way.

**P(4)-Q(50)-A(1)-RO(9)** — The conditions of particular persons taken individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be reduced to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons in whom acts are.

## QUESTION 51

### OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR

#### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in the first place the impediment of error. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony?
- (2) What kind of error?

#### P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)

#### *Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that error should not be reckoned in itself an impediment to marriage. For consent, which is the efficient cause of marriage, is hindered in the same way as the voluntary. Now the voluntary, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), may be hindered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as error, because ignorance excludes knowledge altogether, whereas error does not, since “error is to approve the false as though it were true,” according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error should have been reckoned here as an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, that which of its very nature can be an impediment to marriage is in opposition to the good of marriage. But error is not a thing of this kind. Therefore error is not by its very nature an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, just as consent is required for marriage, so is intention required for baptism. Now if one were to baptize John, thinking to baptize Peter, John would be baptized none the less. Therefore error does not annul matrimony.



**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, there was true marriage between Lia and Jacob, and yet, in this case, there was error. Therefore error does not annul a marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is said in the Digests (Si per errorem, ff. De jurisdic. omn. judic.): “What is more opposed to consent than error?” Now consent is required for marriage. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)** — Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now error is an obstacle to the voluntary, since “the voluntary,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa [\*Nemesius] (De Nat. Hom. xxxii), “is that which has its principle in one who has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of actions.” But this does not apply to one who is in error. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Whatever hinders a cause, of its very nature hinders the effect likewise. Now consent is the cause of matrimony, as stated above (**Q(45), A(1)**). Hence whatever voids the consent, voids marriage. Now consent is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the intellect; and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be lacking also. Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there follows a defect in the consent also, and consequently in the marriage. Therefore it is possible according to the natural law for error to void marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Speaking simply, ignorance differs from error, because ignorance does not of its very nature imply an act of knowledge, while error supposes a wrong judgment of reason about something. However, as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it differs not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no ignorance can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless it have error in conjunction with it, because the will’s act presupposes an estimate or judgment about something which is the object of the will. Wherefore if there be ignorance there must needs be error; and for this reason error is set down as being the proximate cause.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although error is not of itself contrary to matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the cause of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The character of baptism is not caused directly by the intention of the baptizer, but by the material element applied outwardly; and the intention is effective only as directing the material element to its effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by the consent directly. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(1)-RO(4)** — According to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 30) the marriage between Lia and Jacob was effected not by their coming together, which happened through an error, but by their consent, which followed afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin (Sent. iv, D, 30).

## **P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)**

### *Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?*

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that every error is an impediment to matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30), only error about the condition or the person. For that which applies to a thing as such applies to it in all its bearings. Now error is of its very nature an impediment to matrimony, as stated above (**A(1)**). Therefore every error is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if error, as such, is an impediment to matrimony, the greater the error the greater the impediment. Now the error concerning faith in a heretic who disbelieves in this sacrament is greater than an error concerning the person. Therefore it should be a greater impediment than error about the person.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, error does not void marriage except as removing voluntariness. Now ignorance about any circumstance takes away voluntariness (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore it is not only error about condition or person that is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, just as the condition of slavery is an accident affecting the person, so are bodily or mental qualities. But error regarding the condition is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error concerning quality or fortune is equally an impediment.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, just as slavery or freedom pertains to the condition of person, so do high and low rank, or dignity of position and the lack thereof. Now error regarding the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error about the other matters mentioned is also an impediment.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, just as the condition of slavery is an impediment, so are difference of worship and impotence, as we shall say further on (**Q(52), A(2); Q(58), A(1); Q(59), A(1)**). Therefore just as error regarding the condition is an impediment, so also should error about those other matters be reckoned an impediment.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(7)** — On the other hand, it would seem that not even error about the person is an impediment to marriage. For marriage is a contract even as a sale is. Now in buying and selling the sale is not voided if one coin be given instead of another of equal value. Therefore a marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of another.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(8)** — Further, it is possible for them to remain in this error for many years and to beget between them sons and daughters. But it would be a grave assertion to maintain that they ought to be separated then. Therefore their previous error did not void their marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-O(9)** — Further, it might happen that the woman is betrothed to the brother of the man whom she thinks that she is consenting to marry, and that she has had carnal intercourse with him; in which case, seemingly, she cannot go back to the man to whom she thought to give her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error regarding the person is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* Just as error, through causing involuntariness, is an excuse from sin, so on the same count is it an impediment to marriage. Now error does not excuse from sin unless it refer to a circumstance the presence or absence of which makes an action lawful or unlawful. For if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking it to be of wood, he is not excused from sin wholly, although perhaps in part; but if a man were to strike his father, thinking to strike his son to correct him, he is wholly excused provided he take due care. Wherefore error, in order to void marriage, must needs be about the essentials of

marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely the two persons who are joined together, and the mutual power over one another wherein marriage consists. The first of these is removed by error concerning the person, the second by error regarding the condition, since a slave cannot freely give power over his body to another, without his master's consent. For this reason these two errors, and no others, are an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(1)** — It is not from its generic nature that error is an impediment to marriage, but from the nature of the difference added thereto; namely from its being error about one of the essentials to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(2)** — An error of faith about matrimony is about things consequent upon matrimony, for instance on the question of its being a sacrament, or of its being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no impediment to marriage, as neither does an error about baptism hinder a man from receiving the character, provided he intend to receive what the Church gives, although he believe it to be nothing.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(3)** — It is not any ignorance of a circumstance that causes the involuntariness which is an excuse from sin, as stated above; wherefore the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Difference of fortune or of quality does not make a difference in the essentials to matrimony, as the condition of slavery does. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Error about a person's rank, as such, does not void a marriage, for the same reason as neither does error about a personal quality. If, however, the error about a person's rank or position amounts to an error about the person, it is an impediment to matrimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this particular person, her error about his rank does not void the marriage; but if she intend directly to consent to marry the king's son, whoever he may be, then, if another man than the king's son be brought to her, there is error about the person, and the marriage will be void.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(6)** — Error is an impediment to matrimony, although it be about other impediments to marriage if it concern those things which render a person an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the

Master) does not mention error about such things, because they are an impediment to marriage whether there be error about them or not; so that if a woman contract with a subdeacon, whether she know this or not, there is no marriage; whereas the condition of slavery is no impediment if the slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(7)** — In contracts money is regarded as the measure of other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as being sought for its own sake. Hence if the coin paid is not what it is thought to be but another of equal value, this does not void the contract. But if there be error about a thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse; and thus it is in the case in point.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(8)** — No matter how long they have cohabited, unless she be willing to consent again, there is no marriage.

**P(4)-Q(51)-A(2)-RO(9)** — If she did not consent previously to marry his brother, she may hold to the one whom she took in error. Nor can she return to his brother, especially if there has been carnal intercourse between her and the man she took to husband. If, however, she had previously consented to take the first one in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first lives. But she may either leave the second or return to the first; and ignorance of the fact excuses her from sin, just as she would be excused if after the consummation of the marriage a kinsman of her husband were to know her by fraud since she is not to be blamed for the other's deceit.

## QUESTION 52

### OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?
- (2) Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?
- (3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave without his wife's consent?
- (4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or of their mother?

#### P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)

#### *Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?*

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the condition of slavery is no impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is in some way opposed to it. But slavery is in no way opposed to marriage, else there could be no marriage among slaves. Therefore slavery is no impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, that which is contrary to nature cannot be an impediment to that which is according to nature. Now slavery is contrary to nature, for as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), “it is contrary to nature for man to wish to lord it over another man”; and this is also evident from the fact that it was said of man (<sup>000</sup>Genesis 1:26) that he should “have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” but not that he should

have dominion over man. Therefore it cannot be an impediment to marriage, which is a natural thing.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, if it is an impediment, this is either of natural law or of positive law. But it is not of natural law, since according to natural law all men are equal, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), while it is stated at the beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones, ff. de just. et jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, according to law, slavery is not an impediment to any marriage.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, that which is an impediment to marriage is equally an impediment whether it be known or not, as in the case of consanguinity. Now the slavery of one party, if it be known to the other, is no impediment to their marriage. Therefore slavery, considered in itself, is unable to void a marriage; and consequently it should not be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, just as one may be in error about slavery, so as to deem a person free who is a slave, so may one be in error about freedom, so as to deem a person a slave whereas he is free. But freedom is not accounted an impediment to matrimony. Therefore neither should slavery be so accounted.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-O(7)** — Further, leprosy is a greater burden to the fellowship of marriage and is a greater obstacle to the good of the offspring than slavery is. Yet leprosy is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should slavery be so reckoned.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, A Decretal says (De conjug. servorum, cap. Ad nostram) that “error regarding the condition hinders a marriage from being contracted and voids that which is already contracted.”

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)** — Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought for their own sake, because it is qualified by honesty; whereas slavery is one of the things to be avoided for their own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery are contrary to one another; and consequently slavery is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, In the marriage contract one party is bound to the other in the matter of paying the debt; wherefore if one who thus binds himself is unable to pay the debt, ignorance of this inability, on the side of the party to whom he binds himself, voids the contract. Now just as impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to pay the debt, so that he is altogether disabled, so slavery makes him unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as ignorance or impotence in respect of coition is an impediment if not known but not if known, as we shall state further on (**Q(58)**), so the condition of slavery is an impediment if not known, but not if it be known.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Slavery is contrary to marriage as regards the act to which marriage binds one party in relation to the other, because it prevents the free execution of that act; and again as regards the good of the offspring who become subject to the same condition by reason of the parent's slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if one of the parties knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none the less valid. Likewise since in marriage there is an equal obligation on either side to pay the debt, neither party can exact of the other a greater obligation than that under which he lies; so that if a slave marry a bondswoman, thinking her to be free, the marriage is not thereby rendered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no impediment to marriage except when it is unknown to the other party, even though the latter be in a condition of freedom; and so nothing prevents marriage between slaves, or even between a freeman and a bondswoman.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as to the first intention of nature, and yet not against nature as to its second intention. Thus, as stated in *De Coelo*, ii, all corruption, defect, and old age are contrary to nature, because nature intends being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second intention of nature, because nature, through being unable to preserve being in one thing, preserves it in another which is engendered of the other's corruption. And when nature is unable to bring a thing to a greater perfection it brings it to a lesser; thus when it cannot produce a male it produces a female which is "a misbegotten male" (*De Gener. Animal.* ii, 3). I say then in like manner that slavery is contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it is not contrary to



the second, because natural reason has this inclination, and nature has this desire — that everyone should be good; but from the fact that a person sins, nature has an inclination that he should be punished for his sin, and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin. Nor is it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered by that which is unnatural in this way; for thus is marriage hindered by impotence of coition, which impotence is contrary to nature in the way mentioned.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The natural law requires punishment to be inflicted for guilt, and that no one should be punished who is not guilty; but the appointing of the punishment according to the circumstances of person and guilt belongs to positive law. Hence slavery which is a definite punishment is of positive law, and arises out of natural law, as the determinate from that which is indeterminate. And it arises from the determination of the same positive law that slavery if unknown is an impediment to matrimony, lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it is a punishment to the wife to have a slave for husband, and “vice versa.”

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Certain impediments render a marriage unlawful; and since it is not our will that makes a thing lawful or unlawful, but the law to which our will ought to be subject, it follows that the validity or invalidity of a marriage is not affected either by ignorance (such as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by knowledge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity or a vow, and others of the same kind. other impediments, however, render a marriage ineffectual as to the payment of the debt; and since it is within the competency of our will to remit a debt that is due to us, it follows that such impediments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness. Such impediments are slavery and impotence of coition. And, because they have of themselves the nature of an impediment, they are reckoned as special impediments besides error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a special impediment besides error, because the substitution of another person has not the nature of an impediment except by reason of the intention of one of the contracting parties.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Freedom does not hinder the marriage act, wherefore ignorance of freedom is no impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(1)-RO(6)** — Leprosy does not hinder marriage as to its first act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; although they lay a burden upon marriage as to its secondary effects; wherefore it is not an impediment to marriage as slavery is.

## **P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)**

### *Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?*

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his master's consent. For no one can give a person that which is another's without the latter's consent. Now a slave is his master's chattel. Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by marrying without his master's consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot marry without his consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy himself in carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master's consent, the latter would be deprived of a service due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to be.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign country, where the latter's wife is unable to follow him, through either bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling, supposing her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry without his master's consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his master's consent. Much less therefore can he be married without his consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** “In Christ Jesus... there is neither bond nor free” (~~CHR~~ Galatians 3:26,28). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2) —** Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his master’s consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** As stated above (**A(1)**, ad 3), the positive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive law, cannot be prejudicial to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual, so does it seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his master as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the needs of his body, and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the extent of being unable to marry freely, even without his master’s knowledge or consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-RO(1) —** A slave is his master’s chattel in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore, in things pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give another person power over his body without his master’s consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-RO(2) —** A slave is bound to obey his master in those things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master cannot lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master command his slave not to marry, the slave is not bound to obey his master.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-RO(3) —** If a slave has married with his master’s consent, he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave’s marriage, implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If, however, the marriage was contracted without the master’s knowledge or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference to obey his master, if the two

things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such matters there are many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the danger to which his wife's chastity is exposed, and the obstacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and other like considerations, all of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, his master or his wife.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-RO(4)** — In such a case it is said that the master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the weight of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price for his slave.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(2)-RO(5)** — By entering religion or receiving orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or receives orders binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in which his master has power over him, but not in natural works to which a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow continence without his master's consent.

### **P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?***

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that slavery cannot supervene to marriage, by the husband selling himself to another as slave. Because what is done by fraud and to another's detriment should not hold. But a husband who sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes to cheat marriage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore such a sale should not hold as to the effect of slavery.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, two favorable things outweigh one that is not favorable. Now marriage and freedom are favorable things and are contrary to slavery, which in law is not a favorable thing. Therefore such a slavery ought to be entirely annulled in marriage.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, in marriage husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without her husband's consent. Therefore neither can the husband without his wife's consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, in natural things that which hinders a thing being generated destroys it after it has been generated. Now bondage of the husband, if unknown to the wife, is an impediment to the act of marriage before it is performed. Therefore if it could supervene to marriage it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Everyone can give another that which is his own. Now the husband is his own master since he is free. Therefore he can surrender his right to another.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)** — Further, a slave can marry without his master's consent, as stated above (**A(2)**). Therefore a husband can in like manner subject himself to a master, without his wife's consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A husband is subject to his wife in those things which pertain to the act of nature; in these things they are equal, and the subjection of slavery does not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband, without his wife's knowledge, can surrender himself to be another's slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the marriage, since no impediment supervening to marriage can dissolve it, as stated above (**Q(50)**, **A(1)**, ad 7).

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The fraud can indeed hurt the person who has acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prejudicial to another person: wherefore if the husband, to cheat his wife, surrender himself to be another's slave, It will be to his own prejudice, through his losing the inestimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be prejudicial to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks, and to do all that marriage requires of him for he cannot be taken away from these obligations by his master's command.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-RO(2)** — In so far as slavery is opposed to marriage, marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the slave is bound then to pay the debt to his wife, though his master be unwilling.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although husband and wife are considered to be on a par in the marriage act and in things relating to nature, to which the condition of slavery does not extend, nevertheless as regards the management of the household, and other such additional matters the husband is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not “vice versa.” Hence the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without her husband’s consent.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(3)-RO(4)** — This argument considers corruptible things; and yet even in these there are many obstacles to generation that are not capable of destroying what is already generated. But in things which have stability it is possible to have an impediment which prevents a certain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to cease to be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the same with marriage, which is a lasting tie so long as this life lasts.

### **P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)**

#### ***Whether children should follow the condition of their father?***

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that children should follow the condition of their father. Because dominion belongs to those of higher rank. Now in generating the father ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the being of a thing depends on the form more than on the matter. Now in generation the father gives the form, and the mother the matter (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child should follow the condition of the father rather than of the mother.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, a thing should follow that chiefly to which it is most like. Now the son is more like the father than the mother, even as the daughter is more like the mother. Therefore at least the son should follow the father in preference, and the daughter the mother.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are not traced through the women but through the men. Therefore the children follow the father rather than the mother.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** If a man sows on another's land, the produce belongs to the owner of the land. Now the woman's womb in relation to the seed of man is like the land in relation to the sower. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4) —** Further, we observe that in animals born from different species the offspring follows the mother rather than the father, wherefore mules born of a mare and an ass are more like mares than those born of a she-ass and a horse. Therefore it should be the same with men.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** According to civil law (XIX, ff. De statu hom. vii, cap. De rei vendit.) the offspring follows the womb: and this is reasonable since the offspring derives its formal complement from the father, but the substance of the body from the mother. Now slavery is a condition of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind of instrument in working; wherefore children follow the mother in freedom and bondage; whereas in matters pertaining to dignity as proceeding from a thing's form, they follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise, inheritance and so forth. The canons are in agreement with this (cap. Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis ex libero ventre) as also the law of Moses (~~cap.~~ Exodus 21).

In some countries, however, where the civil law does not hold, the offspring follows the inferior condition, so that if the father be a slave the children will be slaves although the mother be free; but not if the father gave himself up as a slave after his marriage and without his wife's consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And if both be of servile condition and belong to different masters, the children, if several, are divided among the latter, or if one only, the one master will compensate the other in value and will take the child thus born for his slave. However it is incredible that this custom have as much reason in its favor as the decision of the time-honored deliberations of many wise men. Moreover in natural things it is the rule that what is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient and not according to the mode of the giver; wherefore it is reasonable that the seed received by the mother should be drawn to her condition.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Although the father is a more noble principle than the mother, nevertheless the mother provides the substance of the body, and it is to this that the condition of slavery attaches.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-RO(2)** — As regards things pertaining to the specific nature the son is like the father rather than the mother, but in material conditions should be like the mother rather than the father, since a thing has its specific being from its form, but material conditions from matter.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The son is like the father in respect of the form which is his, and also the father's, complement. Hence the argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(52)-A(4)-RO(4)** — It is because the son derives honor from his father rather than from his mother that in the genealogies of Scripture, and according to common custom, children are named after their father rather than from their mother. But in matters relating to slavery they follow the mother by preference.



## QUESTION 53

# OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony?
- (2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment?
- (3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?
- (4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married?

#### P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)

*Whether marriage already contracted  
should be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow?*

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought to be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger tie takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the former binds man to God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the marriage tie.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, God's commandment is no less binding than the commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is so binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees of kindred forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine commandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person marry in despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled for that reason.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a

simple vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows. It is clear that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, since according to Jerome [\*Cf. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix] “for those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” Now the marriage contract is not contrary to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal intercourse: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every other time, because a sin committed in the first instance cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, husband and wife should be equal in marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has taken a simple vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is clearly against his vow of continence, since he is bound to continence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt without sin.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Pope Clement [\*Alexander III] says (cap. Consuluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a “simple vow is an impediment to the contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it is contracted.”

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, A thing ceases to be in one man’s power from the fact that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person’s power for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow contains merely a simple promise of one’s body to the effect of keeping continence for God’s sake, a man still retains power over his own body after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another, namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament of matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since it is a sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled on that account.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-RO(1)** — A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he lies. because by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God, with the obligation of

remaining continent. But as to the manner in which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow, since by marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife, but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always in the stronger position. In this respect a simple vow binds in the same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on account of a simple vow.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The contracting of a marriage between blood relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not precisely because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect, as already stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that which is not cause.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-RO(3)** — If after taking a simple vow a man contract marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without mortal sin, because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage has been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore this is not covered by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1). Nevertheless he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(1)-RO(4)** — After contracting marriage he is still bound to keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not rendered unable to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to continence altogether. And since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask for the debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has incurred this obligation through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred. And this holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as when she is ashamed and her husband feels that she desires him to pay the debt, for then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the case if he fears to endanger her chastity: nor does it matter that they are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his own. Some say, however, that he may both ask and pay lest the marriage become too burdensome to the wife who has always

to ask; but if this be looked into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively.

### **P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?***

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that not even a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted. For according to a Decretal (cap. Rursus, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) “in God’s sight a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn one.” Now marriage stands or falls by virtue of the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does not dissolve marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve it.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a solemn vow does not add the same force to a simple vow as an oath does. Now a simple vow, even though an oath be added thereto, does not dissolve a marriage already contracted. Neither therefore does a solemn vow.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a simple vow cannot have. For a simple vow may give rise to scandal since it may be public, even as a solemn vow. Again the Church could and should ordain that a simple vow dissolves a marriage already contracted, so that many sins may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that a simple vow does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, neither should a solemn vow dissolve it.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2) — *On the contrary,*** He who takes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much more excellent than a material marriage. Now a material marriage already contracted annuls a marriage contracted afterwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)** — Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2) — *I answer that,*** All agree that as a solemn vow is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, so it invalidates the contract. Some assign scandal as the reason. But this is futile, because even a simple

vow sometimes leads to scandal since it is at times somewhat public. Moreover the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth of life [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(16)**, **A(4)**, ad 3; **P(1)**, **Q(21)**, **A(2)**, ad 2; **P(2b)**, **Q(109)**, **A(3)**, ad 3], which truth is not to be set aside on account of scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the ordinance of the Church. But this again is insufficient, since in that case the Church might decide the contrary, which is seemingly untrue. Wherefore we must say with others that a solemn vow of its very nature dissolves the marriage contract, inasmuch namely as thereby a man has lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it to God for the purpose of perpetual continence. Wherefore he is unable to surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage. And since the marriage that follows such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is said to annul the marriage contracted.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)-RO(1)** — A simple vow is said to be no less binding in God's sight than a solemn vow, in matters pertaining to God, for instance the separation from God by mortal sin, because he who breaks a simple vow commits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn vow, although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so that the comparison be understood as to the genus and not as to the definite degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, whereby one man is under an obligation to another, there is no need for it to be of equal obligation even in general, since a solemn vow binds to certain things to which a simple vow does not bind.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)-RO(2)** — An oath is more binding than a vow on the part of the cause of the obligation: but a solemn vow is more binding as to the manner in which it binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of that which is promised; while an oath does not do this actually. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(2)-RO(3)** — A solemn vow implies the actual surrender of one's body, whereas a simple vow does not, as stated above (**A(1)**). Hence the argument does not suffice to prove the conclusion.

## P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)

### *Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?*

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that order is not an impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to a thing except its contrary. But order is not contrary to matrimony. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, orders are the same with us as with the Eastern Church. But they are not an impediment to matrimony in the Eastern Church. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now this is most fittingly signified in those who are Christ's ministers, those namely who are ordained. Therefore order is not an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, all the orders are directed to spiritual things. Now order cannot be an impediment to matrimony except by reason of its spirituality. Therefore if order is an impediment to matrimony, every order will be an impediment, and this is untrue.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, every ordained person can have ecclesiastical benefices, and can enjoy equally the privilege of clergy. If, therefore, orders are an impediment to marriage, because married persons cannot have an ecclesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege of clergy, as jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.), then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this is false, as shown by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): and consequently it would seem that no order is an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): "any person whom you shall find to have taken a wife after receiving the subdiaconate or the higher orders, you shall compel to put his wife away." But this would not be so if the marriage were valid.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)** — Further, no person who has vowed continence can contract marriage. Now some orders have a vow of continence connected

with them, as appears from the text (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3) — *I answer that,*** By a certain fittingness the very nature of holy order requires that it should be an impediment to marriage: because those who are in holy orders handle the sacred vessels and the sacraments: wherefore it is becoming that they keep their bodies clean by continence [\*Cf. ~~251~~ Isaiah 52:11]. But it is owing to the Church's ordinance that it is actually an impediment to marriage. However it is not the same with the Latins as with the Greeks; since with the Greeks it is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely by virtue of order; whereas with the Latins it is an impediment by virtue of order, and besides by virtue of the vow of continence which is annexed to the sacred orders; for although this vow is not expressed in words, nevertheless a person is understood to have taken it by the very fact of his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and other Eastern peoples a sacred order is an impediment to the contracting of matrimony but it does not forbid the use of marriage already contracted: for they can use marriage contracted previously, although they cannot be married again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to marriage and to the use of marriage, unless perhaps the husband should receive a sacred order without the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this cannot be prejudicial to her.

Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders now and in the early Church we have spoken above (**Q(37), A(3)**).

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although a sacred order is not contrary to matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain incompatibility with marriage in respect of the latter's act which is an obstacle to spiritual acts.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The objection is based on a false statement: since order is everywhere an impediment to the contracting of marriage, although it has not everywhere a vow annexed to it.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Those who are in sacred orders signify Christ by more sublime actions, as appears from what has been said in the treatise on orders (**Q(37), AA(2),4**), than those who are married. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Those who are in minor orders are not forbidden to marry by virtue of their order; for although those orders are entrusted with certain spiritualities, they are not admitted to the immediate handling of sacred things, as those are who are in sacred orders. But according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the offices of the Church. And since the holding of an ecclesiastical benefice binds a man to the exercise of his order, and since for this very reason he enjoys the privilege of clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege is forfeit to a married cleric.

This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection.

### **P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)**

#### *Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?*

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the weaker. Now a spiritual obligation is stronger than a bodily tie. Therefore if a married man be ordained, this will prejudice the wife, so that she will be unable to demand the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily bond. Hence it would seem that a man cannot receive a sacred order after consummating marriage.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, after consummating the marriage, one of the parties cannot vow continence without the other's consent [\*Cf. **Q(61), A(1)**]. Now a sacred order has a vow of continence annexed to it. Therefore if the husband be ordained without his wife's consent, she will be bound to remain continent against her will, since she cannot marry another man during her husband's lifetime.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, a husband may not even for a time devote himself to prayer without his wife's consent (<sup>4105</sup>1 Corinthians 7:5). But in the Eastern Church those who are in sacred orders are bound to continence for the time when they exercise their office. Therefore neither may they be ordained without their wife's consent, and much less may the Latins.



**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now a Greek priest cannot marry again after his wife's death. Therefore neither can his wife after her husband's death. But she cannot be deprived by her husband's act of the right to marry after his death. Therefore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, order is as much opposed to marriage as marriage to order. Now a previous order is an impediment to a subsequent marriage. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Religious are bound to continence like those who are in sacred orders. But a man may enter religion after marriage, if his wife die, or if she consent. Therefore he can also receive orders.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)** — Further, a man may become a man's bondsman after marriage. Therefore he can become a bondsman of God by receiving orders.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Marriage is not an impediment to the receiving of sacred orders, since if a married man receive sacred orders, even though his wife be unwilling, he receives the character of order: but he lacks the exercise of his order. If, however, his wife consent, or if she be dead, he receives both the order and the exercise.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The bond of orders dissolves the bond of marriage as regards the payment of the debt, in respect of which it is incompatible with marriage, on the part of the person ordained, since he cannot demand the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it does not dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the husband is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot persuade her to observe continence.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-RO(2)** — If the husband receive sacred orders with the knowledge and consent of his wife, she is bound to vow perpetual continence, but she is not bound to enter religion, if she has no fear of her chastity being endangered through her husband having taken a solemn vow: it would have been different, however, if he had taken a simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained without her consent, she is not bound in this way, because the result is not prejudicial to her in any way.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-RO(3)** — It would seem more probable, although some say the contrary, that even a Greek ought not to receive sacred orders without his wife's consent, since at least at the time of his ministry she would be deprived of the payment of the debt, of which she cannot be deprived according to law if the husband should have been ordained without her consent or knowledge.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-RO(4)** — As stated, among the Greeks the wife, by the very fact of consenting to her husband's receiving a sacred order, binds herself never to marry another man, because the signification of marriage would not be safeguarded, and this is especially required in the marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without her consent, seemingly she would not be under that obligation.

**P(4)-Q(53)-A(4)-RO(5)** — Marriage has for its cause our consent: not so order, which has a sacramental cause appointed by God. Hence matrimony may be impeded by a previous order; so as not to be true marriage: whereas order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be true order, because the power of the sacraments is unchangeable, whereas human acts can be impeded.

## QUESTION 54

### OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some?
- (2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?
- (3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to marriage?
- (4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the Church?

#### P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)

##### *Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?*

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined by some as follows: “Consanguinity is the tie contracted between persons descending from the same common ancestor by carnal procreation.” For all men descend from the same common ancestor, namely Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above definition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related by consanguinity: which is false.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a tie is only between things in accord with one another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between other men, since they accord in species but differ in number, just as other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, carnal procreation, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the surplus food

[\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(119)**, **A(2)**]. Now this surplus has more in common with that which is eaten, since it agrees with it in substance, than with him who eats. Since then no tie of consanguinity arises between the person born of semen and that which he eats, neither will there be any tie of kindred between him and the person of whom he is born by carnal procreation.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, Laban said to Jacob (<sup>1234</sup>Genesis 29:14): “Thou art my bone and my flesh,” on account of the relationship between them. Therefore such a kinship should be called flesh-relationship rather than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, carnal procreation is common to men and animals. But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from carnal procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11, 12) “all friendship is based on some kind of fellowship.” And since friendship is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship which is the cause of friendship is called “a tie.” Wherefore in respect of any kind of a fellowship certain persons are denominated as though they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens who are connected by a common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are connected by the common business of soldiering, and in the same way those who are connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be tied by blood [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition “tie” is included as being the genus of consanguinity; the “persons descending from the same common ancestor,” who are thus tied together are the subject of this tie. while “carnal procreation” is mentioned as being its origin.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-RO(1)** — An active force is not received into an instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal agent. And since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter moves not only as to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which belongs to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even in accidentals and not only in the specific nature. And yet this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as it was in the father, and still less so in the

grandson, and thus it goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further. Since then consanguinity results from this power being communicated to many through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it destroys itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix). Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote common ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are descended from him.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-RO(2)** — It is clear from what has been said that blood relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that power peculiar to the individual which is conveyed from one to many: the result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father, but also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, 3).

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing is actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for instance, charcoal has more in common with fire than with the tree from which the wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the nutritive power into the substance of the person fed has more in common with the subject nourished than with that from which the nourishment was taken. The argument however would hold according to the opinion of those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter and that all forms are accidents: which is false.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-RO(4)** — It is the blood that is proximately changed into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted by carnal procreation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than flesh-relationship. That sometimes one relation is called the flesh of another, is because the blood which is transformed into the man's seed or into the menstrual fluid is potentially flesh and bone.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Some say that the reason why the tie of consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and not among other animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity would never come to an end. However the above theory was disproved in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: **P(1), Q(119), A(1)**). Wherefore we must reply that the reason for this is that animals are not united together in the union of

friendship through the begetting of many from one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated above.

### **P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?***

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that consanguinity is unfittingly distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of consanguinity is described as “the ordered series of persons related by blood, and descending from a common ancestor in various degrees.” Now consanguinity is nothing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a line of consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing ought not to be distinguished by itself. Therefore consanguinity is not fittingly distinguished into lines.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, that by which a common thing is divided should not be placed in the definition of that common thing. Now descent is placed in the above definition of consanguinity. Therefore consanguinity cannot be divided into ascending, descending and collateral lines.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a line is defined as being between two points. But two points make but one degree. Therefore one line has but one degree, and for this reason it would seem that consanguinity should not be divided into lines and degrees.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, a degree is defined as “the relation between distant persons, whereby is known the distance between them.” Now since consanguinity is a kind of propinquity, distance between persons is opposed to consanguinity rather than a part thereof.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, if consanguinity is distinguished and known by its degrees, those who are in the same degree ought to be equally related. But this is false since a man’s great-uncle and great-nephew are in the same degree, and yet they are not equally related according to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. v). Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, in ordinary things a different degree results from the addition of one thing to another, even as every additional unity makes a different species of number. Yet the addition of one person to another does not always make a different degree of consanguinity, since father and uncle are in the same degree of consanguinity, for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-O(7)** — Further, if two persons be akin to one another there is always the same measure of kinship between them, since the distance from one extreme to the other is the same either way. Yet the degrees of consanguinity are not always the same on either side, since sometimes one relative is in the third and the other in the fourth degree. Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot be sufficiently known by its degrees.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Consanguinity as stated (**A(1)**) is a certain propinquity based on the natural communication by the act of procreation whereby nature is propagated. Wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) this communication is threefold. one corresponds to the relationship between cause and effect, and this is the consanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that “parents love their children as being a part of themselves.” Another corresponds to the relation of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of son to father, wherefore he says that “children love their parents as being themselves something which owes its existence to them.” The third corresponds to the mutual relation between things that come from the same cause, as brothers, “who are born of the same parents,” as he again says (Ethic. viii, 12). And since the movement of a point makes a line, and since a father by procreation may be said to descend to his son, hence it is that corresponding to these three relationships there are three lines of consanguinity, namely the “descending” line corresponding to the first relationship, the “ascending” line corresponding to the second, and the “collateral” line corresponding to the third. Since however the movement of propagation does not rest in one term but continues beyond, the result is that one can point to the father’s father and to the son’s son, and so on, and according to the various steps we take we find various degrees in one line. And seeing that the degrees of a thing are parts of that thing, there cannot be degrees of propinquity where there is no propinquity.

Consequently identity and too great a distance do away with degrees of consanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than he is like himself: for which reason there is no degree of consanguinity where there is but one person, but only when one person is compared to another.

Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the degrees in various lines. For the degree of consanguinity in the ascending and descending line is contracted from the fact that one of the parties whose consanguinity is in question, is descended from the other. Wherefore according to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning, the person who occupies the first place, whether in the ascending or in the descending line, is distant from a certain one, say Peter, in the first degree — for instance father and son; while the one who occupies the second place in either direction is distant in the second degree, for instance grandfather, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity that exists between persons who are in collateral lines is contracted not through one being descended from the other, but through both being descended from one: wherefore the degrees of consanguinity in this line must be reckoned in relation to the one principle whence it arises. Here, however, the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for the legal reckoning takes into account the descent from the common stock on both sides, whereas the canonical reckoning takes into account only one, that namely on which the greater number of degrees are found. Hence according to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers, are related in the second degree, because each is separated from the common stock by one degree; and in like manner the children of two brothers are distant from one another in the fourth degree. But according to the canonical reckoning, two brothers are related in the first degree, since neither is distant more than one degree from the common stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the second degree from the other brother, because they are at that distance from the common stock. Hence, according to the canonical reckoning, by whatever degree a person is distant from some higher degree, by so much and never by less is he distant from each person descending from that degree, because “the cause of a thing being so is yet more so.” Wherefore although the other descendants from the common stock be related to some person on account of his being descended from the common stock, these descendants of the other branch cannot be more nearly related to him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes,



however, a person is more distantly related to a descendant from the common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, because this other person may be more distantly related to the common stock than he is: and consanguinity must be reckoned according to the more distant degree.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This objection is based on a false premise: for consanguinity is not the series but a mutual relationship existing between certain persons, the series of whom forms a line of consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Descent taken in a general sense attaches to every line of consanguinity, because carnal procreation whence the tie of consanguinity arises is a kind of descent: but it is a particular kind of descent, namely from the person whose consanguinity is in question, that makes the descending line.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(3)** — A line may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken properly for the dimension itself that is the first species of continuous quantity: and thus a straight line contains actually but two points which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any one of which being actually designated, the line is divided, and becomes two lines. But sometimes a line designates things which are arranged in a line, and thus we have line and figure in numbers, in so far as unity added to unity involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree in a particular line: and it is the same with the line of consanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Even as there cannot be likeness without a difference, so there is no propinquity without distance. Hence not every distance is opposed to consanguinity, but such as excludes the propinquity of blood-relationship.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Even as whiteness is said to be greater in two ways, in one way through intensity of the quality itself, in another way through the quantity of the surface, so consanguinity is said to be greater or lesser in two ways. First, intensively by reason of the very nature of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and thus the degree of consanguinity is measured by the persons between whom there is the propagation of a common blood, and in this way the degrees of consanguinity are distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two persons

related to one person in the same degree of consanguinity, one is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the quantity of consanguinity in the first way: thus a man's father and brother are related to him in the first degree of consanguinity, because in neither case does any person come in between; and yet from the point of view of intensity a man's father is more closely related to him than his brother, since his brother is related to him only because he is of the same father. Hence the nearer a person is to the common ancestor from whom the consanguinity descends, the greater is his consanguinity although he be not in a nearer degree. In this way a man's great-uncle is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, although they are in the same degree.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(6)** — Although a man's father and uncle are in the same degree in respect of the root of consanguinity, since both are separated by one degree from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect of the person whose consanguinity is in question, they are not in the same degree, since the father is in the first degree, whereas the uncle cannot be nearer than the second degree, wherein the grandfather stands.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(2)-RO(7)** — Two persons are always related in the same degree to one another, although they are not always distant in the same number of degrees from the common ancestor, as explained above.

### **P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law?***

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that consanguinity is not by natural law an impediment to marriage. For no woman can be more akin to a man than Eve was to Adam, since of her did he say (<sup>1023</sup>Genesis 2:23): "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Yet Eve was joined in marriage to Adam. Therefore as regards the natural law no consanguinity is an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the natural law is the same for all. Now among the uncivilized nations no person is debarred from marriage by

reason of consanguinity. Therefore, as regards the law of nature, consanguinity is no impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the natural law is what “nature has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the Digests (i, ff. De just. et jure). Now brute animals copulate even with their mother. Therefore it is not of natural law that certain persons are debarred from marriage on account of consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, nothing that is not contrary to one of the goods of matrimony is an impediment to marriage. But consanguinity is not contrary to any of the goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, things which are more akin and more similar to one another are better and more firmly united together. Now matrimony is a kind of union. Since then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it does not hinder marriage but rather strengthens the union.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** According to the natural law whatever is an obstacle to the good of the offspring is an impediment to marriage. Now consanguinity hinders the good of the offspring, because in the words of Gregory (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 40): “We have learnt by experience that the children of such a union cannot thrive.” Therefore according to the law of nature consanguinity is an impediment to matrimony.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3) —** Further, that which belongs to human nature when it was first created is of natural law. Now it belonged to human nature from when it was first created that one should be debarred from marrying one’s father or mother: in proof of which it was said (~~Gen~~ Genesis 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother”: which cannot be understood of cohabitation, and consequently must refer to the union of marriage. Therefore consanguinity is an impediment to marriage according to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** In relation to marriage a thing is said to be contrary to the natural law if it prevents marriage from reaching the end for which it was instituted. Now the essential and primary end of marriage is the good of the offspring. and this is hindered by a certain

consanguinity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or son and mother. It is not that the good of the offspring is utterly destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of her father's semen and with the father rear and teach that child in which things the good of the offspring consists, but that it is not effected in a becoming way. For it is out of order that a daughter be mated to her father in marriage for the purpose of begetting and rearing children, since in all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceeding from him. Hence by natural law a father and mother are debarred from marrying their children; and the mother still more than the father, since it is more derogatory to the reverence due to parents if the son marry his mother than if the father marry his daughter; since the wife should be to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence; and this end would be forfeit if a man could marry any blood-relation, since a wide scope would be afforded to concupiscence if those who have to live together in the same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh. Wherefore the Divine law debars from marriage not only father and mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live in close intimacy with one another and ought to safeguard one another's modesty. The Divine law assigns this reason (~~18:10~~ Leviticus 18:10): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness" of such and such a one, "because it is thy own nakedness."

But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards his wife's kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if a man could take a woman of his kindred to wife since no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage. Wherefore, according to human law and the ordinances of the Church, several degrees of consanguinity are debarred from marriage.

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that consanguinity is by natural law an impediment to marriage in regard to certain persons, by Divine law in respect of some, and by human law in respect of others.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Although Eve was formed from Adam she was not Adam's daughter, because she was not formed from him after the manner in which it is natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by the Divine operation, since from Adam's rib a horse might have been

formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence the natural connection between Eve and Adam was not so great as between daughter and father, nor was Adam the natural principle of Eve as a father is of his daughter.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-RO(2)** — That certain barbarians are united carnally to their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion of concupiscence which has clouded the natural law in them.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Union of male and female is said to be of natural law, because nature has taught this to animals: yet she has taught this union to various animals in various ways according to their various conditions. But carnal copulation with parents is derogatory to the reverence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into parents solicitude in providing for their offspring, so has it instilled into the offspring reverence towards their parents: yet to no kind of animal save man has she instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for parents; but to other animals more or less, according as the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the parents to their offspring. Hence as the Philosopher attests (*De Animal.* ix, 47) concerning the camel and the horse, among certain animals the son abhors copulation with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs of animals are united together in man naturally, and more perfectly than in other animals, it follows that man naturally abhors carnal knowledge not only of his mother, but also of his daughter, which is, however, less against nature, as stated above.

Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal procreation in other animals as in man, as stated above (**A(1)**, ad 5). Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-RO(4)** — It has been shown how consanguinity between married persons is contrary to the goods of marriage. Hence the Objection proceeds from false premises.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(3)-RO(5)** — It is not unreasonable for one of two unions to be hindered by the other, even as where there is identity there is not likeness. In like manner the tie of consanguinity may hinder the union of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)*****Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be fixed by the Church?***

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could not be fixed by the Church so as to reach to the fourth degree. For it is written (~~de~~ Matthew 19:6): “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” But God joined those together who are married within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since their union is not forbidden by the Divine law. Therefore they should not be put asunder by a human law.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, matrimony is a sacrament as also is baptism. Now no ordinance of the Church could prevent one who is baptized from receiving the baptismal character, if he be capable of receiving it according to the Divine law. Therefore neither can an ordinance of the Church forbid marriage between those who are not forbidden to marry by the Divine law.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, positive law can neither void nor extend those things which are natural. Now consanguinity is a natural tie which is in itself of a nature to impede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot by its ordinance permit or forbid certain people to marry, any more than she can make them to be kin or not kin.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, an ordinance of positive law should have some reasonable cause, since it is for this reasonable cause that it proceeds from the natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees seem altogether unreasonable, since they bear no relation to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an impediment as far as the fourth degree on account of the four elements as far as the sixth degree on account of the six ages of the world, as far as the seventh degree on account of the seven days of which all time is comprised. Therefore seemingly this prohibition is of no force.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, where the cause is the same there should be the same effect. Now the causes for which consanguinity is an impediment to marriage are the good of the offspring, the curbing of

concupiscence, and the extension of friendship, as stated above (**A(3)**), which are equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at all times: yet this is not true since consanguinity is now an impediment to marriage as far as the fourth degree, whereas formerly it was an impediment as far as the seventh.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(6)** — Further, one and the same union cannot be a kind of sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would be the case if the Church had the power of fixing a different number in the degrees which are an impediment to marriage. Thus if certain parties related in the fifth degree were married when that degree was an impediment, their union would be incestuous, and yet this same union would be a marriage afterwards when the Church withdrew her prohibition. And the reverse might happen if certain degrees which were not an impediment were subsequently to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore seemingly the power of the Church does not extend to this.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-O(7)** — Further, human law should copy the Divine law. Now according to the Divine law which is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition of degrees does not apply equally in the ascending and descending lines: since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry his father's sister but not his brother's daughter. Therefore neither should there remain now a prohibition in respect of nephews and uncles.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Our Lord said to His disciples (~~Q(54)~~ Luke 10:16): "He that heareth you heareth Me." Therefore a commandment of the Church has the same force as a commandment of God. Now the Church sometimes has forbidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the Old Law did not forbid. Therefore those degrees are an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)** — Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were controlled by the civil law, so now is marriage controlled by the laws of the Church. Now formerly the civil law decided which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage, and which do not. Therefore this can be done now by a commandment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)** — *I answer that,* The degrees within which consanguinity has been an impediment to marriage have varied according to various times. For at the beginning of the human race father and mother alone were debarred from marrying their children, because then mankind were few in number, and then it was necessary for the propagation of the human race to be ensured with very great care, and consequently only such persons were to be debarred as were unfitted for marriage even in respect of its principal end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above **(A(3))**. Afterwards however, the human race having multiplied, more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, for they already began to curb concupiscence. Wherefore as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) all those persons were debarred from marrying one another who are wont to live together in one household, because if a lawful carnal intercourse were possible between them, this would prove a very great incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law permitted other degrees of consanguinity, in fact to a certain extent it commanded them; to wit that each man should take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid confusion of inheritances: because at that time the Divine worship was handed down as the inheritance of the race. But afterwards more degrees were forbidden by the New Law which is the law of the spirit and of love, because the worship of God is no longer handed down and spread abroad by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from carnal things by devoting themselves to things spiritual, and that love should have a yet wider play. Hence in olden times marriage was forbidden even within the more remote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguinity and affinity might be the sources of a wider natural friendship; and this was reasonably extended to the seventh degree, both because beyond this it was difficult to have any recollection of the common stock, and because this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost. Afterwards, however, towards these latter times the prohibition of the Church has been restricted to the fourth degree, because it became useless and dangerous to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees of consanguinity. Useless, because charity waxed cold in many hearts so that they had scarcely a greater bond of friendship with their more remote kindred than with strangers: and it was dangerous because through the prevalence of concupiscence and neglect men took no account of so numerous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more remote



degrees became for many a snare leading to damnation. Moreover there is a certain fittingness in the restriction of the above prohibition to the fourth degree. First because men are wont to live until the fourth generation, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, wherefore God threatened (<sup>(1218)</sup>Exodus 20:5) to visit the parent's sins on their children to the third and fourth generation. Secondly, because in each generation the blood, the identity of which causes consanguinity, receives a further addition of new blood, and the more another blood is added the less there is of the old. And because there are four elements, each of which is the more easily mixed with another, according as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first admixture the identity of blood disappears as regards the first element which is most subtle; at the second admixture, as regards the second element; at the third, as to the third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth element. Thus after the fourth generation it is fitting for the carnal union to be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Even as God does not join together those who are joined together against the Divine command, so does He not join together those who are joined together against the commandment of the Church, which has the same binding force as a commandment of God.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the Church's ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only: because just as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws, so are spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Although the tie of consanguinity is natural, it is not natural that consanguinity forbid carnal intercourse, except as regards certain degrees, as stated above (**A(3)**). Wherefore the Church's commandment does not cause certain people to be kin or not kin, because they remain equally kin at all times: but it makes carnal intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different times for different degrees of consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(4)** — The reasons assigned are given as indicating aptness and congruousness rather than causality and necessity.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(5)** — The reason for the impediment of consanguinity is not the same at different times: wherefore that which it was useful to allow at one time, it was beneficial to forbid at another.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(6)** — A commandment does not affect the past but the future. Wherefore if the fifth degree which is now allowed were to be forbidden at any time, those in the fifth degree who are married would not have to separate, because no impediment supervening to marriage can annul it; and consequently a union which was a marriage from the first would not be made incestuous by a commandment of the Church. In like manner, if a degree which is now forbidden were to be allowed, such a union would not become a marriage on account of the Church's commandment by reason of the former contract, because they could separate if they wished. Nevertheless, they could contract anew, and this would be a new union.

**P(4)-Q(54)-A(4)-RO(7)** — In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection. And since the reason for affection towards one's brother's son is not less but even greater than the reasons for affection towards one's father's brother, inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the father to the son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church equally prohibit the degrees of consanguinity in uncles and nephews. On the other hand the Old Law in debarring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of concupiscence arising from cohabitation; and debarred those persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living together. Now it is more usual for a niece to live with her uncle than an aunt with her nephew: because a daughter is more identified with her father, being part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way identified with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born of the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason for debarring a niece and an aunt.

## QUESTION 55

### OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY

#### (ELEVEN ARTICLES)

We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there are eleven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether affinity results from matrimony?
- (2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife?
- (3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse?
- (4) Whether it arises from a betrothal?
- (5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity?
- (6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?
- (7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?
- (8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity?
- (9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce?
- (10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should always be by way of accusation?
- (11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case?

#### P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)

*Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a person does not contract affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation. For “the cause of a thing

being so is yet more so.” Now the wife is not connected with her husband’s kindred except by reason of the husband. Since then she does not contract affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it with her husband’s kindred.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, if certain things be separate from one another and something be connected with one of them, it does not follow that it is connected with the other. Now a person’s blood relations are separate from one another. Therefore it does not follow, if a certain woman be married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected with all his kindred.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, relations result from certain things being united together. Now the kindred of the husband do not become united together by the fact of his taking a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any relationship of affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Husband and wife are made one flesh. Therefore if the husband is related in the flesh to all his kindred, for the same reason his wife will be related to them all.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)** — Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41).

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, A certain natural friendship is founded on natural fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), arises in two ways; first, from carnal procreation; secondly, from connection with orderly carnal procreation, wherefore he says (Ethic. viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his wife is natural. Consequently even as a person through being connected with another by carnal procreation is bound to him by a tie of natural friendship, so does one person become connected with another through carnal intercourse. But there is a difference in this, that one who is connected with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his father, shares in the same common stock and blood, so that a son is connected with his father’s kindred by the same kind of tie as the father was, the tie, namely of consanguinity, albeit in a different degree on account of his being more distant from the stock: whereas one who is connected with another through carnal intercourse does not share in the

same stock, but is as it were an extraneous addition thereto: whence arises another kind of tie known by the name of “affinity.” This is expressed in the verse:

*Marriage makes a new kind of connection,  
While birth makes a new degree,*

because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind of relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through carnal intercourse he enters into a new kind of relationship.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although a cause is more potent than its effect, it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way; wherefore it is not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under the same aspect, as is the case with all equivocal effective causes. Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger than the union of the wife with her husband’s kindred, and yet it ought not to be named affinity, but matrimony which is a kind of unity; even as a man is identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a person who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with all of them. But on account of their separation and distance from one another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in one way is connected with another in another way, either as to the kind of connection or as to the degree.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Further, a relation results sometimes from a movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a relation of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways. In one way when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any movement previous or concomitant of the other extreme; as in the Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge and the knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in the other logically only. In another way when the relation results from the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not

without a previous movement of the other; thus there results equality between two men by the increase of one, without the other either increasing or decreasing then, although previously he reached his actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is founded really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results in a grown child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the former's at the time, but by virtue of that previous movement of his wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there results in him the aforesaid relation through the movement of another. Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same stock as the husband, there results in him affinity with the latter's wife, without any new change in him.

#### **P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?***

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that affinity does not remain after the death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and wife or “vice versa.” Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases after the husband's death, since then “the woman... is loosed from the law of the husband” (~~and~~ Romans 7:2). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity. Now the consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at his death. Therefore, the wife's affinity with them ceases also.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Now consanguinity binds persons together for all time as long as they live. Therefore affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons) is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage by the death of a third person.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause; thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or

when the quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there are certain relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are caused by movement, through something being moved actually; such is the relation between mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the motive power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them result from something, having been moved previously, such as the relation between father and son, for the relation between them is caused not by (the con) being begotten now, but by his having been begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory; whereas the fact of having been moved is everlasting, since what has been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are never dissolved through the removal of the cause, but only through the corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been joined together not by their being actually joined. Wherefore it is not done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been contracted survive, although the person die through whom it was contracted.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The marriage tie causes affinity not only by reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been effected in the past.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity, but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now, but because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)**

### *Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things do not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity, it would sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his blood-relations and with himself: for instance when a man is guilty of incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is not caused by unlawful intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3). Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse according to nature.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, He who is joined to a harlot is made one body (<sup>1</sup> ~~1~~ Corinthians 6:16). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)** — Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the definition of affinity, which definition is as follows: Affinity is the relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. But there is carnal copulation even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of the procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of works: the former of which belongs to marriage by reason of carnal copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership directed to a common life. Now the former is to be found in every carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union may be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it was a carnal mingling, it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far as it has something of natural copulation.



**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)-RO(1)** — In an unlawful intercourse there is something natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this respect it causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does not cause affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a way dishonorable.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)-RO(2)** — There is no reason why diverse relations should not be in the same subject by reason of different things. Consequently there can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse: for instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father's side marries a blood-relation of mine on my mother's side. Hence in the above definition the words "which is altogether void of blood-relationship" apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having intercourse with his blood-relation contracts affinity with himself, since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as likeness does.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(3)-RO(3)** — In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does not cause affinity.

## **P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)**

### *Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal. For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes broken off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more akin to carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment of impotence promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made

between persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful by a vow; or in any other way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendum, De spons. et matrim.) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she had been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case unless affinity were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes not affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity. This is called “the justice of public honesty,” which is an impediment to marriage even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same degrees, and is defined thus: “The justice of public honesty is a relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty.” This indicates the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that this relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)-RO(1) —** Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as “the justice of public honesty”: wherefore just as marriage is a lasting tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)-RO(2) —** In carnal intercourse man and woman become one flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or penetration of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also marriage is according to nature. Consequently affinity results from the marriage contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its consummation, and in like manner there results from betrothal, which is a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely the justice of public honesty.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(4)-RO(3) —** All those impediments which void a betrothal prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence whether he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be under a

solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice, having a perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and after the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a contract there results the impediment called “justice of public honesty,” because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at that age the boy who is insensible is equally impotent in respect of the act in question.

## **P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)**

### ***Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?***

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity. For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): “No man may marry his wife’s surviving blood-relation”: and it is said in the next chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that “the wives of two cousins are forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband.” But this is only on account of affinity being contracted through union with a person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity are reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity does also.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, things that are the same with one and the same are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same relations with all her husband’s kindred. Therefore all her husband’s kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the wife, and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-O(4)** — *On the contrary*, If affinity is caused by affinity a man who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by marrying another man’s widow would contract affinity with all her

first husband's kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this cannot be the case because he would become especially related by affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-O(6)** — Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity. But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations of the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)** — *I answer that,* There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of species, as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process is always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents. The first kind of procession, however often it be repeated, the same species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession, just as in the first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species as often as it is repeated. Thus by movement from a point there proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a line; and from a line moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can go no further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and this always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the marriage union, and this produces a different kind of relationship from the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her husband's blood-relations not by blood but by affinity. Wherefore if this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but another kind of relationship; and consequently a married party contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of affinity but of some other kind which is called affinity of the second kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse quoted above (**A(1)**). Formerly these two kinds were included in the prohibition, under the head of the justice of public honesty rather than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true affinity, in the same way as the relationship arising out of betrothal.

Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which now refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity consists.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-RO(1)** — A husband contracts affinity of the first kind with his wife's male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind with the latter's wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity. Again if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being connected with B by the first kind of affinity, contracts affinity of the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this relation C being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man's wife contracts affinity of the third kind with her husband A. And since the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account of a certain honesty more than by reason of affinity, the canon (cap. Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: "The justice of public honesty forbids the wives of two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after the other." But this prohibition is done away with.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of connection.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-RO(3)** — The wife contracts the same connection with her husband's relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of connection.

Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to them lest the time-honored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-RO(4)** — As stated above, a woman does not contract affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the flesh, wherefore she does not contract affinity of the second kind with a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one of these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid the same man to marry successively two women known by one man.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-RO(5)** — As a man is not connected with his wife by affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the second

kind with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(5)-RO(6)** — One person is not connected with me through another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who is affine to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and according to the olden legislation, I contracted some kind of connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another husband becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again her second husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her other blood-relations are not connected with him, but she is connected with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends from them, or, as with her brothers, as proceeding from the same principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become affine to me in any kind of affinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6)**

### *Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is contrary thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the husband. Now the husband's kindred inherit his possessions after his death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine to them, as shown above (**A(5)**). Therefore affinity is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~Gen~~ Leviticus 18:8): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's wife." Now she is only affine. Therefore affinity is an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6) — *I answer that*,** Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as

consanguinity. For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity: and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is there between those who are affine to one another. If, however, affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated above (**Q(50), A(7)**).

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6)-RO(1)** — Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far as the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The husband's possessions do not become one with him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as consanguinity is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband's wife.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7)**

### *Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees. For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees. Now affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which it is caused.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within the degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the case unless the son of an affine were also affine. Therefore affinity like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7) — *On the contrary***, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Therefore all the degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and so it has no degrees of itself.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7) — *I answer that***, A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus: thus animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation to

consanguinity, because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it; whereas it has no relation to affinity except through consanguinity which is the latter's cause. Wherefore since the degrees of relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the distinction of degrees is directly and immediately referable to consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general rule in seeking the degrees of affinity is that in whatever degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of affinity I am related to the wife.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7)-RO(1)** — The degrees in propinquity of relationship can only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to which affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the degrees of consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(7)-RO(2)** — Formerly it used to be said that the son of my affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but accidentally as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for this reason this prohibition is now revoked.

### **P(4)-Q(55)-A(8)**

#### ***Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity?***

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as from an equivocal cause. Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie of affinity does not last to the same number of degrees as consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, human law should imitate Divine law. Now according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were forbidden, in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage: as instanced in a brother's wife whom a man could marry although he could



not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same degrees.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(8) — *On the contrary*,** A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine. Therefore in whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees of affinity should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(8) — *I answer that*,** Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs be the same in number as those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly and now, a dispensation is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in the remote degrees of consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(8)-RO(1) —** The fact that the tie of affinity is less than the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of relationship but not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(8)-RO(2) —** A man could not take his deceased brother's wife except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to raise up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of the flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying the place of his brother.

## **P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)**

### ***Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguinity should always be annulled?***

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)-O(1) —** It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be annulled by divorce. For “what God hath joined together let no man put asunder” (<sup>400</sup>Matthew 19:6). Since then it is understood that what the Church does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to knowledge they ought not to be separated.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner. Therefore by length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although it was not so before.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)-O(3)** — Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when two brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same reason. and yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled on account of affinity or consanguinity.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)** — *On the contrary*, Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have actually contracted marriage.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)** — *I answer that*, Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it belongs to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who cannot without incest be united in the flesh.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)-RO(1)** — Although the Church is upheld by God's gift and authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in her acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant of an impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought about contrary to Divine authority through man's error, which being an error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence when the impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the aforesaid union.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)-RO(2)** — That which cannot be done without sin is not ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later. iv, can. 50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit.), "length of time does not diminish sin but increases it": nor can it in any way legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful persons.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(9)-RO(3)** — In contentious suits between two persons the verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one brother's marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience the other brother ought not on this account always to be bound to put away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to form his conscience on what has been done about the other marriage: but seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has certain knowledge of the impediment of his marriage, or he has an opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither seek nor pay the debt, in the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the third he can both pay and ask.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)**

*Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a marriage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or consanguinity?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-O(1)** — It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by inscription\* whereby a man binds himself to suffer the punishment of retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [\*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation; Cf. **P(2b), Q(33), A(7)**]. But this is not required when a matrimonial separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-O(2)** — Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the process is not by way of accusation.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-O(3)** — Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie. Now this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not

the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take place at any other time.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-O(4)** — Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to suspicion. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)** — *On the contrary*, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful. Therefore it can be denounced.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)** — *I answer that*, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused, so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-RO(1)** — The punishment of retaliation takes place when a person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-RO(2)** — Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion. Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a perpetual impediment,

which prevents the contracting of the marriage and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-RO(3)** — If the marriage is not yet contracted and there is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not, cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the marriage be contracted.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(10)-RO(4)** — He who is silent at first is sometimes heard afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his qui matrim. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: “If an accuser present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made, so that if he who lodges information against persons already married was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication, or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation.”

### **P(4)-Q(55)-A(11)**

*Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same way as in other suits?*

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(11)-O(1)** — It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where

any witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(11)-O(2)** — Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other. Therefore their evidence should not be taken.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(11)-O(3)** — Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(11)** — *On the contrary*, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in other lawsuits witnesses should be called.

**P(4)-Q(55)-A(11)** — *I answer that*, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things peculiar to this suit; namely that “the same person can be accuser and witness; that evidence is not taken ‘on oath of calumny,’ since it is a quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the names of the witnesses.” All this is in order to prevent the sin that may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test. et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn.).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

## QUESTION 56

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL  
RELATIONSHIP

## (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
- (2) From what cause is it contracted?
- (3) Between whom?
- (4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?
- (5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)*****Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?***

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh. But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual

relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship, since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of a sacrament or the intention of so doing [\*See next Article, ad 3]: whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as stated above (**Q(50), A(1)**). Since then disparity of worship is an impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has not this effect.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded. Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual relationship should also be an impediment.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)** — Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace. Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his child who is at the point of death — and then it is not an obstacle to the marriage act on either side — or it is contracted without any necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is the same with him as in the former case — or it is contracted purposely and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has occasioned the



relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not be prejudicial to the other.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although spiritual relationship does not hinder any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods, namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the impediment precedes.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-RO(3)** — In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a bodily relationship.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(1)-RO(4)** — There is nothing unreasonable in two things that are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage. Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.

## **P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)**

### *Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?*

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a character is imprinted in order as in Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving

orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals. Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from catechizing, as some maintain.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted from catechism any more than from the others.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, the instruction given to the baptized by preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching. Neither therefore does it result from catechism.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(7)** — On the other hand, It is written (<sup>4015</sup>1 Corinthians 4:15): “In Christ Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you.” Now spiritual birth causes spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(8)** — Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-O(9)** — Further, “father” denotes relationship. Now a man is called another’s spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching, pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and Confirmation.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation

given by the bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation. Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds, from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not void the contract.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened; wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The effect of the sacrament of order is not regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(3)** — In catechism one makes a profession of future Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future marriage. Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(4)** — There is not made a profession of faith in the other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the comparison fails.

The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(7)** — The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to their spiritual birth.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(8)** — Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [\*Can. Omnes quos, and seqq., Caus. xxx] was made.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(2)-RO(9)** — A spiritual father is so called from his likeness to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so called from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)*****Whether spiritual relationship is contracted  
between the person baptized and the perso  
who raises him from the sacred font?***

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that spiritual relationship is not contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between the receiver and the received at the sacred font.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, as stated above (**A(2)**). Therefore no relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises from the sacred font.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual relationship is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual relationship.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, There is the definition of spiritual relationship quoted above (**A(1)**), as also the authorities mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument and minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation, stands in the place of the Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with both.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Not only the father, of whose seed the child is born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who provides the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation contracts spiritual relationship.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)-RO(2)** — He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the spiritual birth in which he co-operates.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(3)-RO(3)** — A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the godparent in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.

## **P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)**

### ***Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?***

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate and differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship, than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. Therefore neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her husband being godfather to someone.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always pass from husband to wife.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual: which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife by affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the act of another (B), who baptizes A's child, or raises him in Baptism. In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife, unless perchance it be his wife's child, for then she contracts spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, by his own act, for instance when he raises B's child from the sacred font, and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not his wife. Hence the verse: "I may not marry my own child's godmother, nor the mother of my godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my wife's child."

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-RO(1)** — From the fact that corporal and spiritual union differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but not that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The godfather and godmother of the same person are not united in that person's spiritual birth save accidentally, since one of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence the verse: "Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule is infallible." On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh: wherefore the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-RO(3)** — If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and not because spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife through marriage.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Since no spiritual relationship results between godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising together someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife become twice godmother of the same person from different causes, just as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)**

***Whether spiritual relationship  
passes to the godfather's carnal children?***

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to the godfather's carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from father to son, since the person begotten involves a change of degree, as stated above (**Q(55)**, **A(5)**). Therefore it does not pass to the godfather's carnal sons.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, father and son are related in the same degree as brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes from father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this is false.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, A son is something of his father and not conversely (Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and the third is called spiritual



brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal children of the same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The addition of a person by carnal generation entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of relationship, but not with regard to one connected by another kind of relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father's wife in the same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore a godson is not related to his godfather's carnal son in the same degree as the latter's father is related to him, through whom the spiritual relationship is contracted. Consequently it does not follow that spiritual relationship admits of degrees.

**P(4)-Q(56)-A(5)-RO(2)** — A man is not part of his brother as a son is of his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one with him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after spiritual brotherhood.

## QUESTION 57

# OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) What is adoption?
- (2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to marriage?
- (3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.

### P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)

#### *Whether adoption is rightly defined?*

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined: “Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him.” For the child should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not always the taking of someone as a child.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, “Parents should lay up for their children” (<sup>4724</sup>2 Corinthians 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not inherit the goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally. Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his

own master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally. Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's own seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as one's child.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence whether an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice versa," since a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa." Therefore, if by adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten, it would make no difference whether an older person adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is not true. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child; and consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a grandchild.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-O(7)** — Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should have greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but of someone connected with us.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which reason the taker is not

the thing taken, it follows that the person taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural procreation has a term “whereto,” namely the form which is the end of generation, and a term “wherefrom,” namely the contrary form, so legal generation has a term “whereto,” namely a child or grandchild, and a term “wherefrom,” namely, a stranger. Consequently the above definition includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a “lawful taking,” and the term “wherefrom,” since it is said to be the taking of “a stranger,” and the term “whereto,” because it says, “as a child or grandchild .”

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The sonship of adoption is an imitation of natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called “arrogatio,” whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter; and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive him of a fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way except one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has, is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without the authority of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship imperfectly, and is called “simple adoption,” and by this the adopted does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself. In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter, nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will, unless he will.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Natural procreation is directed to the production of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of the sovereign.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-RO(4)** — An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from begetting need no solace for their lack of children as those who have had and have lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some accidental impediment.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Spiritual relationship is contracted through a sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there is no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and old age (~~ROM~~ Galatians 3:28; ~~COL~~ Colossians 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indifferently become another's godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession and a certain subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not fitting that older persons should be subjected to younger in the care of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older; but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have been the child of his natural begetting.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-RO(6)** — One may lose one's grandchildren and so forth even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption was introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a grandchild and so on.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(1)-RO(7)** — A relative ought to succeed by right of relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)*****Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage  
is contracted through adoption?***

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that there is not contracted through adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is contracted through one's being subjected to another's spiritual care: else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither therefore can this result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of the adopter.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, no tie of relationship results from persons conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from adoption.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education, else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters, which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection arising out of adoption." Therefore adoption results in a tie which is an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)** — Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc. Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse, there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The prohibition of a human law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.

### **P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child?***

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a relationship of this kind is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides the adopter and adopted.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted; because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her.

Therefore he was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying her.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (**A(1)**, ad 2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal. But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither, therefore, does legal relationship.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship does so also.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)** — Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on; the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father. Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-RO(1)** — By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual relationship.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need



for dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie between them remains.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Even a woman can adopt by permission of the sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because he is not a fit subject of spirituality.

**P(4)-Q(57)-A(3)-RO(4)** — By spiritual relationship the son is not placed under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship: because it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted are adopted also.

## QUESTION 58

### OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND DEFECTIVE AGE

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
- (2) Whether a spell is?
- (3) Whether frenzy or madness is?
- (4) Whether incest is?
- (5) Whether defective age is?

#### **P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)**

#### *Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow. But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation. Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can marry. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in itself, is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not an impediment absolutely.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man. But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men be debarred on account of frigidity.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic., cap. Quod Sedem): “Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit for the marriage contract.” Now persons affected with frigidity are the like. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)** — Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts, the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause, for instance spell, of which we shall speak later (**A(2)**). If it be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then it voids marriage, so that the party who labors

under this impediment remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may “marry to whom she will... in the Lord” (~~4179~~ 1 Corinthians 7:39). In order to ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken, seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter has been contracted with her permission. [\*”Nowadays it is seldom necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations of non-consummated marriages.” Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article Canonical Impediments.]

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the act of carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other’s body in relation to marital intercourse.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual. Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment (for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced to frigidity.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although old people have not sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-RO(4)** — In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this inability is of two

kinds. First, because a person is unable to fulfill the obligation “de jure,” and such inability renders the contract altogether void, whether the party with whom he contracts knows of this or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill “de facto”; and then if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding, enters the contract, this shows that the latter seeks some other end from the contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know of it the contract is void. Consequently frigidity which causes such an impotence that a man cannot “de facto” pay the marriage debt, as also the condition of slavery, whereby a man cannot “de facto” give his service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage debt “de jure,” for instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other party knows of it or not. For this reason the Master holds (Sent. iv, D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not altogether unlawful for their subjects to marry.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-RO(5)** — A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot fulfill the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical instrument, and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to nature, for it would be done not for pleasure but for a remedy. Dislike for a woman is not a natural cause, but an accidental extrinsic cause: and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about spells, of which we shall speak further on (**A(2)**).

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(1)-RO(6)** — The male is the agent in procreation, and the female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the male than in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman. Yet there may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman in the same way as of frigidity in the man.

## P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)

### *Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent, for thus they would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage by spells.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, God's work is stronger than the devil's. But a spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage which is the work of God.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment, for since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another spell, or by the exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the demon's power. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle. But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect of one woman without being so also in respect of all.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap. iv): "If by sorcerers or witches..." and further on, "if they be incurable, they must be separated."

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)** — Further, the demons' power is greater than man's:

"There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him  
who was made to fear no one" (~~Gen~~ Job 41:24).

Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration; and this is an

impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by the power of a demon.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural effects the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over men's bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion grows from the root of unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that demons exist save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the demon the terrors which a man conjures from his thoughts, and because, owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his thoughts become apparent to the senses, and then he believes that he sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith whereby we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to do many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such things are called wizards.

Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment is perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But this is contrary to actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.

We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it voids marriage, or it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to put this to practical proof the Church has fixed the space of three years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity (**A(1)**). There is, however this difference between a spell and frigidity, that a person who is impotent through frigidity is equally impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the marriage is dissolved, he is not permitted to marry another woman. whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation to one woman and not to another, and consequently when the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek another partner in marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The first corruption of sin whereby man became the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the generative power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even so the power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other animals according to Genesis 3, since the devil tempted the woman through a serpent.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-RO(2)** — God's work may be hindered by the devil's work with God's permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to destroy His works by violence.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Some spells are so perpetual that they can have no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the demon, or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft can be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be reckoned to be perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon's help by witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on account of sin, it does not follow that his power ceases with the sin, because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been removed. And again, the exorcisms of the Church do not always avail to repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will it so, but they always avail against those assaults of the demons against which they are chiefly instituted.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil is a voluntary cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression made by the demon on a man's imagination, whereby he is deprived of the concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular woman and not to another.



## P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)

### *Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that madness is not an impediment to marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized. Therefore they can also marry.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness. Therefore neither is marriage impeded thereby.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual impediment. Therefore it does not void marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are sufficiently contained in the verses given above (**Q(50)**). But they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Madness removes the use of reason more than error does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is also.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)** — Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The madness is either previous or subsequent to marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be previous, then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no lucid intervals, or marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence

the comparison fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad persons (**P(3)**, **Q(68)**, **A[12]**).

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Madness impedes marriage on the part of the latter's cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the act as frigidity does. Yet the Master treats of it together with frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-RO(3)** — A passing impediment which hinders the cause of marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an impediment that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to void the marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(3)-RO(4)** — This impediment is reducible to error, since in either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.

## **P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)**

### *Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister?*

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister. For the wife should not be punished for her husband's sin. Yet she would be punished if the marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, it is a greater sin to know one's own relative, than to know the relative of one's wife. But the former sin is not an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin, it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife's death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those enumerated above (**Q(50)**). Therefore it does not void the marriage contract.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, By knowing his wife's sister he contracts affinity, with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract. Therefore the aforesaid incest does also.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)** — Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished. Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he ought to be punished by being deprived of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, If a man has connection with the sister or other relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his betrothal, the marriage should be broken off on account of the resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the marriage has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it if asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband's sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without any hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If, however, he marry without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church, but his marriage is not for this reason to be annulled. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an impediment to marriage not so much for its being a sin as on account of the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with the other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)**

### *Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care of a guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that before that age their reason is not sufficiently mature to give consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted before that age. Therefore lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non Solum, De regular. et transeunt.) no one can be professed before the fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person marry if defective age were an impediment.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman can marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is neither perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid impediments (**Q(50)**), and consequently would seem not to be an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic.) says that “a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to marry.” But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)** — Further, “There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in nature” according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4): and consequently it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age by defect of which it is impeded.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts. Consequently according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of discretion when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age is the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what happens in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason are sufficiently developed to

supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled. Wherefore if the parties who marry before the age of puberty have marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none the less perpetually indissoluble.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-RO(1)** — In matters to which nature inclines there is not required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in other matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before one is able to manage one's own affairs in other matters without a guardian.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The same answer applies, since the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer greater difficulty than marriage.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-RO(3)** — It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty sooner than man does (*De Animal. ix*); hence there is no parallel between the two.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-RO(4)** — In this case there is an impediment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the reason, which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetuity.

**P(4)-Q(58)-A(5)-RO(5)** — The impediment arising from defective age, like that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of error; because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.

## QUESTION 59

### OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE

#### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?
- (2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers?
- (3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted?
- (4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife?
- (5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife?
- (6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief?

#### P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)

#### *Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?*

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus: and in both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity of worship previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New. But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer and an unbeliever, as evidenced by <sup>(511)</sup>Deuteronomy 21:10 seqq.: “If thou go out to the fight... and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful woman and lovest her, and wilt have her to wife... thou shalt go

in unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife.” Therefore it is lawful also under the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case where a condition is made of the latter’s future conversion. Therefore under the same condition there can be marriage between them.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism, a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>2</sup>2 Corinthians 6:14): “What concord hath light with darkness? [\*Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial?’]” Now there is the greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of faith cannot marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (<sup>3011</sup>Malachi 2:11):

“Juda hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god.”

But such had not been the case if they could have married validly. Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of father and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently if they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary to the intention of the other, and therefore there cannot be a

fitting marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith previous to marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-RO(1)** — In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however especially forbidden with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of their obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married or their children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their rites and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbelievers, especially when there could be no fear of their being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married unbelievers. But under the New Law which is spread throughout the whole world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence disparity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its being contracted and voids the contract.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-RO(2)** — This law either refers to other nations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was willing to be converted to the faith and worship of God.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Present is related to present in the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the present, unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-RO(4)** — It has been made clear that disparity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good of the offspring.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with regard to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment is not called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 9, **Q(1), A(1)**, qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins



by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he would sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other hand if a catechumen having right faith but not having been baptized were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.

## **P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)**

### *Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?*

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that there can be no marriage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage. Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no marriage between unbelievers.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, just as there is disparity of worship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers, for instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above (**A(1)**). Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers of different worship.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore is there a true marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since “the whole life of unbelievers is a sin,” as a gloss observes on <sup>6143</sup>Romans 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin.” Therefore there is no true marriage between unbelievers.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~4172~~ 1 Corinthians 7:12):

“If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away.”

But she is not called his wife except by reason of marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2) —** Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office of nature, which precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore unbelief does not prevent the existence of marriage between unbelievers.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting — since this can be effected even without marriage — but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything intends naturally to bring its effect to perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter. Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to the first perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which tends to the second perfection. And since the first perfection can be common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to believers, it follows that between unbelievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is between believers.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-RO(1) —** Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament, but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is not competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the dispensation of the Church's ministers, it is nevertheless competent to them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit, although it is not actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-RO(2) —** Disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference of

faith. For disparity of worship hinders not only the second perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents endeavor to draw their children in different directions, which is not the case when both are unbelievers.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-RO(3)** — As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of nature. Now those things that pertain to the natural law are determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among unbelievers forbid the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because before God, however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no difference to one's being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden by any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue, which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has not the effect of wine.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(2)-RO(5)** — An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the offspring, or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole life of unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every act, but because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which they do.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)**

*Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted?*

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that when a husband is converted to the faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is unwilling to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an

unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take the same precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for fear of being turned away from the faith. Since then if the believer remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the danger is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted than those who have been brought up in the faith, it would seem that a believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, “An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who has been received into the Christian faith” (Decretals, XXVIII, qu. 1, can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does not believe.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is void. Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus a believing husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an unbeliever he married her within the forbidden degrees.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he married while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his conversion he can retain several wives.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife he has married a second, and that he is converted during this latter marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot remain with this second wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, The Apostle counsels him to remain (~~4172~~ 1 Corinthians 7:12).

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)** — Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both unbelievers. Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled on that account; and thus it would seem that they may lawfully remain together.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The faith of a married person does not dissolve but perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between unbelievers, as stated above (**A(2)**, ad 1), the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the faith, but sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as to cohabitation and marital intercourse, wherein unbelief and adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring. Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away an adulterous wife or to remain with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her disgrace; although even if there be hope of her amendment he is free to put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may remain with the unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in remaining with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the Apostle counsels (~~4372~~ 1 Corinthians 7:12).

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-RO(1)** — It is easier to prevent a thing being done than to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede the contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with affinity (**Q(55)**, **A(6)**): and it is the same with disparity of worship.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-RO(2)** — In the early Church at the time of the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and consequently the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope for his wife's conversion, even though she did not promise to be converted. Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued to come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at the time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish wife, nor was there hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Consequently, then, the believer could, after his conversion, cohabit with his wife if she were a Gentile, but not if she were a Jewess, unless she promised to be converted. This is the sense of that decree. Now, however, they are on a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are obstinate; and therefore unless the unbelieving wife be

willing to be converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be she Gentile or Jew.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Non-baptized unbelievers are not bound by the laws of the Church, but they are bound by the ordinances of the Divine law. Hence unbelievers who have married within the degrees forbidden by the Divine law, whether both or one of them be converted to the faith, cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have married within the degrees forbidden by a commandment of the Church, they can remain together if both be converted, or if one be converted and there be hope of the other's conversion.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-RO(4)** — To have several wives is contrary to the natural law by which even unbelievers are bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not truly married save to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be converted with all his wives, he may remain with the first, and must put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be converted, and one of the others be converted, he has the same right to marry her again as he would have to marry another. We shall treat of this matter further on **(A(5))**.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(3)-RO(5)** — To divorce a wife is contrary to the law of nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbeliever to divorce his wife. Hence if he be converted after divorcing one and marrying another, the same judgment is to be pronounced in this case as in the case of a man who had several wives, because if he wish to be converted he is bound to take the first whom he had divorced and to put the other away.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)**

*Whether a believer can, after his conversion,  
put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing  
to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator?*

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a believer, after his conversion, cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator. For the husband is more bound to his wife than a slave to his master. But a converted slave is not

freed from the bond of slavery, as appears from ~~<417>~~1 Corinthians 7:21; ~~<500>~~1 Timothy 6:1. Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his unbelieving wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, no one may act to another's prejudice without the latter's consent. Now the unbelieving wife had a right in the body of her unbelieving husband. If, then, her husband's conversion to the faith could be prejudicial to the wife, so that he would be free to put her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith without his wife's consent, even as he cannot receive orders or vow continence without her consent.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, if a man, whether slave or free, knowingly marry a bondwoman, he cannot put her away on account of her different condition. Since, then, the husband, when he married an unbeliever, knew that she was an unbeliever, it would seem that in like manner he cannot put her away on account of her unbelief.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, a father is in duty bound to work for the salvation of his children. But if he were to leave his unbelieving wife, the children of their union would remain with the mother, because "the offspring follows the womb," and thus their salvation would be imperiled. Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, an adulterous husband cannot put away an adulterous wife, even after he has done penance for his adultery. Therefore if an adulterous and an unbelieving husband are to be judged alike, neither can the believer put aside the unbeliever, even after his conversion to the faith.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, are the words of the Apostle (~~<417>~~1 Corinthians 7:15,16).

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)** — Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than carnal. But a man can put his wife away, as to cohabitation, on account of carnal adultery. Much more, therefore, can he do so on account of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Different things are competent and expedient to man according as his life is of one kind or of another.

Wherefore he who dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was bound in his former life. Hence it is that he who vowed certain things while living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he dies to the world by adopting the religious life. Now he who is baptized is regenerated in Christ and dies to his former life, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and consequently he is freed from the obligation whereby he was bound to pay his wife the marriage debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she is unwilling to be converted, although in a certain case he is free to do so, as stated above (**A(3)**), just as a religious is free to fulfill the vows he took in the world, if they be not contrary to his religious profession, although he is not bound to do so.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Bondage is not inconsistent with the perfection of the Christian religion, which makes a very special profession of humility. But the obligation to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is somewhat derogatory to the perfection of Christian life, the highest state of which is in the possession of the continent: hence the comparison fails. Moreover one married party is not bound to the other as the latter's possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of a kind of partnership, which is unfitting between unbeliever and believer as appears from ~~2~~<sup>1</sup> Corinthians 6:15; hence there is no comparison between a slave and a married person.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The wife had a right in the body of her husband only as long as he remained in the life wherein he had married, since also when the husband dies the wife "is delivered from the law of her husband" (~~1~~<sup>2</sup> Romans 7:3). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he has changed his life by dying to his former life, this is nowise prejudicial to her. Now he who goes over to the religious life dies but a spiritual death and not a bodily death. Wherefore if the marriage be consummated, the husband cannot enter religion without his wife's consent, whereas he can before carnal connection when there is only a spiritual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is even corporeally buried together with Christ unto death; and therefore he is freed from paying the marriage debt even after the marriage has been consummated.

We may also reply that it is through her own fault in refusing to be converted that the wife suffers prejudice.



**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Disparity of worship makes a person simply unfit for lawful marriage, whereas the condition of bondage does not, but only where it is unknown. Hence there is no comparison between an unbeliever and a bondswoman.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Either the child has reached a perfect age, and then it is free to follow either the believing father or the unbelieving mother, or else it is under age, and then it should be given to the believer notwithstanding that it needs the mother's care for its education.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(4)-RO(5)** — By doing penance the adulterer does not enter another life as an unbeliever by being baptized. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)**

***Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife  
can take another wife?***

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife. For indissolubility is of the nature of marriage, since it is contrary to the natural law to divorce one's wife. Now there was true marriage between them as unbelievers. Therefore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long as a man is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot marry another. Therefore a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, a crime subsequent to marriage does not dissolve the marriage. Now, if the wife be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator, the marriage tie is not dissolved, since the husband cannot marry another. Therefore the sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the marriage so that her husband be free to take another wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, husband and wife are equal in the marriage tie. Since, then, it is unlawful for the unbelieving wife to marry again while her husband lives, it would seem that neither can the believing husband do so.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, the vow of continence is more favorable than the marriage contract. Now seemingly it is not lawful for the believing husband to take a vow of continence without the consent of his unbelieving wife, since then the latter would be deprived of marriage if she were afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for him to take another wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, the son who persists in unbelief after his father's conversion loses the right to inherit from his father: and yet if he be afterwards converted, the inheritance is restored to him even though another should have entered into possession thereof. Therefore it would seem that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be converted, her husband ought to be restored to her even though he should have married another wife: yet this would be impossible if the second marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot take another wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, Matrimony is not ratified without the sacrament of Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be annulled. Therefore marriage contracted in unbelief can be annulled, and consequently, the marriage tie being dissolved, it is lawful for the husband to take another wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)** — Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbelieving wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator. If therefore it were unlawful for him to take another wife he would be forced to remain continent, which would seem unreasonable, since then he would be at a disadvantage through his conversion.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, When either husband or wife is converted to the faith the other remaining in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if the unbeliever be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator — that is without drawing the other to unbelief — the believer is free to part from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry again. But if the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without insult to the Creator, by making use of blasphemous words and refusing to hear Christ's name, then if she strive to draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after parting from her may be united to another in marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-RO(1)** — As stated above (**A(2)**), the marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the marriage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more firmly. Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified afterwards by Christ's faith.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he was bound to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since if she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-RO(3)** — After the believer has married, the marriage tie is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as to the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed by dispensation to take another husband, should her husband have taken another wife.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-RO(4)** — The husband ought not to take a vow of continence nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a reasonable hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife's conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought his wife to be converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband has received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is deprived of her husband.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(5)-RO(5)** — The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no comparison between an inheritance and a wife.

## P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)

### *Whether other sins dissolve marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same effect.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it is spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will dissolve marriage.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, it is said (<sup>415B</sup> Matthew 5:30):

“If thy right hand scandalize thee,  
pluck it off and cast it from thee,”

and a gloss of Jerome says that “by the hand and the right eye we may understand our brother, wife, relatives and children.” Now these become obstacles to us by any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account of any kind of sin.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, covetousness is idolatry according to <sup>415B</sup> Ephesians 5:5. Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like manner she can be put away on account of covetousness, as also on account of other sins graver than covetousness.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-O(5)** — Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6) — *On the contrary*,** It is said (<sup>415B</sup> Matthew 5:32):

“Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of  
fornication, maketh her to commit adultery.”

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)** — Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties does not fall into sin.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above (**A(3)**). Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages. Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved in two ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery. But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie is not dissolved by adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce to his adulterous wife, and having put her away, could take another wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the act, and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief or fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on account of other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving her of the comfort of his presence.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-RO(1)** — Although adultery is opposed to marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the other way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church, from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the marriage tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The primal union of the soul to God is by faith, and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were, according to ~~ROM~~ Hosea 2:20, “I will espouse thee to Me in faith.” Hence in Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a more remote signification.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-RO(3)** — This applies to the case when the wife proves a notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear his being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with her, as stated above (**A(5)**).

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-RO(4)** — Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the idolater

serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas covetousness corrupts the affections.

**P(4)-Q(59)-A(6)-RO(5)** — The words of the Master refer to betrothal, because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime. Or, if he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of sinning, for instance, if she were to say: “I will not remain your wife unless you amass wealth for me by theft,” for then he ought to leave her rather than thief.

## QUESTION 60

## OF WIFE-MURDER

## (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one's wife?
- (2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)**

*Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife  
if she be discovered in the act of adultery?*

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one's own wife if she be an adulteress.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law can rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death. Since then the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly do so.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if the husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his own wife if she be discovered in adultery.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the

just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous wife.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that “the Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has none but a spiritual sword.” Therefore it would seem that he who wishes to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which permits a man to kill his wife.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1) —** Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in adultery. Neither therefore may a husband kill his wife.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife. First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband, moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can, without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse a person of murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot be made in an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37), the Church does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not lawful, neither according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever evidence he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act, not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the punishment for murder, on account of the very great provocation which the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is not bound in this matter by human laws, neither does she acquit him of the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason that he is quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in no case is it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own authority.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-RO(1) —** The law has committed the infliction of this punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are



deputed to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife's judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge's presence.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The civil law has not commissioned the husband to kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin, just as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from killing his wife.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-RO(3)** — This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of punishment, since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(1)-RO(4)** — There are two kinds of community: the household, such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom. Accordingly, he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care he is charged. But he who presides over a community of the first kind, can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of death. Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind of control over his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some other way.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)**

### *Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?*

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he who kills another man's wife is not hindered from marrying. Neither therefore is he who kills his own wife.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently it would seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to marry.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores) says: "The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance, and they are absolutely forbidden to marry." Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived of marriage.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the contract, as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he has committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women: wherefore if he should have married another, although he sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not voided for this reason.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv, **Q(62)**, **A(2)**) in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to the good of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to marriage than wife-murder, and the argument is based on a false premiss.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has murdered his wife.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Such a man does not sin against marriage as he does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(60)-A(2)-RO(4)** — It does not follow that because guilt has been remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as stated above (**Q(38), A(1)**, ad 3).

## QUESTION 61

# OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider

- (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow:
- (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?
- (2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage?
- (3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?

### P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)

*Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated  
can enter religion without the other's consent?*

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that even after the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent. For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should the Divine law permit it.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according to <sup>4178</sup>1 Corinthians 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter religion.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict — namely a carnal — marriage to a stricter marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's consent.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Married persons are forbidden (<sup>4175</sup>1 Corinthians 7:5) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent, in order to have time for prayer.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)** — Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the other's body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without the other's consent.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)-RO(2)** — It is not unreasonable that a greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered by evil.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(1)-RO(3)** — In every form of religious life marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the same person: wherefore that comparison fails.

## P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)

*Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent?*

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that even before the marriage has been consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering religion.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without the other's consent.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it is said (~~de~~ Matthew 19:6): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But the union which precedes marital intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of man.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, According to Jerome [\*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord called John from his wedding.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption of

human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation they are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii).

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The marriage union, before consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not altogether indissoluble.

### **P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?***

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the wife may not take another husband, if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, after entering religion and before making his profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife

can marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns to the world: which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife receive the power to marry again.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, No one can bind another to those things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will, according to the statement of the Apostle (~~413~~ 1 Corinthians 7:39); so too after the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)-RO(1)** — When both consorts take a like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)-RO(2)** — A person is not accounted dead to the world by entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his wife is bound to wait for him until that time.

**P(4)-Q(61)-A(3)-RO(3)** — We must judge of a profession thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in this case.



## QUESTION 62

# OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION

### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie remains. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account of fornication?
- (2) Whether he is bound to do so?
- (3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?
- (4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?
- (5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?
- (6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?

### P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)

*Whether it is lawful for a husband  
to put away his wife on account of fornication?*

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil. But the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication, seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not lawful.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication, than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication,

they cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if only one commits fornication.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed cannot be motivated by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account of fornication.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural. Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than fornication.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, are the words of <sup>4152</sup>Matthew 5:32.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)** — Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse. Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor of the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven cases to be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has committed fornication, when either the wife is not to be blamed, or both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband also has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man has fraudulently impersonated her husband in the marriage-bed; the fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been reconciled to her by having carnal intercourse with her after she has committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the state of unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband is bound to receive her back again.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-RO(1)** — A husband sins if through vindictive anger he puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin if he does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to share in

her guilt, or in order to correct his wife's sin, or in order to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Divorce on account of fornication is effected by the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty of the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against when both are guilty of fornication than when only one is.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Fornication is directly opposed to the good of marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is broken, and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins, though perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called spiritual fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in the rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication. Because one may take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal fornication, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, but on account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein unbelief is perfected.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the same way, both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it does not so affect the certainty of offspring.

## **P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)**

***Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of fornication?***

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband is the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty of fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her away.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup>4166</sup>1 Corinthians 6:16): “He who is joined to a harlot is made one body.” Now a man cannot at once be a member of a harlot and a member of Christ (<sup>4165</sup>1 Corinthians 6:15). Therefore the husband who is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of Christ, and therefore sins mortally.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-O(5)** — *On the contrary*, A gloss on <sup>4161</sup>1 Corinthians 7:11, “Let not the husband put away his wife” says that “Our Lord permitted a wife to be put away on account of fornication.” Therefore it is not a matter of precept.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication, sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not putting her away.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to her sin, by not having recourse to her due correction.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The wife can be corrected for her sin of fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows; wherefore if she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct her.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The husband seems to consent with her when he retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if, however, she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-RO(3)** — She can no longer be called a harlot since she has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her, does not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-RO(4)** — There is no parallel, because the effect of consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that carnal intercourse between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself, lawful, unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the husband seems to consent to his wife's lewdness.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-RO(5)** — This permission is to be understood as an absence of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept, for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(2)-RO(6)** — The wife sins not only against her husband, but also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot entirely remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.

### **P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication?***

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has been pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for this.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is stated (<sup>4019</sup>Matthew 1:19) that Joseph... being a just man... “was minded to put” Mary “away privately.”

Therefore it would seem that a husband may privately pronounce a divorce without the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife's fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he forfeits the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought to precede the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication cannot be proved, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness" (~~Job~~<sup>Job</sup> 24:15). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription [*\*Cf. P(2b), Q(33), A(7)*], whereby a person binds himself under the pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible in this matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away. Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of another, even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing him privately (~~Mat~~<sup>Mat</sup> 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring his wife's crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked her in private.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.

Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense she has committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon as he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to bed and board, and in this way she cannot be put away except at the judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away otherwise, he must be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove the wife's fornication. Now this putting away is called a divorce: and consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced except at the judgment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The sentence is an application of the general law to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her sanctity, he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel, because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning, but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may discover her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation. Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found together alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or "nudas cum nuda."

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-RO(5)** — A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual judge, and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his end, as the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for inscription to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if he fail to prove his case.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(3)-RO(6)** — According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap. Licet), “there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First, by inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [\*Cf. **P(2b), Q(33), A(7)**] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by fraternal correction.” Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not by accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of the guilty party, but also his punishment, for the safeguarding of the common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.

### **P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)**

#### *Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each other?*

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under the New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old Law (<sup>4051</sup>Matthew 5:31,32). Now in the “repudium” husband and wife were not judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his wife, but not “vice versa.” Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a par with each other.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife have several husbands than that a husband have several wives: wherefore the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband, and consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, where there is greater injury to one’s neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater injury to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a wife’s adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the husband’s adultery does not. Therefore the wife’s sin is the greater, and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.



**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of the wife (<sup>411B</sup>1 Corinthians 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than “vice versa.” Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-O(5)** — *On the contrary*, It would seem in this matter the wife ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more is his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than in men, for which reason Chrysostom [\*Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that “lust is a passion proper to women,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “properly speaking women are not said to be continent on account of their being easily inclined to concupiscence,” for neither can dumb animals be continent, because they have nothing to stand in the way of their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the punishment of divorce.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-O(6)** — Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman’s and so he should be punished the more.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally bound towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the offspring the wife’s adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the husband’s wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them may have sinned more grievously than the other.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but not “vice versa.”

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-RO(2,3)** — These arguments are based on the fact that in comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason for divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each other.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Although the husband is the head of the wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his. Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-RO(5)** — In adultery there is the same sinful character as in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant, wherefore they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences, whereas in man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what we have said above. And since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that, simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more grievously than the adulterous husband, other things being equal.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(4)-RO(6)** — Although the control which the husband receives over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another’s child.

## P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)

### *Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?*

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that a husband can marry again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornication, as stated above (A(2)). Therefore seemingly at least in this case he can marry again.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not continent during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it would seem lawful for her to marry again.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she is freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore “she is loosed from the law of her husband” [\*~~ROM~~ Romans 7:2]. Therefore she can marry again; and the same applies to her husband.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, it is said (~~MTD~~ Matthew 19:9):

Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication,  
and shall marry another committeth adultery.”

Therefore seemingly he does not commit adultery if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of fornication, and consequently this will be a true marriage.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5) — On the contrary,** It is written (~~MTD~~ 1 Corinthians 7:10,11):

“Not I, but the Lord, commandeth that the wife depart not from  
her husband. and, if she depart, that she remain unmarried.”

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)** — Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress would if she were allowed to contract another and more desired marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who

wish to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the husband to contract a second marriage.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it: wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), “as long as they live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor union with another can destroy.” Therefore it is unlawful for one, while the other lives, to marry again.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Although no one is absolutely bound to continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife contract an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease, namely fornication, so as to be incorrigible.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The very shame of having been divorced ought to keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser evil that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Although after divorce the wife is not bound to her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with him, the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and consequently she cannot marry again during her husband’s lifetime. She can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband’s will, unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by false witnesses in pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has made her vow of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful for her to demand it.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(5)-RO(4)** — The exception expressed in our Lord’s words refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on a false interpretation.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)*****Whether husband and wife  
may be reconciled after being divorced?***

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled after being divorced. For the law contains the rule (Can. Quod bene semel, Caus. vi, qu. iv): “That which has been once well decided must not be subsequently withdrawn.” Now it has been decided by the judgment of the Church that they ought to be separated. Therefore they cannot subsequently be reconciled.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, if it were allowable for them to be reconciled, the husband would seem bound to receive his wife, especially after she has repented. But he is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself before the judge, cannot allege her repentance against her husband’s accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is reconciliation allowable.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, if reconciliation were allowable, it would seem that the adulterous wife is bound to return to her husband if her husband asks her. But she is not bound, since they are separated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, if it were lawful to be reconciled to an adulterous wife, this would especially be the case when the husband is found to have committed adultery after the divorce. But in this case the wife cannot compel him to be reconciled, since the divorce has been justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be reconciled.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-O(5)** — Further, if a husband whose adultery is unknown put away his wife, who is convicted of adultery by the sentence of the Church, the divorce would seem to have been pronounced unjustly. And yet the husband is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because she is unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, therefore, is reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been granted justly.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 7:11):

“And if she depart, that she remain unmarried,  
or be reconciled to her husband.”

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)** — Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her away after fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he can be reconciled to her after divorce.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, If the wife has mended her ways by repenting of her sin after the divorce, her husband may become reconciled to her; but if she remain incorrigible in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same reason which forbade him to retain her while she refused to desist from sin.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The sentence of the Church in pronouncing the divorce did not bind them to separate, but allowed them to do so. Therefore reconciliation may be effected or ensue without any withdrawal of the previous sentence.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The wife’s repentance should induce the husband not to accuse or put away the wife who is guilty of fornication. He cannot, however, be compelled to this course of action, nor can his wife oppose her repentance to his accusation, because although she is no longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there still remains something of the debt of punishment, and though this has been taken away in the sight of God, there still remains the debt of punishment to be inflicted by the judgment of man, because man sees not the heart as God does.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-RO(3)** — That which is done in a person’s favor does him no prejudice. Wherefore since the divorce has been granted in favor of the husband, it does not deprive him of the right of asking for the marriage debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence his wife is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he ask her, unless with his consent she has taken a vow of continence.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-RO(4)** — According to strict law, a husband who was previously innocent should not be compelled to receive an adulterous wife on account of his having committed adultery after the divorce. But according to equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first of all to

admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and of scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself seek reconciliation.

**P(4)-Q(62)-A(6)-RO(5)** — If the husband's adultery is secret, this does not deprive his adulterous wife of the right to allege it in self-defense, although she cannot prove it. Wherefore the husband sins by seeking a divorce, and if, after the sentence of divorce, his wife asks for the marriage debt or for a reconciliation, the husband is bound to both.

## QUESTION 63

## OF SECOND MARRIAGES

## (TWO ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is lawful?
- (2) Whether it is a sacrament?

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)***Whether a second marriage is lawful?*

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [\*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that “to take a second husband is in truth fornication,” which is unlawful. Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [\*On <sup><470></sup>1 Corinthians 7:40 and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good. Therefore it is unlawful.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred from being present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore they are unlawful.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a person incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married twice. Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage (<sup><125></sup>Genesis 25:1).



**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)** — Further, the Apostle says (<sup>scilicet</sup> 1 Timothy 5:14):

“I will... that the younger,” namely widows,  
“should marry, bear children.”

Therefore second marriages are lawful.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, The marriage tie lasts only until death (<sup>scilicet</sup> Romans 7:2), wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and consequently when one dies the other is not hindered from marrying a second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only second marriages are lawful, but even third and so on.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely concupiscence which incites also to fornication.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-RO(2)** — A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification which is in a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of Christ and the Church.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Men who are consecrated to Divine things are debarred not only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any appearance of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first marriage.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin, and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [<sup>\*</sup>“Defectus sacramenti,” i.e. defect of signification; Cf. **A(2)**, **O(3)**]. Hence the argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)**

### *Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?*

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament should be done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage ought nowise to be repeated.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But the signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage, because there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another. But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2) — *On the contrary***, Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused [\*Cf. **Q(69), A(1)**] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)** — Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity is contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2) — *I answer that***, Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find all the essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter — which results from the parties having the conditions prescribed by law — and the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of the present), it is clear that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a first.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is implied that the first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is clear in all those sacraments which imprint a character. But those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in the case of Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband's death.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only one woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account of this defect the blessing is omitted in a second marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is a second marriage on the part of both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin marry a man who has had another wife, the marriage is blessed nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent even in relation to the former marriage, since though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the one Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is there a spiritual marriage. For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not blessed on account of the defect in the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The perfect signification is found in a second marriage considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation to the previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(63)-A(2)-RO(4)** — A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament of Order.

**QUESTION 64**

**OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE,  
AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF  
THE MARRIAGE DEBT**

**(TEN ARTICLES)**

In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to marriage:

- (1)** the payment of the marriage debt;
- (2)** plurality of wives;
- (3)** bigamy;
- (4)** the bill of divorce;
- (5)** illegitimate children.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

- (1)** Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?
- (2)** Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?
- (3)** Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?
- (4)** Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?
- (5)** Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?
- (6)** Whether the one without the other's consent may take a vow that prohibits the payment of the debt?
- (7)** Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time?
- (8)** Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?
- (9)** Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?

(10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)**

*Whether husband and wife are mutually bound  
to the payment of the marriage debt?*

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [\*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the obligation of a precept.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to pay the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse the one who asks.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt comes under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening the body: but apparently this is untrue.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as well as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one spouse in the power of the other (<sup>4101</sup>1 Corinthians 7:4). But a slave is bound by an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according to <sup>4601</sup>Romans 13:7, “Render... to all men their

dues, tribute to whom tribute is due,” etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)** — Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (~~and~~ 1 Corinthians 7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is troubled with concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of precept.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power over her husband only in relation to the generative power and not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-RO(1)** — It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful, but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the ministers of the Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion, because without sin they may either abstain out of reverence or receive Christ’s body out of devotion.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The wife has no power over her husband’s body, except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore if she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not bound to satisfy her.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-RO(3)** — If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his wife's sin, should she fall into fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he should endeavor to do his best that his wife may remain continent.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.

## **P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)**

### ***Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?***

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is not bound to payment otherwise.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now even for married people it is better to be continent than to make use of marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to be continent, and so he is not bound to pay her the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master save when the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands it.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he not pay it when he is not asked.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against the wife's concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although she ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment of the debt on the husband's part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though she ask it not of him.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when namely the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it, whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him to admit this presumption if he does see such signs.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to fulfill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by "not serving to the eye" (<sup><H001></sup>Ephesians 6:6; <sup><S002></sup>Colossians 3:22) which is the Apostle's command to servants.



**P(4)-Q(64)-A(2)-RO(4)** — A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger.

### **P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)**

#### *Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wif to ask for the marriage debt?*

*(\*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.)*

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was unclean, even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in the offspring. Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt, this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental to the offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt during her menses.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, “Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers” (<sup>1888</sup>Leviticus 18:19) where Augustine observes: “Although he has already sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem to have spoken figuratively.”

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)** — Further, “All our justices” are become “as the rag of a menstruous woman” (<sup>2360</sup>Isaiah 64:6) where Jerome observes: “Men ought then to keep away from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to all”: and thus the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous woman, for two reasons both on account of her

uncleanness, and on account of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremonial precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For since marriage is chiefly directed to the good of the offspring, all use of marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is in order. Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of the second reason, although not on account of the first. Now, the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to which women are subject at stated periods when they are in good health; and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to a menstruous woman both on account of her infirmity since a woman in that state cannot conceive, and because an issue of this kind is lasting and continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When however the woman is subject to a natural issue of the menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it is forbidden to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to ask for the debt during the period of that issue.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint of this kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(3)-RO(3)** — As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and in course of time become fruitful, and “vice versa,” as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Anim. xvi).

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)**

***Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her husband if he ask for it?***

*(\*This and the previous article are omitted in the Leonine edition.)*

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (~~Ex~~ Leviticus 20:18) that if any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death. Therefore it would seem that both he who asks and she who grants are guilty of mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, “Not only they that do them but they also that consent to them are worthy of death” (~~Ro~~ Romans 1:32). Now he who knowingly asks for the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins mortally by consenting to pay the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should a wife give her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual murder.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** “The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband” (~~1Co~~ 1 Corinthians 7:4). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt even during her menses.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)** — Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her husband. But she would give her husband an occasion of sin, if she paid him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as she would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound to pay for fear of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from marriage, by which the husband is given entire power of his wife’s body with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any parallel between bodily affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be endangered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the offspring which perhaps would not be forthcoming.

Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so either knowingly or in ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and

admonitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that way inclined. If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for not paying the debt, unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband ultimately persists in his request, she must yield to his demand. But it would not be safe for her to make known [\*”Indicare,” as in the commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads “judicare.”] her disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards her, unless his prudence may be taken for granted.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)-RO(1)** — This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband’s sin unless she pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather than consenting.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(4)-RO(3)** — A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is in the case in point.

## **P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)**

### *Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?*

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage act. For according to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii) the agent is more noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that act.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (**AA(1),2**). Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the woman was made on the man’s account in reference to marriage according to <sup>GEN 1:26</sup>Genesis 2:18, “Let us make

him a help like unto himself.” But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage “the husband is the head of the wife” (~~482~~ Ephesians 5:23). Therefore they are not equal in the aforesaid act.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~484~~ 1 Corinthians 7:4): “The husband... hath not power of his own body,” and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they are equal in the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)** — Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above (**Q(44)**, **AA(1),3**). Therefore husband and wife are equal in the marriage act.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two cubits in length. But equality of proportion is that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind as double to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-RO(2)** — This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not

bound to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-RO(3)** — This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(5)-RO(4)** — Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)**

***Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent?***

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above (**A(5)**). Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may without the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot, without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the one can take a vow of continence either absolutely or for a time, without the other's consent.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying him in some service. Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder him from paying the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 7:5):

“Defraud not one another, except... by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer.”

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)** — Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now

“the husband... hath not power of his own body, but the wife”  
(~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 7:4).

Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without the other’s consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow [\*Cf. **Q(53)**, **AA(1),4**; **Q(61)**, **A(1)**].

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-RO(1)** — It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without his wife’s consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife

and not “vice versa,” the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to the wife’s chastity as a result of wandering from country to country, than to the husband’s, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without her husband’s consent.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other’s vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other’s good, but the harm to himself.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-RO(3)** — There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can without the other’s consent vow not to demand the debt, not however not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other’s consent.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(6)-RO(4)** — Just as the wife receives power over her husband’s body, without prejudice to the husband’s duty to his own body, so also is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7)**

***Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?***

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet



on those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the debt at some other time.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7) — *On the contrary*,** Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore neither is it lawful at a holy time.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7) — *I answer that*,** Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one's time to spiritual things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7)-RO(1) —** At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar things, to which even those who observe perpetual continence have recourse.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(7)-RO(2) —** Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.

## **P(4)-Q(64)-A(8)**

### ***Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?***

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(8)-O(1) —** It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the morning to the procession. But this would not have happened had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(8)-O(2) —** Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded (<sup>2015</sup>Exodus 19:15): "Come not near your wives," when namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(8) — *On the contrary***, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(8) — *I answer that***, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of the flesh.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(8)-RO(1)** — This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service against her conscience.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(8)-RO(2)** — The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to a carnal people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in the New Law which is the law of the spirit.

## **P(4)-Q(64)-A(9)**

### ***Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?***

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(9)-O(1)** — It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who consent thereto are equally punished (<sup>¶</sup> Romans 1:32). But the one who pays the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a temporal master.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(9) — *On the contrary***, It is written (~~4015~~ 1 Corinthians 7:5): “Defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time,” etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the other must pay.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(9) — *I answer that***, Since the wife has power of her husband’s body, and “vice versa,” with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once openly.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(9)-RO(1)** — As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(9)-RO(2)** — No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.

## **P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)**

### ***Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?***

*(\*This article is omitted in the Leonine edition.)*

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)-O(1)** — It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration of the others sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the celebration of marriage be forbidden then.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)-O(2)** — Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may be asked for on those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)-O(3)** — Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved if they be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a commandment of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10) — *On the contrary***, It is written (~~2018~~ Ecclesiastes 3:5):

“A time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.”

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10) — *I answer that***, When the newly married spouse is given to her husband, the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations by reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account it is forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially to arise to spiritual things. Those times are from Advent until the Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to the ancient Canons, is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place, **P(3), Q(30)**), from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the Ascension until the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion to be received at that time.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)-RO(1)** — The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)-RO(2)** — There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage; and consequently the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(64)-A(10)-RO(3)** — Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament. Nor is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should a marriage have been contracted or a wedding celebrated at the aforesaid times, those who have done so “ought to be separated.” Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference to some canonical ordinance, such as that of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the Decretals.

## QUESTION 65

### OF PLURALITY OF WIVES

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
- (2) Whether this was ever lawful?
- (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
- (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
- (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?

#### **P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)**

*Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?*

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But “it was not a sin” to have several wives “when this was the custom,” according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 38) that “it was not contrary to a commandment” to have several wives, “because by no law was it forbidden.” Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have several wives.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, “Natural right is that which nature has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(6)** — *On the contrary*, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according to <sup>(102)</sup>Genesis 2:24, “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore it is of natural law.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(7)** — Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same time.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(8)** — Further, “Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself” [\*Cf. Tobias 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-O(9)** — Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and the wife's jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of sharing the beloved," it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called "the natural law" or "the natural right," but in other animals "the natural instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth. Now whatever renders an action impropportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the natural law. But an action may be impropportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body,

which is the principal end of food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if an action be disproportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way disproportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.

Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the “offspring” is assigned as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (**Q(41), A(1)**). And in reference to this they owe one another “fidelity” which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the “sacrament” is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus “potters quarrel with one another” [\*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the Church



one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (*De Inv. Rhet. ii*), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-RO(2)** — As Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet. ii*), “fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are approved by custom.” Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that “they did not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law.”

The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature: and thus Tully defines it (*De Inv. Rhet. ii*) when he says: “Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force.” And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle — thus the movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states (*De Coelo et Mundo iii*, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (*Etym. v*) that “the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel.” Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those

which are dictated by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: “Natural right is what nature has taught all animals.” Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature’s dictate to every animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Since, however, the arguments adduced “on the contrary side” would seem to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the natural law, we must reply to them.

Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-RO(7)** — In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are required by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end), marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of wives is not against the first principles of the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-RO(8)** — This precept of the natural law, “Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself,” should be

understood with the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for his wife to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in *De Gener. Animal.* 7:4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its education. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has been.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(1)-RO(9)** — The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife's love is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love is to another sharing the same wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more jealous of the female than "vice versa."

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)**

### *Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?*

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several wives. For, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v, 7), "The natural law has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality of

wives is forbidden by the natural law, as stated above (**A(1)**). Therefore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former, it would also be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxvi, 3), “as God is the founder of nature, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature.” Since then God has planted in our nature the principle that one man should be united to one wife, it would seem that He has never dispensed man from this.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read in the Law of a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old Testament all who wished to do so, without any distinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by the law or by the prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by dispensation.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any other reason for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of God, and this is necessary also now. Therefore this dispensation would be still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity and the sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage where one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods than the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to have been granted with a view to this multiplication.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is stated (<sup><R18></sup>Galatians 3:19) that the Law “was set because of transgressors [Vulg.: ‘transgressions’],” namely in order to prohibit them. Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition thereof, as appears from (<sup><R15></sup>Deuteronomy

21:15, “If a man have two wives,” etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it was lawful.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)** — Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it was lawful.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (**A(1)**, ad 7,8), plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts, but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above (**A(1)**).

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some

impediment it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at all times and places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it may happen accidentally that a person is ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies to the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-RO(2)** — In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted that it was never lawful to have several wives without having a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not intended to apply to all cases but to the majority, as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart, it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural law to be given under the form of a written law but by internal inspiration.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-RO(4)** — When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(2)-RO(5)** — The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the union of Christ with the

Church as one, nevertheless the plurality of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but also with the Church triumphant where there are “many mansions” [<sup>486D</sup>John 19:2].

### **P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)**

#### *Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?*

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law. But fornication is forbidden (<sup>485D</sup>Acts 15:29) in conjunction with ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those who were brought to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a time.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures no one. But a bondswoman is her master’s property. Therefore if her master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is not against the natural law to have a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, everyone may give his own property to another. Now the wife has power of her husband’s body (<sup>487D</sup>1

Corinthians 7:4). Therefore if his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another woman without sin.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** According to all laws the children born of a concubine are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of which they are born were naturally shameful.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3) —** Further, as stated above (**Q(41), A(1)**), marriage is natural. But this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man could be united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is against the natural law to have a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** As stated above (**A(1)**), an action is said to be against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end intended by nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through being in itself disproportionate to that end. Now the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and rearing of the offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to make use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature intended it, is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that which is of most consequence to them, just as the marriage union took its name from the good of the offspring [*\*Cf. Q(44), A(2)*], which is the end chiefly sought after in marriage, so the name of concubine is expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for its own sake. Moreover even though sometimes a man may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of the offspring, which signifies not only the begetting of children from which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction, by which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents, in respect of which three things the parents are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teaching of the children remain a duty of the parents during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and mother to dwell together for a long time, in order that together they may be of assistance to their children.



Hence birds that unite together in rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the time when they first come together until the young are fully fledged. Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which is the signification of a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have intercourse with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the ceremonial laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature. Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication among that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there was a difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-RO(2)** — This law was the result of the darkness just mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor to God as stated in <sup><B12></sup>Romans 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law was abolished.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-RO(3)** — In certain cases no evil results ensue if a person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a time, so that in neither case is the surrender against the natural law. But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property without injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's property that she may serve him, she is not his that she may be his concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his property. For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not directed to its good, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(3)-RO(5)** — The wife has power of her husband's body, not simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and consequently she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the detriment of the good of marriage.

## **P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)**

### *Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?*

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication: and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to commit fornication with Tamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying (<sup><1832></sup>Genesis 38:23): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine, save in a certain case (<sup><1825></sup>Deuteronomy 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins. Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation. But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple fornication a mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (<sup><1819></sup>1 Corinthians 6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)** — Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a crime according to Tobias 4:13, “Take heed to keep thyself... from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, **Q(1), A(4)**), those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of friendship between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature’s aim in sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple fornication by its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-RO(1)** — It often happens that a man who does not avoid a mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an incentive. Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-RO(2)** — A sin is called deadly, not because it is punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death. Hence also theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies to fornication.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements of lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are to be understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their particular acts.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(4)-RO(4)** — A circumstance is the more effective in aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin. Hence although fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those things which

tighten the bond of human fellowship, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

## P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)

### *Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?*

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to have a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a wife; wherefore according to the Law (<sup>(1211)</sup>Deuteronomy 21:11, seqq.) a bondswoman gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we read that certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives, and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (<sup>(1214)</sup>Genesis 21:14). Therefore she was not Abraham's wife.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the decalogue, namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Therefore it was never lawful.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5) —** Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4): "What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband." But it is never lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse with another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a concubine.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved

his assertion from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's sons from mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked crime (<sup>GEN</sup>Genesis 37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him.

Wherefore we must say that since it is against the natural law to have a concubine outside wedlock, as stated above (**A(3)**), it was never lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman outside wedlock is an action impropportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently it is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testament we read of concubines being taken by such men as we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have been called concubines, because they had something of the character of a wife and something of the character of a concubine. In so far as marriage is directed to its principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above (**A(1)**), and in regard to this there is no dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household and community of works, the wife is united to the husband as his mate: and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this respect a dispensation was possible, since it is the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to concubines, and for this reason they were known as such.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)-RO(1)** — As stated above (**A(1)**, ad 7,8) to have several wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to have a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The patriarchs of old by virtue of the dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their bondswomen with the disposition of a husband towards his wife. For these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage, but not as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and slave.

**P(4)-Q(65)-A(5)-RO(3)** — As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder (as we shall state further on, **Q(67), A(6)**), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which the Apostle explains (~~402~~Galatians 4:22, seqq.). Again, that this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the same place. Even so Esau, the son of a free woman, did not inherit (~~403~~Romans 9:13, seqq.). In like manner on account of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited, as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because “sons and heirs are born to Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free woman and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman.”

## QUESTION 66

# OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having two successive wives?
- (2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once?
- (3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?
- (4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
- (5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?

### P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)

#### *Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?*

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively, the one in being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of more than one wife, so as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (<sup>500</sup>1 Timothy 3:2; <sup>500</sup>Titus 1:6), from the episcopate.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a man who commits fornication with several women gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular. Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular, which is against the decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man who had committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore the perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy, which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives successively; the second is when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively, one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.

There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things, and should be occupied in spiritual matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however is the better.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The multitude of several wives at the same time is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the sacrament



is voided on that account. But the multitude of several successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although those who are guilty of fornication give proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent concupiscence, since by fornication one party is not bound to the other for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(1)-RO(3)** — As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity, because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which signification is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the present is sufficient to cause irregularity.

## **P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)**

### ***Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, one in law, the other in fact?***

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that irregularity does not result from bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of Christ with the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become

irregular by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery. Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several women either in law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a certain likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Although there is no sacrament in this case there is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(2)-RO(3)** — In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist, because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification. Nevertheless if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of imperfect signification.

### **P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?***

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily. But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always cause irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin. Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the debt at her asking, before she is accused and convicted of adultery. Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): “We command thee never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of subjection.”

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the husband it is required that he should not have married another wife, but not that he should be a virgin, whereas on the part of the wife it is also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church militant which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a virgin: wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the part of the bridegroom, is required in

order that a man be made a bishop. This reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the Apostle (<sup><482></sup>Ephesians 5:25):

“Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church,”

which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the bridegroom Christ; and again he says (<sup><482></sup>Ephesians 5:23):

“Because the husband is the head of the wife,  
as Christ is the head of the Church.”

Wherefore others say that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no stain. Also that the synagogue was first united to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification if the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns is one, so is the Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church in which we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to <sup><304></sup>Jeremiah 3:14, <sup><308></sup>Ezekiel 16:8, <sup><309></sup>Hosea 2:16, where the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she was not as a concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this, fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through idolatry. Hence we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the sacrament itself. Now when corruption of the flesh occurs outside wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of the person corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage terminates not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act, is the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes irregular through marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a virgin when he marries, so also would a woman become irregular if she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer a virgin when she married — unless she had been corrupted by reason of a previous marriage.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-RO(2)** — In this case opinions differ. It is, however, more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his flesh among several women.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(3)-RO(4)** — If a woman commits fornication after being married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless he again knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled by his own conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have said is more probable, since here it is not a question of sin, but of signification only.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)**

### *Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?*

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, “the husband of one wife”) that if a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is not a bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity. Therefore it removes irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master's statement (Sent. iv.). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon bigamy.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament, not of a sin."

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)** — Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins." Therefore in like manner one who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage. Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be removed by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-RO(1)** — In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed: unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation should be more easily granted.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-RO(2)** — It does not follow that what does a greater thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not so in the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal of an irregularity.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-RO(3)** — This must be understood of punishments consequent upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is effected by virginity or division of the flesh.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(4)-RO(5)** — Those irregularities were contracted through slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by those sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, whereas Baptism is not.

## **P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)**

### *Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?*

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): “It is not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could do so, have taken to themselves a second wife.”

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (<sup>508P</sup>1 Timothy 3:2): “It behooveth... a bishop to be... the husband of one wife,” it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this matter.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation, it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector, dist. 34.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)** — Further, Pope Martin [\*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: “If a Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same applies if he should be a bigamist.” Therefore he may at least receive a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop, only as regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-RO(1)** — This Decretal shows that there is the same difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married several wives in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such cases.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-RO(2)** — This is true as regards things belonging to the natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to faith. But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Not every signification is essential to a sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,\* and this is not removed by irregularity. [\*Leonine edition reads “officium,” some read “effectum”; the meaning is the same, and is best rendered as above.]

**P(4)-Q(66)-A(5)-RO(4)** — In particular cases there is no ratio that applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is reasonably established for all, in consideration of what happens in the majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain definite case.



## QUESTION 67

### OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE

#### (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?
- (2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?
- (3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?
- (4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?
- (5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?
- (6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?
- (7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?

#### **P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)**

#### *Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?*

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save Christ's has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore it is not of the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the

offspring. But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another, even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore the indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to <sup><100></sup>Matthew 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)** — Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to sunder “what God hath joined together.” Since then the indissolubility of marriage is gathered from this passage ( <sup><100></sup>Matthew 19:6) it would seem that it is of natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents’ heirs ( <sup><1014></sup>2 Corinthians 12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Christ’s law alone brought mankind “to perfection” [\*Cf. <sup><1019></sup>Hebrews 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to “the law of the spirit of life” [\*Cf. <sup><1010></sup>Romans 8:2].

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and in

so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently, as stated above (**Q(65), A(2), ad 5**), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring, although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.

The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for all rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the offspring absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does not prove.

### **P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?***

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)-O(1)** — It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law, which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife, as stated above (**A(1)**). Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a husband towards his wife, as stated above (**Q(65)**, **A(5)**, ad 2,3). Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, In the commandments, especially those which in some way are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in nature. In this way, however, there is no variation in the course of those natural things which happen always, but only in the course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in this way there can be a variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is appointed for the majority of cases, but also in the course which is appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at the time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's Passion [<sup>604</sup>Joshua 10:14; <sup>2002</sup>2 Kings 20:10; <sup>2388</sup>Isaiah 38:8; <sup>4075</sup>Matthew 27:15]. In like manner the reason for a dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in the lower causes, and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts because these are always existent as it were, as stated above (**Q(65)**, **A(1)**) in reference to the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may be given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery, as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dispensations, however, are not granted to all generally, but to certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles. Accordingly, if the indissolubility of marriage is contained among the first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of dispensation in this second way; but, if it be one of the second

precepts of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even in the first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For the indissolubility of marriage is not directed to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in so far as parents have to provide for their children for their whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in life. Now this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore it would seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention of nature, and consequently that it is contrary not to the first but to the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a matter of dispensation even in the first way.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)-RO(2)** — To have a concubine is contrary to the good of the offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good, namely the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it is necessary that the parents remain together permanently; which is not the case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the comparison fails. But in respect of nature's second intention, even the having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as evidenced by ~~XXXI~~ Hosea 1.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.

## P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)

### *Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?*

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from prohibiting when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid the putting away of a wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for “the law... is holy” (<sup>4172</sup>Romans 7:12), it would seem that divorce was at one time lawful.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, according to <sup>4172</sup>2 Peter 1:21. Now it is written (<sup>4176</sup>Malachi 2:16): “When thou shalt hate her, put her away.” Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not unlawful, it would seem that it was not always unlawful to divorce a wife.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, Chrysostom [\*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles permitted second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But second marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was it sinful under the Mosaic law to divorce a wife.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-O(4)** — *On the contrary*, our Lord said (<sup>4178</sup>Matthew 19:8) that Moses granted the Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their heart. But their hardness of heart did not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore did the law about the bill of divorce.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, Chrysostom says [\*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “Moses, by granting the bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but deprived their sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as though they were keeping the law, their sin seemed to be no sin.”

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, on this point there are two opinions. For some say that under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a bill of divorce, were not excused from sin, although they

were excused from the punishment which they should have suffered according to the Law: and that for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of divorce. Accordingly they reckon four kinds of permission: one by absence of precept, so that when a greater good is not prescribed, a lesser good is said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescribing virginity, permitted marriage (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 7). The second is by absence of prohibition: thus venial sins are said to be permitted because they are not forbidden. The third is by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them whereas He can. The fourth is by omission of punishment, and in this way the bill of divorce was permitted in the Law, not indeed for the sake of obtaining a greater good, as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the sake of preventing a greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews were prone on account of the corruption of their irascible appetite. Even so they were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of corruption in their concupiscible appetite, lest they should exact usury of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of suspicion in the reason they were allowed the sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old Law, though it did not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as the saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if it had been a sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have been indicated to him, at least by the law or the prophets: “Show My people their wicked doings” (~~280~~<sup>280</sup> Isaiah 58:1): else they would seem to have been neglected, if those things which are necessary for salvation and which they knew not were never made known to them: and this cannot be admitted, because the righteousness of the Law observed at the time of the Law would merit eternal life. For this reason they say that although to put away one’s wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by God’s permitting it, and they confirm this by the authority of Chrysostom, who says [\*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “the Lawgiver by permitting divorce removed the guilt from the sin.” Although this opinion has some probability the former is more generally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both sides [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(105), A(4)**, ad 8; **P(2a), Q(108), A(3)**, ad 2; Contra Gentes iii, cap. 123].

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-RO(1)** — He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid if he has no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the occasion of a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Divine authority he did not forbid the bill of divorce.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said that a wife ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of the Holy Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-RO(3)** — This likeness of permission must not be applied to every detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both cases, since both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin, the permission given on account of that hardness excused them. For certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing themselves of the permission granted to them.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(3)-RO(5)** — A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in order to obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good becomes virtuous by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted to have only one wife, on account of the good of the offspring. In another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil, and then if this is done with the authority of one who can grant a dispensation, the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet it does not also become virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in the law of Moses in order to avoid a greater evil, namely wife-murder. Hence Chrysostom says that “he removed the guilt from the sin.” For though divorce remained inordinate, for which reason it is called a sin, it did not incur the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal, in so far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt was taken away from it. And therefore he says again [\*Hom. xxxii in the *Opus Imperfectum* falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “divorce was permitted, an evil indeed, yet lawful.” Those who hold the first opinion understand by this only that divorce incurred the debt of temporal punishment.



**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)*****Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife  
to have another husband?***

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong by divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the wife could without sin, marry another husband.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug. xv, xviii) that “when it was the manner it was no sin.” Now at the time of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry another husband: “When she is departed and marrieth another husband,” etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another husband.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New Testament is superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old Testament (Matthew 5). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the New Testament that the divorced wife marry not another husband ( <sup><1053></sup>Matthew 5:32). Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-O(4)** — *On the contrary*, are the words of <sup><1053></sup>Matthew 5:32, “He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery.” Now adultery was never permitted in the Old Law. Therefore it was not lawful for the divorced wife to have another husband.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, it is written ( <sup><1053></sup>Deuteronomy 24:3) that a divorced woman who marries another husband “is defiled, and is become abominable before the Lord.” Therefore she sinned by marrying another husband.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, According to the first above mentioned opinion (**A(3)**), she sinned by marrying another husband after being divorced, because her first marriage still held good. For

“the woman... whilst her husband liveth,  
is bound to the law of her husband” (~~ROM~~ Romans 7:2):

and she could not have several husbands at one time. But according to the second opinion, just as it was lawful by virtue of the Divine dispensation for a husband to divorce his wife, so could the wife marry another husband, because the indissolubility of marriage was removed by reason of the divine dispensation: and as long as that indissolubility remains the saying of the Apostle holds.

Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side:

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-RO(1)** — It was lawful for a husband to have several wives at one time by virtue of the divine dispensation: wherefore having put one away he could marry another even though the former marriage were not dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to have several husbands. Wherefore the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-RO(2)** — In this saying of Augustine manner [mos] does not signify custom but good manners; in the same sense a person is said to have manners [morigeratus] because he has good manners; and “moral” philosophy takes its name from the same source.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law over the Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those things which the Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things which were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by many to be permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained — for instance that of the hatred towards our enemies. and so is it in the matter of divorce.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-RO(4)** — The saying of our Lord refers to the time of the New Law, when the aforesaid permission was recalled. In the same way we are to understand the statement of Chrysostom [\*Hom. xii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], who says that “a man who divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four crimes: for in God’s sight he is a murderer,” in so far as he has the purpose of killing his wife unless he divorce her; “and because he divorces her without her having committed fornication,” in which case alone the law of

the Gospel allows a man to put away his wife; “and again, because he makes her an adulteress, and the man whom she marries an adulterer.”

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(4)-RO(5)** — A gloss observes here: “She is defiled and abominable, namely in the judgment of him who first put her away as being defiled,” and consequently it does not follow that she is defiled absolutely speaking; or she is said to be defiled just as a person who had touched a dead or leprous body was said to be unclean with the uncleanness, not of sin, but of a certain legal irregularity. Wherefore a priest could not marry a widow or a divorced woman.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)**

***Whether a husband could lawfully  
take back the wife he had divorced?***

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced. For it is lawful to undo what was ill done. But for the husband to divorce his wife was ill done. Therefore it was lawful for him to undo it, by taking back his wife.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, it has always been lawful to be indulgent to the sinner, because this is a moral precept, which obtains in every law. Now the husband by taking back the wife he had divorced was indulgent to one who had sinned. Therefore this also was lawful.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the reason given (<sup>634b</sup>Deuteronomy 24:4) for its being unlawful to take back a divorced wife was “because she is defiled.” But the divorced wife is not defiled except by marrying another husband. Therefore at least it was lawful to take back a divorced wife before she married again.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, It is said (<sup>634b</sup>Deuteronomy 24:4) that “the former husband cannot take her again,” etc.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, In the law concerning the bill of divorce two things were permitted, namely for the husband to put away the wife, and for the divorced wife to take another husband; and two things were commanded, namely that the bill of divorce should be written, and

secondly that the husband who divorced his wife could not take her back. According to those who hold the first opinion (**A(3)**) this was done in punishment of the woman who married again, and that it was by this sin that she was defiled: but according to the others it was done that a husband might not be too ready to divorce his wife if he could nowise take her back afterwards.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)-RO(1)** — In order to prevent the evil committed by a man in divorcing his wife, it was ordered that the husband could not take back his divorced wife, as stated above: and for this reason it was ordered by God.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)-RO(2)** — It was always lawful to be indulgent to the sinner as regards the unkindly feelings of the heart, but not as regards the punishment appointed by God.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(5)-RO(3)** — There are two opinions on this point. For some say that it was lawful for a divorced wife to be reconciled to her husband, unless she were joined in marriage to another husband. For then, on account of the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded, it was assigned to her in punishment that she should not return to her former husband. Since, however, the law makes no distinction in its prohibition, others say that from the moment that she was put away she could not be taken back, even before marrying again, because the defilement must be understood not in reference to sin, but as explained above (**A(4)**, ad 3).

## **P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)**

### *Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?*

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife. For it is written (<sup>309</sup>Malachi 2:16): “When thou shalt hate her put her away.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>310</sup>Deuteronomy 24:1): “If... she find not favor in his eyes, for some uncleanness,” etc. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-O(3)** — *On the contrary*, Barrenness and fornication are more opposed to marriage than hatred. Therefore they ought to have been reasons for divorce rather than hatred.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, hatred may be caused by the virtue of the person hated. Therefore, if hatred is a sufficient reason, a woman could be divorced on account of her virtue, which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-O(5)** — Further, “If a man marry a wife and afterwards hate her, and seek occasions to put her away”\* alleging that she was not a virgin when he married her, should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten, and shall be condemned in a hundred sicles of silver, and he shall be unable to put her away all the days of his life (<sup>1223</sup>Deuteronomy 22:13-19). [\*The rest of the passage is apparently quoted from memory.] Therefore hatred is not a sufficient reason for divorce.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, It is the general opinion of holy men that the reason for permission being given to divorce a wife was the avoidance of wife-murder. Now the proximate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the proximate cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like love, from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce certain remote causes which were a cause of hatred. For Augustine says in his gloss (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 14): “In the Law there were many causes for divorcing a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He commands other grievances to be borne for conjugal fidelity and chastity.” Such causes are imperfections either of body, as sickness or some notable deformity, or in soul as fornication or the like which amounts to moral depravity. Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower limits, saying with sufficient probability that it was not lawful to divorce a wife except for some cause subsequent to the marriage; and that not even then could it be done for any such cause, but only for such as could hinder the good of the offspring, whether in body as barrenness, or leprosy and the like, or in soul, for instance if she were a woman of wicked habits which her children through continual contact with her would imitate. There is however a gloss on <sup>1241</sup>Deuteronomy 24:1, “If... she find not favor in his eyes,” which would seem to restrict them yet more, namely to sin, by saying that there “uncleanness” denotes sin: but “sin” in the gloss refers

not only to the morality of the soul but also to the condition of the body. Accordingly we grant the first two objections.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Barrenness and other like things are causes of hatred, and so they are remote causes of divorce.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-RO(4)** — No one is hateful on account of virtue as such, because goodness is the cause of love. Wherefore the argument does not hold.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(6)-RO(5)** — The husband was punished in that case by being unable to put away his wife for ever, just as in the case when he had corrupted a maid (<sup>(1728)</sup>Deuteronomy 22:28-30).

### **P(4)-Q(67)-A(7)**

#### *Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?*

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill: because the husband was absolved from the punishment of the law by the written bill of divorce. But this would seem altogether unjust, unless sufficient causes were alleged for a divorce. Therefore it was necessary for them to be written in the bill.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, seemingly this document was of no use except to show the causes for divorce. Therefore, if they were not written down, the bill was delivered for no purpose.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, the Master says that it was so in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33).

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(7)** — *On the contrary*, The causes for divorce were either sufficient or not. If they were sufficient, the wife was debarred from a second marriage, though this was allowed her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the divorce was proved to be unjust, and therefore could not be effected. Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means particularized in the bill.

**P(4)-Q(67)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, The causes for divorce were not particularized in the bill, but were indicated in a general way, so as to

prove the justice of the divorce. According to Josephus (*Antiq.* iv, 6) this was in order that the woman, having the written bill of divorce, might take another husband, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore according to him it was written in this wise: "I promise never to have thee with me again." But according to Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xix, 26) the bill was put into writing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might be dissuaded by the counsel of the notaries to refrain from his purpose of divorce.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

## QUESTION 68

### OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate?
- (2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?
- (3) Whether they can be legitimized?

#### **P(4)-Q(68)-A(1)**

*Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?*

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that children born out of true marriage are legitimate. For he that is born according to law is called a legitimate son. Now everyone is born according to law, at least the law of nature, which has more force than any other. Therefore every child is to be called legitimate.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, it is the common saying that a legitimate child is one born of a legitimate marriage, or of a marriage that is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a marriage is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church, whereas there is some impediment affecting its validity; which impediment may be known to the parties who marry in the presence of the Church: or they may marry in secret and be ignorant of the impediment, in which case their marriage would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, for the very reason that it is not prevented by the Church. Therefore children born out of true marriage are not illegitimate.



**P(4)-Q(68)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, Illegitimate is that which is against the law. Now those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law. Therefore they are illegitimate.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(1) — *I answer that***, Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful marriage; some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children; some are neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of adultery or incest, for these are born not only against the positive law, but against the express natural law. Hence we must grant that some children are illegitimate.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although those who are born of an unlawful intercourse are born according to the nature common to man and all animals, they are born contrary to the law of nature which is proper to man: since fornication, adultery, and the like are contrary to the law of nature. Hence the like are not legitimate by any law.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Ignorance, unless it be affected, excuses unlawful intercourse from sin. Wherefore those who contract together in good faith in the presence of the Church, although there be an impediment, of which however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their children illegitimate. If, however, they know of the impediment, although the Church upholds their marriage because she knows not of the impediment, they are not excused from sin, nor do their children avoid being illegitimate. Neither are they excused if they know not of the impediment and marry secretly, because such ignorance would appear to be affected.

## **P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)**

### ***Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?***

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that children ought not to suffer any loss through being illegitimate. For a child should not be punished on account of his father's sin, according to the Lord's saying (~~280~~ Ezekiel 18:20). But it is not his own but his father's fault that he is born of an unlawful union. Therefore he should not incur a loss on this account.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, human justice is copied from Divine. Now God confers natural goods equally on legitimate and illegitimate children. Therefore illegitimate should be equalled to legitimate children according to human laws.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is stated (~~Gen~~ Genesis 25:5,6) that  
 “Abraham gave all his possessions to Isaac,  
 and that to the children of the concubines he gave gifts”:

and yet the latter were not born of an unlawful intercourse. Much more, therefore, ought those born of an unlawful intercourse to incur loss by not inheriting their father’s property.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, A person is said to incur a loss for some cause in two ways: First, because he is deprived of his due, and thus an illegitimate child incurs no loss. Secondly, because something is not due to him, which might have been due otherwise, and thus an illegitimate son incurs a twofold loss. First because he is excluded from legitimate acts such as offices and dignities, which require a certain respectability in those who perform them. Secondly, he incurs a loss by not succeeding to his father’s inheritance. Nevertheless natural sons can inherit a sixth only, whereas spurious children cannot inherit any portion, although by natural law their parents are bound to provide for their needs. Hence it is part of a bishop’s care to compel both parents to provide for them.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)-RO(1)** — To incur a loss in this second way is not a punishment. Hence we do not say that a person is punished by not succeeding to the throne through not being the king’s son. In like manner it is no punishment to an illegitimate child that he has no right to that which belongs to the legitimate children.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Illegitimate intercourse is contrary to the law, not as an act of the generative power, but as proceeding from a wicked will. Hence an illegitimate son incurs a loss, not in those things which come to him by his natural origin, but in those things which are dependent on the will for being done or possessed.

## P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)

### *Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?*

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that an illegitimate son cannot be legitimized. For the legitimate child is as far removed from the illegitimate as the illegitimate from the legitimate. But a legitimate child is never made illegitimate. Neither, therefore, is an illegitimate child ever made legitimate.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, illegitimate intercourse begets an illegitimate child. But illegitimate intercourse never becomes legitimate. Neither, therefore, can an illegitimate son become legitimate.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, What is done by the law can be undone by the law. Now the illegitimacy of children is an effect of positive law. Therefore an illegitimate child can be legitimized by one who has legal authority.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, An illegitimate child can be legitimized, not so that he be born of a legitimate intercourse, because this intercourse is a thing of the past and can never be legitimized from the moment that it was once illegitimate. But the child is said to be legitimized, in so far as the losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur are withdrawn by the authority of the law.

There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons (Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries the woman of whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and by special indulgence and dispensation of the lord Pope. The other four ways are according to the laws:

- (1) If the father offer his natural son to the emperor's court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on account of the reputation of the court;
- (2) if the father designate him in his will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the will to the emperor;
- (3) if there be no legitimate son and the son himself offer himself to the emperor;

- (4) if the father designate him as legitimate in a public document or in a document signed by three witnesses, without calling him natural.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)-RO(1)** — A favor may be bestowed on a person without injustice, but a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence an illegitimate child can be legitimized rather than “vice versa”; for although a legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance on account of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was legitimately begotten.

**P(4)-Q(68)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently it cannot be legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an illegitimate child who has no such defect.

# TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION

## QUESTIONS 69-86

### QUESTION 69

## OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH

### (SEVEN ARTICLES)

In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak

- (1) of those things which partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection;
- (2) of the resurrection itself and its circumstances;
- (3) of the things which follow it.

Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider

- (1) the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death;
- (2) the quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire;
- (3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living;

- (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven;
- (5) the signs preceding the general judgment;
- (6) the fire of the world's final conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death?
- (2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death?
- (3) Whether they are able to leave those places?
- (4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?
- (5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?
- (6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of children?
- (7) Whether so many places should be distinguished?

#### **P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)**

##### *Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?*

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that places are not appointed to receive souls after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Wise men are agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place," and this agrees with the words of Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii, 32): "We can answer without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places, except with a body, or that it is not conveyed locally." Now the soul separated from the body is without a body, as Augustine also says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 32). Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the reception of souls.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whatever has a definite place has more in common with that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like certain other spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it cannot be said that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from others, since

they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions. Therefore places should not be assigned for their reception.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, nothing is assigned to separated souls after death, except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. But a corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since they receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not be assigned to receive them.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as soon as it was made it was filled with the holy angels, as Bede [*\*Hexaem. i, ad* <sup><000></sup>Genesis 1:2] says. Since then angels even as separated souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be assigned to receive separated souls.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)** — Further, this appears from Gregory's statement (Dial. iv) that souls after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, as in the case of Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of the soul of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for their reception.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed by God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is that there is a certain fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to the more noble substances: wherefore also the philosophers held that the order of separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though after death souls have no bodies assigned to them whereof they be the forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their degree of nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as they more or less approach to the first substance (to which the highest place it fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim heaven to be (<sup><192></sup>Psalm 102:19, <sup><216></sup>Isaiah 66:1). Wherefore we hold that those souls that

have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Incorporeal things are not in place after a manner known and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are properly in place; but they are in place after a manner befitting spiritual substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Things have something in common with or a likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality: thus hot things have something in common, and incorporeal things can have nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus the Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the principle of spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal life. In this way certain souls have more in common with certain places: for instance, souls that are spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls that are plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The separated soul receives nothing directly from corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by their respective places: yet these same souls, through knowing themselves to be appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow therefrom; and thus their place conduces to their punishment or reward.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)**

***Whether souls are conveyed to  
heaven or hell immediately after death?***

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on <sup><180></sup>Psalm 36:10, “Yet a little while and the wicked shall not be,” says that “the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the saints will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father.” Now those saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the saints do not go immediately up to heaven.



**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cix) that “the time which lies between man’s death and the final resurrection holds the souls in secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or of suffering.” Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell, since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there together with their bodies: so that he would have no reason to distinguish between the time before and the time after the resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven until the day of judgment.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time, so that each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of all, as appears from a gloss on <sup><814></sup>Hebrews 11:40,

“God providing some better thing for us — that the common joy  
may make each one rejoice the more.”

Much more, therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the end, so as to be awarded to all at the same time.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, punishment and reward, being pronounced by the sentence of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell fire and the joys of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ judging them, namely at the last judgment, according to <sup><181></sup>Matthew 25. Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of judgment.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup><182></sup>2 Corinthians 5:1):

“If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we  
have... a house not made with hands, but reserved in heaven  
[\*Vulg.: ‘eternal in heaven’; cf. <sup><1004></sup>1 Peter 1:4].”

Therefore, after the body’s dissolution, the soul has an abode, which had been reserved for it in heaven.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)** — Further, the Apostle says (<sup><1023></sup>Philippians 1:23):

“I desire [Vulg.: ‘Having a desire’]  
to be dissolved and to be with Christ.”

From these words Gregory argues as follows (Dial. iv, 25): “If there is no doubt that Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul’s soul is in heaven likewise.” Now it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since this is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied that the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That also some souls go down to hell immediately after death is evident from ~~the~~ Luke 16:22, “And the rich man died, and he was buried in hell.”

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement, so in souls there is merit or demerit whereby they reach their reward or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls in keeping with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from the body it is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it be held back by some debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed until the soul is first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated in Dial. iv, 25, and in De Eccl. Dogm. xlvii.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the words, “They will not yet be where the saints will be,” etc., by saying immediately afterwards: “That is to say, they will not have the double stole which the saints will have at the resurrection.”

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Among the secret abodes of which Augustine speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are detained before the resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn between the time before and the time after the resurrection is because before the resurrection they are there without the body whereas

afterwards they are with the body, and because in certain places there are souls now which will not be there after the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-RO(3)** — There is a kind of continuity among men as regards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of <sup><4172></sup>Acts 17:24,26, “God... hath made of one all mankind”: whereas He has fashioned souls independently of one another. Consequently it is not so fitting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as that they should be glorified together in the body. Moreover the glory of the body is not so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each one being increased by the common joy.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty (Dial. iv, 25): “If then,” he says, “the souls of the just are in heaven now, what will they receive in reward for their justice on the judgment day?” And he answers: “Surely it will be a gain to them at the judgment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul, afterwards they will enjoy also that of the body, so as to rejoice also in the flesh wherein they bore sorrow and torments for the Lord.” The same is to be said in reference to the damned.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)**

***Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell  
are able to go from thence?***

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): “If the souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in order to abide with me”: and from this he concludes that the souls of the departed do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they would be able to do so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do not go forth from their abode.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (~~Psalm~~ Psalm 26:4):

“That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life,”  
and (~~Job~~ Job 7:9):

“He that shall go down to hell shall not come up.”

Therefore neither the good nor the wicked quit their abode.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, as stated above (**A(2)**), abodes are awarded to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither the rewards of the saints nor the punishments of the damned are increased. Therefore they do not quit their abodes.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus: “For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken up their abode either in Abraham’s bosom or in the place of refreshment, or under the altar of God, and that they are unable to visit their graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, imprison them until the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their lord, them of whom it is written: They follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if the Lamb is everywhere, therefore we must believe that those also who are with Him are everywhere.” Therefore it is absurd to say that the souls of the departed do not leave their abode.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)** — Further, Jerome argues as follows: “Since the devil and the demons wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere present with wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood be imprisoned and unable to go forth?” Hence we may infer that not only the good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander about everywhere.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)** — Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (Dial. iv), where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared to the living.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There are two ways of understanding a person to leave hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so

that heaven or hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state further on (**Q(71), A(5)**, ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them according to the order of nature, and what according to the order of Divine providence; for as Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xvi): “Human affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of the Divine power, nature’s works differ from those which are done miraculously.” Consequently, according to the natural course, the separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut off from communication with the living. For according to the course of nature men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living. Nevertheless, according to the disposition of Divine providence separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to men, as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur sometimes to the damned, and that for man’s instruction and intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory, as evidenced by many instances related in the fourth book of the Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between the saints and the damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the Divine power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will: while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says afterwards, is speaking according to the common course of nature, And yet it does not follow, although the dead be able to appear to the living as they will, that they appear as often as when living in the flesh:

because when they are separated from the flesh, they are either wholly conformed to the divine will, so that they may do nothing but what they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else they are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their grief for their unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear to others.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one may not come forth for a time.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-RO(3)** — As stated above (**A(1)**, ad 3) the soul's place conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through being consigned to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief. Now this joy or grief at being consigned to such a place remains in the soul even when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the honor of sitting on a throne in the church incurs no dishonor when he leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein actually, the place remains assigned to him.

We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in reference to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to that which befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that they are everywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-RO(5)** — There is no parity between demons and angels on the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the other. For the good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of presiding over men, to watch over them or to try them; but this cannot be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of glory, it is competent to the souls of the saints that they can be where they will; and this is what Jerome means to say.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(3)-RO(6)** — Although the souls of the saints or of the damned are sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe that this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to persons whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked angels in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even the living appear to others and tell them many things in their sleep; and yet it is clear

that they are not present, as Augustine proves from many instances (De Cura pro Mort. xi, xii).

### **P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)**

#### *Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?*

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as Abraham's bosom. For according to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xxxiii): "I have not yet found Scripture mentioning hell in a favorable sense." Now Abraham's bosom is taken in a favorable sense, as Augustine goes on to say (Genesis ad lit. xxxiii): "Surely no one would be allowed to give an unfavorable signification to Abraham's bosom and the place of rest whither the godly poor man was carried by the angels." Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is seen by those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may be gathered from Augustine (Confess. ix, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: "Whatever that be, which is signified by that bosom, there lives my Nebridius," and further on: "Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto Thy fountain, and drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom in proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy." Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the Church prays not that a man be taken to hell: and yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul to Abraham's bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham's bosom is not the same as limbo.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss [\*St. Gregory, Moral. xx] on <sup>1313</sup>Job 30:23, "Where a house is appointed for every one that liveth," says: "Hell was the house of all the living until the coming of Christ." Therefore Abraham's bosom is the same as limbo.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)** — Further, Jacob said to his sons (<sup>1418</sup>Genesis 44:38): "You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell": wherefore Jacob

knew that he would be taken to hell after his death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to hell after his death; and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be a part of hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, After death men's souls cannot find rest save by the merit of faith, because "he that cometh to God must believe" (<sup>scilicet</sup> Hebrews 11:6). Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of Abraham, who was the first to sever himself from the body of unbelievers, and to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason "the place of rest given to men after death is called Abraham's bosom," as Augustine declares (Genesis ad lit. xii). But the souls of the saints have not at all times had the same rest after death; because, since Christ's coming they have had complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, whereas before Christ's coming they had rest through being exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end. Consequently the state of the saints before Christ's coming may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called Abraham's bosom, and as regards its lack of rest, and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ's coming the limbo of hell and Abraham's bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents Abraham's bosom from being after Christ's coming, and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be parted from one another.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was good in it was called Abraham's bosom, but as regards its deficiencies it was called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an unfavorable sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although in a way they are one.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called Abraham's bosom before as well as after Christ's coming, but in different ways. For since before Christ's coming the saints' rest had a lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham's bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of Christ the saints' rest is complete through their seeing God, this rest is called Abraham's bosom, but not hell by any means. It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought.



Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: and the same meaning applies to a gloss on <sup><162></sup>Luke 16:22, “It came to pass that the beggar died,” etc., which says: “Abraham’s bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose is the kingdom of heaven.”

## **P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)**

### *Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?*

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the hell of the damned. For Christ is said to have “bitten” [\*Allusion to <sup><134></sup>Hosea 13:14] hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some from thence but not all. Now He would not be said to have “bitten” hell if those whom He set free were not part of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore since those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the same were shut up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the same as hell, or is a part of hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, in the Creed Christ is said to have descended into hell. But he did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers. Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup><176></sup>Job 17:16): “All that I have shall go down into the deepest hell [Douay: ‘pit’].” Now since Job was a holy and just man, he went down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the deepest hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** In hell there is no redemption [\*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii]. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)** — Further, Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii): “I do not see how we can believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in hell.” Now the soul of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain

places. Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are distinct, both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there is eternal punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the limbo of the Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or that they are continuous as it were yet so that some higher part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins, and consequently the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those who were condemned to punishment.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)-RO(1)** — When Christ, by His descent, delivered the Fathers from limbo, He is said to have “bitten” hell and to have descended into hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to situation.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place not in reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other places, as including all penal places under one head. Again we may reply with Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: “When Jacob said to his sons, ‘You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell,’ he seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled with so great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners.” The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.

## P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)

### *Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?*

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. Now the Fathers were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same for both.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): “The punishment of children who die in none but original sin is most lenient.” But no punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the place of punishment is the same for both.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in the limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the children were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and the limbo of the Fathers the same.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward. For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is placed higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference to limbo and hell (**A(5)**).

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to original sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated in so far as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle on the part of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an obstacle both on the part of the person and on the part of nature: and for this reason different abodes are appointed to the Fathers and to children.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some one by reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those who are burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the punishment due to those who are debarred from the reception of glory by no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very delay of glory is called a kind of punishment.

## **P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)**

### *Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?*

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that we should not distinguish so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should there be more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit or demerit. Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after death.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, venial, and mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(4)** — On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many more than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison house of the demons (<sup>Gen 2</sup> 2 Peter 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more than five abodes.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(5)** — Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise after this state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elias. Since then the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would seem that there are more than five.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(6)** — Further, some penal place should correspond to each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to such a person by reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory, where there is none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting punishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode should be assigned.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(7)** — Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of merit and sin are infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded after death.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(8)** — Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where they sinned, as Gregory states (*Dial. iv, 55*). But they sinned in the place which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among the abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this world, as the Master said above (*Sent. iv, D, 21*).

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(9)** — Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to those who die in grace with venial sins an abode is assigned where they are punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is purgatory. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good works.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-O(10)** — Further, just as the Fathers were delayed from obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are they now detained from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are received now from the one where they will be received after the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls' various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could not yet be expiated.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(1)** — Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several places of punishment.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(2)** — The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it is fitting that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive according to their merits there are various states, and consequently the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(3)** — One may be punished in two ways for original sin, as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(4)** — This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (<sup>4121</sup>Matthew 25).

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(5)** — The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(6)** — This supposition is impossible [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(89)**, **A(6)**]. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(7)** — Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of state that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(8)** — Although separated souls are sometimes punished in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their proper place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(9)** — It is impossible for evil to be pure and without the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any admixture of evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to beatitude which is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil. wherefore there must needs be a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who will be thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of their goods, in so far as their past goods avail for the mitigation of their punishment.

**P(4)-Q(69)-A(7)-RO(10)** — The essential reward consists in the glory of the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is entirely

founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the soul's glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body's glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from their bodies and united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not assigned to the souls of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of souls.



## QUESTION 70

OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL  
AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF  
THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON IT  
BY MATERIAL FIRE

## (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?
- (2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul?
- (3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)***Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?*

[\*Cf. **P(1), Q(77), A(8)**]

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): “The soul withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers.” Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xvi): “We believe that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated from the body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits.” Therefore the soul retains its senses after being separated from the body.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the soul's powers are either its essential parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the body.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, a whole is not entire if one of its parts be lacking. Now the soul's powers are called its parts. Therefore, if the soul lose any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after death: and this is unfitting.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, the soul's powers co-operate in merit more even than the body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while the powers are principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be rewarded together with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated soul does not lose them.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, if the soul after separation from the body loses its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot be said that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a part of itself. Now that which entirely comes to naught is not restored in identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the same identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii, 1), as the soul is to the body so are the soul's powers to the parts of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it were not identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would not be identically the same eye, if the visual power were not identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again in identity, and consequently neither would the whole man be identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul to lose its sensitive powers.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-O(7)** — Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to *De Anima* i, "if an old man were given the eye of a young

man, he would, without doubt, see as well as a young man.” Therefore neither are the sensitive powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): “Of two substances alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses.” Therefore the sensitive powers belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the sensitive powers remain not in the soul.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1) —** Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul, expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): “If, however, anything remain at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is not impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is probably impossible.” Hence it seems that the whole soul is not separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul, and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1) —** Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii, 2): “This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not separable as some maintain.” Therefore the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** There are many opinions on this question. For some, holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since these cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that “where we find power there we find action.” Now it is evident that certain operations, whereof the soul’s powers are the principles, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul as united to the body, because they are not performed except through the medium of the body — such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that such like

powers belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily organ — for instance to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body, while those which use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they are of two kinds — some being acts of organs and emanating from the soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, whence the former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step.

Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically, in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This opinion appears to be the more reasonable.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(1)** — This saying of Augustine is to be understood as meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually, namely understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated above [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(77)**, **A(8)**, ad 1 and infra **A(2)**, ad 1].

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The senses which the soul takes away with it are not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses we must reply as above to the first objection.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(3)** — As stated above, the sensitive powers are related to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The powers of the soul are not called its integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul's energy is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective part remain in the separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished, although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared his authority.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(5)** — The body co-operates in merit, as an essential part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(6)** — The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of those organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are. But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold of water that has been heated returns not identically the same, although the water remains the

same in identity), so the organs will be the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(1)-RO(7)** — The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that “old age is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,” namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither weakened nor corrupted on account of the body.

### **P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)**

#### *Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?*

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv): “When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected with these” (namely the imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties) “according to its merits.” But the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of them.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii) that “the body feels not, but the soul through the body,” and further on: “The soul feels certain things, not through the body but without the body.” Now that which befits the soul without the body can be in the soul separated from the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel actually.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, to see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep, belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it happens that the separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way as when we sleep. Thus Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii): “For I see not why the soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees some things which many have related after returning to life from this suspended animation and yet has it not when it has left the body through death having taken place.” For it is

unintelligible that the soul should have an image of its body, except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said before of those who lie senseless that “they have a certain image of their own body, by which they are able to be borne to corporeal places and by means of sensible images to take cognizance of such things as they see.” Therefore the separated soul can exercise the acts of the sensitive powers.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as proved in *De Memor. et Remin.* 1: Now separated souls will actually remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton (~~Q(70)~~ Luke 16:25): “Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.” Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a sensitive power.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii, 9) the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy and sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in the separated soul. Now all the operations of the sensitive powers are common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no sensitive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ. Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)** — Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* i, 4), that “when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves,” and the same applies to all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul does not exercise the act of any sensitive power.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body. and these do not remain in the separated soul; and internal acts which the soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance nowise

dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united to the thing moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held. And since according to him nothing is in motion except what is moved, and lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover moves itself, and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own movement. Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul, one by which it moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by the soul: so that this act “to see” is first of all in the soul itself as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the soul moves the body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (*De Anima* i, 3) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it is nowise moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Some deny that this book is Augustine’s: for it is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine’s works and added things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, as having authority. If, however, its authority should be maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with imagination and other like powers, not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill, according to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like powers: so that the imagination and such like powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body the merit of that affection.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The soul is said to feel through the body, not as though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say that heat heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels some things without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels such things without the outward movement of the body that takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not occur without any bodily movement.



It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul: since the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or we may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the intellective power, with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions. Wherefore Augustine's comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-RO(4)** — As stated in the first book (Sent. i, D, 3, qu. 4), memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the act of the memory will not be in the separated soul. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "when this," the body to wit, "is corrupted, the soul remembers not." In another way memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all differences of time, since it regards not only the past but also the present, and the future as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 11). Taking memory in this sense the separated soul will remember [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(77), A(8); P(1), Q(89), A(6)**].

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in this way they are not exercised without a definite movement of the heart. In another way they denote acts of the will which is in the intellective part: and in this way they will be in the separated soul, even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God's joy is one simple delight."

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)*****Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?***

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii): “The things that affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things.” Therefore the separated soul is not punished with a bodily fire.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii) says that “the agent is always more excellent than the patient.” But it is impossible for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i) and Boethius (De Duab. Natur.) only those things that agree in matter are active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul and corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed into one another, as Boethius says (De Duab. Natur.). Therefore the separated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, whatsoever is patient receives something from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which is received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but spiritually. Now the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul are its perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its perfection.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, if it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (Dial. iv, 29). *On the contrary*, if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since “there is no sorrow contrary to the

pleasure of considering,” according to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13). Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, if it be said that the soul suffers from the corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held by the body while living in the body; *on the contrary*, the soul while living in the body is held by the body in so far as there results one thing from the soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in the manner aforesaid.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(7)** — Further, every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only between corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the soul suffers not from that fire.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-O(8)** — Further, an organic agent does not act on a remote object, except through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it is able to act at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at least the demons to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world: and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any corporeal thing of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3) — *On the contrary***, The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord (<sup>4154</sup>Matthew 25:41),

“Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,  
which was prepared for the devil,” etc.

Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that fire.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)** — Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. Therefore it is just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing by suffering therefrom.

Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Given that the fire of hell is not so called metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said (<sup>1584</sup>Matthew 25:41) that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways.

For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) says: “The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it.” But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is seen, is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire, there must needs be some relation of the soul to the fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul.

Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfillment of <sup>1585</sup>Psalm 13:5, “They have trembled for fear, where there was no fear.” Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that “the soul burns through seeing itself aflame.” But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes (Genesis ad lit. xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that is present to one’s fancy. Moreover, this kind of

suffering would be more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby.

Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29): “We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it.” They explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the sanctification of the soul by the sacraments (**P(3), Q(62), AA(1),4**).

But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house.

Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to a body: for thus we observe that “the corruptible body is a load upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there results one thing simply: and the

spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it from acting where it will and as it will.

This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in flames?" Julian [\*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17] says the same as quoted by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): "If the incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it not be held after death by a corporeal fire?" and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that "just as, although the soul is spiritual and the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing."

Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit, and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Augustine speaks there as one inquiring: wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as quoted above (*De Civ. Dei* xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Although the soul is simply more excellent than the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent. Such is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the argument is not conclusive.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(4)** — By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(5)** — In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it destroys the harmony of the organ. Nevertheless, intellectual vision may cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful, not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(6)** — The comparison does not hold in every respect, but it does in some, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(7)** — Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a "painful object is

said to touch,” as stated in De Gener. 1: This mode of contact is sufficient for action.

**P(4)-Q(70)-A(3)-RO(8)** — The souls of the damned are never outside hell, except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the essential, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, so the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God’s permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on <sup><sup>SIRG</sup>James 3:6, “inflameth the wheel of our nativity,” etc., is in agreement with this, for it is worded thus: “The devil, wherever he is, whether in the air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames.” But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.



## QUESTION 71

### OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD

#### (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there are fourteen points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?
- (2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?
- (3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?
- (4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?
- (5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?
- (6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?
- (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?
- (8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?
- (9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed?
- (10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?
- (11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?
- (12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than others?
- (13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual?
- (14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together avail those for whom they are offered?

## P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)

### *Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot profit others. For it is written (~~3888~~ Galatians 6:8): “What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap.” Now if one person reaped fruit from the suffrages of another, he would reap from another’s sowing. Therefore a person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, it belongs to God’s justice, that each one should receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (~~3900~~ Psalm 61:13) says: “Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.” Now it is impossible for God’s justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for one man to be assisted by the works of another.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one man be meritorious and fruitful for another.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the evildoings of another; indeed, according to (~~3880~~ Ezekiel 18:4, “the soul that sinneth, the same shall die.” Therefore neither does one person profit by another’s good.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~3880~~ Psalm 118:63):

“I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee,” etc.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)** — Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two

ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy; since he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the one he prays.

Accordingly we must say that the work of one person nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another's actions — disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another [*\*Cf. P(2a), Q(114), A(6)*]: and since the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works, albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly, through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not change their state.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-RO(1)** — This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as stated in ~~4R18~~ John 4:36,

**“And he that reapeth... gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.”**

Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man save for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his own works, when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby he merits eternal life.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in lieu of another's.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Praise is not given to a person save according to his relation to an act, wherefore praise is “in relation to something” (Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or ill-disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is praised for another's deeds save accidentally in so far as he is somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance, inducement, or by any other means. on the other hand, a work is meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as evidenced by what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(1)-RO(4)** — It is directly contrary to justice to take away from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently it is not becoming that one should be punished for another's sins, as it is that one should acquire some advantage from deeds of another.

## **P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)**

### *Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of the living. First, because the Apostle says (<sup>also</sup> 2 Corinthians 5:10):

“We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ,  
that every one may receive the proper things of the body,  
according as he hath done.”

Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, this also seems to follow from the words of ~~6413~~ Revelation 14:13,

“Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord  
... for their works follow them.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers, because to them the words of ~~898~~ Job 19:8, refer: “He hath hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass.” Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by a person’s suffrages.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless there be some community of life between them. Now there is no community between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)** — On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: “It is... a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from sins.” But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them. Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)** — Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): “Of no small weight is the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar.” This custom was established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a sermon on suffrages for the dead [\*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3], where he expresses himself thus: “Realizing the nature of the Mysteries the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries.” This is also confirmed by the authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl.), where he mentions

the rite of the Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this without any doubt.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body, has no end: “Charity never falleth away” (1<sup>st</sup> Corinthians 13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or “vice versa”; but they avail for the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change in the state of the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Man while living in the body merited that such things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in the body.

Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: “Blessed are the dead,” etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although, strictly speaking, after death souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the

state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in this respect they are still wayfarers.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)**

*Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not profit the dead. For, according to ~~ROM~~ John 9:31, “God doth not hear sinners.” Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them do not profit the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that “when an offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party is provoked to harsher measures.” Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and consequently their suffrages are of no avail.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, a person’s deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-O(5)** — *On the contrary*, No man can know for certain about another man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore, only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who

are in a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or by wicked persons.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner who offers suffrage may be considered — in one way in so far as it is his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts.



**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners (<sup>4155</sup>Matthew 5:45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss on <sup>4156</sup>John 9:31, "God doth not hear sinners," says that "he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeing clearly."

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The reason why the sinner who performs these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Although the sinner's deed is not living in so far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as stated above.

Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must reply to them also.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Although one cannot know for certain about another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (<sup>4176</sup>Matthew 7:16).

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(3)-RO(6)** — In order that suffrage avail another, it is requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them or by commanding them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)*****Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer them?***

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he offered them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for another.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~Eccl~~ Psalm 34:13): “My prayer shall be turned into my bosom.” Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered for others profit those who satisfy.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)** — Further, the Damascene says in the sermon “On those who fell asleep in the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all he, “ namely the anointer, “shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives for his neighbor’s salvation first of all profits himself and afterwards his neighbor.” And thus the question at issue is answered.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it

is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still more the doer.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the others consider it as meritorious.

### **P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)**

#### ***Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?***

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell. For it is written (2 Macc. 12:40): “They found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols... which the law forbiddeth to the Jews,” and yet we read further on (2 Macc. 12:43) that Judas “sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem... to be offered for the sins of the dead.” Now it is clear that they sinned mortally through acting against the Law, and consequently that they died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit those who are in hell.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the saying of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that “those whom suffrages profit gain either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their damnation.” Now only those who are in hell are said to be damned. Therefore suffrages profit even those who are in hell.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.): “If here the prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do they, after death, profit those alone who are worthy of their holy prayers?” Hence we may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the dead than to the living. Now they profit the living even though they be in

mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, 172; vi, 3) we read, and the Damascene relates in his sermon [\*De his qui in fide dormierunt] that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit even those who are in hell.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, the Damascene in the same sermon relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying to him: “I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan”: and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same sermon, “the whole East and West are witnesses.” Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since “he put many martyrs to a cruel death” [\*De his qui fide dormierunt]. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in hell.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): “The high priest prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to the Divine order,” and consequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that “he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not be heard.” Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)** — Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): “There is the same reason for not praying then” (namely after the judgment day) “for men condemned to the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this reason the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, forsooth, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)** — Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of Augustine (De Verb. A post. Sermon. xxxii): “If a man depart this life without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse to such like acts of kindness.” Now all the damned come under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, There have been three opinions about the damned. For some have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter. First, as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in hell will be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a distinction among those who are detained in hell. Some of these, they said, are very bad, those namely who have died without faith and the sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither “by grace nor, by name” [\*Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass.] can the suffrages of the Church avail; while others are not very bad, those namely who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good, and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen (Peri Archon. i; cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): and consequently endeavored in various ways to avoid this difficulty.

Praepositivus [\*Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D. 1205-9] said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time, namely till the judgment day: for their souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their punishment will nowise be interrupted.

For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole, and secondly, a quarter of

that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous quantity cannot be transferred to spiritual quantity: secondly, because there is no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should diminish the punishment less than the first: thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless the guilt be done away: fourthly, because in the division of a line we come at length to something which is not sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus it would follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a punishment.

Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis [\*William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais] (Sent. iv, Tract. 14) said that suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory (Moral. ix) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less, from the same fire. wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch with the works of the living. Secondly, because they have entirely come to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits, even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment

cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to the essential reward.

However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which, according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xiii) — and this applies especially to the damned — “the spirits of the departed are where they see nothing of what men do or of what happens to them in this life,” and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in spite of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty; wherefore it is safer to say simply that suffrages profit not the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors quoted above.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off in reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus suffrages could profit them. or we may say, according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their sin, according to <sup>1970B</sup> Psalm 77:34, “When He slew them, then they sought Him”: and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-RO(2)** — In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not entirely, but diminished.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable than for a living person, as regards his being in greater want, since he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off

in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not the same reason for praying for the dead as for the living.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-RO(4)** — This assistance did not consist in a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that when he prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this they had a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfillment of their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as neither is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact that they take pity on our ills.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(5)-RO(5)** — Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must needs say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice: and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.

Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen differently in accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xvi).

## **P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)**

### *Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now “there is



no redemption in hell” [\*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii], and it is written (<sup>396</sup>Psalm 6:6), “Who shall confess to Thee in hell?” Therefore suffrages do not profit those who are in purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible to have such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and this would seem incompatible with Divine justice.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory, those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they are fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released. Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), Augustine says (Enchiridion cx): “Suffrages profit those who are not very good or not very bad.” Now such are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)** — Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the “godlike priest in praying for the departed prays for those who lived a holy life, and yet contracted certain stains through human frailty.” Now such persons are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above (**AA(1),2; Q(13), A(2)**),

the works of one person can avail for another's satisfaction, whether the latter be living or dead, the suffrages of the living, without any doubt, profit those who are in purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The words quoted refer to those who are in the hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) that such statements are to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments. But according to the Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now "God changes His sentence but not his counsel," as Gregory says (Moral. xx): wherefore the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes as instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted by the Divine mercy [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(19), A(7)**, ad 2].

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-RO(2)** — It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of suffrages. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited to that other.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-RO(3)** — The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above (**Q(13), A(2)**), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be purified by another satisfying for him.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(6)-RO(4)** — Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action of the agent [\*"Ex opere operante" and "ex opere operato"] and the action done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action — thus from the giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased. In like manner the action of the agent may be considered in relation either to the principal agent or to the executor. I say, then, that the dying person, as

soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full meed of those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another's fault — and the punishment of purgatory is temporal — although as regards the eternal retribution none can be defrauded save by his own fault.

### **P(4)-Q(71)-A(7)**

#### ***Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo?***

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in limbo. For they are not detained there except for another's sin. Therefore it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) the words of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) are quoted: "The suffrages of the Church obtain forgiveness for those who are not very bad." Now children are not reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment is very light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(7) — *On the contrary*,** The text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes Augustine as saying (Serm. xxxii, De Verb Ap.) that "suffrages avail not those who have departed hence without the faith that works by love." Now the children departed thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(7) — *I answer that*,** Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot profit the children in limbo.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(7)-RO(1)** — Although original sin is such that one person can be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(7)-RO(2)** — Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: “Since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever are offered for those who have been baptized,” etc.

## **P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)**

### *Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints in heaven; on account of the words of the Collect in the Mass [\*Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle]: “Even as they” (i.e. the sacraments) “avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing.” Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the altar. Therefore suffrages profit the saints in heaven.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, the sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit those who are in heaven.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-O(3)** — Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it is written (~~Q(71)~~ Luke 15:10):

“There is [Vulg.: ‘shall be’] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance.”

Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently our suffrages also profit them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-O(4)** — Further, the Damascene says (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quoting the words of Chrysostom: “For if the heathens,” he says, “burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer

together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that thou mayest surround him with greater glory by so doing; and if he be a sinner who has died, that thou mayest loose him from his sins, and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!" And thus the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8) — *On the contrary*,** As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), Augustine says (De Verb Ap., Serm. xvii): "It is insulting to pray for a martyr in church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers."

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8) —** Further, to be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not assisted by the suffrages of the Church.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8) — *I answer that*,** Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since no one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God's house (<sup>PSM</sup> Psalm 35:10), they are not competent to be assisted by suffrages.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-RO(1) —** Such like expressions do not mean that the saints receive an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their feasts, but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through His glory thus increasing some what in us, there accrues something, not to God, but to us.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-RO(2) —** Although the sacraments cause what they signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify: else, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-RO(3) —** Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow, that if our joys be increased their joy is also

increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for otherwise their essential reward, consisting of their joy in God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they rejoice with God as the formal aspect of their joy, it does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our works.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(8)-RO(4)** — The sense is not that an increase of meed or reward accrues to the saint from the suffrages offered by a person, but that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed may derive a reward from suffrages through having, while living, provided for suffrage to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)**

***Whether the prayers of the Church,  
the sacrifice of the altar and alms profit the departed?***

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-O(1)** — It would seem that the souls of the departed are not assisted only by the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms, or that they are not assisted by them chiefly. For punishment should compensate for punishment. Now fasting is more penal than almsgiving or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than any of the above.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with these three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii, Q. ii, Cap. 22): "The souls of the departed are released in four ways, either by the offerings of priests, or the alms of their friends, or the prayers of the saints, or the fasting of their kinsfolk." Therefore the three mentioned above are insufficiently reckoned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii).

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-O(3)** — Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments, especially as regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and other

sacraments ought to be offered for the departed equally with or more than the Sacrament of the altar.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-O(4)** — Further, this would seem to follow from the words of <sup>489</sup>1 Corinthians 15:29, “If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then baptized for them?” Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-O(5)** — Further, in different Masses there is the same Sacrifice of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the Mass, be reckoned among the suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same whatever Mass be said for a deceased person, whether in honor of the Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems contrary to the ordinance of the Church which has appointed a special Mass for the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-O(6)** — Further, the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the dead. Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar, but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages for the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)** — *I answer that,* The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as the intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those whose works are by nature best adapted to assist the dead, which pertain chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of one’s intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united and incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of charity is the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part of charity these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the chief suffrages for the dead. But on the part of the intention directed to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very nature implies relation not only to the person who prays, even as other works do, but more directly still to that which we pray for. Hence these three are reckoned the principal means of succoring the dead, although we must allow that any

other goods whatsoever that are done out of charity for the dead are profitable to them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-RO(1)** — When one person satisfies for another, the point to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the other, is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one passes to another, rather than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction; although the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And consequently the three aforesaid are more profitable to the departed than fasting.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-RO(2)** — It is true that fasting can profit the departed by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to the departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain anything pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention, and these things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason Augustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the suffrages for the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-RO(3)** — Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore just as by generation being does not accrue save to the object generated, so Baptism produces its effect only in the person baptized, as regards the deed done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer whether of the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even as other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist is the sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done its effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the other sacraments.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-RO(4)** — According to a gloss this passage may be expounded in two ways. First, thus: “If the dead rise not again, nor did Christ rise again, why are they baptized for them? i.e. for sins, since they are not pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in Baptism not only Christ’s passion but also His resurrection operates, for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual resurrection.” Secondly, thus: There have been some misguided persons who were baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking that this would profit them: and according to this explanation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the opinion of certain persons.



**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-RO(5)** — In the office of the Mass there is not only a sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the Mass contains two of the things mentioned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely “prayer” and “sacrifice.” As regards the sacrifice offered the Mass profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honor it be said: and this is the principal thing done in the Mass. But as regards the prayers, that Mass is most profitable in which the prayers are appointed for this purpose. Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied by the greater devotion, either of the one who says Mass, or of the one who orders the Mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of the saint whose suffrage is besought in the Mass.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(9)-RO(6)** — This offering of candles or oil may profit the departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for the worship of the Church or for the use of the faithful.

### **P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)**

#### *Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)-O(1)** — It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church profit even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church, who orders the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain an indulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten souls, both of the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore indulgences profit the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)-O(2)** — Further, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious than that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage for the departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more therefore does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)-O(3)** — Further, the indulgences of the Church profit those who are members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members of the Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them. Therefore it would seem that indulgences profit the departed.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)** — *On the contrary*, In order that indulgences may avail a person, there must be a fitting cause for granting the indulgence [\*Cf. **Q(25), A(2)**]. Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church, and it is for such a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit not the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)** — Further, indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could avail the dead, it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a deceased person entirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(10)** — *I answer that*, An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the shrine of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for which indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot avail them directly. However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and sometimes not, according to the different forms of indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: “Whosoever does this or that shall gain so much indulgence,” he who does this cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention of the Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive their value, as stated above (**Q(27), A(3)**, ad 2). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form: “Whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other person connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain so much indulgence,” an indulgence of this kind will avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For there is no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, whereon indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead. Nor does it follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory just as he lists, since for indulgences to avail there must be a fitting cause for granting them, as stated above (**Q(26), A(3)**).

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)*****Whether the burial service profits the dead?***

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-O(1)** — It would seem that the burial service profits the dead. For Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes Athanasius as saying: “Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax at his tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward from Him.” Now the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the burial service profits the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-O(2)** — Further, according to Augustine (De Cura pro mort. iii), “In olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and themselves while living charged their children touching the burial or even the translation of their bodies.” But they would not have done this unless the tomb and things of this kind conferred something on the dead. Therefore the like profit the dead somewhat.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-O(3)** — Further, no one does a work of mercy on some one’s behalf unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy, therefore Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): “Tobias, as attested by the angel, is declared to have found favor with God by burying the dead.” Therefore such like burial observances profit the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-O(4)** — Further, it is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for their burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits the dead.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-O(5)** — Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv): “If those who are burdened with grievous sins are buried in the church this will lead to their more severe condemnation rather than to their release.” Much more, therefore, should we say that the burial service profits the good.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): “Whatever service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of humanity.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)** — Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De Civ. Dei i): “The funereal equipment, the disposition of the grace, the solemnity of the obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)** — Further, Our Lord said (~~Q(71)~~ Luke 12:4): “Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do.” Now after death the bodies of the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read of having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does not profit them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)** — *I answer that*, We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be infected by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits the living also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection is confirmed thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the dead in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial place, wherefore a “monument” takes its name from remembrance, for a monument is something that recalls the mind [monens mentem], as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a pagan error that burial was profitable to the dead by procuring rest for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not be at rest until the body was buried, which is altogether ridiculous and absurd.

That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for his body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy place, and pray more frequently and more specially for those who are buried in their midst. But such things as are done for the display of the obsequies are profitable to the living, as being a consolation to them; and yet they can also profit the dead, not

directly but indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to pity thereby and consequently to pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is in this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-RO(1)** — By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the dead we profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church and as giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God. Hence, after the words quoted we read: “For oil and candles are a holocaust.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-RO(2)** — The fathers of old arranged for the burial of their bodies, so as to show that “the bodies of the dead” are the object of Divine providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead body, but in order to confirm the belief in the resurrection, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i, 13). Hence, also, they wished to be buried in the land of promise, where they believed Christ’s birth and death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause of our rising again.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-RO(3)** — Since flesh is a part of man’s nature, man has a natural affection for his flesh, according to <sup>408B</sup>Ephesians 5:29, “No man ever hated his own flesh.” Hence in accordance with this natural affection a man has during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his body after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that something untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who love a man, through being conformed to the one they love in his affection for himself, treat his body with loving care. For as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i, 13): “If a father’s garment and ring, and whatever such like is the more dear to those whom they leave behind the greater their affection is towards their parents, in no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned which truly we wear in more familiar and close conjunction than anything else we put on.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-RO(4)** — As Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* iv), the devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their friends to be buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend their dead to the suffrages of the saints, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(11)-RO(5)** — The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place unfitting for him by reason of human glory.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)**

*Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom they are offered more than others?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased person are not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered, than to others. For spiritual light is more communicable than a material light. Now a material light, for instance of a candle, though kindled for one person only, avails equally all those who are gathered together, though the candle be not lit for them. Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be offered for one person in particular, do not avail him any more than the others who are in purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)-O(2)** — Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), suffrages avail the dead “in so far as during this life they merited that they might avail them afterwards” [\*St. Augustine, Enchiridion cx]. Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more than those for whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more by those suffrages, else their merits would be rendered unavailing.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)-O(3)** — Further, the poor have not so many suffrages given them as the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people profit them alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse off: yet this is contrary to our Lord’s saying (<sup>161</sup>Luke 6:20): “Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.”

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)** — *On the contrary*, Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a person pay another’s debt human justice releases the latter alone. Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they profit this person alone.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)** — Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy

for a living person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction counts only for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)** — *I answer that*, There have been two opinions on this question. Some, like Praepositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular person do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but those who are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is lit for a rich man and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man himself, and perhaps even more, if they have keener sight. They also gave the instance of a lesson which profits the person to whom it is given no more than others who listen with him, but perhaps profits these others more, if they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed out to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appointing certain special prayers for certain persons is futile, they said that the Church did this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are more inclined to offer special than common suffrages, and pray more fervently for their kinsfolk than for strangers.

Others, *on the contrary*, said that suffrages avail more those for whom they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value is derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is more full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him. In this way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the second place suffrages derive their value from being applied to another person by one's intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way, because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the first.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)-RO(1)** — Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of consolation: and this is all the greater according as they are endowed with a greater charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction applied to another by the intention of the offerer, they do not resemble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it does not follow, if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others is paid likewise.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)-RO(2)** — Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this was merely to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It is therefore clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suffrages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their merit is rendered unavailing.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(12)-RO(3)** — Nothing hinders the rich from being in some respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off by the authority quoted.

### **P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)**

*Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)-O(1)** — It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular. For it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he loses nothing if others receive the lesson with him. Therefore in like manner a person for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently if it be offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it were offered for each in particular.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)-O(2)** — Further, it is to be observed that according to the common practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person, other prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this



would not be done, if the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)-O(3)** — Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether He helps by means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether He assists many or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for many, each one of them will receive as much assistance as one person would if that same prayer were said for him alone.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)** — *On the contrary*, It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to have appointed a Mass and prayer to be said for one person in particular, but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful departed: and this is evidently false.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)** — Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if it be divided among many it avails less for each one than if it were offered for one only.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)** — *I answer that*, If the value of suffrages be considered according as it is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much as if they were offered for one alone, because charity is not diminished if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it increased; and in like manner joy increases through being shared by many, as Augustine says (Confess. viii). Consequently many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular avails him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others; for in this case the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it is evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the Church.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)-RO(1)** — Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does; for teaching, like any other action, produces its effect according to the disposition of the recipient. But they profit after the manner of the payment of a debt, as stated above (**A(12)**, ad 1); and so the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)-RO(2)** — Since suffrages offered for one person avail others in a certain way, as stated (**A(1)**), it follows that when Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said for others also. For these prayers are said, not that the satisfaction offered by one suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that the prayer offered for them in particular may profit them also.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(13)-RO(3)** — Prayer may be considered both on the part of the one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect depends on both. Consequently though it is no more difficult to the Divine power to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for one.

### **P(4)-Q(71)-A(14)**

*Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages?*

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(14)-O(1)** — It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For in the life to come each one will be rewarded according to his merits. Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted after death as much as one for whom special suffrages are offered. Therefore the former will be assisted by general suffrages as much as the latter by special and general suffrages.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(14)-O(3)** — Further, the Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist

for all in general is of sufficient value to release all who are in purgatory: and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much assistance as special and general suffrages together.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(14) — *On the contrary*,** Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore special suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable to the person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(14) — *I answer that*,** The reply to this question depends on that which is given to the twelfth inquiry (**A(12)**): for if the suffrages offered for one person in particular avail indifferently for all, then all suffrages are common; and consequently one for whom the special suffrages are not offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom they are offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the suffrages offered for a person do not profit all indifferently, but those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no doubt that general and special suffrages together avail a person more than general suffrages alone. Hence the Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), mentions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man derives from general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which a poor man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance from more sources than the other, he does not receive a greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered obtains a more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be finally released from all punishment.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(14)-RO(1) —** As stated above (**A(12)**, ad 2) the assistance derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit, but conditionally as it were: hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(71)-A(14)-RO(2) —** Although the power of Christ Who is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite effect to which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by one sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man offers, he is not released from the whole satisfaction due for his sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, if any thing from special suffrages be left over for those

for whom they are offered (for instance if they need them not) we may well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) who says: "Truly God, forasmuch as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange for an exchange of deficiencies": and this exchange is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.

## QUESTION 72

### OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?
- (2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us?
- (3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?

#### P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)

#### *Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?*

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our prayers. For a gloss on <sup>2211</sup>Isaiah 62:16,

“Thou art our father and Abraham hath not known us,  
and Israel hath been ignorant of us,”

says that “the dead saints know not what the living, even their own children, are doing.” This is taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), where he quotes the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: “If such great men as the patriarchs knew not what was happening to the people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching and helping the affairs and actions of the living?” Therefore the saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (<sup>2212</sup>2 Kings 22:20):

“Therefore” (i.e. because thou hast wept before Me),  
 “I will gather thee to thy fathers... that thy eyes may not  
 see all the evils which I will bring upon this place.”

But Joas would have gained no such advantage from his death if he were to know after death what was happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death know not our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our prayers.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the more perfect a man is in charity, the more he succors his neighbor when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, in this life, watch over their neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after death, their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our deeds, much more would they watch over their friends and kindred and assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. Therefore it would seem that our deeds and prayers are not known to them.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, even as the saints after death see the Word, so do the angels of whom it is stated (<sup><18></sup>Matthew 18:10) that “their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father.” Yet the angels through seeing the Word do not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels [<sup>\*</sup>Cf. **P(1), Q(106), A(1)**], as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore although the saints see the Word, they do not see therein our prayers and other things that happen in our regard.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone to know our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Gregory, commenting on <sup><18-21></sup>Job 14:21, “Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand,” says (Moral. xii): “This does not apply to the souls of the saints, for since they have an insight of Almighty God’s glory we must nowise believe that anything outside that glory is unknown to them.” Therefore they are cognizant of our prayers. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii): “All creatures are little to the soul that sees God: because however

little it sees of the Creator's light, every created thing appears foreshortened to it." Now apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then distance does not prevent these things, as appears from the authority quoted, it would seem that the souls of the saints are cognizant of our prayers and of what happens here below.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)** — Further, unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they would not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of our needs. But this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter against him. Therefore the saints are cognizant of what happens in our regard.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing all things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees God's essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend the essence of God [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(12), AA(7),8**]: even as the knowledge of a principle does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from that principle unless the whole virtue of the principle be comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints do not comprehend the Divine essence, it does not follow that they know all that can be known by the Divine essence — for which reason the lower angels are taught concerning certain matters by the higher angels, though they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed must needs see in the Divine essence as many other things as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's happiness requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation: for thus they become God's co-operators, "than which nothing is more Godlike," as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such things as are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to their assistance.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The saying of Augustine is to be understood as referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge is devoid of obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their knowledge in the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this, Abraham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of God before Christ's passion.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although the saints, after this life, know what happens here below, we must not believe that they grieve through knowing the woes of those whom they loved in this world: for they are so filled with heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them. Wherefore if after death they know the woes of their friends, their grief is forestalled by their removal from this world before their woes occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve somewhat, if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones: and since the soul of Josias was not glorified as soon as it went out from his body, it is in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show that the souls of the dead have no knowledge of the deeds of the living.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The souls of the saints have their will fully conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things willed. and consequently, although they retain the love of charity towards their neighbor, they do not succor him otherwise than they see to be in conformity with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by interceding for him to God.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Although it does not follow that those who see the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain to the perfection of their happiness, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(1)-RO(5)** — God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the heart: yet others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them, either by their vision of the Word or by any other means.



## P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)

### *Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?*

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to pray for us. For no man asks anyone's friends to pray for him, except in so far as he believes he will more easily find favor with them. But God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently His will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the will of a saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the saints mediators between us and God, that they may intercede for us.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now among the saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to God. Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater saints to intercede for us with God, and never the lesser ones.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Christ, even as man, is called the "Holy of Holies," and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other saints to do so.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, whenever one person intercedes for another at the latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom he intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the saints our intercessors with God.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the same way, or else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the same, or would not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not: for if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even though we prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray not for us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems altogether unnecessary to call on them to pray for us.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~℣~~ Job 5:1):

“Call... if there be any that will answer thee,  
and turn to some of the saints.”

Now, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) on this passage, “we call upon God when we beseech Him in humble prayer.” Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should turn to the saints, that they may pray God for us.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)** — Further, the saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, who are on the way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who said (~~Eccl~~ Romans 15:30):

“I beseech you... brethren, through our Lord Jesus Christ,  
and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me  
in your prayers for me to God.”

Much more, therefore, should we ask the saints who are in heaven to help us by their prayers to God.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)** — Further, an additional argument is provided by the common custom of the Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in the Litany.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) the order established by God among things is that “the last should be led to God by those that are midway between.” Wherefore, since the saints who are in heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine law requires that we, who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should be brought back to God by the saints who are between us and Him: and this happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its effect into us through them. And since our return to God should correspond to the outflow of His boons upon us, just as the Divine favors reach us by means of the saints intercession, so should we, by their means, be brought back to God, that we may receive His favors again. Hence it is that we make them our intercessors with God, and our mediators as it were, when we ask them to pray for us.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-RO(1)** — It is not on account of any defect in God’s power that He works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection of the order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring

of His goodness on things, through His bestowing on them not only the goodness which is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others. Even so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we need to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the end that the aforesaid order in things be observed.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although the greater saints are more acceptable to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the lesser; and this for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has greater devotion for a lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect of prayer depends very much on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to avoid tediousness, for continual attention to one thing makes a person weary; whereas by praying to different saints, the fervor of our devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is granted to some saints to exercise their patronage in certain special cases, for instance to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due honor be given by us to all. Fifthly, because the prayers of several sometimes obtain that which would not have been obtained by the prayers of one.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular persons [supposita]. Hence, were we to say: "Christ, pray for us," except we added something, this would seem to refer to Christ's person, and consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church says not: "Christ, pray for us," but "Christ, hear us," or "have mercy on us."

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-RO(4)** — As we shall state further on (**A(3)**) the saints are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask God to grant those prayers a gracious hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about them, namely what ought to be done according to His providence.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(2)-RO(5)** — A person is rendered worthy of a saint's prayers for him by the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with pure devotion. Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)*****Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth  
to God for us are always granted?***

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are not always granted. For if they were always granted, the saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning themselves. But they are not heard in reference to these things; wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (<sup>661</sup>6:11) that on the martyrs beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth,

“it was said to them that they should rest for a little while till the number of their brethren should be filled up [\*Vulg.: ‘till their fellow-servants and their brethren... should be filled up’].”

Much less therefore, are they heard in reference to matters concerning others.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>211</sup>Jeremiah 15:1):

“If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me,  
My soul is not towards this people.”

Therefore, the saints are not always heard when they pray God for us.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the saints in heaven are stated to be equal to the angels of God (<sup>421</sup>Matthew 22:30). But the angels are not always heard in the prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from <sup>271</sup>Daniel 10:12,13, where it is written:

“I am come for thy words: but the prince of the kingdom of the  
Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days.”

But the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel’s aid except by asking of God to be set free; and yet the fulfillment of his prayer was hindered. Therefore neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray for us.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of

meriting. Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, the saints, in all things, conform their will to the will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know God to will. But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not save for what they know God to will. Now that which God wills would be done even without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not efficacious for obtaining anything.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, the prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they could obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions of the Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below for some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would be wholly delivered from punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for those who are in purgatory on the same account as for us, if they obtain anything for us, their prayers would deliver entirely from punishment those who are in purgatory. But this is not true because, then the Church's suffrages for the dead would be unnecessary.


**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God": and that his prayer was granted is clear from what follows (2 Macc. 15:15): "Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and gave to Judas a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift from God," etc.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)** — Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant.): "Thou sayest in thy pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, but that when we are dead no one's prayer for another will be heard": and afterwards he refutes this in the following words: "If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do so when the crown, the victory, the triumph is already theirs!"

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)** — Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First, by "express" prayer, when by their prayers they seek a

hearing of the Divine clemency on our behalf: secondly, by “interpretive” prayer, namely by their merits which, being known to God, avail not only them unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding of Christ’s blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways the saints’ prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain what they ask, yet on our part they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their prayers, in so far as they are said to pray for us by reason of their merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by asking something for us in their prayers, their prayers are always granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they ask save for what they will to be done; and what God wills is always fulfilled — unless we speak of His “antecedent” will, whereby “He wishes all men to be saved” [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(19), A(6)**, ad 1]. For this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also which the saints will according to this kind of will be not fulfilled sometimes.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be saved, and their consent to God’s justice in punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on  Revelation 6:11, “How long, O Lord,” says: “They desire an increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to God’s justice.”

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel according to their state in this life. For we read that they withstood God’s anger by praying for the people. And yet even if they had been living at the time in question, they would have been unable to placate God towards the people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness of this same people: and it is thus that we are to understand this passage.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-RO(3)** — This dispute among the good angels does not mean that they offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted contrary merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God’s pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says (Moral. xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid words of Daniel: “The lofty spirits that are set over the nations never fight in behalf of those that act unjustly, but they justly judge and try their deeds. And when the guilt or innocence of any particular nation is brought into the

debate of the court above, the ruling spirit of that nation is said to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their Maker is victorious over all, for since they have it ever before their eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain,” wherefore neither do they seek for it. And consequently it is clear that their prayers are always heard.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Although the saints are not in a state to merit for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to merit for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their previous merit: for while living they merited that their prayers should be heard after their death.

Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as its reward; while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which was not merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in the state of impetrating.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-RO(5)** — As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted above (ad 3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to be in the Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor is their prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (*De Praed. Sanct.* [\**De Dono Persever.* xxii]): “The prayers of the saints profit the predestinate, because it is perhaps pre-ordained that they shall be saved through the prayers of those who intercede for them”: and consequently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will shall be fulfilled through their prayers.

**P(4)-Q(72)-A(3)-RO(6)** — The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as so many satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and accordingly they free the dead from the punishment which the latter have not paid. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of making satisfaction; and consequently the parallel fails between their prayers and the suffrages of the Church.

## QUESTION 73

### OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?
- (2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened?
- (3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall come?

#### P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)

#### *Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?*

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the Lord's coming to judgment will not be preceded by any signs. Because it is written (<sup>STB</sup>1 Thessalonians 5:3):

“When they shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come upon them.”

Now there would be no peace and security if men were terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that coming

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, signs are ordained for the manifestation of something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written (<sup>STB</sup>1 Thessalonians 5:2): “The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night.” Therefore signs ought not to precede it.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the time of His first coming was foreknown by the prophets, which does not apply to His second coming.



Now no such signs preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they precede the second.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~Q(73)~~ Luke 21:25):

“There shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars,”

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1) —** Further, Jerome [\*St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St. Jerome, but the reference is not known.] mentions fifteen signs preceding the judgment. He says that on the “first” day all the seas will rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in the “second” day all the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that scarcely will they be visible; on the “third” day they will be restored to their previous condition; on the “fourth” day all the great fishes and other things that move in the waters will gather together and, raising their heads above the sea, roar at one another contentiously; on the “fifth” day, all the birds of the air will gather together in the fields, wailing to one another, with neither bite nor sup; on the “sixth” day rivers of fire will arise towards the firmament rushing together from the west to the east; on the “seventh” day all the stars, both planets and fixed stars, will throw out fiery tails like comets; on the “eighth” day there will be a great earthquake, and all animals will be laid low; on the “ninth” day all the plants will be bedewed as it were with blood; on the “tenth” day all stones, little and great, will be divided into four parts dashing against one another; on the “eleventh” day all hills and mountains and buildings will be reduced to dust; on the “twelfth” day all animals will come from forest and mountain to the fields, roaring and tasting of nothing; on the “thirteenth” day all graves from east to west will open to allow the bodies to rise again; on the “fourteenth” day all men will leave their abode, neither understanding nor speaking, but rushing hither and thither like madmen; on the “fifteenth” day all will die and will rise again with those who died long before.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** When Christ shall come to judge He will appear in the form of glory, on account of the authority becoming a judge. Now it pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judgment, in order that the hearts of men be brought to subjection to the coming judge, and be prepared for the judgment, being forewarned by those signs. But it

is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to Hesychius about the end of the world (Ep. lxxx), refer not only to Christ's coming to judgment, but also to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His Church. So that, perhaps, if we consider them carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks: because these signs that are mentioned in the gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the beginning of the human race: unless perhaps we say that at that time they will be more prevalent: although it is uncertain in what degree this increase will foretell the imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he found them written in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very little likelihood.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)-RO(1)** — According to Augustine (Ad Hesych., Ep. lxxx) towards the end of the world there will be a general persecution of the good by the wicked: so that at the same time some will fear, namely the good, and some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: "When they shall say: Peace and security," refer to the wicked, who will pay little heed to the signs of the coming judgment: while the words of ~~201~~ Luke 21:26, "men withering away," etc., should be referred to the good.

We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time occupied by the judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although men be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think themselves to be in peace and security, after the death of Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once destroyed, as they thought hitherto.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The day of the Lord is said to come as a thief, because the exact time is not known, since it will not be possible to know it from those signs: although, as we have already said, all these most manifest signs which will precede the judgment immediately may be comprised under the judgment day.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(1)-RO(3)** — At His first advent Christ came secretly, although the appointed time was known beforehand by the prophets. Hence there was no need for such signs to appear at His first coming, as

will appear at His second advent, when He will come openly, although the appointed time is hidden.

### **P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)**

#### ***Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth?***

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth. For, as Rabanus says, commenting on <sup>4189</sup>Matthew 24:29 “nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun moon, and stars will then be deprived of their light, as we know happened to the sun at the time of our Lord’s passion.”

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the light of the heavenly bodies is directed to the generation of inferior bodies, because by its means and not only by their movement they act upon this lower world as Averroes says (De Subst. Orbis.). But generation will cease then. Therefore neither will light remain in the heavenly bodies.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, according to some the inferior bodies will be cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Now heavenly bodies act not only by movement, but also by light, as stated above (**O(2)**). Therefore as the movement of heaven will cease, so will the light of the heavenly bodies.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** According to astronomers the sun and moon cannot be eclipsed at the same time. But this darkening of the sun and moon is stated to be simultaneous, when the Lord shall come to judgment. Therefore the darkening will not be in very truth due to a natural eclipse.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)** — Further, it is not seemly for the same to be the cause of a thing’s failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall come the light of the luminaries will increase according to <sup>4300</sup>Isaiah 30:26,

“The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun,  
and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold.”

Therefore it is unfitting for the light of these bodies to cease when our Lord comes.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)** — *I answer that,* If we speak of the sun and moon in respect of the very moment of Christ’s coming, it is not credible that they will be darkened through being bereft of their light, since when Christ comes and the saints rise again the whole world will be renewed, as we shall state further on (**Q(74)**). If, however, we speak of them in respect of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it is possible that by the Divine power the sun, moon, and other luminaries of the heavens will be darkened, either at various times or all together, in order to inspire men with fear.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding the judgment: wherefore he adds that when the judgment day is over the words of Isaias shall be fulfilled.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for the purpose of causing generation in these lower bodies, but also for their own perfection and beauty. Hence it does not follow that where generation ceases, the light of the heavenly bodies will cease, but rather that it will increase.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(2)-RO(3)** — It does not seem probable that the elemental qualities will be removed from the elements, although some have asserted this. If, however, they be removed, there would still be no parallel between them and light, since the elemental qualities are in opposition to one another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is a principle of action not by way of opposition, but by way of a principle regulating things in opposition to one another and bringing them back to harmony. Nor is there a parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for movement is the act of that which is imperfect, wherefore it must needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas this cannot be said of light.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3)*****Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved  
when our Lord shall come?***

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can denote only the blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, ignorance is the cause of wonder (Metaph. i, 2). Now ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as Gregory says (Dial. iv, 33; Moral. ii, 3), “what do they not see, who see Him Who sees all.” Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved with wonder, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48).

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, all the angels will be present at the Divine judgment; wherefore it is stated (~~Gen~~ Revelation 7:11): “All the angels stood round about the throne.” Now the virtues denote one particular order of angels. Therefore it should not be said of them rather than of others, that they are moved.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~Gen~~ Job 26:11): “The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck.” Now the pillars of heaven can denote only the virtues of heaven. Therefore the virtues of heaven will be moved.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3) —** Further, it is written (~~Mat~~ Matthew 24:29):

“The stars shall fall from heaven, and the virtues [Douay:  
‘powers’] of heaven shall be moved.”

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels, [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(108), A(5)**, ad 1] as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xi). For sometimes the name of “virtues” is appropriated to one order, which according to him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) is the highest order of the lowest hierarchy. In another sense it is employed to denote all the angels: and then they are said to the question at issue it may be taken either way. For in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48) it is explained according to the second

acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of the world, as stated in the text. It can also be explained in reference to virtue as the name of a particular order; and then that order is said to be moved more than the others by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) we ascribe to that order the working of miracles which especially will be worked about that time: or again, because that order — since, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi), it belongs to the middle hierarchy — is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry must needs regard universal causes. Consequently the proper office of the virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly bodies which are the cause of what happens in nature here below. And again the very name denotes this, since they are called the “virtues of heaven.” Accordingly they will be moved then, because they will no more produce their effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies: even as the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no longer fulfill the office of guardians.

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This movement changes nothing pertaining to their state; but refers either to their effects which may vary without any change on their part, or to some new consideration of things which hitherto they were unable to see by means of their concreated species, which change of thought is not taken from them by their state of blessedness. Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 20) that “God moves the spiritual creature through time.”

**P(4)-Q(73)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Wonder is wont to be about things surpassing our knowledge or ability: and accordingly the virtues of heaven will wonder at the Divine power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said that the “sun and moon wonder at His beauty”: and this does not imply ignorance in the angels, but removes the comprehension of God from them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 74

# OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION

### (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place?
- (2) Whether it will be effected by fire?
- (3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire?
- (4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?
- (5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements?
- (6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements?
- (7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment?
- (8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire?
- (9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein?

### P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)

#### *Whether the world is to be cleansed?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God's creatures are not unclean, wherefore it is written (<sup>4015</sup> Acts 10:15): "That which God hath cleansed, do not thou call common," i.e. unclean. Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, according to Divine justice cleansing is directed to the removal of the uncleanness of sin, as instanced in the cleansing after death. But there can be no stain of sin in the elements of this world. Therefore, seemingly, they need not to be cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, a thing is said to be cleansed when any foreign matter that depreciates it is removed therefrom: for the removal of that which ennobles a thing is not called a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now it pertains to the perfection and nobility of the elements that something of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since the form of a mixed body is more noble than the form of a simple body. Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that the elements of this world can possibly be cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, All renewal is effected by some kind of cleansing. But the elements will be renewed; hence it is written (<sup>401</sup>Revelation 21:1): “I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth was gone.” Therefore the elements shall be cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)** — Further, a gloss [\*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xx, 16] on <sup>402</sup>1 Corinthians 7:31, “The fashion of this earth passeth away,” says: “The beauty of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames.” Therefore the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Since the world was, in a way, made for man’s sake, it follows that, when man shall be glorified in the body, the other bodies of the world shall also be changed to a better state, so that it is rendered a more fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behooves first of all those things to be removed which are opposed to glory. There are two, namely the corruption and stain of sin — because according to <sup>403</sup>1 Corinthians 15:50, “neither shall corruption possess incorruption,” and all the unclean shall be without the city of glory (<sup>404</sup>Revelation 22:15) — and again, the elements require to be cleansed from the contrary dispositions, ere they be brought to the newness of glory, proportionately to what we have said with regard to man. Now although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin corporeal things contract a certain unfitness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we find that places where crimes have been committed are reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions therein, unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly that part of the world which is given to our use contracts from men’s sins



a certain unfitness for being glorified, wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed. In like manner with regard to the intervening space, on account of the contact of the elements, there are many corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements, which diminish their purity: wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)-RO(1)** — When it is asserted that every creature of God is clean we are to understand this as meaning that its substance contains no alloy of evil, as the Manichees maintained, saying that evil and good are two substances in some places severed from one another, in others mingled together. But it does not exclude a creature from having an admixture of a foreign nature, which in itself is also good, but is inconsistent with the perfection of that creature. Nor does this prevent evil from being accidental to a creature, although not mingled with it as part of its substance.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although corporeal elements cannot be the subject of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that is committed in them they contract a certain unfitness for receiving the perfection of glory.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The form of a mixed body and the form of an element may be considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection of the species, and thus a mixed body is more perfect — or as regards their continual endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble, because it has not in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by something extrinsic: whereas a mixed body has in itself the cause of its corruption, namely the composition of contraries. Wherefore a simple body, although it be corruptible in part is incorruptible as a whole, which cannot be said of a mixed body. And since incorruption belongs to the perfection of glory, it follows that the perfection of a simple is more in keeping with the perfection of glory, than the perfection of a mixed body, unless the mixed body has also in itself some principle of incorruption, as the human body has, the form of which is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although a mixed body is somewhat more noble than a simple body, a simple body that exists by itself has a more noble being than if it exist in a mixed body, because in a mixed body simple bodies are somewhat in

potentiality, whereas, existing by themselves, they are in their ultimate perfection.

## **P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)**

### *Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed like the other parts. Now, the same thing should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water. Since then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, and some need to be cleansed by water — which distinction is moreover observed by the Old Law — it would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse all things.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world's beginning was effected by God's power alone, for the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~1901~~ Psalm 49:3):

“A fire shall burn before Him,  
and a mighty tempest shall be around Him”;

and afterwards in reference to the judgment (~~1901~~ Psalm 49:4):

“He shall call heaven from above,  
and the earth to judge His people.”

Therefore it would seem that the final cleansing of the world will be by means of fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)** — Further, it is written (~~CRD~~ 2 Peter 3:12):

“The heavens being on fire will be dissolved,  
and the elements shall melt with the burning heat.”

Therefore this cleansing will be effected by fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, As stated above (**A(1)**) this cleansing of the world will remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity resulting from mixture, and will be a disposition to the perfection of glory; and consequently in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the elements, its natural properties are more like the properties of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to light. Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; nor are we so familiar with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so that it is not so liable to depreciation. Moreover, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in separating by a process of rarefaction.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter (since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter: and in this respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in its pure state. But in so far as it has an admixture of some foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it will be cleanser and cleansed under different aspects. and this is not unreasonable.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The first cleansing of the world by the deluge regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent then was the sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting for it to be effected by fire than by water. For the power of water tends to unite rather than to separate; wherefore the natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world were already growing old, because then, according to ~~CRD~~ Matthew 24:12, “the charity of many shall grow

cold,” and consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(2)-RO(3)** — By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.

### **P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same species with elemental fire?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the fire in question is not of the same species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes itself. But that fire will consume the four elements according to a gloss on <sup>GRD</sup>2 Peter 3:12. Therefore that fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, as power is made known by operation, so is nature made known by power. Now that fire will have a different power from the fire which is an element: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this fire cannot do that. Therefore it will not be of the same species as this.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, in natural bodies those that are of the same species have the same movement. But that fire will have a different movement from the fire that is an element, because it will move in all directions so as to cleanse the whole. Therefore it is not of the same species.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), and his words are contained in a gloss on <sup>GRD</sup>1 Corinthians 7:31, that “the

fashion of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames.” Therefore that fire will be of the same nature as the fire which is now in the world.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)** — Further, just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so was the past cleansing by water: and they are both compared to one another, <sup>(GRB)</sup>2 Peter 3:5. Now in the first cleansing the water was of the same species with elemental water. Therefore in like manner the fire of the second cleansing will be of the same species with elemental fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, We meet with three opinions on this question. For some say that the element of fire which is in its own sphere will come down to cleanse the world: and they explain this descent by way of multiplication, because the fire will spread through finding combustible matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then since the virtue of the fire will be raised over all the elements. Against this, however, would seem to be not only the fact that this fire will come down, but also the statement of the saints that it will rise up; thus (<sup>(GRB)</sup>2 Peter 3:10) it is declared that the fire of the judgment will rise as high as the waters of the deluge; whence it would seem to follow that this fire is situated towards the middle of the place of generation. Hence others say that this fire will be generated towards the intervening space through the focusing together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focused together in a burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of glasses there will be concave clouds, on which the rays will strike. But this again does not seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be known to those who observe the movements of the stars and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture. Consequently others, following Augustine, say that “just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning of worldly flames” (De Civ. Dei. xx, 16). This burning is nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher causes that by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the Divine power: and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn the surface of this world will result. If we consider aright these opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this

fire and not as to its species. For fire, whether produced by the sun or by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own sphere, except in so far as the former has some admixture of foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire cannot cleanse a thing, unless this become its matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the fire in question is simply of the same species as ours.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The fire in question, although of the same species as ours, is not identically the same. Now we see that of two fires of the same species one destroys the other, namely the greater destroys the lesser, by consuming its matter. In like manner that fire will be able to destroy our fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Just as an operation that proceeds from the virtue of a thing is an indication of that virtue, so is its virtue an indication of its essence or nature, if it proceed from the essential principles of the thing. But an operation that does not proceed from the virtue of the operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears in instruments: for the action of an instrument shows forth the virtue of the mover rather than that of the instrument, since it shows forth the virtue of the agent in so far as the latter is the first principle of the action, whereas it does not show forth the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as it is susceptible of the influence of the principal agent as moving that instrument. In like manner a virtue that does not proceed from the essential principles of a thing does not indicate the nature of that thing except in the point of susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot water can heat is no indication of the nature of water except in the point of its being receptive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water that has this virtue from being of the same species as water that has it not. In like manner it is not unreasonable that this fire, which will have the power to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same species as the fire to which we are used, since the heating power therein arises, not from its essential principles but from the divine power or operation: whether we say that this power is an absolute quality, such as heat in hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to instrumental virtue (Sent. iv, D, 1, qu. 1, **A(4)**) [\*Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(62)**, **A(4)**, ad 1]. The latter is more probable since that fire will not act save as the instrument of the Divine power.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Of its own nature fire tends only upwards; but in so far as it pursues its matter, which it requires when it is outside its own sphere, it follows the site of combustible matter. Accordingly it is not unreasonable for it to take a circular or a downward course, especially in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine power.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)**

*Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens. For it is written (<sup>Psalm</sup> Psalm 101:26,27):

“The heavens are the works of Thy hands:  
they shall perish but Thou remainest.”

Now the higher heavens also are the work of God’s hands. Therefore they also shall perish in the final burning of the world.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>2 Peter</sup> 2 Peter 3:12):

“The heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements  
shall melt with the burning heat of fire.”

Now the heavens that are distinct from the elements are the higher heavens, wherein the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that they also will be cleansed by that fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the purpose of that fire will be to remove from bodies their indisposition to the perfection of glory. Now in the higher heaven we find this indisposition both as regards guilt, since the devil sinned there, and as regards natural deficiency, since a gloss on <sup>Romans</sup> Romans 8:22, “We know that every creature groaneth and is in labor even until now,” says: “All the elements fulfill their duty with labor: even as it is not without labor that the sun and moon travel their appointed course.” Therefore the higher heavens also will be cleansed by that fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, “The heavenly bodies are not receptive of impressions from without” [\*Cf. Sent. Philosop. ex Arist. collect. lit. c. — Among the works of Bede].

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)** — Further, a gloss on <sup>SCOR</sup>2 Thessalonians 1:8, “In a flame of fire giving vengeance,” says: “There will be in the world a fire that shall precede Him, and shall rise in the air to the same height as did the waters of the deluge.” But the waters of the deluge did not rise to the height of the higher heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain summits (<sup>SCOR</sup>Genesis 7:20). Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The cleansing of the world will be for the purpose of removing from bodies the disposition contrary to the perfection of glory, and this perfection is the final consummation of the universe: and this disposition is to be found in all bodies, but differently in different bodies. For in some this indisposition regards something inherent to their substance: as in these lower bodies which by being mixed together fall away from their own purity. In others this indisposition does not regard something inherent to their substance; as in the heavenly bodies, wherein nothing is to be found contrary to the final perfection of the universe, except movement which is the way to perfection, and this not any kind of movement, but only local movement, which changes nothing intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance, quantity, or quality, but only its place which is extrinsic to it. Consequently there is no need to take anything away from the substance of the higher heavens, but only to set its movement at rest. Now local movement is brought to rest not by the action of a counter agent, but by the mover ceasing to move; and therefore the heavenly bodies will not be cleansed, neither by fire nor by the action of any creature, but in lieu of being cleansed they will be set at rest by God’s will alone.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)-RO(1)** — As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18,24): “Those words of the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be cleansed by the fire of the final conflagration.” Or we may reply that if they refer also to the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards their movement whereby now they are moved without cessation.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Peter explains himself to which heavens he refers. For before the words quoted, he had said (<sup>SCOR</sup>2 Peter 3:5-7):



“The heavens... first, and the earth... through water... perished... which... now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the day of judgment.”

[\*The entire text differs somewhat from St. Thomas’s quotation; but the sense is the same.] Therefore the heavens to be cleansed are those which before were cleansed by the waters of the deluge, namely the aerial heavens.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(4)-RO(3)** — This labor and service of the creature, that Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than the successive movements whereby they are subject to time, and the lack of that final consummation which they will attain in the end. Nor did the empyrean heaven contract any stain from the sin of the demons, because they were expelled from that heaven as soon as they sinned.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)**

### *Whether that fire will consume the other elements?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the fire in question will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on <sup>612</sup>2 Peter 3:12 says: “This exceeding great fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world consists: yet it will not so engulf all things that they will cease to be, but it will consume two of them entirely, and will restore two of them to a better fashion.” Therefore it would seem that at least two of the elements are to be entirely destroyed by that fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>613</sup>Revelation 21:1): “The first heaven and the first earth have passed away and the sea is no more.” Now the heaven here denotes the air, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xx, 18); and the sea denotes the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it would seem that these three elements will be wholly destroyed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, fire does not cleanse except in so far as other things are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses the other elements, they must needs become its matter. Therefore they must pass into its nature, and consequently be voided of their own nature.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, the form of fire is the most noble of the forms to which elemental matter can attain. Now all things will be brought to the most noble state by this cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be wholly transformed into fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, A gloss on <sup><117></sup>1 Corinthians 7:31, “The fashion of this world passeth away,” says: “The beauty, not the substance, passeth.” But the very substance of the elements belongs to the perfection of the world. Therefore the elements will not be consumed as to their substance.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)** — Further, this final cleansing that will be effected by fire will correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by water. Now the latter did not corrupt the substance of the elements. Therefore neither will the former which will be the work of fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, There are many opinions on this question. For some say that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will be changed as regards their imperfection; but that two of them will retain their respective substantial form, namely air and earth, while two of them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form but will be changed to the form of heaven. In this way three elements, namely air, fire, and water, will be called “heaven”; although air will retain the same substantial form as it has now, since even now it is called “heaven.” Wherefore (<sup><118></sup>Revelation 21:1) only heaven and earth are mentioned: “I saw,” says he, “a new heaven and a new earth.” But this opinion is altogether absurd: for it is opposed both to philosophy — which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mutual contrariety — and to theology, since according to this opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity of its parts will not be assured on account of two of the elements being destroyed.

Consequently “heaven” is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the elements are designated by “earth,” as expressed in <sup><119></sup>Psalms 148:7,8, “Praise the Lord from the earth” and afterwards, “fire, hail, snow, ice,” etc.

Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their substance, but that their active and passive qualities will be taken from them: even as

they say too, that in a mixed body the elements retain their substantial form without having their proper qualities, since these are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And seemingly the following words of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xx, 16) would seem in agreement with this: “In this conflagration of the world the qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the substance itself will have those qualities that become an immortal body.”

However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial form, it seems impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the cold temperature which it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities belong to the second perfection of the elements, as being their proper passions: nor is it probable that in this final consummation the elements will lose anything of their natural perfection. Wherefore it would seem that the reply to this question should be that the elements will remain as to their substance and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed both from the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the impurity resulting in them through their mutual action and passion: because when once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible in the lower elements: and this is what Augustine calls the “qualities of corruptible elements,” namely their unnatural dispositions by reason of which they come near to corruption.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-RO(1)** — That fire is said to engulf the four elements in so far as in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is said further that “it will consume two entirely,” this does not mean that two of the elements are to be destroyed as to their substance, but that two will be more changed from the property which they have now. Some say that these two are fire and water which excel the others in their active qualities, namely heat and cold, which are the chief principles of corruption in other bodies; and since then there will be no action of fire and water which surpass the others in activity, they would seem especially to be changed from the virtue which they have now. Others, however, say that these two

are air and water, on account of the various movements of these two elements, which movements they derive from the movement of the heavenly bodies. And since these movements will cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the disturbances of winds and so forth), therefore these elements especially will be changed from the property which they have now.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-RO(2)** — As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), when it is stated: “And the sea is no more,” by the sea we may understand the present world of which he had said previously (De Civ. Dei xx, 13): “The sea gave up the dead that were in it.” If, however, the sea be taken literally we must reply that by the sea two things are to be understood, namely the substance of the waters, and their disposition, as containing salt and as to the movement of the waves. The sea will remain, not as to this second, but as to the first.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-RO(3)** — This fire will not act save as the instrument of God’s providence and power; wherefore it will not act on the other elements so as to consume them but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary for that which becomes the matter of fire, to be voided of its proper species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which by virtue of its species that remains returns to its proper and former state as soon as it is taken from the furnace. It will be the same with the elements after they are cleansed by fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(5)-RO(4)** — In the elemental parts we must consider not only what is befitting a part considered in itself, but also what is befitting it in its relation to the whole. I say, then, that although water would be more noble if it had the form of fire, as likewise would earth and air, yet the universe would be more imperfect, if all elemental matter were to assume the form of fire.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)**

*Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that neither will all the elements be cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as stated already (**A(3)**), will not

rise higher than the waters of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge did not reach to the sphere of fire. Therefore neither will the element of fire be cleansed by the final cleansing.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, a gloss on ~~Gen~~ Revelation 21:1, “I saw a new heaven,” etc., says: “There can be no doubt that the transformation of the air and earth will be caused by fire; but it is doubtful about water, since it is believed to have the power of cleansing itself.” Therefore at least it is uncertain that all the elements will be cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, a place where there is an everlasting stain is never cleansed. Now there will always be a stain in hell. Since, then, hell is situated among the elements, it would seem that the elements will not be wholly cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, the earthly paradise is situated on the earth. Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the waters of the deluge reached it, as Bede says (Hexaem. i, ad ~~Gen~~ Genesis 2:8), as is stated in Sentent. ii, D, 7. Therefore it would seem that the elements will not all be wholly cleansed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6) — *On the contrary***, The gloss quoted above (**A(5), O(1)**) on ~~2 Pet~~ 2 Peter 3:12 declares that “this fire will engulf the four elements.”

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6) — *I answer that***, Some [\*St. Bonaventure, Sentent. iv, D, 47, **A(2), Q(3)**] say that the fire in question will rise to the summit of the space containing the four elements: so that the elements would be entirely cleansed both from the stain of sin by which also the higher parts of the elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry which stained the higher regions), and again from corruption, since the elements are corruptible in all their parts. But this opinion is opposed to the authority of Scripture, because it is written (~~2 Pet~~ 2 Peter 3:7) that those heavens are “kept in store unto fire,” which were cleansed by water; and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) that “the same world which perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire.” Now it is clear that the waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of the space occupied by the elements, but only 15 cubits above the mountain tops; and moreover it is known that vapors or any smoke whatever rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin did

not reach the aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something that might be consumed by fire: whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the elements arising from their mingling together to be consumed by fire. And these impurities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle of the air: wherefore the fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up to that point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can be approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they surpassed in a fixed measure.

We therefore grant the First Objection.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss, because, to wit, water is believed to have in itself the power of cleansing, yet not such a power as will be competent to the future state, as stated above (**A(5); A(2)**, ad 2).

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-RO(3)** — The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly to remove all imperfection from the abode of the saints; and consequently in this cleansing all that is foul will be brought together to the place of the damned: so hell will not be cleansed, and the dregs of the whole earth will be brought thither, according to <sup><970></sup>Psalm 74:9, “The dregs thereof are not emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink.”

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(6)-RO(4)** — Although the sin of the first man was committed in the earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners, as neither is the empyrean heaven: since from both places man and devil were expelled forthwith after their sin. Consequently that place needs no cleansing.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)**

***Whether the fire of the final conflagration  
is to follow the judgment?***

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 30) gives the following order of the things to take place at the judgment, saying: “At this judgment we have learned that the following things will

occur. Elias the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will persecute, Christ will judge, the dead shall rise again, the good shall be separated from the wicked, the world shall be set on fire and shall be renewed.” Therefore the burning will follow the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): “After the wicked have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure of this world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames.” Therefore the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, when the Lord comes to judgment He will find some men living, as appears from the words of <sup><S046></sup>1 Thessalonians 4:16, where the Apostle speaking in their person says: “Then we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of the Lord [\*Vulg.: ‘who are left, shall be taken... to meet Christ’ — the words “who remain,” etc., are from <sup><S044></sup>1 Thessalonians 4:14].” But it would not be so, if the burning of the world were to come first, since they would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore this fire will follow the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-O(4)** — Further, it is said that our Lord will come to judge the earth by fire, and consequently the final conflagration would seem to be the execution of the sentence of Divine judgment. Now execution follows judgment. Therefore that fire will follow the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup><S045></sup> Psalm 96:3): “A fire shall go before Him.”

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)** — Further, the resurrection will precede the judgment, else every eye would not see Christ judging. Now the burning of the world will precede the resurrection, for the saints who will rise again will have spiritual and impassible bodies, so that it will be impossible for the fire to cleanse them, and yet the text (Sent. iv, D, 47) quotes Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) as saying that “whatever needs cleansing in any way shall be cleansed by that fire.” Therefore that fire will precede the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, The fire in question will in reality, as regards its beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be gathered from the fact that the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, since according to <sup><S043></sup>1 Thessalonians 4:13-16, those who have slept

“shall be taken up... in the clouds... into the air... to meet Christ coming to judgment.”

Now the general resurrection and the glorification of the bodies of the saints will happen at the same time; for the saints in rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by ~~1~~<sup>15B</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:43, “It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory”: and at the same time as the saints’ bodies shall be glorified, all creatures shall be renewed, each in its own way, as appears from the statement (~~8~~<sup>RO</sup> Romans 8:21) that

“the creature... itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.”

Since then the burning of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal, as stated above (**AA(1),4**); it can clearly be gathered that this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will precede the judgment, but as regards a certain action thereof, whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-RO(1)** — Augustine is speaking not as one who decides the point, but as expressing an opinion. This is clear from his continuing thus: “That all these things are to happen is a matter of faith, but how and in what order we shall learn more then by experience of the things themselves than now by seeking a definite conclusion by arguing about them. Methinks, however, they will occur in the order I have given.” Hence it is clear that he is speaking as offering his opinion. The same answer applies to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-RO(3)** — All men shall die and rise again: yet those are said to be found alive who will live in the body until the time of the conflagration.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(7)-RO(4)** — That fire will not carry out the sentence of the judge except as regards the engulfing of the wicked: in this respect it will follow the judgment.



**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)*****Whether that fire will have  
such an effect on men as is described?***

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that this fire will not have such an effect on men as is described in the text (Sent. iv, D, 47). For a thing is said to be consumed when it is reduced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will not be reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity, that they may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will not consume the wicked, as stated in the text.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, if it be said that it will consume the bodies of the wicked by reducing them to ashes; *on the contrary*, as the bodies of the wicked, so will those of the good be brought to ashes: for it is the privilege of Christ alone that His flesh see not corruption. Therefore it will consume also the good who will then be found.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-O(3)** — Further, the stain of sin is more abundant in the elements, as combining together to the formation of the human body wherein is the corruption of the fomes [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(83)**, **A(3)**; **P(2a)**, **Q(91)**, **A(6)**] even in the good, than in the elements existing outside the human body. Now the elements existing outside the human body will be cleansed on account of the stain of sin. Much therefore will the elements in the human body whether of the good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, and consequently the bodies of both will need to be destroyed.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-O(4)** — Further, as long as the state of the way lasts the elements act in like manner on the good and the wicked. Now the state of the way will still endure in that conflagration, since after this state of the way death will not be natural, and yet it will be caused by that fire. Therefore that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and consequently it does not seem that any distinction is made between them as to their being affected by that fire, as stated in the text.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-O(5)** — Further, this fire will have done its work in a moment as it were. Yet there will be many among the living in whom there will be many things to be cleansed. Therefore that fire will not suffice for their cleansing.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)** — *I answer that*, This fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument of Divine justice as well as by the natural virtue of fire. Accordingly, as regards its natural virtue, it will act in like manner on the wicked and good who will be alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far as it acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will act differently on different people as regards the sense of pain. For the wicked will be tortured by the action of the fire; whereas the good in whom there will be nothing to cleanse will feel no pain at all from the fire, as neither did the children in the fiery furnace (Daniel 3); although their bodies will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of the children: and it will be possible by God's power for their bodies to be destroyed without their suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter for cleansing will be found, will suffer pain from that fire, more or less according to their different merits.

On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since the good will all have impassible bodies.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-RO(1)** — Consumption there signifies being brought, not to nothing, but to ashes.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-RO(2)** — Although the bodies of the good will be reduced to ashes by the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby, as neither did the children in the Babylonian furnace. In this respect a distinction is drawn between the good and the wicked.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-RO(3)** — The elements that are in human bodies, even in the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But this will be done, by God's power, without their suffering pain.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-RO(4)** — This fire will act not only according to the natural power of the element, but also as the instrument of Divine justice.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(8)-RO(5)** — There are three reasons why those who will be found living will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One is because there will be few things in them to be cleansed, since they will be already cleansed by the previous fears and persecutions. The second is because they will suffer pain both while living and of their own will: and pain suffered in this life voluntarily cleanses much more than pain inflicted after death, as

in the case of the martyrs, because “if anything needing to be cleansed be found in them, it is cut off by the sickle of suffering,” as Augustine says (De Unic. Bap. xiii), although the pain of martyrdom is of short duration in comparison with the pain endured in purgatory. The third is because the heat will gain in intensity what it loses in shortness of time.

## **P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)**

### *Whether that fire will engulf the wicked?*

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)-O(1)** — It would seem that that fire will not engulf the wicked. For a gloss on <sup><30B></sup>Malachi 3:3, “He shall purify the sons of Levi,” says that “it is a fire consuming the wicked and refining the good”; and a gloss on <sup><41B></sup>1 Corinthians 3:13, “Fire shall try every man’s work,” says: “We read that there will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the elect and will precede the judgment, another that will torture the wicked.” Now the latter is the fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the former is the fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will not be that which will engulf the wicked.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, that fire will obey God in the cleansing of the world: therefore it should receive its reward like the other elements, especially since fire is the most noble of the elements. Therefore it would seem that it ought not to be cast into hell for the punishment of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)-O(3)** — Further, the fire that will engulf the wicked will be the fire of hell: and this fire was prepared from the beginning of the world for the damned; hence it is written (<sup><42B></sup>Matthew 25:41):

“Depart... you cursed... into everlasting fire which was prepared  
for the devil,” etc.,

and (<sup><31B></sup>Isaiah 30:33): “Tophet is prepared from yesterday, prepared by the king,” etc., where a gloss observes: “From yesterday, i.e. from the beginning — Tophet, i.e. the valley of hell.” But this fire of the final conflagration was not prepared from the beginning, but will result from the meeting together of the fires of the world. Therefore that fire is not the fire of hell which will engulf the wicked.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9) —** *On the contrary*, are the words of <sup>1968</sup>Psalm 96:3, where it is said of this fire that it “shall burn His enemies round about.”

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9) —** Further, it is written (<sup>2000</sup>Daniel 7:10): “A swift stream of fire issued forth from before Him”; and a gloss adds, “to drag sinners into hell.” Now the passage quoted refers to that fire of which we are now speaking, as appears from a gloss which observes on the same words: “In order to punish the wicked and cleanse the good.” Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will be plunged into hell together with the wicked

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9) —** *I answer that*, The entire cleansing of the world and the renewal for the purpose of cleansing will be directed to the renewal of man: and consequently the cleansing and renewal of the world must needs correspond with the cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind will be cleansed in one way by the separation of the wicked from the good: wherefore it is said (<sup>1987</sup>Luke 3:17):

“Whose fan is in His hand, and He will purge His poor,  
and will gather the wheat,”

i.e. the elect, “into His barn, but the chaff,” i.e. the wicked, “He will burn with unquenchable fire.” Hence it will be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that all that is ugly and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and all that is beautiful and noble will be taken up above for the glory of the elect: and so too will it be with the fire of that conflagration, as Basil says in <sup>1960</sup>Psalm 28:7, “The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire,” because whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)-RO(1) —** The fire that will cleanse the elect before the judgment will be the same as the fire that will burn the world, although some say the contrary. For it is fitting that man, being a part of the world, be cleansed with the same fire as the world. They are, however, described as two fires, that will cleanse the good, and torture the wicked, both in reference to their respective offices, and somewhat in reference to their substance: since the substance of the cleansing fire will not all be cast into hell, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)-RO(2)** — This fire will be rewarded because whatever it contains of gross matter will be separated from it, and cast into hell.

**P(4)-Q(74)-A(9)-RO(3)** — The punishment of the wicked, even as the glory of the elect, will be greater after the judgment than before. Wherefore, just as charity will be added to the higher creature in order to increase the glory of the elect, so too whatever is vile in creatures will be thrust down into hell in order to add to the misery of the damned. Consequently it is not unbecoming that another fire be added to the fire of the damned that was prepared from the beginning of the world.

## QUESTION 75

### OF THE RESURRECTION

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth its term “wherefrom”; the fifth the condition of those who rise again.

Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?
- (2) Whether it is universally of all bodies?
- (3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?

#### P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)

#### *Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?*

P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-O(1) — It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body: for it is written (<sup>3842</sup>Job 14:12):

“Man, when he is fallen asleep,  
shall not rise again till the heavens be broken.”

But the heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, “standeth for ever” (<sup>2004</sup>Ecclesiastes 1:4). Therefore the man that is dead shall never rise again.

P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-O(2) — Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words:

“I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living”  
(~~423~~ Matthew 22:32; ~~418~~ Exodus 3:6).

But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the Apostle (~~431~~ 1 Corinthians 15) seemingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul’s instrument. Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final state, and consequently it returns not from this state to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears from ~~400~~ Genesis 2, even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~405~~ Job 19:25-26):

“I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my skin,” etc.

Therefore there will be a resurrection of the body.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)** — Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears from ~~ROM~~ Romans 5:15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be restored from death to life.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)** — Further, the members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since “Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more” (~~ROM~~ Romans 6:8). Therefore men who are His members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a resurrection of the body.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, According to the various opinions about man’s last end there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. For man’s last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have held that man is able to attain this end in this life: wherefore they had no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be able to attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection.

This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of De Civ. Dei (xxii, 22).

Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26): “The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies”: and consequently these did not hold the resurrection.

This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from



this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, **A(3)**; \*[Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(49)**, **A(3)**]).

Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (De Anima ii, 2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle says (<sup>413</sup>1 Corinthians 7:31): “The fashion of this world passeth away.”

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Abraham’s soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence life in Abraham’s soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and although this life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The soul is compared to the body, not only as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since to the worker is due the reward of the work, it behooves man himself, who is composed of soul and body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial

offenses are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body, by death and by its being reduced to ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Bodily death was brought about by Adam's sin which was blotted out by Christ's death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting.

## **P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)**

### *Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?*

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written (<sup>400B</sup>Psalm 1:5): "The wicked shall not rise again in judgment." Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>270B</sup>Daniel 12:2): "Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." But these words imply a restriction. Therefore all will not rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (<sup>485D</sup>1 Corinthians

15:12, seqq.) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their mother's womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently all will not rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is said (~~RES~~ John 5:28,25):

“All that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God...  
and they that hear shall live.”

Therefore the dead shall all rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)** — Further, it is written (~~RES~~ 1 Corinthians 15:51): “We shall all indeed rise again,” etc.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)** — Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others' merits, as to children. Therefore all will rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of that same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above (**A(1)**), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated from the body. Hence no soul will remain for ever separated from the body. Therefore it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-RO(1)** — As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the particular judgment. or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether

unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged [<sup>418</sup>John 3:18].

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 23) explains “many” as meaning “all”: in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-RO(3)** — All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Those who have died in original sin have, by dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of original sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again from death: for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than to be detained by death.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(2)-RO(5)** — We are born again by the grace of Christ that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came about that He took our nature, since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in natural things. Hence those who die in their mother’s womb, although they are not born again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity of their nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the perfection of the human species.

## **P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)**

### *Whether the resurrection is natural?*

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), “that which is commonly observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained

under it.” Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): “Those who do not hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly to hold it on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?” And he offers as examples the light which “as it were dies... and is withdrawn from our sight... and again rises anew, as it were, and is recalled — the shrubs which lose their greenery, and again by a kind of resurrection are renewed — and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again as it were”: which same example is adduced by the Apostle (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:36). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, things that are against nature abide not for long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is restored by the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, that to which the entire expectation of nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the resurrection and the glorification of the saints according to ~~8:19~~<sup>8:19</sup> Romans 8:19. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, the resurrection is a kind of movement towards the everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if it terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of soul and body will be natural, for since the soul is the body’s proper mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** There is no natural return from privation to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one returns from death to life is not natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3) —** Further, things of the one species have one fixed way of origin: wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of the same species as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on Phys.

8:Now the natural way of man's origin is for him to be begotten of a like in species: and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* A movement or an action stands related to nature in three ways. For there is a movement or action whereof nature is neither the principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and sometimes from any other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward movement of a stone which terminates in a violent rest. Again, there is a movement whereof nature is both principle and term: for instance, the downward movement of a stone. And there is another movement whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, the latter being sometimes something above nature (as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the principle of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial process. It is impossible for nature to be the principle and not the term, because natural principles are appointed to definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend.

Accordingly the action or movement that is related to nature in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature: but it is called either miraculous or artificial or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that nature (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be natural.

Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is — either the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in the natural alterations of animals — or the passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies.

The passive principle of natural generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle corresponding to it in nature, according to *Metaphysics* viii, 1: nor as to this does it matter whether the active principle in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all other generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for that union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have explained.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-RO(1)** — Damascene is speaking of those things that are found in all individuals and are caused by the principles of nature. For supposing by a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gathered together in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge, it would not follow that whiteness or existence in some particular place is a natural property of man.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-RO(2)** — From natural things one does not come by a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason one may know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of fruition, as the Master says (*Sent.* ii, D, 1): and in like manner the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory evidences of our faith in the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-RO(3)** — This argument regards an operation which terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to nature. Such is not the resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-RO(4)** — The entire operation of nature is subordinate to the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate to the working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the last end which the whole expectation of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for which reason the attaining thereto is not natural.

**P(4)-Q(75)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Although there can be no natural movement terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement terminating in a natural rest, as explained above.



## QUESTION 76

# OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?
- (2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is?
- (3) Whether the angels are?

#### P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)

### *Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?*

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, an effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But the resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen again: for God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ's resurrection is not the cause of ours.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the same thing produces the one effect throughout the one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all men. Since then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of the resurrection of others.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, an effect retains some likeness to its cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely the wicked, bears no likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection will not be the cause of theirs.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** “In every genus that which is first is the cause of those that come after it” (Metaph. ii, 1). Now Christ, by reason of His bodily resurrection, is called “the first-fruits of them that sleep” (<sup><450></sup>1 Corinthians 15:20), and “the first-begotten of the dead” (<sup><400></sup>Revelation 1:5). Therefore His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1) —** Further, Christ’s resurrection has more in common with our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which is by justification. But Christ’s resurrection is the cause of our justification, as appears from <sup><400></sup>Romans 4:25, where it is said that He “rose again for our justification.” Therefore Christ’s resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Christ by reason of His nature is called the mediator of God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means of Christ’s humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ, in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our grace, because “of His fulness we all have received... grace for grace” (<sup><400></sup>John 1:16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man rising again, He is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal cause of our resurrection. Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this very form, whereby the agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness in the begotten. In this way the resurrection

of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written (~~488~~ Romans 8:11):

“He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also  
your mortal bodies.”

And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of His body whereby He healed the leper (~~488~~ Matthew 8:3).

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-RO(1)** — A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is directed by means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat, however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in the first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's resurrection is said to be the cause of ours, in that it works our resurrection, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power which will work our resurrection in likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works by means of His will which is nearest to the effect; hence it is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that it should happen at the time which God's will has decreed.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-RO(2)** — God's power is not tied to any particular second causes, but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by means of other causes: thus He might work the generation of lower bodies even though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet according to the order which He has established in things, the movement of the heaven is the cause of the generation of the lower bodies. In like manner according to the order appointed to human things by Divine providence, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could

have appointed another order, and then our resurrection would have had another cause ordained by God.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-RO(3)** — This argument holds when all the things of one species have the same order to the first cause of the effect to be produced in the whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in point, because Christ's humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ's Godhead caused His resurrection immediately, but it causes the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising again.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The resurrection of all men will bear some resemblance to Christ's resurrection, as regards that which pertains to the life of nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise again to immortal life; but in the saints who were conformed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to glory.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)**

***Whether the sound of the trumpet  
will be the cause of our resurrection?***

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be the cause of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Thou must believe that the resurrection will take place by God's will, power, and nod." Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of our resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause thereof.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is useless to make sounds to one who cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting to make a sound to arouse them.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, if any sound is the cause of the resurrection, this will only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore a gloss on <sup>1957B</sup>Psalm 67:34, "He will give to His voice the voice of power," says: "to arouse our bodies." Now from the moment that a power is given to a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, after being

restored to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of resurrection, the resurrection would be natural: which is false.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup><S1015></sup>1 Thessalonians 4:15):

“The Lord Himself will come down from heaven... with the trumpet of God; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise.”

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2) —** Further, it is written (<sup><R138></sup>John 5:28) that they “who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God... and (<sup><R135></sup>John 5:25) they that hear shall live.” Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** Cause and effect must needs in some way be united together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous (Phys. vii, 2). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves Christ to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign. According to some this sign will be literally Christ’s voice commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm ceased (<sup><R131></sup>Matthew 8:26). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to the words of <sup><R127></sup>Matthew 24:27: “As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.” These rely on the authority of Gregory [\*Moral. xxxi, as quoted by St. Albert the Great, Sentent. iv, D, 42, **A(4)**] who says that “the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as judge.” According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all nature will obey His command in restoring human bodies: hence He is described as coming “with commandment” (<sup><S1015></sup>1 Thessalonians 4:15). In this way His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry [<sup><R126></sup>Matthew 25:6], as of a crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a trumpet [\*<sup><R131></sup>1 Corinthians 15:52; <sup><S1015></sup>1 Thessalonians 4:15], either on account of its distinctness, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and called to the feast;

and those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the battle in which “the world shall fight... against the unwise” (Wis. 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)-RO(1)** — In those words the Damascene touches on three things respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the Divine will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of execution, when he adds “bidding,” in resemblance to our own affairs: since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is much more evident, if before we say a word, our servants execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, which sign is called a nod: and this nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish our will. And the Divine nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, which all nature will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)-RO(2)** — As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to sanctify, not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this sound, whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered. Even so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is known: since judgment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent to the awakening and is not its cause.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(2)-RO(3)** — This argument would avail, if the power given to that sound were a complete being in nature: because then that which would proceed therefrom would have for principle a power already rendered natural. But this power is not of that kind but such as we have ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, D, 1; **P(1), Q(62), AA(1),4**).

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(3)*****Whether the angels will do anything  
towards the resurrection?***

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power than does begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, if this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore the resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is stated (<sup>SENT</sup>1 Thessalonians 4:15) that

“the Lord... shall come down from heaven... with the voice of an  
archangel... and the dead shall rise again.”

Therefore the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the angelic ministry.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) “just as the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the rational spirit of life”: and Gregory speaks in the same sense (Dial. iv, 6). Consequently in all God’s bodily works, He employs the ministry of the angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the human body; wherefore in this respect God will employ the ministry of the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately created by God, so will it be reunited to the body immediately by God without any operation

of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify the body without the ministry of the angels, just as He immediately glorifies man's soul. This ministry of the angels is called their voice, according to one explanation given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43).

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(76)-A(3)-RO(2)** — This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one Archangel, namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of the Synagogue (<sup>2013</sup> Daniel 10:13,21). Yet he will act under the influence of the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the higher orders will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed either to one or to many angels.



## QUESTION 77

# OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end of the world?
- (2) Whether that time is hidden?
- (3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?
- (4) Whether it will happen suddenly?

### P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)

*Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world?*

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. For there is more conformity between head and members than between one member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may rise again together with the others.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately

after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [\*Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii, among St. Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more conformed to Him by grace and merit.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, according to <sup><175></sup>Matthew 27:52: "Many of the bodies of the saints, that had slept, arose." Therefore it would seem that the resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from <sup><610></sup>Revelation 20:4,5. For it is stated there that "I saw... the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," and further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." And "the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were finished." Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the end of the world, that all may rise together.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1) — *On the contrary,*** It is written (<sup><842></sup>Job 14:12):

"Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens  
be broken, he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep,"

and it is a question of the sleep of death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavens shall be broken.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1) —** Further, it is written (<sup><813></sup>Hebrews 11:39): "All these being approved by the testimony of faith received not the promise," i.e. full beatitude of soul and body, since "God has provided something better for us, lest they should be consummated," i.e. perfected, "without us — in order that," as a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might rejoice the more." But the resurrection will not precede the glorification of bodies, because "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the

body of His glory” (<sup>402b</sup>Philippians 3:21), and the children of the resurrection will be “as the angels... in heaven” (<sup>402b</sup>Matthew 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end of the world, when all shall rise together.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) “Divine providence decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies”: wherefore the entire matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life conformably to Christ Who “rising again from the dead dieth now no more” (<sup>406b</sup>Romans 6:9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return to mortal bodies such as we have now — whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that “any soul will enter any body,” as stated in De Anima i, 3.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the head is more conformed to the members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet the head has a certain causality over the members which the members have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with one another. Hence Christ’s resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ’s members is not the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently Christ’s resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although among the members some rank higher than others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain

to the character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*\*Ep. x ad Paul. et Eustoch.*, now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world — or really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on <sup>4175</sup>Matthew 27:52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection, it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the "first-fruits of them that sleep" (<sup>4850</sup>1 Corinthians 15:20), although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(1)-RO(4)** — On account of these words, as Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or "millenarians." Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xx, 7) that these words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein

not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for  $10 \times 10 = 100$ , and  $100 \times 10 = 1,000$ . Again in <sup><94B></sup>Psalm 104:8, “The word which He commanded to a thousand,” i.e. all, “generations.”

### **P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)**

#### *Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?*

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, since “all things are measured by a certain period” (De Generat. ii). Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is stated (<sup><60B></sup>Revelation 12:6) that  
 “the woman who represents the Church had a place prepared by  
 God, that there she might feed [Vulg.: ‘they should feed her’]  
 a thousand two hundred sixty days.”

Again (<sup><27B></sup>Daniel 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned, which apparently signify years, according to <sup><20B></sup>Ezekiel 4:6: “A day for a year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee.” Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from Holy Writ.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of the New Testament will last to the end of the

world, wherefore it is said (<sup>488</sup>Matthew 28:20): “Behold I am with you... to the consummation of the world.” Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** That which is unknown to the angels will be much more unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from <sup>489</sup>Matthew 24:36: “Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven.” Therefore that time is hidden from men.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2) —** Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God’s secrets than others who followed them, because they had “the first-fruits of the spirit” (<sup>490</sup>Romans 8:23) — ” before others in point of time and more abundantly,” as a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very matter, He answered them (<sup>491</sup>Acts 1:7):

*“It is not for you to know the times or moments  
which the Father hath put in His own power.”*

Much more, therefore, is it hidden from others.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) “as to the last age of the human race, which begins from our Lord’s coming and lasts until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it will consist: even so old age, which is man’s last age, has no fixed time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone it lasts as long a time as all the others.” The reason of this is because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above (**A(1)**). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be

known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this, Christ answered (~~400~~ Acts 1:7):

“It is not for you to know the times or moments  
which the Father hath put in His own power,”

whereby, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): “He scatters the fingers of all calculators and bids them be still.” For what He refused to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our Lord’s Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)-RO(1)** — When we know a thing’s beginning and also its end it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly movement is God’s ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in the Apocalypse (~~602~~ 12:6) denote all the time during which the Church endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist’s preaching and the duration of his persecution.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although the state of the New Testament in general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Augustine (De

Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: “I do not think that the occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not.” The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true, and in others was deceived.

### **P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?***

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the resurrection will not be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be “till the heavens be broken” (~~RS~~ Job 14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (~~ROM~~ Revelation 10:6) that “time shall be no longer.” Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what is done therein: wherefore (~~REB~~ John 13:30) the night is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most manifest, because when the Lord shall come He “will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts” (~~1COR~~ 1 Corinthians 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Christ’s resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now Christ’s resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a



homily for Easter (xxi in Evang.). Therefore our resurrection will also be at night-time.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)** — Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief into the house (<sup><073></sup>Luke 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above (**Q(76), A(2)**). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that Christ arose at such an hour.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)-RO(1)** — When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that hour.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The most perfect disposition of time is said to be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it (<sup><021></sup>Revelation 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(3)-RO(3)** — That time should be adapted to manifestation as regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

## P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)

### *Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?*

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the resurrection will not happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold (<sup>250</sup>Ezekiel 37:7,8) where it is written:

“The bones came together... and I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them.”

Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above (**Q(76), A(2)**). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will not happen suddenly.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De Sensu et Sensato 7 Now the resurrection requires local movement in the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>455</sup>1 Corinthians 15:51,52):

“We shall all indeed rise again...  
in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye.”

Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)** — Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Thou shalt believe in the resurrection

to be wrought by the power of God,” and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, At the resurrection something will be done by the ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God, as stated above (**Q(76), A(3)**). Accordingly that which is done by the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done immediately by God’s power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the higher power brings the lower to perfection.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days, in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand, although all things were made together according to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Although these actions follow one another in nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the other.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-O(3)** — The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its last instant.

**P(4)-Q(77)-A(4)-RO(4)** — The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which is competent to the angels.

## QUESTION 78

# OF THE TERM “WHEREFROM” OF THE RESURRECTION

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether death is the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in every case?
- (2) Whether ashes are, or dust?
- (3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?

### P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)

#### *Whether death will be the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases?*

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that death will not be the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord “will come to judge the living and the dead.” Now this cannot refer to the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will not die before the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (<sup>2</sup> 2 Corinthians 5:4) it is a common desire that “we would not be unclothed but clothed upon.” Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']." Therefore the Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you" (~~✠~~ John 16:23). Therefore at some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be found living.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~✠~~ 1 Corinthians 15:36): "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (~~✠~~ 1 Corinthians 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." Now all shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as the Damascene says (De

Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, “the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,” just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-RO(1)** — This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire whereby we would not be “unclothed,” but “clothed upon,” namely if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a “velleity.”

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-RO(3)** — It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [\*See Editor’s note which follows **P(3), Q(26)**]. Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was vouchsafed — either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without communicating original sin) — or to nature itself which was healed. Now

we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (John 8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.

## **P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)**

### *Whether all will rise again from ashes?*

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to ~~Psalm~~ Psalm 15:10; ~~Acts~~ Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after

death, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the term “wherefrom” corresponds to the term “whereto.” Now the term “whereto” of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the wicked:

“We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed”  
(~~451~~ 1 Corinthians 15:51).

Therefore the term “wherefrom” is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Haymo says (on ~~451~~ Romans 5:10, “For if when we were enemies”): “All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go.” Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)** — Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The same reasons by which we have shown (**A(1)**) that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (~~402~~ Philippians 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from ~~402~~ Genesis 3:19,

“Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [\*Vulg.: ‘Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return’].”

Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be



dissolved into the prejaacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom."

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-RO(2)** — By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body — for two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(82)**, **A(3)**] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is dissolved.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejaacent matter.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Movement does not take its species from its term "wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term "whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term "wherefrom" is the same — for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and to pallor.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)**

*Whether the ashes from which the human body  
will be restored have any natural inclination  
towards the soul which will be united to them?*

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from others: and this is false.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup>XXII</sup>Job 20:11):

“His bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth,  
and they shall sleep with him in the dust.”

But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, The human body can be dissolved into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine (Enchiridion lxxxviii): “The human body, although changed into the substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has become the food and flesh

of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing man.”

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)** — Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessities. Now the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, and consequently the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(78)-A(3)-RO(3)** — These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the sins committed.

## QUESTION 79

# OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY

### (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider:

- (1) Those which concern the good and wicked in common;
- (2) those which concern the good only;
- (3) those which concern only the wicked.

Three things concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we shall inquire

- (1) about their identity;
- (2) about their integrity;
- (3) about their quality.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?
- (2) Whether it will be the self-same man?
- (3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same parts in which they were before?

### P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)

*Whether in the resurrection the soul  
will be reunited to the same identical body?*

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for

“thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain”  
(~~1~~ 1 Corinthians 15:37).

Now the Apostle is there comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish body.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, after death, as stated above (**Q(78), A(3)**), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if it be restored from these parts.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in identity.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~Gen~~ Job 19:26): “In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: ‘my God’],” where he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: “In the last day I shall rise out of the earth.” Therefore the selfsame body will rise again.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)** — Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): “Resurrection is the second rising of that which has fallen.” But the body which we have now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account of robbery and violence, and so forth — and into a body of the same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.

This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(76), A(1)**] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is more acute in him on account

of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii, 1), and in consequence of these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.

In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of ~~Job~~ Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc. Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-RO(1)** — A comparison does not apply to every particular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition, since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the body will rise again identically the same, but of a different condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The soul rising again and the soul living in this world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-RO(3)** — That which is understood as though it were in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics and in *De Substantia Orbis*, in the matter of things subject to generation

and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(76), A(1)**]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in a previous reply (ad 2).



**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)**

*Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?*

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii): “Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically.” Now such is man’s substance in his present state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man cannot be repeated .

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, where there is a distinction of human nature there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not be the same identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same man.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii,

1), and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade from the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~Gen~~ Job 19:27): “Whom I myself shall see... and not another,” and he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2) —** Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that “to rise again is naught else but to live again.” Now unless the same identical man that died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary to faith.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from this — that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated above (**Q(75), AA(1),2**): otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made. And since it behooves the end to be obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is effected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-RO(1) —** The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the recurrence that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to generation and corruption return by generation to specific but not numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water, from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same in

species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point.

We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another, otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form remains not, and their matter remains under another being.

Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul and the whole man.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-RO(2)** — There are two opinions about humanity and about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed, there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity.

The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's, according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only, nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since then at the

resurrection there will be the selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the same humanity.

The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form supervening form and matter; which is false.

The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the selfsame movement. Yet the identity of the rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-RO(3)** — This argument affords a very good proof against those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently neither the same animal nor the same man.

But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form “that contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity” (De Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the

animal's parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(2)-RO(4)** — A statue may be considered in two ways, either as a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also. Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)**

*Whether the ashes of the human body must needs,  
by the resurrection, return to the same parts of the body  
that were dissolved into them?*

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, difference of matter causes difference of identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the parts are different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be the self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state that it may be rewarded in due measure.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is it necessary in man.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)** — Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man does not cause a change of identity.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another. but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak

of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (*De Civ. Dei* xxii). It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity, and how it does not.

But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This argument considers organic or heterogeneous parts, but no homogeneous or like parts.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)-RO(2)** — A change in the position of the parts of matter does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter does.

**P(4)-Q(79)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part but to the whole.

## QUESTION 80

# OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?
- (2) Whether the hair and nails will?
- (3) Whether the humors will?
- (4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human nature will rise again?
- (5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?

### P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)

*Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?*

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that not all the members of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital members, for then they “shall neither marry, nor be married” (<sup>423</sup>Matthew 22:30), it would seem that not all the members shall rise again.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not all rise again.



**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of man. Therefore the members will not all rise again.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore does this apply to the other members.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)** — Further, “The works of God are perfect” (<sup>Gen</sup>Deuteronomy 32:4). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, “the soul stands in relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient cause.” For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in the art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behooves man’s body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in man’s body must needs be restored at the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since “the whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is to another” (De

Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the light of the first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glorified.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but with goodly humors.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.

## **P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)**

### ***Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?***

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less therefore will hair and nails.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for “we do not feel with them” (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13). Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written ( Luke 21:18):

“A hair of your head shall not perish.”

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)** — Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments: wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are directed to the accomplishment of the souls’ operations, for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will rise again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise again in him.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the human body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the protection of the members.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the species.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the individual.

### **P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the humors will rise again in the body?*

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body. For it is written (<sup>4150</sup>1 Corinthians 15:50): “Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God.” Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise again with humors.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, that which is in process of generation in the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not rise again.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that “the body consists of functional members; the functional members of homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors.” Therefore the humors will rise again in the body.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)** — Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the other humors.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above (**AA(1),2**). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual — either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth — or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the perfection of the person rising again.

The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body: while another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state — either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called “ros,” namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins — or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called “cambium”: but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection

that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called “gluten,” and since it belongs to the members it will rise again just as the members will.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)-RO(1)** — In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep. cxlvi) that “flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood”; wherefore the Apostle’s words continue: “Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.”

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Just as the members that serve for generation will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of human nature and to show forth its natural power.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in relation to the members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the humors belong to the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect parts.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)*****Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it?***

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature will not all rise again in him.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, it is impossible for the same thing from different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to the truth of human nature.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other — on the contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing but human flesh were to beget children that which his child derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (De Genesis Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of

the men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature — on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human nature since whatever is in them is derived from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos — and after these have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them — must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in both of them.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in each one.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4) —** Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (<sup>4218</sup> Luke 21:18) that not a hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** “Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being” (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says that “the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached thereto.” Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and that



this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment, although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature.

Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another.

The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the term of

generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.

These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers according to these opinions.

For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being detached and multiplied.

The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, that what first belonged to the substance of a

man's body, will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (*De Gener. i*) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which

the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.

On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two opinions agree.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-RO(1)** — A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argument.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-RO(2)** — That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-RO(3)** — According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in

that he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-RO(4)** — According to the first opinion this argument is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(4)-RO(5)** — The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by

this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; **P(1), Q(119), A(2)**).

### **P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)**

#### *Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?*

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the other members will all rise again.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again: which is inadmissible.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. 1: If, therefore, all the parts of matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in quantity.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)** — Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man

were to rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, What is in man materially, is not directed to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not all, thereof will rise again, as stated above (**A(4)**).

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be

immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)-RO(2)** — According to the third opinion parts of species are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this distinction (*De Gener.* i) in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(80)-A(5)-RO(3)** — In the matter of things subject to generation and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form; wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the human body.



## QUESTION 81

### OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN

#### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?
- (2) Whether they will be of equal stature?
- (3) Whether all will be of the same sex?
- (4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?

#### **P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)**

#### *Whether all will rise again of the same age?*

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youthful age.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i). Therefore if all are to rise again

of the same age, it is more fitting that they should rise again in the age of childhood.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~ROM~~ Ephesians 4:13):

“Until we all meet... unto a perfect man,  
unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.”

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1) —** Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1) —** Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that age.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Man will rise again without any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of decrease begins.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)-RO(1) —** Old age calls for reverence, not on account of the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in them.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)-RO(2) —** We speak of age not as regards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from years. Hence Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to transform nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humors have not yet reached their ultimate disposition.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)**

*Whether all will rise again of the same stature?*

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that all will rise again of the same stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in all, since all will rise again of the same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that “all things in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth.” Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the power of nature will never rise again of a greater quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the human bodies will be restored are equally disposed

to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the same quantity: and so the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Natural quantity results from each individual's nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2) —** Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of stature.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure whereof is gauged according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)-RO(1) —** It has already been explained (**A(1)**, ad 2) that all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or small quantity.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The quantity of a particular individual corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature or matter of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The quantity of those who will be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not belong to the power of the body — nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection — but to nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds of nature.

### **P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)**

#### *Whether all will rise again of the male sex?*

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is written (<sup>4003</sup>Ephesians 4:13) that we shall all meet “unto a perfect man,” etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on <sup>4024</sup>1 Corinthians 15:24. Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the male sex.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i.e. De Generat. Animal. ii) that “the female is a misbegotten male.” Therefore the female sex will not rise again.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): “Those are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again.”

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)** — Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (<sup>Gen 2:22</sup>). Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one another, since there will no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)-RO(1)** — When it is said: We shall all meet “Christ unto a perfect man,” this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2).

## **P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)**

*Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition and generation?*

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (<sup>John 21</sup>;

◀241 Luke 24). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since “happiness” according to Boethius is “a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods” (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (◀121 Matthew 22:30):

“In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married.”

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)** — Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the human race will already have the number of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to

this in his present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-RO(1)** — When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a “dispensation is a relaxation of the general law”: because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operations.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason.

**P(4)-Q(81)-A(4)-RO(4)** — As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does not follow that such



pleasures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the Philosopher's teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude.

## QUESTION 82

# OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again, and

- (1) the impassibility of their bodies;
- (2) their subtlety;
- (3) their agility;
- (4) their clarity.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?
- (2) Whether all will be equally impassible?
- (3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?
- (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?

### P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)

### *Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?*

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-O(1)** — It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be “a mortal rational animal,” for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it is under one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will be passible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise again, as stated above (**Q(80)**, **AA(3),4**). Now, sickness and such like passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, Everything passible is corruptible, because “increase of passion results in loss of substance” [\*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1]. Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to <sup>4650</sup>1 Corinthians 15:42, “It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.” Therefore they will be impassible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)** — Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is

written (<sup>4658</sup>1 Corinthians 15:43): “It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power.” Therefore they will be impassible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, We speak of a thing being “passive” in two ways [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(22), A(1)**]. First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. In another way we use the word “passive” properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being “a movement contrary to nature.” Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be impassible.

The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements, which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of which demand

different complexions. Moreover, according to this, impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth [\*The other four being the elements; this fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. 1, **A(1)**). Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because

“such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly”  
(~~458~~ 1 Corinthians 15:48),

and

“He will reform the body of our lowliness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself” (~~502~~ Philippians 3:21).

And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is against

nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through the cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-RO(1)** — According to Anselm (*Cur Deus Homo* ii, 11), “mortal is included in the philosophers’ definition of man, because they did not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality.” Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences from which the accidental differences result. Hence “mortal” is put in the definition of man, not as though mortality were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection, the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The elemental qualities are the instruments of the soul, as stated in *De Anima* ii, text. 38, seqq., for the heat of fire in an

animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-RO(4)** — According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi) “the Divine power is able to remove” whatever qualities He will “from this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining.” Hence even as in a certain respect “He deprived the flames of the Chaldees’ furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in another respect that power remained, since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove passibility from the humors while leaving their nature unchanged.” It has been explained in the Article how this is brought about.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(1)-RO(5)** — The scars of wounds will not be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others’ joy (Cf. **P(3), Q(54), A(4)**, ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 19): “We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ’s name. Perchance indeed we shall see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue.” Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (<sup>218</sup>Luke 21:18): “A hair of your head shall not perish.”

## **P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)**

### *Whether all will be equally impassible?*

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a gloss on <sup>150</sup>1 Corinthians 15:42, “It is sown in

corruption,” says that “all have equal immunity from suffering.” Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it cannot be greater in one subject than in another.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the saints’ bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in others.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)** — Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, according to ~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:41. Therefore neither will impassibility be equal in all.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself, since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand, if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul’s unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater cause of impassibility.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself and not in relation to its cause.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although negations and privations considered in themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to light.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Some things increase not only by receding from their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases.



Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.

### **P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)**

#### *Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?*

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11), “sensation is a kind of passion.” But the glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual\* alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject to natural alteration. [\*”Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus” — the mind. Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(50)**, **A(1)**,3m; **P(2a)**, **Q(52)**, **A(1)**,3m.] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration which is requisite for sensation.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no new judgment, because “our thoughts will not then be unchangeable,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual sensation.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, when the act of one of the soul’s powers is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (☞ Revelation 1:7): “Every eye shall see Him.” Therefore there will be actual sensation.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) “the animate is distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement.” Now there will be actual movement since they “shall run to and fro like

sparks among the reeds” (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life. [\*This is what Aristotle says: “The good and the bad are in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy” (Ethic. i, 13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.

For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and consequently “not susceptible to impressions from without” [\*Cf. **Q(74), A(4)**, On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54). Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there is

this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations. Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter. that is to say without the material “being” which the species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality is received according to its material “being.” Consequently this kind of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the recipient.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-RO(1)** — As already explained, by this passion that takes place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Every subject of passion receives the action of the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally. For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in this way alone is it altered: whereas, *on the contrary*,

inanimate bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Just as there will be new reception of species in the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of Augustine, that “there our thoughts will not be changeable,” refers to the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the point.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(3)-RO(4)** — When one of two things is the type of the other, the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the operation of another power even as it was with Christ.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)**

*Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection,  
all the senses will be in act?*

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that all the senses are not in act there. For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch

is capable of discerning: and such an alteration will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act there.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such action, as stated above (**Q(81)**, **A(4)**). Therefore taste would be useless there.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the sense of smell is not there in its act.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, “Hearing assists teaching” (*De Sensu et Sensato* i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun’s rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a colored body.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-O(6)** — Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing from a greater distance than

we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4) —** Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** There are two opinions on this question. For some say that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers, but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on <sup>491b</sup>Psalm 149:6, “The high praises of God shall be in their mouth” that “hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God.” The same is had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, “With singing and with cymbals.” Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we have said (**Q(81), A(4)**): unless perchance we say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring humor.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-RO(1) —** The qualities perceived by the touch are those which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has, through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life, a natural

aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food, will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Some have considered smell to be merely a volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration, without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-RO(4)** — In heaven there will be vocal praise (though indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the sake of the

perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 2; **Q(2)**, **A(2)**, ad 5).

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-RO(5)** — The intensity of light does not hinder the spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than defective.

**P(4)-Q(82)-A(4)-RO(6)** — The more perfect the sense the less does it require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater distance.



## QUESTION 83

# OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED

### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
- (2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with another not glorified body?
- (3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?
- (4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another glorified body?
- (5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to itself?
- (6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?

### P(4)-Q(83)-A(1)

#### *Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?*

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will be “more subtle than the wind and the air,” which was condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies, i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean. Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle than now.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:44): “It is sown a corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual,” i.e. a spirit-like, “body.” But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(1)** — Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most subtle.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate. Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that “a subtle thing fills all the parts and the parts of parts.” Now that a body has the power of penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over the matter, the term “subtlety” has been transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term “subtlety” is applied to them, not only by reason of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a subtle thing is said to be penetrative,

for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different ways.

For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* xiii, 22), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle describes as being “spiritual” the bodies of those who rise again (~~1~~ 1 Corinthians 15:44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter between them: and Boethius proves this (*De Duab. Nat.*). Secondly, because, if this were possible, and one’s body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle’s meaning, just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural [animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is clearly false.

Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates (*Moral.* xiv, 56). But this again cannot be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to ~~289~~ Luke 24:39, “A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have,” and ~~1805~~ Job 19:26, “In my flesh I shall see God,” my Saviour: and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.

Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then predominant

in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the elemental nature than now, unless — either the amount of the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again) — or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.

Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which dominion the glorified body is said to be “spiritual,” as being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 56) that “the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual power.”

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the subtlety of rarefaction.

## P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)

*Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified?*

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For according to <sup><802></sup>Philippians 3:21,

“He will reform the body of our lowness made  
like to the body of His glory.”

Now the body of Christ was able to be in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (<sup><809></sup>John 20:19,26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies not glorified.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (<sup><8078></sup>Job 37:18) that “the heavens... are most strong, as if they were of molten brass.” If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able to ascend to the empyrean,\* and this is erroneous. [\*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. **P(1), Q(56), A(3)**].

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other bodies.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident,

as in the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two bodies touch one another, because “contiguous things are those whose boundaries coincide” (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body. Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together with another body.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Boethius says (De Trin. i): “Difference of accidents makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place.” Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will be but one body numerically.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body, unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety. But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 6,7) as being “a place not filled by a sensible body.” And a body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body of our Lord (<sup>228</sup> Luke 24:39): nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident

that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.

Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place together with another body, except something in it that requires a different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of one line, they

must needs occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not make something greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as Boethius says (*De Trin.*), “we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupying one place,” so that this distinction of individuals requires this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, but it will be possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of Peter’s shadow (<sup>415</sup>Acts 5:15) not through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body for the perfection of glory.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-RO(1)** — That Christ’s body was able to be together with another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as in His birth [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(28), A(2)**, ad 3]. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. xxvi in Evang.*): “The same body went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth.” Therefore there is no reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Light is not a body as we have said above (*Sent. ii*, **Q(13), A(3); P(1), Q(67), A(2)**): hence the objection proceeds on a false supposition.



**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The glorified body will pass through the heavenly spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-RO(4)** — From the fact that God will come to the aid of the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(2)-RO(5)** — As stated in Phys. iv, 5, “a point is not in a place”: hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental, because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are said to coincide.

### **P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)**

#### *Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same place?*

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. “Now things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with one another.” Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical dimensions just

as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two. Therefore they are at the same time one and two.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either against the common principles — for instance that the part be not less than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a direct contradiction — or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which are infallible deductions from common principles — for instance that the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles. In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in that place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a proper place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at the same time in different places, except by some kind of

transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3) —** Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (~~John~~ John 20:19, 26).

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** As shown above (**A(2)**) the reason why two bodies must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-RO(1) —** This argument is sophistical because it is based on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the dimension of the

place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed: since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, as stated above (**A(2)**), dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in respect of a different placing; and in like manner neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of points, and thus

different lines described on two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other circle described by the locating body.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-RO(3)** — God could make a body not to be in a place; and yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms of the lesser body.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(3)-RO(4)** — It is impossible for one body to be miraculously in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar), although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)**

*Whether one glorified body can be  
in the same place together with another glorified body?*

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body. Because where there is

greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same place with a less subtle glorified body.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will be able to occupy the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated above (Sent. i, D, 37, **Q(3), A(3); P(1), Q(52), A(3)**). Therefore neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)** — Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The property of a glorified body does not make it able to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two glorified bodies will never be in the same place.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)-RO(1)** — This argument supposes that a glorified body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another body: and this is not true.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The body of heaven and the other bodies will be said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain share in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified human bodies.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)**

*Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body  
will no longer need to be in an equal place?*

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to ~~the~~ Philippians 3:21. Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of the glorified bodies.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a glorified body will be in the same place with another body, as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any place however small.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's will that it will be able to be in a little or great place, and to have a little or great quantity at will.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that “whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself.” Now the glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place equal to itself.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)** — Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. Therefore if the place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would be greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, A body is not related to place save through the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is confined through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they are able to have a great quantity, and when they list a small quantity. But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(22), A(1); P(2a), Q(41), A(1)**] of its substance. Hence in incorruptible, i.e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity however small it may become. And some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its parts can be



one within the other, so much so that a whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and thus they explain how Christ's body came out of the Virgin's womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, **Q(1)**, **A(1)**, ad 5; **P(3)**, **Q(77)**, **A(5)**).

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The Philosopher's argument is that for the same reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the parts of a glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the objection does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(5)-RO(3)** — A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body. Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it will [\*Cf. **P(3)**, **Q(55)**, **A(4)**]. On the other hand, being in a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen is by reason of its color. Consequently the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)**

*Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety,  
will be impalpable?*

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.):

“What is palpable must needs be corruptible.” But the glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it. But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another body, it will not be palpable.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His body was palpable, as appears from <sup>228</sup>Luke 24:39: “Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones.” Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpable.

Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities, and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that “whatever is palpable must needs be corruptible.” Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those

qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that “our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature though changed in glory.”

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)-RO(1)** — The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Although in a way it is possible for a glorified body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is palpable.

**P(4)-Q(83)-A(6)-RO(3)** — In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.

## QUESTION 84

# OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?
- (2) Whether they will move?
- (3) Whether they will move instantaneously?

#### P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)

#### *Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?*

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds “to meet Christ, into the air” (<sup><sup>S</sup>1 Thessalonians 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile.</sup>

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else they would always move in the same direction. Therefore they are not agile.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, nature gives different animals instruments of different disposition according to their different powers:

hence she does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God's works are much more orderly than those of nature. Since then the glorified body's members will have the same disposition, shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no agility other than it has now.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~465~~<sup>466</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power," that is, according to a gloss, "mobile and living." But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore the glorified bodies will be agile.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1) —** Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual according to ~~465~~<sup>464</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:44. Therefore they will be agile.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** The glorified body will be altogether subject to the glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body, but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and this perfection is called "the gift of the glorified body." Now the soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to the glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul.

Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e. the heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable (**Q(82), A(1); Q(83), A(1)**). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-RO(1) —** Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in order to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will show them.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The more the power of the moving soul dominates over the body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be counter to the body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more adapted to obey the moving spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of the glorified body's aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul, there will be no labor in the saints' movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints' will be agile.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-RO(3)** — By the gift of agility the glorified body will be rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and for the execution of all the other operations of the soul.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Even as nature gives to fleeter animals instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that property of glory which is called agility.

## **P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)**

### ***Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement?***

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 2), "movement is the act of the imperfect." But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any movement.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, all movement is on account of some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima, lxiii [\*Cf. Q(70), A(2), ad 1]), "all thou willest will be there, and nothing that thou willest not." Therefore they will not move.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo ii), “that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it more excellently than that which shares it with movement.” Now the glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human bodies remain so.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul being established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ’s body which is the most exalted of all has the highest place of all, according to <sup><307B></sup>Hebrews 7:26, “Made higher than the heavens,” where a gloss [\*Gloss on <sup><307B></sup>Hebrews 1:3: “On the right hand of the majesty”] says, “in place and dignity.” And again each glorified body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be moved.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup><308B></sup>Isaiah 40:31): “They shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint”; and (Wis. 3:7): “(The just) shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds.” Therefore there will be some movement in glorified bodies.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ’s body was moved in His ascension, and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean [\*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. **P(1), Q(56), A(3)**]. But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes

move according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will nowise diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "wherever they are sent their course lies in God."

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (Phys. viii, 7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such like defects will remain in glorified bodies.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-RO(2)** — A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-RO(3)** — This argument would prove if the glorified body were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the movement of the heavenly



bodies could not show their power, except the power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(2)-RO(5)** — The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)**

### *Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?*

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that “wherever the spirit listeth there will the body be.” Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore the body’s movement will be instantaneous.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this can be in the same place with another body, no

matter how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that “the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun’s ray.” Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6. Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** In local movement space. movement and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore this movement will not be instantaneous.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3) —** Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly in a term “wherefrom” and partly in a term “whereto,” as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed; and it is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to another

without passing through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another.

Hence others [\*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, **Q(23)**, mem. 3] say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows that Z does not pass from A to B unless first of all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those

changes which have only one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and “vice versa”; wherefore in such things “to be changing precedes to be changed,” as is proved in *Phys.* vi, 5. Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass through every interval.

Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which is impossible.

To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another.

Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-RO(1)** — That which is little lacking is as it were not lacking at all (*Phys.* ii, 5); wherefore we say: “I do so and so at once,” when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that “wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the body be forthwith.” Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be

an inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall determine.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Some have demurred to this proposition of the Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.

But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [\*The same applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio  $2 + 1$  to  $4 + 1$  is not as 2 to 4.] And so there would not be the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement is not another part

of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.

Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something extrinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.

Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed there will be

no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add no retardation to the movement.

It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said in reference to the heavenly bodies.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover, that results

from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater, according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-RO(4)** — In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.

**P(4)-Q(84)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Although after the resurrection the time which is the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of movement.



## QUESTION 85

## OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES

## (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?
- (2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?
- (3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a non-glorified body?

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)***Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?*

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), “every luminous body consists of transparent parts.” But the parts of a glorified body will not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not lightsome.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on <sup>8387</sup>Job 28:17, “Gold or crystal cannot equal it” (Moral. xviii, 48). “There,” that is in the heavenly country, “the grossness of the members will not hide one’s mind from another’s eyes, and the very harmony of the body will be evident to the bodily sight.” Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in their subject, since “light is the extreme point of visibility in an indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body” (De Sensu et Sensato

iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 3), “the body’s beauty is harmony of parts with a certain charm of color”: and it will be impossible for the glorified bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be lightsome.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a greater disposition to clarity than another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits [\*”Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus” — the mind. Cf. **P(2a), Q(50), A(1),3m; P(2a), Q(52), A(1),3m]** than the bones, the humors than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those bodies to be lightsome.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup><del>466</sup> Matthew 13:43): “The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father,” and (Wis. 3:7): “The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds.”

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (<sup><del>458</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:43): “It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory,” which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the previous context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have often remarked (**Q(84), A(1)**), it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul’s glory into the body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (<sup><del>454</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:41). Thus in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the color of a

body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory says on ~~Gen~~ Job 28:17, “Gold or crystal cannot equal it.”

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency. Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however, clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.

Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of Gregory.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The glory of the body will not destroy nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity resulting from the soul’s glory. Thus we see bodies which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body, for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their regard.

## P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)

### *Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified eye?*

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also will then be greater than it is now, according to <sup><2810></sup>Isaiah 30:26, and the clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a non-glorified eye.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** A gloss on <sup><1020></sup>Philippians 3:21, "Made like to the body of His glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the Transfiguration." Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be visible to non-glorified eyes also.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2) —** Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle. But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally, because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight, and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [\*The dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The clarity of glory will differ generically from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species. Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Just as a glorified body is not passible to a passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [\*Cf. **Q(82)**, **A(1)**], so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits\* asunder. [\*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus" — the mind. Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(50)**, **A(1)**,3m; **P(2a)**, **Q(52)**, **A(1)**,3m.] Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)*****Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?***

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be lightsome. Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, every body which hides other bodies that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, our body will be glorified in being made like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at Emmaus (<sup>Q281</sup> Luke 24:31). Therefore neither will the glorified body be necessarily seen.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)** — Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This clarity will be obedient to the glorified body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)-RO(2)** — A body's color does not prevent its being transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight cannot be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide a body that is behind it.

**P(4)-Q(85)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Quantity is inherent to the glorified body itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the soul's command.

## QUESTION 86

OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE  
BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN

## (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?
- (2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?
- (3) Whether they will be impassible?

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)***Whether the bodies of the damned  
will rise again with their deformities?*

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, just as the saints will rise again to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.



**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will their deformity be taken away.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~4~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:52): “The dead shall rise again incorruptible”; where a gloss says: “The dead, i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs.” Therefore the wicked will rise again without their deformities.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)** — Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without these defects.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place — which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some say that such like deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above (**Q(81), A(1)**). Consequently those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities

resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not, while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world; which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)-RO(2)** — There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not exclude all good, because “if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence it is

necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its species.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.

## **P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)**

### *Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?*

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. Therefore they will be corruptible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>4156</sup> Revelation 9:6): “In those days men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.”

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2) —** Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment both in soul and body (<sup>4156</sup> Matthew 25:46): “These

shall go into everlasting punishment.” But this would not be possible if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on **(A(3))**, even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one thing another is generated.

Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in man’s body were withheld by the grace of innocence from conducing to the body’s dissolution: and much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The contraries of which bodies are composed are conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries

to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it: whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in accordance with nature.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)-RO(2)** — This incorruptibility will result from nature, not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle of corruption, as shown above.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although death is simply the greatest of punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), “Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to be... But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow.” Accordingly just as life is simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in “everlasting death,” according to the Psalm (<sup>1985</sup>48:15): “Death shall feed upon them.”

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)**

### *Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?*

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), “increase

of passion results in loss of substance.” Now “if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away” (Phys. i, 4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false (**A(2)**). Therefore they will be impassible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi, 2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> Corinthians 15:52): “And we shall be changed”: and a gloss says: “We — the good alone — will be changed with the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory.”

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3) —** Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the

resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be passible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)** — *I answer that,* The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion, corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another. For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion which we call “passion of nature.” In another way one thing is received into another spiritually by way of an “intention,” just as the likeness of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things: wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of passion which we call “passion of the soul.” Since therefore after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated above **(A(2))**, it will not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to be passible.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The Philosopher is speaking of the passion whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent, and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, because the species which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-RO(3)** — According to the Philosopher (*De Prop. Element.*), “no animal can live in fire.” Galen also (*De simp. medic.*) says “that there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire”; although sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing.

**P(4)-Q(86)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its natural disposition,



as stated above (**A(2)**). Consequently, however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the soul.

# TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS

## QUESTIONS 87-99

### QUESTION 87

## OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS

### (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment, concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world and of those who will have risen again.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins?
- (2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's conscience?
- (3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and demerits?

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)*****Whether after the resurrection  
every one will know what sins he has committed?***

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-O(1)** — It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know, either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: and many sins will have escaped the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to recall them from the treasure house of his memory. Therefore after rising again one will not be cognizant of all the sins one has committed.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), that "there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits are inscribed." Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be marked down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience according to a gloss of Origen on <sup><8125></sup>Romans 2:15, "Their conscience bearing witness," etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is blotted out by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's conscience all the sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the greater the cause the greater the effect. Now the cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory is charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they recall them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to <sup><6124></sup>Revelation 21:4, "Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them." [\*The quotation is from <sup><2590></sup>Isaiah 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: "Nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more."] Therefore they will not recall their own sins to memory.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, at the resurrection the damned will be to the good they once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now seemingly the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of

the good they once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably. Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they had committed.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that “a kind of Divine energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to mind.”

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1) —** Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to <sup><1187></sup>1 Kings 16:7, “Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.” Now man cannot pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be taken on all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the Divine judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the conscience to witness to everything that has to be judged. But all works, both good and evil, will have to be judged (<sup><1188></sup>2 Corinthians 5:10):

“We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ,  
that every one may receive the proper things of the body,  
according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.”

Therefore each one’s conscience must needs retain all the works he has done, whether good or evil.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** According to <sup><1189></sup>Romans 2:15,16, “In the day when God shall judge” each one’s conscience will bear witness to him and his thoughts will accuse and defend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the general judgment all the works of men will be submitted to judgment, it will behoove every man to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each man’s conscience will be as a book containing his deeds on which judgment will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we make use of records. Of these books it is written in the Apocalypse (<sup><1190></sup>20:12):

“The books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged by those things which were written in the books [Vulg.: ‘book’], according to their works.”

According to Augustine’s exposition (De Civ. Dei xx) the books which are here said to be opened “denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments in whom God’s commandments are exemplified.” Hence Richard of St. Victor (De judic. potest.) says: “Their hearts will be like the code of law.” But the book of life, of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each one’s conscience, which is said to be one single book, because the one Divine power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy, in so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the “book of life” [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(24), A(1)**, ad 1]. Or else we may refer the first books to the conscience, and by the second book we may understand the Judge’s sentence as expressed in His providence.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although many merits and demerits will have escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain somewhat in its effect, because those merits which are not deadened will remain in the reward accorded to them, while those that are deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them, while those which have been blotted out by repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance, which they will recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx), the Divine energy will especially conduce to this.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Each one’s conscience will bear certain marks of the deeds done by him; and it does not follow that these marks are the guilt alone, as stated above.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although charity is now the cause of sorrow for sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that they will have no room for sorrow; and so they will not grieve for their sins, but rather will they rejoice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins are forgiven them. Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine justice whereby those

whom they guard fall headlong into sin through being abandoned by grace. and whose salvation none the less they eagerly watch over.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The wicked will know all the good they have done, and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it, because the greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which reason Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that “the greatest misfortune is to have been happy.”

## **P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)**

### *Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another's conscience?*

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-O(1)** — It seems that it will be impossible for every one to read all that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those who rise again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality with whom is promised us after the resurrection (<sup>4123</sup>Matthew 22:30). Now angels cannot read one another's thoughts in matters dependent on the free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such things to one another [\*Cf. **P(1)**, Q[107]]. Therefore after rising again we shall be unable to read what is contained in another's conscience.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, whatever is known is known either in itself, or in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits contained in a person's conscience cannot be known by another in themselves, because God alone enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be possible for them to be known in their cause, since all will not see God Who alone can act on the will, whence merits and demerits proceed. Nor again will it be possible to know them from their effect, since there will be many demerits, which through being wholly blotted out by repentance will leave no effect remaining. Therefore it will not be possible for every one to know all that is in another's conscience.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi in Ep. ad Hebr.), as we have quoted before (Sent. iv, D, 17): “If thou remember thy sins now, and frequently confess them before God and beg pardon for them, thou wilt very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt

then remember them unwillingly, when they will be made public, and declared before all thy friends and foes, and in the presence of the holy angels.” Hence it follows that this publication will be the punishment of man’s neglect in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore the sins which a man has confessed will not be made known to others.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, it is a relief to know that one has had many associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore every one were to know the sin of another, each sinner’s shame would be much diminished, which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know the sins of all.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, A gloss on ~~406~~ 1 Corinthians 4:5, “will... bring to light the hidden things of darkness,” says: “Deeds and thoughts both good and evil will then be revealed and made known to all.”

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)** — Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out. Yet we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen, Peter, and David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other elect will be known, and much more those of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, At the last and general judgment it behooves the Divine justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently to all. Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless it be delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in order to deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that the sentence appear to be just, that all who know the sentence should be acquainted with the merits. Hence, since every one will know of his reward or condemnation, so will every one else know of it, and consequently as each one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he be cognizant of those of others. This is the more probable and more common opinion, although the Master (Sent. iv, D, 43) says the contrary, namely that a man’s sins blotted out by repentance will not be made known to others at the judgment. But it would follow from this that neither would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which would detract considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-RO(1)** — All the preceding merits or demerits will come to a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising again. Consequently through eternal things being seen, all things in their consciences will be visible, especially as the Divine power will conduce to this so that the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-RO(2)** — It will be possible for a man's merits or demerits to be made known by their effects as stated above (**A(1)**, ad 1), or by the power of God, although the power of the created intellect is not sufficient for this.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The manifestation of his sins to the confusion of the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess them. But that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to their confusion or shame, as neither does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is "fear of disgrace," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), and this will be impossible in the blessed. But this manifestation will bring them great glory on account of the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a man who courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of punishing them.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The sinner's confusion will not be diminished, but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins of others, for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will all the more acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a cause of this kind is owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem of men, who esteem more lightly that which is customary. But then confusion will regard the esteem of God, which weighs every sin according to the truth, whether it be the sin of one man or of many.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)**

*Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance?*

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single



glance. For things considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will consider their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they say (Wis. 5:8): “What hath pride profited us?” Therefore they will not see them all at a glance.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that “we do not arrive at understanding several things at the same time.” Now merits and demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible save to the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to be seen at the same time.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the intellect of the damned after the resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed and of the angels is now, as to the natural knowledge whereby they know things by innate species. Now by such knowledge the angels do not see several things at the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be able then to see all their deeds at the same time.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, A gloss on <sup>898</sup>Job 8:22, “They... shall be clothed with confusion,” says: “As soon as they shall see the Judge, all their evil deeds will stand before their eyes.” Now they will see the Judge suddenly. Therefore in like manner will they see the evil they have done, and for the same reason all others.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)** — Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) considers it unfitting that at the judgment a material book should be read containing the deeds of each individual written therein, for the reason that it would be impossible to measure the size of such a book, or the time it would take to read. But in like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length of time one would require in order to consider all one’s merits and demerits and those of others, if one saw these various things one after the other. Therefore we must admit that each one sees them all at the same time.

**P(4)-Q(87)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that one will see all merits and demerits, both one’s own and those of others, at the same time in an instant. This is easily credible with regard to the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see several things at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a difficulty

presents itself, since their intellect is not raised so that they can see God and all else in Him. Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all their sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment; but that they will not see them all down to each single one at the same time. But neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xx), who says that they will count them all with one glance of the mind; and what is known generically is not counted. Hence we may choose a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine power coming to their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xx) that “they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity.” Nor is this impossible, since in a space of time, however short, is potentially an infinite number of instants. This suffices for the replies to the objections on either side of the question.

## QUESTION 88

# OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE

### (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether there will be a general judgment?
- (2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of mouth?
- (3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time?
- (4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?

### P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)

#### *Whether there will be a general judgment?*

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that there will not be a general judgment. For according to <sup>3409</sup>Nahum 1:9, following the Septuagint version, “God will not judge the same thing a second time.” But God judges now of mans’ every work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried cut before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine judgment on man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom (<sup>4254</sup>Matthew 25:34,41). Therefore since some obtain possession of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for ever, it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, the reason why certain things are submitted to judgment is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the end of the world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each of the blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~Q12~~ Matthew 12:41):

“The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation,  
and shall condemn it.”

Therefore there will be a judgment after the resurrection.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (~~Q13~~ John 5:29):

“They that have done good things shall come forth  
unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done evil,  
unto the resurrection of judgment.”

Therefore it would seem that after the resurrection there will be a judgment.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein they are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation in God. One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by fashioning their nature and by establishing the distinctions which contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to have rested (~~Q14~~ Genesis 2:2). His other operation is that whereby He works in governing creatures; and of this it is written (~~Q15~~ John 5:17): “My Father worketh until now; and I work.” Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of governance which cannot be without judgment: and by this judgment each one is judged individually according to his works, not only as adapted to himself, but also as adapted to the government of the universe. Hence one man’s reward is delayed for the good of others (~~Q16~~ Hebrews 11:13,39,40), and the punishment of one conduces to the profit of another.

Consequently it is necessary that there should be another, and that a general judgment corresponding on the other hand with the first formation of things in being, in order that, to wit, just as then all things proceeded immediately from God, so at length the world will receive its ultimate

complement, by each one receiving finally his own personal due. Hence at this judgment the Divine justice will be made manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for as much as at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others, otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this same reason there will then be a general separation of the good from the wicked, because there will be no further motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as this state of life is governed by Divine providence.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Each man is both an individual person and a part of the whole human race: wherefore a twofold judgment is due to him. One, the particular judgment, is that to which he will be subjected after death, when he will receive according as he hath done in the body [\*Cf. ~~2~~ 2 Corinthians 5:10], not indeed entirely but only in part since he will receive not in the body but only in the soul. The other judgment will be passed on him as a part of the human race: thus a man is said to be judged according to human justice, even when judgment is pronounced on the community of which he is a part. Hence at the general judgment of the whole human race by the general separation of the good from the wicked, it follows that each one will be judged. And yet God will not judge “the same thing a second time,” since He will not inflict two punishments for one sin, and the punishment which before the judgment was not inflicted completely will be completed at the last judgment, after which the wicked will be tormented at the same time in body and soul.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The sentence proper to this general judgment is the general separation of the good from the wicked, which will not precede this judgment. Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence on each individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect since even the good will receive an increase of reward after the judgment, both from the added glory of the body and from the completion of the number of the saints. The wicked also will receive an increase of torment from the added punishment of the body and from the completion of the number of damned to be punished, because the more numerous those with whom they will burn, the more will they themselves burn.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The general judgment will regard more directly the generality of men than each individual to be judged, as stated above. Wherefore although before that judgment each one will be certain of his condemnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the condemnation or reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the general judgment.

## **P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)**

### *Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth?*

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that this judgment, as regards the inquiry and sentence, will take place by word of mouth. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) “it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last.” But it would not be uncertain if the things we are told will take place at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the mind. Therefore this judgment will take place by word of mouth and not only in the mind.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxvi): “Those at least will hear the words of the Judge, who have confessed their faith in Him by words.” Now this cannot be understood as referring to the inner word, because thus all will hear the Judge’s words, since all the deeds of other men will be known to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems that this judgment will take place by word of mouth.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Christ will judge according to His human form, so as to be visible in the body to all. Therefore in like manner it seems that He will speak with the voice of the body, so as to be heard by all.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that the book of life which is mentioned <sup>(602)</sup> Revelation 20:12,[15] “is a kind of Divine energy enabling each one to remember all his good or evil works, and to discern them with the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge accusing or defending his conscience, so that all and each will be judged at the same moment.” But if each one’s merits were discussed by word of mouth, all and each could not be judged at the same moment. Therefore it would seem that this judgment will not take place by word of mouth.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)** — Further, the sentence should correspond proportionately to the evidence. Now the evidence both of accusation and of defense will be mental, according to ~~4119~~ Romans 2:15,16,

“Their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts  
between themselves accusing or also defending one another in the  
day when God shall judge the secrets of men.”

Therefore seemingly, this sentence and the entire judgment will take place mentally.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, It is not possible to come to any certain conclusion about the truth of this question. It is, however, the more probable opinion that the whole of this judgment, whether as regards the inquiry, or as regards the accusation of the wicked and the approval of the good or again as regards the sentence on both, will take place mentally. For if the deeds of each individual were to be related by word of mouth, this would require an inconceivable length of time. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that “if we suppose the book, from the pages of which all will be judged according to ~~4119~~ Revelation 20, to be a material book, who will be able to conceive its size and length? or the length of time required for the reading of a book that contains the entire life of every individual?” Nor is less time requisite for telling by word of mouth the deeds of each individual, than for reading them if they were written in a material book. Hence, probably we should understand that the details set forth in Matthew 25 will be fulfilled not by word of mouth but mentally.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The reason why Augustine says that “it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last” is precisely because it is not certain whether it will take place mentally or by word of mouth. For if it were to take place by word of mouth, a considerable time would be necessary. but if mentally, it is possible for it to be accomplished in an instant.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Even if the judgment is accomplished solely in the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, since though all will be cognizant of their own and of others’ deeds, as a result of the Divine energy which the Gospel describes as speech (~~4120~~ Matthew 25:84-46), nevertheless those who have had the faith which they received through God’s words will be

judged from those very words, for it is written (~~610~~ Romans 2:12):  
 “Whosoever have sinned in the Law shall be judged by the Law.” Hence in a special way something will be said to those who had been believers, which will not be said to unbelievers.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Christ will appear in body, so that the Judge may be recognized in the body by all, and it is possible for this to take place suddenly. But speech which is measured by time would require an immense length of time, if the judgment took place by word of mouth.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)**

*Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?*

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the time of the future judgment is not unknown. For just as the holy Fathers looked forward to the first coming, so do we look forward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time of the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks mentioned in ~~2701~~ Daniel 9: wherefore the Jews are reproached for not knowing the time of Christ’s coming (~~4126~~ Luke 12:56):

“You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the heaven and of the earth, but how is it that you do not discern this time?”

Therefore it would seem that the time of the second coming when God will come to judgment should also be certified to us.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, we arrive by means of signs at the knowledge of the things signified. Now many signs of the coming judgment are declared to us in Scripture (~~4141~~ Matthew 24, ~~4141~~ Mark 13, ~~4201~~ Luke 21). Therefore we can arrive at the knowledge of that time.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the Apostle says (~~6111~~ 1 Corinthians 10:11):



“It is on us [\*These things... are written for our correction,  
upon whom the ends of the world are come’]  
that the ends of the world are come,”

and (1 John 2:18): “Little children, it is the last hour,” etc. Since then it is a long time since these things were said, it would seem that now at least we can know that the last judgment is nigh.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, there is no need for the time of the judgment to be hidden, except that each one may be careful to prepare himself for judgment, being in ignorance of the appointed time. Yet the same care would still be necessary even were the time known for certain, because each one is uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine says (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix) that “as each one’s last day finds him, so will the world’s last day find him.” Therefore there is no necessity for the time of the judgment to be uncertain.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (Mark 13:32):

“Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven,  
nor the Son, but the Father.”

The Son, however, is said not to know in so far as He does not impart the knowledge to us.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)** — Further, it is written (1 Thessalonians 5:2): “The day of the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night.” Therefore seemingly, as the coming of a thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the day of the last judgment is altogether uncertain.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, God is the cause of things by His knowledge [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(14), A(8)**]. Now He communicates both these things to His creatures, since He both endows some with the power of action on others whereof they are the cause, and bestows on some the knowledge of things. But in both cases He reserves something to Himself, for He operates certain things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and again He knows certain things which are unknown to any mere creature. Now this should apply to none more than to those things which are subject to the Divine power alone, and in which no creature co-operates with Him. Such is the end of the world when the day of judgment

will come. For the world will come to an end by no created cause, even as it derived its existence immediately from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God. Indeed our Lord seems to assign this very reason when He said (<sup>4007</sup>Acts 1:7):

“It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father  
hath put in His own power,”

as though He were to say, “which are reserved to His power alone.”

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-RO(1)** — At His first coming Christ came secretly according to <sup>2365</sup>Isaiah 45:15, “Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour.” Hence, that He might be recognized by believers, it was necessary for the time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On the other hand, at the second coming, He will come openly, according to <sup>4008</sup>Psalms 49:3, “God shall come manifestly.” Consequently there can be no error affecting the knowledge of His coming. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-RO(2)** — As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius concerning the day of judgment (Ep. cxcix), “the signs mentioned in the Gospels do not all refer to the second advent which will happen at the end of the world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, which is now a thing of the past, while some, in fact many of them, refer to the advent whereby He comes daily to the Church, whom He visits spiritually when He dwells in us by faith and love.” Moreover, the details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connection with the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as announcing the proximity of Christ’s coming occurred even at the time of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes more sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the apostles were called the last days (<sup>4007</sup>Acts 2:17) when Peter expounded the saying of <sup>4008</sup>Joel 2:28, “It shall come to pass in the last days,” etc., as referring to that time. Yet it was already a long time since then: and sometimes there were more and sometimes less afflictions in the Church. Consequently it is impossible to decide after how long a time it will take place, nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years as Augustine says in the same book (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix). And even if we are to believe that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will immediately precede the judgment day or the

coming of Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Eusebius' History of the Church (vi, 7) and in Jerome's book De Viris Illustribus lii.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The statement, "It is the last hour" and similar expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable us to know the exact length of time. For they are not intended to indicate a short length of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is the last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long this will last. Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the last age of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even longer than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks (Qq. 83, qu. lviii). Hence also the Apostle (<sup>2</sup> Thessalonians 2:2) disclaims the false signification which some had given to his words, by believing that the day of the Lord was already at hand.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death, the uncertainty of the judgment conduces to watchfulness in two ways. First, as regards the thing ignored, since its delay is equal to the length of man's life, so that on either side uncertainty provokes him to greater care. Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not only of his own person, but also of his family, or of his city or kingdom, or of the whole Church, the length of whose duration is not dependent on the length of man's life. And yet it behooves each of these to be so ordered that the day of the Lord find us not unprepared.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)**

### *Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat?*

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the judgment will not take place in the valley of Josaphat or in the surrounding locality. For at least it will be necessary for those to be judged to stand on the ground, and those alone to be raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the whole land of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of those who

are to be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the judgment to take place in the neighborhood of that valley.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, to Christ in His human form judgment is given that He may judge justly, since He was judged unjustly in the court of Pilate, and bore the sentence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these places would be more suitably appointed for the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, clouds result from the exhalation of vapors. But then there will be no evaporation or exhalation. Therefore it will be impossible for the just to be “taken up... in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air”: and consequently it will be necessary for both good and wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than this valley will be required.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~2ND~~ Joel 3:2):

“I will gather together all nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat, and I will plead with them there.”

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)** — Further, it is written (~~4TH~~ Acts 1:11): “(This Jesus)... shall so come as you have seen Him going into heaven.” Now He ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet which overlooks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will come to judge in the neighborhood of that place.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, We cannot know with any great certainty the manner in which this judgment will take place, nor how men will gather together to the place of judgment; but it may be gathered from Scripture that in all probability He will descend in the neighborhood of Mount Olivet, even as He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends is the same as He who ascended.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)-RO(1)** — A great multitude can be enclosed in a small space. And all that is required is that in the neighborhood of that locality there be a space, however great, to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence since being raised in the air, and shining with exceeding glory, He will be visible from a great distance.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Although through being sentenced unjustly Christ merited His judiciary power, He will not judge with the appearance of infirmity wherein He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wherein He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His ascension is more suitable to the judgment than the place where He was condemned.

**P(4)-Q(88)-A(4)-RO(3)** — In the opinion of some the name of clouds is here given to certain condensations of the light shining from the bodies of the saints, and not to evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say that those clouds will be produced by Divine power in order to show the parallel between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He Who ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.

Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence indicates the mercy of the Judge.

## QUESTION 89

# OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL JUDGMENT

### (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider who will judge and who will be judged at the general judgment. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether any men will judge together with Christ?
- (2) Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?
- (3) Whether the angels also will judge?
- (4) Whether the demons will carry out the Judge's sentence on the damned?
- (5) Whether all men will come up for judgment?
- (6) Whether any of the good will be judged?
- (7) Whether any of the wicked will be judged?
- (8) Whether the angels also will be judged?

### P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)

#### *Whether any men will judge together with Christ?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that no men will judge with Christ. For it is written (~~4152~~ John 5:22,23):

“The Father... hath given all judgment to the Son,  
that all men may honor the Son.”

Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, whoever judges has authority over that which he judges. Now those things about which the coming judgment will have to be, such as human merits and demerits, are subject to Divine authority alone. Therefore no one is competent to judge of those things.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, this judgment will take place not vocally but mentally. Now the publication of merits and demerits in the hearts of all men (which is like an accusation or approval), or the repayment of punishment and reward (which is like the pronouncement of the sentence) will be the work of God alone. Therefore none but Christ Who is God will judge.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~CHR~~ Matthew 19:28): “You also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)** — Further, “The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His people” (~~CHR~~ Isaiah 3:14). Therefore it would seem that others also will judge together with Christ.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, To judge has several significations. First it is used causally as it were, when we say it of that which proves that some person ought to be judged. In this sense the expression is used of certain people in comparison, in so far as some are shown to be deserving of judgment through being compared with others: for instance (~~CHR~~ Matthew 12:41): “The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it.” To rise in judgment thus is common to the good and the wicked. Secondly, the expression “to judge” is used equivalently, so to say; for consent to an action is considered equivalent to doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ the Judge, by approving His sentence, will be said to judge. In this sense it will belong to all the elect to judge: wherefore it is written (Wis. 3:7,8): “The just... shall judge nations.” Thirdly, a person is said to judge assessorially and by similitude, because he is like the judge in that his seat\* is raised above the others: and thus assessors are said to judge. [\*An “assessor” is one who “sits by” the judge.] Some say that the perfect to whom judiciary power is promised (~~CHR~~ Matthew 19:28) will judge in this sense, namely that they will be raised to the dignity of assessors, because they will appear above others at the judgment, and go forth “to meet Christ, into the air.” But this

apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of our Lord's promise (<sup>412</sup>Matthew 19:28): "You shall sit... judging," for He would seem to make "judging" something additional to "sitting." Hence there is a fourth way of judging, which will be competent to perfect men as containing the decrees of Divine justice according to which men will be judged: thus a book containing the law might be said to judge: wherefore it is written (<sup>413</sup>Revelation 20:12): "(Judgment took her seat\*) and the books were opened." [\*The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. <sup>414</sup>Revelation 20:4 we find: "I saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given to them."] Richard of St. Victor expounds this judging in this way (*De judic. potest.*), wherefore he says: "Those who persevere in Divine contemplation, who read every day the book of wisdom, transcribe, so to speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by their clear insight of the truth"; and further on: "What else are the hearts of those who judge, divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?" Since, however, judging denotes an action exercised on another person, it follows that, properly speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces judgment on another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his own authority: and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power over others, and to whose ruling those who are judged are subject, wherefore it belongs to him to pass judgment on them. In this sense to judge belongs to God alone. Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the sentence delivered by another's authority, that is to announce the verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, because they will lead others to the knowledge of Divine justice, that these may know what is due to them on account of their merits: so that this very revelation of justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of St. Victor says (*De judic. potest.*) that for "the judges to open the books of their decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below them, and that they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains to the judgment."

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)-RO(1)** — This objection considers the judgment of authority which belongs to Christ alone: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(1)-RO(3)** — There is no reason why some of the saints should not reveal certain things to others, either by way of enlightenment,



as the higher angels enlighten the lower [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(106)**],: or by way of speech as the lower angels speak to the higher [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(107), A(2)**].

## **P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)**

### *Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the judicial power does not correspond to voluntary poverty. For it was promised to none but the twelve apostles (<sup>4188</sup>Matthew 19:28): “You shall sit on twelve seats, judging,” etc. Since then those who are voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it would seem that the judicial power is not competent to all.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, to offer sacrifice to God of one’s own body is more than to do so of outward things. Now martyrs and also virgins offer sacrifice to God of their own body. whereas the voluntarily poor offer sacrifice of outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the judicial power is more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than with those who are voluntarily poor.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup>4166</sup>John 5:45):

“There is one that accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust —  
because you believe not his voice,

according to a gloss, and (<sup>4128</sup>John 12:48): “The word that I have spoken shall judge him in the last day.” Therefore the fact that a man propounds a law, or exhorts men by word to lead a good life, gives him the right to judge those who scorn his utterances. But this belongs to doctors. Therefore it is more competent to doctors than to those who are poor voluntarily.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, Christ through being judged unjustly merited as man to be judge of all in His human nature [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(59), A(6)**], according to <sup>4127</sup>John 5:27, “He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.” Now those who suffer persecution for justice’ sake are judged unjustly. Therefore the judicial power is competent to them rather than to the voluntarily poor.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, a superior is not judged by his inferior. Now many who will have made lawful use of riches will have greater merit than many of the voluntarily poor. Therefore the voluntarily poor will not judge where those are to be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup><3316></sup> Job 36:6): “He saveth not the wicked, and He giveth judgment to the poor.”

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)** — Further, a gloss on <sup><4128></sup> Matthew 19:28, “You who have left all things’ [\*Vulg.: ‘You who have followed Me’]” says: “Those who left all things and followed God will be the judges; those who made right use of what they had lawfully will be judged,” and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, The judicial power is due especially to poverty on three counts. First, by reason of congruity, since voluntary poverty belongs to those who despise all the things of the world and cleave to Christ alone. Consequently there is nothing in them to turn away their judgment from justice, so that they are rendered competent to be judges as loving the truth of justice above all things. Secondly, by reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things that make man contemptible in this world humility is the chief: and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is promised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for Christ’s sake shall be exalted. Thirdly, because poverty disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For the reason why one of the saints will be said to judge as stated above [\*Cf. **A(1)**], is that he will have the heart instructed in all Divine truth which he will be thus able to make known to others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first thing that occurs to be renounced is external wealth, because this is the last thing of all to be acquired. And that which is last in the order of generation is the first in the order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes whereby we advance to perfection, the first place is given to poverty. Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in so far as this is the disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence also it is that this same power is not promised to all who are voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and follow Christ in accordance with the perfection of life.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-RO(1)** — According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx), “we must not imagine that because He says that they will sit on twelve seats only twelve men will judge with Him. else since we read that Matthias was appointed apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul who worked more than the rest will have nowhere to sit as judge.” Hence “the number twelve,” as he states (De Civ. Dei xx), “signifies the whole multitude of those who will judge, because the two parts of seven, namely three and four, being multiplied together make twelve.” Moreover twelve is a perfect number, being the double of six, which is a perfect number.

Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in whose person he made this promise to all who follow them.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose man to retain the precepts of Divine justice in his heart in the same degree as poverty does: even so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the word of God by the cares which they entail (<sup>2014</sup> Luke 8:14). Or we may reply that poverty does not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the fundamental part of that perfection to which the judicial power corresponds. Wherefore among those things regarding perfection which follow after poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom and all the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as high as poverty, since the beginning of a thing is its chief part.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-RO(3)** — He who propounded the law or urged men to good will judge, in the causal (Cf. **A(1)**) sense, because others will be judged in reference to the words he has uttered or propounded. Hence the judicial power does not properly correspond to preaching or teaching. or we may reply that, as some say, three things are requisite for the judicial power; first, that one renounce temporal cares, lest the mind be hindered from the contemplation of wisdom; secondly that one possess Divine justice by way of habit both as to knowledge and as to observance; thirdly that one should have taught others this same justice; and this teaching will be the perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial power.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Christ humbled Himself in that He was judged unjustly; for “He was offered because it was His own will” (<sup>2510</sup> Isaiah 53:7): and by His humility He merited His exaltation to judicial power, since all things are made subject to Him (<sup>3238</sup> Philippians 2:8,9). Hence,

judicial power is more due to them who humble themselves of their own will by renouncing temporal goods, on account of which men are honored by worldlings, than to those who are humbled by others.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(2)-RO(5)** — An inferior cannot judge a superior by his own authority, but he can do so by the authority of a superior, as in the case of a judge-delegate. Hence it is not unfitting that it be granted to the poor as an accidental reward to judge others, even those who have higher merit in respect of the essential reward.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)**

### *Whether the angels will judge?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the angels will judge. For it is written (<sup>425</sup>Matthew 25:31):

“When the Son of man shall come in His majesty,  
and all the angels with Him.”

Now He is speaking of His coming to judgment. Therefore it would seem that also the angels will judge.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the orders of the angels take their names from the offices which they fulfill. Now one of the angelic orders is that of the Thrones, which would seem to pertain to the judicial power, since a throne is the “judicial bench, a royal seat, a professor’s chair” [\*Cf. St. Isidore, Etym. vii, 5]. Therefore some of the angels will judge.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, equality with the angels is promised the saints after this life (<sup>423</sup>Matthew 22:30). If then men will have this power of judging, much more will the angels have it.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>417</sup>John 5:27): “He hath given Him power to judgment, because He is the Son of man.” But the angels have not the human nature in common with Him. Neither therefore do they share with Him in the judicial power.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)** — Further, the same person is not judge and judge's minister. Now in this judgment the angels will act as ministers of the Judge and, according to <sup>4134</sup>Matthew 13:41:

“The Son of man shall send His angels and  
they shall gather out of His kingdom all scandals.”

Therefore the angels will not judge.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, The judge's assessors must be conformed to the judge. Now judgment is ascribed to the Son of man because He will appear to all, both good and wicked, in His human nature, although the whole Trinity will judge by authority. Consequently it behooves also the Judge's assessors to have the human nature, so as to be visible to all, both good and wicked. Hence it is not fitting for the angels to judge, although in a certain sense we may say that the angels will judge, namely by approving the sentence [\*Cf. **A(1)**].

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)-RO(1)** — As a gloss on this passage observes, the angels will come with Christ, not to judge, but “as witnesses of men's deeds because it was under their guardianship that men did well or ill.”

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)-RO(2)** — The name of Thrones is given to angels in reference to the judgment which God is ever pronouncing, by governing all things with supreme justice: of which judgment angels are in a way the executors and promulgators. On the other hand, the judgment of men by the man Christ will require human assessors.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Equality with angels is promised to men as regards the essential reward. But nothing hinders an accidental reward from being bestowed on men to the exclusion of the angels, as in the case of the virgins' and martyrs' crowns: and the same may be said of the judicial power.

## P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)

### *Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the demons will not carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned after the day of judgment. For, according to the Apostle (~~1~~<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:24):

“He will then bring to naught [\*Vulg.: ‘When He shall have brought to naught’, etc.] all principality, and power, and virtue.”

Therefore all supremacy will cease then. But the carrying out of the Judge’s sentence implies some kind of supremacy. Therefore after the judgment day the demons will not carry out the Judge’s sentence.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the demons sinned more grievously than men. Therefore it is not just that men should be tortured by demons.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, just as the demons suggest evil things to men, so good angels suggest good things. Now it will not be the duty of the good angels to reward the good, but this will be done by God, immediately by Himself. Therefore neither will it be the duty of the demons to punish the wicked.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Sinners have subjected themselves to the devil by sinning. Therefore it is just that they should be subjected to him in their punishments, and punished by him as it were.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The Master in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 mentions two opinions on this question, both of which seem consistent with Divine justice, because it is just for man to be subjected to the devil for having sinned, and yet it is unjust for the demon to be over him. Accordingly the opinion which holds that after the judgment day the demons will not be placed over men to punish them, regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the demons punishing; while the contrary opinion regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the men punished.

Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot know for certain. Yet I think it truer to say that just as, among the saved, order will be observed so that some will be enlightened and perfected by others (because all the orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for ever) [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(108), AA(7),8**], so, too, will order be observed in punishments, men being punished by demons, lest the Divine order, whereby the angels are placed between the human nature and the Divine, be entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine illuminations are conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the demons execute the Divine justice on the wicked. Nor does this in any way diminish the punishment of the demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will not lessen but will increase unhappiness.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The supremacy which, it is declared, will be brought to nought by Christ in the time to come must be taken in the sense of the supremacy which is in keeping with the state of this world: wherein men are placed over men, angels over men, angels over angels, demons over demons, and demons over men; in every case so as either to lead towards the end or to lead astray from the end. But then when all things will have attained to that end there will be no supremacy to lead astray from the end or to lead to it, but only that which maintains in the end, good or evil.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Although the demerit of the demons does not require that they be placed over men, since they made men subject to them unjustly, yet this is required by the order of their nature in relation to human nature: since “natural goods remain in them unimpaired” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The good angels are not the cause of the principal reward in the elect, because all receive this immediately from God. Nevertheless the angels are the cause of certain accidental rewards in men, in so far as the higher angels enlighten those beneath them, both angels and men, concerning certain hidden things of God, which do not belong to the essence of beatitude. In like manner the damned will receive their principal punishment immediately from God, namely the everlasting banishment from the Divine vision: but there is no reason why the demons should not torture men with other sensible punishments. There is,

however, this difference: that merit exalts, whereas sin debases. Wherefore since the angelic nature is higher than the human, some on account of the excellence of their merit will be so far exalted as to be raised above the angels both in nature and rewards [*\*Cf. P(1), Q(108), A(8)*], so that some angels will be enlightened by some men. On the other hand, no human sinners will, on account of a certain degree of virtue, attain to the eminence that attaches to the nature of the demons.

## **P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)**

### ***Whether all men will be present at the judgment?***

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment. For it is written (~~413~~ Matthew 19:28): “You... shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” But all men do not belong to those twelve tribes. Therefore it would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the same apparently is to be gathered from ~~408~~ Psalm 1:5, “The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.”

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, a man is brought to judgment that his merits may be discussed. But some there are who have acquired no merits, such as children who died before reaching the perfect age. Therefore they need not be present at the judgment. Now there are many such. Therefore it would seem that not all will be present.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5) — *On the contrary,*** It is written (~~400~~ Acts 10:42) that Christ “was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.” Now this division comprises all men, no matter how the living be distinct from the dead. Therefore all men will be present at the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)** — Further, it is written (~~400~~ Revelation 1:7): “Behold He cometh with the clouds, and every eye shall see Him.” Now this would not be so unless all were present at the judgment. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5) — *I answer that,*** The judicial power was bestowed on Christ as man, in reward for the humility which He showed forth in His passion. Now in His passion He shed His blood for all in point of



sufficiency, although through meeting with an obstacle in some, it had not its effect in all. Therefore it is fitting that all men should assemble at the judgment, to see His exaltation in His human nature, in respect of which “He was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.”

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)-RO(1)** — As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 5), “it does not follow from the saying, ‘Judging the twelve tribes of Israel,’ that the tribe of Levi, which is the thirteenth, is not to be judged, or that they will judge that people alone, and not other nations.” The reason why all other nations are denoted by the twelve tribes is because they were called by Christ to take the place of the twelve tribes.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The words, “The wicked shall not rise in judgment,” if referred to all sinners, mean that they will not arise to judge. But if the wicked denote unbelievers, the sense is that they will not arise to be judged, because they are “already judged” (~~cf.~~ John 3:18). All, however, will rise again to assemble at the judgment and witness the glory of the Judge.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Even children who have died before reaching the perfect age will be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to see the Judge’s glory.

## **P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)**

### *Whether the good will be judged at the judgment?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that none of the good will be judged at the judgment. For it is declared (~~cf.~~ John 3:18) that “he that believeth in Him is not judged.” Now all the good believed in Him. Therefore they will not be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, those who are uncertain of their bliss are not blessed: whence Augustine proves (Genesis ad lit. xi) that the demons were never blessed. But the saints are now blessed. Therefore they are certain of their bliss. Now what is certain is not submitted to judgment. Therefore the good will not be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, fear is incompatible with bliss. But the last judgment, which above all is described as terrible, cannot take place without inspiring fear into those who are to be judged. Hence Gregory observes on <sup><B116></sup>Job 41:16 “When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear,” etc. (Moral. xxxiv): “Consider how the conscience of the wicked will then be troubled when even the just are disturbed about their life.” Therefore the blessed will not be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, It would seem that all the good will be judged, since it is written (<sup><A15></sup>2 Corinthians 5:10):

“We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ,  
that every one may receive the proper things of the body,  
according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.”

Now there is nothing else to be judged. Therefore all, even the good, will be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)** — Further, the “general” includes all. Now this is called the general judgment. Therefore all will be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, The judgment comprises two things, namely the discussion of merits and the payment of rewards. As regards the payment of rewards, all will be judged, even the good, since the Divine sentence will appoint to each one the reward corresponding to his merit. But there is no discussion of merits save where good and evil merits are mingled together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith, “gold, silver, and precious stones” (<sup><A182></sup>1 Corinthians 3:12), by devoting themselves wholly to the Divine service, and who have no notable admixture of evil merit, are not subjected to a discussion of their merits. Such are those who have entirely renounced the things of the world and are solicitously thoughtful of the things that are of God: wherefore they will be saved but will not be judged. Others, however, build on the foundation of faith, wood, hay, stubble [<sup>\*</sup>Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(89)**, **A(2)**]; they, in fact, love worldly things and are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins with alms, and these have an admixture of good with evil merits. Hence they are subjected to a discussion of their merits, and consequently in this account will be judged, and yet they will be saved.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)-RO(1)** — Since punishment is the effect of justice, while reward is the effect of mercy, it follows that punishment is more especially ascribed antonomastically to judgment which is the act of justice; so that judgment is sometimes used to express condemnation. It is thus that we are to understand the words quoted, as a gloss on the passage remarks.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)-RO(2)** — The merits of the elect will be discussed, not to remove the uncertainty of their beatitude from the hearts of those who are to be judged, but that it may be made manifest to us that their good merits outweigh their evil merits, and thus God's justice be proved.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Gregory is speaking of the just who will still be in mortal flesh, wherefore he had already said: "Those who will still be in the body, although already brave and perfect, yet through being still in the flesh must needs be troubled with fear in the midst of such a whirlwind of terror." Hence it is clear that this fear refers to the time immediately before the judgment, most terrible indeed to the wicked, but not to the good, who will have no apprehension of evil.

The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment as regards the payment of rewards.

## **P(4)-Q(89)-A(7)**

### *Whether the wicked will be judged?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that none of the wicked will be judged. For even as damnation is certain in the case of unbelievers, so is it in the case of those who die in mortal sin. Now it is declared because of the certainty of damnation (~~ROM~~ John 3:18): "He that believeth not is already judged." Therefore in like manner neither will other sinners be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, the voice of the Judge is most terrible to those who are condemned by His judgment. Now according to the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 and in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxvi) "the Judge will not address Himself to unbelievers." If therefore He were to address Himself to the believers about to be condemned, the unbelievers would reap a benefit from their unbelief, which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(7) — *On the contrary*,** It would seem that all the wicked are to be judged, because all the wicked will be sentenced to punishment according to the degree of their guilt. But this cannot be done without a judicial pronouncement. Therefore all the wicked will be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(7) — *I answer that*,** The judgment as regards the sentencing to punishment for sin concerns all the wicked. whereas the judgment as regards the discussion of merits concerns only believers. Because in unbelievers the foundation of faith is lacking, without which all subsequent works are deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them there is no admixture of good and evil works or merits requiring discussion. But believers in whom the foundation of faith remains, have at least a praiseworthy act of faith, which though it is not meritorious without charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and consequently they will be subjected to the discussion of merits. Consequently, believers who were at least counted as citizens of the City of God will be judged as citizens, and sentence of death will not be passed on them without a discussion of their merits; whereas unbelievers will be condemned as foes, who are wont among men to be exterminated without their merits being discussed.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(7)-RO(1) —** Although it is certain that those who die in mortal sin will be damned, nevertheless since they have an admixture of certain things connected with meriting well, it behooves, for the manifestation of Divine justice, that their merits be subjected to discussion, in order to make it clear that they are justly banished from the city of the saints, of which they appeared outwardly to be citizens.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(7)-RO(2) —** Considered under this special aspect the words addressed to the believers about to be condemned will not be terrible, because they will reveal in them certain things pleasing to them, which it will be impossible to find in unbelievers, since “without faith it is impossible to please God” (~~scilicet~~ Hebrews 11:6). But the sentence of condemnation which will be passed on them all will be terrible to all of them.

The argument in the contrary sense considered the judgment of retribution.

## P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)

### *Whether at the coming judgment the angels will be judged?*

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that the angels will be judged at the coming judgment. For it is written (<sup><408></sup>1 Corinthians 6:3): “Know you not that we shall judge angels?” But this cannot refer to the state of the present time. Therefore it should refer to the judgment to come.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, it is written concerning Behemoth or Leviathan, whereby the devil is signified (<sup><402></sup>Job 40:28): “In the sight of all he shall be cast down”; and (<sup><402></sup>Mark 1:24)\* the demon cried out to Christ: “Why art Thou come to destroy us before the time?” for, according to a gloss, “the demons seeing our Lord on earth thought they were to be judged forthwith.” [\*The reference should be <sup><402></sup>Matthew 8:29: ‘Art Thou come hither to torment us before the time?’ The text of Mark reads: ‘Art Thou come to destroy us?'] Therefore it would seem that a final judgment is in store for them.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup><402></sup>2 Peter 2:4):

“God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment.”

Therefore it seems that the angels will be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup><300></sup>Nahum 1:9) according to the Septuagint version: “God will not judge the same thing a second time.” But the wicked angels are already judged, wherefore it is written (<sup><511></sup>John 16:11): “The prince of this world is already judged.” Therefore the angels will not be judged in the time to come.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)** — Further, goodness and wickedness are more perfect in the angels than in men who are wayfarers. Now some men, good and wicked, will not be judged as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47. Therefore neither will good or wicked angels be judged.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8) — *I answer that*,** The judgment of discussion nowise concerns either the good or the wicked angels, since neither is any evil to

be found in the good angels, nor is any good liable to judgment to be found in the wicked angels. But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels' personal merits and was made to both from the beginning when some were raised to bliss, and others plunged into the depths of woe. The other corresponds to the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels, and this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, because the good angels will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom they have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will have an increase of torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they have incited to evil deeds. Consequently the judgment will not regard the angels directly, neither as judging nor as judged, but only men; but it will regard the angels indirectly somewhat, in so far as they were concerned in men's deeds.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)-RO(1)** — This saying of the Apostle refers to the judgment of comparison, because certain men will be found to be placed higher than the angels.

**P(4)-Q(89)-A(8)-RO(2)** — The demons will then be cast down in the sight of all because they will be imprisoned for ever in the dungeon of hell, so that they will no more be free to go out, since this was permitted to them only in so far as they were directed by Divine providence to try the life of man.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection.

## QUESTION 90

### OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE JUDGMENT

#### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether Christ will judge under the form or His humanity?
- (2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity?
- (3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy?

#### **P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)**

*Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity?*

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that Christ will not judge under the form of His humanity. For judgment requires authority in the judge. Now Christ has authority over the quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of His Godhead.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, invincible power is requisite in a judge; wherefore it is written (~~2006~~ Ecclesiastes 7:6):

“Seek not to be made a judge, unless thou have  
strength enough to extirpate iniquities.”

Now invincible power belongs to Christ as God. Therefore He will judge under the form of the Godhead.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (~~4162~~ John 5:22,23):

“The Father... hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honor the Son as they honor the Father.”

Now equal honor to that of the Father is not due to the Son in respect of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under His human form.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, it is written (<sup><2019></sup>Daniel 7:9): “I beheld till thrones were placed and the Ancient of days sat.” Now the thrones signify judicial power, and God is called the Ancient by reason of His eternity, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. x). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge as being eternal; and consequently not as man.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.) that “the resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the Son of God, and the resurrection of the body is the work of the Word made the Son of man in the flesh.” Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than the body. Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as man.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup><1872></sup>John 5:27):

“He hath given Him power to do judgment,  
because He is the Son of man.”

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (<sup><1317></sup>Job 36:17): “Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked — by Pilate” according to a gloss — therefore, “cause and judgment thou shalt recover — that thou mayest judge justly,” according to the gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)** — Further, to Him it belongs to judge who made the law. Now Christ gave us the law of the Gospel while appearing in the human nature. Therefore He will judge under that same nature.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Judgment requires a certain authority in the judge. Wherefore it is written (<sup><6101></sup>Romans 14:4): “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant?” Hence it is becoming that Christ should judge in respect of His having authority over men to whom chiefly the last judgment will be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of the Creation, since “the Lord He is God, He made us and not we ourselves” (<sup><1919></sup>Psalms 99:3), but also by reason of the Redemption, which pertains to



Him in respect of His human nature. Wherefore “to this end Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living” (~~449~~ Romans 14:9). But the goods of the Creation would not suffice us to obtain the reward of eternal life, without the addition of the boon of the Redemption, on account of the obstacle accruing to created nature through the sin of our first parent. Hence, since the last judgment is directed to the admission of some to the kingdom, and the exclusion of others therefrom, it is becoming that Christ should preside at that judgment under the form of His human nature, since it is by favor of that same nature’s Redemption that man is admitted to the kingdom. In this sense it is stated (~~440~~ Acts 10:42) that “He... was appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the dead.” And forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored not only man but all creatures without exception — inasmuch as all creatures are bettered through man’s restoration, according to ~~511~~ Colossians 1:20,

“Making peace through the blood of His cross, both as to things on earth, and the things that are in heaven”

— it follows that through His Passion Christ merited lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all creatures, according to ~~418~~ Matthew 28:18, “All power is given to Me, in heaven and in earth” [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(59)**].

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has authority of lordship over all creatures by right of creation; but in respect of His human nature He has authority of lordship merited through His Passion. The latter is secondary so to speak and acquired, while the former is natural and eternal.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Although Christ as man has not of Himself invincible power resulting from the natural power of the human species, nevertheless there is also in His human nature an invincible power derived from His Godhead, whereby all things are subjected under His feet (~~485~~ 1 Corinthians 15:25-28; ~~518~~ Hebrews 2:8,9). Hence He will judge in His human nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore from the very fact that He was able as man to redeem mankind, and thereby obtained

judicial power, it is evident that He is God, and consequently is to be honored equally with the Father, not as man but as God.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-RO(4)** — In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the judicial power is clearly expressed. This power is in God Himself as its first origin, and more especially in the Father Who is the fount of the entire Godhead; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the “Ancient of days sat.” But the judicial power was transmitted from the Father to the Son, not only from eternity in respect of the Divine nature, but also in time in respect of the human nature wherein He merited it. Hence in the aforesaid vision it is further stated (<sup><2013</sup> Daniel 7:13,14):

“Lo, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and He came even to the Ancient of days... And He gave Him power and glory, and a kingdom.”

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Augustine is speaking by a kind of appropriation, so as to trace the effects which Christ wrought in the human nature to causes somewhat similar to them. And since we are made to the image and likeness of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same species as the man Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead the effects wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which He wrought or will work in our bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh, as being the instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on our souls as Damascene asserts (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), according to the saying of <sup><304</sup> Hebrews 9:14, that His “blood” hath cleansed “our conscience from dead works.” And thus that “the Word was made flesh” is the cause of the resurrection of souls; wherefore also according to His human nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily but also of spiritual goods [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(56), A(2)**, ad 1].

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)**

***Whether at the judgment Christ will appear  
in His glorified humanity?***

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that at the judgment Christ will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a gloss [\*St. Augustine, Tract.

cxx in Joan.] on <sup><188></sup>John 19:37, “They shall look on him whom they pierced,” says: “Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified.” Now He was crucified in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the form of weakness and not in the form of glory.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is stated (<sup><188></sup>Matthew 24:30) that “the sign of the Son of man shall appear in heaven,” namely, “the sign of the cross,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxvii in Matth.), for “Christ when coming to the judgment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even His most shameful death.” Therefore it seems that He will not appear in the form of glory.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under that form which can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ will not be visible to all, good and wicked, under the form of His glorified humanity: because the eye that is not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see the clarity of a glorified body. Therefore He will not appear under a glorified form.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, that which is promised as a reward to the righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is promised as a reward to the righteous that they shall see the glory of His humanity (<sup><189></sup>John 10:9): “He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment in His Godhead and humanity,” according to the commentary of Augustine [\*De Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. St. Thomas, De Anima, ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above **Q(70), A(2)**, ad 1] and <sup><190></sup>Isaiah 33:17: “His eyes shall see the King in his beauty.” Therefore He will not appear to all in His glorified form.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein He was judged: wherefore a gloss [\*St. Augustine, Tract. xix, in Joan.] on <sup><191></sup>John 5:21, “So the Son also giveth life to whom He will,” says: “He will judge justly in the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He may be visible to the wicked.” Now He was judged in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the same form at the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup><192></sup>Luke 21:27):

“Then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud  
with great power and majesty.”

Now majesty and power pertain to glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)** — Further, he who judges should be more conspicuous than those who are judged. Now the elect who will be judged by Christ will have a glorified body. Much more therefore will the Judge appear in a glorified form.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)** — Further, as to be judged pertains to weakness, so to judge pertains to authority and glory. Now at His first coming when Christ came to be judged, He appeared in the form of weakness. Therefore at the second coming, when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form of glory.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Christ is called the mediator of God and men (<sup>5115</sup>1 Timothy 2:5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men and intercedes for them to the Father, and confers on men things which belong to the Father, according to <sup>4872</sup>John 17:22, “The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them.” Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He communicates with both extremes: for in that He communicates with men, He takes their part with the Father, and in that He communicates with the Father, He bestows the Father’s gifts on men. Since then at His first coming He came in order to make satisfaction for us to the Father, He came in the form of our weakness. But since at His second coming He will come in order to execute the Father’s justice on men, He will have to show forth His glory which is in Him by reason of His communication with the Father: and therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-RO(1)** — He will appear in the same flesh, but not under the same form.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The sign of the cross will appear at the judgment, to denote not a present but a past weakness: so as to show how justly those were condemned who scorned so great mercy, especially those who persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear in His body will not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power

whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and infirmity. He will also show forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it sensibly before the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by the things which will appear then, namely the signs of His past Passion, He will recall men to the thought of His past death.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-RO(3)** — A glorified body has it in its power to show itself or not to show itself to an eye that is not glorified, as stated above (**Q(85)**, **A(2)**, ad 3). Hence Christ will be visible to all in His glorified form.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure, so the glory and power of one we hate is most displeasing to us. Hence as the sight of the glory of Christ's humanity will be a reward to the righteous, so will it be a torment to Christ's enemies: wherefore it is written (~~2381~~ Isaiah 26:11): "Let the envious people see and be confounded and let fire" (i.e. envy) "devour Thy enemies."

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Form is taken there for human nature wherein He was judged and likewise will judge; but not for a quality of nature, namely of weakness, which will not be the same in Him when judging as when judged (Cf. ad 2).

## **P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)**

### *Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?*

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will know with the greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they will see His Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it will be possible to see it without joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the perverse will of the wicked is not more adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact that they will see the glory of His humanity will conduce to their punishment, as stated above (**A(2)**, ad 4). Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, there would be much more reason for them to grieve rather than rejoice.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the course of the affections is not a necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect: wherefore Augustine says (In Psalm 118: conc. 8): “The intellect precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at all.” Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, whatever is received into “a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received.” But whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the seer. Therefore although the Godhead is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless when seen by those who are plunged in grief, it will give no joy but rather displeasure.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, as sense is to the sensible object, so is the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, “to the unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet,” as Augustine says (Confess. vii), and the same happens with the other senses. Therefore since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it would seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them pain rather than joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (✠ John 17:3): “This is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the... true God.” Wherefore it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss. Therefore the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3) —** Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it is delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore “all naturally desire to know,” as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore it is impossible to see the Godhead without joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3) —** Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens sometimes to be painful. But intellectual vision is never painful since “the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed to it,” according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since then the Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things may be considered, namely the thing which is desired or which gives pleasure, and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurable

in that thing. Now according to Boethius (*De Hebdom.*) that which is can have something besides what it is, but ‘being’ itself has no admixture of aught else beside itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable or unpleasant; but the very aspect of pleasurable has not and cannot have anything mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is possible for things that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness which is the aspect of appetibility or pleasurable, not to give pleasure when they are apprehended, but it is impossible for that which is good by its essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended. Therefore since God is essentially His own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be seen without joy.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The wicked will know most clearly that Christ is God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on account of the most manifest signs of His Godhead.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-RO(2)** — No one can hate the Godhead considered in itself, as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to be hated by certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so far as He does or commands something contrary to their will [\*Cf. **P(2b)**, **Q(34)**, **A(1)**]. Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be painful to no one.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The saying of Augustine applies when the thing apprehended previously by the intellect is good by participation and not essentially, such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be something in them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In like manner God is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their intellect does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence it is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect, as they would if the intellect saw God’s essence which is His goodness.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion. Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause supervene, and does not remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of the damned would be done away if they saw God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(90)-A(3)-RO(5)** — The indisposition of an organ removes the natural proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural aptitude to please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the indisposition which is in the damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby they are directed to the Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in them. Hence the comparison fails.



## QUESTION 91

# OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next discuss the quality which the world and those who rise again will have after the judgment. Here a threefold matter offers itself to our consideration:

- (1) The state and quality of the world;
- (2) The state of the blessed;
- (3) The state of the wicked.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether there will be a renewal of the world?
- (2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?
- (3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more brilliant?
- (4) Whether the elements will receive an additional clarity?
- (5) Whether the animals and plants will remain?

### P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)

#### *Whether the world will be renewed?*

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the world will never be renewed. For nothing will be but what was at some time as to its species: “What is it that hath been? the same thing that shall be” (<sup>200</sup>Ecclesiastes 1:9). Now the world never had any disposition other than it has now as to essential parts, both genera and species. Therefore it will never be renewed.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, renewal is a kind of alteration. But it is impossible for the universe to be altered; because whatever is altered argues some alterant that is not altered, which nevertheless is a subject of local movement: and it is impossible to place such a thing outside the universe. Therefore it is impossible for the world to be renewed.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, it is stated (<sup><000></sup>Genesis 2:2) that “God... rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done,” and holy men explain that “He rested from forming new creatures.” Now when things were first established, the mode imposed upon them was the same as they have now in the natural order. Therefore they will never have any other.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, the disposition which things have now is natural to them. Therefore if they be altered to another disposition, this disposition will be unnatural to them. Now whatever is unnatural and accidental cannot last for ever (De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore this disposition acquired by being renewed will be taken away from them; and thus there will be a cycle of changes in the world as Empedocles and Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3) maintained, and after this world there will be another, and after that again another.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, newness of glory is given to the rational creature as a reward. Now where there is no merit, there can be no reward. Since then insensible creatures have merited nothing, it would seem that they will not be renewed.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup><257></sup>Isaiah 65:17):

“Behold I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance”;

and (Apoc. 21:1):

“I saw a new heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven and the first earth was gone.”

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1) —** Further, the dwelling should befit the dweller. But the world was made to be man’s dwelling. Therefore it should befit man. Now man will be renewed. Therefore the world will be likewise.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)** — Further, “Every beast loveth its like” (Ecclus. 13:19), wherefore it is evident that likeness is the reason of love. Now man has some likeness to the universe, wherefore he is called “a little world.” Hence man loves the whole world naturally and consequently desires its good. Therefore, that man’s desire be satisfied the universe must needs also be made better.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, We believe all corporeal things to have been made for man’s sake, wherefore all things are stated to be subject to him [~~\*~~<sup>ORR</sup> Psalm 8:5, seqq.]. Now they serve man in two ways, first, as sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as man sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made (<sup>ORR</sup> Romans 1:20). Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to render him the first of these services, since his body will be altogether incorruptible, the Divine power effecting this through the soul which it will glorify immediately. Again man will not need the second service as to intellective knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God immediately in His essence. The carnal eye, however, will be unable to attain to this vision of the Essence; wherefore that it may be fittingly comforted in the vision of God, it will see the Godhead in Its corporeal effects, wherein manifest proofs of the Divine majesty will appear, especially in Christ’s flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those bodies also will need to receive a greater inflow from the Divine goodness than now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as to add a certain perfection of glory: and such will be the renewal of the world. Wherefore at the one same time, the world will be renewed, and man will be glorified.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Solomon is speaking there of the natural course: this is evident from his adding: “Nothing under the sun is new.” For since the movement of the sun follows a circle, those things which are subject to the sun’s power must needs have some kind of circular movement. This consists in the fact that things which were before return the same in species but different in the individual (De Generat. i). But things belonging to the state of glory are not “under the sun.”

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-RO(2)** — This argument considers natural alteration which proceeds from a natural agent, which acts from natural necessity.

For such an agent cannot produce different dispositions, unless it be itself disposed differently. But things done by God proceed from freedom of will, wherefore it is possible, without any change in God Who wills it, for the universe to have at one time one disposition, and another at another time. Thus this renewal will not be reduced to a cause that is moved, but to an immovable principle, namely God.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-RO(3)** — God is stated to have ceased on the seventh day forming new creatures, for as much as nothing was made afterwards that was not previously in some likeness [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(73), A(1)**] either generically, or specifically, or at least as in a seminal principle, or even as in an obediential potentiality [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(115), A(2)**, ad 4; **P(3), Q(11), A(1)**]. I say then that the future renewal of the world preceded in the works of the six days by way of a remote likeness, namely in the glory and grace of the angels. Moreover it preceded in the obediential potentiality which was then bestowed on the creature to the effect of its receiving this same renewal by the Divine agency.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-RO(4)** — This disposition of newness will be neither natural nor contrary to nature, but above nature (just as grace and glory are above the nature of the soul): and it will proceed from an everlasting agent which will preserve it for ever.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Although, properly speaking, insensible bodies will not have merited this glory, yet man merited that this glory should be bestowed on the whole universe, in so far as this conduces to man's increase of glory. Thus a man merits to be clothed in more splendid robes, which splendor the robes nowise merited themselves.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)**

### *Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?*

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(1)** — It seems that when the world is thus renewed the movement of the heavenly bodies will not cease. For it is written (~~Gen~~ Genesis 8:22):

“All the days of the earth... cold and heat,  
summer and winter, night and day shall not cease.”

Now night and day, summer and winter result from the movement of the sun. Therefore the movement of the sun will never cease.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>2485</sup>Jeremiah 31:35,36):

“Thus saith the Lord Who giveth the sun for the light of the day,  
the order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night:  
Who stirreth up the sea, and the waves thereof roar... If these  
ordinances shall fail before Me... then also the seed of Israel shall  
fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever.”

Now the seed of Israel shall never fail, but will remain for ever. Therefore the laws of day and of the sea waves, which result from the heavenly movement, will remain for ever. Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, the substance of the heavenly bodies will remain for ever. Now it is useless to admit the existence of a thing unless you admit the purpose for which it was made: and the heavenly bodies were made in order “to divide the day and the night”; and to be “for signs, and for seasons, and for days and for years” (<sup>2484</sup>Genesis 1:14). But they cannot do this except by movement. Therefore their movement will remain for ever, else those bodies would remain without a purpose.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, in this renewal of the world the whole world will be bettered. Therefore no body will be deprived of what pertains to its perfection. Now movement belongs to the perfection of a heavenly body, because, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii, “those bodies participate of the Divine goodness by their movement.” Therefore the movement of the heaven will not cease.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, the sun successively gives light to the various parts of the world, by reason of its circular movement. Therefore if the circular movement of the heaven ceases, it follows that in some part of the earth’s surface there will be perpetual darkness, which is unbecoming to the aforesaid renewal.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, if the movement were to cease, this could only be because movement causes some imperfection in the heaven, for instance wear and tear, which is impossible, since this movement is natural, and the heavenly bodies are impassible, wherefore they are not worn out by movement (De Coelo et Mundo ii). Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(7)** — Further, a potentiality is useless if it be not reduced to act. Now in whatever position the heavenly body is placed it is in potentiality to another position. Therefore unless this potentiality be reduced to act, it would remain useless, and would always be imperfect. But it cannot be reduced to act save by local movement. Therefore it will always be in motion.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(8)** — Further, if a thing is indifferent in relation to more than one alternation, either both are ascribed to it, or neither. Now the sun is indifferent to being in the east or in the west, else its movement would not be uniform throughout, since it would move more rapidly to the place which is more natural to it. Therefore either neither position is ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither both nor neither can be ascribed to it, except successively by movement; for if it stand still, it must needs stand in some position. Therefore the solar body will always be in motion, and in like manner all other heavenly bodies.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(9)** — Further, the movement of the heaven is the cause of time. Therefore if the movement of the heaven fail, time must needs fail: and if this were to fail, it would fail in an instant. Now an instant is defined (Phys. viii) “the beginning of the future and the end of the past.” Consequently there would be time after the last instant of time, which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the heavens will never cease.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-O(10)** — Further, glory does not remove nature. But the movement of the heaven is natural. Therefore it is not deprived thereof by glory.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is stated (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel who appeared, “swore by him that liveth for ever and ever... that time shall be no longer,” namely after the seventh angel shall have sounded

the trumpet, at the sound of which “the dead shall rise again” (~~465~~1 Corinthians 15:52). Now if time be not, there is no movement of the heaven. Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.

Further: “Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy moon shall not decrease” (~~281~~Isaiah 60:20). Now the setting of the sun and the phases of the moon are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore the heavenly movement will cease at length.

Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that “the movement of the heaven is for the sake of continual generation in this lower world.” But generation will cease when the number of the elect is complete. Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.

Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). But all movement for an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the movement of the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be useless, or it will cease at length.

Further, rest is more noble than movement, because things are more likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves unmoved. Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest. Therefore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement terminates naturally in rest.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2) — *I answer that,*** There are three opinions touching this question. The first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so that the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same reason, neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved naturally has a place wherein it rests naturally, whereto it is moved naturally, and whence it is not moved except by violence. Now no such place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in

rest. Hence we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause, but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned (**A(1)**): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and animals needful for man's use generated, and the temperature of the atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(1)** — These words refer to the earth in its present state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said there: "All the days of the earth, seed time and harvest," etc. And it is simply to be granted that as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest, the movement of the heaven will not cease.

We reply in like manner to **O(2)** that the Lord is speaking there of the duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This is evident from the words: "Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever." For after this state there will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had mentioned will cease after this state.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(3)** — The end which is there assigned to the heavenly bodies is their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this act is directed further to another end, namely the service of man, which is shown by the words of ~~Deuteronomy~~ Deuteronomy 4:19:

"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are under heaven."

Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly bodies from the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to them in Genesis.



Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will serve glorified man in another way; hence it does not follow that they will remain without a purpose.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(4)** — Movement does not belong to the perfection of a heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of generation and corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also this movement makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine goodness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But movement does not belong to the perfection of the substance of the heaven, which substance will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose something of its perfection.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(5)** — All the elemental bodies will have in themselves a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness there.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(6)** — A gloss of Ambrose on ~~8:10~~ Romans 8:22, “Every creature groaneth,” etc. says explicitly that “all the elements labor to fulfill their offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them not without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when we are taken up to heaven.” This work, in my opinion, does not signify that any stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement, since this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved in *De Coelo et Mundo* 1: But work here denotes a defect in relation to the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained by Divine providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it follows that as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not reached the term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said metaphorically to labor, as a man who has not what he intends to have. This defect will be removed from the heaven when the number of the elect is complete. Or it may refer to the desire of the future renewal which it awaits from the Divine disposal.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(7)** — In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be in such and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is related to a heavenly body, as the craftsman’s potentiality to construct various

houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these he is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(8)** — Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not equally inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it has a more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in respect of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more noble disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable, since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in relation to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete, it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which does not seem probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same way it would be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to return to a like position: whereas the time of the world's end is stated to be unknown.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(9)** — Time will at length cease, when the heavenly movement ceases. Yet that last “now” will not be the beginning of the future. For the definition quoted applies to the “now” only as continuous with the parts of time, not as terminating the whole of time.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(2)-RO(10)** — The movement of the heaven is said to be natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way as we speak of natural principles; but because it has its principle in the nature of a body, not indeed its active but its receptive principle. Its active principle is a spiritual substance, as the Commentator says on *De Coelo et Mundo*; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this movement to be done

away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that movement.

We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease naturally, we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that movement, namely the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not follow that this movement ceases naturally.

To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual, so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.

### **P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this renewal?***

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies will not be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the lower bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing fire will not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies will not be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of generation in this lower world by their movement, so are they by

their light. But, when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above (**A(2)**). Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies will cease rather than increase.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, if the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be renewed when man is renewed.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, if they deteriorated then it follows that their deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said, will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (<sup>231B</sup>Isaiah 30:26) that "the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun." Therefore in the original state before sin the moon shone as much as the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it made it to be day as the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be false from the statement of <sup>201B</sup>Genesis 1:16 that the moon was made "to rule the night." Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not deprived of their light; and so their light will not be increased, so it seems, when man is glorified.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, the brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection, the brightness of the sun will be of no use to man: for it is written (<sup>231B</sup>Isaiah 60:19): "Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee," and (Apoc. 21:23): "The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it." Therefore their brightness will not be increased.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, it were not a wise craftsman who would make very great instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very small thing in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge bulk surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would seem that man is not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it is unseemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that it should be bettered when he is glorified.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>2311</sup>Isaiah 30:26):

“The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun,  
and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold.”

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3) —** Further, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will increase.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3) —** Further, “every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth the revelation of the glory of the children of God” [\*‘The creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain,’ etc.] (<sup>4182</sup>Romans 8:21,22). Now such are the heavenly bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore they await the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless they were to gain something by it. Therefore their brightness will increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** The renewal of the world is directed to the end that, after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now creatures lead to the knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor; wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): “By the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby.” And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 43:10): “The glory of the stars is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high.” Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will take place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-RO(1) —** The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness of sin and the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this is not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly

bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be Divinely renewed.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Movement does not denote perfection in the thing moved, considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so far as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its substance: and consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-RO(3)** — A gloss on <sup><230B></sup>Isaiah 30:26, “The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun,” says: “All things made for man’s sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light.” This diminishment is understood by some to mean a real lessening of light. Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by the Divine power. Others, however, with greater probability, take this diminishment to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in reference to man’s use; because after sin man did not receive as much benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same sense we read (<sup><0017></sup>Genesis 3:17,18):

“Cursed is the earth in thy work...  
Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee”;

although it would have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man sinning, it will not really be increased at man’s glorification, because man’s sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe, since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man’s glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal creatures, as stated above (**Q(76), A(7)**). Hence there is no comparison.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-RO(4)** — This diminution, according to the more probable opinion, refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does not follow that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be day, but that man would have derived as much benefit from the light of

the moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection, however, when the light of the moon will be increased in very truth, there will be night nowhere on earth but only in the center of the earth, where hell will be, because then, as stated, the moon will shine as brightly as the sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now, and the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although there be no authority or reason to prove this.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-RO(5)** — A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First, by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man because he will have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified (~~612~~ Revelation 21:23) by the words quoted, according to which that “city hath no need of the sun,” nor “of the moon.” Secondly, on account of a greater perfection, and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet not as needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he makes use of them now.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(3)-RO(6)** — This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavors to prove (*Dux errantium* iii) that the world was by no means made for man’s use. Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old Testament about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the quotations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even as the sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person when he encounters a great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of speaking is customary to Scripture), so on the other hand the sun is said to shine brighter for a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men. Consequently we must answer this argument by saying that although the heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were made for man’s sake; not, however as though this were the principal end, since the principal end of all things is God.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)*****Whether the elements will be renewed  
by an addition of brightness?***

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by receiving some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities proper to the elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an increase of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an increase of active and passive qualities.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, rarity, and density are qualities of the elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at this renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements would seem to be an obstacle to brightness, since a bright body needs to be condensed, for which reason the rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness, and in like manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements to be renewed by the addition of brightness.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, it is agreed that the damned will be in the earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal but also external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed with brightness in this renewal, nor for the same reason will the other elements.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, increase of brightness in the elements implies an increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be greater; and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their natural qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and this is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, the good of the universe which consists in the order and harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any individual creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the universe is done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony. Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according to their natural degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be endowed with



brightness, the perfection of the universe would be diminished thereby rather than increased.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>691</sup>Revelation 21:1): “I saw a new heaven and a new earth.” Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of brightness. Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will also.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4) —** Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man’s use. Now the corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss of Ambrose seems to say on <sup>682</sup>Romans 8:22, “Every creature groaneth,” and a gloss of Jerome on <sup>231b</sup>Isaiah 30:26, “And the light of the moon shall be,” etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly bodies.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4) —** Further, man’s body is composed of the elements. Therefore the elemental particles that are in man’s body will be glorified by the addition of brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that whole and part should have the same disposition. Therefore it is fitting that the elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4) — *I answer that*,** Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature was made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now in this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in heaven (<sup>423</sup>Matthew 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and transparency (De Anima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according to their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface will be as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven, fire as the lights of heaven.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-RO(1)** — As stated above (**A(1)**), the renewal of the world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and subtle of our senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies need to be bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the principle of which is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities regard the touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the excess of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas excess of light will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except on account of a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The air will be bright, not as casting forth rays, but as an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface will be clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its density.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The earth will not be glorified with brightness in the infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the earth will have the rational spirits of men and demons who though weak by reason of sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by the dignity of their nature. or we may say that, though the whole earth be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness, since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect, will be unable to enlighten them in another.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-RO(4)** — This brightness will be in these bodies even as it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(4)-RO(5)** — The order of the universe will not be done away by the betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will also be bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)**

*Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?*

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that

belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by the animals and plants [\*Cf. ~~Gen~~Genesis 1:11,12,20,21,24,25]. Therefore they will not be removed in this renewal.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, just as the elements served man, so also did animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the elements will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and mineral bodies will be glorified likewise.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals, plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe. Since then we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals will remain.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for the better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the elements, since they are nobler.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual, at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual generation is directed (De Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to say that these species will at length cease to be.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5) — *On the contrary***, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which had previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise again. But this cannot be asserted for since their form comes to nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for one of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been renewed will remain for ever, generation and corruption being done away. Therefore plants and animals will altogether cease after the renewal of the world.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) the species of animals, plants and such like corruptible things, are not perpetuated except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be perpetuated.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)** — Further, if the end cease, those things which are directed to the end should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human life; wherefore it is written (~~Gen~~ Genesis 9:3):

“Even as the green herbs have I delivered all flesh to you [\*Vulg.:  
‘have I delivered them all to you’].”

Therefore when man’s animal life ceases, animals and plants should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Since the renewal of the world will be for man’s sake it follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (~~1 Cor~~ 1 Corinthians 15:53):

“This corruptible must put on incorruption,  
and this mortal must put on immortality”

and consequently the world will be renewed in such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest. Therefore it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible as a whole: while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but this is on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, the rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption of man. on the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts, both on the part of their matter which loses its form, and on the part of their form which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no way

subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-RO(1)** — These bodies are said to adorn the elements, inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to remain.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will. However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for another, or even for himself that which another or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable thereof.

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-RO(4)** — Although animals and plants as to certain other respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble in relation to incorruption, as explained above [\*Cf. **Q(74)**, **A(1)**, ad 3].

**P(4)-Q(91)-A(5)-RO(5)** — The natural desire to be for ever that is in animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement in the first

movable body, plants and animals cease as to their species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.

## QUESTION 92

# OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED\*

### (THREE ARTICLES)

[\*Cf. P(1), Q(12)]

In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after the general judgment. We shall consider:

- (1) Their vision of the Divine essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly;
- (2) Their bliss and their mansions;
- (3) Their relations with the damned;
- (4) Their gifts, which are contained in their bliss;
- (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn their happiness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence?
- (2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body?
- (3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?

### P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)

### *Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?*

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (<sup>1118</sup> John 1:18): “No man hath seen God at any time”; and Chrysostom in his commentary (Hom. xiv in Joan.) that “not even the heavenly essences, namely the

Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is.” Now, only equality with the angels is promised to men (<sup>423</sup>Matthew 22:30): “They... shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” Therefore neither will the saints in heaven see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i): “Knowledge is only of existing things.” Now whatever exists is finite, since it is confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite, is above all existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him, and He is above all knowledge.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows that the most perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.) that “the darkness” — for thus he calls the abundance of light — “which screens God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge: and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but one of those things that are His.” Therefore no created intellect will be able to see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth.) “God is invisible on account of His surpassing glory.” Now His glory surpasses the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence, since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(7)** — Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.



**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(8)** — Further, whenever the intellect understands something actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(9)** — Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna (Metaph. iii), “the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does not imply that its essence is in our intellect,” because in that case our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an accident, “but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect.” Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us, except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this impression.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(10)** — Further, “In things devoid of matter that which understands is the same as that which is understood” (De Anima iii). Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(11)** — Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(12)** — Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown. Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a created intellect.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(13)** — Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii): “God is by nature invisible.” Now that which is in God by nature cannot be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(14)** — Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode, but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(15)** — Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which is the light of glory, according to <sup>489D</sup>Psalm 35:10, “In Thy light we shall see light.” Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-O(16)** — Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face, according to <sup>489D</sup>1 Corinthians 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>489D</sup>1 Corinthians 13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.” Now that which is seen face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.

Further, it is written (<sup>489D</sup>1 John 3:2):

“When He shall appear we shall be like to Him,  
because we shall see Him as He is.”

Therefore we shall see Him in His essence.

Further, a gloss on <sup><493></sup>1 Corinthians 15:24, “When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father,” says: “Where,” i.e. in heaven, “the essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss.” Therefore the blessed will see God in His essence.

Further, it is written (<sup><494></sup>John 14:21):

“He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father; and I will love  
him, and will manifest Myself to him.”

Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.

Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of <sup><495></sup>Exodus 33:20, “Man shall not see Me and live,” disapproves of the opinion of those who said that “in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature.” But His nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.

Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according to <sup><496></sup>Exodus 33:13, “Show me Thy glory”; <sup><497></sup>Psalms 79:20, “Show Thy face and we shall be saved”; and <sup><498></sup>John 14:8, “Show us the Father and it is enough for us.” Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man’s life is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man’s ultimate happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never attain to the

vision of God in His essence. on either side they were moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan.): “How can the creature see the uncreated?” Those who hold the passive intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine declares (*De Videndo Deo*: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because, since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other than God is the object of man’s happiness: and since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it follows that something other than God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence, and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of separate substances.

It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in various individuals, except as united to various individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity

understood, which is one and the same in the various persons understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says (Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a separate quiddity [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(88)**, **A(2)**].

But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence, which more than any other is of a different nature from any created quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature, nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially: and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images of

their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that “whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the recipient”: and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the Divine vision that we seek.

Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers held, namely Alexander and Averroes (*De Anima* iii.). For since in every knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen, this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This, however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as follows.

As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite itself is [\*Literally, — and becoming the ‘whereby-it-is’ of the composite itself] as instanced in the soul. Now in

the intellect we must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually understanding will be the composite as it were resulting from both. Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (Met. ix): in proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The words quoted can be explained in three ways, according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom understands the saying wherefore he adds: “By seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a comprehension as the Father has of the Son.” This also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: “The Only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him”: his intention being to prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge, whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows the



power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (*De Videndo Deo*: Ep. cxlvii), “God evades every form of our intellect,” because whatever form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something known.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(4)** — God is light (~~cf~~ John 1:9). Now illumination is the impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the “Divine darkness is impervious to all illumination,” because, to wit, the Divine essence, which he calls “darkness” on account of its surpassing brightness, remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and consequently is “hidden from all knowledge.” Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of God’s effects.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Although the glory of God surpasses any form by which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(6)** — Although there can be no proportion between finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be proportion between knower and known, because the power of the knower needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness of the thing surpasses

the power of the knower, as when we know God, or conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for proportion between knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so is the knowable object to the fact of its being known: and this proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite, or conversely.

We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(7)** — Likeness and distance are twofold. One is according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(8)** — In the vision wherein God will be seen in His essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to become one in being, but only to become one as regards the act of understanding.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(9)** — We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers to the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things. Hence he makes this

statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the thing understood.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(10)** — A substance that is separate from matter understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects. And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) as indicated by the Commentator (*De Anima* iii). But when it understands other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object understood becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the intellect is in act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect, as Avicenna proves (*De Natural.* vi.), because the essence of the intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things in succession, in the same way as primary matter remains one under various forms. Hence also the Commentator (*De Anima* iii.) compares the passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or form.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(11)** — These and all like authorities must be understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way, for the reason given above.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(12)** — The infinite is unknown if we take it in the privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion

whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. 3: But if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable; and it is in this way that God is infinite.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(13)** — Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: “For no man hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible even as He is incorruptible.” As, however, He is by nature supremely being, so He is in Himself supremely intelligible. But that He be for a time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in us.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(14)** — In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the created intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine essence has to the effect of being seen.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(15)** — There is a threefold medium both in bodily and in intellectual vision. The first is the medium “under which” the object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see in general, without determining the sight to any particular object. Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as this light is a medium. The second is the light “by which” the object is seen, and this is the visible form whereby either sight is determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone to know a stone. The third is the medium “in which” it is seen; and this is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something else: thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected in the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God be known by the images of other things, as

He is known now, for which reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives the knower the power to know [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(12), A(5)**].

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(1)-RO(16)** — Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this vision, which is effected immediately, is called “vision of face.” Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to the object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)**

*Whether after the resurrection the saints  
will see God with the eyes of the body?*

[\*Cf. **P(1), Q(12), A(3)**]

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes (~~not~~ Job 42:5):

“With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee,  
but now my eye seeth Thee.”

Much more therefore will the glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (~~scrib~~ Job 19:26): “In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: ‘my God’].” Therefore in heaven God will be seen with the eyes of the body.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further. Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified eyes, expresses himself as follows (De Civ. Dei xxii): “A greater power will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to see even incorporeal things.” Now any power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will be able to see God.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the incorporeal: and consequently the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, Gregory, commenting on ~~scrib~~ Job 4:16, “There stood one whose countenance I knew not,” says (Moral. v): “Man who, had he been willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh, became, by sinning, carnal even in mind.” Now through becoming carnal in mind, “he thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by the images of bodies” (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection), he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(6)** — Further, man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-O(7)** — Further, even as God is present to the intellect by His essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be “all in all”

(~~458~~1 Corinthians 15:28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union of His essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the sense.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** Ambrose, commenting on ~~400~~Luke 1:2, “There appeared to him an angel,” says: “God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch.” Therefore God will by no means be visible to the bodily sense.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2) —** Further, Jerome, commenting on ~~206~~Isaiah 6:1, “I saw the Lord sitting,” says: “The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart.”

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2) —** Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii): “An incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye.” But God is supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2) —** Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): “No man hath seen God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the corporeal sight.” Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed, wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2) —** Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv.), “man is said to be made to God’s image inasmuch as he is able to see God.” But man is in God’s image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh. Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences, such as movement, rest, number, and

the like, are called common sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.

An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense, neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of Diaries; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse (thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks): otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.

I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xxii), as is clear if we take note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible



things of God as understood by those that are made, but as when we see men... we do not believe but see that they live.”

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(1)** — This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye, of which the Apostle says (<sup>408</sup> Ephesians 1:18): “The eyes of our [Vulg.: ‘your’] heart enlightened.”

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The passage quoted does not mean that we are to see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall see God.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(3)** — In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before: “Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall see that incorporeal nature”: and then he goes on to say: “Accordingly a greater power,” etc., and afterwards he explains himself.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(4)** — All knowledge results from some kind of abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge. Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects of knowledge.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Although the mind that has become carnal cannot think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which cannot be apprehended corporeally.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(6)** — Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it follows that man’s beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind of overflow,

as explained above (**Q(85)**, **A(1)**). Yet our body will have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and especially in Christ's body.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(2)-RO(7)** — The intellect can perceive spiritual things, whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body will not.

### **P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees?*

[\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(12)**, **AA(7),8**]

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence, see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. 1.): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they happen." Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (<sup>4120</sup>Matthew 22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv.): "Since all see God there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who knows all things?" and he refers to the blessed who see God in His essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that "when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more able to understand the least things." Now God is the greatest of intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him understands all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii.), "to the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small." Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is

a power that is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since “the passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality” (De Anima iii, text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(6)** — Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints who see the Word in its essence see all created things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(7)** — Further, according to ~~CHD~~ Proverbs 10:24, “to the just their desire shall be given.” Now the just desire to know all things, since “all men desire naturally to know,” and nature is not done away by glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(8)** — Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present life [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(85)**, **A(3)**]. Now all penalty will be removed from the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and consequently they will know all.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(9)** — Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ’s body (~~CHD~~ Philippians 3:21). Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of Christ. Now Christ’s soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(10)** — Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof. Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing God see all.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(11)** — Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that “if the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should understand all things.” Now the Divine essence represents all things more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that sees God in His essence knows all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-O(12)** — Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss observes on <sup>(434)</sup>1 Corinthians 15:24, “When He shall have brought to nought,” etc. Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Dionysius says (Hier. Ecclesiastes vi): “The higher angels cleanse the lower angels from ignorance.” Now the lower angels see the Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not necessarily see all things.

Further, Christ alone has the spirit not “by measure” (<sup>(435)</sup>John 3:34). Now it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (<sup>(435)</sup>John 3:35) that “the Father... hath given all things into His hand.” Therefore none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.

Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.

I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things by His “knowledge of vision,” because He knows them as though they were present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His “science” or “knowledge of simple intelligence.” Now it is impossible for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured according to what it

can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of Christ [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(16), A(2)**], which knows in the Word all that God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision. This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more, because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The saying of Isidore, that “the angels know in the Word all things before they happen,” cannot refer to those things which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the lower angels learn

from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things.” Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(2)** — It follows from this saying of Gregory that this blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the Divine essence.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(3)** — The created intellect sees the Divine essence not according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know all things.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Defective knowledge results not only from excess and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the Divine essence more fully.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(5)** — When a passive power is perceptible by several perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection, it is not said to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the preceding dispositions. Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v.): “Unhappy is he who knoweth all these” (namely, creatures), “and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only.”

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(6)** — This mirror has a will: and even as He will show Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will. Nor does the comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in its power to be seen or not to be seen.

We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely. Consequently it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(7)** — The desire of the saints to know all things will be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God. For as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and by possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision of Him suffice the intellect: “Lord, show us the Father and it is enough for us” (<sup>48</sup>John 14:8).

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(8)** — Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation and thus it is a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of things, the knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints in heaven will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes, however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience: and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain things. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the angels will be cleansed from their ignorance.” In this sense ignorance is not a penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be done away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(9)** — Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with clarity even as Christ’s body, but not equally. In like manner our soul will

have glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality thereto: thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(10)** — Although the Divine essence is the type of all things knowable it will not be united to each created intellect according as it is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(11)** — The active intellect is a form proportionate to the passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is in the passive power of matter or the passive intellect is in the active power of the active intellect or of the natural agent. Consequently if the active intellect become the form of the passive intellect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to which the power of the active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is not a form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(92)-A(3)-RO(12)** — Nothing hinders us from saying that after the judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once for all, all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge of vision, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence. Christ's soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it sees them now; while others will see therein a greater or lesser number of things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is written (~~612~~ Revelation 21:23):

“The glory of God shall enlighten the city of Jerusalem [\*Vulg.: ‘hath enlightened it’], and the Lamb is the lamp thereof.”

In like manner the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not indeed with a new enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the lower), but with a kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill. Wherefore it is written (~~711~~ Daniel 12:3): “They that instruct many to justice” shall shine “as stars for all eternity.” The statement that the superiority of the orders will cease



refers to their present ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from the same gloss.

## QUESTION 93

OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS  
AND THEIR MANSIONS

## (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the judgment?
- (2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions?
- (3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of charity?

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)**

*Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than before?*

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is greater before being reunited to the body than after.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, power is more effective when it is united than when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness, since this consists in action [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(3), A(2)**].

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily

organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this is a finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body will not be greater than before.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, A gloss on ~~Rev~~ Revelation 6:9, "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain," says: "At present the souls of the saints are under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they will be." Therefore their happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their death.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)** — Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of the body than before.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(4)**, **A(5)**, ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement]. For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing something that hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more perfect in its natural being, when it

is in the whole — namely, man who results from the union of soul and body — than when it is a separate part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15) that “the corruptible body is a load upon the soul.” If, then, there be removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul’s action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(3), A(2)**, seqq.], the soul’s happiness after its reunion with the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire which proceeds from the soul’s imperfection its operation whereby it is borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35) that “on account of the body’s desire it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign good.”

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The soul united to a glorified body is more like to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has more perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is like to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest, although God is never moved.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-RO(2)** — A power which by its own nature is capable of being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate from matter is more effective.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Although in the act of understanding the soul does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat

conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods conduce instrumentally to the happiness of life.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Although finite added to infinite does not make a greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent of joy regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is increased in extent, through referring to God and to the body's glory, in comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body's glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in so far as it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the greater the delight [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(32), A(1)**], as stated in Ethic. x, 8.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)**

*Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?*

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions. For beatitude implies the notion of a reward: whereas mansion denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place where the saint will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual, namely God Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and consequently the various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, as in heaven there will be men of various merits, so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers. But various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo. Therefore in like manner neither should they be distinguished in heaven.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>441</sup>John 14:2): “In My Father’s house there are many mansions”: and Augustine expounds this in reference to the different degrees of rewards (Tract. lxxvii in Joan.).

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2) —** Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions. Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (<sup>442</sup>Revelation 21:2). Therefore we should distinguish various mansions there according to the various degrees of beatitude.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to all other movements according to the Philosopher (Phys., liber viii, 7). Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has arrived at that place it remains there at rest and is maintained therein. Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the movement is called an establishment [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore since the term movement is transferred to the actions of the appetite and will, the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a house corresponds to the unity of beatitude which unity is on the part of the object, and the plurality of mansions corresponds to the differences of beatitude on the part of the blessed: even so we observe in natural things that there is one same place above to which all light objects tend, whereas each one reaches it more closely, according as it is lighter, so that they have various mansions corresponding to their various lightness.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)-RO(1) —** Mansion implies the notion of end and consequently of reward which is the end of merit.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)-RO(2) —** Though there is one spiritual place, there are different degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions correspond to these.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(2)-RO(3) —** Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell, wherein is the end of the good and of the wicked.

## P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)

### *Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various degrees of charity?*

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the various mansions are not distinguished according to the various degrees of charity. For it is written (<sup>4255</sup>Matthew 25:15): “He gave to every one according to his proper virtue [Douay: ‘ability’].” Now the proper ability of a thing is its natural power. Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are distributed according to the different degrees of natural power.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>4901</sup>Psalm 61:12): “Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.” Now that which is rendered is the measure of beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are distinguished according to the diversity of works and not according to the diversity of charity.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, reward is due to act and not to habit: hence “it is not the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the conflict” (Ethic. i, 8) and “he... shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned except he strive lawfully.” Now beatitude is a reward. Therefore the various degrees of beatitude will be according to the various degrees of works and not according to the various degrees of charity.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** The more one will be united to God the happier will one be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one’s union with God. Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the difference of charity.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3) —** Further, “if one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter.” Now to have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater beatitude follows from having greater charity.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the blessed, whence will result the difference of perfection in them in

respect to the beatific operation: while the remote principle is the merit by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him capable of the Divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the increase in perfection of the Divine vision. In the second way the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the action, but only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(114), A(4)**], which has the end itself for its object [\*Cf. **P(2b), Q(24), A(3)**, ad 1]. Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish the mansions by way of merit.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)-RO(1)** — In this passage “virtue” denotes not the natural ability alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to obtain grace [\*Cf. **P(2b), Q(23), A(8)**]. Consequently virtue in this sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure of grace and glory that one will receive. But charity is the formal complement of merit in relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees of the aforesaid virtue.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Works in themselves do not demand the payment of a reward, except as informed by charity: and therefore the various degrees of glory will be according to the various degrees of charity.

**P(4)-Q(93)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although the habit of charity or of any virtue whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less the principle and reason of merit in the act: and consequently according to its diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not prevent our observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is joy in God, but in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in some created good.



## QUESTION 94

# OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED

### (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?
- (2) Whether they pity them?
- (3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?

#### P(4)-Q(94)-A(1)

### *Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?*

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on ~~2316~~ Isaiah 63:16, “Abraham hath not known us,” says: “The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing” [\*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii, xv]. Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall under the sight.” Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, It is written (~~2m~~ Isaiah 66:24):

“They shall go out and see the carcasses of the men  
that have transgressed against Me”;

and a gloss says: “The elect will go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God.”

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(1) — *I answer that***, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(1)-RO(1) —** This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job’s words (~~34~~ 14:21), “‘Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not understand,’ do not apply to the souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them.” [\*Concerning this Reply, Cf. **P(1), Q(89), A(8)**].

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(1)-RO(2) —** Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and deformed.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)**

***Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?***

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)-O(1) —** It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned. For pity proceeds from charity [\*Cf. **P(2b)**,

**Q(30)]**; and charity will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most especially pity the sufferings of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore He is said to be merciful.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways: first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have compassion on them both by the choice of the will — in which sense God, the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their salvation — and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Charity is the principle of pity when it is possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not prove.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(2)-RO(2)** — God is said to be merciful, in so far as He succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions in

accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though He pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than they deserve.

### **P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)**

#### ***Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?***

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punishment of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>1571</sup>Psalm 57:11): “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.”

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup>2501</sup>Isaiah 56:24):

“They shall satiate [\*Douay: ‘They shall be  
a loathsome sight to all flesh.’] the sight of all flesh.”

Now satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill

them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)-RO(1)** — To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life:

“My brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall  
into divers temptations” (~~ROM~~ James 1:2).

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Although God rejoices not in punishments as such, He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.

**P(4)-Q(94)-A(3)-RO(3)** — It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice in another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in the case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason.

## QUESTION 95

### OF THE GIFTS\* OF THE BLESSED

#### (FIVE ARTICLES)

[\*The Latin ‘dos’ signifies a dowry.]

We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?
- (2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?
- (3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?
- (4) Whether this is competent to the angels?
- (5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?

#### **P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)**

*Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?*

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3, De jure dot.) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride, as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive no dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the dowry is given not by the bridegroom’s father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. v, 11, De dot. promiss., 1: Dig. xxiii, 2, De rit. nup.). Now all the beatific gifts are bestowed on the blessed by the father of the bridegroom, i.e. Christ: “Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above coming down from the Father of lights.” Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the blessed should not be called a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, in carnal marriage a dowry is given that the burdens of marriage may be the more easily borne. But in spiritual marriage there are no burdens, especially in the state of the Church triumphant. Therefore no dowry should be assigned to that state.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, a dowry is not given save on the occasion of marriage. But a spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ by faith in the state of the Church militant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting the blessed, for the same reason it will be befitting the saints who are wayfarers. But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore neither is it befitting the blessed.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, a dowry pertains to external goods, which are styled goods of fortune: whereas the reward of the blessed will consist of internal goods. Therefore they should not be called a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (<sup>485</sup> Ephesians 5:32): “This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.” Hence it follows that the spiritual marriage is signified by the carnal marriage. But in a carnal marriage the dowered bride is brought to the dwelling of the bridegroom. Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ’s dwelling when they are beatified, it would seem that they are dowered with certain gifts.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)** — Further, a dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for the ease of marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more blissful than the carnal marriage. Therefore a dowry should be especially assigned thereto.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)** — Further, the adornment of the bride is part of the dowry. Now the saints are adorned when they are taken into glory, according to (<sup>2910</sup> Isaiah 61:10,

“He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation...  
as a bride adorned with her jewels.”

Therefore the saints in heaven have a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Without doubt the blessed when they are brought into glory are dowered by God with certain gifts for their adornment, and this adornment is called their dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of which we speak now is defined thus: “The dowry is

the everlasting adornment of soul and body adequate to life, lasting for ever in eternal bliss.” This description is taken from a likeness to the material dowry whereby the bride is adorned and the husband provided with an adequate support for his wife and children, and yet the dowry remains inalienable from the bride, so that if the marriage union be severed it reverts to her. As to the reason of the name there are various opinions. For some say that the name “dowry” is taken not from a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but according to the manner of speaking whereby any perfection or adornment of any person whatever is called an endowment; thus a man who is proficient in knowledge is said to be endowed with knowledge, and in this sense ovid employed the word “endowment” (*De Arte Amandi* i, 538): “By whatever endowment thou canst please, strive to please.” But this does not seem quite fitting, for whenever a term is employed to signify a certain thing principally, it is not usually transferred to another save by reason of some likeness. Wherefore since by its primary signification a dowry refers to carnal marriage, it follows that in every other application of the term we must observe some kind of likeness to its principal signification. Consequently others say that the likeness consists in the fact that in carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom on the bride for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom’s dwelling: and that this is shown by the words of Sicheim to Jacob and his sons (<sup><1312></sup>Genesis 34:12): “Raise the dowry, and ask gifts,” and from <sup><1226></sup>Exodus 22:16:

“If a man seduce a virgin... and lie with her,  
he shall endow her, and have her to wife.

Hence the adornment bestowed by Christ on the saints, when they are brought into the abode of glory, is called a dowry. But this is clearly contrary to what jurists say, to whom it belongs to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry, properly speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife made to those who are on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden which the husband has to bear; while that which the bridegroom gives the bride is called “a donation in view of marriage.” In this sense dowry is taken (<sup><1196></sup>1 Kings 9:16) where it is stated that “Pharoa, the king of Egypt, took Gezer... and gave it for a dowry to his daughter, Solomon’s wife.” Nor do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary. For although it is customary for a dowry to be given by the



maiden's parents, it happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives the dowry instead of the bride's father; and this happens in two ways: either by reason of his very great love for the bride as in the case of Sichem's father Hemor, who on account of his son's great love for the maiden wished to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as a punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his own possessions give a dowry to the virgin seduced by him, whereas he should have received it from the girl's father. In this sense Moses speaks in the passage quoted above. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should hold that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is that which is given by those on the wife's side to those on the husband's side, for the bearing of the marriage burden, as stated above. Yet the difficulty remains how this signification can be adapted to the case in point, since the heavenly adornments are given to the spiritual spouse by the Father of the Bridegroom. This shall be made clear by replying to the objections.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although in carnal marriage the dowry is given to the bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership and control belong to the bride: which is evident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved, the dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1,2,3, De donat. inter virum et uxorem). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the very adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her members, belong indeed to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to His glory and honor, yet to the bride as adorned thereby.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of Christ, is the Person of the Father alone: while the Father of the bride is the whole Trinity, since that which is effected in creatures belongs to the whole Trinity. Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly speaking, are given by the Father of the bride rather than by the Father of the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment is made by all the Persons, it may be in a manner appropriated to each Person. To the Person of the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority; and fatherhood in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the Son it is appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for His sake and through Him: and to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is made in Him and according to Him, since love is the reason of all giving [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(38), A(2)**].

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-RO(3)** — That which is effected by the dowry belongs to the dowry by its nature, and that is the ease of marriage: while that which the dowry removes, namely the marriage burden which is lightened thereby, belongs to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its nature to make a man righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man righteous. Accordingly, though there are no burdens in the spiritual marriage, there is the greatest gladness; and that this gladness may be perfected the bride is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she may be happily united with the bridegroom.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The dowry is usually settled on the bride not when she is espoused, but when she is taken to the bridegroom's dwelling, so as to be in the presence of the bridegroom, since "while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord" (~~cf~~<sup>2</sup> 2 Corinthians 5:6). Hence the gifts bestowed on the saints in this life are not called a dowry, but those which are bestowed on them when they are received into glory, where the Bridegroom delights them with His presence.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(1)-RO(5)** — In spiritual marriage inward comeliness is required, wherefore it is written (~~cf~~<sup>1944</sup> Psalm 44:14): "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," etc. But in carnal marriage outward comeliness is necessary. Hence there is no need for a dowry of this kind to be appointed in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage.

## **P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)**

### *Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude\*?*

[\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(12)**, **A(7)**, ad 1; **P(2a)**, **Q(4)**, **A(3)**]

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the dowry is the same as beatitude. For as appears from the definition of dowry (**A(1)**), the dowry is "the everlasting adornment of body and soul in eternal happiness." Now the happiness of the soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, a dowry signifies something whereby the union of bride and bridegroom is rendered delightful. Now such is beatitude in the spiritual marriage. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, according to Augustine (In Psalm 92) vision is “the whole essence of beatitude.” Now vision is accounted one of the dowries. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, fruition gives happiness. Now fruition is a dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus beatitude is a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), “beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” Now the state of the blessed is perfected by the dowries. Therefore the dowries are part of beatitude.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, The dowries are given without merits: whereas beatitude is not given, but is awarded in return for merits. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)** — Further, beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are several. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)** — Further, beatitude is in man according to that which is principal in him (Ethic. x, 7): whereas a dowry is also appointed to the body. Therefore dowry and beatitude are not the same.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that beatitude and dowry are the same in reality but differ in aspect: because dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, whereas beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand, since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry is not an operation, but a quality or disposition. Wherefore according to others it must be stated that beatitude and dowry differ even in reality, beatitude being the perfect operation itself by which the soul is united to God, while the dowries are habits or dispositions or any other qualities directed to this same perfect operation, so that they are directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts thereof.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-RO(1)** — Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment of the soul, but something resulting from the soul’s adornment; since it is an operation, while its adornment is a certain comeliness of the blessed themselves.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Beatitude is not directed to the union but is the union itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by an operation, whereas the dowries are gifts disposing to this same union.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Vision may be taken in two ways. First, actually, i.e. for the act itself of vision; and thus vision is not a dowry, but beatitude itself. Secondly, it may be taken habitually, i.e. for the habit whereby this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by which the soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is a dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude itself. The same answer applies to **O(4)**.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as though they were essential parts of beatitude, but as being in a way directed to beatitude, as stated above.

### **P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)**

#### *Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry?*

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem fitting that Christ should receive a dowry. For the saints will be conformed to Christ through glory, according to <sup>4182</sup>Philippians 3:21, “Who will reform the body of our lowliness made like to the body of His glory.” Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, in the spiritual marriage a dowry is given in likeness to a carnal marriage. Now there is a spiritual marriage in Christ, which is peculiar to Him, namely of the two natures in one Person, in regard to which the human nature in Him is said to have been espoused by the Word, as a gloss [\*St. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i, 40] has it on <sup>4180</sup>Psalms 18:6, “He hath set His tabernacle in the sun,” etc., and Apoc. 21:3, “Behold the tabernacle of God with men.” Therefore it is fitting that Christ should have a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii) that Christ, according to the Rule [\*Liber regularum] of Tyconius, on account of the unity of the mystic body that exists between the head and its members, calls Himself also the Bride and not only the Bridegroom, as

may be gathered from <sup><2610></sup>Isaiah 61:10, “As a bridegroom decked with a crown, and as a bride adorned with her jewels.” Since then a dowry is due to the bride, it would seem that Christ ought to receive a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, a dowry is due to all the members of the Church, since the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a member of the Church according to <sup><627></sup>1 Corinthians 12:27, “You are the body of Christ, and members of member, i.e. of Christ,” according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is due to Christ.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, A distinction of persons is requisite between the bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in <sup><419></sup>John 3:29, “He that hath the bride is the bridegroom.” Therefore since the dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem unfitting for Christ to have a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)** — Further, the same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should have a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord, whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union of condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say, then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for Him to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to that in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a dowry is given to the bride as regards property and control, although it is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem congruous. For in the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of love, even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be a marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is required in the bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in the union of the human

nature with the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or that which regards the conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly speaking, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a dowry is given there should be likeness of nature between bridegroom and bride, and this is lacking in the union of the human nature with the Divine; secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons, and the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly, because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to the dwelling of the bridegroom and thus would seem to belong to the bride, who from being not united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which was assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise than perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should say that the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries befit Him in the highest degree.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This conformity must be understood to refer to the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in Christ: for it is not requisite that the thing in which we are conformed to Christ should be in the same way in Christ and in us.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Human nature is not properly said to be a bride in its union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is requisite between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That human nature is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to its union with the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride, in that it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the bridegroom.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-RO(3)** — If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride, this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He personifies His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him spiritually. Hence nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from being said to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the Church.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-RO(4)** — The term Church is taken in two senses. For sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its Head. In this way alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in this way

Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head from which all the members receive. In another sense the Church denotes the head and members united together; and thus Christ is said to be a member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfills an office distinct from all others, by pouring forth life into the other members: although He is not very properly called a member, since a member implies a certain restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is absolutely entire [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(8), A(1)**], so that He is the entire good of the Church, nor is He together with others anything greater than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this sense, the Church denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as one thing results from their spiritual union. Consequently although Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by no means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the idea of a dowry is not becoming to Him.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(3)-RO(5)** — There is here a fallacy of “accident”; for these things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect of dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)**

### *Whether the angels receive the dowries?*

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, “One is my dove,” says: “One is the Church among men and angels.” But the Church is the bride, wherefore it is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore the angels have the dowries.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, a gloss on <sup><sup>1012</sup> Luke 12:36, “And you yourselves like to men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding,” says: “Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new Man espoused to Himself the angelic host.” Therefore the angelic hosts are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they should have the dowries.</sup>

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no

less than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem that they are becoming to the angels.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than between men and Christ.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, a greater conformity is required between the head and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be called their bridegroom.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely “the bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the bridegroom”: and he says that “the angels are the companions of the bridegroom.” Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)** — Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion: wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (<sup>10025</sup>Exodus 4:25), “A bloody spouse thou art to me.” Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse. Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species. Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in



the specific nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature. Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Although the angels are included in the unity of the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not properly fitting for them to have the dowries.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a broad sense.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-RO(3)** — In the spiritual marriage although there is no other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does not properly befit the angels.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-RO(4)** — The conformity between the angels and Christ as God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an infinite distance between them.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(4)-RO(5)** — Not even is Christ properly called the Head of the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence, speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required among them is one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and one serve another.

Consequently the conformity between God and the angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of bridegroom.

## **P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)**

### *Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?*

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three dowries, namely, “vision,” “love” and “fruition.” For the soul is united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but the will.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith, hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to charity.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since “we are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of beatitude: “So run that you may comprehend” (<sup>1</sup>1 Corinthians 9:24). Therefore we should reckon a fourth dowry

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following pertain to the soul’s beatitude: “wisdom, friendship, concord, power, honor, security, joy”: and consequently the aforesaid dowries are reckoned unsuitably.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(6)** — Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that “in that beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying,

praised untiringly.” Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-O(7)** — Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers, security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers. Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather than the aforesaid.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision, comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said (**A(2)**) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision, and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful; secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary, namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry, which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things are necessary. First, suitability, which regards the affections — and in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part of the visible object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than to have God present and to hold Him within ourself [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(4)**, **A(3)**]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours while

on the way, but of possession [\*Literally “of the reality: non spei... sed rei”] which is in heaven.

Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues, namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one, and some for the other.

Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Memory and understanding have but one act: either because understanding is itself an act of memory, or — if understanding denote a power — because memory does not proceed to act save through the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not remain in heaven [Cf. **P(2b)**, **Q(18)**, **A(2)**] but will be succeeded by comprehension.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Fruition as including comprehension is distinct from vision and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by making it capable of

knowledge without phantasms, of complete control over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result in our being pilgrims from the Lord.

Reply **O(4)** is clear from what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-RO(5)** — Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to Whom “wisdom” alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also in relation to others. They may be either one’s equals, to whom “friendship” refers as regards the union of affections, and “concord” as regards consent in actions, or one’s inferiors, to whom “power” refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and “honor” as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again (they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to this “security” refers as regards the removal of evil, and “joy” as regards the attainment of good.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-RO(6)** — Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact of the soul’s union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the necessary conditions of a dowry.

**P(4)-Q(95)-A(5)-RO(7)** — The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude or to its act, because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8*). Accordingly Boethius shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as “security,” to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the suitable good, as “joy,” or of the perfect good, as “sufficiency,” or to the manifestation of good, as “celebrity,” inasmuch as the good of one is made known to others, or as “reverence,” as indicating that good or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which bears witness to virtue. Hence

it is evident that these five should not be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.

**QUESTION 96****OF THE AUREOLES****(THIRTEEN ARTICLES)**

In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there are thirteen points of inquiry:

- (1)** Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?
- (2)** Whether they differ from the fruit?
- (3)** Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?
- (4)** Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?
- (5)** Whether an aureole is due to virgins?
- (6)** Whether it is due to martyrs?
- (7)** Whether it is due to doctors?
- (8)** Whether it is due to Christ?
- (9)** Whether to the angels?
- (10)** Whether it is due to the human body?
- (11)** Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?
- (12)** Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest?
- (13)** Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)*****Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the aurea?***

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the essential reward which is called the “aurea.” For the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), beatitude is “a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods.” Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven; so that the aureole is included in the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, “more” and “less” do not change a species. But those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would seem that it does not signify something distinct from the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the root of all merit. Since then the “aurea” corresponds to charity, it would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, “All the blessed are taken into the angelic orders” as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Now as regards the angels, “though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree, nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly than others with gifts which, however, they all possess,” as Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the aureole is not a distinct reward from the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then, the “aurea” is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the “aurea,” and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive



[\*”Aureola,” i.e. a little “aurea”]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not a distinct reward from the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** A gloss [\*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on <sup>(253)</sup>Exodus 25:24,25, “Thou shalt make... another little golden crown [coronam aureolam],” says: “This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins alone sing in the presence of the Lamb.” Wherefore apparently the aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas the aurea is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is distinct from the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1) —** Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: “He... is not crowned except he strive lawfully” (<sup>(254)</sup>2 Timothy 2:5). Hence where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1) —** Further, the Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: “I saw the Holy City,” etc. (<sup>(255)</sup>Revelation 21:2). Now in the Church militant special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the same should obtain in the Church triumphant.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** Man’s essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a “crown” or “aurea” metaphorically, both with reference to merit which is gained by a kind of conflict — since “the life of man upon earth is a warfare” (<sup>(256)</sup>Job 7:1) — and with reference to the reward whereby in a way man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed with regal power: “Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom,” etc. (<sup>(257)</sup>Revelation 5:10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.

In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential has the character of a crown. For a crown signifies some kind of perfection, on account of its circular shape, so that for this very reason it is becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the additional reward is called an “aureole.” Now something may be added in two ways to this essential

reward which we call the “aurea.” First, in consequence of a condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore this same glory of the body is sometimes called an “aureole.” Thus a gloss of Bede on ~~Exodus~~ Exodus 25:25, “Thou... shalt make another little golden crown,” says that “finally the aureole is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree of glory is in store for us when our bodies are resumed.” But it is not in this sense that we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts, whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit, from its root which is charity, since it is referred to the last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward, namely the attainment of the end, and this is the “aurea.” Secondly, from the very genus of the act which derives a certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from the habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an “aureole”: and it is in this sense that we regard the aureole now. Accordingly it must be said that an “aureole” denotes something added to the “aurea,” a kind of joy, to wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the joy in being united to God, which is called the “aurea.” Some, however, affirm that the common reward, which is the “aurea,” receives the name of “aureole,” according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money receives the name of debt through being due to some one, though the money and the debt are altogether the same. And that nevertheless this does not imply that the essential reward is any greater when it is called an “aureole”; but that it corresponds to a more excellent act, more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting; so that although two persons may have the Divine vision with equal clearness, it is called an “aureole” in one and not in the other in so far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of meriting. But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted above. For if “aurea” and “aureole” were the same, the “aureole” would not be described as added to the “aurea.” Moreover, since reward corresponds to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this more excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we call an “aureole.” Hence it follows that an “aureole” differs from the “aurea.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Beatitude includes all the goods necessary for man's perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things can be added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as though it were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as stated in *Ethic. i, 8*: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the happiness of heaven.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-RO(2)** — He who keeps the counsels and the commandments always merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we gather the notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works; but not always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part, however, the contrary happens, because the "proof of love is in the performance of deeds," as Gregory says (*Hom. xxx in Evang.*). Wherefore it is not the more excellent essential reward that is called an aureole, but that which is added to the essential reward without reference to the essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being greater, or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has no aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-RO(3)** — Charity is the first principle of merit: but our actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in order to obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition in the first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument. Hence something principal results in the effect with reference to the first mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument. Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity, namely the "aurea," and something on the part of the kind of work, namely the "aureole."

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-RO(4)** — All the angels merited their beatitude by the same kind of act namely by turning to God: and consequently no particular reward is found in anyone which another has not in some way. But men merit beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the comparison fails.

Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another's good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them in the victory.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(1)-RO(5)** — The merit arising from charity is more excellent than that which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to which charity directs us is more excellent than the things directed to that end, and with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by reason of its genus. Hence “aureole” is used as a diminutive in comparison with “aurea.”

## **P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)**

### *Whether the aureole differs from the fruit?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the fruit. For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the aureole and the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss on <sup><118></sup>Matthew 13:8, “Some a hundredfold.” Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) that the “hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins.” Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the aureole also is due to them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, there are only two rewards in beatitude, namely the essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now that which is added to the essential reward is called an aureole, as evidenced by the statement (<sup><125></sup>Exodus 25:25) that the little crown [aureola] is added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for in that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the same as the aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Things which are not divided in the same way are not of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same way, since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the same.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)** — Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a fruit is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways, according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the thing from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking, is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is the last thing to which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is that to which husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any other process. Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for that which refreshes as being the last end: and according to this signification we are said to enjoy [frui] God perfectly in heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signification we have fruition which is a dowry: but we are not speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes only, though it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called fruits, inasmuch as “they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness,” as Ambrose says [\*De Parad. xiii]. In this sense fruit is taken (<sup>400</sup>Galatians 6:22): “The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy,” etc. Nor again is this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have treated of this already [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(70)**, **A(1)**, ad 2].

We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from the labor of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man acquires from his labor in this life: and thus every reward which by our labors we shall acquire for the future life is called a “fruit.” In this sense fruit is taken

(~~410~~Romans 6:22): “You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting.” Yet neither in this sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of fruit as being the product of seed: for it is in this sense that our Lord speaks of fruit (~~412~~Matthew 13:23), where He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold. Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed power is capable of transforming the humors of the soil into its own nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God: wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiritual nature by withdrawing from carnal things, the greater is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of the Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that the “aurea” consists in the joy one has in God, and the “aureole” in the joy one has in the perfection of one’s works, whereas the “fruit” consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of God’s Word.

Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by saying that the aureole is due to the fighter, according to ~~414~~2 Timothy 2:5, “He... shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully”; whereas the fruit is due to the laborer, according to the saying of Wis. 3:15, “The fruit of good labors is glorious.” Others again say that the “aurea” regards conversion to God, while the “aureole” and the “fruit” regard things directed to the end; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and the aureole the body. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same subject and about the same matter, and since the body’s reward depends on the soul’s, these explanations of the difference between fruit, aurea and aureole would only imply a logical difference: and this cannot be, since fruit is assigned to some to whom no aureole is assigned.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)-RO(1)** — There is nothing incongruous if various rewards correspond to the same merit according to the various things contained therein. Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as virginity is kept for God’s sake at the command of charity; the aureole, in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity a person acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal things.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Fruit, according to the proper acceptance as we are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom and virginity, by that which corresponds to the three degrees of continency. This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the reward due to any perfect works whatever.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Although the aureole is an accidental reward added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward is an aureole, but only that which is assigned to works of perfection, whereby man is most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental reward, which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a carnal life.

### **P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)**

#### *Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that a fruit is not due to the virtue of continence alone. For a gloss on <sup>435b</sup>1 Corinthians 15:41, “One is the glory of the sun,” says that “the worth of those who have the hundredfold fruit is compared to the glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who have the sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the thirtyfold fruit.” Now this difference of glory, in the meaning of the Apostle, regards any difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the various fruits should correspond to none but the virtue of continence.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, fruits are so called from fruition. But fruition belongs to the essential reward which corresponds to all the virtues. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, fruit is due to labor: “The fruit of good labors is glorious” (Wis. 3:15). Now there is greater labor in fortitude than in temperance or continence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to continence alone.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, it is more difficult not to exceed the measure in food which is necessary for life, than in sexual matters without

which life can be sustained: and thus the labor of frugality is greater than that of continence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather than to continence.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, fruit implies delight, and delight regards especially the end. Since then the theological virtues have the end for their object, namely God Himself, it would seem that to them especially the fruit should correspond.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, is the statement of the gloss on <sup>4133</sup>Matthew 13:23, “The one a hundredfold,” which assigns the fruits to virginity, widowhood, and conjugal continence, which are parts of continence.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that he passes from the carnal to the spiritual life. Consequently a fruit corresponds especially to that virtue which more than any other frees man from subjection to the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the flesh; so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome (Ep. ad Ageruch.), “not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart of the prophet,” nor “is it possible to understand anything in the midst of that pleasure,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11). Therefore fruit corresponds to continence rather than to another virtue.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-RO(1)** — This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Fruition does not take its name from fruit by reason of any comparison with fruit in the sense in which we speak of it now, as evidenced by what has been said.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds to labor not as resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the production of fruit. Hence a man calls his crops his labor, inasmuch as he labored for them, or produced them by his labor. Now the comparison to fruit, as produced from seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude, because man is not subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude, as he is by the passions with which continence is concerned.



**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-RO(4)** — Although the pleasures of the table are more necessary than the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong: wherefore the soul is not so much subjected to the flesh thereby.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(3)-RO(5)** — Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which fruition applies to delight in the end; but in another sense as stated above (**A(2)**). Hence the argument proves nothing.

### **P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)**

#### *Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit are assigned, “charity, joy, peace,” etc. (<sup>4870</sup>Galatians 5:22). Therefore seemingly we should reckon only three.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, fruit denotes a special reward. Now the reward assigned to virgins, widows, and married persons is not a special reward, because all who are to be saved are comprised under one of these three, since no one is saved who lacks continence, and continence is adequately divided by these three. Therefore three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three aforesaid.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, just as widowhood surpasses conjugal continence, so does virginity surpass widowhood. But the excess of sixtyfold over thirtyfold is not as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold; neither in arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by thirty, and a hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical proportion, since sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty as containing the whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits are unfittingly adapted to the degrees of continence.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, the statements contained in Holy Writ stand for all time: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away” (<sup>4873</sup>Luke 21:33); whereas human institutions are liable to change every day. Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a criterion of the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem in

consequence that the explanation of these fruits given by Bede is unfitting. For he says (Expos. in Luc. iii, 8) that “the thirtyfold fruit is assigned to married persons, because in the signs drawn on the ‘abacus’ the number 30 is denoted by the thumb and index finger touching one another at the tips as though kissing one another: so that the number 30 denotes the embraces of married persons. The number 60 is denoted by the contact of the index finger above the middle joint of the thumb, so that the index finger by lying over the thumb and weighing on it, signifies the burden which widows have to bear in this world. When, however, in the course of enumeration we come to the number 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so that the number 100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the angelic excellence; for the angels are on the right hand, i.e. in glory, while we are on the left on account of the imperfection of the present life.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, By continence, to which the fruit corresponds, man is brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by withdrawing from carnal things. Consequently various fruits are distinguished according to the various manners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now there is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which is superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary consists in the rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed by the pleasures of the flesh: and this obtains when one makes use of carnal pleasures according to the order of right reason. This is the spirituality of married persons. Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws himself entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle the spirit. This may be done in two ways: either in respect of all time past, present, and future, and this is the spirituality of virgins; or in respect of a particular time, and this is the spirituality of widows. Accordingly to those who keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit is awarded; to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixtyfold fruit; and to those who keep virginal continence, the hundredfold fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede quoted above, although another motive may be found in the very nature of the numbers. For 30 is the product of 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the number of everything, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo i, and contains a certain perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end. Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons, in whom no other perfection is added to the observance of the Decalogue, signified by the

number 10, than the common perfection without which there is no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by 10 amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly to widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as to all its circumstances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous act), since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connection with any person, place, or any other circumstance; which was not the case with conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity; because the number 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of numbers: and in like manner virginity occupies the limit of spirituality, since no further spirituality can be added to it. The number 100 also being a square number has perfection from its figure: for a square figure is perfect through being equal on all sides, since all its sides are equal: wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein incorruption is found equally as to all times.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which we are taking it now.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a reward that is not common to all who will be saved. For not only the essential reward is common to all, but also a certain accidental reward, such as joy in those works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be said that the fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as is evidently the case with those who repent in the end after leading an incontinent life, for to such no fruit is due but only the essential reward.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-RO(3)** — The distinction of the fruits is to be taken according to the species and figures of the numbers rather than according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess in point of quantity, we may find an explanation. For the married man abstains only from one that is not his, the widow from both hers and not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion of double, just as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is  $60 \times 40$ , which latter number is the product of  $4 \times 10$ , and the number 4 is the first solid and square number. Thus the addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(4)-RO(4)** — Although these numerical signs are a human institution, they are founded somewhat on the nature of things, in so far as the numbers are denoted in gradation, according to the order of the aforesaid joints and contacts.

## **P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)**

### *Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that an aureole is not due on account of virginity. For where there is greater difficulty in the work, a greater reward is due. Now widows have greater difficulty than virgins in abstaining from the works of the flesh. For Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.) that the greater difficulty certain persons experience in abstaining from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward, and he is speaking in praise of widows. Moreover, the Philosopher says (De Anim. Hist. vii) that “young women who have been deflowered desire sexual intercourse the more for the recollection of the pleasure.” Therefore the aureole which is the greatest reward is due to widows more than to virgins.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, if an aureole were due to virginity, it would be especially found where there is the most perfect virginity. Now the most perfect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is called the Virgin of virgins: and yet no aureole is due to her because she experienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not infected with the corruption of the fomes [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(27), A(3)**]. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, a special reward is not due to that which has not been at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not have been praiseworthy to observe virginity in the state of innocence, since then was it commanded: “Increase and multiply and fill the earth” (~~Gen~~ Genesis 1:28): nor again during the time of the Law, since the barren were accursed. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, the same reward is not due to virginity observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost

virginity; for instance if a maiden be violated unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confessing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(5)** — Further, a special reward is not due to that which is in us by nature. But virginity is inborn in every man both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(6)** — Further, as widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit, so is virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole. Now the sixtyfold fruit is not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any kind of virginity, but only to that which is observed by vow.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-O(7)** — Further, reward is not given to that which is done of necessity, since all merit depends on the will. But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally cold-blooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aureole is not always due to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** A gloss on <sup><125></sup>Exodus 25:25: “Thou shalt also make a little golden crown [coronam aureolam]” says: “This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth.” Therefore the reward due to virginity is called an aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)** — Further, It is written (<sup><250></sup>Isaiah 56:4): “Thus saith the Lord to the eunuchs”: and the text continues (Isaiah 56:5): “I will give to them... a name better than sons and daughters”: and a gloss [\*St. Augustine, De Virginit. xxv] says: “This refers to their peculiar and transcendent glory.” Now the eunuchs “who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven” (<sup><192></sup>Matthew 19:12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special crown is due. Wherefore since by virginity a person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit,” etc. (<sup><157></sup>Galatians 5:17), a special crown called the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of all; but all are not agreed as to the kind of virginity to which it

is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act. So that she who actually remains a virgin will have the aureole provided she be of the number of the saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those who have the will to marry and nevertheless die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that the aureole is due to the state and not to the act: so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity. But this also seems unreasonable, because it is possible to have the same intention of observing virginity without a vow as with a vow. Hence it may be said otherwise that merit is due to every virtuous act commanded by charity. Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as perpetual incorruption of mind and body is an object of choice, as appears from what has been said above (Sent. iv, D, 33, **Q(3), AA(1),2**) [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(152), AA(1),3**]. Consequently the aureole is due to those virgins alone, who had the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, whether or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow — and this I say with reference to the aureole in its proper signification of a reward due to merit — although this purpose may at some time have been interrupted, integrity of the flesh remaining withal, provided it be found at the end of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although virginity of the flesh cannot. If, however, we take the aureole in its broad sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole will be applicable even to those who are incorrupt in flesh, although they had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For without doubt they will rejoice in the incorruption of their body, even as the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although they had no opportunity of sinning, as in the case of baptized children. But this is not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken in this sense.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(1)** — In some respects virgins experience a greater conflict in remaining continent; and in other respects, widows, other things being equal. For virgins are inflamed by concupiscence, and by the desire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be greater than it is in reality, and by their failing to consider the grievances attaching to this pleasure. In these respects widows experience

the lesser conflict, yet theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects one motive is stronger than another, according to the various conditions and dispositions of the subject, because some are more susceptible to one, and others to another. However, whatever we may say of the degree of conflict, this is certain — that the virgin's victory is more perfect than the widow's, for the most perfect and most brilliant kind of victory is never to have yielded to the foe: and the crown is due, not to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(2)** — There are two opinions about this. For some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity, if we take aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has something more than an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole even in its proper signification, and that a most transcendent one: for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but owing to the exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued that she did not feel this conflict. This, however, would seem to be said without reason, for since we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been altogether immune from the inclination of the fomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict with the flesh, since such like conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a gloss [\*St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* xix, 4] on ~~2~~ 2 Corinthians 12:7, “There was given me a sting of my flesh.” Hence we must say that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other members of the Church in whom virginity is found: and although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even Christ (~~4th~~ Matthew 4).

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(3)** — The aureole is not due to virginity except as adding some excellence to the other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection over conjugal continence, since in that case marriage would have been honorable, and the marriage-bed unsullied, for it would not have been dishonored by lust: hence virginity would not then have been observed, nor would an aureole have

been due to it. But the condition of human nature being changed, virginity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is assigned to it.

During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship of God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal intercourse: wherefore no special reward would be given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias and Elias, of whose marriage we do not read.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(4)** — If a virgin is violated, she does not forfeit the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, and nowise consent to the act. Nor does she forfeit virginity thereby; and be this said, whether she be violated for the faith, or for any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Lucy said: “If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will receive a double crown” [\*Office of S. Lucy; lect. vi of Dominican Breviary, December 13th]; not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will receive a double reward, one for observing virginity, the other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing that one thus violated should conceive, she would not for that reason forfeit her virginity: nor would she be equal to Christ’s mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind [\*Cf. **P(2b), Q(64), A(3)**, ad 3; **P(2b), Q(124), A(4)**, ad 2; **P(2b), Q(152), A(1)**].

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(5)** — Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is material in virginity: but the purpose of observing perpetual incorruption, whence virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of grace.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(6)** — The sixtyfold fruit is due, not to every widow, but only to those who retain the purpose of remaining widows, even though they do not make it the matter of a vow, even as we have said in regard to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(5)-RO(7)** — If cold-blooded persons and eunuchs have the will to observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of



sexual intercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole: for they make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xxiv): “For those like eunuchs whose bodies are so formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when they become Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful who are married.”

## **P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)**

### *Whether an aureole is due to martyrs?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that an aureole is not due to martyrs. For an aureole is a reward given for works of supererogation, wherefore Bede commenting on <sup><125></sup>Exodus 25:25, “Thou shalt also make another... crown,” says: “This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general commandments.” But to die for confessing the faith is sometimes an obligation, and not a work of supererogation as appears from the words of <sup><600></sup>Romans 10:10,

“With the heart, we believe unto justice,  
but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.”

Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, according to Gregory (Moral. ix [\*Cf. St. Augustine, De Adult. Conjug. i, 14]) “the freer the service, the more acceptable it is.” Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is a punishment inflicted by another person with force. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, martyrdom consists not only in suffering death externally, but also in the interior act of the will: wherefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Innocents distinguishes three kinds of martyr — in will and not in death, as John; in both will and death, as Stephen; in death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than

external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from will. Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, bodily suffering is less than mental, which consists of internal sorrow and affliction of soul. But internal suffering is also a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption [\*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.]: “I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace, wherefore: Thine own soul a sword hath pierced — namely for her Son’s death.” Since then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond to outward suffering.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(5)** — Further, penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. iii in Evang.): “Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom; since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit.” But no aureole is due to penance which consists in external works. Neither therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(6)** — Further, an aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei i), and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon themselves in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the case of certain women at Antioch (Eusebius, Ecclesiastes Hist. viii, 24). Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(7)** — Further, it happens at times that a person is wounded for the faith, and survives for some time. Now it is clear that such a one is a martyr, and yet seemingly an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(8)** — Further, some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods than from the affliction even of their own body and this is shown by their bearing many afflictions for the sake of gain. Therefore if they be despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ’s sake they would seem to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(9)** — Further, a martyr would seem to be no other than one who dies for the faith, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vii): “They are called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin: because they suffered in order to bear witness to Christ, and strove unto death for the truth.” Now there are virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice, charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole is due to them. Therefore seemingly neither is an aureole due to martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(10)** — Further, even as the truth of faith is from God, so is all other truth, as Ambrose [\*Spurious work on ~~4th~~ 1 Corinthians 12:3: “No man can say,” etc.] declares, since “every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Ghost.” Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers death for the truth of faith, in like manner it is also due to those who suffer death for any other virtue: and yet apparently this is not the case.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(11)** — Further, the common good is greater than the good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just war in order to save his country, an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put to death in order to keep the faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him: and consequently the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-O(12)** — Further, all merit proceeds from the free will. Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of the free will. Therefore they did not merit an aureole: and consequently an aureole is not due to all martyrs.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6) — *On the contrary*,** Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xlv): “No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom.” Now an aureole is due to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom.

Further, the crown is due to one who has striven. But in martyrdom the strife presents a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is due thereto.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6) — *I answer that*,** Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion that is inflicted from without. Wherefore, just as a special crown, which we call an aureole, is due to the most perfect victory whereby we triumph over the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virginity, so too

an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that is won against external assaults. Now the most perfect victory over passion caused from without is considered from two points of view. First from the greatness of the passion. Now among all passions inflicted from without, death holds the first place, just as sexual concupiscences are chief among internal passions. Consequently, when a man conquers death and things directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory is considered from the point of view of the motive of conflict, when, to wit, a man strives for the most honorable cause; which is Christ Himself. Both these things are to be found in martyrdom, which is death suffered for Christ's sake: for "it is not the pain but the cause that makes the martyr," as Augustine says (*Contra Crescon.* iii). Consequently an aureole is due to martyrdom as well as to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(1)** — To suffer death for Christ's sake, is absolutely speaking, a work of supererogation; since every one is not bound to confess his faith in the face of a persecutor: yet in certain cases it is necessary for salvation, when, to wit, a person is seized by a persecutor and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due to a work of supererogation, not as such, but as having a certain perfection. Wherefore so long as this perfection remains, even though the supererogation cease, one merits the aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(2)** — A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect of the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily: since we merit only through that which is in us. And the more that which one suffers voluntarily is difficult and naturally repugnant to the will the more is the will that suffers it for Christ's sake shown to be firmly established in Christ, and consequently a higher reward is due to him.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(3)** — There are certain acts which, in their very selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty: and in such the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit, for as much as in the performance of the act the will, on account of the aforesaid intensity, must needs undergo an alteration from the state in which it was before. Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs an act of lust sins more than one who merely consents in the act, because in the very act

the will is increased. In like manner since in the act of suffering martyrdom there is a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach the degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by reason of its difficulty: although, indeed it may possibly attain to a higher reward, if we consider the root of merit since the will of one man to suffer martyrdom may possibly proceed from a greater charity than another man's act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or greater than that which is due to an actual martyr. But the aureole is due to the difficulty inherent to the conflict itself of martyrdom: wherefore it is not due to those who are martyrs only in will.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(4)** — Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter of temperance, hold the chief place among all pleasures both internal and external, so pains of touch surpass all other pains. Consequently an aureole is due to the difficulty of suffering pains of touch, for instance, from blows and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of bearing internal sufferings, by reason of which, however, one is not properly called a martyr, except by a kind of comparison. It is in this sense that Jerome speaks.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(5)** — The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom properly speaking, because they do not consist in things directed to the causing of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh: and if any one go beyond this measure, such afflictions will be deserving of blame. However such afflictions are spoken of as a martyrdom by a kind of comparison. and they surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in intensity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(6)** — According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i) it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever; unless perchance it be done by Divine instinct as an example of fortitude that others may despise death. Those to whom the objection refers are believed to have brought death on themselves by Divine instinct, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom [\*Cf. **P(2b)**, **Q(64)**, **A(5)**].

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(7)** — If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole: as instanced in blessed Cecilia who survived for three days, and many martyrs who died in

prison. But, even if the wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the occasion of his dying, he is believed to merit the aureole: although some say that he does not merit the aureole if he happen to die through his own carelessness or neglect. For this neglect would not have occasioned his death, except on the supposition of the wound which he received for the faith: and consequently this wound previously received for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal wound received, or again if the wounds received were not mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still merit the aureole. Hence the martyrdom of some saints is celebrated in the Church for that they died in prison, having been wounded long before, as in the case of Pope Marcellus. Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ's sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr and merits the aureole. If, however, it be not continued unto death, this is not a reason for calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in peace, although previously he had undergone certain sufferings.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(8)** — Even as temperance is not about pleasures of money, honors, and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being the principal of all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest of all (Ethic. iii, 6). Consequently the aureole is due to such injuries only as are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause death. Accordingly whether a person lose his temporalities, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible to love ordinate external things more than one's body; and inordinate love does not help one to merit an aureole: nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the body and other like things [\*Cf. **P(2b)**, **Q(124)**, **A(5)**].

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(9)** — The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, inasmuch as the works which Christ perfects in us bear

witness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(10)** — The truth of faith has Christ for end and object; and therefore the confession thereof, if suffering be added thereto, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for instance if a person were willing to be slain for Christ's sake rather than sin against Him by telling any lie whatever.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(11)** — The uncreated good surpasses all created good. Hence any created end, whether it be the common or a private good, cannot confer so great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, to wit, an act is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for instance, if he defend his country from the attack of an enemy who designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and suffer death in that defense.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(6)-RO(12)** — Some say that the use of reason was by the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even as in John the Baptist while yet in his mother's womb: and in that case they were truly martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. others say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in will: and this seems to be the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above (**O(3)**). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not fulfill all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in so far as they rejoice in having. been slain in Christ's service; thus it was stated above (**A(5)**) in reference to baptized children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence and carnal integrity [\*Cf. **P(2b)**, **Q(124)**, **A(1)**, ad 1, where St. Thomas declares that the Holy Innocents were truly martyrs.]

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)*****Whether an aureole is due to doctors?***

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. For every reward to be had in the life to come will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, teaching and preaching are the result of studying and being taught. Now the things that are rewarded in the future life are not acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future life for teaching and preaching.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, exaltation in the life to come corresponds to humiliation in the present life, because "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (<sup><492></sup>Matthew 23:12). But there is no humiliation in teaching and preaching, in fact they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on <sup><405></sup>Matthew 4:5, "Then the devil took Him up," says that "the devil deceives many who are puffed up with the honor of the master's chair." Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7) — *On the contrary*,** A gloss on <sup><405></sup>Ephesians 1:18,19, "That you may know... what is the exceeding greatness," etc. says: "The holy doctors will have an increase of glory above that which all have in common." Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)** — Further, a gloss on <sup><282></sup>Canticle of Canticles 8:12, "My vineyard is before me," says: "He describes the peculiar reward which He has prepared for His doctors." Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward: and we call this an aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7) — *I answer that*,** Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most perfect victory gained over the devil, when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone, but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching:



wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who are competent to preach and teach by virtue of their office. but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the habit, but to the actual strife, according to <sup>2</sup> Timothy 2:5, “He... shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned, except he strive lawfully.”

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)-RO(1)** — Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue, namely mercy, wherefore they are reckoned among the spiritual alms deeds [\*Cf. **P(2b), Q(32), A(2)**].

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)-RO(2)** — Although ability to preach and teach is sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will, which is informed with charity infused by God: and thus its act can be meritorious.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(7)-RO(3)** — Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from that exaltation: whereas he who turns that exaltation to the profit of others acquires thereby a reward for himself. Still, when it is stated that an aureole is due to teaching, this is to be understood of the teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is expelled from men’s hearts, as by a kind of spiritual weapon, of which it is said (<sup>2</sup> Corinthians 10:4): “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual” [Vulg.: ‘but mighty to God’].

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)**

### *Whether an aureole is due to Christ?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. For an aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, whatever is most perfect in human things must ne especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due to Christ.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)-O(3)** — Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.) that “virginity bears a likeness to God.” Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in God. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due to Christ even as God.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)** — *On the contrary*, An aureole is described as “joy in being conformed to Christ.” Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the Philosopher says (Metaph., lib. ix, 3). Therefore an aureole is not due to Christ.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)** — Further, Christ’s reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole from the moment of His conception, since then He had never fought. Therefore He never had an aureole afterwards.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)** — *I answer that*, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that Christ has an aureole in its strict sense, seeing that in Him there is both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole is not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminutive term it follows that it denotes something possessed by participation and not in its fulness. Wherefore an aureole is becoming to those who participate in the perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory is realized. And therefore, since in Christ the notion of victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made victors — as shown by the words of <sup><4963></sup>John 16:33, “Have confidence, I have overcome the world,” and <sup><4964></sup>Revelation 5:5, “Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda... hath prevailed” — it is not becoming for Christ to have an aureole, but to have something from which all aureoles are derived. Hence it is written (<sup><4965></sup>Revelation 3:21):

“To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me  
in My throne, as I also have overcome, and am set down  
in My Father’s throne [Vulg.: ‘With My Father in His throne’].

Therefore we must say with others that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole in Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent than any aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)-RO(1)** — Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor; yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a negligible quantity in comparison with the greatness of His essential reward. Hence He has not an aureole in its proper sense.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)-RO(2)** — Although the aureole is due to a most perfect work, yet with regard to us, so far as it is a diminutive term, it denotes the participation of a perfection derived from one in whom that perfection is found in its fulness. Accordingly it implies a certain inferiority, and thus it is not found in Christ in Whom is the fulness of every perfection.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(8)-RO(3)** — Although in some way virginity has its exemplar in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates is not in God in the same way as in a virgin.

## **P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)**

### *Whether an aureole is due to the angels?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)-O(1)** — It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. For Jerome (Serm. de Assump. [\*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. ix]) speaking of virginity says: “To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is to live as an angel rather than as a man”: and a gloss on <sup>41725</sup>1 Corinthians 7:26, “For the present necessity,” says that “virginity is the portion of the angels.” Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity, it would seem due to the angels.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, incorruption of the spirit is more excellent than incorruption of the flesh. Now there is incorruption of spirit in the angels, since they never sinned. Therefore an aureole is due to them

rather than to men incorrupt in the flesh and who have sinned at some time.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)-O(3)** — Further, an aureole is due to teaching. Now angels teach us by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(111)**, **A(1)**] us, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ecclesiastes vi). Therefore at least the aureole of doctors is due to them.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~2~~<sup>1</sup> Timothy 2:5):

“He... shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned,  
except he strive lawfully.”

But there is no conflict in the angels. Therefore an aureole is not due to them.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)** — Further, an aureole is not due to an act that is not performed through the body: wherefore it is not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom or teaching, if they do not practice them outwardly. But angels are incorporeal spirits. Therefore they have no aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)** — *I answer that*, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfection of surpassing merit. Now those things which make for perfect merit in man are connatural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an aureole in the same sense as an aureole is due to men.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)-RO(1)** — Virginity is said to be an angelic life, in so far as virgins imitate by grace what angels have by nature. For it is not owing to a virtue that angels abstain altogether from pleasures of the flesh, since they are incapable of such pleasures.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)-RO(2)** — Perpetual incorruption of the spirit in the angels merits their essential reward: because it is necessary for their salvation, since in them recovery is impossible after they have fallen [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(64)**, **A(2)**].

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(9)-RO(3)** — The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to their glory and their common state: wherefore they do not merit an aureole thereby.

## P(4)-Q(96)-A(10)

### *Whether an aureole is also due to the body?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(10)-O(1)** — It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. For the essential reward is greater than the accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental reward.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(10)-O(2)** — Further, punishment in soul and body corresponds to sin committed through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body is due to merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited through works of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to the body.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(10)-O(3)** — Further, a certain fulness of virtue will shine forth in the bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in their bodily scars: wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): “We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ’s name. Perchance indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty, though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue.” Therefore it would seem that the martyr’s aureole is also in his body; and in like manner the aureoles of others.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(10) — *On the contrary*,** The souls now in heaven have aureoles; and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul and not the body.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(10) —** Further, all merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should be in the soul.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(10) — *I answer that*,** Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind: since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the joy in the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy in the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness: so that the

aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth in the body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. It must be observed, however, that the beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole in which such scars will not appear, for instance those who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of prison.

### **P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)**

#### *Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned, those of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-O(1)** — It would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence. Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole corresponding to the virtue of justice.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-O(2)** — Further, a gloss on <sup><1025></sup>Exodus 25:25: “A polished crown, etc. says that a golden [aurea] crown is added, when the Gospel promises eternal life to those who keep the commandments: ‘If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments’ ( <sup><1037></sup>Matthew 19:17). To this is added the little golden crown [aureola] when it is said: ‘If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor’” ( <sup><1029></sup>Matthew 19:21). Therefore an aureole is due to poverty.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-O(3)** — Further, a man subjects himself wholly to God by the vow of obedience: wherefore the greatest perfection consists in the vow of obedience. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due thereto.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-O(4)** — Further, there are also many other works of supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many aureoles besides the aforesaid three.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-O(5)** — Further, just as a man spreads the faith by preaching and teaching, so does he by publishing written works. Therefore a fourth aureole is due to those who do this.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)** — *I answer that*, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional victory: wherefore the three aureoles are assigned in accordance with the exceptional victories in the three conflicts which beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. Wherefore an aureole is due to virginity. In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to suffer the world's persecution even until death: wherefore the second aureole is due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from oneself but also from the hearts of others: this is done by teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to doctors and preachers.

Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with the three powers of the soul, by saying that the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the soul's three highest powers. For the act of the rational power is to publish the truth of faith even to others, and to this act the aureole of doctors is due: the highest act of the irascible power is to overcome even death for Christ's sake, and to this act the aureole of martyrs is due: and the highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.

Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with those things whereby we are most signally conformed to Christ. For He was the mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by manifesting to the world the truth which He had received from the Father; He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution of the world; and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Wherefore doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly conformed to Him: and for this reason an aureole is due to them.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-RO(1)** — There is no conflict to be observed in the act of justice as in the acts of the other virtues. Nor is it true that to teach is an act of prudence: in fact rather is it an act of charity or mercy —

inasmuch as it is by such like habits that we are inclined to the practice of such an act — or again of wisdom, as directing it.

We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces all the virtues, wherefore a special aureole is not due to it.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-RO(2)** — Although poverty is a work of perfection, it does not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of temporalities assails a man less than carnal concupiscence or persecution whereby his own body is broken. Hence an aureole is not due to poverty; but judicial power by reason of the humiliation consequent upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the broad sense for any reward given for excellent merit.

We reply in the same way to the Third and Fourth Objections.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(11)-RO(5)** — An aureole is due to those who commit the sacred doctrine to writing; but it is not distinct from the aureole of doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way of teaching.

## **P(4)-Q(96)-A(12)**

### *Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest of all?*

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(12)-O(1)** — It would seem that the virgin's aureole is the greatest of all. For it is said of virgins (<sup>640</sup>Revelation 14:4) that they “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and (<sup>640</sup>Revelation 14:3) that “no” other “man could say the canticle” which the virgins sang. Therefore virgins have the most excellent aureole.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(12)-O(2)** — Further, Cyprian (De Habit. Virg.) says of virgins that they are “the more illustrious portion of Christ's flock.” Therefore the greater aureole is due to them.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(12)-O(3)** — Again, it would seem that the martyr's aureole is the greatest. For Aymo, commenting on <sup>640</sup>Revelation 14:3, “No man could say the hymn,” says that “virgins do not all take precedence of married folk; but only those who in addition to the observance of virginity are by the tortures of their passion on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom.” Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its



precedence over other states: and consequently a greater aureole is due to virginity.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(12)-O(4)** — Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to doctors. Because the Church militant is modelled after the Church triumphant. Now in the Church militant the greatest honor is due to doctors (<sup>487</sup>1 Timothy 5:17):

“Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine.”

Therefore a greater aureole is due to them in the Church triumphant.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(12)** — *I answer that*, Precedence of one aureole over another may be considered from two standpoints. First, from the point of view of the conflicts, that aureole being considered greater which is due to the more strenuous battle. Looking at it thus the martyr’s aureole takes precedence of the others in one way, and the virgin’s in another. For the martyr’s battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely painful; while the conflict with the flesh is fraught with greater danger, inasmuch as it is more lasting and threatens us at closer quarters. Secondly, from the point of view of the things about which the battle is fought: and thus the doctor’s aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict is about intelligible goods. while the other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is more essential to the aureole; since the aureole, according to its proper character, regards the victory and the battle, and the difficulty of fighting which is viewed from the standpoint of the battle is of greater importance than that which is considered from our standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr’s aureole is simply the greatest of all: for which reason a gloss on <sup>488</sup>Matthew 5:10, says that “all the other beatitudes are perfected in the eighth, which refers to the martyrs,” namely, “Blessed are they that suffer persecution.” For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some particular way. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)*****Whether one person has an aureole more excellently than another person?***

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)-O(1)** — It would seem that one person has not the aureole either of virginity, or of martyrdom, or of doctrine more perfectly than another person. For things which have reached their term are not subject to intension or remission. Now the aureole is due to works which have reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is not subject to intension or remission.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)-O(2)** — Further, virginity is not subject to being more or less, since it denotes a kind of privation; and privations are not subject to intension or remission. Therefore neither does the reward of virginity, the virgin's aureole to wit, receive intension or remission.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)** — *On the contrary*, The aureole is added to the aurea. But the aurea is more intense in one than in another. Therefore the aureole is also.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)** — *I answer that*, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards must needs be diversified, according as merits are diversified: for the intension or remission of a thing follows from the intension or remission of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser: wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser.

We must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be intensified in two ways: first, on the part of its cause, secondly on the part of the work. For there may happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or is more constant in preaching, or again withdraws himself more from carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the aurea corresponds to the intension of merit derived from its root; while intension of the aureole corresponds to intension of merit derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is possible for one who merits less in martyrdom as to his essential reward, to receive a greater aureole for his martyrdom.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)-RO(1)** — The merits to which an aureole is due do not reach the term of their perfection simply, but according to their species: even as fire is specifically the most subtle of bodies. Hence nothing hinders one aureole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is more subtle than another.

**P(4)-Q(96)-A(13)-RO(2)** — The virginity of one may be greater than the virginity of another, by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which is contrary to virginity: so that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids more the occasions of corruption. For in this way privations may increase, as when a man is said to be more blind, if he be removed further from the possession of sight.

## QUESTION 97

# OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED

### (SEVEN ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned after the judgment:

- (1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by which their bodies will be tormented;
- (2) matters relating to their will and intellect;
- (3) God's justice and mercy in regard to the damned.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of fire?
- (2) Whether the worm by which they are tormented is corporeal?
- (3) Whether their weeping is corporeal?
- (4) Whether their darkness is material?
- (5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal?
- (6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire?
- (7) Whether this fire is beneath the earth?

### P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)

*Whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire?*

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire; because <sup><1254</sup>Matthew 25:41,

where their condemnation is declared, mention is made of fire only, in the words: “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, even as the punishment of purgatory is due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of ~~4683~~ 1 Corinthians 3:13: “The fire shall try every man’s work, of what sort it is.” Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than of fire.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various punishments, but that of fire alone.

*On the contrary,* It is written (~~4900~~ Psalm 10:7):

“Fire and brimstone and storms of winds shall be  
the portion of their cup.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)** — Further, it is written (~~4349~~ Job 24:19):

“Let him pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)** — *I answer that,* According to Basil (Homilia vi in Hexaemeron and Hom. i in Psalm 38), at the final cleansing of the world, there will be a separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5:21, “the whole world will fight with Him against the unwise.” This is also becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from one by sin, and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so should they be tormented in many ways and from many sources.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)-RO(2)** — It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it be intense.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The punishment of purgatory is not intended chiefly to torment but to cleanse: wherefore it should be inflicted by fire alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the comparison fails.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most intense cold without this giving them any respite: because they will suffer from external agencies, not by the transmutation of their body from its original natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their material being.

## **P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)**

### *Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal?*

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is corporeal. Because flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm: “He will give fire and worms into their flesh” (Judith 16:21), and: “The vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms” (Ecclus. 7:19). Therefore that worm will be corporeal.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 9):... “Both, namely fire and worm, will be the punishment of the body.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 22): “The unquenchable fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal sense, to the body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this seems the more probable.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only the body of

man, because the former are not directed to incorruption [\*Cf. **Q(91), A(5)**], nor after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The very souls of the damned are called their flesh for as much as they were subject to the flesh. Or we may reply that the flesh will be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be understood materially, than that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his words in this passage.

### **P(4)-Q(97)-A(3)**

#### *Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal?*

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal. For a gloss on <sup><623></sup>Luke 13:28, “There will be weeping,” says that “the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection of the body.” But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure of the sin, according to <sup><624></sup>Revelation 18:7:

“As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so  
much torment and sorrow give ye to her.”

Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Two things are to be observed in corporeal weeping. One is the resolution of tears: and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears that humor needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape of tears. Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for corporeal weeping to be in the damned. The other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect weeping will be possible in the damned after the resurrection: for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but also from within, according as the body is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

## **P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)**

### ***Whether the damned are in material darkness?***

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned are not in material darkness. For commenting on <sup>1302</sup>Job 10:22, “But everlasting horror dwelleth,” Gregory says (Moral. ix): “Although that fire will give no light for comfort, yet, that it may torment the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither from the world.” Therefore the darkness there is not material.



**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the damned see their own punishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there is no material darkness there.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, there the damned will have the power of sight after being reunited to their bodies. But this power would be useless to them unless they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>412f</sup> Matthew 22:13): “Bind his hands and his feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness.” Commenting on these words Gregory says (Moral. ix): If this fire gave any light, “he would by no means be described as cast into exterior darkness.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)** — Further, Basil says (Hom. i in <sup>413f</sup> Psalm 28:7, “The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire”) that “by God’s might the brightness of the fire will be separated from its power of burning, so that its brightness will conduce to the joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of the damned.” Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)** — Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided above (**Q(86)**).

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Wherefore accordingly both light and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as stated in Metaph. i, “the sense of sight is most esteemed, because thereby many things are known.”

Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when we see things that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and darkness, that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the heart. Wherefore, simply speaking, the place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, there is a certain amount of light, as much as suffices for seeing those things which are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the

earth, where hell is said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.

Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the damned, which will be darkened utterly.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

### **P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)**

#### *Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?*

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and “demons, and his men” [\*Cf. ~~2~~ 2 Thessalonians 2:3: “And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition.”], namely Antichrist, “together with the ungodly and sinners will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but such as God knoweth.” Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will not be corporeal.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, the souls of the damned when severed from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 32): “In my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal.” Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake, rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): “There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves.” Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, He says (Dial. iv, 29): “I doubt not that the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)** — Further, it is written (Wis. 5:21): “The... world shall fight... against the unwise.” But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they considered it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul’s delight after death that seem to denote bodily pleasure — for instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so forth — must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions of the soul’s suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment — for instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is suffering various pains on account of such like images being in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (Genesis ad lit. xii, 32), as is clear from the

text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body — thus following somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (*De Anima* i, text. 53) to have maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (*Dial.* iv) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of *Sentent.* iv, D, 44, clearly admits (*De Civ. Dei* xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for the present. We have said elsewhere (**Q(70), A(3)**) how the souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a

place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(5)-RO(3)** — That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art requires.

### **P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)**

#### *Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?*

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as the corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): “In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone.” But all or nearly all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same species as this.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, Gregory commenting on <sup>1801P</sup> Job 10:26, “A fire that is not kindled shall devour him,” says (Moral. xv): “Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled by human endeavor, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat.” Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, the everlasting and the corruptible differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire” (<sup>425H</sup> Matthew 25:41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-O(4)** — Further, it belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of ~~1885~~ Job 18:5: “Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?” Therefore... as above.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 6), “every water is of the same species as every other water.” Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)** — Further, it is written (Wis. 11:17): “By what things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented.” Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those same things.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other bodies for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as in burning coal, or of air as in the flame. Under whatever conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know not. And in this way it may differ specifically from the fire we have, considered materially. It has, however, certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of the fire.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-RO(1)** — Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to its matter, and not with regard to its nature.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-RO(2)** — This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30:33): “The breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-RO(3)** — Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell whereby those bodies will be punished.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(6)-RO(4)** — To give light does not belong to fire according to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light; wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different species.

## **P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)**

### ***Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?***

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For it is said of the damned (<sup><1818></sup> Job 18:18), “And God shall remove him out of the globe [Douay: ‘world’].” Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, after the day of judgment the bodies of all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place. Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding great, for “the number of fools is infinite” (<sup>2015</sup>Ecclesiastes 1:15), the space containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the center. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-O(4)** — Further, “By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>2349</sup>Isaiah 14:9): “Hell below was in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming.” Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)** — Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): “I see not what hinders us from believing that hell is beneath the earth.”

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)** — Further, a gloss on <sup>3004</sup>Jonah 2:4, “Thou hast cast me forth... into the heart of the sea,” says, “i.e. into hell,” and in the Gospel (<sup>4124</sup>Matthew 12:40) the words “in the heart of the earth” have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), “I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one.”

Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) having been questioned on this point answers: “About this matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some part of the earth’s surface; others think it to be beneath the earth.” He shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: “If we call it the nether regions (infernus [\*The Latin for ‘hell’]), for the reason that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth.” Secondly, from the words of <sup>6685</sup>Revelation 5:3:



“No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth,  
nor under the earth, to open the book”:

where the words “in heaven” refer to the angels, “on earth” to men living in the body, and “under the earth” to souls in hell. Augustine too (Genesis ad lit. xii, 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that “whereas the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth.” The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of body). Wherefore “just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful”; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it signify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) says that “hell is stated or believed to be under the earth,” because he withdraws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: “Methinks I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth.” However, some philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that “the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments.” But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained (**Q(91)**, **A(2)**).

Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et Mundo ii). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it is beneath the earth.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-RO(1)** — The words of Job, “God shall remove him out of the globe,” refer to the surface of the earth [\*”De orbe terrarum,” which might be rendered “from the land of the living.”], i.e. from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: “He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away

from this world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness.” Nor does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-RO(2)** — Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things were to remain in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of the earth.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-RO(3)** — Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things that “never are satisfied” (~~CHRIS~~ Proverbs 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable that God’s power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(97)-A(7)-RO(4)** — It does not follow of necessity that “by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented,” except as regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since “inordinate love is its own punishment,” as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).

## QUESTION 98

# OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED

### (NINE ARTICLES)

We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
- (2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?
- (3) Whether they would rather not be than be?
- (4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?
- (5) Whether the wicked hate God?
- (6) Whether they can demerit?
- (7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?
- (8) Whether they ever think of God?
- (9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?

### P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)

#### *Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?*

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “the demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand.” Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “evil is altogether involuntary.” Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is

directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, some will be damned who, while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(64)**, **A(2)**]. Further, as the will of the damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that account.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)-RO(1)** — The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil circumstances [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(64)**, **A(2)**, ad 5].

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which

will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.

## **P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)**

### ***Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?***

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticum [\*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that “the damned ever consent to the evil they have done.” Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), “death is to man what their fall was to the angels.” But the angel’s will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(64), A(2)**]. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those “who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things” (<sup>212</sup>Proverbs 2:14). Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): “Repenting within themselves [Vulg.: ‘Saying within themselves, repenting’].”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)** — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that “the wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in

which previously they took pleasure.” Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the more.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-RO(2)** — To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the wicked.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-RO(3)** — It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely the punishment.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(2)-RO(4)** — However obstinate men may be in this world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus Augustine says (QQ(83), qu. 36): “We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)**

*Whether the damned by right and  
deliberate reason would wish not to be?*

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 7): “Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8): “Preference supposes election.” But “not to be” is not eligible; since it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more desirable to the damned than “to be.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now “not to be” is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore “not to be” is more to be shunned than to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>2018</sup> Revelation 9:6):

“In those days men... shall desire to die,  
and death shall fly from them.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)** — Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): “O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg.: ‘patience’].” Much more, therefore, is “not to be” desirable to the damned according to their deliberate reason.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus “not to be” takes on the aspect of good, since “to lack an evil is a kind of good” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (<sup>2018</sup> Matthew 26:24): “It were better for him, if that man had not been born,” and (<sup>2018</sup> Jeremiah 20:14): “Cursed be the day wherein I was born,” where a gloss of Jerome observes: “It is better not to be than to be evilly.” In this sense the damned can prefer “not to be” according to their deliberate reason [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(5), A(2)**, ad 3].

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)-RO(1)** — The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense that “not to be” is eligible, not in itself but accidentally, as

putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that “to be” and “to live” are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)-RO(2)** — Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but only accidentally, as stated already.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(3)-RO(3)** — Although “not to be” is very evil, in so far as it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred “not to be.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)**

***Whether in hell the damned would wish others  
were damned who are not damned?***

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (<sup>2167</sup> Luke 16:27, 28) of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come “into the place of torments.” Therefore in like manner the other damned would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be damned in hell.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i.e. that they should be damned.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are saved.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4) — *On the contrary*,** A gloss on <sup>2349</sup> Isaiah 14:9, “are risen up from their thrones,” says: “The wicked are comforted by having many companions in their punishment.”



**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)** — Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.

I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate. Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (<sup>23rd</sup> Isaiah 26:11): “Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy enemies.” Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)-RO(1)** — So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned, and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Love that is not based on virtue is easily voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4). Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one’s punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)**

### *Whether the damned hate God?*

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “the beautiful and good that is

the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all.” But this is God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone’s hate.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can one will badness itself since “evil is altogether involuntary,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore no one can hate Him.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (~~Ps~~ Psalm 73:23): “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them [\*Cf. **Q(90)**, **A(3)**, ad 2; **P(2b)**, **Q(34)**, **A(1)**].

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)-RO(1)** — The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite. and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above (**A(1)**) [\*Cf.

**P(2b)**, **Q(34)**, **A(1)**, ad 1 where St. Thomas gives another answer].

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(5)-RO(2)** — This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)**

### *Whether the damned demerit?*

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have an evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent. 4:But they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they demerit not there, their damnation is to their advantage.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, the damned are on the same footing as the demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (<sup>Gen 3:14,15</sup>Genesis 3:14,15). Therefore the damned also demerit.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)-O(3)** — Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate will is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of which one is oneself the cause: for the “drunken man deserves a double punishment” if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. iii). Now the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds from their free will, they are not excused from demerit.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(48), A(5)**]. Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse will of the damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)** — Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since then there “will cease to be two cities,” according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would be augmented.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the state of happiness and their contraries to the state of unhappiness (Ethic. i, 9,10).

On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the essential

reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and some to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(62), A(9)**, ad 3; **P(2b), Q(13), A(4)**, ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit.].

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)-RO(1)** — It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage from their sin.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter demerit as regards their secondary punishment [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(62), A(9)**, ad 3; **P(2b), Q(13), A(4)**, ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit].

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(6)-RO(3)** — The reason why they are not excused from demerit is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because they have reached the highest of evils.

However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause, in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)**

***Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge  
they had in this world?***

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that

they have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)-O(2)** — Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any pains of this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in hell.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)-O(3)** — Further, the damned are subject to time. But “length of time is the cause of forgetfulness” (Phys. lib. iv, 13). Therefore the damned will forget what they knew here.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)** — *On the contrary*, It is said to the rich man who was damned (<sup>cf.</sup> Luke 16:25): “Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime,” etc. Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)** — Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (**Q(70)**, **A(2)**, ad 3; **P(1)**, **Q(89)**, **AA(5),6**). Therefore, if they could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)** — *I answer that*, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew heretofore as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments. Likewise

they will be tormented with the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which they might have acquired.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)-RO(1)** — Although the consideration of knowledge is delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as explained above.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)-RO(2)** — In this world the soul is united to a corruptible body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by the suffering of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be so drawn by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul will have a most clear view of those things that can be a cause of anguish to it.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(7)-RO(3)** — Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But after the judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens; wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly movement.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(8)**

### *Whether the damned will ever think of God?*

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(8)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God. For one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now the damned will hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the last Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(8)-O(2)** — Further, the damned will have remorse of conscience. But the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore they will sometimes think of God.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(8)** — *On the contrary*, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest imperfection. Therefore they will not think of God.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(8)** — *I answer that*, one may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount of all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in this way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the damned will think of God.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(8)-RO(1)** — The damned do not hate God except because He punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine commandment.

### **P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)**

#### *Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?*

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)-O(1)** — It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on <sup><1401</sup>Job 14:21, “Whether his children come to honor,” etc. says (Moral. xii): “Even as those who still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the dead who have lived in the body know not the things which regard the life of those who are in the flesh.” Much less, therefore, can they see the glory of the blessed.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)-O(2)** — Further, that which is granted as a great favor to the saints in this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted as a great favor to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for ever with God (<sup><1402</sup>2 Corinthians 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory of the saints.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)** — *On the contrary*, It is stated (<sup><1403</sup>Luke 16:23) that the rich man in the midst of his torments “saw Abraham... and Lazarus in his bosom.”

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)** — *I answer that*, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is like, but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve for their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory. Hence it is written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: “Seeing it” they “shall be troubled with terrible fear.” After the judgment day, however, they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it; because they will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will be tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory which the saints merit to have.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)-RO(1)** — The happenings of this life would not, if seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints; wherefore the things which happen here are not shown to the damned in the same way as the saints’ glory; although also of the things that happen here those are shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.

**P(4)-Q(98)-A(9)-RO(2)** — Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints live with God [\*Cf. **P(2b)**, **Q(185)**, **A(3)**, ad 2], by actual experience thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life to come. Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison fails.



## QUESTION 99

# OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED

### (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?
- (2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end?
- (3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?
- (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?
- (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy?

### P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)

*Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?*

[\*Cf. P(2a), Q(87), AA(3),4]

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be" (<sup>(1851)</sup>Deuteronomy 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punishment should not be eternal.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other. and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other. But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is

infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from one another.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that “punishments are a kind of medicine.” Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [\*The allusion is to Wis. 1:13: “Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living,” as may be gathered from **P(2a)**, **Q(87)**, **A(3)**, **O(3)**]. Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, “nothing accidental lasts for ever” (De Coelo et Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be everlasting.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-O(6)** — Further, the justice of God would seem to require that sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God there is “being” itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punished for ever.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>4156</sup> Matthew 25:46): “These,” namely the wicked, “shall go into everlasting punishment.”

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)** — Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: “Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath

[Vulg.: ‘that everyone... may have’] life everlasting.” Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)** — Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than God. But God’s majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the more grievously is he punished: “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her” (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(87)**, **A(3)**, ad 1]. But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God’s city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11),

“as men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment of the second death.” That the punishment inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end. Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.

We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei.* xii, 12): “He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal.” Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*\*Cf. P(2a), Q(87), A(3), ad 1*]; wherefore Gregory says (*Dial.* iv), it belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For man is “a wind that goeth,” namely to sin, “and returneth not by his own power” (<sup>1371B</sup> Psalm 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin

forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on <sup>184123</sup>Job 41:23, “He shall esteem the deep as growing old” (Moral. xxxiv): “The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live.” Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xlv) that although sin is temporal in act, it is eternal in will.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but equal in duration.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-RO(3)** — The punishments inflicted on those who are not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-RO(4)** — The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): “Almighty God on account of His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the

punishment of the wicked.” Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein, when they see God’s justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (<sup>1571</sup>Psalm 57:12): “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,” etc., and (<sup>2163</sup>Isaiah 66:24): “They,” namely the wicked, “shall be a loathsome sight\* to all flesh,” namely to the saints, as a gloss says. [\*“Ad satietatem visionis,” which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf. **Q(94), A(3)**]. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dial. iv): “The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally.”

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-RO(5)** — Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also will be everlasting.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(1)-RO(6)** — Punishment corresponds to fault, properly speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(85), A(1)**]: and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin.

## P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)

*Whether by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end?*

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written (Wis. 11:24): "Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all things." But among all things the demons also are included, since they are God's creatures. Therefore also their punishment will come to an end.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, "God hath concluded all in sin [Vulg.: 'unbelief'], that He may have mercy on all" (<sup>413</sup>Romans 11:32). Now God has concluded the demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on the demons.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo ii), "it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for happiness." Therefore, since every rational creature was created for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>414</sup>Matthew 25:41):

"Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,  
which is prepared for the devil and his angels."

Therefore they will be punished eternally.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)** — Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is inadmissible.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [\*Cf. **P(1)**, **Q(64)**, **A(2)**] "erred in maintaining that the demons will at length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment." But

this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (~~can~~ Revelation 20:9,10):

“The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets [\*Vulg.: ‘the beast and false prophet,’ etc.] shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever,”

which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God’s mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)-RO(1)** — God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)-RO(2)** — In the words quoted the distribution (of the predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of becoming God’s goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically. For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.



**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)*****Whether God's mercy suffers at least men  
to be punished eternally?***

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-O(1)** — It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is written (<sup><008</sup>Genesis 6:3): "My spirit shall not remain in man for ever because he is flesh"; where "spirit" denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be punished eternally.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-O(3)** — Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (<sup><300</sup>Jonah 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to all.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-O(4)** — Further, the words of (<sup><508</sup>Psalms 76:8) are to the point, where it is said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [\*Vulg.: 'Will God then cast off for ever?']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-O(5)** — Further, a gloss on (<sup><248</sup>Isaiah 14:19), "But thou art cast out," etc. says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt": and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~415~~ Matthew 25:46) of the elect conjointly with the damned: “These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting.” But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3) —** Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) “death is to men what their fall was to the angels.” Now after their fall the angels could not be restored [\*Cf. **P(1), Q(64), A(2)**]. Therefore neither can man after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3) — *I answer that*,** As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who die without charity, since “death is to men what their fall was to the angels,” as Damascene says.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-RO(1) —** This saying refers to man generically, because God’s indignation was at length removed from the human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that which is through Christ.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-RO(2) —** As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory (Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies, that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle says (~~312~~ 2 Timothy 2:25,26), that

“God may give them repentance to know the truth,  
and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil.”

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-RO(3)** — A punishment threatened prophetically is only then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person threatened. Hence:

“I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation... shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them” (~~2810~~ Jeremiah 18:7).

Therefore, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei. xxi, 24): “Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways.”

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-RO(4)** — These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may be called God’s anger on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues (~~2811~~ Psalm 76:11): “This is the change of the right hand of the most High.” We may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: “Will He from His anger shut up His mercies?” but “in His anger,” because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(3)-RO(5)** — This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil’s sin, or of Nabuchodonosor’s.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)*****Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God?***

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God. “For he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (<sup>4160</sup>Mark 16:16). Now this applies to every Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, it is written (<sup>4165</sup>John 6:55): “He that eateth My body and drinketh My blood hath eternal life.” Now this is the meat and drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians will be saved at length.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, “If any man’s work burn, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire” (<sup>4185</sup>1 Corinthians 3:15), where it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, It is written (<sup>4189</sup>1 Corinthians 6:9): “The unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God.” Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently they will be punished for ever.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)** — Further, it is written (<sup>4192</sup>2 Peter 2:21):

“It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them.”

Now those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished for ever.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is

contrary to the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which “it is impossible to please God” (<sup><810f></sup>Hebrews 11:6). Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since according to <sup><812f></sup>2 Peter 2:21, “it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back.” Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written (<sup><812f></sup>James 2:20): “Faith without works is dead,” and (<sup><812f></sup>Matthew 7:21)

“Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord,  
shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth  
the will of My Father Who is in heaven”:

and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment, unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)-RO(1)** — Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [\*Cf. **P(2b), Q(4), A(3)**] “that worketh by love [Vulg.: ‘charity’; <sup><810f></sup>Galatians 5:6]”: wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)-RO(2)** — The saying of our Lord refers not to those who partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily “eat and drink judgment” to themselves (<sup><812f></sup>1 Corinthians 11:29), but to those who eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who approach worthily [\*Cf. **P(3), Q(80), AA(1),2,3**]. Wherefore, so far as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal

life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have received worthily.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(4)-RO(3)** — In this passage of the Apostle the foundation denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins [\*Cf. **P(2a), Q(89), A(2)**] “shall suffer loss,” because he will be punished for them by God; yet “he himself shall be saved” in the end “by fire,” either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after death.

### **P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)**

#### *Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?*

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it is written (<sup><3923></sup>James 2:13): “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy”; and (<sup><4087></sup>Matthew 5:7): “Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy.”

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, (<sup><4255></sup>Matthew 25:35-46) we find a description of our Lord’s discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and consequently the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, it is written (<sup><4062></sup>Matthew 6:12): “Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors,” and further on (<sup><4064></sup>Matthew 6:14):

“For if you will forgive men their offenses,  
your heavenly Father will forgive you also your offenses.”

Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-O(4)** — Further, a gloss of Ambrose on <sup><5008></sup>1 Timothy 4:8, “Godliness is profitable to all things,” says: “The sum total of a

Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment." Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5) — *On the contrary*,** It is written (~~400~~ 1 Corinthians 6:9,10): "Neither fornicators... nor adulterers," etc. "shall possess the kingdom of God." Yet many are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be punished eternally.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5) —** Further, it is written (~~400~~ James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be punished eternally.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5) — *I answer that*,** As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from ~~400~~ 1 Corinthians 13:3. Most evident is this in the case of those who lay hands on other people's property, for after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-RO(1) —** Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at

themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-RO(2)** — The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves “friends of the mammon of iniquity” (~~Q(99)~~ Luke 16:9).

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Our Lord said this to those who ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free altogether.

**P(4)-Q(99)-A(5)-RO(4)** — The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.



# APPENDIX 1

The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement between Questions 70 and 71.

## QUESTION 1

### OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY

#### (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.

Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted with punishment by fire?
- (2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within themselves?

#### **P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)**

*Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire, and are punished by fire?*

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that souls which depart with none but original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For Augustine [\*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament of Baptism will be punished everlastingly." Now punishment

denotes sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of fire.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment. Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is original sin.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, sins are more severely punished after this life than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now, sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this life.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(4)** — Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(5)** — Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible — and no human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state of innocence) — it follows that the bodies of children will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious, so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice, and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the presence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1) — *On the contrary***, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented

with sensible punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore they will not suffer sensible punishment.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)** — Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin (<sup>278</sup>Revelation 18:7): “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” But there is no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore punishment by fire is not due to original sin.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)** — Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he says that “a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice, and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism.” He also gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven, they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the damned: “Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves not honor and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that reason worthy of glory and honor.”

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)** — *I answer that*, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according to the saying of Isaiah (<sup>279</sup>27:8), “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.” Now the defect transmitted to us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary

course of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(1)** — In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the divine vision, even as in Scripture the word “fire” is often wont to signify any kind of punishment.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Of all sins original sin is the least, because it is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial sin. Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with grace; because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without grace, it would be punished eternally.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(3)** — There is no parity between pain of sense before and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing

will act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease, through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all bodily movement and alteration.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(4)** — Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(5)** — The bodies of children will be impassible, not through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering; hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)**

***Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction  
on account of the state in which they are?***

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth.), the punishment of God in that they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision, else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs, suffer none the less.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(4)** — Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ's merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal life on account of Adam's demerit.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(5)** — Further, separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is [\*See **A(1)**, "*On the contrary*"]. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no sorrow.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)** — Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De ira ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed." Now in these children there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could nowise avoid.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)** — *I answer that*, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must explore.

Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(109)**, **AA(5),6**]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise grieve for

being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(1)** — In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the two.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(2)** — Although the will may be directed both to the possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called "velleity" [\*Cf. **P(2a)**, **Q(13)**, **A(5)**, ad 1; **P(3)**, **Q(21)**, **A(4)**] rather than "will"; for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if they were possible.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(3)** — Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss, whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(4)** — The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in <sup>cf. Rom</sup> Romans 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(5)** — Although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.



## QUESTION 2

# OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY

### (SIX ARTICLES)

We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.

Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of this life?
- (2) Whether that punishment is voluntary?
- (3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
- (4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of Purgatory?
- (5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment?
- (6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?

### P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)

*Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass  
all the temporal pains of this life?*

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass all the temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing is the more it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body is more passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety to a fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptible of the agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the

pain which the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, the pains of Purgatory are directly ordained against venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the lightest punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is according to the measure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory is the lightest of all.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin, it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase in one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has been remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment, this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the pain that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to him than all other pains of this life.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)** — *On the contrary*, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De Sanctis): “This fire of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt, seen or conceived in this world.”

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)** — Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case with the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate soul, is greater than any pain suffered by the body.

I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain of sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the least pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For the more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most intense longing — both because their longing is not held back by the weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good — it follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sensible parts cause

the greatest pain. And, because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire is at present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this matter further on [\*Cf. **P(4) Q(70), A(3)**]. Therefore it follows that the pain of Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains of this life.

Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is punished, and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that case the punishment of the damned would be milder after the resurrection than before, which is false.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)-RO(1)** — Although the soul is less passive than the body, it is more cognizant of actual suffering [passionis]: and where the sense of suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the suffering be less.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(1)-RO(2)** — The severity of that punishment is not so much a consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now. Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(2)**

### *Whether this punishment is voluntary?*

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those who are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is to conform one's will to God's, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Psalm 32). Therefore, since it is God's will that they be punished, they will suffer that punishment voluntarily.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(2)-O(2)** — Further, every wise man wills that without which he cannot obtain the end he has in view. Now those who

are in Purgatory know that they cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they are punished willingly.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(2) — *On the contrary*,** No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free, as appears from many incidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv, 40,65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(2) — *I answer that*,** A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by an absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary, because the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the will. Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of the will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health. Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a punishment gladly, and would not have it not to be, as in the case of martyrdom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the punishment, we cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case of natural death: and then the will does not undertake the punishment, and would be delivered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect the punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary.

Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not that they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves damned. But this is false, for did they not know that they will be set free, they would not ask for prayers, as they often do.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(3)**

***Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?***

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(3)-O(1) —** It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons; for, according to the Master, “they will have

for torturers in their pains, those who were their tempters in sin.” Now the demons tempt us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account of venial sins.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(3)-O(2)** — Further, the just are competent to be cleansed from sin both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed by pains inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore after this life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by the demons.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(3)** — *On the contrary*, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone, should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in Purgatory have triumphed over the demons, since they died without mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being punished by them.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(3)** — *I answer that*, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now the elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them. But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank at the angel’s touch [\*<sup>Q125</sup>Genesis 32:25]. Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)***Whether venial sin is expiated  
by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt?*

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(1)** — It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss [\*St. Gregory, Moral. xvi, 28] on <sup><6166></sup>1 John 5:16, “There is a sin unto death,” etc. says: “It is vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life.” Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(2)** — Further, the same subject is freed from sin as falls into sin. But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither can it be loosed from venial sin.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(3)** — Further, Gregory says [\*Dial. iv, 39] that every man will be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because “the tree... wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be” [\*<sup><2118></sup>Ecclesiastes 11:3]. If, then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for venial sin in Purgatory.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(4)** — Further, it has been stated (**P(4) Q(2), A(3)**) that actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then there will be neither merit nor demerit since, according to the Damascene [\*De Fide Orth. ii, 4], “death is to men what the fall was to the angels.” Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in Purgatory as to its guilt.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-O(5)** — Further, venial sin is not in us except on account of the fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned venially, as was stated (Sent. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life there will be no sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul is separated, since it is called the “law of the flesh” (<sup><6100></sup>Romans 7). Hence there will be no venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be expiated by the fire of Purgatory.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)** — *On the contrary*, Gregory [\*Dial. iv, 39] and Augustine [\*De vera et falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author] say that certain slight sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood of the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment. Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their guilt.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)** — Further, wood, hay, stubble (<sup>4182</sup>1 Corinthians 3:12) denote venial sins, as we have said (**P(2a)**, **Q(89)**, **A(2)**). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed in Purgatory. Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)** — *I answer that*, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for a man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial sin. Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed, the powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is cast out. But this opinion is nonsensical in itself and in its proof. In itself, because it is opposed to the statements of holy men and of the Gospel, which cannot be expounded as referring to the remission of venial sins as to their punishment, as the Master says in the text [\*Sentent. iv, D, xxi] because in this way both light and grave sins are remitted in the life to come: while Gregory [\*Dial. iv, 39] declares that light sins alone are remitted after this life. Nor does it suffice for them to say, that this is said expressly of light sins, lest we should think that we shall suffer nothing grievous on their account: because the remission of sin diminishes punishment rather than aggravates it. As to the proof, it is shown to be worthless, since bodily defect, such as obtains at the last moment of life, does not remove the corruption of concupiscence; nor does it diminish it in its root but in its act, as instanced in those who lie dangerously ill; nor again does it calm the powers of the soul, so as to subject them to grace, because tranquillity of

the powers, and their subjection to grace, is effected when the lower powers obey the higher which delight together in God's law. But this cannot happen in that state, since the acts of both kinds of powers are impeded; unless tranquillity denote the absence of combat, as occurs even in those who are asleep; and yet sleep is not said, for this reason, to diminish concupiscence, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to subject them to grace. Moreover, granted that the aforesaid defect diminish concupiscence radically, and that it subject the powers to grace, it would still be insufficient to wash away venial sin already committed, although it would suffice in order to avoid it in the future. Because actual sin, even if it be venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition, as stated above (**P(4) Q(2), A(3)**), however much the latter be in the habitual intention. Now it happens sometimes that a man dies in his sleep, being in a state of grace and yet having a venial sin when he went to sleep: and such a man cannot make an act of contrition for his venial sin before he dies. Nor may we say, as they do, that if he repented neither by act nor by intention, neither in general nor in particular, his venial sin becomes mortal, for that "venial becomes mortal when it is an object of complacency"; because not all complacency in venial sin makes it mortal (else all venial sin would be mortal, since every venial sin pleases for as much as it is voluntary), but only that complacency which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human wickedness consists, in that "we enjoy what we should use," as Augustine says [*\*De Trin. x, 10*]. Hence the complacency which makes a sin mortal is actual complacency, for every mortal sin consists in an act. Now it may happen that a man, after committing a venial sin, has no actual thought of being forgiven or of remaining in that sin, but thinks perhaps about a triangle having its three angles equal to two right angles, and while engaged in this thought falls asleep, and dies.

It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unreasonable: and consequently we must say with others that venial sin in one who dies in a state of grace, is remitted after this life by the fire of Purgatory: because this punishment so far as it is voluntary, will have the power, by virtue of grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible with grace. [*\*St. Thomas expresses himself differently, De Malo, Q(7), A(2), ad 9,17: "Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial sin as to its guilt is remitted in*



Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only as existing in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in detestation of venial sin.”]

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(1)** — The gloss refers to mortal sin. Or it may be replied that although, in this life, it is not amended in itself, it is amended in merits, because a man merited here that his punishment should be meritorious to him there.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(2)** — Venial sin arises from the corruption of the fomes, which will no longer be in the separate soul that is in Purgatory, wherefore this soul cannot sin venially. On the other hand, the remission of venial sin proceeds from the will informed by grace, which will be in the separate soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison fails.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(3)** — Venial sins do not alter a man’s state, for they neither destroy nor diminish charity, according to which the amount of the soul’s gratuitous goodness is measured. Hence the soul remains such as it was before, notwithstanding the remission or commission of venial sins.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(4)** — After this life there can be no merit in respect of the essential reward, but there can be in respect of some accidental reward, so long as man remains in the state of the way, in a sense. Consequently in Purgatory there can be a meritorious act in respect of the remission of venial sin.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(4)-RO(5)** — Although venial sin arises from the proneness of the fomes, sin results in the mind; wherefore even when the fomes is no more, sin can still remain.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)**

***Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers  
from the debt of punishment?***

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)-O(1)** — It would seem that the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from the debt of punishment. For every cleansing is in respect of some uncleanness. But punishment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from punishment.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)-O(2)** — Further, a contrary is not cleansed save by its contrary. But punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore one is not cleansed from the debt of punishment by the punishment of Purgatory.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)-O(3)** — Further, a gloss on ~~4RE~~ 1 Corinthians 3:15, “He shall be saved, yet so,” etc. says: “This fire is the trial of tribulation of which it is written (Ecclus. 27:6): The furnace tries the potter’s vessels,” etc. Therefore man expiates every punishment by the pains of this world, at least by death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the fire of Purgatory.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)** — *On the contrary*, The pains of Purgatory are more grievous than all the pains of this world, as stated above (**A(3)**). Now the satisfactory punishment which one undergoes in this life atones for the debt of punishment. Much more therefore is this effected by the punishment of Purgatory.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)** — *I answer that*, Whosoever is another’s debtor, is freed from his indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment, a person is freed from that obligation by undergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly the punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of punishment.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)-RO(1)** — Although the debt of punishment does not in itself imply uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness by reason of its cause.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)-RO(2)** — Although punishment is not contrary to punishment, it is opposed to the debt of punishment, because the obligation to punishment remains from the fact that one has not undergone the punishment that was due.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(5)-RO(3)** — Many meanings underlie the same words of Holy Writ. Hence this fire may denote both the present tribulation and the punishment to come, and venial sins can be cleansed from both of these. That natural death is not sufficient for this, has been stated above (Sent. iv, D, 20).

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)*****Whether one person is delivered  
from this punishment sooner than another?***

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)-O(1)** — It would seem that one person is not delivered from this punishment sooner than another. For the more grievous the sin, and the greater the debt, the more severely is it punished in Purgatory. Now there is the same proportion between severer punishment and graver fault, as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Therefore one is delivered from this punishment as soon as another.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)-O(2)** — Further, in point of duration unequal merits receive equal retribution both in heaven and in hell. Therefore seemingly it is the same in Purgatory.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)** — *On the contrary*, is the comparison of the Apostle, who denotes the differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. Now it is clear that wood remains longer in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore one venial sin is punished longer in Purgatory than another.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)** — *I answer that*, Some venial sins cling more persistently than others, according as the affections are more inclined to them, and more firmly fixed in them. And since that which clings more persistently is more slowly cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory longer than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in venial sins.

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)-RO(1)** — Severity of punishment corresponds properly speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas the length corresponds to the firmness with which sin has taken root in its subject. Hence it may happen that one may be delayed longer who is tormented less, and “vice versa.”

**P(4)-AP(1)-Q(2)-A(6)-RO(2)** — Mortal sin which deserves the punishment of hell, and charity which deserves the reward of heaven, will, after this life, be immovably rooted in their subject. Hence as to all there is

the same duration in either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is punished in Purgatory, as stated above (**A(6)**).

# APPENDIX 2

## QUESTION 1

### TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY

#### **P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)**

#### *Whether there is a Purgatory after this life?*

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(1)** — It would seem that there is not a Purgatory after this life. For it is said (<sup>641</sup>Revelation 14:13):

“Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From henceforth now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors.”

Therefore after this life no cleansing labor awaits those who die in the Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, since they cannot be cleansed. Therefore there is no Purgatory after this life.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(2)** — Further, as charity is to an eternal reward, so is mortal sin to eternal punishment. Now those who die in mortal sin are forthwith consigned to eternal punishment. Therefore those who die in charity go at once to their reward; and consequently no Purgatory awaits them after this life.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)-O(3)** — Further, God Who is supremely merciful is more inclined to reward good than to punish evil. Now just as those who are in the state of charity, do certain evil things which are not deserving of eternal punishment, so those who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions, generically good, which are not deserving of an eternal reward. Therefore since these good actions are not rewarded after this life in those who will be damned, neither should those evil actions be punished after this life. Hence the same conclusion follows.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1) — *On the contrary*,** It is said (2 Macc. 12:46): “It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins.” Now there is no need to pray for the dead who are in heaven, for they are in no need; nor again for those who are in hell, because they cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there are some not yet loosed from sins, who can be loosed therefrom; and the like have charity, without which sins cannot be loosed, for “charity covereth all sins” [\*<sup>200D</sup>Proverbs 10:12]. Hence they will not be consigned to everlasting death, since “he that liveth and believeth in Me, shall not die for ever” [\*<sup>201D</sup>John 11:26]; nor will they obtain glory without being cleansed, because nothing unclean shall obtain it, as stated in the last chapter of the Apocalypse (verse 14). Therefore some kind of cleansing remains after this life.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1) —** Further, Gregory of Nyssa [\*De iis qui in fide dormiunt] says: “If one who loves and believes in Christ,” has failed to wash away his sins in this life, “he is set free after death by the fire of Purgatory.” Therefore there remains some kind of cleansing after this life.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1) — *I answer that*,** From the conclusions we have drawn above (**P(3)**, **Q(86)**, **AA(4),5**; **P(4) Q(12)**, **A(1)**) it is sufficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for his fault and after being absolved, dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted above, adds: “This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth, and this is our belief; this the universal Church holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed from sins.” This cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory: and whosoever resists the authority of the Church, incurs the note of heresy.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(1) —** The authority quoted is speaking of the labor of working for merit, and not of the labor of suffering to be cleansed.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(2)** — Evil has not a perfect cause, but results from each single defect: whereas good arises from one perfect cause, as Dionysius asserts [\*Div. Nom. iv, 4]. Hence each defect is an obstacle to the perfection of good; while not every good hinders some consummation of evil, since there is never evil without some good. Consequently venial sin prevents one who has charity from obtaining the perfect good, namely eternal life, until he be cleansed; whereas mortal sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined good from bringing a man forthwith to the extreme of evils.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(1)-RO(3)** — He that falls into mortal sin, deadens all the good he has done before, and what he does, while in mortal sin, is dead: since by offending God he deserves to lose all the good he has from God. Wherefore no reward after this life awaits him who dies in mortal sin, whereas sometimes punishment awaits him who dies in charity, which does not always wash away the sin which it finds, but only that which is contrary to it.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)**

*Whether it is the same place where souls are cleansed,  
and the damned punished?*

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(1)** — It would seem that it is not the same place where souls are cleansed and the damned punished. For the punishment of the damned is eternal, according to <sup>1056</sup>Matthew 25:46, “These shall go into everlasting punishment [Vulg.: ‘fire’].” But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 21). Therefore the former and the latter are not punished together in the same place: and consequently these places must needs be distinct.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(2)** — The punishment of hell is called by various names, as in <sup>900</sup>Psalm 10:7, “Fire and brimstone, and storms of winds,” etc., whereas the punishment of Purgatory is called by one name only, namely fire. Therefore they are not punished with the same fire and in the same place.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)-O(3)** — Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii, 16): “It is probable that they are punished in the very places

where they sinned.” And Gregory relates (Dial. iv, 40) that Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found Paschasius being cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are not cleansed in the same place as hell, but in this world.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2) — *On the contrary***, Gregory says [\*The quotation is from St. Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 8)]: “Even as in the same fire gold glistens and straw smokes, so in the same fire the sinner burns and the elect is cleansed.” Therefore the fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of hell: and hence they are in the same place.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2) —** Further, the holy fathers; before the coming of Christ, were in a more worthy place than that wherein souls are now cleansed after death, since there was no pain of sense there. Yet that place was joined to hell, or the same as hell: otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo would not be said to have descended into hell. Therefore Purgatory is either close to, or the same place as, hell.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2) — *I answer that***, Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture about the situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to offer convincing arguments on this question. It is probable, however, and more in keeping with the statements of holy men and the revelations made to many, that there is a twofold place of Purgatory. one, according to the common law; and thus the place of Purgatory is situated below and in proximity to hell, so that it is the same fire which torments the damned in hell and cleanses the just in Purgatory; although the damned being lower in merit, are to be consigned to a lower place. Another place of Purgatory is according to dispensation: and thus sometimes, as we read, some are punished in various places, either that the living may learn, or that the dead may be succored, seeing that their punishment being made known to the living may be mitigated through the prayers of the Church.

Some say, however, that according to the common law the place of Purgatory is where man sins. This does not seem probable, since a man may be punished at the same time for sins committed in various places. And others say that according to the common law they are punished above us, because they are between us and God, as regards their state. But this is of no account, for they are not punished for being above us, but for that which is lowest in them, namely sin.



**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(1)** — The fire of Purgatory is eternal in its substance, but temporary in its cleansing effect.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(2)** — The punishment of hell is for the purpose of affliction, wherefore it is called by the names of things that are wont to afflict us here. But the chief purpose of the punishment of Purgatory is to cleanse us from the remains of sin; and consequently the pain of fire only is ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses and consumes.

**P(4)-AP(2)-Q(1)-A(2)-RO(3)** — This argument considers the point of special dispensation and not that of the common law.