

**The Doctrine of Original Sin, as
Received and Taught by the Churches
of the Reformation Stated and
Defended, and the Error of Dr. Hodge
in Claiming that this Doctrine
Recognizes the Gratuitous Imputation
of Sin, Pointed Out and Refuted (1844)**

ROBERT W. LANDIS

W. W. Wilson
November 24. 18

THE
DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN,

AS

RECEIVED AND TAUGHT

BY

THE CHURCHES OF THE REFORMATION

STATED AND DEFENDED,

AND THE ERROR OF DR. HODGE IN CLAIMING THAT THIS DOCTRINE
RECOGNIZES THE GRATUITOUS IMPUTATION OF SIN, POINTED
OUT AND REFUTED.

BY

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BIOGRAPHICAL.

ROBERT WHARTON LANDIS was born in the city of Philadelphia January 8, 1809. His father, Samuel Calvin Landis, was a descendant of the old Huguenot family of Calvin. His maternal grandfather was a German. When seventeen years of age, he made a profession of faith in Christ by uniting with the Baptist church, of which his parents were members, and at once consecrated himself to the gospel ministry. Taking a school at Stillwater, New Jersey, when nineteen years old, that he might obtain means for carrying on his education, he engaged in earnest and active Christian labors; and assisted by a young friend of like spirit, they were so successful that in two years they left a church where previously there was not a professing Christian. About this time he transferred his membership to the Presbyterian church.

In pursuing his education he had few advantages. Fifteen months in an academy, and three months with a private teacher, embraced his whole course of instruction. His great attainments as a scholar were made by private study, and, for the most part, while he was engaged in active duties,—teaching, preaching, lecturing, or writing for the press.

In December, 1831, he was licensed as a probationer, and one year later was ordained to the full work of the gospel ministry. His first pastorate was with two small churches, Gilead and Rockland, in the State of Pennsylvania. In 1835 he took charge of the churches of Providence and Norriston; in 1839 he went to Allentown; in 1842 to Bethlehem, New Jersey; in 1849 to Hillsdale, New York; in 1852 to Greenville, in the same State; in 1853 to Paterson, New Jersey; in 1856 to Ionia, Michigan; and in 1860 to Somerset, Kentucky. At the beginning of the war he

went to Saint Louis, and for six months supplied the pulpit of the Second Presbyterian Church, while their pastor, Dr. Brookes, was in Europe; after which he entered the United States army as chaplain. In 1865 he resigned his commission to prepare himself for the discharge of the duties of the theological chair in the Danville Seminary, to which the General Assembly had appointed him for the ensuing term, when Dr. Breckinridge would be absent. At the close of the term he went East, and in January, 1867, began his labors at Wilmington, Delaware; but having been elected Professor of Theology at Danville, to succeed Dr. Breckinridge, he returned the same year, and entered upon his duties in that institution, which position he held but one year.

His labors, trials, and illnesses had made such inroads upon his physical constitution that when he left his theological chair he was unfitted for further continuous labors, and the remainder of his life was spent somewhat in seclusion, his time being occupied, when the state of his health permitted, in the work of authorship.

In 1835 he was married to Miss Elizabeth White, of Bristol, Pennsylvania, who lived about fourteen years. In 1856 he married Miss Emma C. Beardslee, of Paterson, New Jersey; but after nineteen months he was again left alone, his wife and a daughter of six months being taken within two days of each other.

In his earlier ministry, Dr. Landis was very popular and very successful as a preacher. His ministry was greatly blessed in building up feeble churches and in the conversion of souls. He was continually called on by pastors, both in the country and in the cities, to aid them in conducting "revival" meetings, in which he was eminently successful.

While living in Philadelphia or its vicinity, he was able to select a library of old theological works from those brought to this country from Europe in colonial times by religious refugees, and from those sent by Napoleon from the monasteries of France, and among them were many books of rare value. He added to them modern works of the highest character, and thus, in the course of years, collected a large and very valuable library. It was selected chiefly with reference to the exposition and defence of the great doctrines which he believed. He made himself acquainted with his books; examining each one with care, and studying most of them thoroughly, whether written in English, Latin, Greek,

Hebrew, Italian, French, or German, he mastered his library, and knew just where to go for any information he desired.

As an author, he gained the reputation of being a vigorous writer, and of possessing vast information, accurate scholarship, and profound learning. As a controversialist he was fearless, but always fair and generous. His first publication was a small work on the Trinity, printed in his twenty-first year, yet of such merit that it long held a place on the list of books for reference at Princeton. When at the age of twenty-nine he sent his articles to the *Biblical Repository*, the editor submitted them to Prof. Moses Stuart, of Andover, who, in his reply, said: "By all means bring so valuable a writer upon the tapis. He is too valuable to have his talents buried. A man who has ability and patience to write and study in this way should not be permitted to lie still." He became from this time a frequent and valued contributor to this and other learned quarterlies. When Prof. Bush published his book on the *Resurrection*, Dr. Landis was one of the first to whom a copy was sent with the request for an expression of opinion upon its merits. This he frankly gave, with the information that he should feel obliged to reply to it. The reply was so thorough an exposure on every side that the editor of the *Presbyterian*, Rev. Dr. Engles, in his notice of the work, said that perhaps it was a defect that the author, in treating the subject, was too anxious to demolish every part of the theory of Prof. Bush. The latter showed his Christian manhood in acknowledging his defeat, erasing the name of that book from the subsequent lists of his publications, and in continuing till his death on terms of intimate friendship with Dr. Landis.

His work on Campbellism, "Rabbah Taken," ranks among the best books brought out by that famous controversy, and did a good work in its day. His "Liberty's Triumph," an epic poem, was used as a text-book in the New York schools. His work on the "Immortality of the Soul" is one of marked ability and learning. Besides these, he wrote other books of less note, furnished for publication a large number of addresses, sermons, poems, and magazine articles, was a constant contributor to various religious journals, and was one of the principal writers for the *Danville Review* during its brief existence.

Dr. Landis has been described as "heroic in mould and mind.

Considerably over six feet in height, he was as erect as an Indian, and had the development of an athlete,—massive and muscular. Above a massive chest was poised a noble and impressive head. Always cleanly shaven, his face was remarkable for the perfection of the large and striking features. In early life he had dark hair, but with age it whitened, and he wore it in long masses, pushed back from his forehead and falling to his neck. The brow was bold and high, and the keen gray eyes were topped by shaggy eyebrows. Everything about him suggested massiveness, and he had a grand leonine movement of limb and sweep of arm that completed the picture. He was an almost perfect specimen of physical manhood, and with this was combined a simple directness of purpose, a kindliness and gentleness of manner, a cool courage and unflinching determination, that marked him as a singularly endowed man."

His last days were spent among his books, which were a solace to him in his loneliness, until his physical sufferings became too great for him to hold converse with the great authors who had been the companions of his life. It has been well said that "his library had a character. Its soul was the Bible. Every book more or less directly helped him to understand or to explain it. As health declined they were neglected. The cluster of books at his side grew less, till the Bible alone was left. With it he began his studies, and with it he closed them." On the 24th of January, 1883, after great and protracted sufferings, which he bore with patience and Christian heroism, he departed this life in the full assurance of a blessed immortality, and with unclouded faith in the Saviour whom he loved so well, and whom he had served so faithfully.

NOTE.

In the autumn of 1877, when Dr. Landis' health was rapidly failing, and his death seemed to be at hand, at his request the Chancellor and President of the Central University of Kentucky visited him at his home in Danville. He then announced to them his desire and purpose to present to that institution his large and valuable library, which he wished them officially to receive. This was done, and the deed of gift was duly recorded. This valuable donation, which was unsolicited and unexpected, was accompanied with the request that the University would publish his work on *Original Sin and Imputation*, which was then in manuscript and ready for the press. Contrary to his expectations, his health improved, and he continued to live until January, 1883, as above stated. Immediately after his death, his executor, according to the requirement of his last will and testament, and of the deed of gift, delivered the library to the authorities of the University, and the manuscript was put into their hands for publication. In accordance, therefore, with the distinguished author's expressed desire, his great and scholarly work is now presented by Central University to the Christian public.

CENTRAL UNIVERSITY,
RICHMOND, KENTUCKY, *July 15th, 1884.*

PREFACE.

THE doctrine concerning Imputation and Original Sin, as inculcated, now and for many years past, in the Theological School at Princeton, (N. J.), was regarded by the late Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, and by many others in our Church, as a radical departure from the recognized Augustinian theology, or Calvinism; and his own position, as stated and defined with great clearness in his Theology, was sustained by the present writer in a series of articles in the *Danville Review* for the years 1861 and 1862. The Princeton Professor, however, has, in his recently issued Theology, reasserted his own views without modification, and has likewise reiterated the announcement (in the accuracy of which we entirely concur) *that the difference in this issue is fundamental to evangelical doctrine.* The design of the present tractate, therefore, is to furnish a thorough historical, theological, and exegetical discussion of the essential points which that issue involves.

When preparing the former essay (consisting of the articles above referred to), though we had not so fully and critically examined the great mass of facts relating to the issue as we have since been able to do, we saw and announced that Dr. Hodge had perpetrated a most unaccountable mistake as to the meaning which the terms *guilt* and *immediate and antecedent imputation* possess in the recognized theology of the Reformation. But we were sanguine enough to suppose that the difference between the theology inculcated at Princeton, and that which was *then* taught at Danville might be lessened by a kindly conducted and thorough discussion, comparing facts and clearly elucidating principles; and we had designed to effect this if possible. That hope, however, was abandoned on the appearance of Dr. Hodge's late work, for

he therein not only insists on the entire accuracy of his previously advanced statements, but his reiteration of the accusations of fundamental error against the views he opposes can leave to us no possible alternative but either to refute the unfounded allegation, or by our silence allow the inference that we are indifferent to the interests both of the truth and of the Church of God.

In his presentation of the subject, moreover, Dr. Hodge has made no *direct* allusion to the Theology of Dr. Breckinridge, nor to the discussion in the *Danville Review*, nor yet to the very able discussion by Dr. Schaff, in his exegesis of Romans v. 12-21, in the American edition of Lange on Romans. And our explanation for citing and referring to him so directly as we have done, is, that there does not exist in the whole body of the recognized Augustinian theology, from the time of Calvin until now, the theory and exegesis which are here investigated, except as they may be referred to or cited in order to be refuted and condemned. It would be impossible therefore to do the subject justice without such references to and citations of his writings. There are occasionally in the Revised Edition of his Commentary on Romans, as well as in his recently published Theology, what appear to be covert allusions to the positions taken in the *Danville Review*. But it has been supposed that Dr. Hodge did not design to invite special attention to that discussion; for he certainly has, so far as any such references are concerned, avoided any open pretext for a rejoinder. While, on the contrary, we being desirous to secure attention to all that he has written on the subject, have fully and freely referred to and cited his writings whenever the discussion has rendered it necessary. We must express our regret, however, that his denunciatory language and attempts at ridicule, not less than his accusations of error, so often and so imperiously repeated in his writings, against what we are assured is the truth of God, have left us no alternative but to repel them in a manner equally decided; for we should regard any succumbing to such assumptions, and to accusations so utterly unfounded and yet so serious, as little short of treachery to the cause of Christ.

In our former discussion (in the *Danville Review*) from a desire to avoid the very appearance of anything like captious criticism, we erred by employing, in some instances (though contrary to Dr. Hodge), the terms *antecedent* and *immediate imputation* in the

sense in which he employs them; that is, as equivalent to *gratuitous imputation*—a sense in which they never are employed by the Augustinian theologians—all of whom recognize an objective and moral basis for the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. From Dr. Hodge's use of those terms, and from the deference with which we had ever regarded his affirmations, it was not unreasonable for us to suppose that they might have been so employed, at least occasionally, by some of the theologians to whom he had referred as indorsing his representations. But in this we were wholly mistaken. In the present work, therefore, and when referring to his views, we have uniformly employed the word which expresses the meaning he attaches to those terms—the *imputation of sin for which he contends being strictly gratuitous*. Nor had we even then a full apprehension of the antagonism of this theory of doctrine and exegesis to the whole Calvinistic system. As regards imputation we saw that he was in error—inculcating a rejected and exploded doctrine. But from his peremptoriness we took for granted that his exegesis might, perhaps, have had a supporter or more amongst the representative divines of the Church; and we saw, moreover, that the principle underlying his theory of imputation was logically fundamental to the supralapsarian scheme, though not generally recognized as such by that school; and hence we treated the subject mainly from that standpoint. But the facts, as shown in the present work (that is, so far as the argument requires that they be elicited), are, that the supralapsarians do not go the length to which Dr. Hodge has gone in carrying out this principle, but discountenance his application of it to the doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin, and that *as a body* they reject the exegesis by which he would justify that application. We felt assured, however, that as the years rolled on, which were required by Dr. Hodge to prepare his lectures for publication, the re-investigation would not only reveal his mistake of supposing that such views on imputation and original sin had been taught by any representative divine of the Church, but likewise induce him to acknowledge that the Church herself had fully and most emphatically recognized as God's own truth the principles which he had been denouncing, and that consequently, there would be no further accusations of error against his brethren who supported them; in which case we had deter-

mined to say no more on the subject. But the renewed and more thorough investigation which his late work has rendered imperative (the results of which are contained in this volume), leaves to us not the shadow of a doubt that such a procedure would have been egregiously wrong, and that the Church herself can ultimately and logically have no possible alternative but either to abandon all the distinctive principles of the Augustinian or evangelical system of doctrine, or to reject this theory utterly and in all its parts. Of the legitimacy of this conclusion, however, our readers must judge for themselves. Our concern is simply *with the facts in the case*.

The hostility to the writer personally, which was awakened by the appearance of his former essay (in the *Danville Review*, and by two later articles on the same subject in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, Columbia, S. C.¹), and which has continued with unabated virulence until the present time, might here be properly a subject for remark; and were he to follow the precedent which many great and good men have furnished in circumstances not dissimilar, he would call attention to the facts in the case. But his aim being to discuss the theme itself, as announced on the title page, he shall not deviate therefrom, except when a reference to other topics may require it in the way of illustration. He may here say, however, that fatuity alone could suppose that such assaults may ultimately succeed in preventing a thorough discussion of the subject-matter in question. The facts alleged *do exist*, and consequently they are either to be met and shown to be irrelevant to the purpose for which they are alleged, or the conclusions they sustain must be regarded as legitimate. He can deeply sympathize with the feelings of affection which pupils may entertain towards a revered instructor; but the legitimate expression of such emotions neither is nor can be in consonance with such efforts as those referred to. And if it be indeed the truth of God which these individuals are thus endeavoring to override and suppress, then let them look to it; for in that case an iniquity has been perpetrated which justice can never regard as expiated (unless devoutly repented of) until every wanton assault shall have recoiled upon

¹ See that Review for April, 1875, pp. 298-315, on "*Unthinkable Propositions and Original Sin*," and likewise for April, 1876, pp. 318-353, on "*The Gratuitous Imputation of Sin*."

its projector, and upon such as have wantonly lent to it aid and encouragement. We may adopt, therefore, the language of Hengstenberg, in the preface to his work on Daniel: "The author thinks that he has a right to expect that, as he has employed arguments in his book, he will be answered by arguments. If this righteous demand be not acceded to, as he can hardly imagine it will be after the experience he has had, . . . the loss will not fall upon him, but upon those who endeavor through abuse to annihilate evidence."

The writer claims no such exemption from liability to error and mistake as these persons have insinuated; and their foolish endeavor, both at home and abroad, to make the impression that he is unworthy of credit as a writer on theology, is worthy of the "*ring*" that concocted it, and it is obvious that it was concocted solely for the disreputable purpose of rendering in public estimation a rejoinder to his argument unnecessary. And then, moreover, they ought to consider that such conduct is (agreeably to the Dean of St. Patrick's) well calculated to flatter the vanity of even a more modest man than my traducers will allow me to be. He says that, "When a true genius appears in the world *you may know him by this sign*, that all the dunces are in confederacy against him." There may possibly be exceptions; and some who are not "geniuses" may, perhaps, be thus treated; and if so, we claim the privilege, which our traducers will readily accord to us, of ranking as an exception. But it would ill become them to object, should we, in consideration of the ground they have so abundantly furnished, lay claim to even the higher honor.

The following paragraph is as fully adapted to the present work as to that for which it was originally prepared; "The reader will probably observe that the same thoughts recur in different parts of the work. This was in some measure unavoidable, from the affinity between topics which, however, required a separate consideration; nor was there much solicitude to avoid it, as it is of benefit to many in whose minds the general course of reasoning might be confused or enfeebled without the aid of occasional repetitions."¹

While the writer would humbly bespeak for the work the candid

¹ Preface to *Plea for Communion*, by Dr. John M. Mason. (New York, 1816.)

consideration of all who love the Church and her theology, he earnestly hopes that no instance of the employment of sophistry or misrepresentation, or of any other of the degrading arts of ambitious controversy, occurs therein. If, however, through human infirmity, any instance of the kind has escaped his attention, he trusts that it may meet with merited detection and exposure; and for himself he should regard no censure as too severe with which such a procedure might be visited.

R. W. L.

DANVILLE, KY., *May* 16, 1878.

ORIGINAL SIN

AND

GRATUITOUS IMPUTATION.

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY AND EXPLANATORY.

THE statements contained in this section will explain the occasion for the preparation of the present work, and are required in view of sundry inaccurate representations in relation thereto, and will, moreover, serve as a general introduction to the discussion itself.

In the autumn of 1859, and by the advice of his physicians, the writer visited the mountainous district of Southern Kentucky, (Pulaski county,) in the hope of there being able to recuperate his health, which had become greatly prostrated through the prevalence of malaria in his field of pastoral labor in the Grand River Valley of Michigan; and as he derived essential benefit from the change of air and climate, he concluded to remain, at least for a season, and soon after accepted an invitation to a field of prospective usefulness in that district, and united with the Presbytery of Transylvania.

About the same time, or perhaps a little earlier, Dr. S. J. Baird issued the *Elohim Revealed*, which became the occasion of some sharp discussion between himself and the professor of theology in Princeton Theological Seminary; and during the early part of the year the late Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge also had published his *Theology Subjectively Considered*, which, with the previous volume, was very rudely assailed, and his admirable exposition of the doctrine of imputation also, though differing from the view of Dr. Baird (so far at least as relates to the application of philosophy for its elucidation), was impugned as a radical departure from the

recognized theology of the Augustinian or Calvinistic Church. In the latter part of the year 1860, the issue of the *Danville Review* was resolved upon, soon after which the writer received from the Faculty of the Danville Theological Seminary a request to furnish for publication in the *Review* an exposition of the doctrine of imputation—a subject on which he had in the course of conversation unfolded his views.¹ The request was complied with, and in September following the first article of the series appeared, and the last was issued in December, 1862. The essay itself had been completed (as published), in 1861; but as our late national conflict was then fully inaugurated, and the war had entered Southern Kentucky, in the neighborhood of his charge, so that he could no longer reside in the vicinity, he, in December, 1861, left the MS. in the hands of Dr. Breckinridge to superintend its publication, and entered the United States army as chaplain,—continuing in the service until June, 1865, when General Thomas (though the regiment was still continued in active service until the ensuing September) kindly accepted his resignation in view of his appointment by the General Assembly to the chair of Dr. Breckinridge during the year, for which the Doctor had obtained leave of absence.

The author had had no intention to write on the subject anterior to his reception of this request of the faculty. But their expressed wish, supported as it was by a strong conviction on his part, and growing out of the discussion by Drs. Thornwell, Hodge and Baird, that the subject had become needlessly perplexed, and ought to be disentangled, induced him to change his purpose. He therefore entered upon the work, though not until he had obtained from Dr. Breckinridge an assurance that, *Deo favente*, a compliance with this request should be followed by his own compliance with a request of mine, to-wit: that with as little delay as possible he would proceed to prepare for publication the *third* or *concluding volume* of his *Theology*, which had not as yet been

¹ The request was communicated to me by Dr. Breckinridge in a letter from which the following is an extract: "Humphrey, Yerkes, and myself had a conference to-day [December 19, 1860], the result of which was that you ought to prepare for us, when it suits you, that paper I have worried you about on the history of the doctrine of imputation (embracing that of headship) in our reformed scientific theology, embracing also its symbolic statement. A fine article from your pen would [do] incalculable good."

fully committed to writing.¹ At the request of Dr. Brooks and his session, I had, early in 1861, made an arrangement to supply the pulpit of the Second Church, St. Louis, (Mo.), during his absence in Europe. He returned soon after my second article of the series was finished. And the war, as above stated, having been fully inaugurated in Southern Kentucky, prevented a return to my pastoral charge and library, so that the *third part* of the essay (contained in the four numbers of the *Review* for 1862), is not so full and complete as I had originally designed.

In pursuing the argument through those six articles, a portion of the mistakes and misconceptions existing in the writings of Dr. Hodge on the subject was unavoidably referred to, but in a kind and apologetic spirit, though many of them, as may be seen by a reference to the facts, are of a very grave and serious character, while in the argument itself the whole ground of the previous discussion was carefully traversed; and the conclusion arrived at was, that Dr. Hodge's theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin constitutes no part of the recognized theology of the Calvinistic church.

The essay made a strong impression on the reflecting and scholarly minds of our own and other communions who had favored it with a perusal; and Dr. Hodge being still in possession of all his mental and physical powers, and having, moreover, just evinced² a vigorous purpose to rebut all exceptions seriously taken against his views on imputation and original sin, it was by many supposed that there would be no lack of a rejoinder; though, for my own part, knowing as I did the facts in the case, I felt assured that he would avoid it if possible. A rude assault, at war not only with propriety but integrity, was made in the *Philadelphia Presbyterian*, over the initials of a Hibernian alumnus of Princeton Seminary (who was anticipating a return to his own country), in an attempt to discredit the essay on the alleged

¹ The coming on of the war, and the active and efficient part which Dr. Breckinridge was called to take on behalf of the government, induced necessarily a postponement of the labor; and the work was thus from time to time delayed until age and its increasing infirmities placed it beyond his power to do full justice to the subject.

² In his review of Dr. Baird's work above referred to. See *Princeton Review* for April and October, 1860.

ground that a word in Turretin had been purposely mistranslated¹ (a word, moreover, which had nothing to do with the issue under discussion); and a clergyman of Philadelphia, who had previously accepted and attempted to sustain the theory of Dr. Hodge, ignoring all the serious and unaccountable misstatements, errors, and mistranslations which had been shown to exist in his discussions on the subject, undertook (and, of course, in self-defence), to herald this alleged error as a complete refutation of the essay itself, and expressed in view of it, the highest admiration of the learning and ability of the alumnus. And here began and ended all open attempts at rejoinder.² But soon after the appearance of the essay, a report was extensively promulgated that Dr. Hodge had been directed by the authorities having in charge the interests of the seminary at Princeton to publish his lectures on theology. This, on the first glance, appeared as though some apprehension might have been awakened as to his doctrinal soundness, and that hence he had been required to explain. The result, however, seemed to wear a different aspect; and whatever may prove to be the actual solution, it certainly did appear as though Dr. Hodge deemed it scarcely advisable to come into collision with the facts and statements of the essay while fresh in the memory of those who had read and pondered them. For if otherwise, why avail himself of the forementioned requirement to consume a period of *ten years* in preparing for the press a course of lectures which, during his long theological professorship, he had so often repeated to his classes? The last article of my essay was issued in 1862, and in 1872 Dr. Hodge's *Theology* appeared.

Were the subject intrinsically of less importance than it really is, the writer would much prefer to pursue it no farther, and to allow the facts and statements of the essay to continue to speak for themselves. But a failure to fulfil the avowal made therein,³ that a reiteration by Dr. Hodge of his groundless accusations of fundamental error against those who maintain what we are fully assured is the Calvinistic doctrine on the subject, would compel a more thorough exposure of the fallaciousness of his reasons for such accusation, must, undoubtedly, make the impression that the

¹ The word *absolutely* had been printed *absolute*.

² See note A. in the Appendix.

³ See *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 561, 562.

ground occupied by Dr. Breckinridge and the writer, and by the late Dr. Henry B. Smith, and Dr. Thornwell (in his Lectures), and by others, in relation to the Church doctrine, had been abandoned. Instead, therefore, of merely reissuing the essay itself enlarged, which was formerly contemplated, we have modified the form of the discussion, and the subject is herein taken up *de novo*, and the aforesaid promise redeemed.

The following letter from Dr. Breckinridge to Mr. Carter, of New York, refers to this matter; and which, as it presents the Doctor's view of the great issues involved in the present discussion, as well as a delineation of the work referred to, we here insert. The letter was forwarded to me by Mr. Carter at the request of Dr. Breckinridge, who granted me permission to publish it, should occasion require. In elucidation of a clause which I have placed in parentheses (in paragraph 1), I would here state that the failure of my health prevented any formal undertaking of the work when first suggested to me by Dr. Breckinridge, and that, up to the time of the reception of the above-quoted letter from the Danville Faculty, I had designed to leave it to be performed by some abler pen.

"DANVILLE, KY., December 9, 1865.

"ROBERT CARTER, Esq., of *Robert Carter & Brothers*.

"MY DEAR SIR: My friend, Rev. Dr. Landis, now temporarily filling my chair in the Theological Seminary here by appointment of the General Assembly, has made proposals to your firm, as he informs me, for the publication by you of a work written by him, the elements of which were published in successive numbers of the *Danville Review*. The work was originally undertaken by him upon very earnest suggestions by me (soon after the publication of my first volume by your house); and after the publication of my second volume, and the establishment of our *Review*, the outline was published in the *Review*; and now it is enlarged and perfected for an independent volume,—each time by my desire, as far as that may be supposed to have any effect.

"I had many reasons for desiring what I urged Dr. Landis to undertake: chiefly, my profound sense of the all-pervading influence of the doctrine of imputation, alike in scientific theology and in practical godliness; the total want of any adequate, sepa-

rate work with regard to that vital subject, in any language known to me; and the manifest and dangerous tendencies in the theology, both formal and practical, of the present century, as well as of the past one, to destroy all the depth, the power, and the fruitfulness of the Calvinistic system, by want of knowledge and want of belief of the true history of this great doctrine in all ages, and its true place and control in the Christian system. If my own theological writings have any special importance, no mean part thereof is derived from my close adherence to the views I maintain on this vast subject, in accordance with every evangelical creed from the Westminster standards to the Council of Nice. But I have treated it, not so much as a separate doctrine, but rather as a *method and rule* of the entire analogy of faith. What was wanted always was a distinct, separate, and sufficiently full history and demonstration of it as a doctrine of the most decisive importance. It is this which Dr. Landis has admirably accomplished. Nor do I believe there exists now in life a single person who, all things considered, was more competent to this work.

"You will not, therefore, take it amiss that I interfere so far as to express my strong desire to see this work of Dr. Landis published, and by your house.

"Very truly, your friend,

(Signed)

"Ro. J. BRECKINRIDGE."

It were a reasonable expectation that in this immediate connection the writer should not only advert to (as in the preface), but bring to light more fully than has yet been done, the proceedings of certain individuals who have evinced a determination to suppress at all hazards any further discussion of the principles which Dr. Hodge has been inculcating as the doctrine of the Church. Whether those persons at the outset contemplated the removal of Dr. Breckinridge and myself from the chairs in the Seminary to which we had been assigned by the largest vote, numerically, ever given to a professor by our General Assembly, is in no sense of the term problematical. The manoeuvring they employed to effect that result can admit of no other construction. But though (as I and my colleague then announced) it was easy to foresee, as the effect of their operations, the breaking up of the institution, at least for a time, nothing further was probably intended than to expel the theology as taught by Breckinridge, and to inaugurate

therein the then forthcoming lectures of Dr. Hodge. The persistent endeavors, likewise, to compel the author, through lack of employment, and, consequently, of subsistence, to leave the church of his choice, that he might thus, in effect, neutralize any subsequent endeavors, as well as those which he had previously made, to call attention to the great issue, would all (if our limits permitted the narration) here have an appropriate place. But though the whole affair is one with which the spiritual well-being of the Church, as well as her polity and the appliance of her constitutional provisions, are gravely interested, he is unwilling that anything which may be in any sense construed as mainly personal should be wrought into the discussion any farther than the essential details of the discussion itself may incidentally evolve. There are, indeed, those who would cover up such enormities on the monstrous plea that religion would be dishonored by their exposure. But as well might it have been argued that justice would be dishonored by the exposure and conviction of a Tweed. The facts, however, are so numerous, and the agents employed have been so imprudent and unscrupulous, that those facts cannot but transpire ultimately to the just surprise of all the true followers of Christ.

To conclude. It is no secret that, for a considerable time past, many of the godly and excellent of our communion have expressed the apprehension that the Church, notwithstanding the appearance of her external prosperity, is not only in a state of spiritual declension, but is verging towards apostasy. The thought is saddening and heart-crushing beyond all expression, and, coming from the source it does, should certainly not be treated lightly. In the past, as we know, it has often occurred that, when ambition and worldly policy have, to any controlling extent, obtained possession of an ecclesiastical community until they who sincerely endeavor to follow the simplicity of Christ, and in His spirit seek to carry out in their life and intercourse the rules which He has appointed for the guidance of His flock, are met and circumvented by worldly craft and policy, He forsakes His ordinances and takes up His abode with His hidden ones, until judgment shall have gone forth, and either reclaimed the wanderer or driven her still onward, until she shall have even passed beyond the pale of His fold. Whether there be ground, therefore, for the apprehension referred to should be most seriously pondered. The subject has been re-

peatedly alluded to even by the press. If, however, there be no sufficient ground for entertaining the apprehension, it may be safely dismissed, though prudence would surely dictate that we should not assume, on mere presumption, that no such reason can exist. Let rather a truthful regard to God's glory, and to the welfare of His flock, prompt to earnest scrutiny and watchfulness. But if, on the other hand, there be reason to apprehend that Christ may indeed be forsaking us (as there must be if vital differences in essential doctrine and fundamental errors really exist in our communion), much more does it become us to lay the matter to heart. If we are truly His servants, we cannot but regard our worldly interest as wholly subordinate to the welfare of His kingdom, whatever discomfort or privation it may demand of us to provide the remedy and save the Church. Fundamental differences in regard to saving truth have neither right nor title to exist in our Church; and if they do exist therein, they prove that already we are sadly astray; nor can they long continue without producing the most disastrous results. If, on the great issue in question, Dr. Hodge has inculcated the Pauline or Augustinian doctrine, any fundamental departure therefrom must, of necessity, involve our whole theological system; and such departure should no more be tolerated or countenanced in our midst than avowed Socinianism itself. So that in such a case the Church would prove herself recreant to the trust confided to her by her exalted Head should she regard the matter as trivial. To attempt to cover up such a state of things as of little or no account, to ridicule the interest felt therein as "antediluvian nonsense," and what not, or to attempt in any way to suppress the free and fair discussion of the issue, is not only unworthy of the Christian name, but if concurred in, would evince that we have already apostatized from the faith of our fathers. And the same is of course true, *mutatis mutandis*, if Dr. Hodge has fundamentally departed from that doctrine. Our own matured and abiding conviction is, that the view of this great truth as presented by Drs. Breckinridge and Schaff, and Henry B. Smith, and Thornwell (in his *Lectures*), and, in the main, by Dr. Baird, is, beyond all peradventure, the doctrine which not only the Calvinistic, but the entire evangelical Church has always taught and defended as the truth of God; and a summary of the reasons which induce this conviction will be found on the ensuing pages.

PART I.

WHEREIN THE QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION IS CAREFULLY EXAMINED, AND THE TRUE ISSUE STATED AND ILLUSTRATED.

§ 2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE.

THE question as to the high importance of the issue involved in this discussion should not be made to rest upon any mere *ex parte* statement or representation. There should be mutual concurrence therein. And it is eminently proper, moreover, that from the facts adduced our readers should be able to determine the question for themselves. We shall therefore here, at the outset, lay before them the deliberate and often-expressed judgment of Dr. Hodge touching the point; and we herewith add the assurance of our full concurrence in his representation, so far as that point is concerned. In this way we may hope to arrive at useful results through the discussion.

In his Theology, when treating formally of *antecedent and immediate imputation*, Dr. Hodge says, "There is a logical connection, therefore, between the denial of the imputation of Adam's sin, and the denial of the scriptural doctrines of atonement and justification. The objections urged against the former bear equally against the latter doctrines. And it is a matter of history that those who reject the one reject also the other."¹ So also, in the *Princeton Review* for the year 1860, when remarking on Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, he says, "The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant Church, and as exhibited by the apostle, is, that as in the case of Christ, His righteousness, as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offence, as something out of ourselves,

¹ Theology, Vol. II. page 201.

a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. *It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology and the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible*, which is strenuously denied by Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation."¹

"*It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his [Paul's] gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam*, and shows that, antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed upon all men for the offense of one. *To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument.* It is to take sides with *the Jews against the apostle*, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another."²

Our readers will observe that in this language, and in all similar utterances from his writings, Dr. Hodge employs the term *imputation* (and *immediate and antecedent imputation*;) to signify *gratuitous imputation*, which is his great *πρώτον ψεδδος*. And certainly no one can doubt that the forecited utterances were carefully and deliberately pronounced. The doctrine therein asserted has been earnestly inculcated upon a large proportion of the ministry of our Church; and if the statements are erroneous they should not, of course, be persisted in. If, however, they are what they purport to be—utterances of the recognized Calvinistic theology—they certainly can have nothing to fear from a fair and thorough investigation. Nor should it be regarded as unreasonable or improper, therefore, *that we who regard them as unauthorized, unfounded, and at direct variance with the Augustinian teaching, so far as they affirm the gratuitous imputation of sin*, should be unwilling silently to assent to what we are assured must, if admitted, effect a fundamental revolution in the theology of the Church. And in direct view of those representations, we affirm as a historic fact, susceptible of any degree of logical verification, that neither in our own nor in any other land has the Augustinian or Calvinis-

¹ Theology, Vol., II. page 341.

² Ibid. pages 344, 345.

tic church ever taught or indorsed the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of Adam's merely personal sin to his posterity as the sole ground for inflicting upon them the penalty of spiritual death, or moral corruption; *that is, in other words, the Calvinistic church has never received or taught this theory of Dr. Hodge, nor his exposition of Romans v. 13-21, but the very opposite.*

§ 3. THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

The doctrine presented and insisted on in our former essay, and which had been plainly announced by Augustine, and always entertained by the Calvinistic church, affirms (1), The natural and federal headship of Adam; (2), That the threatening in Genesis ii. 17, included not only the loss of original righteousness, but spiritual and eternal death; and (3), That in this threatening both Adam and his posterity were included; *and consequently, that all the evils which his posterity suffer result from the first transgression*, since in that transgression (as Paul affirms) they "all sinned," and were thus constituted *ἁμαρτωλοι*, or *veritable sinners*. In other words, they, by participating in that offense, became culpable; and hence from that first sin, wherein "*all sinned*," originated the hereditary corruption in which we all are born. *This was and is our position*, and the doctrine thus defined has always been the faith of our Church. The Princeton professor, however, has departed from this doctrine by insisting (as strenuously as the Socinian and Remonstrant schools did formerly,) that in the first offense the posterity of Adam contracted no subjective ill-desert; and, moreover, that all the evils they suffer are penal inflictions on account of Adam's merely personal sin; a sin which, as he affirms, is to them purely a *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin; a doctrine which, as we regard it, must not only logically isolate its advocate from all actual sympathy with the teaching of the Reformation on original sin, but the maintenance of which (as we claim, and as we shall show,) is fraught with consequences the most disastrous to the entire system of revealed truth. And we shall, moreover, evince that when Dr. Hodge alleges that Augustine,¹ and the Latin Church,² and the Lutheran and Reformed Churches,³ have taught, as he teaches, the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation of Adam's

¹ See Theology, Vol. II., pp. 157-164.

² Ibid. p. 180.

³ Ibid. p. 196.

merely personal sin, he affirms that which is not only unfounded, but that which is totally disproved by fact. WE TAKE ISSUE WITH HIM THEREFORE DIRECTLY ON THE WHOLE QUESTION! And we state, moreover, not invidiously, but as a historical verity to be established in the sequel (though a reference to it is here required in illustration of the importance and true state of the question), *that at the precise point* where Dr. Hodge thus departs from the universally recognized teaching of the Church on original sin, and denounces the principle concerned as unintelligible, impossible, and nonsensical, (as he does most emphatically,¹) the Socinian and Remonstrant schools took their departure, and employ in relation thereto the same style of sarcasm and denunciation. The Protestant Church, as we have stated, held and taught that the posterity of Adam participated in the first offense, and that therefore it was justly imputed to them, as well as to our first parents themselves, who were guilty of its formal perpetration; while, on the contrary, the Socinians and Remonstrants affirmed that any such participation was *ipso facto* impossible, and, as we shall see, denounced and ridiculed the representation; and, on the ground of this alleged impossibility, denied, just as Dr. Hodge has done, that the sin could be imputed to us (as it was the personal sin of Adam alone,) except by a merely forensic imputation. And they thereupon maintain that the evils which have involved us as a result of that transgression are not strictly *punishments*, but calamities inflicted by the mere will or sovereign pleasure of God. Dr. Hodge likewise maintains, that in the race there was no objective guilt, nor any participation of the first offense, nor guilt of any kind previous to the forensic imputation of the *peccatum alienum*; but he names the evils referred to *punishments*, rather than calamities: a distinction hardly practical in the case, since all admit that "*punishments*," not incurred through our own fault or agency, and which are inflicted without a basis of objective demerit, are merely calamities.

In further elucidation of the question, it may be stated that, as Dr. Hodge explicates the doctrine of original sin from the standpoint of the federal relation, subordinating thereto the natural relation (the logical sequence of making the corruption of the race

¹ See his Revised Commentary on Romans, chapter v. 12-21.

the penal consequence of Adam's personal sin), and thus departs from the Church doctrine which demands an equal recognition of both relations; so Placæus went to the opposite extreme, and explicated the doctrine on the basis of the natural relation to the logical exclusion of the federal.¹ For though claiming to maintain both relations, he, by making native corruption, as derived from Adam, causal of the imputation, ignored the federal relation as effectually as Dr. Hodge ignores the natural, by making Adam's purely personal sin, or the *peccatum alienum*, through a merely forensic imputation, causal of the depravity of the race. Each theory is alike repudiated by the Church, as furnishing no adequate ground for explicating the doctrine of original sin.

The philosophical realistic theory, which assumes the personal identity of Adam and the race, and on such ground attempts a solution of the problem involved in the apostolic statement (Romans v. 12, 18, 19), has never been accepted by the Church as expressive of her faith, though it has had many eminent defenders. She has always disclaimed every attempt at philosophical solution, and is, therefore, (as stated in our former essay), quite as unwilling to sanction the solution which philosophical realism proposes as to sanction the solution proffered by nominalism. She has always accepted the inspired statement (that "*all sinned*") as a fact; and in that fact, though of itself wholly inexplicable, her inner consciousness has ever recognized an *explanatory principle*, which furnishes an intelligible and all-sufficient basis for the solution of all the great problems which have been started respecting the calamities of the race, and their reconcilableness with the holiness, justice and goodness of God. But let us now hear Dr. Hodge. The subjoined citations will serve both to illustrate and confirm the foregoing representations in regard to his views.

In the *Princeton Essays*² he says: "Therefore it is for the one offense of the one man that the condemnatory sentence (the *xpīna eis zarāxpīna*) has passed on all men." Also, in his late work, when referring to the analogy in Romans v. 12-21, he says: "The

¹ Placæus, by *mediate* imputation, meant that, as Adam's posterity derive from him a corrupt nature, and so possess morally the same character, they incur with him the like condemnation. See also Dr. Shedd's History of Doctrines, Vol. II., pp. 158-166.

² First Series, p. 161, Wiley & Putnam, N. Y., 1846.

parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the apostle are overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation."¹

Again: "There is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation and sin of his posterity." "His sin was not our sin. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own—a *peccatum alienum*—and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the Divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences."² And after describing the universality of sin in the race, he adds: "The only solution, therefore, which at all meets the case is the scriptural doctrine *that all mankind fell in Adam's transgression*, and, bearing the penalty of his sin, they come into the world in a state of spiritual death, the evidence of which is seen and felt in the universality, the controlling power, and the early manifestation of sin."³ Hereupon follow his citations of the "Confessions of the Reformed Churches," in Latin,⁴ as though to verify the accuracy of this, his representation of the church doctrine; and yet, *in not one of them* can the principle be found which he has thus portrayed. In fact, Dr. Hodge is obliged to admit this substantially in the summary he presents of their teaching.⁵

Again: "The sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible; *it was the ground of their actual condemnation.*" "*All mankind were in Adam.* He was the federal head and representative of the race. *All men sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression. The sentence of condemnation for his own offense passed upon all men.*"⁶ "It was by one man, he (Paul) says, that sin and death passed upon all men, *because all sinned. They sinned in and through that one man.* His sin was the sin of all, in virtue of the union between him and them."⁷

These citations certainly afford a sufficiently full expression of this theory. And by comparing the view thus presented with the views hereinafter to be presented from the ancient Armenians,

¹ See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 212, 213.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 215, 225.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 229.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 230, 231.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 551, 552.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

and from Scotus, Ockhamus, Erasmus, Pighius, Catharinus, and others, it will be perceived that, on the great points immediately under discussion, they are one and the same; that is, they all concur in affirming, (1,) That the first sin was the sin of the first man only, and not of the race; (2,) That it was charged upon his posterity gratuitously, *i. e.*, without any subjective demerit of their own; and (3,) That through this imputation that one sin of the one man became the procuring cause of all the evils which have come upon the race. But before proceeding to examine the arguments by which Dr. Hodge would sustain this theory, it seems necessary just here, in order to prevent any needless mystification of the issue, to inquire into the meaning of the phraseology which, in the above citations, we have *italicised*.

In presenting for the consideration or acceptance of our fellow-men any really important principle, it is obvious that all equivocal or ambiguous phraseology should be avoided, so far as such avoidance is possible. And, moreover, that in relation to matters sacred or divine, the obligation becomes absolutely imperative. How, then, may we regard these conditions as met or fulfilled in the foregoing exposition of a principle which is affirmed by its author to involve (according as it may be either accepted or rejected) the well-being of the Church herself, and the very truth and existence of the religion of Christ? For Dr. Hodge has repeatedly affirmed that such is the fact. Let us, then, endeavor briefly to sift the inquiry.

We do not remember that the Doctor, anterior to the discussion of the subject in the *Danville Review* (of 1861 and 1862), has, unless very sparingly, employed (in the delineation of his theory) the language which we have placed in *italics* in the forecited passages. In his late work, however, it is of frequent occurrence. Has he, then, changed or in any degree modified his views of the doctrine itself? Not at all. For he still affirms them more emphatically, if possible, than before. Why, then, employ thus frequently the language referred to? And how is that language to be construed or understood in the connection?

Catharinus, as we shall see, in unfolding and defending this same theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, endeavors, in like manner, to incorporate with his statement the same expressions, his aim being obviously to foreclose the objection arising from the

divine averment in Romans v. 12, that "*all sinned*."¹ But whether that objection can be thus ignored will appear in the sequel.

Whatever may be the ordinary or established usage of the terms referred to in the forecited passages from Dr. Hodge, he confessedly employs them therein to convey no meaning which can be inconsistent with his constant affirmation, *that in the fall Adam alone contracted moral ill-desert or subjective guilt*. For though in this language his posterity are declared *to have sinned in and with him* in that first transgression, the sentence of condemnation which passed upon them was not for this *their* sin and fall in and with him, but for his sin and fall alone. Dr. Hodge, as he has so often previously announced, and now repeats in these very citations themselves, employs the terms to convey this and no other meaning, while in his Commentary on Romans v. 12-21, and in scores of other instances, he affirms that to suppose that the posterity themselves had contracted subjective guilt or depravity in the first sin, and anterior to the imputation to them of the *peccatum alienum*, or personal sin of Adam, and that this *their* sin was imputed to them, would be in effect to subvert the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and overturn the whole argument of the apostle.²

Let our readers, therefore, contemplate the statement: The posterity of Adam *sinned* and fell with him in his sin, and yet *his sin (and not theirs)* is the sole ground of their condemnation and punishment. His sin and fall, and their sin and fall in and with him, brought subjective guilt and criminality *upon him*, and yet left *them* free of all subjective guilt and criminality until after his own sin and fall had been forensically imputed to them. They are condemned for his sin alone, and his sin alone was by "a sentence of condemnation" (*κριμα εις κατακριμα*) set over to their account, and they are made forensically guilty of that sin alone, and not of their own sin and fall. Then, in virtue of the natural and federal relation between them and Adam (which in no way, however, connects them morally or subjectively with his crime, according to Dr. Hodge), this sentence of condemnation really constitutes

¹ In a future section we shall have occasion to cite his remarks at the Council of Trent when presenting his theory.

² See especially his review of Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, in the April and October numbers of the *Princeton Review* for the year 1860.

their sinning and falling with him, so far as any ill-desert on their part is concerned; for until this sentence comes upon them, they are free of all sin or guilt, whether inherited and inherent or imputed, and free from all subjective ground of condemnation, even though they sinned in and fell with him who; in and through that very fall, *did* contract subjective criminality; so that *their sin is produced solely by the forensic imputation of his sin to them*. But as such imputation of a foreign sin could not, confessedly, take place until *after* the sin thus imputed had been perpetrated, so it is plain that they did not actually sin and fall *with* Adam, or when he sinned (as the apostle affirms they did), but *after* he had sinned and fallen. And if *after he had sinned*, then on what possible or conceivable ground or pretext do Dr. Hodge and Catharinus allege that we sinned in and fell with him? His posterity were innocent (says Dr. Hodge,) previous to the imputation of the *peccatum alienum*, and it was this imputation itself which constituted them guilty. Their sinning and falling with him, therefore, can be neither more nor less than a judicial act of the Creator condemning them on account of a foreign sin of their father. But how, or upon what principle, an act of our holy and blessed Father in heaven is to be construed *as our sinning and falling*, and how it should come to be so described in a plain historic statement, Dr. Hodge has prudently left the reader to explain.

Such, then, are the results yielded by a fair analysis of the forecited language. A judicial sentence of the righteous and eternal Judge condemning a subjectively innocent race for a crime which had been previously perpetrated by their father, and of which he alone, with Eve, was subjectively guilty, may be fittingly and veraciously described in a dogmatic explanation of the occurrence, by saying *that they sinned in and fell with their father* in that criminal transaction. In view of which it need only be added, that if Dr. Hodge considers such an utterance intelligible, he surely should be less free than he has evinced himself to be in his application of the term "nonsensical" to the views of his brethren. But the word of God is not responsible for any such utterance.

Before proceeding with the argument it will be fully in place here to illustrate the nature of this speculation *on sinning and not sinning at the same time, and by one and the same act*, by present-

ing a paragraph or two from the keen-edged satire of Pascal, *on a sufficient grace that was not sufficient*.

"Where am I now," exclaimed I, "and what side am I to take here? If I deny sufficient grace I am a Jansenist; if I admit it with the Jesuits in such a sense that there is no necessity for efficacious grace, I am, say you, a *heretic*; and if I concur with you I am against common sense. I am a madman, say the Jesuits. What then am I to do in this inevitable necessity of being deemed a madman, a heretic, or a Jansenist? And to what a situation are we reduced if the Jansenists alone avoid confounding faith and reason, and thus save themselves at once from absurdity and error?"

"My good friend, the Jansenist, seemed pleased with my remarks, and thought he had already gained me. He said nothing to me, however, but turning to the father, 'Pray,' said he, 'in what respect do you agree with the Jesuits?' He replies, 'In this, that we both acknowledge that sufficient grace is given to all men.' 'But,' returned he, 'there are two things in the term sufficient grace: the sound, which is mere air, and the sense, which is real and significant. So that when you avow an agreement with the Jesuits in the *word*, but oppose them in the *sense*, it is obvious that you disagree with them in the essential matter, though you accord in the term. Is this acting with openness and sincerity?' 'But,' said the good man, 'what cause of complaint have you, since we deceive no one by this mode of speaking; for in our *schools* we publicly declare that we understand the expression in a sense quite opposite to the Jesuits?' 'I complain,' said my friend, 'that you do not declare to all the world that by *sufficient grace* you mean a grace which is *not sufficient*. Having changed the signification of the usual terms in religion, you are obliged in conscience to declare that when you admit of sufficient grace in all men, you really intend that they have not sufficient grace. Every one understands the word sufficient in the same sense, the new Thomists alone excepted. Women of all classes, who constitute one half the world, the whole court, the army, the magistrates, lawyers, mechanics, artificers, and in fact the mass of mankind, the Dominicans apart, consider the word *sufficient* as denoting whatever is necessary. And no one is aware of your singular interpretation; every where it is said that they maintain the doctrine of sufficient grace. What, then, is the natural inference, but that all men possess grace

sufficient for action,—especially when they are seen to coalesce with the Jesuits, who receive it in this sense for selfish and intriguing purposes?"¹ But to return.

Further, Dr. Hodge has the reputation of being able to express himself clearly and forcibly; and the doctrine he is delineating in the passages referred to is simply, *that the personal sin of Adam was forensically imputed to his subjectively innocent posterity, and that thereupon they were regarded and treated as sinners*. In all his previous references to the topic he has expressed the idea without ambiguity. But in his late work, as above shown, he, like Catharinus, wrought into his explanation the phraseology that "the posterity of Adam sinned in him and fell with him, *they sinned in or through that man*," etc. Has he then ceased to hold that Adam's posterity were subjectively innocent when the imputation was made? He says not. And he, moreover, affirms the contrary with vehemence, as our readers may see even in the same passages. Why then endeavor to incorporate with the delineation of such a doctrine the expression *they sinned in him*, when, as he expressly affirms, their sinning was impossible, as they then had no existence? Such a statement is also contrary to the facts in the case; for the sin which was imputed to the race being a *peccatum alienum*, it could not be imputed to them until *after it had been perpetrated*. The expression, moreover, can in no way explain the ground of the imputation, for Dr. Hodge makes their sinning to consist in the imputation itself. It explains nothing, therefore, for it is impossible to regard the phrase *they sinned* as an explanation of the doctrine *that they could not and did not sin*. And for the same reason, it cannot in any way associate the theory itself with the teaching of our doctrinal standards. Why then insert phraseology of such a sort which at best could only perplex the true issue, and confuse the mind of a serious inquirer?

As Adam was already morally depraved when he reached forth his hand and partook of the interdicted tree, on what ground are we to conclude that his posterity likewise were not depraved when they really (and not putatively) sinned in him, and fell with him in that transgression? Such is the Augustinian faith on the subject. And what, then, is there in the utterance that can be re-

¹ Provincial Letters, Letter II.

garded as excusing, or even extenuating, Dr. Hodge's violent denunciation and ridicule?¹ It has the direct sanction of God's word, and is, moreover, clogged with no such incongruous sequences as attach to the theory which he has propounded in lieu of it. Why then treat it thus? Is it because we did not then personally exist, and therefore could not have personally participated in the sin? But the Church has never taught that we did then personally exist, or personally participate; and yet she has ever affirmed that we did then sin "originally," "potentially" (*δυναμει*) "by participation," and to employ a more recent expression, "by an ethical appropriation of the guilt of the fall." But the *mode* in which this participation occurred, or by which it was effected, she has never professed to know, and therefore employs these expressions to designate *the sinning* of the race as distinguished from the personal sinning of our first parents. For the fact of our actual sinning is historically announced as a momentary action of the past, (Romans v. 12-19,) and the objection that we could not then have participated, because we then had no manifested personal existence, if it could be made to apply to the case at all, is as fatal to the doctrine of any imputation itself as it could be to that of any participation in the offense. If a nonentity (for such Dr. Hodge alleges the posterity were at the time referred to) could not sin, a nonentity surely could not incur an imputation. And yet the Divine averment directly assures us that the sinning of the race actually occurred *not after*, but *when Adam sinned*. And then, as both the act of Adam and the already existing corrupt inclination which induced its perpetration, are the grounds of his condemnation, what hinders that our participation in that sin and rebellion should, in like manner and along with his own sin as our head, constitute the ground of our condemnation; that is, the ground on which the apostle affirms that death passed upon all? Why vary the ground in relation to his posterity, as Dr. Hodge has attempted to do?²

Before we proceed to consider the method of reasoning by which Dr. Hodge would sustain his theory, we must offer a remark

¹ See especially his Revised Commentary on Romans, chapter v. 12-19.

² See in this connection our article on Unthinkable Propositions and Original Sin, in *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1875, and another on the Gratuitous Imputation of Sin, in the number for April, 1876.

on a point or two greatly insisted upon by him in connection with his claims on its behalf. And *first*, he objects repeatedly and persistently against the application of the term *theory* to designate his doctrine and exegesis on the subject. He frequently, and in a form calculated only to wound, applies the designation to the doctrine of our participation in the Adamic sin, (although this is the recognized doctrine of the Church,) and yet professes to feel aggrieved when that term is applied to his own doctrine, though the term has been applied to it directly by the Church theologians ever since that doctrine with its exegesis was asserted by Pighius, Catharinus, Slichtingius, and Crellius. We cannot, therefore, admit the disclaimer, greatly as it would gratify us to acquiesce in the wishes of Dr. Hodge. And neither can we, in the next place, assent to the demand recently made on behalf of this theory, claiming that it is entitled to the *sobriquet* of "*the federal or representative system*;" for it really has no alliance with that system as taught in Calvinistic theology, but, as we are fully prepared to prove, is in radical hostility to all of its distinguishing principles. Both Catharinus and Crellius claim, quite as strongly as Dr. Hodge, that it was in consequence of Adam's violation of the covenant (*pactum*) made with him that his innocent offspring were involved in the fearful calamities which have come upon the race. In regard to Catharinus, this will not be denied. And as to the Socinian school, we cite a passage below from Crellius, the most profound genius of that school, which can leave no doubt on the subject.¹ But can this claim of theirs entitle their theory to the time-honored appellation of the "federal or representative system"? We say, *No!* and a thousand times *No!* And yet, though this constitutes the sole claim of Dr. Hodge's theory to be thus designated, those who repudiate the claim are already invidiously accused of "*rejecting the federal system*"! To apply the

¹ In his *Paraphrase of Romans* he thus gives what he regards as the sense of Romans v. 18: "Quare ut comparationem superius cooptam absolvimus, et totius rei summam concludamus: *Quemadmodum* EX UNO DELICTO UNUS HOMINIS, consecutum Dei judicium omnes homines damnationi subiecit, EO, quo supra explicuimus, PACTO; ita etiam una unius hominis justitia factum est, ut gratia divina, in omnes homines, qui nempe eam, ut diximus, amplectuntur, dimanaret ac vitam illius sempiternam afferet." Compare this passage with Dr. Hodge's statement of doctrine beginning with, "Not only, however," etc., in *Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 26, 27, and in many other places.

term thus is, therefore, a misnomer; and Dr. Hodge must excuse us for affirming that it can on no account be recognized. When Epeus fabricated the wooden horse, Sinon was adroitly sent forth to the wonder-stricken Trojans to give it a name. He bestowed upon it a sacred appellation (*Donum Minervæ*), through the seductive influence of which the inhabitants of the city became so infatuated as to welcome the structure, with all the desolation and horrors it contained, into the very heart of Troy; and on the following morning ILIUM FUIT announced the terrible result.

In illustration of the question itself, I, in conclusion, here present a single statement of the doctrine as always entertained and taught by the Augustinian or Calvinistic church, and cite for this purpose the language of one of the great and good men who maintain the Calvinistic soundness of the thirty-nine articles. I refer to the eminently learned and gifted Archbishop Usher, who says: *Sin imputed* is "our sin in Adam; in whom as we lived, so also we sinned. For in our first parents (as hath been showed) every one of us did commit that first sin which was the cause of all others; and so we all became subject to the imputation of Adam's fall, both for the transgression and guiltiness. Original sin is a sin wherewith all that naturally descend from Adam are defiled, even from their first conception; infecting all the powers of their souls and bodies, and thereby making them drudges and slaves of sin. For it is the immediate effect of Adam's first sin, and the principal cause of all other sins."¹ This representation, as our readers will presently see, is coincident with that of the whole Calvinistic church. The first sin is "the sin of Adam," and yet "our sin in Adam;" and "every one of us did commit that first sin," and so "became subject to the imputation of Adam's fall, both for the transgression and guiltiness,"—that is, God found the whole race already guilty when He imputed to it the first sin of Adam.

We cannot be supposed "legally" to have concurred in the sinful act of our first parents without at the same time admitting an ethical or moral basis for the concurrence. The contrary supposition is wholly inadmissible. And hence the Church has always taught that the moral corruption inducing that act was common alike to both Adam and his naturally begotten posterity.

¹ Sum and Substance of the Christian Religion, p. 127.

§ 4. DR. HODGE'S RATIOCINATION ON THE ISSUE.

And now, as to the argumentation which has been employed in support of this theory, Dr. Hodge admits that there must be a basis for the imputation of Adam's personal sin to his posterity, and that otherwise such imputation would be arbitrary and incapable of being justified.¹ But he maintains that the basis is not their own subjective ill-desert, as of course he must do, claiming as he does that it is the imputation of Adam's strictly personal sin which is the procuring cause of the spiritual death and moral corruption of the race. He, however, professes to find that the basis consists of "the union, natural and representative, between Adam and his posterity;" not, however, as it is taught by the Church theology, that this union, *by connecting the race subjectively with the sin of Adam*, constitutes thereby the ground for the imputation (*natura corrumpit personam*), but that it constitutes that ground irrespective of any such connection, and while the race is entirely innocent, and free of all subjective demerit or ill-desert. And on such a basis he endeavors to justify the procedure which he attributes to the Most High. He attempts, moreover, to support this view by adducing Romans v. 12–21, together with numerous facts (claimed by him as analogies) derived from the Scriptures, and from the operations of Providence in its dealings with mankind. We shall defer our consideration of the passage in Romans until we shall have examined his statements containing the rest of the argument.

He says, "Our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, so far as that sin is concerned, *arises solely from his being our representative, and not from any participation in its moral turpitude.*"² And he cites from Stapfer the statement that "God in imputing this sin (Adam's) *finds* the whole moral person (the human race) *ALREADY* a sinner, and not merely constitutes it such;" and on which Dr. Hodge thus remarks, "He says, indeed, that Adam and his race form one moral person, and so would Turretin and Tuckney, and so would we, and yet one and all deny that there was any personal union. The very epithet *moral* shows no such idea was intended. When lawyers call a corporation of a hundred men a legal person, we do not hear that philosophy is called in to ex-

¹ Theology, Vol. II., page 196.

² Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 171.

plain how this can be. And there is no need of her aid to explain how Adam and his race were one in the sense of common Calvinists. But he says, God finds 'this whole moral person ALREADY a sinner!' Yes, he denies antecedent and immediate imputation, and teaches that it is from the view and on the ground of inherent hereditary depravity imputation takes place. This is *mediate* imputation," etc.¹ Such confounding of antecedent and immediate imputation with gratuitous imputation, on the one hand, and of the church doctrine with the technical notion of *mediate* imputation on the other, as is evinced by these statements, betrays a remarkable absence of accurate knowledge on the subject. In his theology, moreover, he reiterates on the same ground the assertion, charging Stapfer with teaching mediate imputation.²

Thus the doctrine actually entertained by the Calvinistic Church from the beginning is set entirely aside by Dr. Hodge, who, in lieu of it, maintains that the first sin *became common by being imputed*,³ and not as the Church has ever held and taught, *that it was common to all, and therefore imputed to all*; or, as President Edwards, in his reply to Dr. Taylor, expresses it, "The sin of the apostasy is not theirs because God imputes it to them, *but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground* God imputes it to them."⁴ And again, "The first existing of a corrupt disposition *is not to be looked upon as sin distinct from the participation of Adam's first sin*. It is, as it were, the extended pollution of that sin, . . . or the inherence of the sin of that head of the species in the members, *in their consent and concurrence with the head in that first act*. But the depravity of nature remaining as an established principle in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after operations, *is a consequence and punishment of the first apostasy* thus participated, and brings new guilt."⁵ It is noticeable in the connection that Dr. Hodge attempts no discussion of the view thus intelligibly and clearly presented, though it be the doctrine inculcated by the Church perpetually from the day that it was formulated by Augustine; but satisfies himself, and would satisfy his readers, by endeavoring to fix upon it the brand of philosophical realism, and stigmatizing it as mediate imputation, in the offensive theo-

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 149. ² See Vol. II., p. 207.

³ See his Theology, Vol. II., pp. 190, 192, 196, 204, 205, 240, 253.

⁴ See Edwards' Works, Vol. II., p. 559, (New York, 1830). ⁵ Ibid. p. 344.

logical sense of that term as applied to the errors of Placæus. And instead of finding in the community of the sin the basis for the imputation, professes to find that basis solely in the representative character of Adam, (just as Catharinus, and the Socinians, and Remonstrants have done,) without any reference whatever to the guilt of the race itself.

But that our readers may be able to avoid even the possibility of misapprehending the views of Dr. Hodge, as advanced from the first, and still maintained by him, we here cite another passage in which they are fully presented and illustrated. He says: "To impute sin, therefore, 'is to lay it to the charge of any, and to deal with them according to its desert.'—(*Owen*.) If the thing imputed be antecedently ours, then there is merely a recognizing it as such. If it be not ours, there is necessarily an ascription of it to us on some ground or other, and a determination to deal with us according to the merit of the thing imputed. When Paul begged Philemon to impute to him the debt or offense of Onesimus, he begged him to regard him as the debtor or offender, and exact of him whatever compensation he required. When our sins are said to be imputed to Christ, it is meant that He is treated as a sinner on account of our sins. And when Adam's sin is said to be imputed to his posterity, it is intended that his sin is laid to their charge, and they are punished for it, or are treated as sinners on that account. In all such cases there must be some ground for imputation; that is, for the laying of the conduct of one to the charge of another, and dealing with him accordingly. In the case of Paul, it was the voluntary assumption of the responsibility of Onesimus; so it was in the case of Christ. The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity is the union between them, which is two-fold: a natural union, as between a father and his children, *and the union of representation, which is the main idea here insisted on*,—a relation admitted on all hands."¹

These citations may suffice from the earlier writings of Dr. Hodge on the subject. In his late work, when treating on the "Representative Principle in Scripture," as involved in his doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin, he proceeds in the following line of argumentation: "2. This representative principle pervades the whole Scriptures. The imputation of Adam's sin to

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, page 136.

his posterity is not an isolated fact;" and in illustration of which statement he adduces Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7; Jeremiah xxxii. 18, and the cases of Esau, Moab, and Ammon, with their descendants, and of Dathan, Abiram, and Achan, with their families; and refers also to other similar facts everywhere occurrent in the Bible, as well as to others mentioned in profane history. And then, by way of anticipating what "may be said, that this is not to be referred to the justice of God, but to the undesigned working of a general law, which, in despite of incidental evil, is on the whole beneficent," he adds, "The difficulty on that assumption, instead of being lessened, is only increased. On either theory the nature and degree of suffering are the same. The only difference relates to the question, Why they suffer for offenses of which they are not personally guilty? The Bible says these sufferings are judicial; they are inflicted as punishment in support of law. . . . The assumption that one man cannot righteously, under the government of God, be punished for the sins of another, is not only contrary, as we have seen, to the express declarations of the Scriptures, and to the administration of the Divine government from the beginning, but it is subversive of the doctrine of atonement and justification. . . . There is a logical connection, therefore, between the denial of the imputation of Adam's sin, and the denial of the scriptural doctrines of atonement and justification. The objections urged against the former bear equally against the latter doctrines; and it is a matter of history that those who reject the one, reject also the other."¹

The imputation which Dr. Hodge throughout all these passages thus labors to illustrate and establish is, as our readers have doubtless perceived, *gratuitous imputation*. And yet, although he has cited the cases, he does not believe that Philemon could have justly imputed the debt of Onesimus to Paul gratuitously, or that our sins were gratuitously imputed to our adorable Redeemer; that is, that in either case there could have been a just imputation without the concurrence of him who was the subject of it. In what way, then, can such cases either illustrate or confirm the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin? And of what conceivable avail can

¹ Theology, Vol. II., pp. 198-202. The statement in the last two sentences of this citation, Dr. Hodge elsewhere, and very inaccurately, attributes to De Moor, as will be shown in § 15 of the sequel.

they be to his argument, except to refute it or to expose its utter fallacy? But not to dwell upon this, let us proceed to consider briefly this line of labored ratiocination; for the question simply is, whether sin may be gratuitously imputed or charged upon the guiltless?

The first important point demanding attention is the marked endeavor of Dr. Hodge to illustrate and confirm, and so identify, his theory of the imputation of Adam's personal sin to a *subjectively innocent* posterity (for such he claims them to be), with the imputation of a parent's sin to an already *subjectively guilty* offspring, *as is the fact in all the cases alleged by him as confirmatory and illustrative of his position and argument*. For he claims that the doctrine of imputation may be impeached alike in both cases, if it be liable to impeachment in the former. He assumes this without any attempt to establish it, fundamental as is the difference between the instance of Adam and his offspring and the other instances alleged, and so rests the whole of his ratiocination upon a mere *petitio principii*. But let us view the procedure in the light of a brief illustration.

If in relation to the administration of some human government it were claimed that because the ruler had the conceded right, in regard to sundry criminals already under sentence of death, to make a summary disposal of them by associating them in the punishment to which other criminals had been consigned (*i. e.*, by executing them all together), and which punishment in no way exceeded their actual desert, he therefore likewise possessed the prerogative to condemn and execute the guiltless, and that the two things are so far analogous, that to question his right to do the latter would involve the denial of his conceded right to do the former,—what would be either the moral or logical value of such an argument; however boldly and emphatically it might be insisted on?—and what weight or intelligence could be accredited to the opinions of those who should insist on the validity of such a conclusion? And does the actual case in the matter before us (so far as the real point is concerned) differ in any essential particular from that of the case supposed for illustration? Here is an existing race,—guilty, polluted, and already under sentence of death,—and God, without transcending their actual desert, includes portions of it in the punishment which is inflicted upon other portions

on some specific occasion. And this procedure, says Dr. Hodge, is sufficient to illustrate and confirm the allegation that God claims and exercises the prerogative to condemn also the guiltless, and to treat them in a similar manner!

If Dr. Hodge can really regard these cases as parallel, we shall not object to his reasoning thus from the one to the other, nor are we unwilling that his argument should be accepted as valid by any who may be able to discover its force and relevancy. But we do object to his efforts to represent such views as the doctrine of the Church or of the word of God. The Reformed divines could, and did with entire propriety, adduce the cases of Esau, Dathan, Achan, etc., with their seed, in illustration and confirmation of the doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin; for, according to that doctrine, the race was not (as Dr. Hodge would have it) subjectively innocent anterior to the original imputation, but subjectively guilty by participation of the first offense, which was, therefore, imputed to them. But Dr. Hodge can in no legitimate sense allege those cases in support of his view, *that the race was guiltless when the imputation was made, and was constituted guilty through the imputation itself.*

This, however, singular as it may appear, is not the main feature of logical incongruity in this effort to sustain his theory. It will be observed from the foregoing citations that, in the one case, to-wit: that of Adam and his seed, Dr. Hodge finds both a natural and federal relation actually existing, and which he properly denominates *a federal and natural union of Adam with his posterity*. And thus far his finding is certainly accurate. But inaccurately, and upon the ground of this union alone, he assumes to justify the gratuitous imputation of guilt and punishment to the posterity of Adam on account of his *peccatum alienum*, and claims, moreover, that this relation furnishes just and righteous ground for such imputation. In the other cases, however, which he alleges as confirmatory of his argument, to-wit: those specified in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, and Jeremiah xxxii. 18, as well as the cases of Korah, Achan, etc., all of which he regards as sufficiently analogous to warrant his reasoning from the one to the other, he finds existing *the natural relation alone*—that of parent and his descendants. And yet, *solely on the ground of this natural relation*, he would justify the imputation and punishment in these cases. He has repeatedly

averred, as we shall presently see, that the difference between the two, as furnishing ground for imputation, is vital and fundamental. And yet, notwithstanding this irreconcilable difference, he here, in the extremity of his theory, is compelled to regard the cases as so intrinsically alike that (as he endeavors to show) the justice of God may impute sin, pronounce sentence, and then punish, as well on the ground of the natural relation as on the ground of the natural and federal conjoined; and that in either case, as well on the one ground as on the other, notwithstanding this fundamental heterogeneity, the requirements of justice may be exacted, and the divine law be sustained in its requirements and fully vindicated in all its demands! Such is the representation here exhibited, and by which the gratuitous imputation of sin is to be demonstrated. But if the facts be so, on what ground is it to be supposed that divine justice, as Dr. Hodge so emphatically alleges, *required, as indispensable to a just imputation*, that a moral or federal relation, along with the natural, should exist as the basis of its requirements, and of the penalty it inflicted in the one case (*i. e.*, that of Adam and his seed), while in the other cases claimed by him as analogous and confirmatory of this statement, it makes no such requirements, but, on the contrary, regards the natural relation alone as a wholly sufficient basis for these exactions? Can any legitimate conclusion in favor of the gratuitous imputation of sin be deduced from such an argument?

And then still further. Even this is not the most incongruous element in the foregoing attempt to assimilate that dogma with Augustinian theology; for in regard to Adam and his posterity Dr. Hodge finds *the federal relation alone* the ground of the judgment unto condemnation which passed upon the race. In referring to the *Larger Catechism*, (Question 22,) he says: "If English be any longer English, this means that it was our representative—as a public person we sinned *in him*—*in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract*. Let it be noted that this is the *only union* here mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our parent is not even referred to. It is neglected because of its secondary importance, representation being the main ground of imputation; *so that when representation ceases imputation ceases*, although the natural bond continues."¹

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 187.

Again: "According to this view of the subject, *the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such a sense that it would not have been imputed had he not been constituted their representative.* It is imputed to them, not because it was, antecedently to that imputation and irrespective of the covenant on which the imputation is founded, already theirs, but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him."¹

Now, if this be so, then we are logically brought to the conclusion that the justice of God vindicates itself, and so sustains the divine law and government, on grounds which are not only heterogeneous, but really subversive of each other, according to Dr. Hodge's often-repeated affirmation. In the one case, it vindicates itself and sustains the government on the ground of the federal relation, as that relation is (says Dr. Hodge) the sole ground of imputation; and in the other and analogous cases, (as Dr. Hodge's argument represents them to be,) it vindicates itself in the same demands, and upholds the same government, on the grounds of the natural relation alone. And furthermore, in the former case, (*i. e.*, that of Adam and his seed,) the "*sin would not have been imputed,*" and "*there could have been no imputation on the ground of the natural relation*"; yet in the latter cases adduced for illustration and confirmation of the truth of this representation *the natural relation is the sole ground of the imputation!*

Such, then, is the argument by which Dr. Hodge would demonstrate that his theory is an integral part of Calvinistic theology, and so justify his violent proscription of his brethren who repudiate that theory. And thus, by confounding gratuitous with immediate and antecedent imputation, and by persisting in the unauthorized assumption that the gratuitous imputation of sin was taught by the Reformed church, and that, consequently, what the Reformers with reason urged in support of their doctrine, might also be alleged by him in support of his theory, Dr. Hodge has been led into these mortifying and fatal inconsistencies and contradictions. The instances alleged, as we have already stated, are all of them applicable for illustration and confirmation of the doctrine entertained by the Protestant church, to-wit: that THE RACE, and not Adam only, had already transgressed when the

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 340.

imputation was made; while, on the contrary, every one of them furnishes a direct and unanswerable argument against the theory which Dr. Hodge would incorporate with the theology of the Church. And it is, moreover, a consideration of the deepest interest in the connection, as illustrating the grievous nature of this departure from sound doctrine, that Wallæus, the celebrated Leyden divine, in his *Reply* to the assault upon Molinaeu's "*Anatomy of Arminianism,*" by Corvinus, finds the Remonstrant theologian (who had adopted the Socinian view of imputation) in precisely the same predicament with this of Dr. Hodge, on the very same subject, and in Chapter IX. (Works, Vol. II., *folio*) thoroughly exposes it. The following, which we present in his own language, will amply suffice for illustration: "*Ex puro Dei arbitrio hujus peccati imputationem in posteros derivari, nescio quo pacto dicant Remonstrantes, qui alibi, ut superius visum, non eo aliquid esse justum dicendum esse contendunt, quia id Deus velit, sed ideo aliquid velle, quia id in se justum est: nisi fortassis intelligant hanc imputationem rem per se esse indifferentem, et nec justitiæ nec in justitiæ in se habere rationem, sed tantum ex Dei arbitrio; . . . nec in quem alium finem id ab iis dicatur, video, nisi ut pœnas illas quæ ex hoc reatu humano generi incumbunt quantum possunt elevent, at cum Vorstio nullam necessitatem satisfactionis Christi quam arbitrariam inferant. Si alia est eorum mens, explicant se clarius, et probent quod dicunt; quia assertiones nudæ nullius nobis sunt ponderis.*" (Pp. 157, 158.)

The transcendent importance of the subject before us in its clear and obvious relations to sound theology, and to the very foundation of ethics, and to the glory of God and the honor of His kingdom (all of which will fully appear in the sequel), demands this rigid scrutiny of the ratiocination by which Dr. Hodge would inculcate his theory upon the Church as her recognized doctrine, and sustain his proscriptive assaults upon his brethren who discard these speculations. And we appeal with confidence to any competent mind unwarping by prejudice to decide, whether such attempts at argument can seriously be otherwise regarded than as a surprisingly inadequate treatment of a most vital and sacred subject.

And then, moreover, such a style of representation as the foregoing must, of course (in the view of him who employs it), rest

upon some adequate basis involving or sustaining it. Does Dr. Hodge mean, then, that *essential justice*, after all, may indifferently regard either of the relations referred to as adequate ground for inflicting the fearful *κρίμα εἰς κατακρίμα*? Can he really affirm such an idea, and thus deliberately contradict all his previous utterances on the subject? And likewise caricature in such style the holy and righteous nature, and the moral government of God, by representing that he may, on grounds not only heterogeneous and conflicting, but really subversive of each other, inflict the most dreadful punishments upon the innocent? Or would he with Socinus, and several of the Supralapsarian school, deny that *essential justice* is one of the Divine perfections? This would, of course, resolve the query; but in so doing he must at the same time retract what he has in his theology just affirmed to the contrary. But we shall not dwell upon the point. His forecited ratiocination may conduct the mind logically to either of these inferences; and our readers will decide for themselves as to the weight to which such ratiocination is entitled.

That the posterity of Adam were condemned for his sin alone, or the children of Dathan, Achan, and others, for their parents' sin alone,—that is, without regard to their own existing depravity, as the argument and theory of Dr. Hodge necessarily affirm,—is not only a wholly baseless assumption, but is condemned alike by the word of God, and by the convictions of our moral nature. Our participation of Adam's offense is directly affirmed in the inspired announcement that *all sinned*, and that they were, in consequence, constituted sinners, or *exhibited in their real character as such*. And this is affirmed to be the reason why *death*, or *the judgment unto condemnation* passed upon all. We repeat, that we know nothing as to the mode or manner of this participation. Nor is such knowledge at all needed in order to our full confidence in the truth of the Divine averment. The posterity of Adam were punished because they all alike were guilty with their parents; though *in what manner* the ethical appropriation of that guilt actually occurred we know not; and neither do we believe *how* it occurred, since the *how* is nowhere revealed. The fact that we all sinned in the first sin is of pure revelation; and as such we reverentially receive it. Baier, (a theologian of rare accomplishments and remarkable accuracy, and one who still retains his emi-

nence amongst the evangelical divines of Europe,) has said, admirably to the point: "Ut autem subtilius disputatur; *quo modo* Dens lapsum Protoplastorum posteris ipsorum, nondum existentibus, ita *imputare* potuerit; ut propterea etiam ipsos justitiâ originali destitutos et peccatores nasci oporteret? *Non opus est, nec fortasse consultum*. Sufficit enim τὸ δέειν esse revelatum; etsi τὸ πῶς ignoretur."¹ In other words, the fact stated is to be received simply *as a fact revealed by the Holy Spirit*; and such in every age has been the position of the Augustinian Church.

I may be permitted to say, in conclusion, that my sole aim in this work (as in my former essay,) is to place the doctrine of imputation and original sin in its true position in the relation which it fundamentally sustains to the Church theology and the whole system of salvation as revealed, for in both these aspects the theory of Dr. Hodge has brought it into deadly peril. The doctrine itself, that we all sinned in the first sin, is of pure revelation, and as such neither our philosophy, nor our notions of the "absurd" and "impossible," can have any thing to do with it. The Holy Spirit does not teach absurdities, nor do they believe absurdities who believe what He teaches. The question, therefore, is, Has God plainly and clearly announced that the posterity of Adam became veritable sinners in the fall? And has the Church received and taught this doctrine? These inquiries present the point at issue, and in this tractate we design to place fairly and truly in possession of our readers the great and important facts which bear to that issue a determining relation.

It is certainly to be contemplated with emotions of humiliation and regret, that a fundamental difference on this vital doctrine should now exist in our communion. But they who depart essentially from the principles entertained and cherished by the Church from the beginning are alone responsible for this state of things, and should not complain that such departure calls for a rigid investigation of its grounds—an investigation, moreover, which no abortive attempts at ridicule, or proscription, or calumny, shall avail to hinder. "That those should shrink from the investigation of such topics who, by receiving their theology from the hands of their superiors in a mass, have already relinquished the

¹ Compendium Theol. Positivæ (editis tertia), page 510, Tenæ, 1694.

liberty of thinking for themselves, is no more than might be well expected."¹

§ 5. DR. HODGE'S POSITION IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE.

It is now in place to call special attention to the position assumed by Dr. Hodge in relation to the issue itself, that so the great central point of this discussion may be clearly before our readers during the prosecution of our inquiry. We design, however, not to anticipate the theme of a later section of the argument, (which relates, as the reader will see, to another aspect of the question,) but merely to develop the course of Dr. Hodge in regard to the main issue itself.

The question which presents the issue is, as we have shown in the preceding sections, perfectly plain and simple in its terms and statement. But in illustration we shall here cite part of a paragraph from our former essay, in which we endeavored to call the serious attention of Dr. Hodge to the precise point involved in the inquiry, and of which he really seemed to have formed no adequate conception; but which, if we may form an estimate from his Revised Commentary on Romans, published subsequently, produced upon him no effect other than to induce a determination, through ridicule and denunciation, or any other means which might be deemed available, to put an end to the discussion.

The passage to which we refer is the following: "And now, in view of the foregoing speculation of Dr. Hodge and others, let it be considered that an act of God imputing to us a personal sin of Adam can only be, in its own nature, outward and forensic to us; and that no such act of God can in its own nature make us inwardly depraved. Something more is requisite; for otherwise the imputation of our sins to Christ would have made Him inwardly corrupt, and the imputation of His righteousness to us would make us inwardly holy; neither of which is true, or even possible. On the other hand, our inward natural pollution would not necessarily involve and draw after it, or necessarily presuppose, an imputation, outward and forensic as to us, of the guilt of any personal sin of Adam. In the one case and in the other, the facts being absolute and synchronous and inseparable, (as has been so fully illustrated throughout this discussion,) the headship of Adam,

¹ Robert Hall, in reply to Kinghorn, (Works, Vol. I., page 493).

both natural and federal, and the headship of Christ, both supernatural and federal, *are always implied*. Considered as of one nature with Adam, and being his posterity, there is no difficulty in seeing that we sinned in him and fell with him; considered as being different persons from him, and yet his descendants and of his nature, there is no difficulty in seeing that he might be our federal head. If Dr. Hodge should still insist that the idea of oneness of nature and plurality of persons in the human race, puts the question of the headship and the effects upon us of his fall, in a position that renders the idea of our sinning in him incomprehensible, except it mean that we sinned in him *only* representatively, (for sinning representatively and sinning *only* representatively are not the same,) we respectfully request him to bear in mind that the doctrine of oneness of nature and plurality of persons in the Godhead *is the very foundation of all that is explicable in the revealed mode of salvation, and of the efficacy of it all as revealed*; and so, too, the announcement involving an equally incomprehensible principle of oneness and plurality *is the very foundation of all that is explicable in all that is revealed to us of the doctrine of original sin*. And why, then, should any Christian man make the incomprehensibility of this latter announcement a reason for disregarding and rejecting it, and yet aver that the incomprehensibility of the former furnishes no ground for rejecting that,—while at the same time he concedes that each announcement rests alike upon the revealed testimony of God? Adam and his race have the same nature and oneness of nature, but many persons; and God is One, and He is Three, and the three persons of the Godhead have one and the same nature; and these are *facts of revelation*, and not the discoveries of philosophy.¹

¹ This illustration has been adopted by Dr. Schaff, and others of our eminent divines, as directly in point. It is plain to the most moderate capacity, and not easily misunderstood. A writer, however, in the *Princeton Review*, for April, 1870, finding the impression it had made, and was still making, against his mistaken representations of the Church theology, undertakes to set it aside by the following summary procedure: "Nor is the case relieved by the illustration from the Trinity. If it were just, the Trinity ceases to be a mystery. The unity of essence and plurality of persons is precisely that which exists among men, and there is no more that is incomprehensible in it than in the plurality of human persons having a common humanity. Is this all the mystery of the Trinity? What is this common humanity? Is it one

In the latter case, moreover, we are lost if our salvation be not explicable consistently, not only with the mode of God's being, but with the mode still farther complicated (if we may so speak) by the Second Person of the Godhead taking our nature, and then renewing us in His own nature; thus making our union with Him mean that we share a common nature with Him in a two-fold way. And now, with all the seriousness which a theme so deeply serious is calculated to awaken, let me ask, Can anything be more idle, after accepting these truths as the basis of salvation, than to quibble about the pretended difficulties of our being in Adam, sinning with him and falling with him, because we are different persons from him? Can there possibly be any more difficulty in believing the testimony of God in the one case than in the other? Was not the Son of God a different person from the Father, and also a different person from us, and yet is He not of one nature with both? Indeed, if it be not so, our whole race is lost and undone for ever."¹

These remarks had reference mainly to Dr. Hodge's then recent allegations in the *Princeton Review*,² and which, though we shall have occasion in the sequel to call attention to them, we here cite. He says: "That we acted thousands of years before *we* existed, is as monstrous a proposition as ever was framed. The doctrine of preëxistence, as held by Origen, revived in our day by Dr. Müller and others, and by Dr. Edward Beecher in this country, is, compared to that proposition, clear sunshine. Apostasy, as we are requested carefully to consider, 'is an act,' it is 'a voluntary act,' it is an act of 'self-determination,' and it is affirmed to be our act. That is, we performed a personal act,—that is, a voluntary act, an act of self-determination, before that *self* had any existence. There is no definition of a personal act more precise and generally

substance numerically? Or is it not, rather, resembling qualities depending on a common origin?" (Page 251.) We should feel that we were trifling with the intelligence of our readers were we to enter upon an exposure of this unworthy quibbling, which certainly exhibits either a wanton evasion of the point so fully illustrated, or an incompetency to apprehend it intelligently. In note (B.) of the Appendix we have followed out with much care and labor the thought presented in the text.

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 566-568.

² For 1860, pp. 356-359, in his review of Dr. Baird's work entitled *Elohim Revealed*.

adopted than an 'act of voluntary self-determination.' Such was apostasy in Adam, and if we performed that act, then we were in him, not by community of nature merely, but personally; for we are said to have done what nature as nature cannot do,—what of necessity implies personality. Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says."

It is not a little instructive to observe, in view of this tirade, that when Dr. Hodge finds it necessary in his *Theology*¹ to attempt the vindication of the Divine Being against the charge of the authorship of sin in the race, *he there expresses his belief in that which he here affirms no man can believe.* He, in that connection, finds himself under the necessity of abandoning for the time being his gratuitous imputation scheme, and, instead of asserting, as he does in the above quotation, that apostasy is *the result* of God's abandoning the posterity of Adam, alleges that He abandoned them *because they were already apostate.* And if already apostate, they had, of course, apostatized previous to the sentence of abandonment. Such is the style in which the Professor feels at liberty to inculcate Calvinistic theology. But the full consideration of it will come up in a future section.

In the revised edition of his *Commentary on Romans*, issued, as above stated, soon after the appearance of my essay in the *Danville Review*, the Doctor makes no direct allusion to that essay, but rises to a still higher tone of denunciation and sarcasm, as stated above. He denounces the principle presented and illustrated in the foregoing extract from that essay as Pantheistic nonsense, "which does not rise even to the dignity of a contradiction, and has no meaning at all," and adds, "It is a monstrous evil to make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men."² All of which is, moreover, substantially repeated or sustained in his *Theology*.³ And thus, instead of essaying in a frank and scholarly manner to meet and solve the inquiry whether the instance in question (Romans v. 12—"all sinned,")

¹ See Vol. II., p. 253, and in other places.

² See p. 226.

³ See Vol. II., pp. 190, 192, 216, 220-227.

does not fairly come under the same category with those other announcements of inexplicable facts pertaining to the two natures of Christ and the unity and distinct personality of the divine nature, and is therefore to be received simply as a fact without explanation, or rather as itself constituting an explanatory principle, communicated by the Spirit of truth to aid our inquiries, he prefers this unworthy course of sarcasm and denunciation; and so assumes the position of thus treating, and in relation to a fundamental truth, the cherished and settled convictions of the Church of God from the days of Augustine until the present hour.

In the things of faith, let our thoughts be the thoughts of God, and not our own imaginings. This is the safe rule, and it is always perilous to set it aside. When Socinus was denouncing the doctrine of the Trinity, and raving against the doctrine of original sin as entertained by the Church as preposterous and impossible, Beza quietly remarked, "*Qui sequitur Deum emendate sane loquitur*,"—a golden sentence, which no herald of the cross should permit himself ever to lose sight of. And in this connection it is certainly a most impressive reflection that Socinus and his school (as will fully appear in the sequel) present the same array of argument, denunciation and ridicule against the doctrine of original sin as received and taught by the Reformed Church as is thus presented by the Professor at Princeton. They make the same points of exception, and urge them in the same style as he in the preceding citations and in innumerable other passages—the explanation of which startling fact will fully appear when we come to treat of the exposition which he offers of Romans v. 12–21.

I may repeat, also, in conclusion, that this discussion owes not its origin to me. He only is responsible for it who, by unauthorized endeavors to introduce fundamental changes into our received theology, has imperilled the well-being and harmony of the Church. In my former essay I adverted to this, and established, as I think, beyond successful contradiction, the fact that Dr. Hodge's speculations were logically leading to such a result, but at the same time intimated in the kindest manner that he had fallen into mistakes which he would certainly correct. Still later, Dr. Schaff, in the American edition of "Lange on Romans," (page 194), suggested that his hostility to the realistic Augustinian view of the doctrine appears to proceed "from a misunderstanding." But Dr.

Hodge repudiates all such suppositions, and in his Theology reiterates and endeavors to confirm his previous and unauthorized assumptions. The accusation, therefore, by sundry individuals, who plainly evince neither the adequate knowledge nor the capacity to appreciate the subject, charging the writer as aiming to disturb the peace of our denomination simply because he cannot acquiesce in what he claims to have shown to be a fundamental departure from our recognized theology, should be shrunk from with shuddering recoil by every one who would venture to allege it in a Protestant community.¹ And neither should any one who would be regarded as possessed of either intelligence or piety avail himself of such a plea by such individuals in justification, or even extenuation, of a refusal to respond to exceptions and arguments which he himself has invited. Nor is it of any avail to say that Dr. Hodge does not admit the departure. For the same was pleaded likewise by Arius and Sabellius, and by others without number, whose errors have more or less in every age imperilled the souls of men. Those gentlemen, however, were bound, in consideration of the earnest protests of their brethren, fairly to meet the statements upon which the charge of departure had been predicated, and to reconcile their professed adherence to the doctrine of the Church, with those exceptions, so far at least as to show, if this could be done, that the charge was groundless, and not attempt to supersede the discussion or to satisfy inquiry by a bold reiteration of previous utterances. And if this could not be done, their duty in the premises was plain. In the case of Dr. Hodge the instance is still more striking; for not only did the author of the essay entertain this conviction, but many of the ablest theologians then living expressed their concurrence in the strength and validity of the reasons alleged; and therefore the groundless and imperti-

¹ "There is an extreme of caution as reprehensible and hurtful as the extreme of rashness. Till human opinions become infallible, the practices which grow out of them cannot be always right. . . . At no time, and upon no pretence, must it be allowed to usurp the right of controlling conscience in matters of *scriptural principle*, nor to exert the pestilent prerogative of abetting the cause of error by arresting the progress of inquiry after truth. Unless we accede to this proposition, the rock is swept away from under our feet. The doctrine of Reformation is the worst of heresies, and every attempt to enforce it a profligate insurrection against human peace."—*Plea for Sacramental Communion*, by Dr. John M. Mason, pp. 4, 5, (New York, 1816.)

nent accusation of disturbing the peace of the Church can furnish neither a justification for persistence in error, on the one hand, nor on the other hand the slightest reason for backwardness in the sacred duty of defending the truth.

Wallæus, in his work already referred to, adverting to a somewhat similar condition of affairs in his day, which, as all are aware, resulted in endowing with new life several of the most pernicious errors of the Pelagian scheme, remarks: "As hectic diseases are the more dangerous because they are not perceived until by their prevalency in the system they have brought the life itself into jeopardy; so those errors are most to be dreaded which steal secretly into the Church, and never exhibit their actual presence until they have brought into peril her well-being itself." Many examples in illustration can be adduced from the ecclesiology of the past; though few, as we conceive, can be found more alarming than the instance now under consideration. This representation is not lightly made. And if we fail to sustain and justify it by even a superabundance of pertinent proof, we are willing that the odious appellation of *troubler of the Church* should rest upon our memory. If, however, the proof be furnished, then the appellation must rest where, in that case, it will rightfully belong.

§ 6. ANTECEDENT OR IMMEDIATE IMPUTATION IS NEVER, IN THE REFORMED THEOLOGY, CONFOUNDED WITH GRATUITOUS IMPUTATION.

When Turretin and the old divines allege, as they very often do, that the inherent sin or hereditary corruption of our race cannot be reconciled to the justice of God without the admission of imputed sin, they never mean by imputation a merely forensic putation; nor by imputed sin, the merely personal sin, or *peccatum alienum* of Adam, as Dr. Hodge always does; but the immediate imputation of the first sin, which they invariably define to be *Adam's sin and our own sin in and with him*; that is, our mutual participation of the first offense. And hence they teach that the guilt and corruption under which we come into the world would be irreconcilable with the justice of God unless this mutually participated sin had been, through a just and righteous imputation, its procuring cause. In my former essay, through misplaced reliance on the peremptory asseverations of Dr. Hodge, that Turretin somewhere (though he never mentions precisely where) had asserted

the gratuitous imputation of sin, I was led into a hypothetical concession that it might, perhaps, be even so. A more thorough examination, however, has shown the statement to be wholly without foundation; and the concession therefore is withdrawn. Those divines, in referring to the transgression of our first parents, speak of it indifferently, as "Adam's sin," "the sin of our first parents," "the first sin," and the like (which phraseology will be the subject of a future section); but when they allude to it as the procuring cause of the existing corruption of our nature, they never speak of it as Adam's merely personal sin; and never designate it, as Dr. Hodge always does, a *peccatum alienum*; nor ever assert that it was gratuitously imputed.

Another point which, in this connection, is of no little importance, on account both of its intrinsic relation to the subject itself and of Dr. Hodge's strange representations in regard to it, is, those divines never, in this connection, employ *reatus* (a word which they very frequently use) to signify a mere liability to arrest, or a mere exposure to suffering or penalty;¹ but always in any such connection employ it to signify *exposure to punishment, indebtedness to justice, liability to arrest*, FOR SIN, CRIMINALITY, actual ill-desert,² (as with our English word *guilt*), using the term interchangeably with *culpa*, *crimen*, *peccatum*, and the like. Hence they employ interchangeably the phrases, *imputatio culpæ*, *reatus*, *criminis*, *peccati Adami*; and apply alike and indifferently all these terms in reference to our participation with Adam in the first sin.

To any one at all conversant with the subject it would be quite superfluous to illustrate or confirm this representation by examples. I add, however, an instance or two in the margin, from which it

¹ See Princeton Essays, First Series, pp. 176-186. So also Dr. Hodge, in Theology, Vol. II., p. 189, and in many other places.

² *Reatus* has only a late classical usage, Messala having invented the term about the commencement of the Christian era. (Observe what Quintilian says in regard to it, Instit. lib. 8, cap. 3.) The Roman jurists employ the word as the equivalent of *crimen*, (a fault exposing to punishment,) though in its original import it seems to have denoted the state or external condition of one who was *reus* (charged with criminality) *anterior to trial*, or to a legal condemnation or acquittal; and then, still later, to denote the state of such as had been actually arrested and committed to custody in order to be tried. The early Christian writers, as Prudentius, employ it to designate the *culpæ*, or *crimina*, of which all men are guilty before God.

may be at once perceived that in the old Calvinistic usage of *reatus*, *culpa*, and the like, no such distinctions are observed as is pretended by Dr. Hodge.¹

The English word *guilt* expresses precisely the sense attached to *reatus* by the Reformed divines, in verification of which we need only cite the following-named lexicographers, who, having thoroughly traced out its usage in our tongue, present the subjoined definitions: *Johnson* says, "Guilt, 1, The state of a man justly charged with a crime; the contrary of innocence; 2, A crime; an offense." *Richardson* cites approvingly the following ancient etymology: "Guilt is *ge-wig-led*, *guiled*, *guil'd*, *guilt*; the past participle of *ge-wiglian*; and to find guilt in any one is to find that he has been guiled, or, as we now say, *beguiled*; as *wicked* means *witched* or *bewitched*. To pronounce *guilt* is to pronounce *wicked*." *Worcester*, in perhaps the best of all English dictionaries, defines it, "1, The state of being guilty, or of having violated a law, knowing it to be such; criminality; guiltiness; criminousness; 2, A crime, an offense, misdeed, delinquency."

Such, then, is the meaning of *reatus*, and such the mode of its application in the matter before us; a term, the signification of which Dr. Hodge has wholly misconceived through his endeavors to give currency to the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin. That theory obliges its supporters, from *Catharinus* to Dr. Hodge, to apply the term in a sense in which it neither is nor could be applied by the Reformed divines in stating and defending the doctrine of antecedent and immediate imputation. They all entertain the latter doctrine, while they all wholly repudiate his theory.

The error of Dr. Hodge, which, both in his earlier writings and in his late work, he endeavors to establish, has, therefore, really nothing to support it. And the following, from the latter, is all that need be here further referred to. He says that the distinction

¹ *Culpa* and *reatus* are employed interchangeably by *Ursinus* in his *Explic. Cat. ad Quæst. 7*, pp. 39-44, and by *Filenus*, *Syntag. Fripart. Theologiæ*, pp. 87, 88, 352. *Beza* likewise, in passages to be hereafter cited, says: "*Culpa* promanans ex eo quod omnes peccavimus," etc. "Corruptio quæ est pœna istius culpæ." *De Moor* likewise, (III., p. 255,) "Imputatio justitiæ Christi et culpæ Adami pari passu ambulant," etc.—a passage which Dr. Hodge cites (*Theol. Vol. II.*, p. 207), though totally misapprehending the meaning of the words, as is shown in our § 15, *infra*, near the beginning.

between "criminality, demerit, and blameworthiness," and "obligation to suffer the punishment due to an offense, theologians are accustomed to express by the terms *reatus culpæ*, and *reatus pœnæ*. *Culpa* is (Strafwürdiger Zustand) blameworthiness; and *reatus culpæ* is guilt in the form of ill-desert. Whereas the *reatus pœnæ* is the debt we owe to justice."¹ This most absurd representation is affirmed with a view of laying a historico-theological basis for the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin. But the statement, so far as relates to the recognized theologians of the Protestant Church, is so very inaccurate as to be fabulous, for they entertain no such notions as Dr. Hodge here affirms; and a very slight inspection of the theology of the Calvinistic church will evince that her theologians disallow them utterly. Dr. Hodge should have stated what "theologians are accustomed to express" the dogma he here advances. But since he has not regarded this as necessary, *Turretin* shall do it for him, and inform our readers how the doctrine is regarded by the Church divines. He, in direct reference to the matter, says,² "But by the Papists, *reatus* is falsely distinguished into *reatus culpæ* and *pœnæ*. They allege that *reatus culpæ* is that by which the sinner is of himself undeserving of the favor of God, and deserving of His anger and condemnation; while *reatus pœnæ* is that by which he is exposed to condemnation, and bound up to it. They allege that the former is taken away through Christ, while the latter can remain as to the guilt of temporal punishment. But the folly of the distinction appears from the nature of both. For since crime and punishment are related, and *guilt (reatus)* can be nothing else than obligation to punishment which arises out of crime, they come on together, and together depart; so that the crime and its guilt being taken away, the punishment itself should of necessity be removed, since it cannot be inflicted except on account of crime. For the crime cannot be said to be remitted, or its guilt taken away, if anything still remains for the sinner to suffer on account of it." This certainly is decisive. Dr. Owen, and others of our eminent divines, in treating the topic, speak just as decidedly in repudiation and reprehension of the popish figment which is now inculcated by Dr. Hodge as Calvinistic theology. It is, however, unnecessary to cite them.

¹ See his *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 189; compare likewise *Princeton Essays*, First Series, pp. 176-186. ² See Loc. IX., Quæst. 3, Sect. 6.

On this whole subject, therefore, Dr. Hodge has affirmed, in regard to the teaching of the Reformed church, not only that which is without foundation, but that which is contrary to fact, and the misconception runs through all his discussions respecting it. He moreover, and with the same peremptoriness, claims that his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin is taught in the doctrinal standards of our Church. He says: "According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a penal evil from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. This is our doctrine, and the doctrine of the standards of our Church. For they make original sin to consist, 1st, In the guilt of Adam's first sin; 2ndly, The want of original righteousness; and 3dly, The corruption of our whole nature."¹ The same is many times repeated in his *Theology*,² from which we cite the following brief explanations: "His (Adam's) sin was not our sin. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a *peccatum alienum*; and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences."³ "To impute sin, in scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant, not criminality or moral ill-desert, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice."⁴

Now, although there can be no rational doubt (as will fully appear in the sequel,) that had the question been propounded to the Westminster Assembly, as to the meaning they attach to the term *guilt*, in the passage above cited by Dr. Hodge, they, one and all, would have answered, *Guilt by participation* (*culpa participatione*, to use the expression which then and previously was everywhere current in the Calvinistic church), and in which even the supralapsarian Rutherford would have joined; and although this explanation of the term in such connection is found everywhere existing in our theology, Dr. Hodge has utterly slighted and repudiated it as unworthy of notice; and on the most unauthorized assumption claims that the guilt referred to is that of a *peccatum alienum*, or Adam's personal sin alone. And in entire disregard of all the

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 168.

² See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 192-227.

³ Ibid. Vol. II., p. 225. ⁴ Ibid. p. 196.

other statements of our standards affirming a community of guilt, and against all emphatic precedent in the acknowledged statement of the doctrine itself, persists likewise in claiming that *the order of topics*, as exhibited in this one place, is designed by the Assembly as a logical statement of cause and effect—the cause being Adam's *peccatum alienum*, and the effect being the universal depravity or corruption of his posterity. And having thus, by the merest *petitio principii*, assumed all this, he deduces the *monstrous* (if I may employ one of his favorite terms,) and equally false and baseless conclusion, that our standards support the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin.¹

In our former essay² we called the attention of Dr. Hodge to the error here referred to, and gave him full proof that the divines of the Reformation never attach the slightest importance to the mere order or arrangement in which the topics, *guilt and depravity*, are presented in defining the doctrine of original sin; but (holding as they do, that the doctrine is to be explicated from an equal recognition of both the federal and natural relations of the race to Adam), were satisfied if only the statement contained a clear enunciation of each; and that they sometimes state the topics in the order of *guilt, depravity, death*, and at other times the same divines present them in the order of *depravity, guilt, death*; which fact, while it illustrates their view of the synchronousness of guilt and depravity in the race, shows at the same time the impossibility of supposing that they should have regarded either as causal of the other; that is, depravity as causal of this imputation (as Placæus maintained), or the imputation as causal of the depravity, as is alleged by Dr. Hodge, who, as above stated, persists

¹ So far as mere logical order is concerned, however, there could indeed be no valid objection to admitting its existence in the statement referred to, if the term *guilt* be taken in the sense attached to it by the Westminster divines, i. e., *guilt by participation of Adam's first sin*; for this places the loss of original righteousness and the corruption of our whole nature in their proper and recognized relation to the first sin. But to depart from the recognized meaning of the term (in such connection), and to attribute to it, as Dr. Hodge does, the sense of *liability to punishment for a mere peccatum alienum*, is to invert their doctrine, and to represent them as teaching what they utterly disclaim and condemn. But no such sentiment was known to the Church in their day, as we shall abundantly show, except to be rejected as a pernicious heresy.

² See *Danville Review* for 1861, pp. 403-407.

upon a mere *petitio principii*, which is disproved, moreover, by the existing facts, to claim that in the foregoing citation from our standards there is (1), A recognition of Adam's merely personal sin, or *peccatum alienum*, as the first sin; and (2), A logical order of statement, making the guilt of that merely personal sin causal of the depravity of the race; while, at the same time, he would subordinate to this mere assumption all their other statements which so clearly affirm a community of guilt in the fall. And so, upon this mere shade of a shadow, gratuitous imputation must be confounded with immediate and antecedent imputation, and be regarded as the doctrine of our Church. A rigid analysis is, however, the only refutation which such a procedure requires.

The statement with which this section commences exhibits the ground on which Dr. Hodge's strange misapprehension must have occurred; who, finding that the old divines, when they treat of the doctrine of original sin *in the relation it sustains to Divine justice*, always place the *culpa* or *reatus* before the *corruptio*, or *peccatum inherens*, inferred that the blameworthiness was held by them to be on account of Adam's *peccatum alienum* alone, (a notion they always repudiate,) and lost sight of the fact, so fully affirmed by them, that it is *on account of Adam's sin, and of our own participation therein*. How easily, for instance, might the meaning of the writer of such a passage as the following be misconceived by one who had persuaded himself that the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin was a part of their theology, to-wit: "The first sin or fall of Adam and original sin differ as cause and effect. For the fall of Adam is the cause of guilt and corruption, not only of Adam himself, but of his entire posterity. But original sin is nothing other than the effect itself of the first fall, (existing and inhering in Adam, even before he proceeded to sin actually,) being propagated to posterity, to-wit: the guilt and corruption of nature. . . . Depravity cannot be the first part of original sin. For God does not inflict the punishment of privation and depravity unless upon those who are guilty. Guilt, therefore, precedes in the order of nature."¹

Dr. Hodge, in applying such a passage, (as in similar instances he has done very frequently,) so as to make it sustain his theory

¹See the Commentary of Dr. David Pareus, on Leviticus xii. (Opera Exegetica, Tom. I., page 412. Francofurti, 1647.)

of gratuitous imputation, would perpetrate an incongruity of which no theologian ought to be guilty. For "the guilt which precedes in the order of nature," is the guilt, not of Adam's personal sin alone, but of our sin in the fall. And our readers will see, by our subsequent citations from this great divine, that no theologian of the Reformation was more decidedly hostile than he to the whole theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, which, in his day, was perpetually asseverated by the Socinian and Remonstrant schools. By the sin and fall of Adam, therefore, he does not mean only his personal sin, but our sin in and with him, as when, for example, remarking on Ezekiel xviii., he, after citing Romans v. 12, adds, "And so, on account of the first fall of Adam, his whole posterity contracted guilt, and was deprived of its original dignity and righteousness, (1), Because his entire posterity sinned in Adam, seeing that they were in him. Wherefore, it was not only on account of a foreign sin, but on account also of their own; *non tantum propter alienum, sed etiam propter suum peccatum*."

And then, moreover, the definition which Dr. Hodge, in his late work, as in his earlier writings, has attached to "immediate imputation," confounding it with gratuitous imputation, differs *toto cælo* from the definition attached to it by the Calvinistic church. I refer not to the *Confessio Helvetica*, (though this fully sustains the representation,) of which Hase, in his Church History, declares that its "legal influence had ceased even at the commencement of the eighteenth century;" and which Ebrard, too much in the denunciatory style of Dr. Hodge, has characterized as the "ridiculous after-birth of a symbolic book;" but I include all the acknowledged doctrinal symbols of the Church, and the statements of her representative divines. Dr. Hodge, in his Theology, has largely cited those symbols; but aware that this doctrine is not taught in any one of them, as he is obliged tacitly to concede, *has cited them in Latin* without assigning any reason for doing so, and has thus placed it beyond the reach of the mass of our Church members to form an intelligent judgment from the facts in the case.

The phrase *immediate imputation*, in very recent usage, has been employed in a two-fold signification; and, as thus used, may mean either the direct imputation of the first sin of the race, or the alone imputation of Adam's personal sin (the *peccatum alienum*). In the former sense it is employed by the Calvinistic church

after the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation had been recognized, (*i. e.*, during the latter part of the seventeenth century,) and in the latter sense Dr. Hodge employs it, who seems never to have ascertained its true import, and therefore preposterously employs it as a synonym with gratuitous imputation in respect to both sin and righteousness. The former usage presents the idea *that the race sinned in and fell with Adam in the first sin*; and that, on account of this mutual participation, that sin was directly or immediately imputed both to Adam and themselves, and antecedently to the *personal* existence of his posterity. But the latter usage excludes this idea of participation, as may be seen by the foregoing citations from Dr. Hodge. And any who may employ it agreeably to such usage must necessarily maintain, as did Socinus and his followers, and likewise the Remonstrant school, that the first sin was Adam's alone, and that as such it was gratuitously imputed to his posterity. In the former usage we have *depravity, guilt, death*; not, indeed, as a logical statement presenting depravity as causal of the guilt, but merely as synchronizing with it; and in the latter we have *guilt, depravity, death*, claimed by Dr. Hodge as a logical statement of cause and effect, Adam's *personal* sin being the cause, and the universal depravity of the race the effect. The former teaches that the first sin, with its accompanying guilt, was a common sin, being mutually participated by ourselves and by Adam; while the latter teaches that originally the first sin was not ours, but that God has made it ours,—that is, common to the race,—by a forensic imputation. The former finds the guilt already common; the latter makes it common. In the former we contract the guilt by our fall and sin in Adam; in the latter the guilt is inflicted on us while yet in a state of innocence, in punishment for the *peccatum alienum* of Adam.

Any intelligent perusal of the old theology will evince the utter impossibility of the supposition that the expression *antecedent* or *immediate imputation* should be employed therein to signify *gratuitous imputation*; nor is it conceivable how such perusal should fail to show that the expression can only mean an imputation grounded on a real participation by the posterity of Adam in the guilt or sin of his fall. No scholar can be pardoned for confounding the two; or for maintaining either that they convey the

same idea, or that the one implies the other. The difference between the two doctrines, as exhibited in our theology, is, as Dr. Hodge perpetually alleges, a vital and fundamental difference; although, as his explications evince, he has so grievously misapprehended the phraseology itself as to mistake the one for the other. The doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of Adam's sin, (that is, its imputation irrespective of our own subjective ill-desert,) the Augustinian divines denounce without measure, and utterly disclaim (as we shall show), and insist, moreover, in the most decided manner that the *modes* in which both sin and righteousness are communicated form no part of the apostolic comparison or analogy in Romans v. 12–21; though Dr. Hodge, as our previous citations demonstrate, is necessitated, in the strongest manner, to affirm the contrary, since without this admission his whole theory is left destitute of even a shadow of scriptural support. All this we shall make good in its proper place in the argument; for the point is indeed vital in the discussion. In employing the phrase “immediate imputation,” therefore, we emphatically repeat that the Calvinistic divines (even from the very commencement of that employment of the phrase) never mean by it what Dr. Hodge means: a forensic imputation of the *peccatum alienum* of Adam, as antecedent to and solely productive of the inherent sin or corruption of the race; but an imputation, not only of Adam's sin, but of our own sin in and with him; which imputation, as they teach, is antecedent to our birth, or to what is named in the church theology “*actual sin*,” as distinguished from the *inherent* or *habitual*. And after the most careful and protracted consideration of the subject, I cannot hesitate to affirm that there is really no basis for an intelligent litigation of this point more than there could be in the case of a man claiming to be an astronomer who should seriously maintain that the earth is the centre of the stellar and solar system. In such contingency,—that is, if it were at all important to meet his lucubrations,—little more could be demanded of you than to announce the facts of the science, and leave him to explain the grounds of his strange misapprehension concerning them.

I greatly fear that the repetitious particularity which I have regarded as necessary in treating the theme of the present section may have wearied the reader; but with the whole field and its

various bearings in full prospect, which it is the design of this treatise to occupy, I must crave his indulgence for what seemed to me to be a fair and full statement of a most important branch of the argument, and one which has been greatly mystified. I conclude with a single reflection.

The main principle underlying this discussion is, therefore, not only fundamental to theology, but in the issue, moreover, the entire foundation of ethics or morality is clearly involved. For example: let the serious-minded reader propound to himself, and frankly answer according to the spontaneous convictions of his moral nature and the impressions derived from the teachings of the divine word, the question, whether it can conceivably consist with the moral perfections of God, as revealed in His word and works, that He, on any ground whatever and by a mere act of the will, should constitute an innocent dependent creature depraved, apostate, and criminal, and then treat him or proceed against him as such? May He, in the case of creatures in whom sin or depravity *does not exist*, proceed, by a mere sovereign act of His will, *first* to produce it within them, and then to punish them for it according to the fearful inflictions of His punitive justice? In other words, Is it the prerogative of divine justice to pronounce sentence according to actually existing desert, *e. g.*, in the case of apostasy or criminality of any sort; or are we to regard it as possessing the prerogative *first* to produce effectively that apostasy or ill-desert, and *then* to visit with its fearful retributions those who have thus been rendered subject to the infliction? If the latter, (and the latter is what Dr. Hodge teaches as our theology,) then the conception of divine justice in its relation to the creature, and as entertained by all rational or accountable beings, must certainly undergo an essential and radical modification, and along therewith the whole science of ethics and theology. The issue, therefore, involves principles of antagonism eternally irreconcilable,—principles which, of course, therefore, can never be intelligently commingled in any consistent or accurately digested theological system,—a statement which carries with it clearly the evidence of its truth. Nor can any attempt at defining *sin*, *guilt*, *the Divine will*, *justice*, and *the like*, suffice to bring those antagonizing elements into coherence or correlation, any more than they could suffice to bring into mutual coherence those of holiness and sin.

§ 7. THE CALVINISTIC SYSTEM AND MEDIATE IMPUTATION.

The Princeton Professor in his Theology, as also in his previous discussions of the topic, has classed under the category of *MEDIATE imputationists* those who reject his theory of *gratuitous*, or (as he preposterously names it) *antecedent and immediate imputation*,¹ and adhere to the expressed doctrine of the Church—the *culpa participatione*. In a previous section we have shown that in the Church theology there is observable a clear and radical distinction between the direct or *immediate imputation of the first sin* (which includes not only the sin of Adam, but that of his posterity as implicated with him in the same sin),² and the gratuitous imputation of Adam's *peccatum alienum*. She acknowledges and defends the former, while she unhesitatingly repudiates the claim of the latter to furnish any adequate or even intelligible basis on which to account for or explain the existing depravity of the race; and on the contrary, directly maintained (as we have stated) that not only did Adam sin, but that all so sinned as to become implicated in the guilt of his sin, and thereby to render themselves subjectively deserving of the Divine displeasure; thus affirming that the sin of Adam (as their representative), and their own guilt by participation therein, constituted "the first sin," or "the Adamic sin," which was immediately or directly imputed, and so brought the *κρίμα εἰς τὰς ἀρχαίαι*, or judgment unto condemnation, upon all. And thus, as stated in our previous section, she explicated the doctrine of original sin from an equal recognition of the two-fold standpoint, to-wit: the *moral* (subsequently named the federal), and the *natural* headship of Adam. His sin was not regarded as his sin only; but as likewise *their* sin, in the plain and obvious sense that it was the expression of their own as well as of his guilt and criminality. Theirs, as the old divines express it, was *culpa participatione*: they participated in his sin, and the

¹ In my former essay, as already stated, and out of undue deference to Dr. Hodge's authority, I frequently employed the terms "antecedent" and "immediate imputation," as he does, to designate gratuitous imputation, though accompanied with frequent expressions of dissent from such usage as inaccurate. In a revision of that essay (still unpublished) the error is corrected, and it is hereby likewise retracted; for it was a concession which ought not to have been made in any form whatever.

² This language is Heidegger's, who employs it in stating the accredited doctrine of the Church. (See *Danville Review* for 1862, p. 560.)

guilt was common alike to all. And hence upon all equally came the judgment unto condemnation: "death passed upon all men, inasmuch as all sinned." They held, not that his personal act was our personal act, but maintained that his sin is not to be confounded with our sin, and *vice versa*, or to be reckoned as in any sense identical therewith, except as the guilt of the participator may be regarded as the guilt of the principal.

Nothing can more strikingly evince how strange and unaccountable are the misconceptions and perversions of Calvinistic theology by Dr. Hodge than his perpetual endeavors to confound this doctrine,—the doctrine of the Augustinian church in all ages,—with the doctrine of mediate imputation, as taught by Placæus. It is as unaccountable as it is irreconcilable with any clear or definite conceptions of the Church theology, and can only be explained on the ground that the *ignis fatuus* of the gratuitous imputation of sin, being accepted as a guide, led him thus shockingly astray, and then left him to flounder inextricably and hopelessly in the morasses and quagmires into which he was so willing to be brought. The same misconception controls his exposition of Romans v. 12–21, and suggests his views of guilt, sin, justice, justification, etc., and, in a word, has led him to reject as "nonsensical" the Church doctrine of our participation in the first sin, and even to denounce it as *mediate* imputation, and utterly preposterous. Such things are truly deplorable; but the Church has no saving alternative, if she would deliver herself from these fatal toils, but to cashier this entire representation and return to the purity and simplicity of her faith. And then, moreover, to designate this theory "*the federal system*" of our theology, as Dr. Hodge does, is not only a misnomer, but a reprehensible perversion of facts. Participation, therefore, in no-sense of the term either involves or implies the doctrine of mediate imputation, but necessarily excludes it. And no man can either confound the two, or mistake the one for the other, without forfeiting all claim to candor or accuracy.

When the supralapsarian theory, as taught by Maccovius, Twisse, and others, was making the most strenuous efforts to regain the ground it had so ingloriously lost at the Synod of Dort, the learned and eminent divines who constituted the school of Saumur devoted their energies to an earnest and well-meant endeavor to deliver the Reformed theology from its entanglements

and encroachments. Their course of procedure therein was not, however, as wise as it was well intended; for, in pursuing it, they unguardedly verged to the opposite extreme, and instead of accurately defining and then defending (as they, of course, should have done) the doctrine of their church as exhibited in those articles upon which the encroachment was attempted, they assumed philosophical standpoints, which logically induced them to vary the ground, and to such an extent, ultimately, that the result of their efforts was a serious and inadmissible modification of the doctrine itself. Placæus, who in culture and intellectual power was inferior to neither of his celebrated colleagues (Amyrald and Capell), prepared a series of theses, directed against the attempt to explicate original sin on the ground of Adam's federal relation to his seed, and assuming the position that the corrupt nature derived from our first parents is the ground of the imputation of their sin.¹ In other words, that original sin should be explicated upon the ground of the natural relation to their posterity. And these theses he distributed through the Synod in print and manuscript. This view, as above stated, he designed as an offset to the error which was then seeking to extend itself in the Church—to-wit: that the moral relation, to the practical exclusion of the natural, is the ground for explicating the doctrine of original sin. He virtually ignored Adam's moral relation, though it should be likewise here stated that, in a work issued by him ten years after the condemnation of his views by the Synod of Charenton, he denies this; and by making the then unrecognized distinction between mediate and immediate imputation, claims that he admits the former and denies only the latter.

¹ Dr. Shedd, who has given an excellent account of Placæus and his views (see History of Doctrines, Vol. II., p. 163), states that it was his purpose "to carry the doctrine of gratuitous imputation, such as holds true of Christ's righteousness, over to Adam's sin, and proposed to impute the Adamic guilt, without any real or inherent demerit upon the part of the posterity;" and further adds that Turretin and Heidegger opposed him therein. Admitting this to be so, how can Dr. Hodge, with any degree of propriety, represent Placæus (as he always does) as grievously in error on this whole subject; for this is precisely his own theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin? And if such were his views and intention, Placæus (Dr. Hodge being judge) must, after all, have entertained the true doctrine, and Turretin and Heidegger, in opposing him, have been clearly in the wrong.

In our discussion (already referred to) in the *Danville Review*, we have with sufficient fulness treated the matter relating to Placæus and his doctrine, and shall not occupy space by here repeating what is therein presented. Let it therefore suffice to remark that *mediate* imputation is not, as Placæus incorrectly represented, antithetical of what the Church denominates *immediate* imputation, but is simply the antithesis of *gratuitous*, the one taking the natural and the other the federal relation for its basis, while the Church doctrine, immediate and antecedent imputation, recognizes both relations equally as the basis for explicating the doctrine of original sin. The advocates of the former theories do, indeed, claim to recognize both relations; but in this they plainly deceive themselves in the use of terms, as we have stated on a previous page. For if the federal relation be the ground upon which the judgment unto condemnation and its consequent moral corruption come upon the race (as Dr. Hodge alleges), the natural relation can have no doctrinal significance whatever. The violation of the covenant by the *peccatum alienum*, or merely personal transgression of Adam, is the sole ground of the guilt and consequent condemnation and pollution of his posterity; and of course the natural relation, or headship, is practically ignored and set aside, so far as any determining effect is concerned. And so, on the contrary, if the natural relation be assumed as the basis on which to explicate the doctrine, and on which to account for the corruption of the race, the moral or federal relation is equally without a determining significance. And to claim that this relation is likewise recognized in the explanation is merely to deceive one's self by the use of terms which, in such connection, are without meaning. For here, as in the former instance, the only existing distinction is that of cause and effect; that is, the natural relation induces the imputation in this case, as the moral or federal does in the other.

I repeat, therefore, that the Calvinistic church has never advanced or accepted either of these theories as expressive of her true views, her doctrine being that original sin can be truly explicated only by an equal recognition of both these relations. God finds Adam, as the federal and natural head of the race, and the race itself, alike implicated in the guilt of the first sin, and therefore imputes it alike to both,—to Adam as principal, to the race

as participators. The sinning was synchronous; "all sinned," as the apostle teaches (using the second aorist or historic tense), and thus the natural and moral headship are, as they should be, equally recognized as possessing a determining significance, which it is impossible that they should coincidentally possess in either of the theories aforesaid, seeing that they resolve into the simple relation of cause and effect both sin and imputation; *i. e., sin and the consequent imputation*; or *imputation and the consequent sin*, as above shown. It requires, therefore, no argument to evince that the doctrine of the Church—*antecedent and immediate imputation*—(as it is expressed in our later theology), is opposed alike to the technical theories of both *gratuitous* and *mediate imputation*.

§ 8. DR. HODGE AND PARTICIPATION.

Whether the doctrine of our participation in the first sin may be with propriety characterized, as it is by Dr. Hodge, as "Pantheistic, nonsensical, and impossible," is a question we shall now submit to our readers.

In a future section the question will be considered whether the main issue involved in this inquiry may properly be regarded as a subject for philosophical solution; but here our design is to ascertain, in view of the facts in the case, whether the doctrine itself involves a principle which may, with even the slightest degree of propriety, be characterized by the epithets aforesaid. Controversialists rarely employ epithet and denunciation except from a conscious failure of resources. But in no case can such terms be regarded as a judicious substitute for argument, and especially when employed in assailing the deliberately formed views entertained and cherished by the great body of the learned and godly who in different ages have adorned the Church of God.

We need not here repeat the very offensive language of Professor Hodge, as cited in § 5 above. Our readers may find also much too frequent repetition of such and similar terms in all his assaults upon the doctrine. But though we are not willing to imitate his example therein, it is only just to remark that, were we so disposed, it would really be difficult to find under the category of *theology* a subject more exposed to unsparing, pointed satire than his own theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, and this, too, in the entire range of its relation to sin, guilt, justice, human accounta-

bility, as well as to the whole of God's moral character and attributes. Unsupported as it is by even a shadow of divine authority, as exhibited either in the word or works of God, it would constitute a most legitimate theme for sarcasm and denunciation, were it proper to employ such in a discussion like the present. We shall not therefore follow the example, frequent as the provocations are, which his indiscretion in this regard has furnished; but in view of the facts and statements which follow, shall leave our readers to determine as to the propriety of the language to which we have called their attention.

In treating sundry objections to the Scripture doctrine of satisfaction, Dr. Hodge says, very justly and forcibly, "On this class of objections it may be remarked, 1, That they avail nothing against the plain declarations of the Scriptures. If the Bible teaches that the innocent may bear the guilt of the actual transgressor—that he may endure the penalty incurred in his place—then it is in vain to say that this cannot be done."¹ He then, on the following page, adds, "There would be no end of controversy, and no security for any truth whatever, if the strong personal convictions of individual minds be allowed to determine what is or what is not true; what the Bible may and what it may not be allowed to teach"—a most important truth, but grievously neutralized by what follows; for he continues thus, "*It must be admitted, however, that there are moral intuitions founded on the constitution of our nature, and constituting a primary revelation of the nature of God, which no external revelation can possibly contradict.* The authority of these intuitive truths is assumed as fully recognized in the Bible itself. They have, however, their criteria. They cannot be enlarged or diminished. Those criteria are, (1), They are all recognized in the Scriptures themselves; (2), They are universally admitted as true by all rational minds; (3), They cannot be denied. No effort of the will, and no sophistry of the understanding, can destroy their authority over reason and conscience."

This is neither the place nor the occasion for entering upon a discussion of intuitions and their criteria; nor, indeed, does the argument require it. The aim of such statements as the foregoing seems sufficiently plain when viewed in connection with the cita-

¹ Theology, Vol. II., page 530.

tions from Dr. Hodge in § 5 above, and with the fact that he unhesitatingly rejects the doctrine of participation on the assumed ground that it is inconsistent with reason, philosophy, and common sense, and is nonsensical. And with the fact that when, in obvious reference to this doctrine, he applies his principles,¹ he remarks, "We have a right to reject as untrue whatever it is impossible that God should require us to believe. He can no more require us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong." But Dr. Hodge has decided that the doctrine of our participation in the first sin is absurd and nonsensical, and it of course is a foregone conclusion, that whatever the Bible may affirm in relation to it, God does not and cannot require us to accept that doctrine as true. Is such, then, a legitimate application of his doctrine of intuitions? If not, what is the real import of his language?

That there are recognized in intellectual and moral science, and in all true science, what may be named "first truths," is of course undeniable. But that what are called first truths, primary and dependent intuitions, etc., in natural theology may, in the manner above illustrated, set aside the direct averments of a conceded "external revelation," or revealed theology, the very design of which is to inform the understanding, correct our errors, and make known to us truths which we could not otherwise have ascertained, is, in every view that can be taken of it, simply preposterous.

We shall not dwell upon the wholly indefinite nature of this attempted delineation of intuitions and their criteria; for whatever may be conceded as the actual truth in relation to that matter, the loose and indefinite definings of Dr. Hodge present the subject in an aspect wholly impracticable, so far as any benefit is to be derived by the serious inquirer; while at the same time they open the way for a thorough misconception as well as perilous misuse and application of all that is really true concerning them. And a glance will make this sufficiently obvious to any intelligent reader who will but ask himself, (1), Who has decided as to what are these "*moral intuitions?*" and by what process is it to be actually determined that "they cannot be enlarged or diminished?" (2), Who is to decide whether or not any assumed criterion is recognized in the Scriptures? Has this been determined? If so, by

¹ In his discussion of the question "*What is impossible?*" See his Theology, Vol. I., pages 51, 52.

whom? Or is every one to decide the question for himself? If not, how may it be ascertained? (3), How may it be known, in regard to any specific instance, that the criterion is universally admitted as true by all rational minds? This can scarcely be practically verified. Is it then to be assumed as David Hume assumed "universal experience" in his argument against miracles? And (4), How is it to be ascertained that what are or may be assumed to be truths of this character "cannot be denied;" and that no effort of the will, and no sophistry of the understanding can destroy their authority over the reason and conscience?" Are we to take this also for granted, and consequently that they possess greater power than any of the truths which God has "externally revealed?" And is every man in any specific instance to determine it, as well as what are those truths, for himself? and (5), Who, then, is to determine the intuitions and demonstrate their number, and point out the unexceptionable method of applying them? Or is Dr. Hodge's aforesaid method of their application to the doctrine of participation to be accepted as legitimate? In all these particulars we are hopelessly left in practical uncertainty. And in what way, therefore, are these criteria, with their intuitions, to secure to us, in regard to any of the announcements of divine revelation, any good or useful practical result? And of what possible use are the aforesaid delineations, except to throw open the door to naturalism, and to invite her (as in Germany) to a seat in the Church of God?

These and similar passages in the work, however, bear plainly the appearance of being designed to level an avenue for the battery of so-called reason, by which to approach under cover and assail the doctrine itself, and upon which to justify the denunciation of it as absurd and impossible. Though incidental approaches apparently, we do not regard them as any the less designed. But this may pass for the present. As regards the sentiment itself, however, it certainly is never to be presumed that God, either in His written word, or through the works of His providence, should say or do anything which would be in contravention of the moral and intellectual nature He has given us. And therefore, to hypothecate that, should He reveal thus or so, we would be bound to believe it, is to trifle egregiously with a very serious subject. And hence our duty as fallen and depraved creatures is, obviously, not to go about to ascertain whether a given statement in His word,

or "external revelation," comports with certain assumed intuitive truths in order to know whether we may receive it or not, but simply to enquire and ascertain, through the legitimate principles of hermeneutics, what God has *announced in His word*; and when ascertained, to receive it with the most unwavering assurance that, since He has made the announcement, it can contain nothing that is either "Pantheistic, nonsensical, or impossible."¹ The case as presented above by Dr. Hodge, if it have any designed bearing in justifying his treatment of the doctrine of our participation of Adam's sin, would warrant the attempt of the inquirer first to ascertain certain so-called intuitive truths, according as in his wisdom he may presume that the Scriptures recognize them; and secondly, having ascertained what he has persuaded himself are really such, to accept them as constituting a primary revelation of God's nature, and as something, therefore, which no ²external revelation can contradict; and so to constitute thereupon an *à priori* principle wholly independent of grammatical exegesis, and by it to determine, in certain cases at least (as in Romans v. 12), what is and what must be the real meaning of the inspired word. And should those assumed intuitions pronounce that a statement taken in its strict grammatical import is impossible and absurd, it is to be accounted such (however clearly it may be sustained by the *usus loquendi* of the Scriptures), according to Dr. Hodge's canon above-quoted, "It is as impossible that God should require us to believe what is absurd as to do what is wrong." This is precisely the principle and the process (as any one may perceive who will peruse only the work of Dr. Tindall²) which resulted in the development of naturalism in England, and subsequently of rationalism on the continent.³ And it is both deplorable and humiliating to find the sad lesson already so utterly disregarded, that, notwithstanding the terrible experience through which the Church in Germany has passed (from an incautious recognition of this same principle by Semler), a teacher in one of our leading theological schools should thus openly appear as its advocate.

¹ The direct practical bearing of the principle thus insisted on will strongly appear in §§ 18-25, in which Dr. Hodge's exegesis of Rom. v. 12-21, is considered.

² "Christianity as Old as the Creation." London, 1730, republished at Newberg, New York, 1798. ³ See our § 26, *infra*.

The accuracy of this whole representation is susceptible of illustration from facts without number. We shall, however, here adduce only the following example of the application of the same principle by one of the fathers of English naturalism. He says: "All that the Socinians say is, that the Supreme God and a human soul cannot be the same intellectual being, agent, or person, and therefore that they cannot with any truth or consistency be joined together under one common name, as if they were the same I, the same he, or the same intelligent person or self. And really, *sir*, methinks it is a little hard that men should be damned only because they will not talk the grossest nonsense and renounce the very first principles of reason."¹

If, then, no external revelation can set aside what may be called "intuitive truths," and if on such *dicta* we may be authorized to reject as absurd and nonsensical a plain and distinct averment of God's word, what shall be said of this and similar applications of the rule? Can any truth be more "reasonable," or more obviously intuitive, than that the *Eternal Creator* and a *creature of time* cannot be the same intellectual being or person, so as to be joined under the same I and he? And are we thereupon to repudiate the knowledge which comes to us from a higher source than our reason and intuitions, and conclude, as Morgan and the Socinians do, that the Bible can teach nothing inconsistent therewith, since "it is a monstrous evil," as Dr. Hodge affirms, "to make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men?"²

And then, further, what can be a plainer intuition than that a plurality of persons cannot be predicated of a moral and intellectual nature, whose essence is one and indivisible? and that hence, according to the foregoing principles, our reason and intuitions are to accept no information to the contrary, however high the source of its emanation? Observe how glibly Socinus can, in relation to this same matter, employ the terms "common sense," "personality," and the like. He says: "Now, as to what appertains to common sense itself, there is no one so stupid that he may not perceive these things to be self-contradictory; to-wit: that our God, the Creator of heaven and earth, should be one only in num-

¹ Tracts by Dr. Morgan (a dissenter from the Church of England), page 239; London, 1726.

² See Dr. Hodge's Revised Commentary on Romans v. 12-21.

ber, and yet be three, each of which is Himself one God. For, as to what they say, that God is indeed one in number by reason of essence, but three as to persons, they here again utter things which are mutually subversive, since it is impossible that two or three persons should exist where, numerically, there is but one individual essence; and to constitute more persons than one, more than one individual essence is required. For what is a person other than an individual, intelligent essence? Or in what conceivable way may one person be distinguished from another except by the diversity of his individual or numerical essence? Wherefore it is astonishing that, notwithstanding, they should say that while a thing of this character ought not to be inquired into, it yet ought to be firmly believed, as though any thing ought to be believed that contradicts the truth, or that any thing may be true which manifestly conflicts with reason itself and implies a contradiction, as it certainly does to say that the Divine essence is only one in number, and yet not only one Divine Person, but many."¹ Thus he finds the proposition impossible, contrary to reason and common sense, self-contradictory, and absolutely "unthinkable," to use the expression of Dr. Baur of Tübingen, and repeatedly cited and adopted by Dr. Hodge.

After this preposterous style, therefore, do Morgan, Socinus, and their followers apply their doctrine of intuitions to decide whether the truths announced by revelation are to be believed; and on the principle laid down by Dr. Hodge, and as applied by him to the doctrine which the Church has ever regarded as taught in Romans v. 12-21, how are we to escape their conclusion, with its corollaries, rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity, the Deity and two natures of Christ, His satisfaction for sin, and the doctrine of our participation in the first sin of Adam?—all of which, as entertained by the Church, they thus assail and reject as preposterous and nonsensical. It cannot be done; for if the principle be in either instance legitimately applicable, it is applicable alike in all. The Socinians, in their application, are consistent and uniform; while Dr. Hodge would be satisfied with a few applications, inasmuch as he is not prepared to reject all the truths to which they apply it. But if there be any truth in history, his modesty in this

¹ See his *Quod Regni Poloniæ, &c.*, Cap. IV., Opp. Tom. I., p. 637.

regard is not likely to be imitated by those who hereafter shall plead his sanction of the principle itself.

° But are our intuitions competent to grasp, or even to pronounce upon, any such themes, involving, as they do, truths, in regard both to the Divine existence and our own, of which we can really know nothing except what is revealed, and because nothing besides the fact itself in regard to those truths has been made known to man? For example (as regards the explanatory principle of unity and distinction of personality in our race, as brought to view in Romans v. 12 and Ecclesiastes vii. 29), the facts known to God, and upon which is predicated the Divine announcement that we all sinned when Adam sinned, are still unknown to us, because unrevealed,—the whole matter being to us one of purely divine revelation. In what sense, then, are human intuitions competent to any judgment or decision on the subject? Certainly in no conceivable sense whatever. And hence, after all that has been claimed for them by Dr. Hodge and others, the naked alternative alone presents itself to us, either to reject the testimony of God without one particle of actual knowledge on the subject, or to accept it as sustained by all positive evidences of His revelation of the fact. They have neither place nor authority in determining what God may or may not have communicated in relation to things respecting which we otherwise can know nothing.

°° And then further. While we might concede that the primary intuitions of all moral beings, in the strict sense of the term, are alike, there must be a vast difference between the dependent ones of purely holy and unfallen beings, and those of the fallen and depraved, whose reasonings are all liable to be swayed and perverted by their selfishness and sin. And besides all this, there must be an immense liability in mankind to mistake and substitute dependent intuitions for the primary; so that mere casuistry is for ever liable to self-deception and delusion on this whole subject.

What, then, is the worth or value of our native and bedimmed intuitions in determining *à priori* on what an infinite, eternal, and all-wise Being may reveal respecting His nature and our own? Had He Himself, either “penally” or otherwise, brought us into a sinful, and consequently a helpless condition, such considerations might be shorn of their strength, so far as any practical bearing is

concerned; but as this is in no sense the fact, our undoubted duty is to receive implicitly what He has spoken, and ALL that He has spoken, without questioning, or pretending to hypothecate that in certain contingencies we might be justified in setting aside the obvious import of any of the utterances of His “external revelation,” which, so far as it legitimately conveys the impression that He *might* speak what cannot be believed, is clear blasphemy.

Now, Dr. Hodge informs us that “human nature apart from human persons cannot act, and therefore cannot contract guilt, or be responsible;”¹ and he elsewhere represents the opposite view as absurd, impossible, and nonsensical;—a statement which, it must be conceded, exhibits either an offensive arrogance in the face of the universally received formula of all the churches of the Reformation, as well as of the leading divines of the Church since Augustine, (*persona corrumpit naturam, atque tunc natura corrumpit personam,*) or a vast attainment in the knowledge of what has been hitherto supposed to be unknown because unrevealed. But Paul, on the contrary, when treating the subject, has not scrupled to say that “by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men inasmuch as ALL sinned;” and further, that because all sinned, the judgment unto condemnation passed upon all. This proposition is not less plain and definite than that of Dr. Hodge, and, taking its terms in the sense of the unvarying *usus loquendi* of the Scriptures, is its direct antithesis. Dr. Hodge claims that, his proposition being sanctioned by reason and his own intuitions, its counterpart must be absurd and nonsensical. The apostle, on the other hand, avers that his announcement is given by inspiration of God; and as none will dispute that the Spirit of inspiration knows far more as to man’s creation in the image of the Godhead, and of human nature, both in its original unity and subsequent individuality, than any theologian may reasonably lay claim to, and that He has, moreover, here spoken in exact accordance with that knowledge, we may add that they who can are welcome to doubt as to which of these propositions should command our assent.

When Dr. Hodge claims, moreover, that it is a “moral impossibility that a nature, as distinguished from a person, can sin or be guilty,”² it might have been well had he explained, on his own

¹ Theology, Vol. II., p. 536. ² *Ibid.*, p. 537.

principles, his method of distinguishing an intellectual and moral nature from personality. But as the matter stands, he makes a direct and dogmatic affirmation on a subject on which it is clearly impossible that he should know anything. It is not needed, however, that we either deny or admit his affirmation in order fully to receive as truth the inspired announcement *that all sinned when Adam sinned*; for, as already stated, we do not pretend to know *how* the posterity sinned, and neither do we believe *how* they sinned; for the fact, and not the mode, forms the subject of the announcement. And as it was not designed that we should either know or believe how they sinned in order to believe the fact stated—that they did sin—we ought to be satisfied to leave the fact where God has placed it. The announcement of the fact itself, irrespective of all theories as to mode, constitutes, as we have already stated, an explanatory principle which furnishes the only intelligible basis on which the true explication of the doctrine of original sin is possible,¹ as the fact of the unity and tri-personality of God, though in itself wholly inconceivable by us, forms the only basis on which it is at all possible to explicate the doctrine of redemption. And who will venture to deny that the inexplicable fact of oneness of nature and plurality of persons in the Godhead may have its distant adumbration or counterpart in the equally incomprehensible principle—(that is, incomprehensible to us in our present stage of being)—of oneness and plurality in that nature which was created in the image of the Godhead!²

Dr. Hodge, in confirmation of his reiterated and offensive allegation, that the doctrine is absurd and nonsensical, cites a similar denunciation of it by the late Professor F. C. Baur, the founder of the infidel Tübingen school, and the bitter enemy of evangelical doctrine; who, having embraced the Pantheistic notions of Hegel, labored during the last thirty years of his life, and by every means in his power, to subvert and destroy the faith of the Church

¹ Luther's estimate of the importance of rightly understanding the doctrine may be learned from his notes on Genesis xlii.: "Ignorantia peccati secum trahit ignorantia Dei, Christi, Spiritus Sancti, omniumque rerum. Nemo potest se fore theologum, vel lectionem, vel auditorem Scripturæ Sacræ qui malum illud originali extenuat, aut non recte intelligit."

² See note B. in the Appendix.

of Christ.¹ No one ever cast so much contempt and ridicule upon all the Christian activities of the present century—the Sunday-schools, missionary operations, the evangelical alliance, etc.—as did this unhappy rationalist in his lectures. And no one in Tübingen exercised so strong a personal influence over the students, nor deprived so many amongst them of the most precious treasures of their heart,—the faith of their childhood, the fruits of the prayers and tears of godly parents, and the tranquillity of the whole future of their lives.² He denied that he was an Atheist, but that denial only meant that he was a Pantheist. Yet this man, compared with whom Socinus himself was an earnest, devout believer, is, with all his intensely embittered hatred of the gospel and its doctrines, cited by Dr. Hodge, not only approvingly, but with an actual endorsement of his vapid denunciation of the Church doctrine of our participation in the sin and guilt of the fall,³ and by adopting his ratiocination would endeavor to sustain his own assertion that that doctrine is absurd and nonsensical. Would it not have been infinitely better for Dr. Hodge to abandon a principle which required the defense of such an ally? If such a procedure be legitimate in the treatment of revealed truth (or at least of that which the Church of Christ has ever regarded as such), why not, for like purposes, cite also Socinus, and Crellius, and Morgan, and even Voltaire himself. But this matter must come up again.

Upon the whole, therefore, there is no ground on which the doctrine before us may, without the most offensive arrogance, be denounced by any professed follower of Christ, as "Pantheistic, impossible, and nonsensical."

As to the position we take in maintaining and defending it, we add here a word in conclusion, and invite the reader to contemplate, in the light of an illustration furnished by science herself, the reasonableness of that position, and the unreasonableness of assailing it, as Dr. Hodge has done. That the point of the illustration, however, may not be misconceived, we here repeat that the doctrine (that the whole race of man became veritable sinners

¹ Dr. Baur was born in 1792, elected professor of theology in Tübingen in 1826, and died there in 1861. He was the Coryphæus of the late most destructive school of German neology.

² See "News of the Churches," for 1861.

³ See Dr. Hodge's Theology, Vol. II., pp. 178, 179, 223, 234.

in the fall), is recognized by the Church as simply a matter of fact announced by the Divine testimony, and therefore accepted as an undoubted truth. It is not necessary to maintain that the *modus* of the fact is incapable of ultimate solution. But while we concede our inability to explain it, and (as is directly and repeatedly stated in our former essay), have no hypothesis to offer for its solution, we most emphatically affirm that our inability to explain the fact itself affords no rational ground for its rejection; and further, that so far as concerns the doctrine of original sin and the correlated doctrines in theological science, the inspired announcement of the fact referred to answers every doctrinal and every ethical or practical purpose quite as well as a knowledge of the *modus* itself would, if it were really known or were susceptible of the clearest scientific verification. This is our position. Is there, then, either in or about that position, aught that may warrant a Christian teacher, or any man who may claim only ordinary intelligence in denouncing it as unphilosophical, unscientific, or nonsensical?

When Sir Isaac Newton announced to the scientific world that gravitation was an action between two distinct bodies, and demonstrated the fact, but declared his inability to explain it, a number of scientists at once applied themselves to the task of explicating that action; whereupon Leibnitz (basing his censure, however, upon those attempted explanations), denounced the whole affair as absurd, or, in the philosophical sense of the term, *supernatural*,—precisely as the Professor at Princeton now bases his denunciations of the doctrine before us upon unauthorized attempts to explain that which is conceded to be inexplicable.

Sir Isaac Newton, however, had taught no theory on the subject. Nor had he, in relation to it, even attempted to project any hypothesis. He had, as above stated, demonstrated the law of gravitation, and had accepted it as an explanatory principle, but as to those hypotheses which had been invented to explain the fact itself, he did not feel called upon to express an opinion, or either to adopt or reject them. And he neither affirmed nor denied that some medium of communication must exist between the bodies referred to; and therefore when Leibnitz said, "We cannot understand this; for how is it possible that attraction should exist at such incalculable distances? We will not believe till we can understand

the matter," Newton merely answered that the fact was real; that its actual existence was demonstrable, and had been demonstrated, and was not dependent upon their ability to understand and explain it. He would not deny that it may be ultimately explained; but insisted that he was not called upon to explain it in order to justify either his own announcement or their reception of it as a fact.

This position, as every thoughtful intelligent mind must admit, was eminently philosophical and reasonable. And it is ours precisely in relation to the great truth on which is founded the Church doctrine of original sin. God Himself, in an inspired announcement, has given us, as an explanatory principle, the fact of the synchronisness of Adam's sin with the sin and corruption of the race, and the synchronisness of our subjective ill-desert and the imputation of the Adamic sin: truths with which no human intuitions can pretend to deal without evincing the most conceited arrogance. We are not unwilling, however, that Dr. Hodge, or any other nominalist (if they can without a sacrifice of gospel truth), should explain, if they are able, the *modus* of the moral and natural connection between Adam and his posterity;¹ or that the philosophical realists, if they can, may solve the inquiry upon their hypothesis. But having abundantly witnessed the disastrous effects resulting from such endeavours in the past, we abjure them; and, irrespective of any theory on the subject, or of any attempted explication, we accept and rest upon the fact as divinely announced that the whole race truly sinned in and with our first parents in the fall. And we claim, moreover, that no exigency exists, or ever has existed, which renders such explanation necessary. It is not needed in order to an intelligent admission of the fact itself; nor is it at all necessary (as will appear in a subsequent section), in order to apply that fact to all purposes, both doctrinal and practical.

A late able writer, referring to the aforesaid position of Sir Isaac Newton in relation to the antagonism of Leibnitz, offers the following impressive remarks: "The law of gravitation, *considered as a result*, is beautifully simple, and in a few words it explains a fact from which most numerous and complex results may be deduced by mere reasoning,—results found invariably to agree

¹ See our article in *Southern Presbyterian Review* for 1875, pp. 309, 310.

with the records of observation; but the same law of gravitation, looked upon as an axiom or first principle, is so astoundingly far removed from all experience as to be almost incredible."¹

But there is, however, another and most instructive lesson which may likewise be learned from the example of Sir Isaac in this connection. While he continued to occupy the aforesaid ground, he stood firmly, and his position was impregnable. But after a lapse of years, he began to imagine that an explanation might be devised, and finally even allowed himself to seek for a philosophical solution of the *modus* itself; and the result was what might have been, even from his own previous admissions, easily anticipated. We shall, however, present the statement of this result in the words of Burke,² who united with the philosophical and scientific world generally in deploring the mistake of this truly great and excellent man. He says: "When Newton first discovered the property of attraction and settled its laws, he found that it served very well to explain several of the most remarkable phenomena in nature; but yet, with reference to the general system of things, he could consider attraction but as an effect, whose cause at that time he did not attempt to trace. But when he afterwards began to account for it by a subtle, elastic æther, this great man (if in so great a man it be not impious to discover anything like a blemish) seemed to have quitted his usual cautious manner of philosophizing, since, perhaps, allowing all that has been advanced on the subject to be sufficiently proved, I think it leaves us with as many difficulties as it found us."

True science, therefore, and true philosophy amply sustain the position which the Church has always maintained in relation to the doctrine before us. And the attempt by denunciation and sarcasm to set that position aside can have little influence upon any really intelligent and considerate mind.

¹ See *North British Review* for March, 1868, page 125.

² Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful, Part IV., § 1, pp. 194, 195.

PART II.

WHEREIN IS PRESENTED AND ILLUSTRATED THE MANNER
IN WHICH THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING ORIGINAL SIN AND
IMPUTATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN EXHIBITED BY THE RE-
PRESENTATIVE DIVINES OF THE CHURCH.

§ 9. THE ORDER OF TOPICS IN STATING THE DOCTRINE.

DR. HODGE, as already remarked, claims that in the statement of the doctrine of original sin contained in our Catechism¹ there is to be recognized a logical presentation of the topics enumerated; that is, between the guilt of Adam's first sin (the *peccatum alienum*) and the loss of original righteousness both of himself and race. And, of course, that there is a causal connection between his personal guilt and the corruption and spiritual death of his posterity. In a previous section, however, we have shown that the guilt or blameworthiness therein referred to is that of participation, and not the merely personal guilt of Adam. And that this fact is unquestionable will appear in the sequel. That the Westminster Assembly designed to teach no such causal connection between Adam's personal guilt and our own loss of original righteousness may be seen by the fact, if there were no other proof, that in the same immediate connection, as well as elsewhere, they affirm, as we shall show, such participation. Dr. Hodge's construction of the phrase, therefore, is not only without reason, but is a mere assumption, in conflict with the actual facts of the case. And although, so far as finding his theory in our standards is concerned, everything depends upon his showing that the interpretation of the phrase there employed is at least probable, he has contented himself with a mere peremptory assumption of its accuracy. It will be quite in place, therefore, before we proceed further in our argument, to illustrate at this point, by a brief ex-

¹ See the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, Question 18.

ample, the manner in which the language referred to is understood and applied by Calvinistic divines in stating the doctrine; and we shall cite an instance not unfamiliar to our churches.

Fisher's Exposition of the Shorter Catechism (issued by our Board of Publication) was first published more than a century after that Catechism had been framed and adopted, and is the production of not only his own able pen, but likewise the result of the joint labors of the two Erskines, and of other eminent cotemporaries in the Scottish church. In expounding the language of Question 18, (to-wit, "*Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell?*")—The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it," they say, "*Original sin imputed is the guilt of Adam's first sin*" (Quest. 3). "*Guilt is an obligation to punishment on account of sin,*" (Rom. vi. 23) (Quest. 5;) and it is affirmed that "*all mankind became guilty of the first sin by imputation*" (Quest. 6). It is then added, "*And surely there can be no condemnation passed by a righteous judge where there is no crime,*" (Rom. vi. 15) (Quest. 10); and further on, that the Scriptures plainly prove Adam's posterity *to be chargeable with his first sin* (Quest. 11). And then in Question 25, that native corruption *is propagated by generation*; and that the soul of every one is a part of that person who is cursed in Adam. And finally, in Question 30, "*that our state both of sin and misery is the bitter fruit of our own voluntary apostasy in the first Adam as our covenant head, having sinned in him, and fallen with him in his first transgression.*" Such is their language employed in this exposition. And we need not dwell upon it further than to ask the reader to note that when (at Quest. 10) it is said, "*And surely there can be no condemnation passed by a righteous judge where there is no crime,*" the design, of course, is not to vindicate the justice of the condemnation of our first parents, but that of their posterity for their then "*voluntary apostasy,*" and hence that Adam's sin as imputed to them *was their own crime* not less than his, and as such was imputed for their condemnation.

Now, the foregoing expository statement is as near an approximation as can be found in our recognized theology to the theory which

Dr. Hodge has been inculcating as Calvinistic doctrine;¹ and yet between the two there is truly a *χάσμα μέγα* over which no one may hope to pass; or, in other words, there is between them a total antagonism *on the very issue now under discussion*. The authors of this exposition affirm emphatically the subjective guilt of the race, and that Adam's first sin was also *our voluntary apostasy or crime*; all of which is as pointedly denied by Dr. Hodge, while he, at the same time, affirms that not the criminality was ours, but merely a putative guilt forensically charged upon us. They, moreover, affirm the existence of this *common or subjective guilt* in the very exposition they give of the phrase "*Adam's first sin.*" And as such, beyond all serious question, is the usage of that phrase in all Calvinistic theology, on what ground are we to admit the naked and wholly unsustained assumption of Dr. Hodge that the guilt of Adam's first sin here means merely *the guilt of Adam alone in the first sin?*

In some unimportant affair a man might, without incurring rigorous censure, assume the truth of a representation not too broadly in conflict with existing facts, and might also, by a pardonable exercise of good nature, be excused for not offering proof, seeing he had none to give. But the case is widely different when the matter concerned is not unimportant; but, on the contrary, and as conceded and even affirmed by himself, is invested with surpassing interest to the truth of God, and to the well-being of His Church. Dr. Hodge, in total disregard of the manifest usage of the expression, and of the clearly ascertained meaning of every kindred expression touching the subject, assumes that the well-understood theological phrase, "*the guilt of Adam's first sin,*" is here employed to signify the guilt of Adam alone in the first sin,—a meaning which, in such connection, it never bears in the exposition of our recognized or Augustinian doctrine. Our divines may, of course, speak of Adam's personal guilt in that sin, in distinction from the guilt of his descendants. But in defining the doctrine of original sin, they do not mean by "*the guilt of Adam's sin*" merely the *personal guilt* of Adam therein. Nor indeed could such a method of defining its meaning be possibly resorted to by any who entertain in its integrity the doctrine of

¹ See in § 13, A. No. 28, *infra*, a similar statement by Cluto, a justly celebrated continental divine.

the Church, since they all recognize the fact everywhere transparent in our theology, *that Adam's guilt in that sin did not constitute the whole guilt of that sin.* And, therefore, to assume such a position in such a discussion is as inexcusable as it is inadmissible.

In another section there will be occasion to consider this assumption more at large than is permitted in the present connection, and we shall there view it in the light of existing facts.¹ Our intention here is to show, from the manner in which the Reformed divines, when stating the doctrine of original sin, have always presented the topics—*guilt and depravity*—that they neither did nor could have entertained any such conception as Dr. Hodge insists upon, of a logical or causal relation between Adam's merely personal sin, or *peccatum alienum*, and the depravity and death of the race.

In our former essay we called attention to the fact adverted to above, that Dr. Hodge, in stating the doctrine of original sin as presented in the Shorter Catechism, makes everything to depend upon an assumed logical connection between Adam's merely personal sin and the moral corruption of the race.² And we suggested to him that this assumption might be seen to be unfounded by the very words which, in the answer, precede those which he has quoted, to wit: "The *sinfulness* of that estate whereinto *man fell*," as also in the answer to Question 16, "*All mankind descending from him by ordinary generation sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression.*"

It may be said without any exaggeration, that no assembly of men that was ever convened could have more carefully weighed the import of its published utterances than that of Westminster. Each term was duly considered, and the appropriateness and force of every expression, as well as its possible constructions. And this body of learned and wise and good men here announce, as a doctrine of eternal truth, and one which had been fully recognized by the Church of God, that the race of man "*sinned in and fell with Adam in his first transgression.*" And now, reader, put to yourself seriously the question, Can human language express an idea more directly at variance with this than to say, "they sinned only forensically or by imputation;" that is, that the personal sin of

¹ See Section 14, *infra*.

² See Princeton Essays, First Series, pp. 167, 168, and also our § 6, above.

Adam, *after* it had been perpetrated, was forensically charged to his posterity. Could it by any conceivable possibility have been charged to their account anterior to its committal? Even allowing, therefore, such a construction of the language as Dr. Hodge insists upon, their sin was not, and could not have been, coetaneous with the *peccatum alienum* or foreign sin of Adam, since that sin could be in no sense imputed to them until *after* it had been perpetrated by him. Is it not, then, a plain perversion of language to say that (such being the conceded circumstances), "they sinned in and fell with their father," when, in the very necessity of the case, they could not sin and fall until after he had sinned and fallen; and especially also in view of the fact that Dr. Hodge perpetually alleges that they were free from all sin and guilt until after they had incurred the imputation of Adam's *peccatum alienum*?

And then, still further. In the answer to Question 19, we are told that "ALL MANKIND BY THEIR FALL lost communion with God," etc. No idea can be more plainly expressed. Is it possible, then, so to torture this language as to obtain from it the meaning that "all mankind, *by the fall of another*—by a *peccatum alienum*—lost communion," etc.? Are not these expressions in direct antithesis? But admitting, for the sake of the argument, that they may be reconciled, in what way, according to this theory, can it be said that *all mankind* sinned and fell at the time referred to? Or even allowing that the phrase "all mankind" might include all who *have* already lived, still they are not *all mankind*, and perhaps not a hundredth part of what will constitute the completed number of the race. In what way, then, may it be said, according to Dr. Hodge's theory, that *they have sinned* who, as he assures us, are as yet the merest nonentity? In what way has his "forensic imputation" reached them, so as to justify his assertion that they were then constituted sinners? Can that imputation be incurred by nonentities? His theory, therefore, even as expounded by himself, can in no sense allow that they who, as yet, have had no existence, have already sinned and fallen. And yet our standards, with the inspired apostle himself, distinctly affirms *that ALL the race veritably sinned in the first sin*, and thereby were constituted sinners, and so lost communion with God. Dr. Hodge, however, denounces this as Pantheistic, impossible, and nonsensical! Prudence, however, might certainly have suggested that it would have

been better to spare such substitutes for argument until he should have at least attempted to explain how it is not absurd and nonsensical to maintain that nonentities may sin and fall and incur an imputation. His theory, therefore, is hopelessly irreconcilable with our standards, which plainly teach that the first sin was to the race a common sin. And hence, in Larger Catechism (Quest. 26), they distinctly affirm that "original sin is conveyed from our first parents" (not from Adam alone, as Dr. Hodge's theory requires,) "*unto their posterity by natural generation.*" The guilt being common, this could not be otherwise. But this also is denied by Dr. Hodge, who maintains that it is communicated by a forensic imputation alone.¹

That the assembly of divines understood by the term *guilt*, as employed in this connection in both Catechisms, and also in the Confession, *guilt by participation*, is equally plain also from the fact that such was the usage of the term by their Calvinistic contemporaries, both in England and on the Continent. Poole,² in his *Synopsis Criticorum*, on Romans v. 12, presents clearly the recognized doctrine of the Church on the subject. He refers to Pareus (of Heidelberg), who, on page 119 of his Commentary, has given the statement still more fully. As cited and endorsed by Poole, it is as follows: "There were three things IN THE *first sin*, 1, Actual *criminality* (*culpa*); 2, Natural *depravity*, or a horrible deformity of nature; 3, Legal *guilt* (*reatus*). And all these have come upon the posterity, *not in one way, but in three.* *Criminality* by participation (*culpa participatione*), because all were seminally in the loins of Adam; *depravity by propagation*, or generation, because Adam begat sons after his own image, not after the image of God; *guilt by imputation*, because grace was so granted to Adam that, if he should sin, his whole posterity along with himself should be deprived of it; as feudal grants are bestowed upon vassals, with the condition that should they forfeit them through crime, they involve their children in the same guilt."

¹ In support of this allegation Dr. Hodge makes the following assertion, which it is painful to be obliged to say is wholly unfounded: "The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by the Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians, is that original sin IS PROPAGATED NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM." See *Princeton Review* for 1860 pp. 362, 367, 368, and *Danville Review* for 1861, p. 569. ² Matthew Poole was born in 1624, and died in 1679.

Here, then, we have *culpa*, or criminality, first; *pravitas* second; and *reatus*, or exposure to punishment for crime, third; as in the Catechism we have guilt, loss of original righteousness, and corruption, which exposes to the penal justice of God. The Commentary of Pareus, at the time of the sessions of the Assembly, was in the highest repute amongst the English Calvinists; and James I. had greatly enhanced its popularity by ordering it to be burned at Oxford by the hangman, solely on account of its pointed assertion of human freedom, and of the right of the people to resist tyrannic rulers.¹ And the answer to question 18 of our Shorter Catechism appears to have been condensed from his admirable statement above cited, and which was everywhere current in the Church.

To these eminent men we add a third, a cotemporary (who died in 1631), who presents the teaching of the Protestant Confessions succinctly (in the passage we shall cite) on the subject. We refer to Benedict Turretin (father of Francis, the theologian), a great and venerated name in the family of Christ, and who, in referring to the same point, affirms that this very exposition is the doctrine of the Church as announced in her doctrinal symbols. When commenting on Romans v. 12, he, adverting to the Confessions of the Protestant Church, says: "Our Confessions include under original sin THE PARTICIPATION (or communion) WHICH WE HAVE IN THE FIRST SIN, and the loss of original righteousness and purity which we have sustained, and the inherent corruption of the soul." Such, then, is the expressed doctrine of the Protestant Church. And here, too, we have the same order and the same exposition in relation to the guilt of Adam's first sin as connected with original sin. It is *our guilt by participation*. "The communion which we have in the first sin." Dr. Hodge had seen this very testimony of Turretin in the work of Rivetus, containing his "Testimonies on Imputation."

We add, likewise, an instance or two from the English theologians. Rutherford (supralapsarian as he was) could not venture to depart from this representation. He was a member of the Westminster Assembly, and in his "Trial and Triumph of Faith,"

¹ See Commentary of Dr. David Pareus on Romans xiii. 1-7, and likewise the subjoined narrative by his son Philip (in the edition of 1647), containing the history of that whole transaction.

for example, he says: "And truly it is bad divinity for Dr. Crispe to say, 'As we are actual, real sinners in Adam, so here God passeth really sin over to Christ;' *for we sinned intrinsically in Adam*,—as parts, as members, as being in his loins,—*and we are thence by nature children of wrath*."

Dr. John Owen, another cotemporary, who, although not a member of the Assembly, has ever been esteemed as teaching the current doctrine of the Church on the whole subject, says: "There can be no liability to punishment,—*obligatio ad pœnam*—where there is not *desert* of punishment,—*dignitas pœnæ*." "There can be no punishment, nor *reatus pœnæ*, the guilt of it, but where there is *reatus culpæ*, or sin considered with its guilt."¹

These decided utterances all proclaim that the term *guilt*, as employed by our standards in the connection referred to, is *guilt by participation*; so that the obvious meaning of the answer to Question 18 is, "Original sin consists of the *guilt by participation of Adam's first sin*, the loss of original righteousness," etc. This sense of the term in such connection being universally known and recognized by the Reformed church, the Assembly reasonably enough supposed that none could mistake or misunderstand it, and especially in view of their other statements remarked upon above, and therefore that there could be no occasion for overloading the sentence by the addition of superfluous words. And hence, if, as Dr. Hodge insists, the statement should be conceded to be logical, it is a logical connection, not between Adam's *personal* sin and our loss of original righteousness, but between our mutual participation or community with him in his sin, and the evils which have overtaken us through our fall.

The fact that from the very first the Reformed church (as we reminded Dr. Hodge in the previous essay) has been wholly indifferent as to the order observed in stating the topics *guilt* and *depravity* in connection with the doctrine of original sin,—that is, whether they were stated in the order of *guilt, depravity, death*, or *depravity, guilt, death*,—is wholly subversive of the assumption of a logical or causal connection* between Adam's *peccatum alienum* (as Dr. Hodge calls his merely personal sin) and the depravity of the race, and consequently subversive of the theory of gratuitous imputation. This we then illustrated and established

¹ On Justification (issued by our Board of Publication), page 222.

by reference to Calvin, the XXXIX. Articles, Beza, and other instances; and had Dr. Hodge but given due attention to this single fact, it must have secured him from any further attempt to establish as the doctrine of the Church a doctrine which she has ever decidedly repudiated, and from the mortifying failure of such attempt. We called his attention to it, moreover, directly in view of his then recent assertions in the discussion with Dr. Baird. And he was fairly required, therefore, as it seems to us, by the demands of duty to the church whose ministry he was assisting to educate, to give the subject a full and candid consideration in any subsequent presentation he might offer of the doctrine; for he well knew, and had occasion to remember, how deep was the impression made by that essay on a large portion of the Church. He has, however, and doubtless for reasons which he considered sufficient, deemed it advisable to ignore that work, so far as any frank and scholarly reference to it is concerned. I shall now, therefore, proceed to restate and illustrate still more fully the fact itself, that so the Church may be able to take it thoroughly into consideration in forming a righteous estimate of the true nature of those efforts which are now being made to modify essentially this vital doctrine of her cherished faith,—a change which, if accepted, must ultimately and by inexorable logic carry with it an essential and fundamental modification of her whole doctrinal system, and more especially of those grand and precious features which give vitality and character to evangelical religion, and in defence and vindication of which her sons have not only always stood foremost, but rejoiced to seal their testimony with their blood. Whether such a change could ever have been seriously contemplated by Dr. Hodge is immaterial to the question. For myself, I should most emphatically prefer any other solution. But the result is not the less certain in either case; nor can that result be in any way determined or even regulated by his intentions. In his Theology some of those features have been preserved in their integrity by a logical inconsistency in the application of his principles; but should they who come after him prove consistent therein, the results of that consistency must clothe our Church in sackcloth for generations to come.

We ought, perhaps, in this SECOND PART of the work, to entreat the patience of our readers in regard to the numerousness of our

citations of authorities; but we trust that they will take into due consideration the fact that it now has become necessary to do full justice to the subject before us; and while we shall carefully avoid any needless overloading of our pages, we must present a sufficiency of facts to resolve each question for the determination of which such appeal has become necessary. Occasionally we shall cite from the summary of testimonies contained in our previous discussion, but for the most part these will be brief; and by referring to the more extended citations, as well as to the other authors presented therein, and comparing them with those which are now adduced, our readers will perceive the cumulative nature of the argument. In the present tractate, moreover, we shall give more frequently than in the former our citations in the original language of the authors. It would greatly enlarge the volume to present both the original and translation of each passage; but deeming it highly important that our classically educated laymen, as well as the ministry, should possess for reference a fair proportion of the original documents, we shall present them, though at the same time taking care that the merely English scholar shall be able to perceive and understand the scope of the whole.

THE CITATIONS.

The Confessions of the evangelical churches are, for the most part, easily accessible to our readers, and we shall not, except in very few instances and by way of illustration, occupy our space with their testimony; and in fact it would be but a work of supererogation, in view of the full announcement of the leading divines of those communions, that the Confessions with one voice teach our participation with Adam in the first sin.

1. *The Marburg Colloquy*, (1529.)

This formula, after being carefully drawn up by the conjoint labors of Luther, Melancthon, Jonas, Zwingli, Ecolampadius, Bucer and others, *was subscribed by each*. Its fourth article reads as follows: "We believe that original sin descends to us by birth and inheritance (*hæreditariis à nobis per nativitatem trahi*), from Adam, and that it is a sin which condemns all men, and that if Christ had not by His death and life delivered us, all would have eternally perished on account of it, nor ever have obtained the kingdom of God and eternal salvation."

2. *The XXXIX. Articles.*

The Calvinistic soundness of these articles has always been admitted by the churches of the Reformation. Article IX. declares that "original sin is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world it deserveth God's wrath and damnation." Thus, in these early symbols the topics are all clearly stated, but the order of their statement, which, according to Dr. Hodge's theory is everything, (as it must be, if designed to be in his sense of it logical,) is the reverse of his own, and the reverse of that which he claims interpretatively to be the order in the Shorter Catechism. Instead of *guilt, depravity, death*, it is *depravity, guilt, death*. Could language more directly exhibit the fact that the Church has ever regarded the guilt and depravity as synchronously existing, and never could have entertained such a conception as that the depravity is the penal consequence of Adam's personal sin?

3. *Peter Martyr*.¹

The following passages will exhibit the views of this eminent reformer:² "Assuredly no one can doubt that original sin is inflicted on us in revenge and punishment of the first fall, (nobis infligi in ultionem et pœnam primi lapsus.)" He includes, of course, the whole race in the first fall, and hence employs the terms *ultio* and *pœna*; not to intimate that God would *revenge* on a guiltless race a *peccatum alienum*, as Dr. Hodge would have it, but that the race itself was criminal. Martyr entertained no such conception of the justice and moral character of God as this notion would imply. The *revenge* and *punishment* suffered by the race were therefore on account of its participation in the Adamic sin; and hence he adds, "Adamo peccante proinde fuit ac si omnes peccantes adfuissent et simul cum eo peccavissent."

Again, "Original sin is a depravation of the whole nature of man derived from our first parents to their posterity *by generation*."

¹ In our previous essay we presented brief, biographical sketches of most of the eminent divines therein cited, and should do the same in the present work did not our limits forbid.

² See Commentary on Rom. i. and v. 12-19, and 1 Cor. xv. 22.

And as was the fact with all the early reformers, he employs "original sin," in such connection, in the widest sense of the phrase, and as including both inherent and imputed sin,—*both being derived to us by generation*. He adds: "The efficient cause is the sinning will of Adam. When, therefore, the apostle seems to assert that the sin for which we are condemned is not another's, but our own, *he means that the sin of Adam was not so the sin of another, but that it was ours also*." Thus is Dr. Hodge's pernicious conception of the *peccatum alienum* in every form excluded and repudiated, and the moral and objective basis of the imputation fully affirmed as the ground of the *ultio* and *pœna* aforesaid.

4. *Musculus*, (Wolfgang,) in like manner, declares that the first sin was not the sin of Adam alone; that is, a sin in which he alone contracted subjective guilt, but our sin also in him; that is, the guilt of the principal, and the guilt of our own participation therein, were both laid to our charge. He says, "Some explain the word *ἡμαρτον* (*they sinned*) to mean that we are condemned, or virtually constituted sinners on account of sin; but there is no reason why you should not thereby understand the actual sin of Adam *in whom all that existed in his loins have sinned*. For since we receive from Christ, not only this benefit, that we should be virtually justified by His obedience, but also this, that by the very actual obedience of Christ we obey the Father, as we are Christ's, *so we are not only virtually made sinners in Adam, but are condemned for this very sin of Adam*. Whence the apostle declares, that by the offence of one, or the one offence, judgment came upon all men to condemnation."

The distinction here so carefully drawn between *our being virtually made sinners in Adam*, (which recognizes our subject-depravity,) and *being condemned for the very sin of Adam*, may serve to evince how widely the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin departs from the Augustinian doctrine. Dr. Hodge can admit no such distinction, holding, as he does, that *we are made sinners by being condemned as such on account of the personal sin of Adam*. And yet, as we have seen, he endeavors in his statements to appropriate language somewhat similar,¹ and this, too, while he pointedly affirms that being made sinners in Adam, and being condemned for the sin of Adam, *are one and the same thing*,

¹ See Theology, Vol. II., pp. 202, 203, and compare our preceding §§ 4 and 5.

and that the posterity of Adam had no subjective demerit whatever when the condemnatory sentence passed upon them. He names them *sinners* in virtue of their federal and natural relation to Adam, and says they all sinned; but at the same time insists that they so sinned as to leave them free of any ill-desert or subjective guilt, they being entirely guiltless anterior to the sentence imputing to them Adam's personal sin.

What intelligible idea such a statement is intended to convey, would, as it seems to us, require the Sphinx to determine, and to undertake to name it "*the federal system*," and the doctrine of our Church is, in every view that can be taken of the case, simply preposterous. And it is, moreover, not a little noteworthy that this should be soberly insisted on in close proximity to his assault upon the Church doctrine of participation as impossible and nonsensical. But (as I trust I may add without offence), that the posterity should sin in and with their father, and so become sinners; and yet, that while he in that sin became fearfully corrupt, they should in themselves remain perfectly incorrupt and free from all guilt and criminality, and without any subjective ill-desert demanding punishment until after his *peccatum alienum* had been charged upon them, is certainly hardly in accordance with the Scriptures, or with the "*criteria* and intuitions" referred to in the preceding section. And we really think that there is no illiberality in suggesting that they who can grasp so as to comprehend such propositions, ought not to find any very serious obstacle in the way of accepting the Church doctrine that all the race veritably sinned, and became subjectively guilty in our first parents.

5. *Calvin*.

"Original sin, therefore, appears to be a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through all parts of the soul, rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and producing in us those works which the Scriptures call the works of the flesh."¹ Here, too, the topics are presented in an order the reverse of Dr. Hodge's, and we have *depravity, guilt, death*. If, then, a logical or causal connection is to be attributed to the statement of the topics in Calvinistic theology, and Adam's first sin means Adam's *peccatum alienum* or personal sin only, under what category is Calvin to be placed? He certainly was no Calvinist, if this theory

¹ *Institutio*, lib. II., cap. 1, § 8.

of gratuitous imputation is Calvinistic. Can anything, then, be plainer, than that the Church of the Reformation never attached to that *merely personal sin* a causal relation to the depravity of the race?

Again, Calvin, when referring to Pighius, Catharinus, and other Papal theologues, who contended that only the guilt of Adam's personal sin was imputed to the race forensically, and thus became the cause of their inherent sin, remarks: "*We are not condemned by imputation alone, as though the punishment of another's sin were exacted of us; but we therefore endure its punishment because we also are guilty of the offence so far as this, that our nature, vitiated in him, is regarded as guilty of iniquity before God.*"¹ And again, in his Institutes he says: "We have already proved that original sin is the pravity and corruption of our nature, *which first makes us guilty of the wrath of God*, and then also brings forth in us those works which the Scriptures call the works of the flesh."² These passages may suffice from this unequalled theologian.

6. *Beza*. In his note on Rom. v. 12, he says: "Duo sunt in peccato originis. 1. *Corruptio* quæ tollitur sanctificatione, &c. 2. *Reatus*; de quo hic propriè agitur cui opponitur imputatio obedientiæ Christi." Here, too, in this emphatic statement of the doctrine, *corruption* is first, and *guilt* second. Again: "Two things should be taken into consideration in regard to original sin, guilt and corruption (*reatus et corruptio*), which, although *they cannot be separated*, yet ought to be accurately distinguished." In this latter citation the order is the reverse of that in the preceding, *and both statements are given in the same note*. Can any one, therefore, in view of such a fact, even imagine that Beza could have regarded the topics as logically or causally related, and so making at first the corruption causal of the guilt, and then immediately afterwards the guilt causal of the corruption? What, then, is the value of Dr. Hodge's assumption? But in the latter citation Beza gives the ground of this variation in statement: "The two," says he, "cannot be separated (*quæ non possunt separari*), as they, of course, could be, if Dr. Hodge's theory were true, which makes the one causal of the other: that is, the guilt of Adam's *peccatum aliæum* causal of the moral corruption of the race, or as they could be if

¹ Comment. in Rom. v. 17.

² Lib. iv. cap. 15, § 10.

the counter theory of Placæus were true, which makes inherited corruption causal of the imputation.

Again, says Beza: "*Tria sunt quæ hominem constituunt reum coram Deo. 1. Culpa promanans ex eo quod omnes peccavimus in protoplasto. (Rom. v. 12.) [Here is the aforesaid culpa participatione.] 2. Corruptio quæ est poena istius culpæ imposita tam Adamo quam posteris. (Heb. ix., 27.) 3. Peccata quæ perpetrant homines adulti, suntque fructus,*" &c.¹

7. *Danæus*, the colleague of Beza, adopts (in a work of his with the same title), this language, word for word: "There are three things which constitute a man guilty before God: 1. The criminality flowing from this, that we have all sinned in the first man. 2. Corruption, which is the punishment of this sin which fell alike upon Adam and his seed. 3. The sins which adult men commit, and which are fruits brought forth by this root of corruption, of which we are guilty before the judgment of God."²

It will be observed by the reader that in all these passages the demerit or subjective guilt of the posterity is affirmed to be the same as the subjective desert of their first parents.

8. *Zanchius*, in like manner, affirms our subjective guilt and the imputation of the Adamic sin. In his *De Peccato* he says: "Because the whole human race, which is propagated by natural generation from Adam, were in his loins, hence the precept with its penalty *was not addressed to the person of Adam alone*, but pertained likewise to the whole human race. Therefore we believe and confess with the apostle, that in sinning Adam all men sinned, *so that that disobedience was not peculiar to Adam, but was the common (disobedience) of the whole human race*, since his guilt has involved all men naturally descended from his loins." Though a supralapsarian, this eminent divine thus fully sustains the declared doctrine of the Reformed theology, *that we in Adam, as in our origin, became veritably guilty, and that his sin and our own participation therein are imputed to us for condemnation*.

9. *Whittaker*, with all his supralapsarian proclivities, never attempted, as Pighius and Catharinus (the leading supralapsarians of the papal and scholastic school) did, to explicate the doctrine from the standpoint of imputation alone, or to make Adam's merely personal sin causal of our guilt and condemnation. In fact, he, as

¹ Apologia pro justificatione.

² Apologia pro justificatione.

shown in our former work, denounces severely those who do this, and who, by making inherent sin the effect of the forensic imputation of Adam's personal sin (as did the papal theologues referred to) do really, in the judgment of the Reformed Church, place original sin in imputation alone, agreeably to the everywhere acknowledged canon,—*causa causæ est etiam causa causati*. He says: "Original sin is inherent and native depravity, but the actual free transgression of Adam is imputed to us. For we should neither be held under the guilt or depravity thence contracted, unless that act by which Adam violated the divine precept was ascribed to us by imputation. But in regard to that, some scholastic theologians *place original sin in imputation alone; IN THIS THEY BASELY AND NEFARIOUSLY ERR.*" These theologians never denied the existence of *inherent* sin in us, or in human nature; but by making it the penalty of Adam's *peccatum alienum*, and denying its transmission by generation (and this is precisely the theory of Dr. Hodge), they clearly ascribed it to imputation alone. They taught that its existence was transmitted only *per culpam*; or, as Szydlovius expresses it, "*Neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per imputationem.*"¹

10. *Sohnius* states the order of topics as follows: "Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity, includes three deadly evils,—the *demerit*, the *guilt* or liability to punishment, and the *depravity* or corruption of nature. . . . The first sin of Adam, therefore, as we said before, must be viewed in a double aspect. In one respect it was the sin of Adam, and was not original sin, but actual, originating—that is, giving origin to the original sin of his posterity. In another respect it was the sin of his posterity, who were in his loins, so that, in mass, they committed the same sin, and hence it was imputed to them all. . . . He (the apostle) does not say in this place (Romans v. 12) that *guilt* had entered, but that *sin* had entered into the world. And this is not left to be inferred, but is expressly asserted in the same verse,—'*in whom all have sinned.*' Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death and condemnation by the sin of one, *it is a just inference that all were partakers of his sin*, and are born in a state of moral pollution. In the nineteenth verse it is said, 'By

¹ See the *Danville Review* for 1861, page 569; also the *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 362, 367, 368.

the disobedience of one, many are constituted sinners.' Now, to be constituted sinners includes the idea, not only of being made subject to the penalty (as the Papal divines whom he was answering had asserted), but partaking of the nature of sin; for they who are entirely free from sin cannot with propriety be called sinners."

And now let our readers for themselves endeavor to imagine a more direct antagonism to both the exegesis and doctrine which Dr. Hodge has been inculcating as the doctrine of our Church than is here advanced by this illustrious reformer, (successor to Ursinus in the theological chair at Heidelberg,) and we think they will concede it to be impossible. The views here presented by *Sohnius* were always the received doctrine of the Calvinistic church, and yet Dr. Hodge rejects them as Pantheistic and nonsensical! Is this the way, then, to impart to our youth a due respect for the recognized doctrines of Calvinism?

11. Our next citation shall be from the *SYNOPSIS PURIORIS THEOLOGIE*, by the Leyden divines (anno 1624), the design of which was, by means of a brief and lucid statement, to correct the misrepresentations which the then flourishing sects of the Socinians and Remonstrants had been making of the evangelical system of grace and salvation. And our readers may observe how, in the very face of all the denunciation and sarcasm of those bigoted sectaries (to which we shall have occasion to advert in another section), these eminent and learned men deliberately reiterate the doctrine of the Church. We will first present a very brief analysis of their statement, and then, as above remarked, shall give it in the original language.

The term *ἀνομία*, which is here used, and also very frequently employed in such connection by the Reformed theologians (and in the strictly scriptural (see 1 John iii. 4) and likewise classical sense of *iniquity, injustice, disregard of law*), is the antithesis of *δικαιοσύνη*, and is so employed here by these divines. They name original sin such from the defection in the loins of Adam of all who are naturally begotten of him, whereby they became corrupt, averse to all good, and so prone and inclined to evil as to have incurred the displeasure of God and become exposed to eternal death. The whole race was hidden in the loins of Adam (as Levi was in Abraham when typified in him) and sinned together with him. The sin or crime, therefore, was universal, and is derived to all through

generation, (for the threatening in Genesis ii. 17, "*in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die*," was addressed to all), and it was consequently imputed by God justly to the posterity. Such is the main idea here presented, and which we now give in their own words.

They say: "Ad rem quod attinet Peccatum Originale definimus *ἀνομίαν* seu vitiositatem hæreditariam; ex defectione omnium hominum naturali modo ab Adamo propagatorum in ipsius primi parentis lumbis factam: quæ toti quanti sunt, corrupti, eoque ab omni bono aversi, et ad omne malum tantum propensi et inclinati, rei sunt iræ Dei et morti æternæ obnoxii."

"Efficiens hujus peccati causa est primorum parentum lapsus, quo justo Dei judicio reatus pravitas naturæ attracta est, et in totam posteritatem transfusa. Quia enim in Paradiso duplicem Adam gerebat personam, cum suam ipsius, tum totius posteritatis cujus sustinebat massam; etiam peccatum ejus geminum habuit respectum; tum ad ipsum, et sic erat personalis et actualis ipsius transgressio, non propriè originalio sed originans, seu originem præbens omnibus aliis et peccatorum effectibus: tum ad totum posteritatis genus, quod in lumbis ejus latens una peccabat, ut Levi decimatus fuit, dum *esset in lumbis Abrahami patris sui*, (Heb. vii., vers. 8 et 9,) et ita fuit universalis culpa seu peccatum universale et naturæ totius vel speciei, in omnes homines generatione derivandum *ad quos in Adamo sententia illa directa fuerat, Quacumque die comederis de fructu, etc. Morte morieris.* (Gen. ii. 17.)"

"Forma peccati originalis consistit in *ἀνομία* illa et inobedientia, qua, cum Adamo peccaverunt omnes qui in eo fuerunt secundum rationem, et vocant, seminalem; quæ inobedientia et culpa cum reatu consequente, justè à Deo iudice omnibus Adami filiis imputatur quatenus omnes fuerunt et sunt unus cum eo. Si vero consideretur id quod in homine post actum remanet et veram peccati rationem habet, unde propriè et formaliter homo dicitur peccator, nihil est aliud quam depravatio illa et deformitas totius humanæ naturæ, quæ conformitate cum Deo amissa, labes, et fœdissima omnium hominis partium corruptio, successit.

"Non igitur significanter satis vim hujus peccati expresserunt, qui eam tantum in justitia originalis carentia constituerunt; quæ per illud, natura nostra non tantum boni inops est, sed etiam malorum

omnium adeo fertilis et ferax, ut otiosa esse non possit. Itaque corruptionis hujus duas partes cum Scriptura agnoscimus, nempe defectum et privationem boni, et pravam ad malum inclinationem; cum præter ignorantiam in mente, et aversionem à Deo in corde, hæret in omnibus pronitas ad sapiendum et faciendum ea quæ lege Dei prohibentur. Hinc quidam è nostris, fomitem peccati non esse absque actuali peccato, imo peccatum actuale esse dixerunt; quod *ἀνόμιος* quidem dictum, in calumniam tamen non debuit ab adversariis trahi, cum nihil aliud voluerint quam peccatum hoc et esse actu, et actuosum etiam et operosum, utne in parvulis quidem quiescat, quin vitiosus motus excitet."¹

They conclude with the following from Bernard: "The crime (culpa) is another's, because we have all unconsciously sinned in Adam. It is our own, because, although in another, we nevertheless have sinned, and by the just, though secret, judgment of God it is imputed to us."

12. PAREUS. (*Dr. David, of Heidelberg.*)

We have already referred to this remarkably able divine in connection with Poole, and we add here a brief passage in his own words. He says that the evils which Adam brought upon himself by his sin "all came at the same time, or simultaneously, upon his offspring, not in one way, but in a threefold manner, to-wit: *participatione culpæ, imputatione reatus, propagatione naturalis pravitatis*—by participation of the crime—because all his posterity were seminally in the loins of Adam. They therefore all sinned in Adam when he sinned,"—thus making the imputation to be that of our participated criminality. (See his Commentary on Romans v. 12.)

And now, in view of these few testimonials (few in comparison of the many we are prepared to allege,) from those truly learned divines, will any serious man pretend to say that there was not present to the minds of Pareus, Poole, Turretin, Calvin, Rivetus, and of the hosts of others who announce and reiterate that the posterity of Adam participated with him in the first sin, all the so-named reasons upon which Dr. Hodge has so ungraciously ventured to denounce that doctrine as impossible, Pantheistic, and nonsensical? They knew full well every part and particle

¹ Disput. XV., §§ 10, 11, 24, 25, pp. 151, 152, 157, 158 (Editio quarto), Leyden, 1652.

of those asserted reasons, and had met with them, as perpetually alleged by Jesuits, Socinians, Remonstrants, and others, against the same grand truth; and yet, in full view of all the efforts of those sectaries to throw it out of the discussion as an absurd and unbutable proposition, these truly venerable and godly men come forth and thus reannounce the doctrine as their own cherished and deliberate view of the teaching of the Bible, and as the theology of their doctrinal symbols.

We omit other citations as unnecessary, and conclude the section with a brief remark on the bearing of this branch of the argument.

Dr. Hodge's scheme of gratuitous imputation, to which he has presumed to apply the *sobriquet* of "*the federal system*," depends, as we have shown, on his assumption of a logical order, or causal relation in the topical statement, *Adam's personal guilt and the depravity or spiritual death of the race*; that is, he assumes that there is a causal connection between Adam's sin—the *peccatum alienum*—and the inherent sin of his posterity. But, as the foregoing citations all evince, the Calvinistic church repudiates any such connection, and thus ignores the principle which is fundamental to his theory. They evince, moreover, that when she does speak of guilt or criminality as producing the inherent or hereditary corruption of the race, the reference is not by any means to the guilt of Adam only, but to the guilt also of his posterity by participation in the same sin, which participation has rendered the whole race subjectively criminal. They make no attempt to explain the *modus* of the participation, for they regard the fact itself as inexplicable. In our previous discussion we presented the same position and illustrations, together with many of the preceding authorities, which, however, had no effect upon Dr. Hodge, except to draw from him the unfortunate attempts at denunciation and sarcasm to which we have referred.¹ We have not retorted, nor shall we. And though it was not unnatural for us to feel that such usage was not calculated to allay or soothe the just sense of wrong which is common in like cases, we were assured that Dr. Hodge has more to regret than we could possibly have from this procedure. When he ventured, therefore, to denounce such par-

¹ See especially his Review of Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, *Princeton Review* for April, 1860, and his Revised Commentary on Romans (issued in 1866).

ticipation as impossible, and to deride it as nonsensical, was he, or was he not, aware that he was thus treating the recognized and sacred doctrine of the Church whose theology he had been employed to teach to her rising ministry? This question is eminently pertinent in whatever way he may answer it. But we have no disposition to press the point.

The foregoing citations, evincing what were the views of the Church in regard to the order of topics, are abundantly sufficient to demonstrate that the theory of gratuitous imputation of sin is fundamentally at war with the Augustinian theology. But the subject, as it now stands related to our own Church in this country, is far too important to be allowed to rest here, and we therefore invite our readers to a further consideration of it from other and not less important points of view.

§ 10. THE CHURCH DOCTRINE ON THE RELATION WHICH THE PUNITIVE JUSTICE OF GOD SUSTAINS TO HIS CREATURES.

In section six, above, we have pointed out the inconclusiveness of Dr. Hodge's endeavor to trace an analogy between the instances which he cites in the illustration and enforcement of his argument, to-wit: between the punishment of Adam's *sinless* offspring (as his theory affirms them to have been) for his personal sin, and the punishment of the *sinful* progeny of Esau, Korah, and others, for their parents' sin; and we shall now proceed to define and illustrate the doctrine of the Calvinistic church in relation to punishment and ill-desert.

That doctrine is nowhere doubtfully expressed, either in her standards or approved theology, in both of which it is fully taught that the *actual ill-desert of the creature invariably precedes the penal exactions of divine justice*. By his theory Dr. Hodge is, as we have shown, obliged to repudiate this principle, infixed as it is in the very centre of man's moral nature; and in order to justify himself in such repudiation he affirms that it is subversive of the whole doctrine of redemption through our Lord Jesus Christ, inasmuch as He, though perfectly innocent and holy, did endure the Divine wrath or inflictions of punitive justice in their most unmitigated severity. But the endeavor to draw into the argument the expiatory work of our adorable Redeemer, who was no creature, and who voluntarily became sin and a curse for us, evinces only the

extremity to which a conscious lack of support has reduced his theory. Dr. Hodge will not venture the assertion that, irrespective of the assumption of our legal relation to divine justice, our sins either were or could be imputed to the Redeemer. And he is therefore obliged practically to concede that *there is really no analogy between making a punitive exaction of an innocent creature, who has never assumed or in any way incurred the liability, and making a punitive exaction of one who has willingly and even joyfully incurred it.*¹ The instance of our blessed Redeemer, therefore, can bear no actual relation to the merits of the question before us. And consequently, if the foregoing statement presents (and we claim that it does present) an accurate expression of the recognized views of the Church, no words are needed to evince that Dr. Hodge's theory is in deadly conflict with her cherished doctrine. Our citations shall be as brief as a fair presentation of the case will allow.

THE CITATIONS.

1. CALVIN says: "For if predestination is no other than a dispensation of divine justice—mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame—since it is certain that they were not unworthy of being predestinated to that fate, it is equally certain that the destruction they incur by predestination is consistent with the strictest justice. Besides, their perdition depends on the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves." "In the next place we maintain that they act preposterously, who, in seeking for the origin of their condemnation, direct their views to the secret recesses of the divine counsel, and overlook the corruption of nature which is its real source." "We confess the guilt (noxam) to be common, but we say that some are relieved by divine mercy."²

Can our readers reconcile these, and a thousand similar utterances of this pre-eminent theologian, with the supposition that he acknowledged a prerogative in God to pronounce and treat of His mere will and pleasure *the innocent as guilty, or the just as unjust?*

¹ Owen, in a passage to be cited in the sequel, expresses the true doctrine of Calvinism on this point as follows: "*Sin, imputed by itself alone, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any but Christ.*"

² Institut., Lib. III., cap. 23, §§ 8, 9, 11.

2. CHARNOCK.

"God cannot pollute any undefiled creature by virtue of that sovereign power which He has to do what He will with it, because such an act would be contrary to the foundation and right of His dominion."¹

3. AMES, in the eleventh chapter of his "*Medulla*," thus applies the same principle in what the Socinians and Arminians of his day denounced as an extremely absurd statement: "In ordering the event (of the fall) as to man, two things are to be considered, ἀπόστασις and ἀνάστασις,—man's *fall* and his *restoration*. (Rom. v. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 22.) In the angels there was a *preservation* of some and an *apostasy* of others, but no restoration of those who had apostatized. In man, however, there could not be together both preservation and apostasy, because all men were created in one Adam, as in a beginning, root and head; but some could not be preserved from the fall, and others fall, in one and the same Adam."

Then in Chapter XII., he says: "Punishment is an evil inflicted upon the sinner for his sin. It is called an evil, because it is a privation of good. . . . It is said to be an evil inflicted, not merely contracted, because it pertains to rewarding and avenging justice. It is said to be inflicted on account of sin, because it always has respect and order to the desert of sin (ad meritum peccati); to which punishment follows from the offence by reason of the prohibition, and from the guilt by reason of the threatening. *Therefore punishment in the proper sense of the term* (poena proprie dicta) *has no place except in intelligent creatures, in whom sin also is found.*"

4. HOORNBECK, in his *Instit. Theologiæ*,² cites and adopts this latter passage as explaining his own views of the same great truth. Nor can language evince more clearly that these divines entertained no such conception as that which Dr. Hodge has so injuriously and rashly charged upon them, to-wit: that God claims and exercises the prerogative to visit with punitive and avenging justice the creature when not already subjectively deserving of the curse.

5. MARESIUS, in his *Theologia*, repeats the same view: "Guilt

¹ Discourse X., "On the Attributes." The whole discourse should be read in connection with our argument.

² Cap. VII., § XI., page 229.

is an obligation to punishment arising out of sin and transgression. Some inaccurately define it as the essence of sin itself; but the essential matter of sin is the violation of law itself, which produces defilement and guilt. This guilt follows sin. . . . *It therefore arises out of crime and precedes punishment.* As to its result it pertains to the punishment; as to its source to the crime." "The crime, in fact, is not only the antecedent cause of the guilt, but also the recipient subject of it."

In the second of his *Dissertationes*, in reply to Curcellæus, (*De Peccato Originis*), he presents the same views, and, greatly to the disgust of the Arminian professor, makes the following application of the aforesaid explanatory principle: "I concede that they who are without either understanding or guilt are likewise without sin *proper* and *personal*. Still it does not follow from thence that they are without *hereditary* and *common* sin. For both idiots and infants being naturally propagated from Adam, *they all sinned in him and contracted the guilt of death.*"

The patience of the Arminian quite breaks down at the utterance of an absurdity so "*unthinkable*" (as Baur and Dr. Hodge have named it), and he begins his response in the following terms not at all remarkable for classic chasteness and propriety: "Sed crassa Professoris hujus ignorantia se in omnibus istis aperte prodit." And further on, in showing that Maresius must have overrated the effects of the first sin, he (without informing us how many swallows it really does require to make spring) gives force to his argument by the following philosophical and pertinent analogy: "Sicut enim una hirunda non facit ver, ita neque una actio habitum parit."¹

JOHN HENRY HEIDEGGER, in his exposition of the doctrine of original sin, affirms the same explanatory principle in vindication of the justice of God in its treatment of the posterity of Adam, and affirms that God adjudges the posterity of Adam *as implicated with him in his sin*, and therefore treats them as sinners.² And in his *Dissertatio de Concordia Potest*, § 51 (as cited by J. A. Turretin in *Nubes Testium*, he asserts that in every case the cause of blame of perdition is to be sought, not in God, but in men themselves: "Omnis perditionis causa vel culpa, non in Deo,

¹ *Opera Curcellæi*, pp. 904, 905, (Amsterdam, 1675.)

² Cited largely in De Moor, Vol. III., pp. 277, 270.

sed in hominibus quærenda sit." Could there be a more direct disavowal of the notion that God pronounces the just unjust?

WALLÆUS, in his reply to the Arminian theologian, Corvinus, says: "The guilt of the first sin to condemnation (and as the apostle Paul speaks in Rom. vi. 16, *χρῖμα εἰς κατὰχρῖμα*), cannot be imputed to posterity unless that vitiosity of inherent sin intervene; since the justice of God will not permit that the first sin should be imputed for condemnation to a posterity having no sin in themselves."² Corvinus denied just as strongly as Dr. Hodge our participation in the first sin, and affirmed the dogma of gratuitous imputation, and this is the reply he receives. Wallæus was a colleague of Rivetus in the Leyden University, and had been appointed by the Synod of Dort to draw up its canons. And now, reader, decide for yourself. Can language convey a more direct and definite affirmation than that which is here given of the great explanatory principle of the Calvinistic church in explication of the doctrine of original sin, or utter a more thorough repudiation of the gratuitous imputation theory of Dr. Hodge?

8. MOLINÆUS. (Peter du Moulin.)

This pre-eminent theologian, and most learned and excellent man, stood in the front rank of the Calvinistic divines during the first half of the seventeenth century, and received the thanks of the Synod of Dort for his able defence of Calvinistic doctrine. In his *Euodat. Quest. de Peccato Originali*, he says: "*Nor indeed would God impute the sin of Adam to his posterity, unless they had in themselves something which was truly of the nature of sin, and unless they were evil by nature.*"¹

I repeat here the inquiry: Can any serious man, in the light of such declarative statements, even imagine that these representative divines of the Church could have entertained the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin; that is, that God may pronounce a guiltless creature guilty, morally corrupt, or unjust, and then treat him as such?

Again, in his *Anatome Arminianismi*, and referring especially to the relation sustained by God's punitive justice to the creatures of his hand, he says: "Estque damnatio actus divinæ justitiæ, quæ sibi constare non posset, si homo innocens et nullum ob

¹ *Opera Wallæi*, Tom. III., p. 151, column 2. (Leyden, 1643.)

² Cited by Rivetus in his *Testimonies on Imputation*.

culpam destinaretur ad desertionem, ex qua æterna perditio necessario consequeretur. Quod si Deus, insontem creaturam destinavit, ad perditionem, necesse est eandem destinaverit ad *peccatum sine qua non potest esse justa perditio*, et sic Deus erit causa impulsiva peccati. *Nec homo poterit juste puniri ob peccatum, ad quod est aut præcise destinatus, aut Dei voluntate compulsus.*" (Capite IX.) That is, in brief, they who advocate such a doctrine cannot possibly avoid the consequence of making God the impelling cause of sin.

9. WENDELINE. (Marcus Frederick.)

This excellent theologian treats as follows the sentiment that God, of his mere prerogative, can pronounce and treat the just as unjust. He is expounding the doctrine of reprobation, and says: "The end is the declaration of Divine justice *in punishing sin*. I. This appears from the testimony of Scripture. (Rom. xiv. 17, 22.) (He cites the verses.) Therefore God does not destine the reprobate to sin *forasmuch as he finds sin in them*, but to the punishment of sin. II. From what we have said of the causes of this reprobation, it appears what grievous calumniators our adversaries are, who now attribute to us a decree of reprobation so absolute that in it there is plainly no respect had to sin as the cause of the decree of damnation. *Our unvarying doctrine is this: that as God condemns no one in time except on account of sin, so also he decreed from eternity to condemn no one except on account of sin, which, in the Synod of Dort, was solemnly promulgated.*"¹

10. TURRETTIN (Francis), when speaking on the topic before us, says: "2. Because all die in Adam (1 Cor. xv. 22), that is, contract the guilt of condemnation and death, therefore they sinned also in the same, and are held with him in a common criminality. For no one can, in any respect, deserve the punishment of death unless he should have with him and in him *that common sin which is the cause of death*. It does not suffice to say that we all die in Adam efficiently, inasmuch as we derive from Adam original sin, which is the cause of death; because, by the same reason, we might say that we die in our parents and ancestors, from whom we immediately derive sin, which yet the Scripture never asserts, but from Adam only, inasmuch as we were in him in a peculiar manner, not only in a seminal principle, but also as in a represen-

¹ Theol. Christ., lib. I., cap. 4, Thes. 6, page 177. (Leyden, 1658.)

tative head; and so we are said to have sinned in him, not only by reason of efficiency, *since he is the cause from which sin is propagated to us*, but also by reason of demerit, inasmuch as his fault draws guilt upon us, in the same mode in which all are in like case said to be vivified in Christ, not only efficiently through the vivifying Spirit, but likewise meritoriously, through the imputation of His righteousness."¹

The latter part of this passage has been misconceived by some, who seem unwilling that Turretin himself should explain it. He has done so very fully and repeatedly in subsequent parts of his work, wherein, referring, for instance, to the analogy in Romans v. 12-19, he says: "Nor yet, if Adam has even constituted us unjust effectively *through propagation of inherent vitiosity*, on account of which we are also guilty of death before God, would it likewise follow that Christ constitutes us righteous through a forensic justification of the judgment of God by inherent righteousness given to us by Himself; *because the scope of the apostle, which alone is to be regarded, does not tend to that; but he aims only to lay open the foundation of the participation* (communions) *of guilt to death and of the right to life* (from our union with the first and second Adam) *as to the thing, although the mode is diverse on account of the diversity of the subject.*"²

11. RYISSENIUS.

This careful and esteemed theologian (who is sometimes quoted by Dr. Hodge in other connections), when discussing the question, "Whether God may deprive an *innocent* creature, not only of life, but consign it to endless torment?" rejects all hypotheses tending to countenance such a dogma. And then, after answering the query by a decided no! sustains the denial by the following arguments, to-wit:

"I. All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth to such as keep His covenant. (Ps. xxv. 10.)

"II. He who approaches God should believe that He will remunerate obedience, and not condemn the obedient. (Heb. xi. 6.)

"III. In the innocent creature there could be no consciousness of crime and of the just sentence of God, which is the punishment of sense.

¹ Instit. Eleuct. Theol., loco IX., Quæst. 9, § 18, (New York, 1847).

² Ibid., loco XVI., Quæst. 2, § 19. See also Quæst. 3, § 15.

"IV. No glory could be derived to God from such an act, but rather the ignominy of tyrannic rule.

"V. The righteousness of God demands that the holy be discharged. (Ps. xviii. 26.)"¹ i. e., The law cannot punish them.

12. JOHN OWEN.

We invite special attention to the following affirmations by this illustrious prince of divines. In his "Display of Arminianism," (Chapter VIII.), when replying to the rabid assaults of the Remonstrant school upon the doctrine of our participation in the first sin, he says: "I see no reason, then, why Corvinus should affirm, as he does, 'That it is absurd that by one man's disobedience many should be made *actually* disobedient,' unless he did it purposely to contradict St. Paul's teaching us that 'by one man's disobedience many were made sinners,' (Rom. v. 19). *Paulus ait, Corvinus negat, eligite cui credatis*: choose whom you will believe, St. Paul or the Arminians. The sum of their endeavors in this particular is to clear the nature of man from being any way guilty of Adam's actual sin, as being then in him, a member and part of that body whereof he was the head, or from being obnoxious to an interpretation of it by reason of *that covenant which God made with us all in him*; so that, denying, as you saw before, all inherent corruption and pravity of nature, *and now all participation by any means of Adam's transgressions*, methinks they cast a great aspersion on Almighty God, however He dealt with Adam for his own particular, yet for casting us, his most innocent posterity, out of Paradise." . . . "We confess, say they (that is, in the Apology for their Confession), that the sin of Adam may be thus far said to be imputed to his posterity, inasmuch as God would have them all born obnoxious to that punishment which Adam incurred by his sin, or permitted that evil which was inflicted on him to descend on them.' *Now, be the punishment what it will, never so small, yet if we have no demerit of our own, nor interest in Adam's sin, it is such an act of injustice as we must reject from the Most Holy with a God forbid!* Far be it from the Judge of all the world to punish the righteous with the ungodly. If God should impute the sin of Adam unto us, and thereon pronounce us obnoxious to the curse deserved by it, if we have a pure, sinless, unspotted nature, even this could scarce

¹ Summa Theologiæ, loco IX., p. 74 of the quarto edition.

be reconciled with the rule of His proceeding in justice with the sons of men,—'the soul that sinneth it shall die,'—*which clearly granteth an impunity to all not tainted with sin*. Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by His mercy, pardoning the one, and so not inflicting the other, *yet never by His justice inflicting the latter where the former is not*. *Sin imputed by itself alone, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any one but Christ*. *The unsearchableness of God's love and justice in laying the iniquity of us all upon Him who had no sin is an exception from that general rule He walketh by in His dealing with the posterity of Adam*. So that, if punishment be not done unto us for a solely imputed sin, much less, when it doth not stand with the justice and equity of God to impute any iniquity unto us at all, can we justly be wrapped in such a curse and punishment as woeful experience teaches that we lie under."¹

Again: In his treatise on *Divine Justice* he says, "There are, again, some attributes which can in nowise have an egress, or be exercised, without an object predetermined, and, as it were, by some circumstances prepared for them; among them is *punitive justice, for the exercise of which there would be no ground but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being, and of its having sinned; but these being supposed, this justice must necessarily act according to its own rule*."²

In view of such absolute testimonies as this, and the whole of the preceding catalogue, which present the doctrine recognized and taught by the Church of God on this subject, can any thing be more painfully surprising than that a member of our own communion should reject, denounce, and ridicule the great fundamental truth thus affirmed, and then coolly offer as the doctrine received by the Church a scheme in direct antagonism therewith? naming it "the federal system," and what not! and proscribing as in fundamental error all who adhere to the Church doctrine, and refuse their assent to a claim so really preposterous and enormous! The existence of such a phenomenon would seem almost to baffle belief. It is hardly necessary in this connection to refer to Dr. Hodge's favorite sophism, by which he has attempted to

¹ Works, Vol. V., pp. 128, 129, (London, 1826).

² Ibid., Vol. IX., page 359.

invalidate the force of such and similar utterances against his theory, yet a passing remark may not be unimportant.

The Doctor claims that the existence of guilt is always presupposed in the exactions of punitive justice, and that, if it be not subjective demerit, it must be imputed sin. This, indeed, is, at least in form, not unlike the formulation of the Augustinian divines, who, in disputing with the Socinians and Remonstrants, maintain that imputed sin, not less than our inherent, personal sin, may justly render us obnoxious to punishment, since Adam's own sin is truly imputed to us; but, in the same connection in which they insist upon this, they likewise affirm (as in the foregoing instances) that it would be unjust were he to punish in an innocent creature the merely personal sin of another. These, however, are no antagonisms in the Church theology; but in the theory of Dr. Hodge they are so utterly irreconcilable that the one logically and of necessity subverts the other. And yet he affirms, just as those divines do, that God may righteously punish the race for imputed sin! What, then, is the solution? It is neither recondite nor difficult, but is found upon the very surface, to-wit: *Dr. Hodge has rejected as nonsensical their principle of explanation, and yet would avail himself of the explanation itself.* They, by imputed sin in this connection, mean the sin of Adam as principal, and our own sin as participants therein; in other words, our participation in the offence of Adam, which constituted us subjectively guilty. But *he*, on the contrary, means by it Adam's merely personal sin—a *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin—and rejects and denounces the doctrine of participation. And hence, while he, being compelled to do so by the exigencies of his theory, affirms that God, on His mere prerogative or arbitrary will, may pronounce and treat the just as unjust, *they*, with the whole Church, affirm that such a dogma is at war with the whole moral nature of God, and would constitute Him the author of sin. And thus, by repudiating the only available principle of explanation, Dr. Hodge rejects the Church doctrine at the same time that he professes to receive and teach it.

13. PRESIDENT WITHERSPOON.

"It seems to be a matter insisted on in the strongest manner in Scripture, that the evil or guilt of every creature is to be ascribed to the creature, as to its proper and adequate cause."¹

¹ Works, Vol. IV., pp. 81, 82. (Philadelphia, 1802.)

The foregoing citations are certainly sufficient to illustrate and establish the accuracy of the representation made in the beginning of this section, though the whole Calvinistic church could be appealed to as inculcating the same doctrine. It will be in place, however, before concluding, to present in his own words the view alleged on the same subject by Dr. Hodge, that our readers may have the opportunity to compare it promptly with the expressed doctrine of the Church. In his review of Dr. Baird's work (already referred to) he says, "We cannot help agreeing with Dr. Thornwell in saying that this is substituting absurdity for obscurity. Still, there is no sin in absurdity. But the case is very different when we are told that we must believe this doctrine, because otherwise God would be unjust; or when it is asserted, in support of this theory, that the judgment of God must be founded on the personal merits or demerits of those whom they affect; that it is a denial of His moral nature, and even atheistic, to say that He can pronounce the just unjust, or the unjust just; that the only legitimate ground of judgment are character and works; and when still further it is asserted that community in a propagated nature involves all those to whom that nature belongs in the criminality and pollution of their progenitor. Then, we say, that the whole gospel is destroyed, and every scriptural ground of salvation for sinners is removed."¹

This repudiation of the Church doctrine is sufficiently explicit. And the attempt of Dr. Hodge to justify it, by endeavoring to identify that doctrine with philosophical theories with which it has not even the remotest connection, can in no wise relieve the fatal position here assumed. Certain divines have, indeed, philosophized on the subject; but the Doctor is aware, and no man oftener than he has insisted on the fact, that no unauthorized speculations are to be attributed to the Church as her recognized doctrine. We have seen, moreover, in a preceding section, that his endeavor to fortify himself in this antagonism by assumed analogies in Scripture, and in profane history, is simply absurd, since the principle he asserts is in no way either involved or implied in any of the cases which he has adduced, or can adduce. The doctrine of the Reformed church, therefore, while it thus

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 763, 764. We shall have occasion in another section to remark directly on this passage.

unequivocally teaches that God never punishes sin in any creature whose conscience (His own vicegerent) can enable him truly to say, "I have not transgressed," repudiates, as a festering, fatal gangrene, the whole theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin.

§ 11. CONDITION OF THE ARGUMENT.—AUGUSTINE.

In our two preceding sections, the doctrine of the Church in respect to the issue before us has been presented, as it were, incidentally—that is, as brought to view in its connection with the *order of topics* and *punitive justice*. In the remaining sections of our SECOND PART, we shall, under various captions, proceed to unfold the doctrine as directly stated and explained. Should we, in some instances, regard it as important to consider a citation from more than one standpoint, this will be but seldom, for our aim is to lay before our readers as large a portion of the testimony of the good and gifted men of the Church as is compatible with the limits assigned to the work, in order that our own denomination, which is principally concerned in the matter, may possess in a convenient form the material requisite to enable her fairly and promptly to resolve the issues involved in the transcendently important question, which (as we are assured) must soon be practically decided,—*whether the fundamental principles of her cherished theology are now to be compromised, or are still to be maintained in their integrity*. We are no alarmist, but we do affirm most emphatically that existing circumstances imperatively demand that this momentous question be determined with the least practicable delay.

The earlier as well as the later theologians of the Reformation, both Lutheran and Calvinist, had, through the assaults of sundry Jesuitic and Papal divines, and of the Socinian and Remonstrant schools, and through the exegesis they adopted, not less than through the sarcasm and denunciation by which they would enforce the necessity for such exegesis, the fairest opportunity to learn the full force of all that is now offered in favor of the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation, and against the Church doctrine of original sin. Some, it is true (as remarked on a previous page), did resort to the philosophy of realism, and others to that of nominalism, to parry those assaults; but, *as a body*, they disclaimed such resort, and frankly conceded their inability to explain how the race itself so sinned in and with Adam as to become sub-

jectively with him partakers of guilt and corruption. The truth of the doctrine was based by them simply on the inspired testimony; and they claimed that what was thus announced was needed as an explanatory principle, on which alone the doctrine itself could be truly explicated so as to be reconcilable with the moral perfections of God, the doctrine of redemption itself, and, in one word, with the entire Christian system. They may not have employed the term *explanatory principle* in the case any more than in relation to the *Tri-unity* of God, but their treatment of the subject everywhere evinces that the conception was recognized by their inner consciousness, even though it might not as yet have obtained a formulated utterance.

In a previous section we have shown, by a reference to the law of gravitation, that science recognizes the propriety and justness of such a position, so that it is now too late to attempt to carry it by the assaults of sarcasm, or to place it *hors du combat* by denunciation. Such a procedure availed little in the time of Augustine¹ and of the Reformation, and with the serious minded and intelligent it is still less effective now. The supporters of the dogma of the gratuitous imputation of sin must, therefore, meet the question squarely; for it will be in vain to attempt still to ignore the position, or to evade the point by the unscholarly procedure of endeavoring to associate the principle itself with either the realistic philosophy on the one hand, or the doctrine of mediate imputation on the other. That principle repudiates both as entirely as it repudiates the theory of gratuitous imputation itself; and any farther manœuvring of the kind will be regarded as a concession of inability to sustain either the argument or the peremptoriness with which the principle has been assailed. Dr. Hodge has affirmed times twice told that the issue between the doctrine we are defending and that which he maintains is vital and fundamental to the evangelical system; and in this he is clearly right, and, as already stated, we fully concur with him therein.

We repeat, then, that the Reformers taught, not only that the corruption of nature which makes us guilty before God is trans-

¹ Pelagius, *e. g.*, in his note on Romans vii. 8, says: "They are *insane* who teach that the sin of Adam comes on us by propagation." And his pupil, Celestius, (on original sin) says: "A sin propagated by generation is wholly contrary to the Catholic faith."

mitted from our first parents by generation, but that we so participated in this very offence as to become subjectively guilty. This has always been the doctrine of the Church; and we request our readers to observe that within her enclosure no such doctrine as the gratuitous imputation of a *peccatum alienum* was ever broached, except to be sternly rejected and condemned. Some few of the earlier Reformers entertained the conception, which subsequently was strongly presented by the great Quenstedt and other rigid Lutherans, that the corrupt or sinful state of human nature was not so much a positive infliction as a natural and necessary consequence of the fall; yet, for the most part, the divines of the Calvinistic communion taught, not only that this depraved condition constituted us subjectively guilty, but that it results penally from our having sinned in the fall; that as Adam and Eve, by their sin, plunged themselves into the abyss of spiritual degradation and death, exposing themselves to all its fearful evils, so, by participating therein, their posterity plunged themselves into the same. And that, as far as moral corruption may be considered a penal infliction on our first parents, so far may it be accounted such in their posterity, but no farther, and in no other sense. They never held that Adam's personal sin, being imputed as a *peccatum alienum*, was the ground on which God inflicts upon the race the penalty of moral corruption and spiritual death. Dr. Hodge has, in times without number and in every form, *asserted* the contrary; but the *proof* of the allegation, though so vitally necessary to the very existence of his theory, he leaves to take care of itself.

And now a single word in relation to Augustine, before we proceed with the argument:

In his Theology Dr. Hodge has very erroneously represented this illustrious father as inculcating the gratuitous imputation of sin. For example, he charges him with holding "That the loss of original righteousness and the corruption of nature consequent on the fall of Adam are penal inflictions, being the punishment of the first sin;" (meaning by *first sin* the merely *personal sin* of Adam), a statement which Augustine everywhere and constantly disclaims. And then, on the page following, after properly representing him as teaching "that a sinful nature is propagated by the very law of generation," Dr. Hodge adds, *that this is not an*

¹ See Theology, Vol. II., pp. 161-163.

*integral part of his system.*¹ It is to be presumed that Dr. Hodge is not unaware of the responsibility incurred by such an utterance, and we take direct issue with him thereon. For that a sinful nature *is propagated by generation* was not only affirmed by Augustine to be a radical part of his system,² and that the entire Lutheran and Reformed churches have not only regarded him as so teaching, but have, in the most explicit manner, themselves inculcated the same, is (as we shall show), beyond any serious question.

The citations which Dr. Hodge subjoins from Augustine are, in their entirety, consistent with the doctrine that the posterity were seminally present with Adam, and potentially sinned in and fell with him in the first transgression, and thus became, along with him, subjectively guilty; and though the citation from Wiggers (to the effect that spiritual death was held by Augustine to be the special and principal penalty of Adam's sin, which penalty has passed upon all men), is so presented by Dr. Hodge as to give to it the appearance of sustaining the supposition that Augustine regarded the first transgression as *Adam's personal sin alone, to the exclusion of our sin in him*, it is done without authority from either Wiggers or Augustine himself. Augustine does not attach this meaning to the phrase "Adam's first sin," when employed by him in such connection. In his view it is always a sin in which his posterity so participated as to become alike guilty with him, and justly exposed to condemnation and death. And hence, when Pelagius accused him of holding that the sin of Adam as a *foreign sin* (*PECCATUM ALIENUM* is the term he employs), was charged upon the race as the actual ground of its condemnation and death (the very principle which Dr. Hodge himself asserts), Augustine denied it in the most emphatic manner, and shows that the doctrine which he entertained and defended involved no such conclusion.

He taught, indeed, not only that physical death resulted both to

¹ Theology, Vol. II., p. 162.

² Wiggers gives the following as the first article in his summary of the doctrine of Augustine on original sin: "Adam's sin has been propagated among all men, and will always be propagated, and that by sensual lust in procreation (concupiscentia), by which man in his natural state is subjected to the devil." (*Augustinism and Pelagianism*, page 88), and which he fully and abundantly establishes by quotations from Augustine on the subsequent pages.

Adam and his seed from their sin, and was not (as Pelagius asserted), natural to man; but also that original sin or corruption was a punishment for the first transgression, and was truly sin; for, being contracted by us in the fall, it descends through natural generation, as both our sin and punishment.¹ We could fill pages with extracts illustrative of this representation, but shall offer a few only which are current in our theological literature, and which, from their frequent citation, may be supposed familiar. In his work on original sin, and referring to God's connection with the events of the fall, he says: "God did nothing except that He, by a just judgment, condemned with the root, man, who had wilfully sinned; and therefore that which was not as yet born was deservedly condemned in the traitorous original, in which condemned root carnal generation holds the race."²

It may be so, as Dr. Hodge ungraciously alleges, that Augustine was not altogether consistent in some of his avowals; and it would be indeed marvellous if, emerging in early life from the polluting sink of Manichæism, his first-formed conceptions of divine truth should not, in his long and laborious and prayerful study of the Scriptures, have advanced to greater maturity; but as regards the subject before us, the statement contained in this citation embodies his matured and abiding convictions. And so, again, he affirms the imputation of the original or first sin with a strictness and emphasis beyond all who had preceded him, as, for example, referring to our first parents, he says: "By whom so grievous a transgression was perpetrated *that human nature became thereby changed for the worse* (ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana); *the bondage of sin and the necessity of death*

¹ The Pelagians, when they speak of Augustine's views on the subject, instead of the term *Original Sin* used by him, employ rather the expression *natural sin* (*peccatum naturale*), or the expression *natural evil* (*malum naturale*; probably for the purpose of rendering more striking the contradiction involved in the phrase *natural sin*, and on which account Augustine protested against this expression, and when it was employed by the Pelagians usually substituted his own expression, *peccatum originale*. There may indeed be, says he, a *SIN OF NATURE* (*peccatum naturæ*), but not a *natural sin* (*peccatum naturale*.) In a certain sense, however, he was not unwilling that the term should be employed. (Op. Imp. V., 9, 40.) Only he regarded the expression *original sin* as more definite, because by it the idea of God being the author of sin is removed. See Wiggers, *ubi supra*, page 83.

² *De Peccato Originis*, cap. 38.

being transmitted even to posterity."¹ The thought, moreover, is never lost sight of, *that demeritoriously the sin was as fully ours as it was theirs*; e. g., "Through the perverse will of that one, all have sinned in him (*in eo*), seeing that all were that one; from whom, therefore, every one derives original sin."² Again (from the *De Civitate Dei*): "Not as yet was the form created and assigned to us each in which we each should live; for as yet the nature from which we should be propagated was seminal, which, however, became vitiated on account of sin (*propter peccata*), and bound by the chain of death and justly condemned; nor of any other condition can man be born from man."³

"Wounds inflicted on bodies make the limbs falter or move feebly, but not that power by which man is just; but the wound which is called sin wounds that life by which there was holy living. Therefore, by that great sin of the first man, *our nature*, then changed for the worse, *not only has become a sinner* (*peccatrix*), *but produces sinners*. And yet that weakness (*languor*) by which the power of holy living perished is not nature at all, but a corruption, just as bodily infirmity is certainly not any substance or nature, but a vitiation."⁴

Such, then, are his views; nor is it easy to understand how they could be so egregiously misapprehended as to lead any one to imagine that he taught the gratuitous imputation of sin. Hagenbach, whose impartiality will not be questioned, affirms that Augustine laid down this proposition: that "as all men have sinned in Adam, they are justly subject to the condemnation of God *on account of the hereditary sin and the guilt thereof.*"⁵ And Dr. Julius Müller avers that "Augustine everywhere remains true to the denial of the divine origination of sin. Though the opposite opinion has often been imposed upon him in the past and present times, on account of divine predestination, yet this belongs to those groundless inferences which have been so freely drawn, especially from this great teacher of the Church."⁶

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 16, cap. 1. ² *De Nupt. et Concept.*, II., cap. 5.

³ Lib. 13, cap. 14.

⁴ *De Nupt. et Concept.*, II., 34. Confer item *De Nat. et Grat.*, 54. Op. Imp. vi. 7.

⁵ Hagenbach, *ubi supra*, p. 299.

⁶ On the *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Vol. I., p. 308.

But we must proceed with our citations, and shall first present a few of the more general references to the subject by the Church theologians, and lay before the reader what may properly be called their unstudied or spontaneous allusions to the doctrine (which is certainly a consideration of some weight), after which we shall present more elaborately some of the more formal or expository statements of both Calvinists and Lutherans; for both alike are claimed in support of his theory by Dr. Hodge, and both alike repudiate it utterly.

§ 12. GENERAL REFERENCES TO THE SUBJECT BY THE DIVINES OF THE REFORMATION.—CITATIONS.¹

1. We begin with VIRET, the companion of Calvin in the Reformation. He says, "God permitted the fall and corruption of the whole nature of man in the man first formed." (Dial. I.) Our readers will observe the force of the word "permitted" as here employed—God *permitted* Adam to corrupt himself, and the whole race to corrupt itself; that is, the whole nature to become corrupt in the man first formed. Now, Dr. Hodge's theory makes this corruption of the race a positive, divine, and penal infliction, not on account of our own guilt or demerit, but of Adam's *peccatum alienum*. He says: "Spiritual death was the penal, and therefore certain, consequence of our condemnation for the sin of Adam."² Viret makes it a *permission* on the part of God; and thus, while he does not deny that evil came upon us penally, he recognizes our own ethical appropriation of the guilt which brought it upon us.

2. In like manner speaks BULLINGER of Zurich, who, instead of deriving the corruption of the race from the personal sin alone of Adam through a forensic imputation, derives it from our first parents through propagation. He says: "Sin is called original, or the sin of our birth, because it comes from our first origin, or is derived from our first parents upon all *by propagation or traduction*. . . . After man became obnoxious to punishment, so far were we from having any power by which we could deliver ourselves, that by reason of our nature and inherent depravity we rather increase the shame."

¹ Most of the citations in § 12 will be found more fully presented, with notices of their authors, in our former essay, in the *Danville Review* for 1862.

² See Theology, Vol. II., p. 538.

3. URSINUS. In the earliest issue of his *Expositio Catechismi Heidelberg*,¹ he says: "That sin is called original which comes from our first origin, even from the first parent, *derived to all by propagation or traduction*." (Page 102.) In the last edition (by Pareus, 1622), he says: *Original sin* "passes neither by the body nor by the soul, *but by the unclean generation of the whole man*, on account of the fault (culpa) of our first parents."² And then, still further on: "But we all suffer justly the fault of Adam: 1, Because it is so the fault of Adam, that it is also ours (culpa sic est Adami, ut etiam sit nostra); for we all sinned in sinning Adam, because we were all in his loins." And again: "*Peccatum originale est vitium non voluntatis, sed naturæ*." (Pages 40–43.)

4. CHEMNITZ (a Lutheran, though greatly esteemed in the Reformed church) says: "As we know not how the soul contracts that evil (the corruption of nature), we may safely be ignorant; because the Holy Spirit has not attempted to make this known by sure and certain testimonies." (Cited in Baier's Theol. Positiv., p. 523.)

¹ This edition (by the learned and excellent *Simon Goulart Seulisin*, who had succeeded Calvin in Geneva as pastor, and died in 1628, aged 86 years), was issued in 1584, about a year after the demise of Ursinus, and was one of the three editions then published from notes of his lectures taken by his pupils, and was, moreover, prepared from notes taken by Goulart himself and several other students; for Ursinus delivered his lectures *extempore*. These editions were, however, on many accounts imperfect, and greatly inferior to that of Pareus, the favorite pupil of Ursinus, and who had received the whole exposition from his own lips, and whose edition, from the time of its first appearance (in 1591), was universally regarded as the most authentic, and as every way superior to the others, none of which were afterwards reprinted. I refer to these facts simply because everything relating to Ursinus and this admirable work of his cannot but be regarded as of interest to the Church.

² In our former essay we did injustice to De Moor, by stating that he had not quoted this passage from Ursinus correctly. We have since seen a copy of the edition from which he made the quotation (for he has not named it), and find the passage *verbatim* as cited by him. He himself, however, has been unjust therein (unintentionally of course) to Ursinus by not citing from the edition which Pareus pronounces to be the only complete one, and from which he emphatically enjoins that all subsequent reprints (and, of course, citations) be made. It was published in 1622 by his son, Philip, with this injunction, some five years later than the one from which De Moor has quoted, and should certainly have been employed in presenting on all really important questions the views of its illustrious author.

5. DANÆUS. "Adam *when* he sinned *instilled* his poison into us all." "In one Adam they sinned, and are constituted guilty before God."

6. HYPERIUS. "The evil and contagion is to all the posterity of Adam by propagation alone (*ipsa sola propagatione*). "By the offence of one evil was propagated to all men for condemnation." Our readers must not suppose, from these and similar statements of this eminent reformer and critic, that he in any way discarded the doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin. He held that doctrine in its integrity, as entertained and taught by the Reformed church, two-wit: that the criminality of Adam's sin was imputed to us because of our participation therein; and that this, together with inherent sin, descends by propagation to all who are naturally begotten; or, in the words of Ursinus, it descends "by the unclean generation of the whole man." In other words: original sin, including both inherent corruption and imputed guilt, descends to all the race through propagation. And yet Dr. Hodge inculcates as the doctrine of the Reformed Calvinistic church that original sin is propagated neither through the body nor through the soul, but through guilt!¹

7. POLANUS. "The first fall of Adam was not only the sin of Adam, but ours;" that is, the original fall was our sin not less than the sin of Adam, and the guilt of it no more becomes ours through a merely forensic imputation than it did his.

8. PAREUS. "Original sin, properly defined, is the corruption of the whole human race, from the fall of our first parents, *naturally propagated to all*; making us guilty of temporal and eternal punishment, unless there should be forgiveness on account of Christ."

9. FILENUS. "Original sin is that hereditary corruption of human nature whereby all who are propagated by natural generation from Adam are infected, and so in the loins of this first parent *they both sinned together with him, and incurred the guilt of temporal and eternal punishment*."

10. DU PLESSIS MORNAY. "We know whence proceeded the corruption of the human race, to-wit: *from our grievous sin and the punishment which followed it. We were all in the first man when he sinned*." It is noteworthy that this most accomplished

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 362, 367.

scholar, statesman, and theologian,—the favorite officer, both in cabinet and in the field, of Henry IV. (of Navarre, who used to speak of him as his "walking library,")—should not only utter the foregoing "*unthinkable*" proposition (as Drs. Bauer and Hodge have discovered it to be), but should even utter it, as he does again and again, in the very face of the learned infidels of his time, as a proposition which really had sense in it; and that he should do this, moreover, in the admirable treatise written by him for the purpose of convincing them of the truth and reasonableness of Christianity!¹

11. DRELLINGCOURT. "The sin of Adam *is imputed to us because we all sinned in Adam*." Think of any serious mind soberly endeavoring to reconcile such a statement with the gratuitous imputation scheme of Dr. Hodge!

12. HOORNBECK. "You ask, whence is the sin that is within us? The answer is ready: *from the common sin of Adam, imputed to all men from Adam*."

13. USHER. "Secondly, that we all who are descended from Adam by natural generation were in his loins and a part of him when he fell, *and so by the law of propagation and generation sinned in him*, and in him deserved eternal condemnation therefrom."

14. SYNOPSIS PURIORIS THEOLOGIE.

"Homini in creatione duplex vita à Deo data ex fuit, animalis et spiritualis: illa, in animæ et corporis unione sita fuit; hæc, in conjunctione animæ cum Deo opifice suo. Ut prima amittitur per separationem illius naturalis; sic per alienationem hominis à Deo, sequutus est spiritualis interitus. Qua defectione si reliquas etiam creaturas ita possum dedit Adam, ut propterea maledictioni factæ fuerunt obnoxie, nihil à ratione alienum est, si ad totam ejus sobolem sit propagata, quæ peccati hujus per quod mors intravit in mundum, particeps facta, sub illius deformitate et reatu oppressa manet, donec ab alio liberetur." (Disput. XV., § 1.)

15. MESTREZATIUS, in his work against Millitaire (who was condemned by the Synod of Charenton), says: "But you will say, the corruption of Adam has descended to us really, and inheres in us. So it does; but I affirm *that the imputation of his disobedience*

¹ See his *De Veritate Relig. Christ.*, cap. XVI., p. 270, and cap. XVII., pp. 281, 284, 285. Herbornæ, Nassauviorum, anno 1609.

precedes, and that therefore corruption is derived to us by generation, because we sinned in Adam as in our head, God abandoning the posterity of Adam to the corruption of their father on account of his sin" (p. 43). This is one of the passages which an unobservant reader might easily mistake the sense of; but the intelligent mind will have no difficulty in observing that Mestrezat does not employ the term *imputation*, as Dr. Hodge does, in the merely forensic sense; nor the phrase *Adam's sin* to signify only Adam's personal sin, or *peccatum alienum*.

16. MARESIUS. "And seeing that in him should be rated newly born infants, who are not guilty of having imitated the Adamic transgression, nor, indeed, are able, it remains that they are made sinners by his offence, not by imitation; but partly by imputation, partly by propagation through generation."¹ As the Socinians denied all participation of Adam's sin, and admitted only its forensic imputation to the race, the later Reformers, as in this instance, affirmed specifically both the *real* or *immediate* imputation of the first sin as our own by participation, and its propagation through generation.

These references may suffice, though we could give multitudes of others equally in point, as exhibiting, so to speak, how the doctrine presents itself, not in elaborate formulated phraseology by the Augustinian divines, but simply as the spontaneous and often incidental utterance of impressions which the truth had inwrought into their very souls. All their allusions to it, whether casual utterances or formal dogmatic announcements, (as the reader will see from our next section,) conveyed the same unvarying impressions. And the reader has but to cast his eye over the preceding references alone in order to perceive how unfortunately and lamentably Dr. Hodge has gone astray by intimating, as above shown, *that the propagation of a sinful nature by the law of generation is not a part of the Augustinian system*, (see his *Theology*, Vol. II., page 162); and that, moreover, the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, which he denominates "*the federal system*," and persists in attributing to them, had not the slightest foothold in their theology, any more than the scheme of Socinianism itself. All of which, however, will be, if possible, still more apparent from the next ensuing sections.

¹ Contra Volkel, Tom. III., page 612. (Groningæ, 1651.)

§ 13. FORMAL AND EXPOSITORY STATEMENTS.

We have already adverted to the fact that Dr. Hodge teaches that the sin of Adam was made common to the race by a forensic or gratuitous imputation, while, on the contrary, the Calvinistic and Lutheran communions have, from the beginning, always taught that the sin was imputed *because it was common*; i. e., the sin alike of Adam and his posterity. This single point presents, in fact, the *nucleus* of the whole question. For if the sin became common only through the forensic or gratuitous imputation of Adam's *peccatum alienum*, or merely personal guilt, then the doctrine of our participation therein is a figment, and Dr. Hodge's theory is the true doctrine, and no alternative can remain to us but to accept it with all its fatal sequences as regards our theology, and to acquiesce, moreover, in the exegesis by which he claims that it may be supported. But if, on the contrary, the first sin was imputed because it was common, and if such be the unvarying doctrine of the Church of God, then of course Dr. Hodge has left to his brethren no alternative but to regard and treat his theory as a fundamental and fatal departure (as he himself has always conceded) from their cherished faith. Let us, then, at this stage of the investigation patiently hear *the formal and expository utterances* of the Church on the subject. And we shall in this section employ the letter "*A*" to designate the catalogue of the Calvinistic testimonies, and the letter "*B*" those of the Lutheran.

A. The Calvinistic Divines.—Citations.

1. ALTINGIUS.

This truly learned and eminent theologian, who is sometimes referred to by Dr. Hodge, though not in connection with the topic before us, stands in the very front rank of our Church divines. He repeats in every form of expression that the first sin was common alike both to Adam and his posterity, not because imputed, but common, and *therefore* imputed. *All*, says he, *sinned in him potentially and originally*. *Omnes in ipso peccarunt δυναμει et originaliter*.

In his celebrated work, *Scriptorum Theolog., Heidelberg*,¹ he, after remarking on the efficient cause, both near and remote, of original sin, says: "The *mode of effecting in general* can be called

¹ Tom. I., p. 124, (Amsterdam, 1646).

the transmission or *derivation of sin* from one to all,—from Adam to his posterity. But *in particular*, in respect to the remote consequence, it is called *imputation*; in respect to the cause at hand,—that is, the first man who perpetrated the first sin, the cause of original sin,—it is called *generation*. From which method of a twofold presentation original sin is occasionally (*nonnumquam*) distinguished into imputed and inherent. *Imputation* is that God imputes the first actual sin of Adam to all his natural heirs. (Rom. v. 19.) Wherefore it is for this reason said to be imputed, because it had passed into act, and does not inhere to us as to Adam. And most deservedly (*meritissime*) is it imputed, because all sinned in him as in the stalk or root. (Rom. v. 12; Heb. vii. 10.) *Generation* is that Adam in generating *propagates to his posterity the corruption of nature contracted from the first sin*. (Gen. v. 3; Job xiv. 4; Ps. li. 7; John iii. 6.) And the antithesis—spiritual regeneration from the incorruptible seed of the word of God—evinces that this is so. (1 Pet. i. 23; James i. 18.) The foundation of it is the law of generation divinely appointed; *for, as in our pristine condition God would have propagated original righteousness as the reward of obedience, so he wills that original sin be propagated in our corrupt nature in punishment of disobedience*. (Rom. v. 19.) Hence, as *physically*, not only does man generate man, but also the diseased will generate the diseased, and the leprous a leper; so, *theologically*, the corrupt will beget the corrupt, and the sinner a sinner.” This passage can leave no doubt as to the views entertained by this great theologian on the subject before us; nor could the latter part of it have been more direct and pointed had it been designed as a formal offset to Dr. Hodge’s “constant answer” of the Calvinistic theologians, that original sin is propagated *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*.

Then, in his great work, *Theologia Eclectica Nova*,¹ when refuting the objection that “the goodness, veracity and wisdom of God would not permit Him to impute a foreign sin to another (*alienum peccatum alteri*), and that therefore he could not impute the sin of Adam to his posterity,” he says: “*Antecedens simpliciter acceptum abunde refellit vel sola communicatio legis*, (Ex. xx. 5; xxxiv. 7), atque etiam exemplum Christi, cui peccata nostra

¹ See page 333, (Amsterdam, 1654).

verè imputata sunt. (Esa. liii. 6, et seq.; 2 Cor. v. 21.) *Restringendum igitur antecedens ad peccata, quæ simpliciter aliena sunt, et uni propria. Sed peccatum Adami esse omnibus verè commune jam supra evincemus.*” That is, “The threatening of the law alone, as likewise the example of Christ (to whom our sins were truly imputed), abundantly refute the antecedent strictly taken. Therefore it should be restricted to sins which properly are another’s, and pertain to one only. *But the sin of Adam was common to all, as we have already shown.*”

The doctrine unambiguously declared in this passage is, 1, That the antecedent member of the objection cited (which affirms that the goodness, veracity and wisdom of God cannot impute the sin of one person to another), if strictly taken, is false, being contrary to the Scriptures. Though, 2, it is nevertheless at the same time to be conceded as affirming the truth, if the sins imputed are strictly foreign (*aliena*), and pertain only to another. And, of course, therefore, neither the instances referred to in the law, nor the case of our blessed Redeemer, can be included under the category; for God, who would not impute sin which is wholly another’s, did impute and punish it in these cases, Christ having voluntarily assumed its guilt. And 3, *The sin of Adam cannot be brought under this category, because it was truly common to all the race, and was, therefore, imputed to all.* Such is the doctrine herein inculcated; and yet Dr. Hodge has taught, and still persists to teach as a vital and undoubted principle of the Augustinian theology, that the sin of Adam was to the race strictly a *peccatum alienum*.

Altingius, referring also to the question, Whether all the race sinned in Adam? and whether his sin should be imputed to all his posterity? had said, on a previous page (p. 329), that as Adam is to be regarded both as an individual distinct from other individuals, and also as the beginning of the whole human race (because they were in him as the root, and from him were propagated), so is his sin to be regarded in a twofold aspect. After which he adds: “*Etenim quatenus ad ipsum refertur est delictum particulare ipsius, tanquam individui. Ut vero etiam ad posteros extenditur, est culpa universalis totius generis humani, in ipso contracta, et toti generi humano, justo Dei judicio imputata; i. e., the ground of its righteous imputation is the fact that it was the*

culpa participatione of the entire race; on which ground, however, Dr. Hodge constantly affirms that there could be no imputation.¹

Alting continues as follows: "Thus in regard to this sin the orthodox churches with great unanimity believe and teach agreeably to the word of God. The Socinians and the Innovators [Remonstrants], however, turn aside from this consent to the Pelagian dogmas, forasmuch as they expressly deny that the whole human race has sinned, and that it is fallen in Adam, (Socinus *de statu primo hominis*, cap. 10,) 'or that God has determined that, on account of that one fall of Adam, the whole human race should be accused of sin.' . . . They plainly assert, as did the old Pelagians, 'That the sin of Adam injured himself only, not other men, his posterity also.' The Innovators for a time expressed themselves ambiguously, as persons might do who are in doubt; but in their Apology [for their Confession], the mask being laid aside, they declare themselves for the Socinians, for they plainly write (in cap. 7), '*Peccatum Adami à Deo imputari posteris ipsius, non quasi revera censeat ipsos reos ejusdem cum Adamo peccati et culpa, sed quatenus eos eidem malo, cui Adamus per peccatum obnoxium se reddidit obnoxios nasci voluit.*' But of what kind it may be, and that it can furnish neither ground of sin nor of proper punishment, will appear in the sequel. Therefore they also deny that we, properly speaking, sinned in Adam, or are accused of his sin."

Such is his statement. And now let our readers carefully note its points. They are, 1, That while the Socinians and Arminians denied the Church doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, they admitted and maintained its putative or gratuitous imputation. Note, 2, With what clearness Alting affirms the Church doctrine that we participated in the *culpa* of Adam's sin, and how fully he distinguishes this doctrine from the forensic or gratuitous theory of the Socinians and Arminians, which Dr. Hodge now maintains to be the doctrine of the Calvinistic church. Also, 3, Observe his statement, that Socinus and his followers, in

¹ See, for example, Princeton Essays, first series, p. 147. The error thus brought to view, evincing Dr. Hodge's total misapprehension of the nature of imputation as taught by the Augustinian church, is the ground upon which he has been so strangely led to assume that the divines of the Reformation actually entertained and taught his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin.

opposing this doctrine of the orthodox churches (ecclesiæ orthodoxæ) expressly denied that the race sinned and fell in Adam, and assumed the ground (subsequently taken also by the Innovators or Arminians in chapter 7, of the *Apology for their Confession*), to-wit: "That the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity by God, not as though He accounts them guilty of the same fault and sin with Adam, but so far as He willed that they should be born obnoxious to the same evil to which Adam had exposed himself through sin." And, 4, Let it be further observed, that Dr. Hodge likewise affirms the same; not, however, as the doctrine of Socinus and his school, as Alting here does, but as the recognized theology of the Calvinistic church, and as such has been inculcating it upon the students of our theological seminary. And, 5, and finally, that Alting affirms in the most direct and emphatic manner that this theory is a denial of the doctrine of original sin; that is, that we, properly speaking, sinned in Adam, and are charged with the guilt of that participation.

One other point demands our attention in connection with this eminent theologian. Dr. Hodge, in expounding his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, asserts that the depravity, or native inherent corruption of Adam's posterity, is the penal consequence of the imputation of his merely personal sin—"the one sin of the one man," to use a favorite expression of his; and, moreover, that imputed sin is never by the Calvinistic divines named "*verè peccatum.*" On page 337 of this same work Alting discourses on that subject in the following form: "Whether original sin is truly and properly sin (*verè et propriè peccatum*), or only the effect and punishment of Adam's first sin?" On which, after a remark or two, he proceeds to say, "The orthodox doctrine is as follows: I. That original sin is sin in the true and proper sense of the term. II. That in the wider sense it consists in the transgression of Adam imputed to us, in whom we all have sinned (Rom. v. 12), and in the corruption of nature inhering in every one (Rom. vii. 14, seq.), EACH OF WHICH IS SIN, (*quarum utraque est peccatum*). III. But that, strictly taken, it includes only the internal corruption of nature, of which the privation of righteousness, or the natural inclination and proclivity to evil, are as parts."

It is quite unnecessary for us to dwell upon these citations; they speak for themselves. But in view especially of the last, we re-

quest that our readers will consider the subjoined allegation of Dr. Hodge: "Old Calvinists *did* make two sins, first, the sin of Adam, and secondly, *inherent depravity resulting from it*. The former is ours forensically in the eye of the law, the latter morally. *The former is never said to be in us verè peccatum*; the latter by Calvinists always."¹ Such is the unfortunate result of confounding, as Dr. Hodge does, the terms "first sin," or "Adam's sin," as employed in their theology, with a *peccatum alienum*, or Adam's merely personal sin—"the one sin of the one man." It is inconceivable that a properly trained or well informed theologian should so read their theology as to do this. And certainly it never had been done during all the past centuries by any one in the long array of the illustrious theologians of the Augustinian church until the Princeton Professor led the way. But to do it must inevitably lead to that concatenation of fatal mistakes and most mortifying blunders into which Dr. Hodge has fallen. But we proceed to our next witness.

2. MARESIUS (Des Marets).

This eminent divine, the cotemporary of Altingius, is justly regarded as one of the ablest defenders of the doctrines of grace against the assaults of the Socinians and Remonstrants, which in his day were of the most violent character. In his *Exposition of the Belgic Confession* (Article XV.), and in replying to an objection, he remarks that "Original sin may be accounted voluntary in a three-fold manner—*subjectively, consequently*, and (after explaining these terms he adds) *antecedently* in Adam as the root, head and stalk of our origin, in whom and through whom, *whilst we willed the transgression of the divine law, we willed also the extinction of original righteousness*, and that corruption of nature which followed the sin itself. . . . Sin is *avopia* (the transgression of the law). But even this also is such, since it conflicts with that perfect sanctity and perfection which the law demands," etc.²

Thus strongly and directly, and in the very face of the Socinian and Remonstrant oppugners of the Church doctrine, he lays down her explanatory principle—the *participation of the race in the sin and fall of our first parents*—as furnishing the real ground of explanation, not only of our pollution and condemnation, but like-

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, page 177.

² Confess. Eccles. Belgicorum Exegesis, page 222; (Gronigæ, 1652).

wise of the exhibition of God's punitive justice in regard to us. The sarcasm and denunciation with which his antagonists treated the principle itself were esteemed by him unworthy of notice, further than to remark in passing that "it was not without reason the words *corruption of nature and hereditary blemish* (vitium) are employed in this article, *first*, that it should not be thought, as Flacius Illyricus insanely imagined, etc. . . . *Fourth*, That original sin should not be placed only in the guilt of Adam's transgression *deservedly imputed to his posterity*, because all have sinned in him, (Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22,) as Levi was tithed in the loins of Abraham."¹

The following extract is somewhat extensive, but invested with much interest in the connection, from its reference to Placcus and Rivetus on the one hand, and to the supralapsarianism of Szydlovius and certain Jesuits on the other, as maintaining that original corruption is derived "*ex nudo Dei cum homine pacto*"—from our mere covenant relation to Adam.

After explaining the more general sense of the phrase "original sin," he says, "Wherefore it was not wholly without ground that the National Synod of the French churches, being convened in the years 1644 and 1645, at Matrona of Charenton, decreed that those should not be admitted into the sacred ministry who would not acknowledge this imputation of the first sin. And although Curcellæus may deride the synodical decree, and the reverend and learned Josua Placcus, Professor at Saumur, (who had given occasion for the assembling of the Synod,) assailed with great effort that imputation itself; yet the blessed Rivetus, in the year 1646, in a work prepared expressly for this purpose, established the equity of that decree by a great number of testimonies of theologians. There is no doubt that the effect of this imputation may be from God (*ex parte Dei*) in some respect, because men are born destitute of original righteousness; and the consequence is *that native corruption should be propagated through generation*, in which sense Augustine (Ret. lib. I., cap. 13,) says, *that it is sin in such a way as to be also the punishment of sin*."

"7. For by taking original sin as it is here taken, in the stricter signification, the imputation of the first sin will indeed pertain to it antecedently, yet not formally; *nor can it subjectively enter to*

¹ Confess. Eccles. Belgicorum Exegesis, page 222; (Gronigæ, 1652).

any one otherwise than as a hereditary vice through generation. For what Szydlovius (*Vindic.*, Cap. 7), affirms, that it is so propagated by imputation, is too shallow to deserve a minute refutation.¹ For divine imputation, seeing that it is an act of justice, NEITHER PRINCIPALLY NOR INSTRUMENTALLY PRODUCES NATIVE CORRUPTION, inhering to each from his mother's womb, NOR PROPAGATES IT IN EVERY ONE OF THE POSTERITY OF ADAM. But it only subjects them to guilt and obligation to punishment on account of the sin of the first man, WHICH ALL COMMITTED IN HIM. (*Imputatio enim divina cum sit actus, justitiæ, nec principaliter nec instrumentaliter producit ipsam nativam corruptionem cuique ab utero matris inherentem, nec propagat eam in singulis posteris Adami; sed tantum illos subicit reatui et obligationi ad pœnam propter peccatum primi hominis quod omnes in ipso commiserunt.*) The actual guilt of that sin pertains to every one from imputation. But as, besides the imputation of the righteousness of Christ for the remission of sins, we obtain, by the benefit of regeneration, that righteousness inherent to each which is named sanctification, but which as yet is imperfect, and, therefore, not that through which we stand before God; so, besides the imputation of that sin of which all from their origin are guilty before God, that inherent vice, DERIVED TO ALL THROUGH GENERATION, NOT FROM THE NAKED COVENANT OF GOD WITH MAN, as the Jesuits affirm, against whom Jansenius disputed (*lib. I. de statu naturæ lapsæ, cap. 5, et seq.*),² but from the nature of the thing and from the law of natural and ordinary generation itself (*quam univocam meritò dixeris, quòd fiat semine virili et ex concubitu maris et feminae*), by which man should reproduce his own likeness; and now, therefore, the sinner begets one that is corrupted and a sinner, according to the remark of Augustine (*lib. II. operis imperf. contra Julian*), 'From the begetting the child is born drawing original sin; by vice propa-

¹ The argument of Szydlovius in the chapter referred to by Maresius, and which he here refutes, is thus stated by himself: "*Peccatum originale ab Adamo non propagatur in eos per corpus, quia illud contradistincte ad animam non est capax peccati; non per animam, quia illa pura à Deo creatur, nulloque modo à corpore utpote spiritus, infici potest. Ergo per imputationem.*" Let the reader here note how Maresius handles it. Concerning Szydlovius, see *Danville Review* for 1861, pp. 567-569.

² Compare Princeton Essays, First Series, page 187.

gating vice, God creating the nature.' And therefore generation holds its position here, not only that it may be as a condition *sine qua non* for the imputation of the first sin; but as the medium by which, or the cause through which this blot may be transmitted and propagated with human nature itself, whose necessary adjunct it has become." (Pp. 224, 225.)

We state only an obvious truth when we say that, had this whole passage been prepared expressly in refutation of Dr. Hodge's theory throughout, it could not have been more directly in antagonism thereto. And these antagonisms meet and remorselessly assail him in every point of his development and elucidation of that theory, as can be evidenced by scores of citations from his writings, if it were at all necessary for this purpose to adduce others besides what are given in the different parts of this work. Let a single instance in illustration suffice. Dr. Hodge (as we have shown) affirms that "The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin made by the Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians is, that original sin is propagated, NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM," (the capitals are his), a principle upon which his whole theory is based, and one which has been by him inculcated until it has become, in a manner, canonical with his followers. And it is moreover true that, without such a representation of the matter, the claim that his theory is identical with the approved doctrine of the Church must be hopelessly surrendered. And yet the statement itself is without even the shadow of a foundation in fact; nor can Dr. Hodge verify it by any reference even approximating fact. The manner in which the Reformed divines always regarded and treated it is apparent from the passage before us, in which Maresius, on behalf of the Church, and in expounding its then great symbol of doctrine, takes up this very idea as then advanced by Szydlovius, and refutes and rejects it as altogether alien from Augustinian doctrine. The same is true in regard to Dr. Hodge's exposition of the analogy in Rom. v. 12-19. Maresius here presents the exposition recognized by the Church, and it is directly subversive of that offered by Dr. Hodge for the purpose of sustaining his theory. And so on throughout the passage.

3. CALVIN.

In our previous work we cited largely the testimony of Calvin;

but here a few brief extracts will suffice. He says: "We have already proved that original sin is the pravity and corruption of our nature, *which first makes us guilty of the wrath of God*, and then also brings forth in us those works which the Scriptures call the works of the flesh."¹

"Thus it is certain that Adam was not only the progenitor, but, as it were, the root of mankind, and therefore that all the race were vitiated in his corruption. . . . He who pronounces that we were dead in Adam, now, at the same time openly testifies also that we were implicated in the taint of sin (*peccati labe esse implicitis*); *for neither could condemnation reach to those who were touched with no blame of iniquity*. No other explanation, THEREFORE, can be given of our being said to be dead in Adam than that his transgression procured not only misery and ruin to himself, but precipitated our nature also to a like destruction; AND THAT NOT BY HIS INDIVIDUAL GUILT, WHICH PERTAINS NOT TO US (*neque id suo unius vitio, quod nihil ad nos pertineat*), but because he infected all his descendants with the corruption into which he had fallen. Otherwise there would be no truth in the statement of Paul, that all are by nature children of wrath, if they had not been already under the curse before they were born."²

If this be Calvinistic theology, then, as the gratuitous imputation of sin is fundamentally its opposite, there can be no question that this theory has in no sense a claim to be regarded as such. Calvin, as Schaff has well remarked, always guards against the supposition that we are condemned by an arbitrary imputation of a foreign act personal to Adam.³ And it may be added, that with equal care he guards against the supposition that the depravity, and consequent inability to obtain justification by law, which the Scriptures ascribe to the unregenerate, exempts them from blame, as it must do had it come upon them solely from without; and on the contrary affirms that it is truly an enhancement of their guilt.

4. M. F. WENDELIN.

In his theology, which, ever since its first appearance (an. 1633), has been a highly valued text-book in the Calvinistic schools, he says: "Sin is *original* or *actual*. Original sin is a *blot* (*labes*) which man draws with him from his mother's womb from his first

¹ Instit., lib. IV., cap. 15, § 10. ² Ibid., lib. II., cap. I., p. 193.

³ In Lange on Romans (Scribner's edition), p. 193.

origin or nativity. It is *imputed* or *inherent*. *Original sin imputed* is the disobedience of Adam and Eve, which is imputed to all their posterity, no otherwise than as if they themselves had also violated in act the law of God concerning the not eating of the fruit of the interdicted tree." (Theses 2-5.)¹

Thus both imputed and inherent sin are inherited, and descend to us by propagation. In his note on the last of these theses Wendeline cites Rom. v. 12, and remarks that this passage must refer to the aforesaid imputation, inasmuch as we could not then sin in act; and that hence the theologians state that Adam did not sin as a single person. And then, in answering the objection that the actual sin of Adam was not original sin to his posterity (*peccatum illud actuale Adami non esse in posteros peccatum originale*), he employs the *reductio ad absurdum*, and shows that it is imputed justly (*justè imputatur*), 1, Because Adam represented his posterity; and 2, Because *by nature* we all approve of the disobedience of Adam, and incline to the same. He then, in thesis 6, defines *inherent sin* as a "hereditary corruption naturally propagated to us (*naturaliter in nos propagata*) from the fall of our first parents, rendering us exposed (*reos*) to temporal and eternal punishments." And under thesis 11 he says, "That this hereditary evil, or blot, inhering in all men, even from their very birth, is properly called sin, is proved, 1, Because it conflicts with the law of God, which requires the perfect image of God in man. . . . 2, Because it renders us obnoxious to the divine anger (Eph. ii. 3), in which we are called children of wrath by nature. 3, Because it is condemned in Scripture. . . . 4, Because many infants die before birth; *but no one dies except the sinner* (*at nemo moritur nisi peccator*), for death is the wages of sin, *i. e.*, the punishment due to sin. 5, Because baptism is to be applied to infants also; but there could be no need of this unless they were sinners, (*nisi peccatores*)."

Then, in reply to the objection that, as sin is the vice of the parents, it cannot therefore be transferred to their offspring, since the virtues of parents,—their piety, learning, temperance, etc.,—are never thus propagated, he says: "The consequence is denied. The reason offered does not sustain it; for the sin which we call *original* is *natural to man after the fall*, and pertains to the entire species, as is apparent from Scripture. Virtues, however, are not

¹ Christiana Theologia, lib. I., cap. X. (Leyden, 1658.)

natural, but are acquired by practice or infused through grace; so that they are personal, and pertain to the individual, and therefore are not propagated. Hence, amongst men, numerous diseases are propagated from parents to children, as is apparent from the leprosy, etc. Neither are the actual sins of parents propagated, but only the original.

The following passage is from page 244, where, in reply to the objection that if the nature of man be corrupt from its origin, it must be a corruption of either body or soul, he makes this impressive remark, affirming the basis of the great explanatory principle aforesaid. We present it to our readers in his own language: "Resp. Corruptum ab utero hominem esse, evidentibus Scripturæ testimoniis probavimus. *Quibus acquiescere possemus, si vel maxime modum propagatæ hujus corruptionis ignoraremus: Nam in Theologis earum rerum, quas Deus in verbo non revelavit, ignorantia nulli nocet, neque quicquam fidei præjudicat.*"

5. MOLINÆUS, (Du Moulin).

In his celebrated *Anatomy of Arminianism*,¹ this most learned and accomplished theologian presents the following exposition of the Calvinistic doctrine on the subject before us: "Original sin is the depravation of man's nature, contracted and drawn from the very generation itself, and derived from Adam to all mankind, consisting of the privation or want of original righteousness and the proneness to evil." (See chapter 8, § 1.) "*This guilt, obliging to punishment, cannot be any part of the definition of original sin, SEEING IT IS THE EFFECT OF IT.*" (§ 6.)

"Seeing, therefore, the death of infants is a punishment of original sin, if original sin were not truly sin, *but only the punishment of sin, then the death of infants would be the punishment of a punishment, and not the punishment of sin.* But to say that God doth punish punishments, and not sins, is uncomely for any who profess themselves to be maintainers of God's justice." (§ 14.) "Original sin also may be said to be voluntary; because by it we sin voluntarily, *and also because we sinned in Adam, and, therefore, in him were desirous of this corruption.*" (§ 15.) "*We so sinned in Adam in power (potentially) that also the sin was in us in act; neither do we only bear the punishment of another's sin, but also our own.*" (Chapter 9, § 7.)

¹ I cite this work as translated by Newberry, (London, 1620.)

' Our readers will observe that this is urged by the author against the Socinian notion, recently then adopted by the Arminians, of a merely forensic imputation of Adam's personal sin, or *peccatum alienum*, to his posterity, and in reply to their objections against the doctrine of our participation in the first sin. *At that period* his statements were truly Calvinistic.

The Reformed church has no name amongst the best and greatest of her sons more venerated, and none whose influence as a man of God, as a scholar, and as a theologian stands higher than that of *Peter du Moulin*.¹ The forecited work was not only approved and endorsed by the Faculty of Leyden University, but highly esteemed by the Dordrecht divines, and who, in speaking of the author and his works, employ (in sessions 143, 144,) the following terms: "Pro accuratissimo judicio suo et consensu in doctrina gratias egeret." Rivetus, his kinsman and intimate friend, has cited his testimony,² and placed it amongst his most honored and conspicuous witnesses against the errors of Placæus. And Dr. Hodge himself (in 1839), when making extracts from that work, in order, as he said, to exhibit its character, could not venture to omit this testimony, though he expresses dissent from its doctrine,³ and has appended thereto the following remark: "It is evident that he acknowledges imputation with inherent depravity conjoined; but in his *Anatomy of Arminianism* he asserts the doctrine of imputation professedly, and spends one whole chapter in its defence."⁴

I would do no injustice to Dr. Hodge; but if this language has a meaning, as of course it claims to have, it certainly (as it seems to me) conveys the impression that Molinæus, in the *Anatomy*, asserts the doctrine of imputation in a form *in which it is not, as here, conjoined with depravity; i. e.,* that he therein asserts it in the sense claimed by Dr. Hodge as the true one,—that is *gratuitous* imputation. But in that whole work of Molinæus there is not a single utterance to sustain any such intimation. In the passage

¹ See the *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 531-534.

² From his *Euodatio Quæst. de peccato originali*. The extract is given above in our § 10, No 6.

³ It was first published by Dr. Hodge in the *Biblical Repository*, with a mistranslation, obscuring the sense, and which is still perpetuated in the *Princeton Essays*.

⁴ See the *Princeton Essays*, First Series, page 206.

from his *Euodatio*, as cited by Rivetus, and translated (as above stated) by Dr. Hodge, he says: "We sinned in Adam, and in him willed this depravation." And in the *Anatomy* he says: "We sinned in Adam, and therefore in him willed this depravation."

Dr. Hodge, moreover, made the foregoing representation, as his words evince, with the following declaration of Rivetus directly under his eye: "*Negat quidam Molinæus SOLAM imputationem: sed eam agnoscit ac probat cum corruptione conjunctam, QUOD FECIT SYNODUS: agnoscit enim nos in Adamo peccasse, ac proinde in eo voluisse hanc depravationem. Paulò ante dixerat, nec sanè Deus Adami posteris imputant peccatum Adami, nisi haberent in se aliquid quod esset verè peccatum: et nisi naturà essent mali.*"

"*Agnoscit ergo imputationem cum inhærente malitia conjunctam, sed ex professo, HANC IMPUTATIONEM ASSERTIT IN ANATOMIA ARMINIANISMI toto capite nono, ubi eam asserit argumentis ex Scriptura et ratione petitis, et adversariorum Remonstrantium objectionibus respondit, quæ non opus et describere cum de eo omnibus constat.*"¹ Such are the facts.

The forecited remark of Dr. Hodge likewise represents the view as presented by Molinæus as exceptional to that of the Church in general, as presented by Rivetus in this very work of his on the *Testimonies on Imputation*; and as exceptional to theirs on the ground that "he acknowledges imputation with inherent depravity conjoined;² and he cites in support of this statement these words of Rivetus, though in this very passage Rivetus (obviously alluding to the unfounded assertion of Placæus that the Church herself was at that time recognizing such a doctrine) affirms that Molinæus truly denies *imputation alone*,³ but approves it as conjoined with corruption, which, says he, the Synod [*i. e.*, of Charenton, which condemned the error of Placæus] *has done*," etc. And that in the *Anatomy* he asserts the same imputation

¹ See Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 206. Also the tractate of Rivetus in *Opp.*, Tom. III., 799, seq., which, since the issue of my former work, I have had the opportunity to consult, having been apprized by the late excellent Dr. Allen, Professor of Theology in Lane Seminary, that it was in the library of that institution.

² Even Principal Cunningham (with others in Scotland) was utterly misled by this representation of Dr. Hodge, as we shall have occasion to show in the sequel.

³ See the citation from Calvin in § 9, No. 5, above.

through a whole chapter, by arguments derived from both Scripture and reason, and replies to the objections of the Remonstrant adversaries,—*thus clearly affirming that the doctrine thus presented by Molinæus in his Euodatio and in his Anatomy of Arminianism* (and which are cited by us above) *is the very doctrine recognized by the Synod (and by the whole Calvinistic church) in its condemnation of the doctrine of Placæus.*

Further remark on this truly painful subject is certainly unnecessary; yet it may be added in illustration, that Wallæus, a colleague of Rivetus, in replying to the assault of the Arminian, Corvinus, upon this work of Molinæus, reiterates and defends specifically every position in its argument, and most emphatically the point here before us (as the Arminians with great vehemence assailed the doctrine of our participation in the first sin), respecting which he says: "The guilt of the first sin to condemnation, and, as the apostle speaks, 'the judgment unto condemnation' (Rom. v. 16), *cannot be imputed to posterity unless that vitiosity of inherent sin intervene: seeing that the justice of God will not permit that the first sin should be imputed for condemnation to a posterity having no sin in themselves.*"¹ Wallæus, moreover, before he published this Reply, submitted it to the examination of his colleagues—Polyander, Rivetus, and Thysius—in the university, and it came forth with their high endorsement and recommendation, in which they say, "*Quam non dubitamus orthodoxis omnibus prout meretur gratissimam et acceptissimam fore.*"²

In view of facts like these, which meet us at every step, our readers must make up their own minds as to the theological position assumed by Dr. Hodge, and to the propriety and decency, moreover, of his denouncing as in fatal and fundamental error those who refuse to recognize as the doctrine of the Augustinian church his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin. But as we begin to find that it is requisite either to abridge the number of authors whom we had marked for citation, or to cut down the citations themselves (as our limits absolutely forbid a continuation of such extended extracts and remarks), we shall pursue the latter, and curtail our quotations.

¹ See Opera Wallæi, Tom. II., p. 151, folio. (Leyden, 1643.)

² See *ibid.*, p. 76, and likewise Polyander's funeral oration on the death of Wallæus (prefixed to Vol. I.), page 4.

6. HEIDEGGER (John Henry) is our next witness, and who, after adverting to the then recently made distinction of mediate and immediate imputation, says: "But the imputation of the *Adamic sin* does not follow, but precede inherent corruption as the meritorious cause of it. For the first sin is not imputed to us because we are born corrupt, but we are born corrupt because the first sin is imputed to us for corruption and condemnation. *For imputation consists in this: that God has, with sinning Adam, adjudged his posterity* (BECAUSE IMPLICATED IN THE SAME SIN) *not to be worthy of the divine image*, but rather of the whole punishment by which he punished sinning Adam, and therefore to be punished with spiritual death."¹ This is precisely the *immediate imputation* taught in the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*; and our readers can perceive how utterly it differs from the gratuitous imputation scheme of Dr. Hodge, but with which he has so unfortunately endeavored to identify it. God, says Heidegger, finds both Adam and his posterity alike implicated in the first sin, and therefore adjudges them alike to punishment. Dr. Hodge says: "His (Adam's) sin was not our sin. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a *peccatum alienum*, and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the Divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences." "The sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible: it was the ground of their actual condemnation."²

7. PETER VAN MASTRICHT, in the estimation of the Church, stands in the same high rank with the theologians already cited. In his great work—*Theoretico-Practico Theologia*³—he likewise affirms that Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity because it was a *common sin*. In the exposition of Rom. v. 12, with which the chapter begins, he remarks that the cause on account of which all die is because all sinned. Then, in § 10 (cap. 2,) he thus proceeds: After remarking that two things are comprehended in the first sin, the guilt (reatum) or desert of condemnation which we have from Adam, and the stain and corruption (labem ac tabem) inherent in us, he adds, "The former is commonly called original

¹ *Corpus Theologicæ*, loco X., cited in De Moor, III., 277, 278.

² See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 225, 551, 552.

³ See lib. IV., cap. 2, (Amsterdam, 1715.)

sin *imputed*, the latter original sin *inherent*. But imputation consists *not in a mere putation*, by which God may attribute the breach of the covenant, not to our first parents, but actually and *personally to all their offspring likewise, for this would plainly be an error*; but that that breach of the covenant perpetrated *in act* by our first parents had been committed by ALL the posterity in him, as if *in causa*, and therefore the friendship of God, not only with our first parents, was lost, but with all mankind, etc. Sed quod œdificium illud, *actu commissum à protoplastis*, in eo velut in causa, fuerit commissum ab *omnibus* ejus posteris, adeoque *amicitia Dei perierit*, non modo cum protoplastis; sed cum *toto mundo*, ac propterea Deus *imaginem suam non amplius contulerit* ejus posteris; et propter *peccatum* illud, quavis *morte* persequatur." (Page 344.)

8. PAUL FERRIUS, in his *Orthodox-Specimina*, says, "We were all in the loins of Adam, and sinned in him and with him." And in his *Scholast. Orthodox.*, as cited by Vœtius,¹ he says, "Consequently, it is impossible that such privation (of the Divine image) should be brought about by a natural or physical expulsion, and therefore there is a real cause of its [original sin's] transmission (traductionis ejus), which is admitted to be moral, and is either the *general sin in which we have all transgressed in Adam*, or natural propagation. . . . Whence also it appears that the actual sin itself, *by which we all transgressed in him, has directly caused this original sin*; also that generation or propagation is only applicative, to-wit: by substituting the subject in whom that common sin may produce its effect." Thus, according to this eminent divine, the actual sin in which we all participated in Adam has produced original sin, or the corruption of nature, which is transmitted *by propagation* on account of the community of that sin.

9. KECKERMAN.

Dr. Hodge, in his *Theology*, cites this celebrated theologian, but not on the subject before us. We shall present his testimony in his own language; for while it fully concurs with all the preceding, the scholar will be gratified to possess the original document. We present the *Theses* (or *Canones*) without the notes. He says:

"Sic de peccato in genere: est autem vel originis vel actuale.

¹ *Selectæ Disputationes*, Tom. I., page 1112, (Utrecht, 1641).

Peccatum originis sive originale est, quod à prima sua origine homo secum trahit.

"Hujus canon est:

"Originis peccatum gravius est peccato actuali itaque et hinc debetur æterna pœna. Estque vel imputatum vel inhærens.

"Peccatum originis imputatum, est ipsa defectio sive prima prævaricatio ab Adamo et Eva esu fructus vetiti commissæ; sed toti postea humano generi ex duabus istis primis personis naturaliter prognatio imputata.

"Canon de peccato originis imputato est:

"Quod Adamo fuerit personale; nobis autem sit naturale.

"Peccatum originale inhærens, est dispositio proclivis humanarum facultatum ad malum, orta ex privatione earum virium, quas ad bonum ante lapsum homo obtinebat.

"Canones de hoc peccato sunt:

"1. Peccatum originis inhærens, habet se instar defectus, non actualis, sed potentialis sive habitualis.

"2. Peccatum originis diverso respectu et naturale est homini et præternaturale.

"3. Subjectum hujus peccati, est totus homo.

"4. Propagatur hoc peccatum à parentibus in sobolem ratione principii sui."

On this last canon Keckerman remarks: "Rectissime dixit Augustinus (lib. de Morib. Ecclesiæ, cap. 22,) *Nihil peccato originali ad prædicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius*. Id quod præcipue verum est de modo, quo peccatum originis à parentibus in prolem propagatur: hæc enim questio tam est intricata, tamque difficilis, ut præstantissimi et acutissimi quique viri ultro fateantur sese modum illum ignorare. Nam ut nihil dicam de alio, clarissimus ille Wilhelminus Witakerus, libro primo de peccato originis, capite VIII., ita inquit: *Quemadmodum ab Adamo ad posteros peccatum propagatum fuerit, magis credi debet, quam quæri; et quæri facilius quam intelligi potest; et melius intelligitur, quam explicatur.*"¹

The difficulty here and thus alluded to by these eminent men, is in like manner referred to by the profound Pascal as follows: "It is an astonishing thought that the mystery farthest removed

¹ Systema S. S. Theologiæ, lib. II., cap. V., Editio tertia, pp. 251, usque ad 257, Hanoviæ, 1607.

from our apprehension, the transmission of original sin, is a fact, without the knowledge of which we can never satisfactorily know ourselves! For undoubtedly nothing appears so revolting to our reason as to say that the transgression of the first man imparted guilt to those who, from their extreme distance from the source of evil, seem incapable of such a participation. This transmission seems to us not only impossible, but unjust, . . . and yet, without this mystery, of all others the most incomprehensible, we are incomprehensible to ourselves. *The complicated knot of our condition has its mysterious folds in this abyss*, so that man is more incomprehensible without this mystery, than is the mystery itself to man."¹

We could add scores of equally impressive testimonies from the great and the good of the past centuries, evincing that by the whole Augustinian church the difficulty has ever been regarded as insuperable by all the appliances of reason and philosophy. But now, as it would seem (and the remark is not uncalled for in the connection, but deserving of deep consideration), it is to be solved in our communion by the acceptance of the gratuitous imputation scheme! For now it has amongst us become consistent with a claim to the most rigid orthodoxy: 1, To deny that sin, or moral corruption, either is or can be propagated at all by generation (as the Church has always held, though Pelagius denounced the sentiment as "*insane*"); and 2, To affirm that it is transmitted "*neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*;" that is, solely by imputation. God imputes to the race forensically Adam's personal sin, then abandons them in consequence of that imputation, and thus inherent moral corruption becomes the clear logical result. There is, therefore, now no longer any mystery as to how we *then* sinned, or as to *how* we now are brought to inherit the result. Thus has Dr. Hodge, in his Theology, carried forth "*the strength*" of the Calvinistic system, especially of that type of Reformed theology known as the federal or representative system," as we are informed by an article signed "L. H. A.," in the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* (for 1872, page 789). In such style as this has the time-honored phrase, "the federal and representative system," now become degraded, and made to conceal the introduction into the midst of our communion of the

¹ Thoughts on Religion, Part II., Chapter V.

foul and loathsome dregs of blank Socinianism. The transparent folly and illiteracy of the assertion will at once present themselves to the reader who will but reflect, that if such be really a carrying forth of the strength of the Calvinistic system, the grand old divines of the Reformation, if they had but opened their eyes, had not far to look in order to receive a complete solution of the difficulty aforesaid. For Socinus and his school, and still later the whole school of the Remonstrants, had adopted this same forensic gratuitous imputation scheme,¹ and on the ground thus furnished, denounced and ridiculed the Church doctrine of our participation in the sin of Adam, and the consequent transmission of native corruption by generation, which, in fact, constitute the very nucleus of the mighty problem referred to. We have now, however, caught up with them in carrying forward the strength of our system, though it has required several centuries to do so. Whether we shall yet distance them in the race as has been repeatedly done in other and like instances, must be left to the decision of time.

10. MATTHIAS MARTINIUS.

In the notes to this theologian's method, (*Theologæ*, lib. III., cap. 19), he says: "*But I know that original sin is propagated from our parents by the just judgment of God*, who, as He after the fall deprived of wisdom and saving righteousness the souls of Adam and Eve, which were created in purity, so He likewise deprived their natural posterity of the same. *This is a punishment (which is sin) such as we have deserved, forasmuch as we have deserved this blindness and incapacity for good*, and forasmuch as we still are delighted with it, and, as if the thing should be pleasantly borne, esteem ourselves to be wise and just."²

11. PISCATOR, of Herborn.

In his *Observations* on Rom. v., he says: "Here are to be noted the testimonies concerning the former part of original sin, *which is the revolt of all the natural heirs of Adam in his loins*. But as to the latter part, which is the corruption of nature which followed from that revolt, the testimonies may be seen under Chapter vii. 7, and the verses following. Therefore it is in respect to the defection that the apostle speaks in this place, when he says,

¹ The evidence of this will be fully presented in §§ 18-22, *infra*.

² Cited by Vætius, *Selectæ Disputationes*, Tom. I., page 1111.

that by one, to-wit, Adam, sin has entered into the world. Also, in v. 16, he says *that the guilt was from the one fall*, to-wit, Adam's, *to condemnation*; *but he speaks of the guilt of the whole human race* (*loquitur autem de reatu totius generis humani*." (Page 468.)

12. GISEBERT VÆTIUS, though a strenuous supralapsarian, affirms clearly the same explanatory principle of the Reformed church on the subject. He says: "And this I regard as the higher cause to which we must ascend when it is asked why Christ, equally as other men, was not exposed to sin? Let it be replied, that by the justice of God He did not incur *that penalty which all incurred*. If it be asked, why He did not incur it? I answer, that it was because He neither sinned in Adam, nor was reckoned and regarded as in the head and root of the first covenant, and consequently the judgment and guilt of the first sin did not pass to him."¹

13. URSINUS, in his *Explicatio Catech.* (ad Quæst. 7), says: "We justly suffer the punishment of Adam's fault: 1, Because we all approve and follow his fault; 2, The fault is so Adam's that it is also ours, for we were all in sinning Adam, and therefore, as the apostle testified, we have all sinned in him."

14. GOMARUS.

As the occasion will occur in another part of the argument to cite the testimony of this eminent theologian somewhat fully, we shall adduce here but a single remark. Near the close of his exposition of Rom. v. he says: "But we deny that the reason is certainly the same; because a particular disobedience in Adam suffices for the desert of the anger of God and eternal death, which was also expiated by the particular punishment of Christ, *when He bore what Adam and we in common had deserved*; but for obtaining eternal life a particular obedience does not suffice; it must, as we have seen, be universal."²

15. HOORNBECK.

As regards the testimony of this eminent and excellent divine, it will suffice here to cite the caption of Section X. of Chapter VII. of his *Instit. Theol.* (Leyden, 1658), which is as follows: "*It was a common sin of the whole nature in Adam, not of himself alone*."

¹ *Selectæ Disput.*, Tom. I., p. 1114.

² *Opp.*, Tom. I., p. 406. (Amsterdam, 1664.)

16. RYISSENIUS.

In his reply to the perpetually repeated objection to the Church doctrine by the Socinians and Remonstrants of his day, who, however, were therein only repeating the speculations of certain scholastics to whom he here also refers, to-wit: that God, of His own sovereign will, can condemn the innocent, and that therefore "*God is able to impute the sin of Adam*" (that is, as a *peccatum alienum*), he says: "I answer, that that sin is accounted ours *because it is truly ours* (quod revera nostrum est), as the children of servants are servants, and the sons of citizens are citizens; and are so accounted."¹

But here the scholastic (as Pighius or Catharinus) or the Socinian objector, or both, would defend the gratuitous imputation of sin on the assumption that God of His sovereign will and pleasure could forensically impute Adam's personal sin to the race; to which, however, Ryissenius replies, that He *does* impute it, but that the ground of the imputation is *that it is truly ours, i. e., by participation*. It is not imputed, therefore, in order to constitute us guilty, as Dr. Hodge so preposterously teaches, but because we are guilty. The sin is already ours before the imputation takes place.

Then, on page 77, he introduces and discusses the question, "Whether all men have so sinned in Adam that this sin ought to be accounted the sin of all?" In reply he says: "The ancient *Pelagians* insisted that the sin of Adam harmed only himself, and not his posterity. The *Socinians* plainly deny that the whole human race sinned in Adam [*i. e., except putatively or forensically*]. The *Anabaptists* likewise deny that the posterity are guilty on account of the fall of our first parents. The *Remonstrants* indeed retain the name imputation, but abolish the thing itself,"—*i. e., they retain and insist on (precisely as Dr. Hodge does) the judicial or forensic imputation of Adam's personal guilt, while they at the same time deny our participation in the first sin, which is a real denial of the doctrine of immediate imputation as entertained and taught by the Church.*

He then refers to Placæus, and shows that he likewise rejected the Church doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin, and bases the condemnation of the race solely on the ground that

¹ Summa Theologiæ, loco IX., page 74. (Date of the copy lost.)

the posterity inherit from fallen Adam a corrupt nature; and justly remarks in relation to this view, that if we are constituted guilty before God, and become obnoxious to penal justice on account of the hereditary corruption which we draw from Adam, there is no proper imputation, which is clearly so, the act being simply one of arbitrary condemnation. And he adds: "We teach that the actual sin of Adam is in very deed so imputed to all who descend from him by ordinary generation, that on account of it we all are considered guilty, and are delivered over to punishment, or at least, regarded as worthy of it."

This position he then establishes by a series of arguments, of which we here adduce the first two; and in them our readers will perceive the sense in which he employs the phrase, *Adam's sin*, in such connection.

He says: "1. Paul teaches this in Rom. v. 12-14, 'As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned;' where ἐφ' ὃ, whether it is rendered *in quo*, or *ex quo*, or *quia*, it amounts to the same thing. For the *cause* is rendered by the apostle why death has passed upon all and every one, to-wit: because all have sinned, not as actually or personally in themselves, for as yet they were not, *but in sinning Adam*.

"2. 'In Adam all die' (1 Cor. xv. 22), *i. e., contract the guilt of condemnation and death. Therefore in him they also have sinned. For no one could deserve in another the punishment of death, unless he had had in him a common sin which is the cause of death.*" And thus, while maintaining in the most direct manner the imputation to us of Adam's sin, and our condemnation on account of it, he affirms with equal directness our subjective guilt and participation in the first sin. These things are perfectly reconcilable (as we have shown) in Calvinistic theology, but totally irreconcilable and subversive of each other on the gratuitous imputation scheme taught by Catharinus, Crellius, and Dr. Hodge.

It is most instructive to note here in this connection who were the assailants of this great doctrine which Ryissenius thus defends. They were not, in general, members of any evangelical communion, but Pelagians in the Papal church, and Socinians and others (as named by him in a previous extract), who had apos-

tatized from the churches of the Reformation. And further, it is no less so to observe how little those eminent and approved divines were moved to depart from their great explanatory principle by the ribaldry and idle denunciations of those assailants, or even in any degree to imitate their example by returning railing for railing. All the sarcasm and accusations of teaching nonsense and unintelligible propositions, which their antagonists were perpetually repeating, were regarded by them as unworthy of a serious thought.

17. ZANCHIUS, in like manner with the forecited, makes original sin (that is, as he expresses it, the *culpa, reatus, et defectus justitiæ originalis*) to descend from our first parents to their offspring by propagation. We had designed here to lay before our readers the whole of his *nine propositions, or theses de peccato originali*, but can present only a brief extract or two.

"II. *The crime and guilt of Adam's sin is derived by hereditary law to all his posterity, naturally begotten*, so that on account of his disobedience we are all truly sinners, and guilty of eternal death before God.

"III. On account of that disobedience of Adam the privation of original righteousness and corruption of the whole man is derived, together with guilt, (or, to speak with the apostle and Augustine—*concupiscence*, for this single term includes both,) and that by propagation.

"VI. In this, to-wit: original sin, are to be especially noted the *formal* and the *material*. The formal is the crime and guilt, but the material is concupiscence itself.

"VII. *This sin in us is not so another's, that is, Adam's, but that it is also our own; nor is so involuntary but that it is in a certain sense voluntary also.*"¹

18. SYNOPSIS PURIORIS THEOLOGIE.

"The form of original sin consists in that *avopia* and disobedience by which all sinned in Adam who were in him seminally; which disobedience and crime, with the consequent guilt, was justly imputed by God the Judge to all the sons of Adam, forasmuch as all had been and are one with him." (Page 157.) And thus, as appears from this and all the preceding citations, the moral and objective basis of the imputation is always recognized by the

¹ Opera. Tom. IX., pp. 675, 676 (folv. 1618.)

Church theologians, and rejected only by Pelagians, Socinians, and others, who sympathized with their errors.

19. PAREUS.

In replying to Socinus, directly after that heresiarch had issued the last division of his work *De Servatore*, and after citing Romans v. 12, and other passages, this eminent critic and theologian adds, "But these three things confirm us against the heretics.

"I. That eternal death rushed (*irruisse*) upon all men through sin, as a punishment due and deserved for sin; that it cannot be otherwise understood than concerning a *desert of eternal death common to all on account of a sin common to all*. Therefore what the heretics assert, that all who are propagated from Adam die from no sin of their own, or of another, is false.

"II. That that sin by which guilt has been attracted to all his posterity *was not committed by Adam alone, but by all his posterity in Adam*, because we were all in the loins of Adam, and were as if a part of Adam; and thus the sin of Adam was the sin of us all. Wherefore it was indeed another's, but it was likewise our own.

"III. That eternal death is not a punishment for Adam's first sin only, but is due likewise to all the subsequent sins of his posterity. For the expression, *the wages of sin is death*, plainly speaks of the sins of posterity. And it is most certain (as above shown), and promulgated plainly from God, that *the soul that sinneth it shall die*. Hence we thus reason against the heretics: Whosoever shall sin shall die on account of sin. (Ezek. xviii.) *All have sinned in Adam by another's sin, and by their own*. (Rom. v.) By another's sin, therefore, and by their own sin they all die, and that an eternal death, as many as shall die. . . .

All the posterity of Adam likewise communicate with the offence of their parent, *not only by participation of a sinful nature, but ALSO BY THE ACT OF SINNING ITSELF*. For, as the apostle testifies, *we all have sinned in the one*, because all were in the loins of sinning Adam. In him our whole nature stood and fell; had been immortal, and is now dead. We all, therefore, when we suffer the punishment of his sin, *suffer punishment for a sin not simply another's, but which is our own also*. And it is said to be imputed to us all, *not as simply another's, but also as our own; neither as to the innocent, but as to companions in the crime, and who are*

one in guilt. For in the one all sinned. *It is false, therefore, that it may not be imputed.*"¹

And now, reader, in view of this passage, determine for yourself the question: Does not Pareus, in this refutation of the theory of Socinus, refute also the theory which Dr. Hodge has been inculcating as the recognized doctrine of the Calvinistic church? Can there be a more direct antithesis than is here presented throughout the passage to the scheme of the gratuitous imputation of sin, as taught and imperiously insisted on by the Princeton Professor? Let him, or any one who may sympathize with his views, point out even the vestige of a difference!

But further. This accomplished scholar and divine is here replying directly to the cavils of Socinus against the doctrine of our participation in the Adamic sin, and hence this full explication of that doctrine itself. But let us suppose now, for illustration, that the arch-heretic could have referred to some living and reputedly orthodox divine at Heidelberg or elsewhere, and cited him as saying that "the notion of such participation is unintelligible; that it does not rise to the dignity of a contradiction, and has no meaning at all; that it is Pantheistic, nonsensical, and impossible;" and adding, in attempted enforcement of this tirade, that "it is a monstrous evil to make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men." And suppose, moreover, that while that divine was asserting all this he should still claim to agree with Pareus himself in his theological views, and to receive and defend the recognized doctrine of the Church, would not an occurrence of such a character clearly have demonstrated one or the other of the following points, to-wit: either that Pareus, after all, did not really disagree with Socinus in his theological views, and that the heresiarch did still retain the Church doctrine; or that the divine whom Socinus had thus cited had plainly abandoned the evangelical system on the great cardinal truth before us, and had gone over to the Socinian camp?

20. PETER MARTYR.²

¹ Comment. on Gen. ii. 17, page 74, col. 2 (1647).

² This and the eight following citations are from Rivetus, as given in the *Princeton Repertory* for 1839, and re-printed in *Princeton Essays*, First Series, pp. 200, *seq.*, though the doctrine itself is treated rather cavalierly in the note on page 172 of that volume.

"I admit that $\epsilon\psi\ \delta$ (Rom. v. 12) is a causal particle, so that the sense may be that death has passed upon all men *because all have sinned*; for Chrysostom says, "By the fall of Adam, Paul has determined that other mortals who did not eat of the tree are infected; and as a prudent physician, when about to administer for a particular disease, does not delay in the mere circumstances or sequences, but has recourse to the head and primary cause, thus *all die because all sinned*. Nor should we in this place take the word *sinned* in such a sense as would render it inapplicable to infants, but as though he had said *they are held in sin and are esteemed guilty* (rei); for he was able from the explanations given in the Epistle to the Hebrews to declare '*how we sinned in Adam*,' for there we read that Levi paid tithes in Abraham. By the same reason it may be here understood *that we were contaminated in the loins* in the mass of Adam." (Comment. in Rom. v., and repeated in Comment. on 1 Cor. xv. 22.)

21. BULLINGER.

"Sin is called original, or the sin of our birth, because it comes from our first origin, *or is derived from the first parent upon all by propagation or traduction*. It derives its origin from the first formed man, and hence it is termed the hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature. Moreover, this evil flowed from our first parents to all their posterity." (*Decad. III., Serm. 10.*)

22. FAYERS, of Geneva.

"We believe that the sin of Adam, whilst it was the act of an individual, *was common to the whole species*, inasmuch as Adam was not a private person, but was constituted by God the fountain of the whole race. For the human race, lying hid in the loins of Adam, was adorned by God with original righteousness and grace, and by the sin of Adam was despoiled of both; for as a murder perpetrated by the hand is not imputed to the hand only, but to the whole body, so this sin was imputed, not to Adam alone, who was but a member of the body of men, but to the whole race of men; *therefore, it is not of another's sin that we are reckoned guilty, but of our own*," etc. (Euchirid. Theol. Disp. 37.)

23. FRANCIS JUNIUS, of Leyden.

"In the first Adam the whole species was, by God, *naturally deposited*; in whom all sinned, and became guilty, and the children of wrath, and of an eternal malediction." (*De Peccato Orig., Thes. 4.*)

"They who pronounce that sin to be simply involuntary are very much deceived, since the same thing may be said to be voluntary and involuntary in different respects, whether you respect its generation or its constitution; *for the whole race was voluntary in sinning in Adam* (although in respect to its particular origin it was to us involuntary), in whom we have a common origin; and as *from the fault of our nature* it is voluntary, though not by a particular act of the will of each individual." (Ibid., *Thes.* 8.)

"Hence it comes to pass (namely, by the transgression of Adam) that all of us who are born bear the stigma or brand of our rebellion, so that before we enjoy the light we partake of the injury of our origin; for, indeed, we all sinned in him in whom we all were one man." (Ibid., *Thes.* 2.)

24. JOHN CHENET.

In his *Examen of the Principal Articles of Religion*, he says: "As we are not otherwise reformed and regenerated by the Holy Spirit, but as we are pardoned and justified by the gratuitous imputation of the merit of Christ; so original sin does not consist merely in that depravity which is the opposite of that renovation which is by the Holy Spirit, but also in the imputation of the sin of Adam, which is the opposite to the payment made by Christ, and to his perfect obedience for us, even to the death of the cross." Again: "Although actually and in very deed we did not eat of the forbidden fruit as did Adam, nevertheless we all sinned in Adam (Rom. v. 12); and as Augustine teaches (Epist. 23, to Boniface), we subsequently contracted from him an obligation to punishment, since we were one with Adam when he sinned." (Lib. XI., c. 21 and 28.)

25. ISAAC JUNIUS, of Delft.

In his *Antapol. Posthuma*, he says: "In the sum of the matter ALL THE REFORMED CHURCHES AGREE, AND TEACH WITH UNANIMOUS CONSENT, *in accordance with the sacred Scriptures, and the universal agreement of antiquity, first*, THAT THE SIN OF ADAM WAS NOT A PERSONAL SIN, BUT OF THE WHOLE HUMAN RACE, inasmuch as they were all included in the loins of Adam, and in Adam, the first parent of us all and root of the whole human race, they sinned; *secondly*, [That] there was also transfused a principle contrary to original righteousness, *contracted from Adam in the first transient act of his sin*, AND PROPAGATED BY MEANS OF GENERATION to all his

posterity, so that all men by nature are guilty of death, and averse from the love which they owe to God and divine things, and turned or inclined to evil." (Cap. 7, page 152.)

26. G. S. FRISIUS.

"Nor is it merely the imputation of the sin of another, as if all on account of the first sin of their parents only were made obnoxious to death, as if this evil would not have the nature of their own proper sin unless their consent was added; but is the real sin of the whole human race through the fall of Adam, in whom all have sinned, (Rom. v. 12); and are all by nature under an obligation from the just judgment of God to endure the punishment of eternal death?" (De Peccato Originali.)

27. J. LORENTIUS.

"The true and genuine exposition of these words (Rom. v. 12,) is, that all men sinned in Adam as in their common stalk and mass, and so in him and by him. *It is altogether a different thing to sin in Adam, and to derive sin from him. And we should carefully distinguish the sin WHICH ALL COMMITTED IN ADAM FROM ORIGINAL SIN, NAMELY, AS THE CAUSE FROM THE EFFECT.* For all sinned in Adam at the same time that he sinned by eating the forbidden fruit, as then naturally existing in his loins. This first sin of Adam is the cause of original sin, which is the effect; therefore it is falsely asserted by Catharinus and Pighius that original sin is nothing but the first sin." (In Rom. v. 12.)

28. JOHN CLUTO, of Franequer.

"Concerning all the posterity of Adam we affirm that, as well on account of the fall of Adam *as by their own proper sin*, they are cast into a state of misery; in this following the Scriptures, which teach that the first origin of death was from Adam; *so that, in truth, his posterity are reckoned to have sinned in him*, and so on account of the sin of Adam, which he committed by eating the forbidden fruit, *not as if their sin was altogether another's, but as being in some sense their own, they are adjudged to death.* (Rom. v. 12.)"

"The meaning of the Scripture is evident, since it pronounces that men are considered sinners by the disobedience of Adam; for it clearly teaches that men are so constituted sinners by the sin of Adam, that according to the divine ordination sin is imputed to his posterity, and on this account they are equally reckoned sin-

ners as if in their own proper persons they had committed it." (Disput. XVI., Theses 14 and 18.)

While our limits have obliged us to give but a portion of what Rivetus has quoted from these eminent divines (to-wit: the preceding nine), still we have, as we think our readers themselves will admit, presented sufficient to give clearly and comprehensively their views, and which it would seem impossible to misunderstand. We, moreover, present the passages in the translation made of them in 1839 by Dr. Hodge himself, as we have not the work of Rivetus now at hand. We cannot pause to expatiate upon their testimony, nor, indeed, is it needed. They one and all affirm the common standpoint of the Church, that the whole race so sinned in Adam as to become veritable sinners by participating with him in the first sin. On this ground do they explicate the doctrine of original sin, AND NEVER IN A SINGLE INSTANCE *do they, or any representative divine of the Church, even attempt to explicate it on the ground so unwarrantably assumed by Dr. Hodge*, to-wit: that Adam's personal transgression was, as a *peccatum alienum*, forensically imputed to his posterity while in a state of perfect innocence, in order to constitute them guilty and depraved, and is transmitted by this forensic imputation alone. While, on the contrary, these eminent men all, in unison with the entire Calvinistic church, affirm that the imputation was that of a *common* or *universal sin*, and that it is propagated by ordinary generation.

29. A. SCULTETUS, colleague of Pareus at Heidelberg.

"It is objected," says he (as cited by Rivetus), "But by what right do the offspring suffer punishment for the crime of their parents? Paul answers that they have all sinned in their first parents: Original sin containing, 1, The first transgression; 2, The corruption of our parents."

30. ANDREAS ESSENIUS, colleague of Hoornbeek.

In discussing the cavils of the Socinians and Remonstrants of his day, he says: "It is objected *fourthly*, 'we stood not with Adam when he sinned; therefore we neither sinned together nor consented to that sin,' etc. I answer that *we did virtually stand in Adam*, and were federally reckoned and included in him; *wherefore that sin is not foreign from us*; illud peccatum non est à nobis alienum;"¹ that is, it is not as Dr. Hodge styles it, a *peccatum alienum*.

¹ Compend. Theol. Dog., cap. 10, Thesis. 28. (Utrecht, 1682.)

31. MARCK, in his *Medulla*, when replying to the Pelagian objection that "the act of the Adamic sin was that of a single person, and is long since past," says: "*I reply that the offence was common*, and that hence the guilt flowing from it remains." (Cap. 15, § 32.)

32. So uniform and invariable is the testimony of the Church, that even DE MOOR, (who carried the federal relation to its farthest admissible extent as asserted in the Helvetian *consensus*), in stating the doctrine of original sin, ventures not to depart from the great explanatory principle aforesaid, and which Dr. Hodge has so unceremoniously rejected. For example, in his great and invaluable work on Marck's *Medulla*, and in referring to the 12th question of the Heidelberg Catechism, he says: "Nisi Adamus consideretur ut caput representativum totius generis humani, in quo nos cuncti dono' Rectitudinis ornati peccavimus, à quibus proin propter Reatum in Adamo contractum, non minus quam à primo illo parente, judicialiter per modum Pœnæ dona illa sunt ablata, quæ nos ipsi peccantes in Adamo sponte dilapidamus? atque hic mihi creditur nativus hujus Responsi sensus."¹ In replying also to the objection that the act of Adam pertained to himself alone, he says: "The crime, nevertheless, is common." And in answering an exception to this, he says further: "We all having been made guilty in Adam when existing in his loins, have also sinned in him." (P. 285.) And then, on the same page, while stating the federal relation in the strongest manner, he carefully avoids the destructive and fatal error of Dr. Hodge, and so presents that relation as to retain the aforesaid explanatory principle—the *subjective ill-desert of the posterity*, which, says he, is *deservedly* the grounds of their punishment for the sin of our first parents. For example: "Fœdus illud neglecto officio nostro in capite nos representante, *violavimus, hinc ob culpam in Adamo commissam et nobis imputatam* MERITO OMNES PUNIMUS."

But we must conclude this part of our catalogue of witnesses, though it were easy to extend it by the addition of a multitude of citations no less pertinent and conclusive as to the *recognized doctrine of the Church that the first sin was common, and therefore imputed, and not made common by being imputed*, as Dr. Hodge's

¹ See *Commentarius Perpetuus in Johanni Markii, Compendium Theol. Christianæ*, Tom. III., p. 273. (Leyden, 1765.)

theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin requires. And we shall now proceed to hear the divines of the Lutheran communion, since they too, and with equal absence of all rational ground to sustain the allegation, are claimed by Dr. Hodge as favoring his theory.

B. Testimony of the Lutheran Divines.

1. We begin with MARTIN LUTHER.

As this truly great and gifted man died in the year 1516, while the Council of Trent was engaged in deliberating on the doctrine of original sin, and as the work we shall cite was published in 1544, his statements as presented therein can have no reference to the decisions of the Council on that subject, as the remarks and statements of Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, and other divines subsequently had. The following is from his "Commentary on Genesis."¹ He says: "When the sophists discourse on original sin they speak only of misery and foul lust or concupiscence. But original sin is, in truth, the total fall of human nature, because the understanding has become darkened, so that we can no longer know God and His will, nor regard His works. Then, because the will is dreadfully depraved, so that we cannot trust the mercy of God, but having neglected the word and the will of God, we follow concupiscence and the lusts of the flesh. Then, further, because the conscience is no longer at rest, but whenever it thinks upon the judgment of God it despairs, and follows after and seeks unlawful reliefs and remedies. These sins are so deeply impressed upon nature that in this life they cannot be wholly eradicated; and yet the miserable sophists say not a word in regard to them. As is the nature of correlates, original sin evinces, after this manner, what was original righteousness from its contrary,—even that it is the loss or privation of original righteousness, as blindness is the privation of sight.

"This appears far more extensively than the monks imagine, who understand original righteousness only of chastity. But let the soul be carefully considered; afterwards the body also, so befouled with lust. But it is the soul especially, because it has lost the knowledge of God; because we do not always and everywhere give Him thanks; because we do not delight in His works and

¹ On chapter ii. 17, pp. 32, 33, (published at Wittenberg, 1544.)

deeds; because we do not trust Him; because when He visits us with merited chastisements we begin to hate Him and blaspheme; because when we have transactions with a neighbor we consult our cupidity, and are rapacious, dishonest, adulterers, murderers, cruel, inhumane, unmerciful, and the like. The fury of lust is, indeed, a particular part of original sin. But greater are these vices of the soul,—incredulity, ignorance of God, desperation, hatred, blasphemy. Adam, in the state of innocency, knew nothing of these spiritual calamities.

"Then there are to be enumerated the punishments of original sin. For original sin rightly is called whatever is lost of these conditions which Adam possessed while as yet in a state of integrity; because in penetration he was so sagacious that he immediately knew Eve to be of his flesh, and he possessed an exact knowledge of all creatures, because he was also just, upright, excelling in intellect, unbiassed in will, and notwithstanding, imperfect; for after that animal life, perfection should be delayed for the spiritual."

The doctrine thus inculcated is, that the first sin is truly the sin of the race; and that the evils resulting from it are consequently penal, and descend to us through our first parents by propagation.

Previous to this presentation of the Augustinian doctrine Luther had, on the preceding page, adverted to certain grievous errors that were in his day inculcated concerning it. Erasmus and Pighius had been reviving the Pelagian views of the early Arminians, and of certain of the Scholastics, respecting the imputation of a *peccatum alienum*; and Luther perceiving at once how fatal in its effects must prove to be the admission of this principle into the Protestant doctrine, and anticipating from its reception therein all those ruinous consequences which its subsequent introduction into Poland and Transylvania developed in the churches, gives the following admonition respecting it, and in which, as our readers may perceive, he describes and refutes the very theory which Dr. Hodge has been inculcating as Calvinistic truth. He says: "And it seems that in our own day also, there are those who are deceived by this argument; for they so speak of original sin (*i. e.*, inherent corruption) as if it were no fault of ours, but only a punishment (*ac si non culpa sed tantum pœna*); as Erasmus somewhere argues in express terms, 'that original sin is a punishment

inflicted on our first parents, *which we their posterity are compelled to suffer on account of another's crime, without any demerit of our own*, (propter alienum culpam, sine nostro merito,) as an illegitimate child is obliged to endure the shame arising not from his own fault, but from that of his mother; *for how could he have sinned who as yet did not exist?* THESE THINGS MAY BE FLATTERING TO REASON, BUT THEY ARE FULL OF IMPIETY AND BLASPHEMY! (Ablandiuntur hæc rationi, sed sunt plena impietatis et blasphemiae." (Pag. 31).)

2. MELANCTHON.

In his *Hypotyposis Theologicæ*, or *Loci Communes*, (as the work is ordinarily named,) he says: "Peccatum originale est nativa propensio et quidam genialis impetus et energia, quæ ad peccandum trahimur, *propagata ab Adam in omnem posteritatem*. Sicut in igni est genuina vis, qua sursum fertur, sicut in Magnete est genuina vis, qua ad se ferrum trahit; *ita est in homine nativa vis ad peccandum*."¹

"Quod si natura sumus filii iræ, certe nascemur filii iræ. Quid enim ibi (Eph. ii. 3) aliud agit Paulus, quam omnes vires nostras peccato obnoxias nasci, nihil ullo tempore in ullis hominum viribus boni esse. Capite quinto ad Romanos instituit disputationem de peccato, gratia, et lege, *ubi peccatum docet propagatum in omnes homines*. Quomodo vero propagatum est unius peccatum, si non ab uno omnes nascuntur peccatores? Neque vero negari potest, quin de originali peccato eo loco Paulus disserat. Nam, si de suo cujusque peccato loqueretur, non posset dicere, *unius delicto multos mortuos esse*. . . . *Et cum non nisi per peccatum mors irumpat; necesse est pueros peccati reos esse, peccatumque habere, at, quod? certe originale*." (Pp. 20, 21, § III.)

Again, "Proinde cum Sophistæ docent, peccatum originale esse, excidisse favore Dei et carere originali justitia, *debebant addere, quod, cum absit à nobis Dei Spiritus et benedictio, maledicti simus, cum lux absit esse in nobis nihil nisi tenebras, cæcitatem et errorem; cum absit veritas, nihil in nobis esse nisi mendacium; cum absit vita, nihil esse in nobis nisi peccatum et mortem*." (Pp. 29, 30.)

These sophists maintained, that as the posterity of Adam did not participate in his sin, their abandonment by God on account of the

¹ Loc. Com. De Peccato. § 1, p. 19. ¹ (Lipsiæ, 1821.)

personal sin of Adam, left them merely in that natural state or condition in which Adam was anterior to the covenant transaction referred to in Genesis ii. 17. And in strictness of terms this (untenable as it is in the light of the Scriptures) is the position which the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, if pressed, is necessitated to assume. And hence, as before remarked, Dr. Hodge denounces and attempts to ridicule the idea that the posterity could have been in a state of apostasy anterior to the imputation to them of Adam's personal sin. Their apostasy, says he, *was the consequence, and not the ground, of their condemnation*. They were deprived of God's favor as the penal consequence of the one sin of the one man, etc.¹ And yet he claims that the doctrine of original sin, as he teaches it, "attributes no efficiency to God in the production of evil."² This would be true provided the doctrine he teaches was the Church doctrine, which affirms that God abandons or punishes the race for its complicity with Adam in the first sin. But it is not true, and never can be true, on the principles inculcated by Dr. Hodge, which represent God as penally inflicting on the posterity moral corruption simply on account of a *peccatum alienum*—a sin in whose perpetration they were in no way or manner implicated. The foregoing statement of Melancthon, therefore, makes it transparently clear, that for God to treat the posterity thus would be equivalent to constituting them morally depraved and corrupt, (because, if for a foreign sin He deprives them of His Spirit, His blessing, His truth, etc., the opposite condition must necessarily supervene in the soul); and so He would efficiently become the author of their evil nature—a result or consequence which in the circumstances folly alone could disclaim.

3. THE FORM OF CONCORD.

"In respect to our corruption and the fall of our first parents, . . . we teach that this hereditary evil is the fault or guilt (culpa seu reatus) by which it has come to pass, that on account of the disobedience of Adam and Eve we became hateful before God (in odio apud Deum), and by nature the children of wrath." "*The false opinions of the Pelagians are repudiated, that original sin is only guilt or blame, which has been contracted from another's transgression (ex aliena transgression) without any corruption of*

¹ See *Princeton Review* for April and October, 1860, especially pages 356, 357, &c. ² See his *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 253.

our nature.”¹ Here is a full and entire repudiation of Dr. Hodge’s notion that the posterity has no corruption of nature anterior to the imputation to them of Adam’s personal sin.

4. J. A. QUENSTEDT, 1617–1688.

This great master spirit and representative divine of the Lutheran communion still retains unimpaired all his influence and honors, and the labors of no subsequent divine have in any degree superseded his great work, *Theologia Didactico-Polemica, seu Systema Theologiæ*. He everywhere recognizes and affirms the doctrine that our participation in the evils of the fall is conditioned by our participation in the guilt or criminality of the fall. For example, “*Voluntas Adami censebatur nostra; nam primus homo omnium posterorum voluntates in sua quasi voluntate locatas habere,—tenemus, 1, participatione culpæ actualis; in Adamo namque omnes peccavimus; 2, imputatione reatus legalis, etc. Non posset in nos propagari reatus, nisi præcessisset imputatis actus quippe qui illius fundamentum est.*”²

In the same *Quæstio* he thus lays down and treats upon the following thesis: “It was not alone of the good pleasure of the Divine Being, nor of His absolute rule, (absoluti dominii) that the sin which Adam, as the root and stem of the whole human race, committed was imputed to us, and propagated to us as to its guilt, but of the most perfect justice and equity (sed summæ justitiæ et æquitatis). And so, in Adam as in a common trunk (stipite), we have all sinned, and that first fall is ours, not indeed by propagation, but by imputation, not *actualiter*, but *originaliter*.”

“The first Adamic sin is imputed to us *immediately*, so far as we yet stood in Adam. But the sin of Adam is imputed to us *mediately*; that is to say, *inherent, original sin intervening* (mediate peccato originali inhærente), so far as we are regarded in our own persons and individually. For no one is held as a sinner before God; to no one is that first sin imputed, unless to him who, being contaminated with original sin, descends from Adam himself.” Thus the notion of constituting the posterity guilty by a *peccatum alienum* is every where repudiated by the Lutheran (as by the Calvinistic) divines, and refuted as a Socinian and Pelagian cavil against the truth.

¹ Article I., cited in Bretschneider’s *Dogmatik*, Vol. II., p. 35.

² Cap. II., De Peccato, Sect. II., Quæst. 7.

5. J. M. GERHARD is likewise one of the choice spirits, and one of the most deservedly eminent theologians of the Lutheran church, and his *Loci Theologici* are still regarded as high authority.

In *Locus* IV., § 331,, he says, “The Papists contend that original sin is only the privation of the supernatural gift of original righteousness, and that in the meantime the nature of man continues to be such as it was when first created. We, on the contrary, declare that through original sin not only was the concreated righteousness lost, but that the nature of man itself was corrupted in ways astonishing and sad to contemplate (*miris ac miseris modis*). And this corruption of nature, which evinces itself in all men by a bias or inclination to evil, we call a positive quality (which the Papists will not admit—see Bellarmin *De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati*, lib. V., cap. 15), not as though any power of acting is, in itself, or by itself, *sin*; but because this power of acting is in man prone and ready only to sin.”

Again: “That sin (of Adam) is not in all respects alien from us, because Adam sinned not as a private individual, but as the head of the whole human race; and as human nature being communicated through him becomes their own to every person begotten of him, so also is the corruption of nature communicated through propagation; and therefore as it is said that the tribe of Levi, being contained in the loins of Abraham, offered tithes to Melchisedek, (Heb. vii. 9,) so also we who were concealed in the loins of sinning Adam were not only corrupted in and with him, but also became guilty of the displeasure of God; *sed et rei iræ Dei facti sumus.*”

6. J. G. BAIER.

We now call attention to the testimony of this remarkably acute and accurate theologian, who still stands in the front of the Lutheran divines. In his chapter on *original sin*¹ he lays down the proposition: “*Dari peccatum originis etsi Ratio ex suis principiis certè ac distinctè agnoscere non possit, in Scriptura tamen manifestissimè indicatur.*” And then, after briefly illustrating the former part of it, he thus speaks in reference to the latter: “See especially Romans v. 12, where it is said that *therefore death came upon all men, because in one man, Adam, all sinned, or are con-*

¹ We quote his *Theol. Positivæ, Parte II., capite II., De Peccato Originis* (editio tertia). (Tænæ, 1694.)

stituted sinners. For although the word ἀμαρτάνειν may otherwise denote the act of sinning, still it is admitted that in this place it is to be understood, even of those who, by reason of their immature age and the defect of the use of reason, could in no way thus sin, yea, who did not exist when man first fell. Whence, to say that all sinned in Adam is not the same as to say that all imitated the sin of Adam by similar acts." Then, after quoting verse 14, and Eph. ii. 3, and expatiating thereon, he adds: "For to be a son of wrath is the same as to be obnoxious to the Divine anger, and worthy of punishment by God, in vindication of His law, inflicted on account of the violation of the law. And so no one can be a child of wrath by nature, *unless by nature, or through the corruption of nature, he is polluted with sin.*" (§ I.) Then, in Section II., he says: "But original sin imports in part the privation of original righteousness, and in part the inclination of our whole nature to evil." Then, in Section VII., "*The remote efficient cause of original sin is the devil; the near is our first parents, Eve, and especially Adam.*"

Baier then, in a note to Section XI., says: "See Rom. v. 12, where it is especially taught that all men have sinned by a sin *by which all are polluted* (quo omnes polluuntur), that death has passed to all men, even to those who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression; or who have not by a like prevarication imitated the actual and voluntary sin of Adam, *but nevertheless were therefore made obnoxious to death because they had sinned in Adam*, and consequently derived sin from him to themselves." (P. 513.) Then, in Section XV., he thus formally delineates the doctrine: "Original sin may be described *as the want of original righteousness propagated to all men through the fall, by carnal generation*, deeply corrupting the nature of man itself and all the faculties of the soul, rendering them inapt to the pursuit of spiritual good, prone to evil, and subjecting mankind to the Divine anger and eternal death, unless saved therefrom by the remission of sin on account of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith." (P. 526.)

7. J. F. BUDDÆUS.

In his *Theology*¹ he says: "Hence Augustine rightly says: 'We all were potentially (virtute) included in Adam, and all were

¹ Instit. Theol. Dogmat., lib. III., p. 531, ad § 16. (Leipsic, 1724.)

one in him.' (De Peccat. Merit., lib. I., cap. 10.) And again: 'In the one man all men are understood to have sinned originally.' (Lib. VI., Contra Julian, cap. 2.) And these indeed evince that Adam should be altogether regarded as a natural and seminal head in this covenant; which is denied in vain, therefore, by certain doctors of the Reformed church, who contend that Adam should be considered *as a federal head only*; and from thence they further conclude that original sin is no otherwise propagated to the posterity of Adam than as God imputes the sin of Adam as a federal head to all his posterity. As to such a notion every one may perceive how harsh it is. Yet again, it is frequently inquired, whether he should be considered wholly as a federal head. This likewise, however, many doctors of the Reformed church emphatically deny, and contend, moreover, for that propagation of original sin which proceeds only from natural generation, not admitting the imputation of the Adamic."

In order to sustain this latter representation, Buddæus refers to Whitby (a strange reference) and his tractate against the Church doctrine of imputation; while Witsius is cited as sustaining the former; *i. e.*, in regard to the more rigid divines of the Reformed Church. But Witsius, and the divines thus generally referred to, plainly and clearly assert the subjective guilt of the whole race in the fall; and that the first sin was not imputed to posterity simply as the sin of another, but as their own likewise.¹ Had Buddæus referred to Szydlovius, or Crellius, Slitchingius, etc., the reference would have been in point, so far as doctrine is concerned, though, as to ecclesiastical position, as wide of the mark (except in the case of Szydlovius) as his previous reference to Whitby.

Again: "But although original sin may be such that it cannot be perpetrated by the posterity of Adam; yet in itself, whilst it cleaves to every man, *it is rightly referred to him as the cause*, and therefore, and thus far, it is rightly ascribed to him. Although, therefore, it may be a calamity, because they had been brought into this condition, aside from their own voluntary agency, by being born; nevertheless the guilt of blame and of punishment cannot be taken away from sin on that account (because it is rightly imputed to any one, whether on the ground of perpetration or inhæssion), for divine justice cannot permit it. *And hence also*

¹ See Econ. Fœderis, lib. I. cap. 8, § 30, *usque ad* § 35.

*it appears, if any one is punished on account of original sin, that he is not punished so much on account of the sin of another as on account of his own. Yet, at the same time, let it be understood, that no injury is done to any if the sin of Adam should be imputed to them. . . . And truly, that the εφ' ὧ is to be referred to the sin of Adam, appears from the fact that likewise the apostle could not have said that, by one man, sin, and at the same time death, entered into the world. If all, therefore, have sinned in the one man, the sin of this one man is rightly imputed to all."*¹

8. J. G. WALCH, of Jena.

In his *Einleit in die Dogmatik*, cap. XI., § 13, he says: "Inasmuch as the fall of our first parents occurred with their knowledge and consent, so it was justly imputed to them; yet not to them alone, but to all their posterity. That such imputation takes place justly, and that God regards all the posterity of Adam as having sinned at the same time with him (Zugleich gesündigt), appears from this that all are by nature children of wrath, (Eph. ii. 3,) and are subjected to death as the wages of sin, (Rom. vi. 23, and v. 12.) The ground of this imputation is twofold, and lies, 1st, in this, That Adam sinned not as a natural head only, but as a moral head; and, consequently, his posterity are regarded as having taken part in his transgression, (Rom. v. 12.) 2d, It is based, too, on this: That we all are conceived and born in sin, and, consequently, have within us something deserving of punishment, so that the infliction which must take effect according to divine justice necessarily infers the imputation."

9. C. E. WEISSMAN.

In his *Instit. Theol.*, loco VII., he says: "The apostle teaches that there is (*i. e.*, between Adam and his posterity) a mutual participation of the effect of death, sin and judgment; but that it takes place precisely on account of a certain federal connection and by the way of immediate and previous imputation; and that the act of the Adamic sin is in this mode imputed to posterity for condemnation—this he does not say, and hence care should be taken lest we obtrude a meaning upon his words which he has not conveyed," (page 389.)

Again: "12. We have said decidedly, also, that in a certain

¹ See lib. III., cap. II., § 24, page 588.

sense the first sin was imputed to the whole human race, but by imputation rather mediate than immediate. We do not allege that the sin or moral corruption was propagated to the seed of Adam only by way of physical and natural generation, but we acknowledge, likewise, that this sin, existing by nature in all men, as in the children of sinners, brings them under the judgment of God, and excludes them from intercourse with God and His grace while they remain such." (P. 421.)

"14. We say still further, that that which we call original sin is not a mere calamity or infirmity, like a physical or civil disability; for example, as in the case of hereditary diseases, or as in the forfeiture of the honors and dignities of parents (when convicted for a civil offence) by their children; but that it is in verity such a state or condition as is judicially obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, and which subjects man to spiritual evil, although he has not contracted it by his own sins. This part of the proposition is a rock of offence, and an especial stumbling-block to those who violently assail the doctrine of original sin in the common theology. Or should they admit somewhat of this guilt (for at times the manifest truth extorts the like from them), they, nevertheless, quickly close their ears, so soon as they hear that this moral vice of man is to be called sin, obnoxious to the divine displeasure, and to spiritual privations. Curcellæus says: 'In brief, there is nothing in us when we are born which can be truly and properly named sin, for which God is displeased and purposes to inflict any degree of punishment. But we establish our proposition by these and other arguments: (1.) Because the condition is such that no one who continues therein can enter into the kingdom of God. (2.) Because all are by nature the children of wrath. . . .

. . . (5.) Because the root of all sins cannot itself be innocent before God.'" (Pp. 423, 424.)

The endeavor of this learned and excellent man (as also of Budæus, above cited) to place the natural relation of Adam before the moral in regard to the imputation of the first sin to his posterity, is a plain and unauthorized departure from the common faith; though by no means so serious and fatal in its effects upon the evangelical system as it would be to place (as Dr. Hodge and Orellius and Catharinus have done) the moral relation before the natural in explicating this great doctrine, and so to constitute the

merely personal sin of Adam the sole ground of condemnation and consequent corruption of the race, all of which will be made fully apparent in the sequel. The Augustinian theology has always regarded the imputation of the first sin as based simultaneously and equally upon each relation; and has recognized as the ground of it not only the transgression of Adam, but our moral participation with him in his fatal apostasy.

10. J. J. RAMBACH.

In his *Kirchen-Historie des Alten Testaments* (a work of great merit) he says: "The remote effect of the first sin is the introduction of sin and death in the world. Until then sin existed only with the fallen angels. But as Adam and Eve procreated offspring, so sin came also into the world; and they could communicate and impart to their children *no other nature* (keine andere menschliche natur) *than that which is guilty and corrupt*. We may learn from this that Adam sinned not only as an individual, but as the father of the human race. (Isa. xliii. 27: *Thy first father hath sinned*.) Had he sinned only as an individual, his guilt would have been only personal; *i. e.*, it would have remained in his own person. But inasmuch as he sinned as the father of mankind, *so his guilt was hereditary*, in which it was necessary that all should participate to whom he has imparted his fallen nature. And as in this way sin entered into the world, so death, as the wages of sin, followed in its wake; so that all the sons of Adam *are guilty and sinners by nature, and likewise mortal*."¹

The prayer at the close of his first *Meditation* on the sufferings of our blessed Lord commences thus: "O faithful Saviour! let the highest praise be thine for that unspeakable love which induced thee in thy high and adorable person to pursue that painful course on which our redemption depends, and to retire into a garden, there to expiate the sins which we in a garden had committed by our first father Adam."²

11. J. A. ERNESTI.

"The sin of Adam descends to all his posterity, partly through propagation, partly through the imputation of the first sin; which is clearly apparent from Romans v. 12, 14, 15, 19. The ground of the first is the natural relation of Adam as their original parent;

¹ See Tom. I. pp. 73, 74. (Frankfort and Leipsic, 1737.)

² Betrachtungen über das ganze Leiden Christi. (Halle, 1757.)

but of the second, is the relation of all mankind to Adam as their representative."¹

12. J. A. H. TITTMAN.

We conclude the catalogue of these citations with the following statement from this profound and learned exegete, whom no man who has a proper respect for his own reputation will accuse of uttering Pantheistic nonsense.

He says: "Let us now consider, therefore, the case of man's being made sinners. *No one, I apprehend, can be so wanting in proper regard to divine justice and holiness as to suppose that all men are made sinners merely by the offence of Adam, and without any blame of their own; i. e.*, no one can naturally look upon all men as sinners in the judgment of God merely because of Adam's offence, or as rendered miserable not on account of their own sin, but because Adam once sinned." It is obvious from this that Tittman had not the slightest conception that the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin had ever been taught in the Lutheran Church; and yet Dr. Hodge peremptorily claims that communion in support of his theory!

Tittman continues as follows: "As to the distinction made by former theologians between the imputation of guilt and punishment, I fear this cannot remove the objections which lie against imputation of any kind; for what difference can there be between being punished as if a man were criminal, and being regarded as in fact a criminal? But Paul has removed all ground of doubt as to the passage before us by what he says in verse 12. After declaring that death comes upon all from the time that Adam sinned, *lest any one should doubt for what reason it came upon all, he immediately adds, 'Because all have sinned.'*

"It follows from this that throughout the whole passage *man's own culpability is not to be excluded; we are punished for our own sins*. For although by the offence of Adam death came into the world, yet this death is not of the nature of punishment for individual offences. Upon all such as receive the pardon of their offences, and are by faith made partakers of a new spirit, death does not come as a *punishment*, although it still reigns, as it did over those 'who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression.'

¹ Cited in Baumgarten's Streitig., Tom. II., p. 430. (Halle, 1763.)

"In view of all this we may now say that the meaning of Paul, when he declares that *all men are made sinners by the disobedience of one*, must be quite plain; for the word sinners (*ἁμαρτολοι*) *cannot mean merely such as are exposed to sin, or inclined to sin by a kind of necessity, or by nature*. It denotes such as are polluted in their sinful habits and connections; miserable on account of the sins they have committed, and therefore obnoxious, *i. e.*, exposed to divine punishment; *dead in trespasses; by nature children of wrath*. Such all have become through the disobedience of one man (*ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον*), *because all men have sinned*."¹

In his admission here of the force of the objections "to imputation of any kind," Tittman refers to those views of imputation alluded to by him in the concluding part of the same sentence, *i. e.*, that there can be no imputation to us of that which is really ours. He himself throughout these extracts contends for the doctrine substantially as entertained by the leading divines of his church, for he affirms *that we all are constituted veritable sinners, because we all sinned in Adam*, and are all made sinners (*ἁμαρτολοι*) through the disobedience of the one.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

Such, then, is the testimony of the Reformed and Lutheran communions in respect to this great fundamental truth in the theology of the Reformation,—a truth which, though formulated in the days of Augustine, had been recognized in its controlling power by the family of Christ ever since their reception of the inspired utterances of Paul. And thus do her members with one voice utterly repudiate the theory which Dr. Hodge would claim to be the very doctrine which they have taught. His theory and exegesis, that is, as dogmatically presented and insisted on by himself, are nowhere at any time found asserted by any representative divine of either communion; nor can he furnish a solitary reference to any such divine who has inculcated them. Why, then, are our walls, at his injunction, to be taken down, in order to admit this wooden horse, with all its concealed forces of desolation and destruction, while those who would raise the voice of warning are

¹ See *Tract on the Obedience of Christ*, translated from the Latin by Prof. Stuart, and published in the *American Biblical Repository* for July, 1836.

made offenders, and are hooted down and strangled by the serpent and his brood!

Dr. Julius Müller, whose learning and candor none will question, presents the following statement of the doctrine as originally received and always taught by the Protestant communions; and we request our readers to compare his delineation with the statement so constantly presented in the foregoing catalogues of citations. He says: "This, therefore, is the point at which all the threads of the orthodox doctrine of hereditary sin meet, in which it must be dogmatically justified, if it is at all capable of such justification. It first of all appears as something quite incredible that in the fall of Adam *all his natural posterity are supposed to have some participation*. If now it may be shown that this is only the paradox which every deeper connexion of things has for ordinary thinking, then all further difficulties of the dogma become involved of themselves.

"We must therefore regard it as a laudable testimony for the acuteness and systematic thoroughness of our older theologians that they cognize this point in its great significance, without, on the other hand, concealing from themselves that it can indeed only have this significance as an explanatory principle of the real determinations which, from the fall of our first parents, diffused themselves over the entire race of their posterity. According to the *modus docendi*, prevalent in the old Protestant dogmatic, the connection of our culpability with the fall of our first parents is a double one, *mediate* and *immediate*. The corruption of human nature which has arisen in *consequence* of this fall, which indeed, at the time of their fall only has real existence in them, they transmit by generation to their children, and these again to their descendants; so that all mankind, from the commencement of their existence, bear in them a constitutional character which objectively strives against the law of God (*Mediata peccati Adamatici imputatio*.) But also *immediately* have all the descendants of Adam with him *made themselves guilty in his fall*. They are regarded by God as such; who have committed the very act by which Adam fell (*immediata peccati Adamatici imputatio*); by the Reformed theologians also denominated *imputatio antecedens*, in distinction from the *imputatio mediata* as *consequens*; but they are therefore regarded as such because they have really taken

part in that act. This immediate imputation of the fall has its real basis in the propagation of the natural corruption. But Quenstedt, on the other hand, definitely recognizes that the participation in the punishment of the fall, to which the loss of the divine image and the dominion of evil lust most essentially belong, is conditioned by participation in the guilt of the fall."¹

The doctrine of the Church, therefore, beyond all question is, that the guilt of the first sin is charged upon the posterity of Adam because they are veritably guilty of having participated in that sin. It is charged upon them, not by a legal fiction forensically constituting it theirs, but divine justice lays it to their charge because it is theirs. The charge is not fictitious, or the utterance merely of a determination to treat them as sinners, and as if they were actually guilty, but a sentence pronounced in accordance with actually existing facts. *They are guilty, and therefore are condemned.* They are sinners, corrupted and polluted, and therefore are treated accordingly. The imputation, or condemnatory sentence, does in no sense of the word produce the guilt, or is in any sense of the word the cause of it. Such is the invariable teaching of the Church of God, and thus impressively and thoroughly does she disclaim and repudiate that whole theory and exegesis which Dr. Hodge, to the impending subversion of our Church theology, has been during many years inculcating upon her rising ministry as the doctrine of the Church and of the word of God.

We ought, perhaps, out of regard to the patience of our readers here conclude Part II. of this discussion. But we feel that it can hardly be regarded as complete without a fuller elucidation than we have yet been able to give of a single point, which through Dr. Hodge's treatment of it has become considerably mystified, and we therefore devote to its consideration the following section.

§ 14. ADAM'S PERSONAL SIN AND THE FIRST SIN.

The distinction clearly and constantly observable in the theology of the Reformation touching the proposition announced in the caption of this section is repeatedly glanced at in our previous

¹ *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Vol. II., pp. 364, 365. We have not access to the original of this masterly treatise, and have quoted from the translation (which, though greatly labored, seems to be quite inadequate), by the Rev. William Pulsford.

citations, and by our theologians it has never been considered a very scholarly procedure (in treating the doctrine before us) to represent the expressions "Adam's sin" and "the first sin" as meaning nothing more than the mere *peccatum alienum*, or personal sin of Adam. The Pelagians and early Arminians, and subsequently several of the scholastics, and still later Pighius and Catharinus, with those of the Socinian and Remonstrant schools, had all suffered shipwreck in the attempt to identify the two, and yet there is no point in the whole discussion on which Dr. Hodge has more imperiously and proscriptively dogmatized than on this. Nor is it, perhaps, after all very surprising; for, having gratuitously accepted his theory and exegesis as Calvinistic, nothing is more certain than the fact, that should he fail to establish this assumed identity, his whole apparatus goes overboard—tackle, anchors, compass, and all—and sinks hopeless below all fathomable soundings. Hence all the resources of which he can avail himself have been again and again laid under oppressive contribution in order to bear against the very supposition that in the Augustinian theology *the first sin*, or Adam's sin, can possibly mean anything other than Adam's personal sin,—a *peccatum alienum* to the race,—and that consequently in no intelligible, or even conceivable, sense can the race be said to have sinned in the first fall, except putatively. For example, he says: "The only possible way in which all men can be said to have sinned in Adam is putatively."¹ "There are penal evils which come upon men antecedent to any transgression of their own; and as the infliction of those evils implies a violation of law, it follows that they are regarded and treated as sinners on the ground of the disobedience of another."² "The interpretation, therefore, which we put upon the phrase in question ['because all sinned'] is possible. But further, it is the only interpretation which, with a shadow of reason, can be put upon it in our standards."³ "Human nature, apart from human persons, cannot act, and therefore cannot contract guilt or be responsible."⁴ Rather a summary method this of disposing of the old Augustinian canon, *Primum persona infecit naturam, sed post natura infecit personam*—a canon recognized and adopted by the entire Church of the Reformation.

¹ Revised Commentary on Romans, page 204.

² Ibid., p. 252.

³ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 187.

⁴ Theology, Vol. II., p. 536.

Again, says Dr. Hodge: "A sin of which it is impossible that we should be conscious as our voluntary act can no more be the ground of punishment *as our act* than the sin of an idiot, or a madman, or of a corpse. . . . The assumption that we acted thousands of years before we were born, so as to be personally responsible for such act, is a monstrous assumption. It is, as Baur says, an unthinkable proposition," etc.¹ In assuming such a position, Dr. Hodge, as it seems to us, has left to himself no alternative but either frankly to retrace the fatal step, or content himself with being regarded as having *ipso facto* forsaken the Church doctrine of original sin for the Pelagian and Socinian scheme.

The citations presented in our previous sections, while confirming the propositions under which they are severally adduced, evince likewise the inadmissibility of any assumption which would confound the first sin with Adam's merely personal sin. Yet in view of the reiterated and vehement assertions of Dr. Hodge since the appearance of my former essay, and of his attempts by denunciation and sarcasm to ignore any further discussion of the issue involved—an issue, moreover, which he himself had raised in our Church—we shall now invite attention to a few specific testimonies bearing directly upon the question specifically before us.

The point referred to ought not to have been thus treated and ignored by that gentleman. The late Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge had, in his *Theology*, taken direct issue with him thereon, and his attention was, moreover, specifically and repeatedly called to it in my own essay.² And then, still further, in the effort to sustain himself herein Dr. Hodge has directly reversed and so ignored the doctrine of the Reformation, that the ground of the imputation of the first sin is, that it was a sin common alike to our first parents and their posterity, and has sought to substitute in lieu of this fundamental truth the unsustained and fatally erroneous theory that the basis, in view of the natural and federal relation, was Adam's personal guilt alone, which was made common to the race by being imputed to them—a substitution which must, by an inexorable logic, carry with it a radical and essential abandonment of

¹ *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 223-234.

² See Dr. Breckinridge's *Knowledge of God Objectively Considered*, pp. 428, 429. And likewise the *Danville Review*, for 1862, pp. 558-561, and many other places of the essay published therein.

the whole system of evangelical doctrine. He has not even approximated a discussion of the point at issue with the persons referred to (to say nothing of others), and the only apparent approach to such discussion is the trivial attempt he has made to associate their theological position with one or another philosophical theory, and so strike at it under his own imposed mask, though at the same time he had the fullest evidence before him, in scores of their decided and unambiguous utterances, that they disclaim and repudiate all philosophical attempts to elucidate or establish the doctrine of our participation in the first sin, as fully and as decidedly as they do such attempts to elucidate or establish the doctrine of the Trinity itself. And, moreover, that they claim to rest it upon the plain and simple utterance of divine inspiration, and which they accept from the Holy Spirit as an explanatory principle, to wit: *Adam sinned and all sinned; and death passed upon all, inasmuch as all sinned*. And thus, while they affirm that the very sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, they no less decidedly affirm that we participated in that sin, and are condemned on account of the guilt thus contracted.

Dr. Hodge, therefore, has merely evaded, and that not in the most scholarly method, the discussion of the subject in that very aspect of it which now so deeply affects the best interests of the Church of which both he and I are members; and so refuses, moreover, to meet the question as applied to the issue, *whether the facts of revelation are to be accepted as facts?* or may be rejected if our philosophy, or so-called "*intuitions*," should refuse to concur in so regarding them? The Church during ten years has been kept in expectation of a scholarly and ingenuous treatment of issues which he himself was the first to raise within her pale, but would now ignore—issues which bring his theory and utterances, as applied by himself, into direct conflict with the published announcements of the ablest and most revered of her sons during the past centuries, while he attempts to satisfy this her reasonable expectation by a bald and threadbare reiteration of his previous and unsupported allegations.

Has the Church, then, regarded the expressions, *Adam's sin* and *the first sin*, so far at least as concerns its imputation to posterity, as meaning nothing more than Adam's personal sin? This is here the question. What say her own approved divines in answer?

THE CITATIONS.

1. MARTIN BUCER and PETER MARTYR, each distinctly employ the following words on the subject: "When, therefore, the apostle appears to assert that the sin for which we are condemned is not another's, but our own, he means that the sin of Adam was not so the sin of another but that it was our own also." (Comment. in Rom. v.) Here, then, the sin which was imputed, and for which "the judgment unto condemnation" came upon both Adam and his posterity, is plainly affirmed to be not his personal sin alone. Their testimony therefore is that the first sin was not, as Dr. Hodge maintains, merely Adam's personal sin.

2. To the like purport speaks D. G. SOHNUS: "In one respect it was the sin of Adam; . . . in another respect it was the sin of his posterity, who were in his loins, so that they committed the same sin, AND HENCE IT WAS IMPUTED TO THEM ALL." "On this text (Rom. v. 12) it is worthy of remark that it is not only asserted that the punishment of death has passed upon all men, but the reason is added, namely, 'because all have sinned, so that the fault and punishment of the guilt and pollution are by the apostle joined together.'"

3. BENEDICT TURRETIN.

Our readers will observe the direct reference by this divine and the one next cited to the recognized theology of the Church. He says: "OUR CONFESSIONS include under original sin the communion (literally, mutual participation) we have in the first sin, and the loss of original righteousness and purity which we have sustained, and the inherent corruption of the soul; or, as Pareus had previously expressed it, "*Participatio culpæ, imputatio reatus, propagatio naturalis pravitatis*,"—statements which, as we have shown, appear to be the origin of the one given in answer to Question 18 of the Shorter Catechism.

4. ISAAC JUNIUS, of Delft.

"In the sum of the matter ALL THE REFORMED CHURCHES AGREE, and teach with unanimous consent, in accordance with the sacred Scriptures and the universal agreement of antiquity—first, THAT THE SIN OF ADAM WAS NOT A PERSONAL SIN, BUT OF THE WHOLE HUMAN RACE, inasmuch as they were all included in the loins of Adam, and in Adam, the root of the whole human race, they sinned; secondly, that there was also transfused a principle contrary

to original righteousness, contracted from Adam in the first transient act of his sin, and propagated by means of generation to all his posterity, so that all men by nature are guilty of death, averse from God and divine things, and inclined to evil."

5. CHAMIER.¹

"The very sin of Adam, I say, his own personal disobedience, must be imputed to his posterity. And so, also, in regard to the personal obedience of Christ, because the whole human race was considered in Adam by nature." "Hence it comes to pass that we are not only made sinners through Adam, but are declared to have sinned in him, WHICH IS A VERY DIFFERENT THING. (Inde factum, ut non tantum per Adamum peccatores facti sunt omnes, sed et in ipso peccasse dicantur quod longè aliud est.)"

6. LAMBERT DANÆUS, referring to the fall of our first parents, says: "The first sin rendered them guilty before God; then the corruption was transferred to us: on account of this inbeing in us we are now guilty, as infected with our own depravity—vile and spotted, hateful to God, not only in Adam, but as we are viewed as the fountain and root of the human race; but as we are considered in ourselves, and from ourselves corrupted."

7. ZANCHIUS says: "But the apostle teaches that all men were in Adam when he also says that in him all sinned: to wit, potentially and originally; not by act or actually (*δυνάμει* et originaliter, non actu seu actualiter.) So, too, it appears that all souls were in Adam, in a certain way, as in the root of the whole human race. . . . Now we hold that souls (which are not transmitted from Adam as to their substance), are yet said to have been and to have sinned in Adam; seeing, to wit, that men have been in Adam and have sinned in him as in the original beginning and root. . . . Hence, also, we are truly said to have been and to have sinned in Adam, because in him all men have sinned. Original sin, therefore, is not so the proper sin of Adam but that it is the common sin of all men: non ita proprium est Adæ quin omnium hominum sit commune."²

8. JOHN PISCATOR, of Herborn.

"Original sin is the apostasy (defectio) of all the natural heirs

¹ See in *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 271 seq., a brief sketch of this great divine.

² De Peccato Originis, Thesib. 3 and 4, Opp. Tom. IV., p. 49, seq.

of Adam, who being in his loins *revolted from God to the devil*, and the corruption or vitiosity of nature inflicted on man by the just judgment of God on account of the apostasy." (Comment. in Rom. vii. 7.) "The apostle speaks especially of that first sin which our first parents committed in Paradise, *and we together with them*; et nos unà cum illis." (Comment. in Rom. v. 12.)

9. DAVID PAREUS, of Heidelberg.

"It is manifest, therefore, that the apostle assigned this reason why all men die—*because all have sinned*—evidently to prove the existence of original sin in all men, Christ excepted (He not being naturally begotten from Adam), and that it is truly sin *because all have truly sinned in Adam*, (quia omnes verè peccaverunt in Adam). . . . He had said in verse 12, that all sinned, and here (verse 19) that all were made guilty." (Comment. in Rom. v.)

10. DRELLINGCOURT, Pastor, in Paris.

"The sin of Adam was imputed to us because we all sinned in Adam."

11. JOHN OWEN.

"In respect to our wills, we were not thus innocent neither, for we all sinned in Adam, as the apostle affirmeth. . . . Now, be this punishment what it will, never so small, yet, if we have no demerit of our own, nor interest in Adam's sin, it is such an act of injustice as we must reject from the most holy with a God forbid!"

12. ANDREW WILLETS.

In his *Hexapla or Sixfold Commentarie on Romans*, a work in high repute with his cotemporaries, both in England and on the continent, he says, in response to Bellarmin and others: "We have better reasons out of the Scriptures to refute this assertion; for where there is no sin death hath no power; because all are sinners by nature, they all die; otherwise the apostle had not reasoned well *that death reigned from Adam to Moses, because all had sinned* (verse 14); and (verse 19) the apostle saith that by one man's disobedience many are *peccatores constituti*, made sinners, *which is more than to be counted sinners, or to have sin imputed*. . . . If there were not in us original sin by nature of our own, but only Adam's imputed, *it would follow that his posterity should be punished not for their own, but for another's sin*; WHICH WERE AGAINST THE RULE OF GOD'S JUSTICE." He also cites Peter Martyr as likewise affirming the same. (Page 275.)

14. FRANCIS TURRETIN.

"From this it appears that *the sin of Adam was not peculiar to himself, but common to the whole nature, since on account of it punishment has passed upon all*." (De Satisfac., Par. I., § 33.)

15. HERMAN WITSIUS.

"By these words, ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἡμαρτον, he gives the reason why he had asserted that by the sin of one man death passed upon all. This, says he, ought not to astonish you, *for all have sinned*." Can any serious man possibly suppose that this and the numberless similar declarations by Calvinistic divines in explicating the doctrine of original sin were designed to convey the idea that we ought not to be astonished that God inflicts the most fearful punishments upon the race, *inasmuch as He first inflicts guilt upon them so as to furnish a pretext for their punishment*? This is the gratuitous imputation scheme. But would it be calculated to allay our astonishment at the conduct of an individual who had set his dogs upon a neighbor and torn him in pieces to have him say, "There is no ground for astonishment in the matter, for I first clothed my neighbor in the skin of a wild beast, and then set my dogs on him, and of course they tore him to pieces."

16. JOHN HENRY HEIDEGGER.

This eminent divine, being substantially the author of the *Helvetian Consensus*, his views on the subject before us possess no little interest. Our readers will doubtless be gratified to have a passage from him in his own language. He says, "Vera autem imputatio peccati Adamici corruptionem posterorum insitam, tanquam causa hujus meritoria, antecedit, non sequitur. Non enim primum peccatum nobis imputatur, quia corrupti nascimur, sed corrupti nascimur, quia primum peccatum nobis ad corruptionem et condemnationem imputatur. In eo enim imputatio consistit, quod Deus peccante Adamo judicavit, posteros ejus, utpote peccato eidem implicitos, non esse dignos imagine sua, sed potius poena omni, qua Adamum peccantem plexit; adeoque etiam spirituali morte plectandos."¹ In what conceivable sense, then, could it be supposed that Heidegger could have regarded the first sin, or Adam's sin, as importing nothing more than Adam's personal sin? And to prove that the Church herself entertained such a notion, Dr. Hodge has very often referred to the *Formula Consensus*.

¹ See De Moor, Vol. III., pp. 277, 278, and also our § 13, A., No. 6, above.

We conclude the section by adducing a few names of later date.

17. DE MOOR in no way departs from the same representation. He says, "*We have violated (the covenant) in our representative; hence, on account of the fault committed in Adam (culpam in Adamo commissam) and imputed to us, we all are deservedly punished; merito punimur.*" (*Perpet. Com., Tom. III., p. 285.*)

18. WITHERSPOON, President of Nassau Hall.

Referring to Romans v. 12-19, he says, "And, indeed, when we consider *the universality of the effects of the fall*, it is not to be accounted for in any other way than from Adam's being the federal head of the human race, *and they sinning in and falling with him in his first transgression.*"¹

19. ROBERT HALDANE.

"If, then, all are condemned by that sin, all must be guilty of it, for the righteous Judge would not condemn the innocent. To say that any are punished or condemned for Adam's sin who are not guilty of it, is to accuse the righteous God of injustice. Can God impute to any man anything that is not true? If Adam's sin is not ours as truly as it was Adam's, could God impute it to us? Does God deal with men as sinners while they are not truly such?"²

20. PHILIP SCHAFF, referring to *ἐν ᾧ* in Romans v. 12, remarks, "I prefer the translation *so far as, inasmuch as*, which gives good sense in all the Pauline passages. . . . It is not so much a causal as a qualifying and conditioning conjunction, (a relative or modified *ἐν*), which in our passage shows more clearly the connection of death with sin. *It implies that a moral participation of all men in the sin of Adam is the medium or cause of their death*, just as faith on our part is the moral condition of our participation of Christ's life. It is unfavorable to the doctrine of *gratuitous* imputation. The legal act of imputation is not arbitrary and unconditioned, *but rests on a moral ground and an objective reality.*"³

21. DORNER, of Berlin, referring to the same subject, says: "There is, then, *a sin of the race in which all participate*, but which is not wrought with *personal* guilt. Hence the universality

of sin in every individual. *The character of this sin of the race is moral worthlessness* and evil, but it is not of such a nature as to determine the destiny of the individual. Each member of the race is also personally accountable. Personal guilt is impossible without the racial sin, and is therefore without necessary universality."¹

Thus is the moral and objective ground for this imputation affirmed by the Church, and thus is the broad distinction between *the first sin*, or *Adam's sin*, and Adam's *merely personal sin*, the invariable teaching of the Church. She pronounces the guilt of the race in that first transgression to be real, subjective, and universal. And though she often speaks of the sin as Adam's sin, she utterly repudiates the conception so insisted on by Dr. Hodge, and on which his whole theory leans for support, that it was the sin of Adam only. I repeat, then, again, that vital and fundamental truth, affecting the whole system of the doctrines of grace, is involved in the issue thus presented, and now imperatively forced upon the Church; nor can she shrink from the sacred obligation of meeting that issue, and of giving a clear and decided utterance in relation to it, except at infinite peril of proving recreant to the hallowed trust reposed in her by her glorious and exalted Head.

¹ See Outlines of Dr. Dorner's System of Theology, (translated by Professor Hall, of Antioch College,) published in the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* for 1873, page 67.

¹ Works, Vol. IV., page 96.

² Commentary on Romans, page 217.

³ See Scribner's edition of Lange on Romans, page 177.

• PART III.

IN WHICH ARE CONSIDERED THE GROUNDS ALLEGED BY DR. HODGE IN DEFENCE OF HIS THEORY, TOGETHER WITH THE RESULTS WHICH MUST LOGICALLY ACCRUE FROM ITS RECEPTION.

§ 15. REMARKS ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT.

THERE is one position assumed and greatly insisted on by Dr. Hodge in the previous efforts to sustain his theory and exegesis, but in respect to which the ten years' examination preceding the issue of his Lectures (see our § 1 above) has obviously compelled him to forego; that is, it has convinced him (as it doubtless must have convinced any man) that the doctrine which he claims to be Augustinian on the subject before us is not taught either in any creed of the churches of the Reformation, or in the theology of their approved divines. Any one, however, who will compare his previous publications on this topic with his last, cannot but discover that in the last he has failed utterly to adduce any authoritative theological announcement in support of those imperious dogmatic utterances which are so constantly appearing in the former. Calvin, Rivetus, Owen, Turretin, Heidegger, and even the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, all of which play so conspicuous a part in the former, are found to be "*exerunt omnes*" in the latter, —that is, they are no longer adduced on the subject before us, (though, perhaps, referred to on others); for to any competent mind a fair investigation must evince how entire is their want of sympathy with the dogma of the gratuitous imputation of sin. Dr. Hodge can specify no approved divines of our communion who have taught that theory, though he still claims that the Church has always regarded it as her recognized doctrine.

No dispute has existed between Princeton and Danville on the question whether pain, sickness, death, and the other evils we here suffer, result to us as the penal consequence of the first transgres-

sion; but the point in issue is, *whether those evils are punishments for Adam's merely personal sin, or peccatum alienum?* And this point, though certainly it is sufficiently apparent, Dr. Hodge has alike failed either to apprehend or to appreciate. Let it be observed, then, that in Adam's case his sin produced these evils to himself. This, of course, will not be denied. Did, then, his merely personal sin, or *culpa*, alone, bring them likewise upon his posterity? Or was it his sin with their participation therein that brought them upon the posterity, as his own personal offence brought them upon himself? The reader, we hope, will pardon this repetitious particularity; for it is our purpose that in no future attempt at an intelligent discussion of the theme the actual issue shall be again ignored in the way it has been by Princeton. In the Calvinistic church, until lately, there never has been any denial of this participation, or any dispute in regard to it. She has ever considered the guilt of Adam and of his posterity, through communion or mutual participation, as the procuring cause of all the evils referred to. And when the conception of a federal or representative relation was, by Cocceius (1669), more fully elaborated with a view to the elucidation of the doctrine, *the true idea was, not that the guilt of the representative was charged upon the represented to constitute them sinners* (as Dr. Hodge so preposterously imagines), *but that it was charged because the guilt was common alike to them and to their representative.*

In view of these facts, each of which is susceptible of actual demonstration, it is impossible to conceive what Dr. Hodge should expect to realize by assuming, and even insisting upon the assumption, that they are in fundamental error who reject his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, and that he should further affirm that history shows that they who do this are ultimately led to reject the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of the righteousness of Christ for justification. This remark is calculated to make a deep impression upon the mind of the uninformed but pious believer in proportion as the authority is relied on from which it emanates, and also to do an inconceivable amount of injury to such if false. Dr. Hodge has, however, assumed, and must now sustain, the responsibility of giving it utterance, and we shall proceed to lay before our readers his reasons for doing so.

In our former essay we took occasion kindly to admonish Dr.

Hodge that such representations were unauthorized, and had no ground to sustain them; that they were offensive, and that if reiterated he might with reason expect the errors of his theory, which required such allegations in its support, to be exposed more unsparingly than had been already done.¹ But he was deaf to the intimation, and has, nevertheless, without stint and most offensively, repeated them, both in his Revised Commentary and in his Theology; and thus has left us no alternative except either to admit such inaccurate and uncalled for accusations against the theology of the Church and its supporters, or to demonstrate their injustice by a clear exposé of the fallacious representations upon which they are attempted to be sustained; and so to rescue the Church, if not already too late, from that fearful and now impending apostasy of doctrine into which she must inevitably sink if such statements are to be accepted as truly expressing her fundamental principles.

In order to justify this his representation, Dr. Hodge, in his Theology,² repeats what he had in substance affirmed many times previously in support of his gratuitous imputation scheme, that "the Protestant theologians agree in holding that 'imputatio justitiæ Christi et culpæ Adami pari passu ambulat, et vel utraque sint vel utraque agnosci debet,'" and gives De Moor³ as authorizing the representation. This is one of those astounding perversions of authorities which are found so frequently occurring in Dr. Hodge, and which lead the mind of the intelligent reader to pause, and wonder whether heedlessness or design could have prompted it. The unlearned reader is deceived by an apparent array of facts and authoritative statements, when in fact the whole representation is entirely deceptive and unauthorized. De Moor has no more held and taught the theory of the Adamic sin which Dr. Hodge holds and ascribes to him than he held and taught the doctrines of the Mormons; and yet he is here brought forward as a weighty authority inculcating that very scheme, and then, moreover, as affirming that a denial of it must lead to a denial of the imputation of Christ's righteousness for our justification. But let us proceed:

Having had some acquaintance with De Moor, and never having obtained therefrom the impression that he had lent any counten-

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1862, page 562. ² Vol. III., page 207.

³ Comment. Perpet. in Marck, Tom. III., pp. 255, *et seq.*

ance to such a theory as the gratuitous imputation of sin, I at once turned to his work, and as the affair, in view of Dr. Hodge's aforesaid representation, is one of very grave importance, I here lay before our readers as briefly as possible the result.

The context of the passage quoted by Dr. Hodge properly begins with Section 31, (see our last marginal reference,) in which he explicates the proposition or *thesis* that the cause of the corruption of the race is the guilt of Adam imputed to his posterity, and upon which he thus remarks:

"1. If we all die in Adam, we have therefore all sinned in Adam. But the former is true. *Ergo*: The reason of the major proposition is, that *death* is not inflicted without *sin*, nor *punishment* without *crime*. But as we all could not sin in Adam otherwise than as we were reckoned in and represented by him, so neither could we *die* in him unless on account of the imputation of his crime by which we are constituted guilty." The continuation is as follows:

"2. *Quomodo in Christo vivificamur, ita in Adamo morimur.* In Christo vivificamur tum per ipsius *demeritum* facta institutiæ Christi nobis imputatione, tum vera efficientia per Spiritus ipsius vivifici virtutem. Similiter in Adamo morimur tum per *demeritum* culpæ Adami nobis imputatum, et contractum hinc nobis omnibus mortis reatum; tum ratione *efficientiæ*, quia ab Adamo mors Spiritualis sive corruptio, quæ morti ulteriori nos subjecit ad nos propagatur. DUO VERO ILLA UTI IN VIVIFICATIONE PER CHRISTUM, ITA NEC IN MORTE PER ADAMUM AD NOS DELETA SEJUNGI A INVICEM DEBENT." That is, in brief: "As in our vivification through Christ the imputation of His righteousness is not to be severed from the efficacious or regenerating operation of the Holy Spirit, so in our death through Adam the imputation of his guilt to us is not to be severed from our inward corruption. In each case the two are to be regarded as co-existing." And having thus clearly explained the topic, he cites Rom. v. 12-19 in proof of the accuracy of the representation; and in remarking on this passage employs the expression which, as above stated, Dr. Hodge has inaccurately quoted from him, and the sense of which is, "*And therefore* the imputation of the righteousness of Christ (as just explained) and the imputation of the offence of Adam (as just explained) proceed with equal pace; so that either they must

be both alike abandoned, or be both alike maintained." A remark the truth of which no candid explorer of the past can deny.

By citing the passage as an independent statement, and omitting the first two words which give the reader the inferential nature of the statement, Dr. Hodge has thus far divested it of its just force and application to the case in hand. De Moor presents it in the form of a *sequence from the exposition or explanation which he had just presented*—"ADEOQUE imputatio," etc.—"AND THEREFORE the imputation," etc.; that is, *the doctrine of imputation as he had just defined it* (and not as errorists had attempted to represent it.) In other words, not the imputation of righteousness severed from renewal by the Holy Spirit, nor the imputation of the offence of Adam severed from inherent corruption, *but with these included and co-existing*. These are the two imputations which proceed hand in hand, and of which the acceptance or rejection of either is the logical forerunner of the acceptance or rejection of both. Such is transparently the meaning of the remark whose import Dr. Hodge has so misconceived and entirely reversed, and then applies the statement itself to prove that "the Protestant theologians agree" in holding, *that if his own monstrous doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin* (which does confessedly and logically separate the two things in both cases, by making regeneration a *consequence* of justification, and inherent depravity a *consequence* of the imputation of Adam's personal guilt¹), be rejected, that rejection must be followed by an abandonment of the doctrine of justification through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.²

It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary to dwell upon the point, but taking into consideration the grave importance of the subject-

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 341, and the note in Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 194.

² In the course of the argument in our former essay it became our painful duty to point out a number of like instances of careless misapprehension and perversion of his authorities by Dr. Hodge. Dr. Schaff likewise, in his notes on Rom. v. (see Scribner's edition of Lange on Romans), has been under the necessity of adverting to others not less humiliating. And certainly, such things should have awakened a degree of caution sufficient to guard against a recurrence of the like, in any subsequent publication at least, in matters involving interests of such transcendent importance to the souls of men and to the Church of God.

matter itself, as remarked above, we shall add a few words in relation thereto.

Could anything, for example, be more unreasonable than that I should claim to hold the latter of these two imputations, *i. e.*, that on account of the fall of our first parents, as *inseparably connected* with our own inherent sin, hereditary depravity and guilt came upon their posterity, while I at the same time should insist that the merely personal sin of Adam *is the sole cause of their inherent corruption*? Would not the latter affirmation really nullify and subvert the former, by tracing the whole of the existing evil to the *peccatum alienum* as the alone procuring cause, and to the exclusion of depravity as any part of the cause? In what possible sense, then, could I claim to recognize *both* as unitedly or inseparably constituting the cause? In what sense, or by what rules of reasoning, could I maintain that the personal sin of Adam, conjoined with our own depravity, procured the evils we suffer from the fall, and at the same time allege that this very depravity itself is one of the evils which, along with all the others, the personal sin of Adam has brought upon us? Moral corruption, spiritual death, etc., says Dr. Hodge, do not come upon us for our own demerit or subjective guilt, but are inflicted upon the race by punitive justice for the *peccatum alienum* of Adam; and at the same time he claims to maintain that *both inherent corruption and imputed sin are the procuring cause of those evils*.

Is this attempt nonsense? It certainly sounds very much like it. But let us survey it in the light of a brief illustration.

A nobleman, for example, is convicted and attainted of high treason, and, as a consequence, brings the attainder upon his innocent offspring. A writer, on undertaking to explain the ground of these their sufferings, says, "Properly speaking, there were two grounds which constituted the procuring cause of their condemnation and other evils, and those grounds were, *first*, their father's attainder; and *secondly*, their own." Would there be any reason or sense in this, seeing that their father's attainder, and nothing else, was the procuring cause of their own? And so, if I affirm that Adam's personal sin is, by a divine sentence, the procuring cause of the moral corruption and condemnation of his posterity, in what conceivable sense can I claim also to hold that Adam's sin *and* our own corruption are alike the procuring cause of our con-

demnation and other evils? or to hold, as the Church of God has always held, that corruption and guilt are both derived by ordinary generation from Adam? Would not such language be plainly deceptive? All our previous citations evince that the Church now holds, and ever has held on this subject, *not that Adam alone incurred the wrath or displeasure of God by his sin*, and that his posterity *deserved that displeasure merely because he deserved it*; this never was her doctrine, but a doctrine she has ever indignantly disclaimed and condemned; but the doctrine, as she has ever entertained and taught it, is thus expressed in the *Form of Concord*: “Repudiantur Pelagianorum falsæ opiniones quod peccatum originale sit tantum reatus seu culpa, quæ ex aliena transgressione absque ulla naturæ corruptione sit contracta;” *i. e.*, “We reject the false opinions of the Pelagians, to-wit: that original sin is only the guilt or criminality which has been contracted from a foreign transgression, without any corruption of nature.” But while she repudiates these *falsæ opiniones* (which logic itself can never discriminate from the theory of Dr. Hodge), she did hold, and always has held, that we likewise deserve the sentence of condemnation, *because we participated with our first parents in their sin*. So that this imputation, being a sentence of condemnation, has been by the Lutheran and Calvinistic communions always based upon the equal recognition and simultaneousness both of Adam’s sin and our own inherent sin, both alike being imputed for condemnation.

But, says Dr. Hodge, if you bring into the imputation of Adam’s sin for condemnation the element of the subjective desert of his seed, you must likewise introduce subjective desert into the imputation of righteousness to Christ’s seed for justification. This, however, is a baseless assumption. He claims to find reason for it in the equally unfounded assertion that the *modes* of the transmission of both sin and righteousness are a part of the Pauline analogy, in Rom. v. 12–19. But this also, as we shall prove, is an assumption contrary to fact, since, as will be fully shown, the mode of transmission forms no part of the comparison therein instituted. Nor has the church of God ever so regarded it.¹ And then, further, it is sufficient, to show the wholly unfounded nature

¹ In the *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 517–540, we have established, by an abundance of unimpeachable facts (to which we shall refer in the sequel), how grievous is the mistake of Dr. Hodge in relation to this whole matter.

of this assumption, to call the reader’s attention to the fact that the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is a sentence of approval, or a gratuitous gift of pure grace or mercy to the undeserving; while, on the contrary, the imputation of the first sin is the work of punitive justice—a sentence unto condemnation—and, therefore, requires subjective demerit on the part of those who are condemned. It is not a sentence which *produces* subjective desert (which Dr. Hodge maintains, and which is simply ridiculous), but a sentence based upon and pronounced in view of actually existing facts: *the condemned are sinners, and the sentence of condemnation comes upon them because they are such*. This objection of Dr. Hodge, therefore, is, as the old Calvinists have always taught, wholly unfounded, and in direct conflict with the analogy of faith, as well as with the testimony of the divine word, and, as we have shown in our former essay, is only a reproduction in another form of the old supralapsarian sophism, that if sin be the procuring cause of reprobation, then faith and good works must be the procuring cause of election, thus confounding the divine bestowment of the gifts of mercy with the exactions of punitive justice, and referring the operations of the justice and grace of God not to his moral nature, but to his will.

The old Calvinists frequently speak of the imputation of Adam’s sin as *bringing* pollution and death to his posterity (but never of Adam’s *peccatum alienum* producing these effects), and as the *cause* of pollution and death to them; yet never losing sight of the fact above referred to by De Moor, respecting the inseparableness of the imputation from our own subjective desert on account of our participation in that sin, and in explanation of which they, moreover, in every form affirm that “*we sinned in Adam and in him willed this depravation*.” But the learned Cloppenburg, and several others in his day, seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the human intellect might be able to comprehend how we, the posterity, should *then* have *willed* to sin; and through their speculations were, *to a certain extent*, induced to fall in with the Socinian and Remonstrant conception of a merely forensic imputation of sin and guilt to the race, though still claiming that the putation was in no way, either incidentally or otherwise, *productive* of the moral corruption, *but found it already existing, and that it was traceable to the first sin through ordinary generation*.

It was not, therefore, such a forensic decision as in their view *constituted us guilty and depraved because Adam sinned*, but a forensic decision *that we are subjectively criminal on the ground of our natural and federal relation to him when he sinned*. This putation, moreover, asserted our then existing subjective guilt, but did not, as Dr. Hodge's does, claim to produce it. It simply pronounced us guilty, without pretending to explicate how the subjective guilt was contracted by us, other than that it descends to us by natural generation. In this way, therefore, they guarded the justice of God against impeachment, *since He did not produce the guilt by imputing it*, but merely charged it as already existing in the race, because Adam sinned. And thus they claimed, likewise, a subjective moral basis for the judgment unto condemnation, which the Socinian and Remonstrant schools, however, utterly rejected.

It was this supralapsarian conception—itsself a plain departure from the recognized theology—which, through an utter misapprehension, seems to have led the Princeton Professor into the Socinian error of endeavoring to base the imputation itself, or condemnatory sentence, *upon the mere relation of Adam to his posterity, without any reference to demerit or subjective desert*. But the conception that the natural and federal relation of Adam could so connect him with us, and *vice versa*, as to make us partakers with him in his condemnation, and yet not connect us subjectively or demeritoriously with his guilt by participation, though clearly elaborated by Crellius, the great leader of the Socinian school, is, nevertheless, an idea nowhere to be found in the acknowledged theology of the Reformation. Dr. Hodge can find it nowhere asserted in that theology. It comes, therefore, necessarily under the category of "*New Lightism*," and is really "an original idea in our theology." And though the Professor and other conductors of the *Princeton Review*, prompted undoubtedly by a very commendable modesty, have repeatedly and most earnestly averred that that periodical does not contain one original idea in theology,¹ we will venture the appeal to our readers in justification of our offering the suggestion whether that self-deprecating disclaimer ought not, in view of the foregoing facts, to be now withdrawn.

Let it be observed, then, that the Calvinistic church never

¹ See Index Volume to *Princeton Review*, pp. 3, 4, 9, 11. (Philadelphia, 1871.)

maintained that the personal sin of Adam was *our* personal sin, or that his sin and moral character were transferred to us, though she has ever affirmed that his sin was imputed to us, and that we were guilty of it by a mutual participation. The guilt of his sin was charged to us as participators; the guilt of the principal to those whom he represented. But this neither makes his personal act our personal act, nor his moral character ours, any farther than the like would accrue from our ecclesiastical, civil, or social representation. Our guilt and moral character are our own, and became ultimately what they are from our participation in his transgression, or sinning where he sinned. There was no personal identification further than this.

We ought also in this connection briefly to notice several other equally unaccountable misconceptions, and consequent misstatements, of Dr. Hodge, in his treatment of the theme. For, as presented by him, they have had no little effect towards leading the unwary to conclude that his theory and exegesis are truly a part of Calvinistic theology.

And first: We solicit attention to the allegation that the Lutheran divines of the Reformation concur with him as to the *penal nature* of innate, inherent depravity, because they affirm this depravity to be a penal evil. In remarking on the subject, he, in reply to any who may be supposed to deny this concurrence, asks: "If [this depravity be] penal, of what is it the punishment? Of Adam's sin. Then, if this sin be morally ours, they taught that men are punished with moral depravity for being morally depraved; they assume the existence of corruption to account for its existence! All becomes plain if you will allow these men to mean what they say they mean."¹ But in this again, Dr. Hodge merely perplexes the question through that strange inadvertency so often observable in the references to his authorities. The Lutheran divines *did*, as our preceding citations abundantly show, affirm and teach that inherent or hereditary depravity is a penal evil; *but they, one and all, most decidedly denied that it was the punishment of a peccatum alienum, or Adam's merely personal sin*. They taught that it was the punishment of Adam's sin, *and of our sin in participating with Adam*. Such, then, is the amount of *this agreement*. It consists of a *toto calo* antagonism.

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 184.

And so, too, and in the same connection, referring to the doctrine which is really the acknowledged doctrine of the Calvinistic church, he confounds it with that of a literal transfer of moral acts or character, and asks: "Does the doctrine of imputation, as taught by the old Calvinists as a body, include the idea of 'literal oneness' and transfer of moral acts or moral character?"¹ And again: "What do our standards and old Calvinists generally mean when they say 'all mankind sinned in Adam?' The expression obviously admits of two interpretations: the one, that which the Protestant and spectator would put upon it, viz.: that in virtue of 'a literal oneness' all mankind really acted in him—his act was literally our act; the other proceeds on the principle of representation—we acted in him as our representative. This latter interpretation is at least possible. . . . But further, it is the only interpretation which, with a shadow of reason, *can* be put upon it in our standards;"² to all of which I reply most emphatically, that neither the old Calvinists (as our citations from them have proved, see Sections 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14, above), nor our standards, teach the one or the other in any such sense as is here asseverated by Dr. Hodge. The old Calvinists, or Calvinistic church, as a body, have ever taught that we really, *i. e.*, morally, and not merely putatively or forensically, *sinned in and fell with Adam*, and that his guilt and our guilt, by mutual participation, were imputed or charged upon the posterity; a doctrine which neither supposes nor implies any transfer either of moral acts or of moral character; and ever since Augustine gave utterance to the celebrated formula, "Fuerunt omnes in lumbis Adami quando damnatus est; et ideò sine illis damnatus non est;"³ associated with the impressive statement, *Peccatum "antiquum quo nihil est ad prædicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius,"*⁴ this has been the position assumed by the Church.

It is also in point to enquire here, inasmuch as Dr. Hodge would explain all the aforesaid expressions of the old Reformers *forensically, juridically, and putatively*, and claims to be able to do so, (though he has wisely concluded still to postpone the attempt,)

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 185.

² See Princeton Essays, First Series, pp. 186–189.

³ Contra Julian, Pelag., lib. V., cap. 2.

⁴ De Moribus Eccles. Cat., cap. 22.

how it happens that he is so taken aback with the same expressions precisely when employed by theologians now? Even when they employ no other language than the Church from the beginning has employed to express her faith, he denounces the phraseology, and ridicules it as Pantheistic and nonsensical. And then, throughout a discussion with the *Quarterly Christian Spectator*, he insists *ad nauseam* on those explanations, and even employs thereon such language as the following: "Those gentlemen err precisely as the early opponents of the Reformers or Calvinists did, *by insisting on taking in a moral sense modes of expression which were used and meant to be understood in a judicial or forensic sense.* This is the *πρωτων φεδδους* of our New Haven brethren on this subject, and it runs through all their exhibition of their views of the old Calvinistic doctrine. In this respect they are treading, as just remarked, in the footsteps of all the early opposers of these doctrines."² The same allegations are substantially reaffirmed in his later essays and Revised Commentary, and in his Theology! But in none of them does he attempt to indicate the source to which he is indebted for such marvellous but most unfortunate representations.

It is impossible even to imagine the extent of the injury which these repeated and singularly inaccurate affirmations are calculated to effect in our Church and upon our rising ministry. But instead of here expatiating on this aspect of it, (with which our readers will be made acquainted in the sequel,) I will briefly state what no candid mind who is acquainted with the facts will attempt to deny, to-wit: 1, That the early Calvinists adopted the expressions referred to (*i. e.*, as to our having sinned when Adam sinned, and thus becoming veritable sinners), directly from the word of God; 2, That they always insisted that these expressions *are to be received in a moral sense*; 3, That when the Socinian school arose, and in its efforts to abolish the Church doctrine of original sin elaborated and insisted on the exegesis that these expressions should be received or understood only in a forensic or putative sense, aiming thus to destroy the doctrine that we participated in the first sin, the Lutherans and Calvinists with one voice repudiated both the exegesis and

¹ See, for example, Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, and Dr. Hodge's review of it in the April and October numbers of the *Princeton Review* for 1860.

² Princeton Essays, First Series, page 169.

the argument. It was therefore the "early opposers" who took the very ground against the Church doctrine which Dr. Hodge here charges the Reformers themselves with taking in its defence. "The early opposers," therefore, did not err in the manner asserted by Dr. Hodge, nor did the early Calvinists make any such reply to them as he has stated; *nor can Dr. Hodge cite any instances of the kind.* Their reply uniformly is, *that the imputation was just, and was merited by us, because we ourselves had become truly sinners in the first sin; and that the imputation itself does not constitute us guilty, but only makes it appear that we are guilty.* Such was their answer, and they repudiate the notion that the imputation was merely forensic or putative. The question as thus raised pertained to the *ground* of the imputation, not its *effects*. They affirm a *moral* ground and an *objective* reality, while their Pelagian and Socinian adversaries affirm a *forensic* or *putative* ground alone. The Reformers affirm that we, by veritably sinning in Adam, deserved the sentence of condemnation, and that this sentence was no more forensic or putative in our own case than it was in the case of our first parents themselves.

But to conclude. The points herein involved are of the deepest practical significance, and I would most earnestly entreat our ministry especially to consider that the step from a merely forensic imputation of sin to a merely forensic expiation of sin, is not a lengthy stride. It has often been taken, and it is easily taken. And most certainly it behooves those who are now inculcating the former to ponder it in relation to this very obvious consequence. Socinus himself, though he rejected with scorn the doctrine of imputation as held by the Church, yet by his exegesis of Rom. v. 12-19, justified the forensic (which his followers adopted), and hence, by an easy gradation, insisted strongly that the satisfaction rendered by Christ for sin was merely forensic, and not a true expiation. He and his school had, against all usage, construed ἁμαρτία ἁμαρτωλός and ἁμαρτάνειν, in a merely forensic sense (as Dr. Hodge and his followers now do), and they thereupon found but little difficulty in setting aside, after the same manner, the legal and established usage of λύτρον ἀντίλυτρον, λύτρωσις, ἀπολύτρωσις, δικαίωμα, and ῥασμός, and so to repudiate the doctrine of satisfaction through Christ. Such is ever the infinite peril attending all efforts to place upon the plain and obvious announcements of the word of

God a meaning which the Holy Spirit has not conveyed, and so compel them to harmonize with a preconceived theory.¹ And in the present instance it is impossible to find language to express adequately the deep anguish of my spirit in view of the fearfully imperilled condition into which our beloved Church has already been brought by the persistent inculcation of these most unauthorized speculations.

§ 16. THE RELATION WHICH ROMANS V. 12-21 SUSTAINS TO THE WHOLE SUBJECT CONSIDERED, TOGETHER WITH THE EARLY CHURCH CONCEPTION OF THE COVENANT.

The Princeton Professor, supposing, for reasons which have as yet never come sufficiently into the clear, that the gratuitous imputation of sin is the doctrine of the Calvinistic Church, claims that this doctrine is directly taught in Romans v. 12-21. In view of this claim, therefore, the passage is entitled to and should receive a thorough consideration. In all his lucubrations on imputation, and especially in his Theology, he has repeatedly introduced it, and frequently with extended remarks as to its meaning; and he finds in it not only a plain presentation of the existing analogy between the first and second Adam—the one introducing sin and death, and the other righteousness and life (as the Church has always stated in her exposition of the passage), but he likewise, as above remarked, strenuously insists that this analogy, if we would regard it as complete, must likewise include amongst the points of resemblance and comparison the *mode* in which both sin and righteousness are communicated from the first and second Adam to their respective seed, to wit: that as the righteousness of Christ is communicated to his seed gratuitously, or without any subjective desert on their part, so the guilt of Adam's personal sin, or *peccatum alienum*, is communicated to his seed gratuitously, and without any demerit on their part; otherwise, says he, the whole analogy fails. And he claims, moreover, that almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote concurs with him in this representation.²

¹ Turretin in his *De Satisfactione*, Parte VIII., § 10, has some impressive remarks on this same subject, to which we beg leave to refer our readers.

² See his Theology, for example, in Vol. I., pp 26, 27, and Vol. II., pp. 187-192, and 551, 552. Also his commentary on the passage, especially the revised edition. Also the Princeton Essays, first series, pp. 171-174, 176, 177. And likewise the *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 339-341, 368, and 763-764.

If this tremendous doctrine, that God may, without regard to its own agency or concurrence, charge soul-destroying guilt upon a rational, accountable, and yet *guiltless* creature be taught in the Scriptures, this is absolutely the only place wherein, with the slightest shadow of reason, it can be claimed to be found. But though it be a doctrine which seems not only irreconcilable to the moral consciousness, but which, on the ground of the universally conceded canon—*causa causæ est causa causati*—appears, likewise to furnish a logical basis for the extenuation and excuse of all actual sin in the posterity of Adam. We offer not these as objections to the truth of the doctrine itself, on the supposition that there is to be conceded with it a scriptural basis; for, if but once plainly announced by the spirit of truth, it is as worthy of all acceptance as if he had announced it in every page of His word. But to the claim that it *is* here announced, it certainly is not apart from the province of due consideration to suggest whether a doctrine which, if conceded to be taught, must essentially modify the conception hitherto entertained by the Church universal as to the whole system of revealed truth, and (as can be fully demonstrated), logically render the most peremptory convictions of our moral nature pointless and uncertain, might not be expected to have been taught in the form of direct dogmatic announcement, rather than be left to be merely *inferred* from a doubtful, or, at most, an incidental allusion found in the illustration which the apostle had selected for the purpose of setting forth to our perishing and helpless race the mercy and goodness of God! We say *doubtful allusion*, because the whole claim that the doctrine is true depends on the aforesaid unsustained assumption that the *modes*, *i. e.*, of our justification through Christ and condemnation through Adam, form an integral part of the comparison—an assumption which has nothing whatever to support it, either in exegesis or in the analogy of faith. Take away, then, from the supposed points of resemblance the alleged comparison of the modes, and Dr. Hodge's whole theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin vanishes, like a ghost, into thin air hopelessly and forever. And since, therefore, the leading divines of the past ages (as we have shown), in expounding the passage have failed to find the mode mentioned, or even alluded to therein, and have emphatically denied that it is therein introduced as a part of the comparison of similitudes; is it

not, we again ask, somewhat surprising that a doctrine of such tremendous sequences, both as regards our conception of God's moral perfections and of the relations He sustains to His accountable creatures, should have been unrecognized by the Church in any age, and be left by the author of revelation to be developed only inferentially, from one little corner of an illustration which had been introduced for the purpose of setting forth, by various points of similitude and dissimilitude, God's boundless love and compassion towards man, as exhibited through our Lord Jesus Christ? And is it really conceivable that Paul should undertake to *illustrate* and establish God's infinite goodness and mercy to the race *by showing that He charges them gratuitously with soul-destroying guilt, and then treats them in accordance with the charge?*

But it may greatly assist in forming an accurate estimate, not only of the scope of the apostle, but of the theology of the early churches of the Reformation, both Lutheran and Calvinist, and also in forming a just estimate of the misapprehensions into which Dr. Hodge has been betrayed respecting their views of the teaching of this passage, to present just at this point the concept they entertained respecting the covenant transaction between God and our first parents, and which is so inwrought (so to speak) into the very texture of this passage itself. The doctrine, as we shall lay it before our readers, was that of the Church anterior to Cocceius (1669), who extended and elaborated this earlier conception, and whose view became subsequently current to a considerable extent, though never formally adopted by the Church herself, many of whose divines, as Vitringa and Buddæus, having refused to accept it, and others, like Venema, directly rejecting it, preferring alike the more ancient expression of the doctrine. The passages we shall cite, moreover, will serve very happily to illustrate the meaning and force of the various expressions touching the subject in our doctrinal symbols.

In order to do no injustice to the earlier conception itself, we shall present it as elaborated by the celebrated Gomarus (of Leyden), one of the most thoroughly learned and systematic divines of his age, and withal a strong supralapsarian, whose doctrinal theory would therefore naturally lead him to present the federal conception (as then entertained) in its most decided form.

His presentation of the matter will evince, moreover, the inadmissibility of the supposition that their exposition of Romans v. 12-21, should have included in the analogy thus instituted *the mode of transmission*,—that is, the gratuitous imputation of Adam's personal sin to his posterity as the procuring cause of their corruption and condemnation, or that such a conception should have been at all entertained in their theology.

In his inaugural address, when entering upon his theological professorship in Leyden University,¹ and which is republished as prolegomena in the folio edition of his works,² he treats upon the theme *De Fœdere Dei*; and after expounding בְּרִית of the Old, and διαθήκη of the New Testament, he says, "But because the covenant of God is not of one kind we should first define the term, and divide and distinguish its meaning, so that we may be able fully to understand what is meant by the New Covenant or Testament. The covenant of God, properly speaking, therefore, is a *mutual obligation of God and men* in respect to eternal life, which He was to bestow upon them under a certain condition. The parts of it are two: the obligation of God, which is eternal life, and the obligation of man, which is a stipulated condition prescribed by God. This covenant, moreover, (porrò) is two-fold—natural and supernatural. The natural is the covenant of God known by nature (*natura notum*), because God alone has promised eternal life, and requires from men the condition of perfect obedience, and therefore it is rightly called natural, because it is inscribed by nature on the heart of men. (Rom. ii. 14, 15.) And this is only in the thing itself; but in the adjuncts it varies, of which in method it is not to be divided, but distinguished."³

"For first, and immediately after their creation, it was begun by God in Paradise *with our first parents and the human race*, their nature being still upright and in friendship with God; and hence it was possible for mankind both to know and to perform it perfectly. And there was added a special test of obedience, that is, abstaining from the forbidden tree (Gen. ii. 17), and a token

¹ June 8, 1594. ² In two volumes, folio. (Amsterdam, 1664.)

³ Rollock, first Principal of the University of Edinburgh, (who died in Feb., 1599,) in the second chapter of his celebrated work, *De Vocatione Efficaci*, (published in 1597,) appears to have largely drawn upon this discourse of Gomar.

(*tessera*) of the divine promise—the tree of life. Afterwards it was repeated by the mediator Moses to the Israelites, and delivered upon the two tables of the decalogue, which contains the written out (*expressam*) form of the natural covenant. But now, our nature being corrupt and hostile to God, it is on that account imperfectly known by men, and impossible for them to perform. (Rom. viii. 3.) There was likewise a peculiar test of obedience, even the ceremonial yoke and *intricate burdens*, as Tertullian calls them. Thus much for the natural covenant.

"But *the supernatural covenant* is a covenant unknown by nature, and merely gratuitous, in which God offers to men not only Christ and perfect obedience in Him for reconciliation and eternal life, but grants also the condition of faith and of repentance by His Spirit, as the formula of the covenant (Jer. xxxi. 31, etc.; Heb. viii. 8, etc.), and the discourse of Christ (in Mark i. 15) abundantly demonstrate. But we call it supernatural, because it is observed and known by us not from learning, nor from natural capacity, but by the supernatural grace of the Spirit alone." (Page 4.)

What is here designated as the *natural covenant* embraces, therefore, the whole Edenic transaction on the subject, *including both the moral and natural relation of Adam to his posterity*, as the doctrine then was received and taught by the Church. The author, then, after expatiating on the supernatural covenant (subsequently named the covenant of grace), by referring to *its announcement* in Paradise after the fall, *its confirmation* to Abraham, and still through the ceremonial law as given by Moses, thus continues the discrimination:

"Besides, it is called the New Covenant or Testament by reason of the natural covenant or law, as that which succeeds the Old Covenant as abrogated by Christ (Jer. xxxi. 31; Heb. viii. 8 and ix. 15); and hence appear the distinctive characteristics and difference between them—the natural as the Old, and the supernatural as the New, to-wit: *first*, in the material; that is, in the parts (but in mutual obligation), for the obligation of God in the natural and ancient covenant is the bare promise of eternal life. In the supernatural and new it is first and foremost that of the whole natural covenant; that is, not only of eternal life, but the promise of perfect obedience of the law in Christ; and *secondarily*,

the bestowment of the condition of the New Covenant. But the obligation of mankind in the natural covenant is perfect obedience to the law, which, *after the fall of the human race*, consists in satisfaction of the violated covenant, and in perfect holiness and righteousness. The obligation of men in the New and supernatural covenant is faith and repentance. Another distinction between these covenants is in the effects. Subsequent to the fall, the natural lays open sin and condemnation, and announces that we are condemned; whence it is called the ministry of death, and the letter which killeth. (2 Cor. iii. 6, 7.) But the supernatural takes away both sin and condemnation, and bestows both joy and salvation; whence it is significantly termed the ministry of righteousness, and of the Spirit which giveth life. (2 Cor. vi. 3, 9.)

"The *third* difference is in their properties and adjuncts. The natural is known by nature, and is a bare covenant, not a testament also. But the supernatural is unknown by nature, and is a testament on account of the death of the testator Christ." (P. 5.)

Such, then, is the formulated representation of this doctrine as entertained by the Church from the days of Luther and Calvin, and which, to a great extent, is based upon Rom. v. 12-21, as then understood by the Church, as may, for example, be seen by Gomar's exposition of it, who says: "*Adam by the force of nature (vi naturæ) communicates his sin to all and each of his natural offspring*; but Christ communicates His righteousness and life to each of His renewed."¹ And such, too, is the language of the whole Church of the Reformation,—*Adam communicates his sin by natural generation*. What, then, becomes of the theory of Dr. Hodge, that it is communicated solely by a forensic imputation? Of course Adam could not thus communicate it; and if it is as Dr. Hodge insists, the act of God, then Adam does not communicate it at all. The notion of a gratuitous imputation of a *peccatum alienum*, in order to reproduce the guilt and corruption of Adam in a guiltless offspring, is a conception of which those truly learned and venerable men could find no words sufficient to express their abhorrence.

But we will cite briefly another expounder, a *clarum et venerabile nomen* likewise. We refer to Polavius of Basle (1610), who in his Theology gives substantially the same exposition of the existing view of the Church. We cite his own language, with its some-

¹ Opera, Tom. I., p. 405, col. 1.

what peculiar orthography. He says: "*Fedus inter Deum et homines est pactum, quod Deus ultro cum hominibus iniit, in quo hominibus promittit aliquod bonum et eosdem vicissim obstringit ut præstat ea quæ ab ipsis requirit.*"

"Partes ejus duo sunt: *Promissio boni alicujus ex parte Dei, et stipulatio officii ex parte hominis.* Nam Deus nobis sponte promittit bonum aliquod: et rursus à nobis stipulatur officium sibi præstandum.

"Coeterum fedus hoc vel *spirituale* est, vel *corporale*, *Fedus spirituale*, est in quo Deus hominibus spiritualia bona, nempe immortalitatem et vitam æternam promittit. Estque duplex; *fedus operum* vel *fedus gratiæ*.

"*Fedus operum* est in quo Deus promittit vitam æternam homini omnibus numeris perfectam Legi operum obedientiam præstanti, annexa comminatione mortis æternæ si perfectam obedientiam non præstiterit. *Fedus operum* dicitur etiam, *fedus naturale*, quia in creatione prima à Deo cum hominibus initum, et quia continetur in lege qua naturâ hominibus nota est. Hoc fedus pepigit Deus initio cum primis hominibus ADAMO et EVA in statu primæve integritatis. (Gen. ii. v. 17.) 'De fructu arboris scientiæ boni et mali, de isto ne comedas,' etc.

"Ab hoc federe à creatione excidit homo per inobedientiam, et fedifragus et mendax evasit. Factusque et obnoxius utrique morti tam spirituali, quam corporali. Idem fedus repetivit Deus cum populo Israelitico per Mosen," etc.¹

Such being the views of this great theologian, he of course explains Romans v. accordingly. After remarking that Bellarmine deceives himself in his exposition of the analogy contained therein, since Paul "*does not compare the modes* by which we are in ourselves either sinners or righteous, *but the efficient causes whereby we become sinners or righteous before God*," he adds, "For he says, that we are constituted sinners by the disobedience of the one man; that is, the disobedience of Adam is the efficient cause by which all who are naturally descended are made sinners, that is, transgressors." And then, after refuting the Pelagian objection, that the disobedience of Adam is not imputed to us, he asks, "How are we constituted sinners?—not certainly *per formalem in-*

¹ See his *Syntagma Theologiæ Christianæ*, lib. VI., cap. 33, page 1445, (Hanoviae, 1624.)

hærentem. For first, that transgression of the divine interdict did not inhere in us *in actu* subjectively, formally, habitually, or after the manner of a habit (*habitualiter*, seu *per modum habitus*); for we did not in act commit that disobedience, because as yet we did not exist in act, but only potentially (*δυναμικῶς*) in the loins of Adam as our root. We are not, therefore, constituted sinners by an actual or habitual inhering of this first disobedience as if we ourselves had committed it—had transgressed the divine interdict and eaten the forbidden fruit. This is what Paul affirms in Romans v. 12, that we all sinned in Adam, that is to say, *originally*, as Augustine rightly explains.”¹

Here, then, are clearly brought to view the early Calvinistic conception of this federal transaction, and of the doctrine taught in Romans v. 12–21. No attempt is made to distinguish between the natural and federal relation of Adam to his posterity in any such way as Dr. Hodge insists upon as fundamental to our theology, and much less is any preference assigned to the federal over the natural relation. Both relations alike are equally recognized as associating us by participation with the first sin, and so, as the ground of the imputation of the first transgression, and the *modes* of the conveyance of sin and righteousness, are not included as points of comparison in the apostolic analogy. The imputation of the first sin is not that of a *peccatum alienum*, but of our own subjective ill-desert, contracted not merely *through* or *on account of*, but *in* our first parents; *we sinned when they sinned*; or, as Polanus himself elsewhere expresses it, “The first disobedience exists not in us as its authors, because we have not by act sinned in Adam, seeing that as yet we did not exist in act. We sinned, therefore, only *originally*, as Augustine is accustomed to speak; that is, we sinned in actual will (*voluntate actuali*) in Adam, his will being ours. As far as Adam willed, so far are we accounted to have willed. But Adam knowingly and willingly sinned. We, therefore, in him, and by that will of his (*eaque ejus voluntate*), both sinned and willed to sin.”² Thus our own subjective guilt in the fall is recognized as the explanatory principle; and hence, as the Church has always taught, the disobedient *act* of Adam himself

¹ See his *Syntagma Theologiæ Christianæ*, lib. II., cap. 21, page 517, (Hanovæ, 1624).

² *Ibid.*, lib. VI., cap. 36, page 1473.

could be ours only by a forensic decision, while our participation in the sin of that act is immediately imputed to us as our own offence.

In the early Lutheran church likewise, the same conception, though not so systematically elaborated, is found. The views of Luther are presented with sufficient clearness in his Commentary on Genesis ii. 17. For instance, in a passage already cited,¹ he evinces a thorough mastery of the whole theme in its various relations to the system of divine truth as announced in the Scriptures, and in the light of it thus delineates and rejects the scheme which Dr. Hodge has been inculcating; “and it seems to me that there are in our own day also some who are deceived with this argument. For they so speak of original sin (native corruption) *as if it were not a crime, but only a punishment* (*ac si non culpa sed tantum poena*.) As Erasmus likewise somewhere argues in express terms, that ‘original sin is a punishment inflicted on our first parents, which we, their posterity, are compelled to suffer *on account of another’s crime without any subjective ill-desert of their own* (*propter alienam culpam sine nostro merito*); as an illegitimate child is obliged to endure the shame arising, not from his own fault, but from that of his mother; for how could he have sinned who as yet did not exist? *These things may be flattering to reason, but they are full of impiety and blasphemy.*” And, then, as evincive of his estimate of the vital importance of the true doctrine of original sin, he, in column two of the same page, in referring to the Antinomian argument that the righteous have no need of the law, says: “And by this very argument Satan makes a mighty effort to nullify original sin; and this would be to deny the passion and resurrection of Christ.” Then follows on the next page the other passage we have cited in § 13, B. No. 1, above, which, if the reader will here consult, he may obtain a clear and comprehensive view of the sentiments of this illustrious Reformer on the topic before us.

As set forth by *Flacius* (1575) in his *Clavis*,² however, no doubt can be entertained as to the early conception of the Lutheran church in regard to the covenant. For though he therein alleges that “*Fœdus significat autem plerumque pactionem quam Deus cum genere humano iniit*” (page 343), and speaks as Gomar and Polanus do of the covenant with Abraham, and also as re-

¹ See § 13, B. No. 1, *supra*.

² Vide sub voce *Fœdus*, Opp. Tom. I. (Leipsic, 1719.)

affirmed through Moses to Israel, and still further of the covenant through Christ, and illustrated His definition by many appropriate references to the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers, he makes not the slightest allusion that I have been able to discover to any application of the term to the Edenic transaction referred to in Gen. ii. 16, 17, though he strongly and almost fiercely contends for the imputation of the Adamic sin. He says: "Sic enim nostra injustia Christo imputatur; sic nos rei sumus ob Adami lapsum, seu ob illud-ipsam ejus actuale peccatum." (Page 439.)

Our readers will not suppose that our design in these and in our previous references is to prove, by human authority, a doctrine of our holy religion to be true (which would be a preposterous procedure), for the question *as to its truth* is in no sense the issue involved in this inquiry. Our aim is simply to determine by the facts in the case whether Dr. Hodge has been inculcating, as he claims to have been, the actual or recognized doctrine of the Church, or has, on the contrary, essentially and fundamentally departed therefrom. But as we now pass on from the present topic, it will be highly proper to call the attention of our readers to the fact fully exhibited in this section, that the views of the covenant as entertained by the Reformers wholly forbid the supposition that Adam's posterity could be chargeable with the crime of having violated that covenant, while they really sustained no causal relation whatever to that violation. That is, in other words, that the Adamic sin could not be justly and morally their own, or be as such charged upon them, when they had no agency whatever in its perpetration and when the act referred to is, therefore, *in no sense the act of those to whom it is imputed*, except on the ground that it is forensically imputed to them. The principle itself need not be now dwelt upon; and we advert to the subject merely to call attention to the fact (in its direct relation to the inquiry) that the whole church of the Reformation denied that the first sin was merely Adam's personal sin, and, as our previous citations have abundantly shown, based the justice of the imputation of that sin to his posterity on the ground that they had participated therein. No subsequent theory of covenants, or of representation, therefore, can either neutralize or change this broad and incontrovertible truth. They were punished, as were Adam and Eve, not for any already existing depravity, *but for their sin*; they

had "*all sinned*." And such has ever been the doctrine of the Church.

§ 17. THE POSITION AND POINT OF THE APOSTLE'S ARGUMENT (IN ROMANS v. 12-21), AS UNDERSTOOD AND AFFIRMED BY THE DIVINES OF THE REFORMATION.

Whether the *analogy* in Romans v. includes, as points of comparison, the modes in which sin, on the one hand, or righteousness on the other, is communicated from either the first or the second Adam to their respective seed, is a point of fundamental interest in this inquiry, as the entire structure of Dr. Hodge's theory rests upon his assumption that such is the fact. But at the same time, however, he does not even pretend to allege that any thorough grammatical exegesis of the passage requires the modes of transmission to be regarded as points of resemblance, for nothing whatever can be offered to sustain such an assumption. Even Marek and De Moor (who at the same time affirm *that our actual guilt renders us deserving of the imputation*), in regard to the mode as referred to, have not claimed a grammatical basis for the assertion, and are obliged to content themselves with the mere rhetorical standpoint, *that* if the mode be not included the analogy fails (which Dr. Hodge repeats, though rejecting their admission of our subjective guilt.) They do not, indeed, explain *how* or *why* it must fail in such contingency, and neither does Dr. Hodge condescend to enlighten us on the point; but having asserted it in the very face of the great mass of the churches of the Reformation, who, as we shall see, had been teaching exactly the contrary, they tacitly, but in a manner very flattering to the sagacity of their readers, assume that that sagacity will, of course, render any such explanation supererogatory. As Dr. Hodge, however, has, as already illustrated, carried his theory of imputation far beyond all recognized limits in our theology,¹ so in his assertion of this

¹ This has been unhesitatingly conceded in page 789 of *The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* for 1872, in an article (already referred to) signed "L. H. A.," who represents Dr. Hodge's Theology as carrying forward "the *strength* of the Calvinistic system, especially of that style of reformed theology known as the federal or representative system." Our previous references to the Reformed theology, however, convict this remark of an attempt to theologize without the requisite information to do it intelligently. Calvinistic theology is not "carried forward" by being abandoned for the So-

unsustained assumption, his positiveness is greatly in excess of theirs. For the imputation for which he contends is not only unauthorized in Calvinistic theology, but contrary to the expressed dogmatic utterances of the church from Augustine until our own day. We have already shown how the principle itself has always been regarded by our approved divines wherever they had occasion to revert to the theme. And we now affirm that Dr. Hodge cannot adduce a single instance of a representative theologian of the Church who has ever taught his theory and exegesis of the passage before us. The subjoined are a few of the statements by which he endeavors to show that the passage does support it, and to the consideration of which we ask the careful attention of our readers: "The scope of the passage is to illustrate the doctrine of justification as the ground of the righteousness of Christ, by a reference to the condemnation of men for the sin of Adam. The analogy is destroyed, and the point of comparison fails if anything in us be assumed on the ground of the infliction of the penal evils of which the apostle is here speaking."¹ So, too, in his *Theology*: "Not only, however, does the comparison which the apostle makes between Adam and Christ lead to the conclusion that as all are condemned for the sin of one, so all are saved by the righteousness of the other, those only excepted whom the scriptures except."² Again: "The parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the apostle overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation."³ "There is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity."⁴ All this, however, is piling one assumption upon another, to wit: "that the apostles, in order to show that God's mercy is perfectly gratuitous in justifying the penitent ungodly, must necessarily affirm likewise that his sentence of condemnation must like-

cinian scheme of a mere forensic imputation. And it is truly painful to see the time-honored phrase "federal or representative system," as employed in our theology, thus prostituted to designate a scheme which is as opposite thereto as light is to darkness. Let all such abuse of the language be utterly and always discountenanced. Dr. Hodge's scheme throughout is one merely of coerced or arbitrary representation. The Calvinistic is that Adam and his posterity all were parties on the human side of the covenant.

¹ Commentary on Romans, v. 12, and repeated likewise in vs. 15, 18 19.

² Vol. I., pp. 26, 27. ³ Ibid, Vol. II., pp. 212-213. ⁴ Ibid., p. 215.

wise be gratuitous, and bear no relation to the subjective demerit of the condemned. But the only refutation that an assertion so utterly unauthorized and absurd requires, is a bare denial. *It is not true* that because God extends mercy gratuitously to the penitent believing sinner, he therefore inflicts vengeance gratuitously upon the innocent. Paul has in no way whatever taught any such notion.

The apostle having previously set forth the ruined and helpless condition of our race, and announced the way of deliverance through our Lord Jesus Christ, and having shown, moreover, that they who accept the proffer of mercy obtain peace with God, being thus reconciled to Him, and have free access to Him through Jesus Christ, next proceeds to present, in a condensed and most impressive form, a view of the points which his argument thus far had elicited, and to show their relation to the whole scheme of redemption. He had been unfolding the awful truth that the Gentile world, and along with it the Jews, were all under sin—in a guilty, condemned and hopeless state—but as yet had said nothing of the first fall as the procuring cause of all this woe, nor of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. The fact that they all alike were under sin (a fact to the truth of which their own consciences bare witness) was plainly stated, and there left as undisputed and indisputable. He had, as stated above, also announced salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, and illustrated the method by which we may avail ourselves of the proffered mercy, declaring that God would receive and justify, through Jesus, all who believingly accept that proffer, and now, in summing up and illustrating the argument, he introduces the first Adam—the procuring cause of our fall and misery—and, after remarking that he was a type of Him who was to come, to-wit: Christ, shows how Christ, sustaining the relation of a second Adam, was the procuring cause of our deliverance and salvation; and in dwelling on this analogy shows that, as we were constituted sinners by the disobedience of the one—we all having sinned in and with him—so we are constituted righteous by the obedience of the other, who, by his obedience, had effected the *reconciliation* of which (in verse 11) he had just spoken.¹ So that, as by the one offence (justice de-

¹ *Κατάλλαξις* is here properly *reconciliation*, though in our version rendered *atonement*, which word in modern English usage has become so changed from its meaning in the time of our translators as now to seem incongruous.

manding our punishment), the judgment unto condemnation was pronounced against us, so by the one righteousness the free gift came upon all unto justification of life.

Such, in brief outline, is the argument. On what ground, then, are we to suppose that the analogy thus presented requires a comparison between the *mode* in which the judgment unto condemnation is inflicted, and that in which the free gift of righteousness is bestowed? Does not the simple fact that the one is inflicted on the race as the punishment of their sin, and the other bestowed as the free gift of mercy delivering from all sin and condemnation, render the whole argument sufficiently obvious and easily understood? Then, further, can it really amount to anything, except to perplex the argument of the apostle, to add that the sentence of condemnation resembles the sentence of acquittal? They certainly cannot be compared as points of similarity, except so far as the righteous Judge has pronounced them; and this surely does not infer a similarity, either between the sentences themselves or the form of their announcement; for the judgment comes upon the race for the one offence in which we all participated, while, in the other case, the free gift, which is more than a sentence of mere acquittal, comes to us gratuitously; for in no sense could we merit that. Where, then, is to be found this alleged ground for comparison? In the former, the one offence, on account of our participation therein (*ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον*), is charged upon us for condemnation, and is, therefore, in no sense a gratuitous imputation. In the latter, the one righteousness, wherein we did not participate, is gratuitously bestowed upon us for justification. And these things were, from the preceding argument of the apostle, sufficiently plain, and needed not to be formally presented in the analogy, even as points of antithesis, the mere statement of the facts being sufficient. But as respects their being points of similitude, and being compared as such in the manner asserted and insisted on by Dr. Hodge, there is nothing in the passage even to

In their time, however, it was synonymous with reconciliation, and used interchangeably with it, an instance or two will illustrate this: Shakespeare, for example, in *As you like it*, says, "Then is there mirth in heaven, when earthly things made even, *atone* together;" in *Richard II.*, "Since we cannot *atone* you, we shall see;" in *Henry IV.*, "If we do now make our *atonement* well;" in *Cymbeline*, "I was glad I *did atone* my countrymen and you."

countenance the idea, nor has the Church herself ever entertained such a conception.

But as the Doctor claims that they really are points of similitude and comparison, let us here briefly enquire what he proposes to gain by such an assumption. We have above shown that in the analogy the two points—the one relating to justice and the other to mercy—may, either or both of them, be unduly extended, unless the *scope* of the apostle be regarded, as Turretin (*Loco* 16, *Quæst.* 2, § 19, and *Quæst.* 3, § 15,) and De Moor (*ut supra*) and others have carefully stated, though at the same time holding that the fact of an imputation in both cases is implied. But Dr. Hodge, in this his assumption, does not propose, as some have done, to show that as the judgment unto condemnation is an act of punitive justice for subjective ill-desert, therefore the justification must likewise be regarded as flowing to us for subjective desert; but has chosen the other members of the antithesis as his starting point, and as the free gift is a gratuitous bestowment, and in no way dependent on our subjective desert, so in like manner must the condemnatory sentence be a free and gratuitous bestowment! It is simply to incorporate with evangelical theology this astounding and monstrous conception, that the analogy must be here pressed into a formal recognition of the *modes*, not as points of antithesis, which the divines of the Reformation insist that they are, but as points of similitude! And Dr. Hodge peremptorily affirms, that unless this be granted the whole analogy fails: "the apostle's argument is overturned," and we "take sides with the Jews against him."¹ So that, according to this exposition, we are to conclude that, inasmuch as the Most High bestows blessings and favors gratuitously, He therefore gratuitously inflicts moral corruption upon his innocent creatures, and then visits them with the exactions of His punitive or avenging justice on account of that corruption. It would certainly seem, *à priori*, that the mere utterance or statement of such a conception must, in the view of all who truly love and fear God, suffice for its refutation and rejection. The topic is suggestive of themes for very serious reflection, and we refer to a single one before passing to our next point.

The mercy here adverted to by Paul as the free gift of God is, as we have seen, a purely gratuitous bestowment upon the needy

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 341, 344, 345.

but penitent believer. It is entirely the work of God, therefore, who confessedly takes pleasure in all his works and ways, (Ps. civ. 31,) and can with complacency contemplate this and its happy results as His own work. Now the theory of Dr. Hodge makes the condemnatory sentence of Adam's *guiltless* posterity (for such he of necessity affirms them to be antecedent to that sentence) equally gratuitous, equally the work of God, who, as He thus clothes with this fearful guilt the innocent creature, hands him over into an indescribably dreadful condition of spiritual death and misery, and of abiding enmity to holiness and to Himself, and to all His works and ways. And this, agreeably to the theory in question, is as fully and simply His own work as is the other. Will Dr. Hodge, then, or any who may have adopted this theory, undertake to allege that our good and gracious God, who takes no pleasure in the death even of the sinner, can with complacency contemplate such a work as this, with all its assured and eternal hostility to Himself? Let the question be fairly met and answered, and let there be no attempted evasion to the effect that the exhibition of wrath and indignation against sinners is always unpleasant to the Divine nature, and is His strange work, and the like; for even admitting this in its fullest extent, it meets not the case. The question here pertains not to *sinners*, but (as Dr. Hodge constantly affirms) to the *sinless*. It relates to the grounds for the exhibition of this wrath against those who were *not* sinners, but subjectively guiltless or innocent of all sin, and free from all ill-desert, and from any subjective blame whatsoever. And, moreover, it was the exhibition of this very wrath against them which, subsequent to its infliction, brought them out of their guiltless state into a state of guilt and misery, and of spiritual death. We ask, then, again, will Dr. Hodge, or any who accept his views, venture to affirm that God could with complacency contemplate *as His own* such a work, as He confessedly can His work of renewing, and justifying, and saving the redeemed? Their theory demands an affirmative response to the inquiry, for a negative will be tantamount to an admission that the theory itself is false.

The science of hermeneutics, therefore, can furnish no relief in the extremity to which this theory finds itself reduced in the attempt to constitute *gratuitous* justification and *merited* condemnation points of resemblance and comparison in this analogy.

And to achieve such result, while *χρῖμα* here retains its relation to *εἰς ζαχαριῶνα*, is simply impossible; for a sentence unto condemnation can never be other than antithetical to the bestowment of a free and gracious gift. But let us proceed to *the analyses of the argument in Romans v. 12-21, as presented by the divines of the Reformation*. Dr. Hodge has labored very assiduously to show that they so explained the passage as to inculcate his theory, and it will be well, therefore, to allow them an audience, that they may speak for themselves.

The leading thought of the passage, and that with which it is chiefly occupied, relates to the analogy between the first and second Adam; in reference to which, and in the sense in which he explains it, Dr. Hodge asserts that "*this analogy is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote*; that he "might go on for a month" making quotations from their writings in confirmation of the views which he advocates respecting it; and that "nothing can be plainer than that these men considered the cases as perfectly parallel as to the point,—viz.: *the nature of imputation*."¹

In my former essay I called his attention to the fact that this whole representation was inaccurate, and furnished a superabundance of proof in confirmation of the statement.² But not being prepared to abandon the theory he had erected upon it, he has chosen the alternative of persisting therein, and has since then re-affirmed substantially all his previous assertions. In his *Theology* he says: "Its guilt (*i. e.*, of Adam's sin) does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own,—a *peccatum alienum*,—and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences. Just as the righteousness of Christ is not our own, but is imputed to us, and we have a title in justice on the ground of that righteousness, if we accept and trust it, to all the benefits of redemption."³

This method of procedure, summary as it appears, does not, however, seem to satisfy the Doctor, who, in order to carry his point, assails (as is shown in Section 8, above) the received doctrine as inconsistent with philosophy, common sense, and the

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 173.

² *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 517-540.

³ *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 225. Also pp. 202, 203, 212, 213, 216.

word of God. And in his late work he throws out occasionally, as if incidentally, what is plainly intended to justify such utterances. For example, in treating the question "What is impossible?" he says: "We have a right to reject as untrue whatever it is impossible that God should require us to believe. He can no more require us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong."¹ I should deeply regret doing any injustice to the writer in interpreting this remark, but certainly its true bearing and animus must be regarded as apparent in his aforesaid proscription of the Church doctrine that we participated in the Adamic sin. Is this inference avoidable? If not, then we are brought to the further conclusion that, pressed by the exigencies of his theory, he has not only misstated the doctrine of the Church, but by a broad and clear implication has justified the Rationalistic principle that we are entitled to form an *à priori* judgment as to what may be regarded as "absurd" in matters purely of faith or revelation, and then reject or refuse to believe whatever may in our estimation come under that category, since "God can no more require of us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong." Instead, however, of inculcating upon our ministry such a sentiment, which is the very foundation stone upon which the superstructure of both English and German Rationalism has been reared, why could not Dr. Hodge claim, as the Church has ever claimed, that as the word of God can teach nothing absurd, so we are reverentially to bow to its authority in all its utterances, lead where they may, and however much our reason or philosophy might reluctate or be disposed to reject them as absurd?² For example: The divine word, in the passage before us, affirms expressly, and without the slightest ambiguity, that in the first sin *we all sinned*, and *through that sin were constituted sinners*. Dr. Hodge alleges that this, if literally taken, is absurd, and thereupon denounces the doctrine of participation, and insists that *ἀναπαράσσειν* must be understood either in a passive or a putative sense,—*in neither of which is the word ever employed*. Though the Spirit of God has affirmed the statement, and though the uniform usage of the terms *ἀναπαράσσειν*

¹ Theology, Vol. I., pp. 51, 52.

² See Lord Bacon's *Novum Organum*, lib. I., §§ 41, 42, Works, Vol. II., p. 435, (London, 1838); and also his *Advancement of Learning*, Book II., Works, Vol. I., p. 34.

and *ἀναπαράσσειν* shows how that statement is to be understood, the proposition thus affirmed is "unthinkable," impossible, and nonsensical, and therefore God does not require that we believe it any more than He would require us to do what is wrong. But the point must recur in the sequel.

It has been already remarked that the argument of the apostle in the paragraph before us is concerned only with the headship of Adam and of Christ, and with the main fact that, as the one brought death, so the other brought life to their respective seed; and further, that the *modes* in which life and death are conveyed *form* no part of the comparison. That such was, from the first, the doctrine of the Calvinistic church is apparent from our citations in Section 16 above. But we shall now proceed to establish it by direct testimony, and in doing this shall lay before our readers the analyses of the argument by a few of her representative divines, as also their own views of the point in question. Our readers, upon a resurvey of the whole discussion, will not, we are assured, suppose that we have bestowed upon the consideration of this vital point more attention than the necessity of the case requires. We commence with the analysis of—

1. GOMARUS, of Leyden, who, after remarking that the passage begins with a reference to the previous part of the chapter, proceeds as follows: "Atque ita ad reconciliationem et pacem cum Deo, de qua initio capitis actum est, eleganter redit, et id alteram hujus capitis partem viam sibi sternit. Qua parte doctrinam de justificatione et reconciliatione nostri cum Deo, per Christum illustrat, amplificat ac probat, comparatione Adami et Christi, tanquam typi et archetypi, quam ex superioribus concludit.

"Comparatio autem est gemina, videlicet similitudinis et dissimilitudinis: et utraque constat propositione et redditione.

"Prior comparatio continetur, v. 12, 13, 14, similitudo autem si rem intueamur, consistit in natura et effectis duobus. In natura, quod utraque homo: in effectis; primum, quod uterque suos habet posteros et multitudinem, cujus principium et caput est: *deinde quod uterque habet aliquid, quod propageret ad omnes et solos posteros*. Quemadmodum autem simile non est idem, sed nonnihil etiam habet diversi: ita etiam hoc in loco apparet: Adam *ἄνθρωπος* homo tantum: sed Christus etiam filius Dei *θεῖος ἄνθρωπος*, *Deus-homo*. Adamus posteros habet et hæredes omnes homines, secundum

carnem, naturæ vi genitos: Christus verò electos omnes ac fideles, supernaturali gratia regenitos: ille natorum: hic renatorum principium est. Adamus peccati et mortis, in hominibus fons est: Christus verò justitiæ et vitæ author. *Adamus peccatum suum omnibus et solis natis suis, vi naturæ*; Christus verò justitiam et vitam omnibus et solis renatis suis communicat.”¹

The terse brevity and force of this beautiful analysis can scarcely be transferred into English, and we therefore give it to the reader in the language of the author. The portions which we have italicised, and which present his views in a way not to be mistaken in their relation to our main subject, are his usual expressions in view of it. For example, in Tom. II., page 44, Thesis 50, in referring to the sin of Adam, he says, “Ac se suosque posteros generandos constituit peccatores;” and in Thesis 57, “Alterum malum quod præter peccatum, à primo Adamo posteris ipsius communicatum, est stipendium peccati, mors prima et secunda.” On this whole subject he is, as he claims to be, Augustinian. But to return.

After presenting the above analysis, and remarking that the *protasis* of this comparison has two parts, “the guilt of the sin of Adam, and the corruption of nature,” he adds, “The first is transient and actual, even the fall of Adam, which is ours by a *just imputation*, because as he at the same time stood both for himself and for us, so he sinned. . . . Which two (sin and spiritual death) he (the apostle) *shows to be propagated from him to all men naturally* begotten; death, indeed, when he says, *and so—that is, by the fall of Adam death passed upon all men*; but *sin* when he adds, *in whom all sinned*.”

He then, referring to the *dissimilitudes* in the analogy, *classes therewith the very point which Dr. Hodge has so peremptorily claimed, not only as a point of similitude, but as one the recognition of which is essential to the very existence of the analogy itself*. He says: “But the similitude is placed in the causes and effects. And first in the causes, *because Adam communicates his fall and death to his posterity by nature*; Christ communicates His righteousness and life by grace and gift; which dissimilarity, indeed, is not expressly unfolded, but covertly intimated by the words *grace and gift*, which are in antithesis to *fall*. (*Dissimilitudo*

¹ Analytic. Explicat. Epist. ad Romanos. Opp. Tom. I., page 405.

autem statuitur in causis et effectis. Ac primum in causis, quod Adamus suum lapsum et mortem *communicat posteris suis* naturâ; Christus suam justitiam et vitam gratia et dono. Quæ quidem dissimilitudo non explicatur apertè sed opertè innuitur, vocibus, *gratiæ et doni*, quæ *lapsui* opponuntur.”)

Such is the teaching of Gomar and of the early Church in regard to the doctrine of the apostle here. And yet Dr. Hodge asserts *that they taught that the mode forms an essential and indispensable part of the comparison*; while in their view the comparison would indeed fail if the analogy included the *mode*.¹

2. POLANUS takes precisely the same ground as to the exclusion of the mode from the points of comparison, as may be seen by the citation from his Theology in § 16, above.

3. WALLÆUS, in chapter VIII. of his Reply to Corvinus, presents the following analysis of the argument. Referring to the positions of Molinaus, which Corvinus is endeavoring to enervate, he says: “The first is taken from Romans v., which is properly the *sedes* of the subject-matter; for although we may admit that it was the purpose of the apostle to compare the first and second Adam, and oppose to the guilt and condemnation *propagated from Adam to all his natural offspring* the benefit of righteousness and life which is derived to us from Christ, yet, as righteousness and life are not communicated through Christ except to those who believe and are renewed by the Holy Spirit, *so the guilt of the first sin does not pass, unless by natural generation, to a posterity defiled and corrupted*, as Augustine rightly urges, (*De Peccat. Merit.*, lib. I., cap. VIII.).” Then, after citing the words of Augustinē, he thus continues: “Whence the apostle, in verse 12, not only says that *all sinned in him*, which should be referred to imputation, but also, ‘By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin,’ *which should be wholly understood of a real defilement of nature* (de reali iniquatione naturæ), as not only the word εἰσέρχασθαι,—to enter or invade,—evinces, but also the term death, associated with the same word; *unless they* (the Arminians) *should think that death passes to us only through imputed sin*, and not through that which is really communicated to us,” i. e., by propagation. Here, too, Dr. Hodge’s essential point in the comparison

¹ See in *Danville Review* for 1862, p. 526, a further reference to the views of this great divine.

is rejected from the analogy, and *the Arminian notion that death passes to us only through a forensic imputation promptly discarded*. The high estimation in which this treatise of Wallæus was held by his learned cotemporaries may be seen by referring to § 13, A., No. 5, above.

4. PISCATOR, after presenting a general analysis of the passage similar to the foregoing from Gomar, remarks: "But the full comparison (*plena comparatio*) is as follows: As through Adam sin has entered to all mankind, and death through sin, because that in Adam all have sinned, so through Christ righteousness has entered to all that believe, and through righteousness life, because that in Christ all who believe have rendered satisfaction for their sins." (*In locum.*) The FULL COMPARISON, therefore, as then understood, included no such point as Dr. Hodge has so proscriptively affirmed to be essential to the whole analogy. Dr. Twisse pronounced Piscator the ablest theologian of his age.

5. WILLIAM AMES, of Franequer.

In his *Seiagraphy of a Christian Catechism*, p. 14, after quoting Rom. v. 12, he thus analyzes the paragraph (vs. 12-21): "The design of the apostle in this place is to illustrate that doctrine which he had previously taught concerning justification through Jesus Christ, to which end he institutes a similitude between this grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the sin of Adam, our first parent. *The comparison turns upon the force and effects of each.* The proposition of the comparison is contained in verse 12, the application is afterwards explained by a parenthesis. In this proposition Adam is regarded as the cause of a twofold effect, the introduction of sin, and the introduction of death. The reason of the connection of these effects with the cause is in the last words of this verse *explained* from that *mutual participation* (*conjunctione illa*) *which all had with Adam in the first sin*, in whom all sinned."¹

6. RIVETUS (ANDREAS), whom Dr. Hodge extols as "the greatest theologian of the age," in expounding the analogy, says: "Perhaps it might be more to the purpose to consider what others object from Paul (Rom. v. 17, 18), that we are rendered righteous in Christ as we were rendered sinners in Adam; but in Adam we have become sinners, not only by imputation, but also inherently,

¹ Christian Catech. Seiagraphia, Dom. III. (Amsterdam, 1635.)

therefore we thus become righteous in Christ. But I reply that it is not true that we have both in Christ and by Christ. For we become righteous by the imputation of His righteousness, and day by day we are rendered just in ourselves both in habit and in holy actions proceeding from the renewal of the Holy Spirit. The first we possess perfectly, the second incipiently; but we look for its completion at the end of the present life. . . . Yet there is nothing in this argument which forbids that we acknowledge the necessity of inherent qualities. For it can only be proved that in Christ we have righteousness, as we have in Adam unrighteousness. *But there is a comparison of the causes, AND NOT OF THE MODE IN WHICH THE THING IS COMMUNICATED TO US.* *For the sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, but the righteousness of Christ by imputation.* THEREFORE THE APOSTLE DOES NOT COMPARE THE MODES in which righteousness is received, but the causes, effects, and subjects of each. The cause of salvation is the obedience of the second Adam, as the cause of condemnation was the disobedience of the first. The effects are that the one constitutes us unrighteous as the other righteous," etc.¹

7. CALVIN.

In the forecited work of Rivetus, he has largely shown (at the end of the chapter which contains the section we have quoted) that the views of Calvin on this subject concur entirely with his own, and the evidence adduced by him can leave upon no mind even the shadow of doubt that this is so. It will suffice to present here, however, a single passage from Calvin's note on Rom. v. 17, in which he says: "It is worthy of remark that there are two points of difference between Christ and Adam concerning which the apostle was silent, not because he thought they might be neglected, but because it did not pertain to his present argument to specify them. The first is, that by the sin of Adam we are not condemned by imputation alone, *as though the punishment of a foreign sin (alieni peccati poena) may be exacted of us; but we bear his punishment because we also are guilty of his crime*; for because our nature is vitiated in him it is bound by the guilt of the iniquity

¹ See Summa Controv., Tract. IV., Quæst. 2., Opp. Tom. II., page 156. (Genevæ, 1644.) This quotation is more fully given, and with the original, in the *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 517, 518.

before God." Thus is Dr. Hodge's comparison of the modes utterly discarded.

8. PAREUS presents with but little variation the same analysis as Rivetus and the others, and finds no such point of comparison as Dr. Hodge regards as essential to the very existence of the analogy. Referring to Rom. v. 12, he says: "For unless the apostle had affirmed that all are by nature corrupted and guilty, how could he show, as he does, in verses 18, 19, that in Christ there is for all a remedy for the criminality and guilt? It is manifest, therefore, that this reason why all die, being brought forward, to-wit: *because all have sinned*, the apostle plainly attributes original sin to all men, Christ only excepted (who descended not from Adam by ordinary generation), and that it is TRULY SIN BECAUSE ALL HAVE TRULY SINNED IN ADAM (quodque sit verè peccatum QUIA OMNES VERE PECCAVERUNT IN ADAMO)." Thus he effectually disposes of the theory of a merely putative sinning in Adam. He repeats the same on verse 18, and then on verse 19 says: "By the phrase *κατεστάθησαν ἁμαρτωλοὶ*, he shows with increased emphasis the destructive force of the disobedience; that it had not only defiled all by guilt, but by corruption, making them not only depraved, but likewise rendering them sinners habitually; for in verse 12 he had said *that all once sinned in Adam*, and that hence all were made guilty, (vs. 15, 16.) Now he adds, that they were likewise constituted sinners; that is, *not only that they were polluted by nature, but vitiated likewise in the whole habit of life, so that they can do nothing but sin*. He here, therefore, says more than in verse 12, '*in whom all sinned*.'" (*In locum.*) Thus not only is the notion of the *mode* excluded, but the whole exegesis of Dr. Hodge rejected.

9. A. WILLETS, in his *Sixfold Commentarie upon Romans*,¹ and in treating the points in the comparison is not sufficiently sharp-sighted to discern that which Dr. Hodge so peremptorily insists upon as essential to its integrity, although in discoursing "*of the disparitie and unlikeness*" he specifies that very point. He says: "*The manner how these two things (death by Adam and life by Christ) are conveyed are diverse; Adam's sin is transmitted by natural propagation, but life and righteousness are conveyed by grace.*" (P. 257.) This author, as we have stated, stood very

¹ Completed in 1610, though not published until 1620.

high with his coteremporaries. He is frequently referred to with great deference, and cited by Rivetus and other continental divines, as by those of his own country, amongst whom Poole praises him highly and frequently cites him in his *Synopsis Criticorum*.

10. BEZA, in his notes on the passage, presents the same view: "Paul exhibits two Adams, of whom the former was the type of the latter—the *type*, I say, not because each may be proposed for imitation, but on account of the like power of each (*vim utriusque similem*); in the former the power of propagating ruin to his posterity, in the latter the power of justifying those who were his," (vs. 14, 15.) Then, referring to verse 15, he says: "In this verse Adam is compared with Christ, and the offence of the former with the obedience of the latter, so that it might be understood what was *their respective power* of their deriving themselves to their respective seed. In verse 16 *the power of each is compared*; THAT IS, OF THE FALL OF ADAM PROPAGATED BY NATURE, AND OF THE OBEDIENCE OF CHRIST IMPUTED THROUGH GRACE. In verse 17 the ends of these are compared. In verse 18 the three comparisons are joined together, the ground or common reason of which is explained in verse 19."¹

In introducing this beautiful analysis, and referring to the distinction between justification and forgiveness, he had, on verse 12, said: "But this distinction plainly appears (in the analogy), partly, indeed, from the whole comparison of the unrighteousness of Adam with the righteousness of Christ, to wit: *of the former through propagation; of the latter communicated to us* (believers) *through imputation.*" And had it been his intention to repudiate and condemn both the theory and assertions of Dr. Hodge on the subject, his remarks could not have been more directly to the point. And in like manner, all these divines carefully distinguish between the mode of our receiving hereditary depravity from Adam (*i. e., by natural propagation*), and the mode of receiving justification through Christ (*i. e., by the imputation of His righteousness.*) The notion of our receiving both *by or through a merely forensic imputation* they rejected *in toto*, as subversive of the whole system of evangelical or Augustinian theology.

¹ Annotationes Theod. Bezae in Novum Testamentum. (Published by Henry Stephens, in 1588.)

11. HYPERIUS also, whose excellent commentaries on the New Testament still retain their high rank with scholars, thus explains the passage, and finds the modes of communication to be points of disparity or antithesis, and not of comparison. In reference to verse 12, he says: "But if we would have the method of the antithesis, it must be thus stated, to wit: *As* by the one man, Adam, sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death has passed upon all men, so far as we have all sinned; *so*, by one man, Christ, righteousness has been brought into the world, and through righteousness, life; and so life has come forth to all men, so far as we all have believed." Then, after expatiating hereon, Hyperius remarks: "But lest any one should pretend that the comparison here instituted should not be thus expressed, it may be observed that the apostle, a little further on, explains it when he says: *Therefore, as by the offence of one evil was propagated to all men*, (Propagatum est malum in omnes homines), etc., to the words, *But, moreover, the law entered.*" And still further on he remarks: "But some one may inquire, what is the formal cause or mode whereby the sin of Adam passes to all his posterity, so that even infants, who have not [personally] committed actual sins are condemned? I answer, *that the evil and contagion is derived to all the posterity of Adam by propagation alone*, (Ipsa sola propagatione.) For what Adam became after his transgression, so all became who were afterwards begotten of him."¹

12. The very learned and profound LUD. DE DIEU presents the same view as to what constitutes the points of comparison. He says: "Apostolos confert (in verse 15), cum peccato hominis gratiam Dei, etc., Deinde effectus etiam peccati Adami ac gratiæ Christi confert; quod inde mors, hinc salus, ad illos manaverit," etc. (Cited in *Poole's synopsis*.)

13. CHAMIER, in his discussion with Bellarmin, and referring to Rom. v. 12-19, says: "I say, then, that it is certain that *all men were constituted unrighteous by Adam*, and that all believers are really constituted righteous *by Christ*. But I deny that this is the point which the apostle had under consideration; for his inquiry here is into the grounds of our condemnation and justification; for although he considers *κατάκριμα* as in Adam, yet not as peculiar to him, but pertaining to the whole human race. For the

¹ Commentarium in Epistolas Pauli ad locum. (Tiguri, 1582.)

meaning is that when Adam sinned the whole human race was condemned or made guilty of disobedience to God; whence, also, *this was by Augustine called original sin, the punishment of the first sin. But how could it be punishment unless that very first sin was imputed?*" No voice after Calvin would be more cheerfully regarded by the Reformed Church as uttering her acknowledged views of doctrine than that of "*the great Chamier*," (1622), the *sobriquet* by which he is still designated, and thus decidedly does he disclaim the whole representation that the mode forms any part of the comparison in the analogy.

14. TILLENUS, in his Theology, referring to the general subject, says: "Therefore generation itself and *σπέρματισμός*, is the mode by which this evil (original sin) flows forth in the human race, *who also in this mode depend from Adam.*"

Again: "Nor does the antithesis in Rom. v. 19 explicate the mode whereby righteousness may either inhere in or be imputed to us; but the causes, effects and subjects of salvation and damnation. For as the first Adam is the cause of sin and perdition to those who by nature are born of him, so the second Adam is the cause of righteousness and salvation to those who, through grace, are renewed by His Spirit."¹

15. F. TURRETIN, in disputing against the positions which Bellarmin had assumed, presents the same exposition of this analogy, and in like manner affirms that the mode forms no part of the comparison. He says: "Nor, if we are constituted unjust and guilty *through the sin propagated from Adam*, ought we to be immediately justified through inherent righteousness communicated to us by Christ through regeneration; for the reason of each is very different (diversissima.) And Paul here institutes a comparison between the first and second Adam in the thing, and not in the mode of the thing."² This theologian has been steadily claimed by Dr. Hodge as endorsing the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, though he thus utterly and reiteratedly repudiates the whole foundation upon which it is based.

16. RYSSENIUS, in responding to the argument, that "according to Rom. v. 19, we are constituted righteous through Christ, as we

¹ Syntag. Theol., Parte I., loc. 56, Thes. 31, and Parte II., loc. Thes. 23. (Geneva, 1618.)

² Instit. Theol., loco 16, Quaest. 2 § 19, and Quaest. 3, § 15.

were constituted unrighteous through Adam, which was inherently," thus remarks: "I reply, Christ is rightly said to constitute us just, not through inherent but imputed righteousness, as in chapter iv. 6. For they are no less constituted just before God who are absolved from merited punishment on account of the obedience of Christ imputed to them, than they who, on account of the disobedience of Adam, are constituted unrighteous; that is, guilty of condemnation and death. Nor if Adam did indeed constitute us unjust effectually, through the propagation of inherent vitiosity, on account of which we are even guilty of death before God, would it likewise follow that Christ constitutes us just through a forensic justification at the tribunal of God by inherent righteousness bestowed on us by Himself, *because the scope of the apostle does not tend in that direction*; but he aims only to lay open the foundation of a common guilt to death, and of a right to life, from our union with the first and second Adam *as to the thing, although the mode is diverse on account of the diversity of the subject.*"¹

17. The view of the Lutheran church may be learned from the following remarks of GLASSIUS on the subject: "Rom. v. 19, *As by the disobedience of the one man many were constituted sinners, so also (οὕτως,) by the disobedience of one shall many be constituted righteous.* The papists here assume that 'as we have been constituted unjust in Adam by inherent qualities, therefore, also in Christ by a like mode are we constituted just or justified, seeing that through the particles of comparison both are conjoined by the apostle.' *But the comparison instituted by these particles is, so to speak, only in the act itself, not in the mode of constituting just and unjust.* Augustine on Original Sin (Book II., chap. 24), says: "In the design (causa) of these two men Christian faith properly stands (consistit), of whom by the one we have been sold under sin, by the other we have been redeemed from sin; *the former of whom destroyed us in himself* by doing his own will, not the will of Him who made him; the latter hath saved us in himself by not doing his own will, but the will of Him who sent him."²

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECT.

Such, then, is the Church doctrine in relation to the topic be-

¹ *Summa Theol. Didact. Eleuct.*, loco 14, *Controversia Secunda*.

² *Philolog. Sacra.*, lib. III., Tract. V., p. 1010. (Leipsic, 1705.)

fore us; and thus directly and utterly are the unfounded assumptions and theory of Dr. Hodge as to the forensic imputation of sin to the guiltless disclaimed. For if the *mode* forms no part of the comparison, his whole theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin becomes an idle dream—there being no other passage in the Scriptures to which he can pretend to lay the slightest claim for its support. How, at the outset, he came to hazard, and then to insist so peremptorily upon the declaration that this analogy, as construed by himself, "is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote," and that, as thus construed it is essential to the Protestant doctrine, must be referred to himself for that eclaireissement which, in view of an assertion so deliberately made, and so often repeated, the Church is bound in duty to herself and to God to require. Such an affirmation, designed as it is to support a principle of such tremendous sequences in its relation to evangelical doctrine, but likewise to furnish a basis for denouncing, as in fatal delusion, all who hold the Church doctrine and reject his theory, should not have been made without some adequate sense of the responsibility incurred thereby. Let, then, the grounds of the assertion be presented, or let it be plainly retracted, as in such a case it should be, as utterly unfounded and false.

The subject, however, is, as we have seen, too important to the well-being of the Church and her doctrine to allow it to pass with a single remark. And that our readers may perceive the peril attending such efforts to substitute a mere *assumption* as to what the truth is, for an actual and easily ascertainable *knowledge* as to what it really is, we solicit a careful consideration of the subjoined extracts (part of which has already been quoted) from the published statements of Dr. Hodge respecting the matter, and that they be pondered in connection with the preceding citations from the Church divines.

In his review of Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed* Dr. Hodge says: "The fact that men were born under condemnation was [by the old divines] sometimes referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves, at others to the corruption of nature derived from him. What finally modified and harmonized these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. *It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz.: that the ground of our*

justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us; but the righteousness of Christ, as something out of ourselves, *could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union representative and natural between him and his posterity.*"¹

This most unfortunate representation, which Dr. Hodge does not even attempt to sustain by a single reference either to authority or fact, is substantially reiterated on page 340 of the same work, while on page 341 he thus follows it up: "The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, *as presented in the theology of the Protestant Church*, and as exhibited by the apostle, is that, as in the case of Christ, His righteousness, as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, *with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence* [sic!]; so in the case of Adam, his offence, as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. *It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology and to the evangelical system*, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied by Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation." It is not without a shudder that I transcribe these passages for republication, for a more pernicious and unauthorized misrepresentation than they exhibit was never made of the received doctrine of the Reformation.

In the same spirit he had previously affirmed, that "This analogy (*i. e.*, as he explains and applies it), is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote. 'We are constituted sinners in Adam in the same way that we are constituted righteous in Christ; but in Christ we are constituted righteous by imputation of righteousness, therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 339; and on the subject at large see likewise pp. 336, 373, 374, 763, 764. Also the *Theology of Dr. Hodge*, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, and Vol. II., pp. 192, 195, 196, 204, 205, 212-216, 223, 224, 225, and 538.

imputation of his sin. Otherwise the comparison fails.' (*Turretin*.) 'We are accounted righteous through Christ in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam.' (*Tuckney*.) 'As we are made guilty of Adam's sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us, so are we made righteous by the righteousness of Christ, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us.' (*Owen*.) We might go on for a month making such quotations. *Nothing can be plainer than that these men considered these cases perfectly parallel as to the point in hand, viz.: the nature of imputation.*"¹

It is not necessary to point out Dr. Hodge's entire misapprehension of the authorities cited in this last paragraph, further than to say that they all—Turretin, Tuckney, and Owen—decidedly reject the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, and that they all maintain an objective moral ground in the race for the imputation to it of the first offence, even though he here cites them in defence of the opposite doctrine, and that he has in this instance also deceived himself by taking *imputation*, in the merely forensic sense (a sense in which they never employ it in this connection), and "*Adam's sin*," for Adam's *merely personal sin*, and not *the first sin* or *sin of the race*. But we shall conclude his representation of the matter by citing the following, wherein, as in a focus, the reader will find concentrated the sum and substance of all the preceding utterances. He says: "The design of the apostle in Rom. v. 12-21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life; *but it is to illustrate the mode or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification*. From the third chapter and twenty-third verse he has been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, His propitiatory death, His righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corrup-

¹ See *Princeton Essays*, First Series, pp. 171-174, 176, 177. And also Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 227, 551, 552.

tion of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offence of one. *To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument.* It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another."¹

These assertions, unsupported though they be, have all had, in view of the author's position in the Church, a mighty influence towards shaping and controlling the doctrinal utterances of her ministry; but in view of them we shall merely leave it with our readers to decide how fearful from the beginning has been the condition of the churches of the Reformation, both Lutheran and Reformed, as exhibited by their own testimony in the present and preceding sections of this work! They, with the exception, perhaps, of a supralapsarian or two, not only have thus denied the very thing which, according to Dr. Hodge, the apostle here affirms, but have never paused in their terrible career till they had overturned his whole argument, and taken sides with the Jews against him, and had consequently, in like manner, maintained that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another. How sad to contemplate these entire communions as thus rushing pell-mell, and apparently without knowing it, into such an apostasy! as they must have done if Dr. Hodge is correct. Would it not have been better for them to have never left the papal church at all than to assume such an attitude against Paul?

It will not be necessary, however, that we point out to the intelligent reader the complete antagonism existing between the aforesaid statements of Dr. Hodge and the statements of the representative divines of the Church, as presented in the sections above referred to. His views on these great and leading points are a perfect antithesis to theirs, and on those points there neither is nor can be anything in common between them, as his theory has of necessity compelled him to affirm, as we have fully shown by his own admissions (cited in our SECOND SECTION) in relation to the issue involved in this discussion. Both of course, therefore, cannot be true, any more than sin and holiness can be identical.

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 344, 345.

And hence it is obvious that Dr. Hodge's claim to be in doctrinal agreement or sympathy with those divines can be by no possibility intelligently allowed, any more than the idea could be intelligently entertained that he might really and sincerely receive a proposition as true which he at the same time denounces and repudiates as utterly false; and if Dr. Hodge, therefore, really regards the views of the Reformed church on this vital issue as fundamentally erroneous, there can be not the shadow of a doubt as to his duty in the premises.

Had the Doctor investigated the subject properly before he thus committed himself to denunciation and proscription (for it is inconceivable how any well-read theologian could have hazarded such utterances), he would have learned for himself the actual facts in the case, and also how dangerous the course he was pursuing. It is always perilous to substitute (in important matters, at least) mere fancies for facts, and especially if such procedure be accompanied by a peremptory or proscriptive spirit. Such a disposition is not unfrequently left to the mortifying results of its own indulgence. And though it be extremely painful to advert to these particulars, it is demanded by the necessities of the case. No man can, without adequate investigation, possess the right to *assume* that in a certain important connection a vitally important principle, in either doctrine or ethics, *must be* as he would wish it to be, and thereupon to denounce in the most unmeasured and offensive terms all who refuse to concur with his representation; and still further, and in view of such assumption, to insist on a principle which, if received, must ultimately and logically induce a fundamental change in the whole system of evangelical doctrine. And when such an effort is attempted, any one whom God in His providence has enabled to obtain a true knowledge of the actual state of the case would prove recreant to duty, and richly merit the execration of all the wise and good, should he, from the puerile and dishonoring fear of being misapprehended, or made to suffer from the proscription and calumny of the servile and hostile, fail, at any possible sacrifice, to apprize the Church of her danger, even though, for the time being, she may be so overswayed and blinded by the influences brought to bear upon her judgment as to be unwilling to take the matter into serious consideration; or should even fall in with that infamous utterance of cowardice and

(of treachery to God's own truth, *that position in the Church is the criterion for soundness of doctrine*; for such a state of things must inevitably be brought to a merited and dishonorable end. In the present instance, the dogma in question is claimed by Dr. Hodge to be an essential part of the analogy referred to. Then, of course, the conclusion seemed reasonable that the grand and learned old divines of the Reformation must have perceived it, and accordingly the next assumption is that it was both perceived and maintained by them. The notion thus begotten and born is then fostered, until, in the view of its parent, it becomes fundamental to the Protestant theology; and, of course, all who refuse to entertain it are asserted to be in fundamental error, and are shamelessly traduced and denounced, as reversing the doctrine of the apostle and taking sides with the Jews against him. And these asseverations, unfounded and false as they are, have been emphatically inculcated upon a large proportion of the ministers of our Church; and are now inculcated in several of our theological schools as the truth of God, received and taught by the Church from the beginning. It is true that, when the facts become known, such assumption and calumnious reproaches can effect no lasting injury; and that they may be known, and that the Church may be at length delivered from the unhappy results of having countenanced thus in its incipency so deplorable and fatal a departure from her most precious faith, I have, at the cost of sacrifice which I need not name, and of severe and prostrating labor, sought, before it be too late, to arouse her attention to the facts in the case.

But having now disposed of the historic question in relation to the import of the analogy, on the interpretation of which the whole scheme of Dr. Hodge is compelled to lean for support, we shall proceed to consider the method of exegesis by which he proposes to arrive at his aforesaid conclusions.

§ 18. DR. HODGE'S EXPLANATION OF THE PASSAGE.

Prefatory.

We trust that we may not weary the patience of our readers by the effort to present somewhat fully this important paragraph of the apostle in its impressive relations to the whole subject before us (for everything in regard to the scheme of Dr. Hodge

depends upon the view which is taken of it); but having presented so fully in our last section the analyses of it as understood by the Augustinian divines, and, by consequence, evinced that the theory of Dr. Hodge had never been even supposed to be taught therein, it will, at this stage of the discussion, be only proper to allow him to lay before us his own analysis, and to explain on what ground he would justify the exposition he has given.

In his Commentary, the Doctor states that verses 12, 18, and 19 of the paragraph contain the main idea of the whole passage; and as we concur with him, it will be needless to multiply our pages by following his detail through the rest of the passage; for to determine the meaning of these verses will be, so far as the actual issue is concerned, to determine the doctrine of the whole. In order, however, to support his views of the analogy in the passage, he has found it necessary to ignore and abandon the exposition which has always been given and maintained, as above stated, by the Augustinian divines. This is not referred to as in itself unjustifiable; nor would it furnish any ground of exception, important as the matter certainly is, if the fact had been frankly admitted (as it most certainly should have been), and substantial reasons furnished for the departure. The motto of every one who is at all worthy to be numbered amongst the really intelligent of our communion always has been,

"Nullius addictus jurare in verbis magistri;"

and such we hope it may ever continue to be. It alters the case greatly, however, when, without due intimation, such departure is taken for the purpose of sustaining a merely arbitrary assumption against the recognized doctrine of the Church; when it sets aside the true and universally acknowledged principles of Scripture hermeneutics, and when it infallibly compromises the fundamental verities of our system of doctrine, not only by proscribing them, and those who receive and support them, but by endeavoring to replace the doctrines thus rejected by dogmas wholly antagonistic, and which the Church has always discarded. Should it be claimed that such a procedure may occur through mistake, and be therefore consistent with uprightness of intention, it need only be remarked (1), that one in Dr. Hodge's position, whose high and special duty it had emphatically become to be rightly informed

on such a subject before presuming to commit himself in regard to it, had no right to make *such a mistake*, and that, therefore, in such a case it is inexcusable; and (2), that the fact of its being a mistake can in no way either lessen the fatal consequences of such a procedure, or cancel our obligation to oppose it to the last. On the contrary, instead of being thus lessened, both alike are, in fact, enhanced by such a consideration.

We neither profess to have, nor do we wish to have, any sympathy with that morbid fastidiousness which, while it would shrink from a plain and decided expression of God's truth, when her suffering interests clearly demand utterance, is, at the same time, disposed to divest error of its odiousness when some prominent individual becomes its advocate, and even to discountenance and suppress, by every available means, the efforts which are demanded in vindication of her claims, lest, forsooth, the result might present the errorist in a light not so pleasing as such persons may deem desirable. Such recreancy to the cause of God and to the claims of His truth cannot be extenuated by the fact, even if it were a fact, that the error, in some of its protean forms, may have previously existed, even in the Church; for even they who, in their fatal folly, pursue such a course, certainly know what Jesus has said of those who are ashamed of Him "*and of his words*," and can hardly suppose that their servility should influence minds who are actuated by Christian principle; and should such persons still say or insinuate, as some such have done, that in these most laborious efforts to deliver the Church from what clearly appears to be an impending and fearful apostasy of doctrine, I have sought to disturb her peace, or that I have invidiously introduced the facts which are essential to a fair and intelligible presentation of the case, then they are guilty of falsehood and calumny, and should be so regarded and treated by the friends of truth. There have been more than is meet of such unworthy and disgraceful tampering with God's truth, in the efforts which have been already made to suppress this discussion.

The Exegesis.

In the earlier editions of his Commentary, Dr. Hodge advances the following exposition as presenting the true sense of the passage referred to, retains it unaltered in his revised edition, and reproduces it in his "Systematic Theology":

In referring to the words in verse 12, "*because all sinned*," and after enumerating three different interpretations of them, he adds: "The third interpretation, therefore, according to which the words in question mean, *all are regarded and treated as sinners, is to be preferred*. The verse, then, contains this idea: 'As by one man all men became sinners and exposed to death, and thus death passed on all men, since all sinned, *i. e.*, *are regarded as sinners on his account*,' even so by one man, etc. The arguments in support of this interpretation are the following: 1. The word translated *have sinned* may, in strict accordance with usage, be rendered *have become guilty*, or *regarded and treated as sinners*. Compare Gen. xlv. 32, 'I shall bear the blame,' literally, 'I shall have sinned.' See also Gen. xliii. 9, 1 Kings i. 21. 2. It is almost universally admitted that verse 12 contains the first member of a comparison between Adam and Christ, etc. "The scope of the passage is to illustrate the doctrine of justification on the ground of the righteousness of Christ by a reference to the condemnation of men for the sin of Adam. *The analogy is destroyed and the point of the comparison fails if anything in us be assumed as the ground of the infliction of the penal evils of which the apostle is here speaking*." My design here is to give merely the interpretation itself of Dr. Hodge, and so much of the ground for it as to guard against misconstruction. The hermeneutical principles involved will be considered in the sequel.

Then, on verse 14, in adverting to this interpretation, he says: "All the arguments, therefore, which go to establish the interpretation given above of verse 12, or the correctness of the exhibition of the course of the apostle's argument, and design of the whole passage, bear with all their force in support of the view given of this clause. *Almost all the objections to this interpretation, being founded on misapprehension*, are answered by the mere statement of the case. The simple doctrine of the apostle is, that there are penal evils which come upon men antecedently to any transgression of their own; and as the infliction of these evils implies a violation of law, *it follows that they are regarded and treated as sinners on the ground of the disobedience of another*." On verse 15 he repeats the same: "*The very point of comparison is that as the righteousness of Christ, and not our own works, is the ground of our justification, so the sin of Adam, an-*

tededently to any sin of our own, is the ground of the infliction of certain penal evils. *If the latter be denied, the very point of the analogy between Christ and Adam is destroyed.*"

Verse 18. "Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came on all men to condemnation, even so," etc. The words rendered *therefore* mark the resumption of the comparison commenced in verse 12.

"There are two important questions yet to be considered, in reference to this verse. The first is: what is the force of the phrase, *by the offence of one* judgment came on all men to condemnation? There is no dispute as to the meaning of the expression 'judgment came on all men to condemnation,' it is admitted to mean what alone it can mean, that all are condemned. See above, on verse 16. But the question is, What is the relation between the offence of Adam and the condemnation of men? Or what is the force of the words, *by the offence of one*?"

"We have, therefore, in this single passage, no less than three cases, verses 12, 18, 19, in which this preposition (*dia*) with the genitive indicates such a means to an end, as the ground or reason on account of which something is given or performed. All this is merely sufficient to prove that it *may*, in the case before us, express the ground why the sentence of condemnation has passed on all men. That such, in this connection, must be its meaning appears, 1, From the nature of the subject spoken of. . . . 2, From the antithesis. If the phrase 'by the righteousness of one all are justified' means, as is admitted, that that righteousness is the ground of our justification, the opposite clause, 'by the offence of one all are condemned,' must have a similar meaning. 3, The point of comparison, as frequently remarked before, lies in this very idea. The fact that Adam's sin was the occasion of our sinning, and thus increasing the divine displeasure, is no illustration that Christ's righteousness, and not our own merit, is the ground of our acceptance. There would be some plausibility in this interpretation, if it were the doctrine of the gospel that Christ's righteousness is the occasion of our becoming holy, and that on the ground of this personal holiness we are justified. But this not being the case, the interpretation in question cannot be adopted in consistency with the design of the apostle, or the common rules of exposition."

"Verse 19. *For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.* This verse presents the doctrine of the preceding one in a somewhat different form. As in the doctrine of justification there are two ideas of the ascription of righteousness and treating as righteous; and in the doctrine of the fall, the ascription of guilt (legal responsibility) and the treating all men as guilty; so either of these ideas is frequently presented more prominently than the other. In verse 18 it is our being *treated* as sinners for the sin of Adam, and our being *treated* as righteous for the righteousness of Christ, that is most prominently presented. In verse 19, on the contrary, it is our being *regarded* as sinners for the disobedience of Adam, and our being *regarded* as righteous for the obedience of Christ, that are rendered most conspicuous. Hence Paul begins this verse with *for*, 'We are treated as sinners for the offence of Adam, for we are regarded as sinners on his account,' etc.

"With respect to the first clause of this verse, we meet again the three interpretations to which reference has so frequently been made. That the disobedience of Adam was the occasion of men's becoming sinners. That through that disobedience all were corrupted; that is, that they have derived a corrupt nature from Adam, which is the immediate ground of their suffering penal evils. That it is on account of this disobedience they are regarded and treated as sinners. *With increasing clearness, it may be made to appear that here, as elsewhere throughout the passage, the last is the apostle's doctrine.*

"1. It is in accordance with one of the most familiar of scriptural usages, that the words *to make sinners* are interpreted as meaning *to regard and treat as such*. . . . 3. The antithesis is here so plain as to be of itself decisive. To be made righteous is, according to Professor Stuart, 'to be justified, pardoned, regarded and treated as righteous.' With what show of consistency, then, can it be denied that 'to be made sinners,' in the opposite clause, means to be regarded and treated as sinners? If one part of the verse speaks of justification, the other must speak of condemnation. 4. As so often before remarked, the analogy between the case of Adam and Christ requires the interpretation."

"The meaning, then, of the whole passage is this: BY ONE MAN sin entered into the world, or men were brought to stand in the re-

lation of sinners to God; death consequently passed on all, because for the offence of that one man they all became sinners (guilty); *i. e.*, were all regarded and treated as sinners. That this is really the case is plain, because the execution of the penalty of a law cannot be more extensive than its violation, and consequently, if all are subject to penal evils, all are regarded as sinners in the sight of God. . . . We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam."

In his revised edition Dr. Hodge reasserts this attempt at exposition in the most peremptory and dogmatic style, as though there could be no other possible exposition than that which he thus offers; when it is wholly inconceivable that he should not have known it to be contrary to and subversive of the interpretation adopted and defended by all the approved expositors in the Calvinistic church. He says: "The only possible way in which all men could be said to have sinned in Adam is putatively. His act, for some good and proper reason, was regarded as their act, just as the act of an agent is regarded as the act of the principal."¹

Remarks.

Such is the exposition, the necessity for which was indispensable in order that, by constituting the *modes* of communicating the condemnatory sentence and the free gift, points of likeness and comparison in the analogy, Dr. Hodge might provide a basis for his theory of the merely forensic or gratuitous imputation of Adam's personal sin, a *peccatum alienum*, to his posterity. Participation is thus swept entirely away, and the ground regarded as levelled and cleared, and all the *impedimenta* in the way to the conclusion removed. Neither the Socinians nor the Remonstrants, it will be remembered, ever required more than this in their contests with the Church on original sin. And let it, moreover, be carefully observed, that in the foregoing professed enumeration and examination of the various interpretations put upon the passage, Dr. Hodge makes no allusion whatever to the great cardinal one so fully presented by Augustine, and so universally accepted and insisted on by the churches of the Reformation, as our previous citations evince. He ignores it, and all allusion to it, as entirely as though it had never in any way come within the range of his

¹ Revised Commentary, p. 304. See likewise, p. 279.

reading. But what, let me ask, is the real pivot of the whole controversy (not only now, but in the past centuries), if it be not this question of participation? This was the great issue raised by Dr. Hodge himself at the outset, and the discussion of which, in its relations to his theory, our Church has been earnestly looking for at his hand, in view of the decided criticisms which his course had elicited,—the great leading point which it was expected he should especially present and treat upon in his then forthcoming work on theology. But just this point, the most important of all others at the present time, in relation to the Church theology on this doctrine, and which should have been most carefully investigated and decided on, *is not examined into, but treated as of no account in this long expected theological work*. And thus, while even claiming to carry forward "the strength of the Calvinistic system" in its great representative feature, he, apparently without being conscious of it, aims a death-blow at the very heart of the whole system. And yet all may see, that if, as he alleges, the idea of participation be an absurdity, and nonsensical, etc., etc., and yet has been from the first regarded by the whole Church as a great and fundamental doctrine, much more was there reason why Dr. Hodge should not thus attempt to give it the go by. But instead of attempting in any way to sustain his offensive allegations, he asks the Church (as Strauss does, in regard to miracles) simply to *presuppose an impossibility in relation to it*.¹ For though in the revised edition of his Commentary he does advert to it, it is simply for the purpose of repeating his assumption that it is impossible and nonsensical.

The school of Socinus were among the most learned as well as the most inveterate of all the impugners of the theology of the Reformation; and next to the doctrine of the Trinity and its more direct correlates their hostility was most envenomed against the doctrine of original sin as set forth in our Confessions and maintained by our leading divines. For until the doctrine of our participation in the first sin could be exploded they felt that no reasonable expectation could be entertained of being able to abolish the doctrine of a real satisfaction for sin. While, on the contrary, could they succeed in annulling the former so far as to establish the notion that the race could be said to have sinned only forensi-

¹ See Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, Lecture VI.

cally or putatively in Adam, little difficulty would remain in the way of demonstrating that, as putative sin could require only putative expiation, the satisfaction rendered by Christ for the sin of the world was not a *real*, but merely a *putative* or *forensic satisfaction*, which any unfallen creature might accomplish. And hence the necessity that our Redeemer should be truly God is at once set aside, and along therewith the doctrine of the Trinity and its correlated truths. And hence they brought steadily to bear against the doctrine of our participation in the first sin all the resources of their learning, and wit, and sarcasm, and ferocious denunciation.

In this controversy the Reformers constantly appealed to Rom. v. 12-21, as teaching the Church doctrine of participation, and claimed that the apostle therein announces that we all sinned when Adam sinned, and were constituted sinners, and consequently shared deservedly in his condemnation. (See Sections 9-14 and 17, above.) And it was in order to set aside this doctrine that the Socinians, and subsequently the Arminians likewise, adopted and elaborated the exegesis which I shall now proceed to lay before our readers; and I do this with the earnest request that they will carefully compare it, together with the results which it announces, with the exposition presented by Dr. Hodge.

§ 19. THE SOCINIAN EXEGESIS OF ROMANS V. 12-21.

1. We commence with FAUSTUS SOCINUS.

In his paraphrase of Romans v. his criticism on verse 12 extends only to the substitution of *quatenus* for the *in quo*, commonly then adopted by the Church divines; for his objection to it was that it favored the doctrine of participation.

We present the next passage in his own words: "Vs. 18, 19. *Sicut enim*, etc. Quandoquidem sicut per inobedientiam unius hominis factum est; ut multi propterea quod ex ipso secundum carnem nati essent, *pro peccatoribus sint habiti, atque ut tales tractati*, sic similiter per obedientiam unius hominis, multi propterea, quod ex ipso secundum spiritum sunt nati, *pro justis sunt habendi atque ut tales tractandi*."¹ This is simply affirming in Latin the criticism which Dr. Hodge has above affirmed in English: that to be constituted sinners, and to be constituted righteous, means, in this passage, *nothing more than to be regarded and treated as such*.

¹ See Opp. Tom. I., p. 149, in Biblioth. Frat. Polonorum.

Thus, in his Work, *De Servatore*,¹ Part IV., Chapter 6, he gives an extended exposition of the passage, wherein he violently assails the Church doctrine from the standpoint of this exegesis. We give a few extracts. He commences with a pointed address to *Covetus* (against whom the book was written), who had claimed that the passage in Romans v. supported the orthodox doctrine, and says to him: "But that which appears to support your views strongly, is the comparison of the obedience and righteousness of Christ with the disobedience and offence of Adam." *Covetus* had said, "For Paul in that comparison plainly teaches that all have sinned in Adam, and have become obnoxious to death on account thereof (*ob eam rem*);" and deduces from it the doctrine that the first sin, as committed in and with Adam, was imputed for condemnation to all his posterity, as the obedience of Christ was imputed to all believers as a release from condemnation. Socinus, however, denounces the whole statement as false, while he cheerfully admits that we are saved by Christ alone, and that we are adjudged to all the miseries of our present condition, and to eternal death *for the personal sin of Adam*. He continues thus: "You appear to have formed your opinion from those words in the Latin Vulgate, 'in whom all have sinned;' but even they cannot be in any way shown to contain that opinion. . . . They therefore who think that in this whole comparison there is nothing said of *actual sin* (as they name it), are, as we shall presently show, egregiously deceived. . . . Besides they can in no way explain those expressions so often repeated by the apostle,—*by the offence of one, and through the offence or disobedience of one*,—from which it is made plain that the one offence of Adam, and not the actual sins of men, is there regarded by Paul as the cause of the condemnation and death of the human race." Then, in reply to an objection, and after quoting verse 16, he thus proceeds: "For Paul here clearly announces this difference between condemnation and justification, that the former had proceeded from one offence only, but the latter from the forgiveness of many offences; which difference had not been affirmed by him, if he had taught that condemnation proceeds from the actual sins of men. . . . And although this portion of Paul's discourse has been, and may be, variously explained, yet this is always elicited from it, that this

¹ See Opp. Tom. II., p. 182-246.

difference ought to be acknowledged as to the evil which we have contracted from sinning Adam, and the good we have derived through Christ's obedience; *that the former has proceeded from one, or from the offence of one*, but the latter from many, or the forgiven offences of many, which difference, as above stated, can have no existence if we maintain that in that evil Paul can refer only to our actual sins." (Pages 221, 222.)

He then, after endeavoring to trace the repetition of "*all*" in verse 12 to Hebrew usage, and after remarking that the relative *illi* could have been properly substituted for the second *all*, thus proceeds: "From which repetition they who do not rightly perceive the aim of the apostle gather the doctrine that the whole human race have been subjected to death, although the apostle in these words has really declared to them nothing more than that all have been subjected to death who have sinned." Then, after adding that "hence it happens when they see, especially in the case of infants, that the expression *the whole race sinned* cannot refer to actual sin, they make it refer to what they call *original sin*, for the confirmation of which notion they interpret the words *in quo* as if they were *in quo homine*, for, say they, in the first man the whole race did not sin *actually*, but *originally*," on which, with some impatience, he remarks, "Which doctrine and interpretation they are not able in any way to sustain; for who is there that cannot see that this is a discourse, not on original but actual sin, seeing that death is said to have entered into the world by sin?"

Then, after insisting on this in his customary style of proscriptive arrogance throughout the next five paragraphs, and discussing other portions of the passage, he thus proceeds: "*Quamvis enim, si summum jus, etc.; i. e.*, for even though we should consider the rigid right which God may exercise towards any, and that, perhaps, wrong-doing may at the least deserve death, yet here there is nothing said of any other right which may flow from that sentence which was brought against the offence of Adam. For death has not therefore entered into the world because it is the nature of any sin to produce death, but because God saw proper to punish the sin of the first man with death." (Page 225.) It is on this ground that Socinus claims to deny the truth of *the Church doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam, and of the obedience*

of Christ, although he here admits as fully as Dr. Hodge himself the merely juridical or forensic; and he and his school asserted in every form the doctrine of a merely forensic imputation. At the same time, therefore, that they deny the real imputation of both sin and righteousness, they in the strongest manner insist *that the judgment unto condemnation passed upon the race for the personal sin of Adam alone*, and that salvation redounds to men only through or on account of the obedience of Christ. Had the Church doctrine of imputation, then, really been what Dr. Hodge insists that it was—that we are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the merely personal sin of Adam, as believers are regarded and treated as righteous on account of the obedience of Christ—Socinus would have been its strongest supporter, *for this is the very dogma which he arrays against the Church doctrine*, and which he and his school everywhere insist on.

On account of his representative position we have cited Socinus more fully than we shall his disciples. Our next is—

2. JOHN F. CRELLIUS, who, in learning and critical acumen, was certainly the ablest of the Socinian school. He has copiously expounded the paragraph before us, first in his *Commentary* on the epistle, and then in his *Paraphrase*. We shall cite briefly from both.¹

On page 12 of his *Commentary* he says: "*And so death passed to all men*. In these words he (Paul) shows that Adam drew and involved his posterity into the same ruin with himself, and that through his sin it was brought about that his posterity should be in that same condition. . . . For this punishment has redounded upon his whole posterity, *who yet, as regards their being his posterity, there existed no reason why they should be punished*." (P. 124.) He presents this feature (let our readers observe), as discriminating the Socinian doctrine from the received doctrine of the Church.

In his *Paraphrase* he represents the apostle as saying: Cum ergo, ut hactenus docuimus, tanti Dei beneficii, hoc est justificationis ac vitæ sempiternæ per Christum fiamus participes; . . . hinc jure concludi potest, totius hujus rei imaginem quondam nobis esse propositam in re contraria, hoc est in Adami lapsu ut eo, quod inde tum ad ipsum, tum ad universam ejus posteritatem,

¹ His works from Vols. III. and IV. of the Biblioth. Frat. Polonorum.

redundat, damno." And he adds that there was nothing wrong in this, seeing that this punishment was consentaneous to their natural condition; and besides, that God, on account of the sins of parents, treats their posterity more severely than He otherwise would have done." (P. 212.) His views on divine justice are very decided, as may be seen by his annotations on Heb. x. 26, 32, and differed materially from the mere governmental notion of Socinus.

On verse 18 he continues thus: "*Ἀπα ὁδὺν*. Here at length, the apostle explicates the apodosis more fully: *as by one sin to all men unto condemnation*. The word *judgment* is to be understood here from verse 16. By *one sin* judgment, to wit: *came upon all men unto condemnation, so by one act justly upon all men unto justification of life*. The word *grace*, or *free gift*, is here also to be supplied from verse 16. But the whole obedience of Christ is here regarded as if it were *one act*, that by so much more elegance the antithesis might be presented between his obedience *and the* single transgression of Adam." (P. 126.)

In his *Paraphrase* he expresses it thus: "Quare, ut comparationem superius coeptam absolvimus, et totius rei summam concludamus. *Quemadmodum ex uno delictu unius hominis, consecutum Dei iudicium omnes homines damnationi subjecit, eo, quo supra explicuimus, pacto; ita etiam unius hominis justitia factum est, ut gratia divina, in omnes homines qui nempe eam, ut diximus, amplectuntur, dimanaret, ac vitam illis sempiternam afferet.*" (P. 213.)

On verse 19 Crellius says: "*For as by the disobedience of the one man the many have been constituted sinners*; that is, they are no otherwise treated than as if they had transgressed as Adam did, under the threatening of death, the law which God had plainly announced; or, which is the samething, *they are treated as sinners*, and subjected to condemnation and death. (Tanquam peccatores sunt tractati, ac morte damnationique subjecti.)"

"*So by the obedience of one many shall be constituted righteous*. So with all those who believe in and obey Christ, God does not act otherwise than as if they had fully observed the law, as Christ observed it. For if *they* without law (as I may say) could be condemned, then *THESE* also could without law be justified. And then further: *If God could make such a decree*, that if Adam transgressed his precept, not only he, but all his posterity who should at

all come short of duty, should undergo the same penalty of death, he could likewise enact that if Christ should fully observe and obey the law, all his followers who obeyed, even if not so perfectly as he, should obtain the same condition of happiness." (P. 126.)

In his *Paraphrase* he explains the passage as follows: "V. 19. For as through the disobedience of one it came to pass that many, that is, all who are begotten of him, *should be treated as sinners, and be subjected to the same punishment with the parent who had transgressed the divine law*, so also shall it be, through the obedience of one man, that many, even all who are by him spiritually renewed, *should be treated as righteous*, and obtain the same reward which he himself obtained." (P. 213.) These extracts require no remark in order to develop their bearing on the subject before us. We will now hear

3. JONAS SLICHTINGIUS, their next most eminent leader.¹

In his Commentary on Romans, and when treating on our passage, he of course objects strongly to the *in quo* (verse 12) of the old exegesis, on the ground that it appeared to favor the doctrine of our participation in the first sin; and in the exact style assumed now by Dr. Hodge, labors to demonstrate the utter absurdity of attributing to the posterity any such participation; though he employs a grave irony rather than the vapid denunciation and abortions of wit so common with his school. He says: "Verse 12, *so far as that all sinned*. The apostle adds this clause lest it might appear to any one to be unjust, that all men should be subjected to death because their father had sinned, and became subject to death. He replies that this is not unjust; for although in the child death might not assume the form of punishment, but was only an effect of the sin of the parent (who had propagated to his children the condition and allotment which his crime had brought upon himself); yet, by so much the more does this take place justly, *because they and their offspring had all sinned*. . . . They who insist on *in quo* here meaning *in which man* all sinned, not only depart from the signification of the Greek words *ἐφ' ὧν*, but greatly impair the aptness and coherency of the words of the apostle among themselves. Would not the following cohere charmingly? By man sin entered, and by sin death, and so death has passed upon all men in which man all sinned. For when

¹ His works are contained in Vol. V., Biblioth. Fratrum Polonorum.

Adam and Eve sinned there was not as yet any other human being on the earth. Nor could Adam, because he himself had sinned, make his children guilty of the same sin; for he sinned when as yet they did not exist. What part, therefore, could they have had in his sin, or in the guilt (reatu) of it? None whatever. The author of the Hebrews says, that through Abraham, *as I may say*, Levi gave tithes (chapter vii. 9), because he could not say it properly. But it is one thing to give tithes, and quite another thing to sin." (P. 203.)

Dr. Hodge is less moderate in his denunciation of the doctrine: "Sins of which we know nothing, which were committed by us before we were born, which cannot be brought home to the conscience as our own sins, can never be the righteous grounds of punishment any more than the acts of an idiot." "A sin of which it is impossible that we should be conscious as our voluntary act, can no more be the ground of punishment *as our act* than the sin of an idiot, of a madman, or of a corpse."¹

On verse 14, Slichtingius says: "Peccata igitur posteris Adami imputata sunt ad mortem, non propter legem Dei quæ tum nondum extabat, sed propter Adamum ejusque peccatum." And on verse 15, "*Si unius delicto illi multi mortui sunt*; Id est, si unius delicto factum est, ut non ille unus tantum, sed et illi multi morentur." And on verse 18, "*Sicut per unum delictum*. Id est, propter unum delictum, nempe, Adami, *per pro propter*. In omnes homines. Intellige ex vers. 16, venit iudicium, *quo scilicet illis imputata sunt peccata*. Per omnes homines intelliguntur illi omnes de quibus vers. 12, 14, 15 loquutus est. In condemnationem. Id est, ut condemnarentur et morte adjudicarentur *χρίμα* eis *κατάκριμα* ut habuimus vers. 16. In omnes homines. Intellige ex eodem vers. 16 venit *δῶρημα* a vel *χάρισμα*, id est, donatio, actus gratiæ, *quo illis qui peccarunt imputatur justitia*. In justificationem vitæ. Id est, ut justi pronuncientur," etc. (P. 208.) Then, after quoting verse 19, he says: "This verse rather illustrates and confirms the consequence. *For, as through the disobedience*. Here likewise *through* is put for *on account of*. . . . *Of one man*, even Adam. *Were constituted sinners*; that is, *were pronounced sinners; were condemned; were adjudged to death, and affected with death; for this constituting was by a decree, and in execution of a*

¹ Theology, Vol. II., pp. 216, 223.

decree. . . . Even as through the obedience; that is, on account of the obedience of one man, Jesus Christ. *Shall be constituted righteous*: In a similar way, by a decree and the execution of the decree; that is, they shall be pronounced just, released from condemnation, and life eternal shall be adjudged and bestowed upon them." (P. 208.)

4. We conclude with a brief extract from the *Compendiolum Socinianismi*, containing a statement of the doctrines entertained by the Socinian churches, and which appears to have been prepared by *Ostorodus and Voivodius*.¹ In chapter III., *De Lapsu hominis et Peccato Originis*, the subject before us is treated as follows:

"Our churches teach that through the fall the guilt of necessary and eternal death was contracted. (Gen. ii., Rom. v. and vi.) That is, that unless deliverance should be brought by the grace of God, it would have been necessary for all to have remained in death; yet without eternal torment. *And they acknowledge that this guilt (reatus) has passed upon all the posterity of Adam without any intervening fault (culpa) of their own*. Yet so that this guilt, in respect to the posterity, should bear no aspect of punishment, but only of a necessary condition attracted naturally in conjunction with the race itself." That is, they make it an unavoidable calamity inflicted upon the innocent.

Remarks.

Such, then, is the exegesis of the passage plainly and fully expressed. And our readers will observe that the question here is not whether Dr. Hodge has taken his exposition from this school (though their apparent identity is such as might easily lead to such a conclusion), or whether his views on other doctrines may coincide with theirs, but simply whether he has not applied to this great *locus classicus* the same principles of exposition that they have, and with the purpose of securing the like result; *that is, the destruction of the doctrine of our participation in the first sin*. This is the sole point of inquiry with which the argument is here concerned. And if language may be regarded as having any definite, settled meaning, the forecited extracts demonstrate, beyond cavil itself, that the principles of exegesis which he has applied to this passage, and so peremptorily asserted, are identical with those

¹ It was first issued at Amsterdam in 1598.

which the Socinian school have applied and defended in order to destroy the Church doctrine of original sin, and on which they insist fully as earnestly as he.

It will be further observed, that the matter with which the main question is concerned is not one on which all alike, whether friends or foes of evangelical doctrine, may agree, as *e. g.* in a historical or archæological point of inquiry; nor does it pertain to a matter which is indifferent, and on which the supporters of evangelical truth may and do differ, as on church government, the use of forms in public prayer, and the like, (though Dr. Hodge, on page 126 of the abridged edition of his Commentary, has represented the exegesis as of this character); but it pertains to one which constitutes, to a great extent, the line of separation between the system of evangelical doctrine and the system of error which rejects it, and has ever been laboring for its subversion. And, as above remarked, the clear and avowed purpose of the Socinian school in adopting and defending this exegesis was to enervate and overthrow the doctrine of original sin, and along with it the whole evangelical system of truth as entertained and taught by the churches of the Reformation.

Dr. Hodge's avowed aim in employing this exegesis, and applying it as he does, is to explicate the doctrine of original sin as entertained by the Reformed or Calvinistic church. While, on the other hand, the design of the Socinians in employing it (and they employ and apply it precisely as he does against the doctrine of our participation in the first sin,) was to destroy that doctrine; and thus the Socinian refutation of Calvinistic doctrine on this vital subject is virtually accepted and defended by Dr. Hodge as the Calvinistic doctrine itself. Such is the real state of the case into which he has been inducting the Church by inculcating this exposition, and insisting on it as the only one that is at all possible; and further, by decidedly claiming that the doctrine elicited by that interpretation is fundamental to the Protestant theology and the evangelical system as taught in the Scriptures. Our readers must determine for themselves what to think of this. And then further still, if such indeed be the Calvinistic system, they must likewise determine for themselves under what category to place the labored and learned replies which our theologians have made to these arguments and to this exegesis of their opposers. They

were refuted by such men as Pareus (of Heidelberg), Arnold (of Franequer), Drs. John Owen, Hoornbeck, Cloppenburg, Maresius, Turretin, and a host of other great and venerable men whom the Church, ever since their day, has named amongst her noblest sons. They denounced and refuted as ruinous errors not only what Dr. Hodge accepts, but what he, in a style the most imperious, as well as proscriptive of those who reject his views hereon, claims to be the very substance of the gospel economy of salvation. Were those learned and godly men, therefore, deceived and in error in this their estimate of gospel truth, and in defending it thus against the rabid assaults of the Socinian school? And is Dr. Hodge, on any conceivable ground, to be sustained in thus uniting with that school on the vital issue before us, while still retaining his connection with a Calvinistic communion? And are we now, instead of requiring that he fairly meet and respond on the issues which he has thus raised, to concede all this, and on the plea (ignoble and disgraceful as it is!) of "carrying forward the strength of the federal or representative system," to move over into the Socinian camp?—a movement which he himself has thus practically inaugurated! And still further: Is a fair and candid exposure of facts, in which are so deeply and fundamentally involved the purity, and soundness, and spiritual life itself of the Church, to be met by professed followers of Christ by denunciations and revilings, and by the iniquitously false accusation of aiming at notoriety, and to destroy the peace of the Church?—accusations which, from the very beginning, have always and in every age heralded the initiation of efforts to subvert the foundations of her doctrine and efficiency. These are questions which the Church herself must now assume the responsibility of determining.

§ 20. REFUTATION OF THE SOCINIAN EXEGESIS BY THE CALVINISTIC DIVINES.

Before proceeding to the next general topic in the argument, it will be proper to present here in illustration a few brief specimens of the replies by which the Calvinistic divines repelled these assaults upon the very citadel of their faith. Our previous citations have exhibited their explanation of the passage. And now all that will be further necessary is to lay before our readers *the re-*

sults to which they arrived in refuting the theory and exegesis in question after the Socinian school had begun to employ it in their assaults upon the Church doctrine. We begin with—

1. PAREUS.

The refutation of the scheme of Socinus which is given by Pareus in his commentary on the first three chapters of Genesis, was more damaging to that wily heresiarch, and was felt by him more keenly than anything which had been previously written against it, and for a while his defiant arrogance was completely changed by it into deprecation and entreaty. James Covetus,¹ against whom the *De Servatore* was written, had alleged that none ever suffer death under the government of God unless for their own sins or the sins of others. Socinus devoted Chapter 8 of Part III. to his refutation of this, and says: "If by death you mean *perpetual death*, your statement is both silly and false. For all men since our first parents, and *without any sin of their own* (etiam sine ullis propriis peccatis), as will be demonstrated in the sequel, are under sentence of that death." Pareus, who, when this portion of the work appeared, had been for several years professor of theology in Heidelberg, takes up and answers all his leading objections, and thus replies to the one here cited; "God has plainly said, *that the soul that sinneth it shall die*. Hence we thus argue against these heretics, that whosoever sins dies on account of sin. (Ezek. 18.) All have sinned in Adam, by another's sin and by their own. (Rom. v.) Therefore, all who die eternally die by another's sin and by their own.

¹ A brief notice of this excellent and learned person may not be out of place in the connection. He was born in Paris, in 1546, and died in 1608. His first pastoral charge was the church in Villamont, from which he was called to that of Paris. But when the civil wars began, he retired to Switzerland, and became pastor of the church in Geneva. He labored also during several years and with great success at Basle amongst his countrymen who had fled thither from the St. Bartholomew persecution, and in 1579 was deputy to the National Synod of Figeac. In 1590, Henry IV., who held him in high esteem, invited him to become one of his chaplains, but Covetus, preferring to devote his labors to the welfare of his flock, declined the invitation. While on a visit to Frankfort in 1577, he had a discussion with Socinus, and published his argument. Socinus replied in Part I. of his *De Servatore*, (but the remainder of that work was not issued until 1594, in Poland,) and sent the Reply to Covetus, but frankly acknowledges that it never reached him; and hence it received no answer. Du Pin, in speaking of Covetus, has fallen into some strange errors.

"But let us now briefly examine *this heretical assertion*, which, indeed, is too impudent and unheard in the Christian Church (inauditum in ecclesia Christiana), *that all mankind, after our first parents, are doomed to eternal death, without any sin of their own*. . . . What else is this than to charge the scriptures with speaking falsely? . . . As to his other statement, that no one suffers death for other's sins, it is sophistical. Other's sins (aliena peccata) are either simply another's, in which no other has in any way participated with him, or they are *secundum quid* another's, which any person may appropriate to himself by some method of participation. What they (Socinus and his school) say of the former may be true; but as applied to the latter, it is false. For that any one should suffer for the sin of another with which he had participated, or in some way aided to perpetrate, is not accounted unjust by either human or divine law. . . . Wherefore it was not improper that Christ should undergo spiritual and corporeal death for our sins. *But all the posterity of Adam do communicate in the original offence, not only by participation of a sinful nature, but likewise in the act of sinning itself*. (Sed etiam ipso peccandi actu.) . . . We all, therefore, when we suffer for his sin, do not suffer simply for the sin of another, but also for our own. And it is said to be imputed to us all, *not as simply another's, but also as our own*. Neither as being innocent, but as companions in the offence, and together guilty with him. (Non ut simpliciter alienum, sed etiam ut nostrum; nec ut insontibus, sed ut delicti sociis, et una reis.)"¹

2. F. SPANHEIM was one of the most thoroughly learned and able divines of the Calvinistic church, and as remarkable for his clear penetration and subtlety as for his erudition. In the following paragraph, cited and endorsed by the venerable Hoornbeck,² he takes occasion to restate the faith of the Church on the subject before us, and directly in face of the Socinian exceptions. After presenting a fine vindication of the federal headship of Adam, he says: "What then is there surprising in the fact that the sin of this natural and moral head should be reckoned *as the common sin of the whole body itself*? Hence the apostle appositely says, in Rom. v. 15 (ἐφ' ὧ), *in whom all sinned*, or so far

¹ Comment. in Gen. ii. 17, p. 74, col. 2. (Frankfort, 1647.)

² See Hoornbeck's Instit. Theol. Cap. VII., § 7. (Leyden, 1647.)

as he sinned all sinned, not only efficiently or demeritoriously, but formally likewise; and it amounts to the same thing, whatever interpretation be chosen of the apostle's phrase. Formerly, indeed, the Pelagians, and to-day the Socinians, have regarded it otherwise. *But theirs is a heifer with which none of the orthodox can here plough.*"

3. MARESIUS, likewise, was a successful defender of the Church doctrine against the Socinians. In their *De Vera Religione* they assail the Augustinian theology with great learning and energy; and in Book V., Chapter 18, make their assault on the doctrine of original sin. Volkel (for Maresius refers only to him as the author), after remarking that the defenders of this doctrine deduce it from principles which are utterly false, proceeds to state it with great fairness, preparatory to his assault. Maresius (who replies to him, paragraph by paragraph), compliments his fairness, and says: "Although in the schools of Christians various questions are treated on original sin, we can yet acquiesce in the delineation of Volkel, as far as relates to that natural blot (*ad illam labem naturalem*), which is derived from Adam to his posterity by generation." But as Volkel proceeds to assail the doctrine *first* on the ground of reason (so as to determine beforehand whether it is absurd or not, and in order to ascertain *â priori* whether God could require him to believe it), and professes to find it exceedingly ridiculous and nonsensical, and, amongst other things, he says: "Certè nos ab Adamo, utut in peccatum illud primum jam lapso, tantum distaremus quantum à cœlo terra, et ne millesimam quidem eorum partem, quod Adamus jam lapsus præstare potuit nos hodie præstare possemus." Maresius remarks: "But in impugning that original blot, the heretic proceeds viciously by deducing the first phalanx of his argument from reason, when, first and foremost, he should have argued from the scriptures,"¹ a caution not less appropriate at the present time.

Volkel, in assuming that the doctrine is contrary to reason, says: "Plainly it is contrary to its decision that one single act of sinning should have power to destroy the whole nature of man, and even the will itself;" to which Maresius replies by showing that an act of sin perpetrated by a holy being cannot but produce this effect, and that it changed angels into demons, and that, according to the

¹ Hydra Socinian Expugnat., Tom. III. pp. 549, 550. (Groningen, 1662.)

law of generation through which like begets like, it is right *that Adam should propagate to his seed that habitual corruption which he contracted by his sin*, as the Ethiopian begets an Ethiopian, and as the leprous a leper, and as certain diseases are hereditary in families. . . . But his was in this sense natural, forasmuch as he vitiated in himself the fountain of our whole nature. Whence it is said that he begat a son in his own likeness; not in the likeness of God, which, by his sin, he had abolished in himself and in us all. Nor is it necessary to say, 'that the sin of Adam had not truly this power *per se*; but that this was a punishment inflicted on account of it by God'; for *first*, it is certain that the sin of Adam had this power, that it could deface and abolish the image of God, or the original righteousness in which he was created," etc. (Pp. 450, 451.) Then in chapter 21, referring to Volkel's remarks on the comparison of Christ with Adam, he says that "this whole comparison (Rom. v. 18, 19; 1 Cor. xv. 22), bears directly upon the question. For as the first Adam sinned, not as acting solely on his own account, but on the account of all who were reckoned in him, so Christ, the second Adam, perfectly obeyed the law and satisfied divine justice on our account, for whom he stood; so that it will equally accord that the obedience of Christ is imputed to us for righteousness and forgiveness, and the disobedience of Adam for guilt and condemnation. Nor can Volkel extricate himself from this conclusion otherwise than by denying that we sinned in Adam, or that the sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity." (P. 407.)

In replying to Volkel on verse 12, Maresius remarks: "For it must needs be that all who die have sinned in Adam; forasmuch as through this very man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, which so passed through him upon all, for that all sinned, although it may otherwise also extend to them who sinned not after the similitude of Adam's transgression; that is, actually. Nor could death by itself have passed upon all so far as that all sinned, unless by him sinning through whom they were made obnoxious to death. They all were accounted to have sinned. *For to whomsoever death, the punishment of the Adamic sin, pertains, to them should pertain its criminality (culpa), seeing that it is foreign from the goodness and justice of God to punish mankind so grievously for sin which is in no way their own.*" (P. 609.)

And again: "*He (Paul) does not treat of the imputation of sin which is simply and absolutely another's (de imputatione peccati simpliciter et absolute alieni), WHICH WOULD NOT ACCORD WITH DIVINE JUSTICE, BUT CONCERNING THE IMPUTATION OF SIN WHICH IS TRULY AND PROPERLY THEIRS TO WHOM IT IS IMPUTED, (quæ non quadrat justitiæ divinæ, sed de ejus peccati imputatione, quod revera eorum est quibus imputatur.*" (P. 610.) It is quite unnecessary to dwell upon these extracts, and we conclude with the following:

4. N. ARNOLDUS, of Franequer.

The *Racovian Catechism* was compiled from the works of Socinus by Valentine Smalcus (Smaltz), and was published in 1606. It was replied to by Maresius, Alsted, Hoornebeck, Alting, and others; but as the late Dr. Archibald Alexander has justly remarked: "No refutation was so full and satisfactory as that of Arnold."¹ He takes up each question with its answer, and replies to them *seriatim*; and from this reply the few following extracts are made, which we present in the translation of Dr. Alexander.

In the reply to Question 1, Arnold says: "Hence also we may understand what is to be thought of that declaration, that it is inconsistent with justice for a man to be deprived of free will. It certainly belongs to justice to inflict deserved punishment on the disobedient, but this depravation is a part of the punishment. *Neither have you a right to say that all men are not chargeable with the sin of Adam*, that as they never committed that sin they cannot be punished for it; for undoubtedly Adam should be considered as the head of the whole human race, and so his sin was not *personal*, but *universal*. As the father and head of the whole family of man did he perpetrate the crime, and so he involved all his posterity in guilt, and thus spiritual death has come upon them, *as the merited punishment of this sin*, and this includes the depravation of the free will of man." (P. 232.)

On Question 2, he says: "It is true the Scriptures do not express the inherent and habitual stain of our nature by using the technical phrase *original sin*, but they clearly designate the same thing by words which have the same import." (P. 233.) "There

¹ See Dr. Alexander's article on this subject in *Princeton Essays*, First Series, pp. 228-249, as republished from the *Princeton Biblical Repertory* for the year 1833.

is no truth nor force in what is next asserted, 'that the fall of Adam did not corrupt his own nature, and, therefore, could not corrupt that of his posterity.' For they admit that eternal death was *the punishment incurred for the sin of Adam*; and why should it seem strange that that act which subjected the transgressor to so great a penalty, should, at the same time, work a corruption of his nature? Surely that which could effect the greater might also produce the less. *But the reason why the sin of Adam corrupted the nature of his posterity was, because it was not the sin of an individual, as your sin or my sin, BUT IT WAS THE SIN OF THE WHOLE RACE. It was a universal sin.* For Adam was the stalk, the root, the head of the whole family of man." (P. 235.)

In remarking on Question 3, he says, "Another evidence that inherent natural depravity is included in the account [in Genesis iv. 5, and viii. 21] is, that infants, who are incapable of actual sin, were nevertheless swallowed up in the deluge as well as adults. Now this judgment was sent upon them justly or unjustly; *if the first, then they are chargeable with sin, and grievous sin too, to deserve such a punishment*; but this of necessity must be original sin, for, as we have seen, they are not capable of actual sin. But if this punishment should be pronounced unjust, then we do no less than accuse the Governor of the world of *acting the part of an unjust judge in bringing such a calamity unjustly upon His innocent creatures*, WHICH WOULD BE BLASPHEMY. . . . As infants perished in the deluge, and God is here giving the reason why the deluge was sent, it must be comprehensive enough to include them, and therefore we must include original as well as actual sin, *unless any one will choose to maintain that infants were punished without any faults, which, as was before shown, would be an impious impeachment of the character of God.*" (Page 237.) And on Question 4, he says, "*Individual properties are not indeed communicated by ordinary generation, but qualities which affect the whole species are transmitted, of which nature is original sin.*" (Page 239.)

The following is the next question, with its answer:

"*Question 5.* But does not Paul say, Rom. v. 12, that all men have sinned in Adam?

"*Ans.* It is not declared in the text quoted that all men sinned in Adam, for the words in Greek $\epsilon\phi' \omega$, which are everywhere ren-

dered in Latin by *in quo, in whom*, may with more propriety be rendered *because that*, or *since*, as in the parallel passages, Rom. viii. 3, *ἐν ᾧ, in that*; Phil. iii. 12, *ἐφ' ᾧ, that for which*; Heb. ii. 13, *ἐφ' ᾧ, in that*; 2 Cor. v. 4, *ἐφ' ᾧ, because that*. It is evident, therefore, that the doctrine of original sin cannot be built on this passage." (Page 241.)

In his reply, Arnold, after referring to the analogy between Adam and Christ in the context, and remarking on the above criticism, says, "But if we take the phrase as our adversaries wish to designate, not the *subject*, but the *cause*, it will amount to the very same thing. For the reason is here assigned by the apostle why death has passed upon all men; and according to this interpretation the reason is 'because all sinned;' but this cannot be understood of actual sin, for in this sense all who die have not sinned, since infants are incapable of sinning actually. The meaning, therefore, must be that all have sinned in their first father and representative. *If they had not sinned in him they would not have been subjected to the punishment of the first transgression.* And that condemnation comes on the race on account of their one sin is so clearly taught in the following verses, that there is no room left for any reasonable doubt that the apostle meant to teach that this sin was imputed, or that hence condemnation was incurred by all men. It is repeatedly declared that by *one sin* of the *one man* many had died, had come into condemnation, had been constituted sinners, etc.; it seems, therefore, most natural and reasonable to suppose that the apostle, in the 12th verse, where he assigns a reason for the death of our whole race, means the same which he evidently does in the subsequent verses. . . . In this passage are clearly taught, first, the universal and total corruption of all men; secondly, that this corruption is derived from the first man, not by imitation of his first sin, concerning which many know nothing, *and of which others were incapable, BUT BY A PARTICIPATION OF THE CRIME OF THE FIRST MAN.* Hence also men are bound to suffer death, although not guilty of actual sin; for, according to the nature of the apostle's argument, the participation and propagation of sin and death must be derived from one man, just as the participation and propagation of righteousness and life are derived from another, even Christ. In a word, the argument may be stated simply thus: 'As by Christ

alone life and righteousness are introduced, so by Adam sin and death. And as all who are justified and receive the gift of life are indebted for these benefits to Christ alone, so as many as sin and die do all sin and die in Adam alone.' The same thing is necessarily implied in those words, 'As in Adam all sin [die], so in Christ shall all be made alive;' *for evidently if all die in Adam, all must have sinned in him. It is repugnant to every idea of divine justice that any should be subjected to the punishment due to another without any participation in his sin.*" (Pp. 241, 242.)

Thus clearly and constantly, and in the very face of their learned and scoffing antagonists, do these eminent men reaffirm the subjective guilt of Adam's posterity in his first sin, and their participation with him therein. They attempt no solution nor explanation of the fact, but accept the statement as a divinely revealed explanatory principle, and employ it as such in teaching the doctrines of the cross.

I conclude these extracts with the following, which is Arnold's last paragraph in reply to Question 5: "As to the exception of Ostorodus,¹ that in this passage the word 'sinners' does not denote those who were truly such, but persons who are spoken of as if they had been sinners, IT IS TOO UNREASONABLE TO REQUIRE A MOMENT'S CONSIDERATION; but it is enough FOR EVER to silence this objection, that these persons are really subject to the penalty of death. If, therefore, they are liable to death, which is the wages of sin, they must be sinners, otherwise there could be no correspondence between the crime and punishment. IF THE CRIME WERE MERELY SUPPOSITITIOUS AND THE PUNISHMENT REAL, HOW COULD GOD BE A JUST JUDGE WHEN HE TREATED THOSE AS REAL SINNERS WHO WERE ONLY PUTATIVELY SUCH." (P. 243.)

Such, then, in a word, is the method by which the Reformers treat that theory and exegesis which is now so imperiously asserted and insisted on by Dr. Hodge. They universally disclaim it as subversive of the doctrine of original sin, and of all proper conceptions of the righteousness of God. It was probably Ostorodus who suggested it to Socinus, either from Erasmus or the scholastics, and hence it is here attributed to him rather than to the

¹ This really learned and noted Socinian died at Brescow in 1611. He had probably learned from Erasmus the forensic criticism to which Arnold refers. See our Section 16, near the end.

latter. This same exegesis was repudiated and denounced at Princeton until the year 1833 at least, as is apparent from Dr. Alexander's presentation and emphatic endorsement of these statements of Arnold, and until then they were beyond the shadow of a doubt the recognized doctrine of the Presbyterian Church. But we cannot dwell upon this point, and shall therefore conclude the section by presenting a few of the remarks appended to the foregoing by Dr. Alexander:

"We should be pleased," says this venerable and excellent man, "if our space would permit us to follow this learned and solid theologian through the whole discussion; but what we have extracted may serve as a specimen of the manner in which theological discussion was conducted nearly two centuries ago. One thing must have struck the reader as remarkable, namely, that the modern arguments by which error attempts to defend her cause are precisely the same as those employed for centuries past. We know, indeed, that those who now adopt and advocate these opinions greatly dislike this comparison of modern hypotheses with ancient heresies, and denounce it as invidious. But why should it be so considered? Or why should they be unwilling to acknowledge the conformity of their opinions with those of ancient times, when the argument is so manifest, not only in the doctrines themselves, but in the arguments and interpretations of Scripture by which they attempt to support them? If the 'New Divinity' be correct, then certainly many who were formerly condemned by the majority of Christians as heretics ought to be considered the true Church and their doctrines as orthodox, while those who censured and condemned them ought to be considered as a set of unreasonable bigots, who, by their numbers and influence, were able to suppress the cause of true Christianity.

"Certainly, then, they who are now so confident that they have received new light, ought not to be ashamed of their brethren who struck out this same light hundreds of years before they were born, and defended their opinions by arguments as ingenious and by exegesis as learned as any of those now living have a right to pretend to. It is, however, a fact that those theologians who have long maintained the character of being orthodox are very reluctant to be classed with Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians, even when they are conscious that their opinions coincide with those desig-

nated by such denominations. This does not arise from any abhorrence of the sects so denominated, but from their knowing that the Christian public with which they are connected entertain strong prejudices against those sects, and it requires no small degree of moral courage to stem the torrent of popular prejudice. There has been, therefore, in our 'New Light' theologians, *an unusual solicitude to persuade the religious community that they were not contemplating innovations upon the ancient creed of the orthodox*,¹ but that they had merely adopted more rational philosophy, by which they were able to explain the knotty points in Calvinism, so far as to render doctrines naturally offensive to human reason, if not entirely palatable, yet in a good degree free from objection." "Whether the 'New Divinity' will maintain the consistency of the Socinianism of Poland remains to be proved; *but there is much reason to apprehend that*, although the theologians who now advocate it will not have the courage to carry it out to its legitimate consequences, yet their successors will be less timid, and will feel that, in self-defence, it is necessary to go a great deal farther in the line of deviation from orthodoxy than has yet been done."

These considerations are not less pertinent, and are, if possible, even more forcible in their application to the subject and method pursued in relation to the present discussion, than they could possibly have been to the subject to which they were originally applied by their venerable author. But still, I should have let them pass (for it is with real pain that I cite them), if the stern demands of truth, and of fealty to God and to His kingdom, were not such as to render their omission here wholly unjustifiable, if not, indeed, criminal. And in view of all the facts in the case, and especially of the consideration that, when Dr. Alexander prepared this translation and the subjoined remarks, there was not (and never had been) in our Church any such theory and exegesis as Dr. Hodge has since inaugurated, I cannot doubt that God's own kind hand has been in this matter, nor that His providence has guided both in the selection of the work for translation, and in the observations appended thereto; that thus the precious name and influence of Dr. Alexander might, even after he had

¹ The *italics* are ours. But if our readers will compare pp. 3, 4, 9, and 11 of the *Index Volume to the Princeton Review*, they will find a remarkable illustration and confirmation of the fact here stated by Dr. Alexander.

been welcomed home to his heavenly inheritance, be brought still to operate in order to aid in rescuing from an impending apostasy the Church he loved so well, and so many of the ablest of whose ministry he had so successfully aided in preparing for their work of bringing back the wandering and perishing to the fold of the Great Shepherd and Bishop of souls.

§ 21. THE EXEGESIS OF ROMANS V. 12-21, AS REPRODUCED AND APPLIED BY THE REMONSTRANTS AND SEMI-PELAGIANS.

The historical treatment of the topic still before us, and in its all-important relations to our general theme, could scarcely be regarded as complete without at least a brief presentation of the point suggested in the heading of this section, as well as of the manner in which, when thus reasserted and applied by these sectaries, the exegesis was still regarded and treated by the Calvinistic church. For it is of the highest importance intrinsically to the well-being of the Church we love, to develop here the fact, which, indeed, no really well-read theologian will pretend to deny, that this exegesis, whenever and by whomsoever asserted from the days of Catharinus and Socinus until now, has been aimed directly against the Augustinian doctrine of our subjective guilt and participation in the first sin, and has always been regarded by the Church herself as wholly irreconcilable with the recognized doctrine of original sin. We have seen how emphatically this is true of it as employed and applied by Socinus and his school, and we shall now show that it is equally true of it as employed and applied by the Arminians and Semi-Pelagians. A few of their representative men are all that need be cited in illustration.

1. CURCELLÆUS, (STEPHANUS.)

Maresius, whose writings we have already quoted in several of the previous sections, published also a work in which he arraigned the doctrinal soundness of Curcellæus on the Trinity, and on original sin, and several other admitted tenets of the evangelical system. Curcellæus had been pastor of the church in Amiens. But when the National Synod of Ales (in 1620) adopted the *Dordrecht Canons and Rejection of Errors*, he, after some unexplained tergiversation, united with the Arminians, and on the death of Episcopius (1643) was appointed his successor in their theological school at Amsterdam. He replied to Maresius very

tartly in *Quatuor Dissertationes*, in the second of which he treats upon the doctrine of original sin.¹ Maresius had affirmed and defended the Augustinian doctrine, and in accordance with his views as already presented in reference to the first sin, had said: "Since it was *the common guilt of Adam and his posterity*, it is not foreign from the mercy of God that He should have remitted it to Adam and many others, or from his justice, that it should be imputed for punishment to a still greater number, for God was not required to remit it to them;" to which Curcellæus replies: "But whom would Maresius persuade *that this was the common guilt of Adam and his posterity?* Were they then companions in sinning, or cut-purses (*manticularii*), of whom the one steals and the other conceals? It therefore cannot be called common to both otherwise than by a figure of speech (*nisi figurata loquendi ratione*), because *being the specific act of only Adam and Eve it was imputed to their posterity*, which two things even the blind may see how widely they differ from each other." (P. 897.) Thus was the doctrine of the Church then understood and held, and thus was it then assailed; the Arminian taking the position now assumed by Dr. Hodge, and on that ground denouncing and ridiculing the Calvinistic doctrine.

Maresius then, adverting to Ezek. xviii., remarks, that "this place should be understood of the personal sin of the parent and of the son who is free from any of the guilt. But this hinders not that *the common and natural iniquity of the first man should be justly imputed for punishment to all his seed who sinned in him*; and who, besides the guilt contracted in him, are also through generation inhesively corrupt, criminal, and sinful;" to which Curcellæus answers, "But if in this place God treats of the personal iniquity of the parent, and of the son free from all the guilt, I have all that I want; for no iniquity is more properly personal than that of Adam and Eve, who, when they sinned, were as yet alone in the world; nor can any descendants be conceived, even in imagination, to be more perfectly exempt from guilt than those who, in the nature of things, do not exist. But because Maresius calls it *the common iniquity* (*iniquitatem communem*) of the first man, it should be known *that it is not common except through that imputation concerning which we are disputing*. So

¹ See *Opera Theol.* Curcell., pp. 892 seq. (Amsterdam, 1675.)

that the participation (communitas) which in the order of nature follows imputation, is ridiculously assumed by him to be the ground of the imputation. . . . Can those, then, who are not as yet born, but are pure nihility, contract guilt in Adam? How can this be possible?" (Page 897.) Thus Curcellæus, while he denies and ridicules the doctrine of our subjective guilt and participation in the fall, affirms, in opposition to it, the very principle maintained by Dr. Hodge, *that the first sin was not imputed because it was a common sin, but became common by being imputed*; ¹ a notion which no Calvinist can maintain until he has virtually abandoned the doctrine of his Church.

Curcellæus, moreover, employs all his resources of wit and sarcasm in denunciation and ridicule of the doctrine. Holding as he did that God does not require of us to believe that which our intuitions may pronounce absurd or nonsensical, and that the doctrine of our participation in Adam's sin comes plainly within that category, he felt no peculiar obligation to argue against it out of the Scriptures. He denounces it as simply ridiculous; and consciously unable to grapple with the questions involved in the issue itself, he, in order to cover that fact from public observation, resorts to his senseless attempts at sarcasm. A single specimen, which I subjoin in his own words, will suffice for illustration. He says: "Unde neminem esse credo qui morsum conscientiae accusantis inde sentiat, quod olim in Adamo peccaverit, aut ab eo labem originariam contraxerit. Quamvis enim isto hyperbolice et valde pathetice exaggerent theologi, in aminos auditorum non penetrant. 2. Nulla ipsum lege à Deo prohiberi potuisse. Cui enim istam legem dedisset? Num embryoni, qui primum in utero materno formari incipit? At istud ridiculum est. Embryo enim nullius adhuc legis est capax. Num parentibus? Ut sic matrimonium ipse est institutor damnasset." (Page 902.)

And then he not only adopts and defends the exegesis of Rom. v. 12, 18, 19, which Dr. Hodge has now reproduced, but elsewhere insists that the posterity of Adam were not really sinners in the first sin, but merely accounted and treated as such, and that Adam's personal sin, or rather guilt in that sin, was forensically imputed to them as the ground of this treatment. And he presents the very texts and ratiocination which Dr. Hodge himself

¹ See Dr. Hodge's Theology, Vol. II., pp. 191, 192, 196, 204, 205, 240, 253.

has insisted on, and on page 206 has a labored argument to prove that sin cannot be transmitted through the body, which is no more capable of such transmission than a stone or log of wood. Whence it follows, says he, that the soul, if created pure, could not be defiled by an impure body, since the body cannot communicate an infection which it does not possess. He then proceeds to denounce the method of illustration which, as the reader may see from our previous citations, was so common in the Reformed theology—that as lepers begat lepers, so sinners begat sinners. And on page 907 he says: "In the Hebrew language, whose phrases the apostles often imitate in writing Greek, *the name sinners is attributed to those who are treated as sinners* (qui tanquam peccatores tractantur), or *who are implicated with them in the same calamity*, even though, properly speaking, they are not sinners, or, at least so grievous as those who are associated with them in punishment." And in proof of this he cites, as Dr. Hodge (under verse 12) had done, Gen. xliii. 9 and xliv. 32, and 1 Kings, i. 21, and then adds: "In this sense, in this place of Paul, the men who lived before the law and had no other general rule of life than the light of reason, were said to be constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam, because his sin, rather than their own, was to them the occasion of death," etc. (P. 908), and then, finally, in his *Instit. Religionis Christianæ* (lib. III. Cap. 16), he repeats the same; though, in the concluding paragraph, he recoils from the inference (in which Dr. Hodge, however, discerns no incongruity), that a merely putative sin may justly deserve and receive actual punishment. He says: "Let every one, therefore, insist as much as he pleases on these words of the apostles, he can elicit from them nothing to the purpose, other than that it may be said by a trope that we sinned in Adam as Levi was tropically tithed in Abraham. But a figurative sin does not deserve punishment properly so called, for all punishment should be proportional or analogous to the sin. Now, there is no analogy between a punishment which one may actually suffer, and a sin improperly so named, and which was committed in the person of another. But it is proper that a just proportion should exist between them; that as the sin is figurative and perpetrated in another, so it should be punished only figuratively, and in another." (P. 136.)

This certainly is, in its connection, a most instructive paragraph,

and evinces not only the difficulty which this learned critic found in escaping from his early Calvinistic convictions of God's truth, but developes the logical concatenation and connection (which in this very effort to escape becomes apparent) existing between a putative sin, and a merely putative satisfaction for sin. He is led to see this connection, and not only to admit, but even to affirm it, and then, subsequently, to carry it forward in logical sequence to the full denial of a real satisfaction through our adorable Redeemer for sin. Let the supporters of the theory that the race sinned only putatively in Adam lay this consideration to heart. Curcellæus is reported to have lapsed into Socinianism shortly before his death. And though he had made no open avowal to this effect, some of his posthumous publications render the fact but too sadly apparent that he must indeed have done so. We hope that without offence we may request our readers to turn back for a moment and reperuse the concluding paragraph of our *fifteenth* section.

2. PHILIP LIMBARCH (Limburgius.)

After the foregoing full extracts from Curcellæus, a single extract will be sufficient from this eminent Arminian, who, it may be well to add, was his successor in the chair of theology. Referring to Rom. v. 19, he says: "To be constituted a sinner signifies in Hebrew phrase *to be treated in like manner as sinners* (perinde ut peccatores tractari.)" Then, after citing as confirmatory Isa. v. 23, and the passages above referred to by Curcellæus, he adds: "The sense of the apostle in this place, therefore, is, that God, in consideration of this sin, has treated the posterity of Adam until Moses, (who were indeed sinners, but not transgressors of the express precept sanctioned by the threatening of death,) in like manner as he treated Adam that they might be types of the faithful who of Christ are spiritually renewed; whom God, in consideration of the perfect obedience of Christ (though their own righteousness is not perfect) would graciously treat no otherwise than as if they were perfectly righteous; that is, impute to them perfect righteousness, and bestow the reward of eternal life."¹

3. DANIEL WHITBY.

This learned and acute writer who, in his Commentary on the

¹ Theolog. Christ., lib. III., cap. III., § 18. (Amsterdam, 1730.)

New Testament, has, with such signal ability defended the doctrine of the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ against both the Arian and Socinian schools; but who, near the close of life lapsed thoroughly into Arianism, presents substantially the same exposition of Rom. v. 12, 18, 19, as Dr. Hodge, and his aim was thereby to enervate and abolish the Church doctrine of original sin. In his annotations on verse 12, he says: "None of the other senses are true, or suitable to the scope and argument of the apostle; *v. g.* It is not true that death came upon all men *for that*, or *because* all have sinned. For the apostle directly here asserts the contrary, *viz.*: that the death and condemnation to it, which befell all men, *was for the sin of Adam only*; for hence it is expressly said that *by the sin of one man many died*; that *the sentence was from one*, and that *by the sin of one death reigned by one*; therefore the apostle doth expressly teach us, that by this death this condemnation to it came not upon us for the sin of all, but only for the sin of one; *i. e.*, of that one Adam in whom all men die. (1 Cor. xv. 25.)

"He also farther teacheth, that the death and condemnation came upon all *for one sin of that one man*, for it came *δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος*, *by one offence* upon all men; it came not therefore upon all men for the sin of all, and this the comparison plainly requires, which saith, the opposite justification and free gift came upon all men *by one man, Jesus Christ*; by the obedience of one, and *δι' ἑνὸς δικαιοσύνης*, *by one righteousness*, verses 16, 17, 18, 19; *i. e.*, by the obedience to the death of that one man."

Again, on verse 13, "2. That the punishment of Adam's sin devolved upon his whole posterity is fully proved from this chapter; but it is not here said that they were *truly* and *formally* made sinners by his sin." Then, on verse 17, "Moreover, if all the posterity of Adam, they sinned against some law given to them, *for sin is the transgression of a law*; and *where there is no law there is no transgression*. Now, they could not sin in Adam so as to deserve death for their sin only by sinning against the law requiring Adam not to eat of the forbidden fruit, for Adam himself became guilty of death only by transgressing that law; and all the posterity of Adam cannot be said to have sinned against that law, for when did they sin against it? If when Adam did so, then all his posterity must be actually sinners from the begin-

ning of the world; *i. e.*, some thousands of years before the greatest part of them had a being. Now, seeing action must be the action of some being, does it not seem absurd at first sight to say, that so many myriads were actually sinners when they were not in being, if when they came into the world they could not sin in Adam, or in his actions, for he did not then eat the forbidden fruit in the midst of Paradise?"

Wherein does this style of ratiocination differ from that of Dr. Hodge against the same doctrine, when he says, "Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says."¹ Or again: "The assumption that we acted thousands of years before we were born, so as to be personally responsible for such act, is a monstrous assumption. It is as Baur says, an unthinkable proposition; that is, one to which no intelligible meaning can be attached."²

Whitby then, after denouncing the doctrine of the proper imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity (though he admits the putative or forensic), says: "These interpretations being so inconsistent with the apostle's words, and with the plainest evidence of reason, I am forced to prefer before them that of the Greek fathers, *viz.*: that we all sinned in Adam; *i. e.*, by becoming obnoxious to that death which was the punishment of his sin, and that *by one man's disobedience many were made sinners*, by being subject to the death and temporal calamities and miseries which came upon all mankind for Adam's sin; so that we become sinners in him, or by his disobedience, by a metonymy of the effect, by suffering the punishment which God had threatened to him for it, as the experience of all men and women show we do in all parts of the earth; and this is a common sense of the word *chattah*, which signifies both sin and the punishment of it. It is true we meet not with the words *ἡμαρτον* and *ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν* in this sense elsewhere in the New Testament," etc.

Here, then, the very exegesis which Dr. Hodge insists on is fully produced and applied by this learned writer to sustain and

justify his assault against the Church doctrine of original sin. His reference to the Greek fathers will be attended to in the sequel, as also the usage of the words here referred to. His admission that they are not elsewhere in the New Testament employed in such a sense is one of pregnant interest, as *ἁμαρτάνειν* is therein employed some *forty-three* times, and *ἁμαρτωλός* *forty-six*. And it may be likewise added, that *ἁμαρτία*, though employed therein *one hundred and sixty-nine* times, can in no sense be fairly claimed as justifying this criticism.¹ And we repeat, that the step between attributing a merely putative sense to these terms in their relation to the doctrine before us, and a similar application to *λότρον* and its cognates in their relation to the doctrine of satisfaction, is easily taken. It was just here that both Curcellæus and Whitby lapsed into Unitarianism—the former into Socinianism, and the latter into Arianism. For what is more natural than to conclude that as putative sin cannot, in the nature of things, strictly require any thing beyond a putative punishment or satisfaction, so it was not necessary that our blessed and adorable Redeemer should be truly God in order to render such an expiation?

4. JOHN TAYLOR, of Norwich, England.

We conclude these references with a few citations from this learned divine, who is, perhaps, more extensively known to the American churches than either of the foregoing, on account of the signal refutation which his celebrated work on Original Sin received at the hands of President Edwards. If that doctrine ever had an inveterate and uncompromising assailant, he certainly must be admitted to rank under that category. His work itself, however, as any competent judge may perceive by comparing the two, is little else than a "*re-hash*" of the forementioned dissertation of Curcellæus. But in the commencement of Part II. he quotes in full the eight questions and their answers relating to the doctrine as presented in the Westminster *Larger Catechism*, and then turns upon them with all the artillery he can muster; and the exegesis which he gives of the passage before us was especially designed by him to deprive the Church doctrine of that which he regarded as its main support, and so to prepare the way for its

¹ Our readers, we doubt not, will be gratified to consult on all these terms Cremer's recent and valuable *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*. (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1872.)

¹ *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review* for 1860, page 357.

² See his *Theology*, Vol. II., page 224.

utter repudiation. We shall briefly cite it, and the reader can compare it with that of Dr. Hodge.

On page 30,¹ and referring to Romans v. 12–21, he says: “Therefore it follows that these words, *By one man’s disobedience many were made sinners*, mean neither more nor less than that by one man’s disobedience the many, that is, mankind, were made subject to death *by the judicial act of God*. This conclusion, I think, must be true if *words* and *understanding* are of any use.” (Read Edwards, Vol. II., pp. 427–430.) He then repeats the forecited criticism of Curcellæus respecting Hebrew usage, and says: “*Being made sinners* may very well signify being adjudged or condemned to death; . . . *for condemnation in judgment*, and *making one a sinner by a judicial act, by an act of judgment*, are the very same thing in the *Hebrew* language” (p. 33). And in a note he adds: “It is not in the Greek text ἐγένοντο, *became* sinners, but καταστάθηναι, *were constituted* sinners, viz., by the will and appointment of the Judge.” “But besides all this, it is here expressly affirmed that the many, *i. e.*, mankind, *are made sinners*, not by *their own disobedience*, but by the disobedience of another man. Now any one may see that there is a vast difference between a man making *himself* a sinner by his *own* wicked act, and his being made a sinner by the wicked act of *another*, of which he is altogether guiltless. They who are *made sinners* by the disobedience of *another*, without their knowledge or consent, surely can be sinners in no other sense but as they are sufferers. . . . Sin and *iniquity* are frequently used to signify *suffering* by putting the effect for the cause” (pp. 33, 34). (Read the thorough refutation of this whole statement in Edwards, II., pp. 494–500.)

Again, on page 38, he says: “But in the 12th verse, the apostle, I say, does not take in both parts of the comparison; he only men-

¹ See *The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin*, by John Taylor; London, 1740. As it will not be necessary, after the foregoing full exposure and rejection of this exegesis as employed by the Socinians (see § 20, above), to add the Calvinistic refutation of it as employed also by the Arminians, I merely refer the learned reader to Wallæus’ Reply to Corvinus, chapter VIII. And I shall also, *in the text itself*, add some specific references to Edwards’ Reply to Taylor on the several propositions and objections as they occur in our citations. The paging in the references to Edwards is that of the *ten volume* edition of his works, published by Carvill, New York, 1830.

tions what happened on Adam’s part, namely, that death entered into the world by his sin, and by his sin came upon all mankind. There he stops awhile, and before he goeth any further brings an argument to prove that it was as he said, that death came upon mankind, not for their personal sins, but upon account of Adam’s one transgression: that it was his first sin alone, his own offence, which subjected mankind to death.” (Read Edwards, II., p. 486, *seq.*)

Again, on page 40: “The whole of the apostle’s argument and assertion standeth plainly upon this double foot, that it is by the *one* OFFENCE of *Adam* that death passed upon all men, and not by their own personal sins; and again, that it is by the Obedience of *ONE*, or the act of Christ’s obedience (in His sufferings and death upon the cross, I suppose, see *ver.* 9, 10), that all men are justified unto life, and not by their own personal righteousness.” (Read Edwards, II., pp. 481–486.)

Again, on page 51, he says: “Nothing more, I think, wants to be explained in this passage but the expression (verse 12), *And so death passed upon all men for that all have sinned*, namely, *in Adam*; for the apostle doth not here intend to affirm that death passed upon all men by their *own* sins. The whole of his discourse plainly shows that he understood and believed that death came upon mankind by *Adam’s one offence*.” (Read Edwards, II., pp. 483, 511.) Also on page 54: “And should we render the words thus, ‘And so death passed upon all men, *unto which* all have sinned,’ and explain them thus—Death passed upon all men, as far even as which all men were constituted sinners, *or were treated as sinners*; that is to say, all men became sufferers in consequence of Adam’s *one offence*—I am inclined to believe that we should not be wide of the apostle’s true intention.” (Read Edwards, II., p. 476, *seq.*)

Again, on pages 56, 57: “To this purpose, let it be observed, that by one man, *Adam*, sin entered into the world. He began transgression, and through his one sin death also entered into the world; and so in this way, through his one sin, death came upon all mankind, as far even as which all men are sufferers through his offence.” (Read Edwards, Vol. II., pp. 479 and 483, *seq.*) And then, on page 62, he thus paraphrases verse 19: “For as upon the account of one man’s disobedience, *mankind were judicially*

constituted sinners, i. e., subjected to death by the sentence of God the Judge, so it is proportionably right and true that by the obedience of one mankind should be judicially constituted righteous by being raised to life again." (Read Edwards, Vol. II., p. 489.) And then on page 253,—and in precisely the same spirit with which Dr. Hodge, in his Revised Commentary, assails the Church doctrine of our participation in the first sin, as mystic and Pantheistic nonsense, which does not rise even to the dignity of a contradiction, and has no meaning at all, and that it is a monstrous evil thus to make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men,—Dr. Taylor says: "Must it not greatly sink the credibility of the gospel to suppose it teacheth the common doctrine of original sin? *For if it is easily seen to be an absurdity, who can believe that to be a revelation from God which is chargeable with it?*" And I make no doubt this, with other pretended principles of the like nature, have filled our land with infidels. Such doctrines set religion in direct opposition to reason and common sense, and so render our rational powers quite useless to us, and consequently religion too; for a religion which we cannot understand, or which is not the object of a rational belief, is no religion for reasonable beings." (Read Edwards, Vol. II., pp. 546, 547.)

Our readers will observe that the language thus cited from these two writers is, in both its spirit and aim, homogeneous; and that they thus concur in applying it in denunciation of one and the same object, to-wit, the Church doctrine of original sin; and that yet one of them openly professes himself to be the friend and defender of that doctrine, and the other frankly acknowledges himself to be its foe. Both cannot be in the right. Which, then, is in the wrong?

But we need not continue our quotations, for the foregoing will suffice to evince what were the principles on which Dr. Taylor thus impugned the doctrine of original sin. On page 63 he protests the great sincerity with which he has urged his views, that it was "in the integrity of my (his) heart, without any design, desire, or endeavor to cloak or smother, color or dissemble, magnify or lessen anything;" and on page 258, that "if upon further examination, or the kind information of any person, I find myself in any mistake, I shall be very glad to see and ready to own it."

President Edwards furnished the Doctor with such information, and afforded him a fine opportunity to make this promise good, but it continued in *statu quo*.

Edwards, in the conclusion of his own work, offers some highly important and impressive remarks on the whole subject, which, if our space permitted, we should be glad to transfer to our pages. Our readers, however, will, we trust, take some opportunity to give them a perusal. We add only a brief specimen. He says: "On the whole, I observe there are some other things besides arguments in Dr. Taylor's book which are calculated to influence the minds and bias the judgment of some sorts of readers. Here, not to insist on the profession he makes, in many places, of sincerity, etc., nor on his magisterial assurance, appearing on many occasions, and the high contempt he sometimes expresses of the opinions and arguments of very excellent divines and fathers in the Church of God, who have thought differently from him—both of which it is not unlikely may have some degree of influence on some of his readers—I would take notice of another thing," etc. And after showing how the most unreasonable and extravagant interpretations are (sought to be) palliated and recommended "by such writers," he adds: "But I humbly conceive that their interpretations—particularly of the apostle Paul's writings—though in some things ingenious, are in many things extremely absurd and demonstrably disagreeable in the highest degree to his *real* design, to the language he commonly uses, and to the doctrines currently taught in his epistles. Their criticisms, when examined, appear far more subtle than solid; and it seems as if nothing can be strong enough, nothing perspicuous enough, in any composure whatever, to stand before such liberties as these writers indulge." We offer, in conclusion, a brief remark or two:

• *Remarks.*

Such, then, is the *design, paternity, development, and application* of the exegesis, which Dr. Hodge has reproduced and employed, and still defends and insists upon as essential to an intelligent understanding and reception of the gospel, and of the evangelical or Calvinistic system of truth. I say, *paternity*, though some of the forecited writers claim to trace it to several of the Greek fathers, who, themselves, however, did not receive the doc-

trine of original sin, a subject to which attention will be given presently. It was likewise, however, accepted and elaborated into its existing form by Ostorodus and Socinus, for refuting that doctrine, and still later was, as we have shown, urged and insisted on by the Arminians and Semi-Pelagians, for the like purpose. While from first to last of this its reproduction, it has been refuted and rejected with one voice by the Calvinistic church. And thus the matter continued until Dr. Hodge, with not the slightest intimation of its actual paternity and subsequent application or employment, saw proper to rule out the long-standing exception to it, and both to adopt and inculcate it as not only consistent with the Calvinistic theology, but as vital to it, and fundamentally necessary to any true and intelligent reception of that system of doctrine. It, of course, devolves not on me to explain this procedure, or why, without any notification as to its previous design and use, he should present this exegesis with the theory based upon it to our Church and ministry as the accredited Augustinian exposition, even while purporting to expound that very doctrine which it was emphatically the design of every previous employment and application of it to destroy. It would be painful to attribute the procedure to a defective knowledge as to the true state of the case, or to a design to revolutionize our theology by substituting the Socinian notion of representation and the covenant, for that which is recognized in the system of grace; and yet I am free to state that without a moment's hesitation I would accept either of these solutions rather than admit either the ignoble plea that such a procedure is only carrying forward to its proper sequences "the strength of the Calvinistic system, especially of that type of Reformed theology known as the federal or representative system,"¹ or allow the cherished doctrines of our communion to be authoritatively subjected to such a subversion and impeachment as must inevitably be inaugurated if this wholly unsustained and pernicious attempt to pervert the teaching of the apostle be accepted by our denomination. But this is a matter which pre-eminently pertains to the official action of the Church herself; and in view of that fact I shall here proceed, with all possible brevity, and as introductory to the next topic in the dis-

¹ See, as already referred to, the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* for 1872, page 789.

cussion, to invite attention to the results of such a procedure as affecting the analogy of faith throughout the whole system of Christian theology. The subject is very extensive, and we can here advert to only a few of its more salient features. But the reference will itself be suggestive, and other topics no less important must necessarily come up in the sequel for consideration in other connections.

§ 22. THE EXEGESIS AS EMPLOYED AND APPLIED BY DR. HODGE REVERSES THE CONNECTION BETWEEN REGENERATION AND JUSTIFICATION.

The question whether the exegesis in question may be sustained on the recognized principles of hermeneutics will receive its full meed of attention in Section 25. The point now directly before us is, *its relation to the analogy of faith*, or to the approved theology of the Augustinian churches. We have already shown that it has always been repudiated by the Church as peculiar to the opponents of her doctrines. And even if an individual case might be claimed as exceptional on behalf of both theory and exegesis, the Church is not responsible as such for the vagaries and speculations of individual members, as no man has ever more pointedly insisted on (in former years) than Dr. Hodge himself. The point now in view, therefore, relates simply to his assumption and inculcation of this theory and its legitimate sequences as fundamental to the Protestant theology, and his denial of the Calvinistic soundness of those who refuse to acquiesce in such an assumption.

The connection between regeneration and justification, as exhibited in the evangelical system, is vital to that system, and cannot be disturbed without fatally impairing the integrity of the whole as entertained and defended by the Augustinian Church. This is too obvious to need to be dwelt upon. And that the view presented by Dr. Hodge, in his employment and application of this exegesis, does reverse the proper connection between these doctrines he himself is compelled to admit, though it does, in fact, result so plainly from the premises that any attempt at denial would be futile; for, in order to carry out his exegesis, logical consistency obliges him to regard the depravity and moral pollution of the race as a consequence of Adam's personal transgression, or (as he prefers to name it) *peccatum alienum*. The posterity,

says he, had no subjective ill-desert or moral pollution; these, by the divine sentence of imputation, result to them for or on account of Adam's personal sin, irrespective of any subjective criminality on their part. And so likewise in respect to the righteousness of Christ. We are (says he, and justly,) wholly without subjective merit or desert, and the imputation of His righteousness is gratuitous. But he adds, *that the INSEPARABLE CONSEQUENCE of this imputation is the bestowment of a new or regenerate nature.* The parallel, as claimed by Dr. Hodge, of course demands this. So *that the seed of Christ are regenerated as an inseparable consequence of the imputation to them of His personal righteousness, as the seed of Adam became morally depraved and corrupt as the inseparable consequence of the imputation to them of his personal sin.*

Dr. Hodge, perceiving no possible method by which to avoid the former of these sequences while he maintains the latter, and while insisting that *the modes of communication* are (in Rom. v.) an essential part of the analogy in the comparison between the first and second Adam, does not shrink from the conclusion, but affirms it in the most decided and peremptory manner. For example, in a passage already cited by us in other connections, he says, "The main part in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant Church, and as exhibited by the apostle, is that, as in the case of Christ, His righteousness, as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, *with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence*; so in the case of Adam, his offence, as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, *of which condemnation spiritual death or inward corruption is the expression and the consequence.* It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied by Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation."¹ And this statement, as remarked by us in a previous section, he presents very frequently, reasserting it substantially also in his Revised Commentary, and likewise in his Theology; so that not only the principle itself necessitates the dogma

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, page 341.

that regeneration or inherent holiness is the consequence of justification, but the dogma itself is thus directly affirmed by Dr. Hodge as fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system as taught in the word of God.

The principle referred to is, indeed, "fundamental" to Dr. Hodge's theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin; but it nowhere exists, either in or in connection with the doctrine of imputation, as taught by the evangelical Protestant church, either in her Confessions or in the writings of her representative divines. And in respect to it, therefore, my first remark is, *that this principle, by reversing the connection between regeneration and justification, wholly subverts the doctrine of justification by faith alone.*

The doctrine of justification, as entertained by the Reformed church and presented in their standards, and as taught by all her leading divines, is, that the penitent, though ungodly sinner, by believing in or accepting Jesus Christ as his only Saviour from sin and its curse, obtains pardon and the imputation of his justifying righteousness: that is, he is justified. This, his faith, brings him into vital union with Christ, who, having promised to accept and save all who thus trust him, makes good the promise in every such case; so that *the believing penitent* is, accordingly, delivered from a state of condemnation and introduced into a state of favor and salvation. Such is the invariable teaching of the Calvinistic church.

And with precisely the same unanimity, she teaches, likewise, that this faith, by which the penitent accepts of Jesus as his Saviour, is a result of the renewal of his nature by the Holy Spirit, which renewal is mentioned in our standards as *effectual calling*, or *regeneration*. On each of these great and vital points the unanimity of the Church has always been as full and perfect as on the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity itself, or the Godhead of Christ, or on any other fundamental fact of her theology. And any modification of her doctrine on either of those points must (as no competent theologian of well-balanced mind would question), result in essentially changing by inexorable logical sequence, the whole scope and tenor of her doctrinal system. *But Dr. Hodge's theory makes this faith* (technically called *saving or justifying faith*), *by which the penitent accepts the promise and is justified, either an exercise of the soul anterior to regeneration, or an exercise of the soul subsequent to justification*; for he affirms that inward holiness is

the invariable *consequence* of justification, as the inherent moral pollution of the race is the inseparable consequence of the imputation of Adam's personal sin. But take it either way, that is, let this faith be regarded as an exercise of the soul *anterior to regeneration*, or an exercise of the soul *subsequent to justification*, and the great Protestant doctrine of *justification by faith alone is utterly sacrificed and destroyed*.

Such, then, are the facts; nor do they require to be dwelt upon. But what say our standards and their accredited expositors to a speculation like this? A page may very well be appropriated here to the few citations which will settle the question:

1. *The Confession of Faith.*

"Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so, as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto."¹ (Chapter IX. § 3.) This being the fact, in what sense could he be said to exercise saving faith anterior to his possession of inward holiness?

"The effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not for anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, *until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed by it.*" (Chapter X., § 2.) "*Faith thus receiving and resting on Christ and his righteousness, is the alone instrument of justification*, yet is not alone in the person justified, but is ever accompanied with all other saving graces, and is no dead faith, but worketh by love." (Chapter XI., § 2.) (Compare, also *Larger Catechism, Questions 66-73.*)

2. *The Shorter Catechism.*

In answer to Question 31, effectual calling is defined as "the work of God's Spirit, whereby, convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing our wills, *he doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to us in the gospel.*" To the 32nd Question ("What benefits do they that are effectually called partake of in this life?") it is answered, that "They that are effectually called do in this life *partake of justification*, adoption, sanctification," etc. In what way, then, can effectual calling, or the imparting of

inward holiness, be an "inseparable *consequence* of justification?" But let us hear a few of the popular expositors of this symbol.

3. *Fisher*, in explaining the question, says: "Q. 4. What is the connection between effectual calling and justification? A. *In effectual calling, sinners being united to Christ, by faith, have thereby communion with Him in his righteousness, for justification.* (Phil. iii. 9.)"

4. *Brown*. "Q. What blessings do *believers* share of in this life? A. Of *justification*, adoption, sanctification, and such blessings as in this life flow from them. (Rom. 8.) Q. How are the benefits which believers receive from Christ *connected with effectual calling*? A. They all flow from our union with Christ, *obtained in it.*"

5. *Paterson*, in his analysis and proofs of this question, says: "We are here taught: 1. That they who are effectually called partake of justification. (Rom. viii. 30: Whom he called, them he also justified.)"¹

6. So, likewise, "*The Key to the Shorter Catechism*," in its "exercise" on this question, says: "Who partake of justification and the other benefits there mentioned? They who are effectually called."

7. *Matthew Henry's* exposition is the same. Referring to the effectually called, he says: "Are they justified? Yes: Whom he called he also justified."

I advert to these little manuals, all of them favorites in our American church, to evince what is the doctrine hitherto inculcated as the teaching of our standards. And such are, and ever have been, the inculcations of the Calvinistic church. And, moreover, she has always pronounced the contrary doctrine—that effectual calling, or inward holiness, as wrought by the Holy Ghost, is "the *consequence*" of justification—a fundamental and fatal error, and regarded it as subversive of the whole doctrine of justification by faith alone.

It can amount to nothing, so far as arresting the progress of this grievous error is concerned, that Dr. Hodge has elsewhere inculcated different views; for example, when treating formally of justification and regeneration. For, while the fact remains that he never has retracted, and (while he holds his theory) never can re-

¹ This and the work next following are issued by Carter & Brothers, New York.

tract the view here referred to, and that it still is affirmed by him to be taught by the apostle, and to be fundamental to the Protestant theology and to the evangelical system, as announced in the word of God, this, of course, must be regarded as his real view, and any deviation from it on his part a mere inadvertence. He has, therefore, not only strongly asserted this error, but vehemently insists on it as so fully involved in the apostle's analogy in Rom. v. 12-21, that, unless it be recognized as therein inculcated, the whole analogy is destroyed. The Church, therefore, is thus presented with the alternative of either admitting that she has been from the first—and on this great cardinal point, so inseparably connected with the whole doctrine of salvation—in vital or fundamental error, or of promptly and effectually disclaiming the deadly antagonism to her cherished faith, and along therewith the whole of that exegesis upon which it is assumed to stand: that is, if she would be true to God and to herself, and to the souls of men whose salvation this flagrant departure from God's truth must, in its effects, greatly imperil, by recognition in our midst.

Our *second* point is that

§ 23. THIS EXEGESIS INVOLVES THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL JUSTIFICATION.

In my previous essay Dr. Hodge's attention was solicited to the fact that his principles of exposition, as applied by himself to Rom. v. 12-21, must involve, by rigid logical sequence, the principle which underlies that most pestiferous heresy, "eternal justification,"¹ against which the Church has repeatedly uttered the voice of solemn protest and earnest disclaimer. I was sufficiently sanguine to suppose that this consideration had really escaped his notice, and, moreover, to hope that the exposure of the fact so plainly made, together with a due consideration of the sad consequences which must accrue to our theology and to religion itself from any authorized inculcation of the pestilent heresy, might not be wholly void of effect in inducing a reinvestigation of the unauthorized assumptions in hermeneutics which led to the occupancy of such a position, and which must, if persisted in, present to the Church (as above stated) the alternative of either abandoning the theology which she has ever cherished and defended, or of inaugurating

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 84-86.

the requisite steps to purify herself from this error, which will "*eat as doth a gangrene*." And our readers will, I trust, bear with me if the adequate presentation of this important point may require a range somewhat more extensive than the previous one, as well as a brief reference to a fact or two already elicited. For it seems necessary, in order to bring forward the subject in its proper relations to our theme, and especially in view of the intimation which has been given that this foundation of the error has been recognized in the approved Calvinistic doctrine.

After several of those divines who, at and subsequent to the sessions of the Synod of Dort, received the appellation of supralapsarians, had assumed a position in relation to the will of God which clearly militated against the recognized theology, and their refinements in speculation had not encountered the disapprobation to which they were entitled, several of the less conspicuous, as Lubbertus, and still later, Cloppenburg, threw out the intimation that Adam's sin alone was imputed to the race—using the term imputation in a forensic rather than ethical sense, which was a departure from the Church usage of the term in such connection, yet still maintaining (rather mystically) that the first sin was common to Adam and the race, and that the race somehow or other subjectively merited the imputation; so that, strictly speaking, the imputation was not that of a purely foreign sin, or *peccatum alienum*, but in some way had reference to subjective ill-desert in the posterity. This further appears from the fact that they ventured not to depart from the earlier statement, that inherent sin and imputed sin are alike *verè peccatum*. But how the merely personal sin of Adam should be *verè peccatum* in his posterity, and they be subjectively guilty by having it charged upon them, or of being juridically accused of it (if such were indeed their meaning), was a secret which they appear never to have felt at perfect liberty to disclose. They could not avowedly abandon the recognized formula that *imputed sin is truly sin*, and could not but admit, moreover, that to maintain that a *merely forensic imputation* of Adam's personal sin rendered the race subjectively corrupt, would be logically to constitute God the author or originator of that corruption; and here was the dilemma. Rollock, however, who, like many others, was more inclined to theological speculation than adapted to it (and who took the ground subsequently assumed

also by Twisse, of rejecting the distinction between the positive and permissive decrees of God¹), had previously come to the assistance of such by endeavoring to inaugurate the bold hypothesis, that "The apostasy in itself and *per se* was good, as likewise the privation of original righteousness, because it is a thing in nature, and a consequent of that apostasy. This privation, I say, is from God, and is in itself good. To conclude: that positive quality which succeeds to the place of holiness and of the divine image is from God as the efficient principle, and is good *per se*;² a dogma which Dr. John Taylor likewise incorporated with his theory of original sin,³ and which seems, unless I err, to have found favor, likewise, with the late Dr. Taylor of New Haven; and which is but a legitimate sequence from the Socinian notion of a gratuitous imputation of sin. This monstrous idea was but the logical outgrowth of supralapsarian speculation, though Rollock himself was only in part a supralapsarian. "God produced it," continues he, "by His own efficient operation, and God can produce only that which is good, and therefore sin is a positive good;" thus anticipating "the best possible system" of some later divines. This speculation, however, only rendered the darkness more visible, and the "confusion worse confounded," and could in no possible way relieve the emergency. And as De Moor justly remarks, it was utterly disclaimed and discarded by the Church.

Several of the theologians above referred to, therefore, approximated (though they did not recognize) that theory of gratuitous imputation which Dr. Hodge claims to be taught in Rom. v.; for it seemed, incidentally, to lend a helping hand to their view of reprobation, as pertaining to the race in its unfallen condition. Very few, however, went to the extent that Rollock had gone in asserting that sin is a positive good; and the churches of the Reformation with one voice denounced as a calumny the accusation that their doctrine in any sense, either directly or by imputation, constituted God the author of sin. And those divines who subse-

¹ His words are, "Nam omnia media, sive ea faciat ipse Deus, sive ea permittat à malis instrumentis fieri, primo loco et destinantur à Deo, diriguntur ad gloriam misericordiæ," etc.

² See Rollock's Works, Vol. I., 172-177, (Edinburgh, 1849); and Vættii Selectæ Disputationes, Tom. I., p. 1091. (Ultrajecti, 1648.)

³ See his work on Original Sin, *ut supra*, pp. 252, 253.

quently—that is, after Cocceius (1669) had elaborated his system of the Covenants—were led to allow a precedence to the federal relation over the natural in the matter of imputation, still regarded the imputation of the first sin as in no proper sense the imputation of only Adam's personal guilt, but recognized the first sin as the sin of both Adam and his seed; while even the supralapsarians, as a body, steadfastly affirmed the subjective guilt of the race, and in their theology still claimed the formula *natura corrumpit personam* as expressive of their views,¹ and that the race was not innocent of subjective guilt when the *ἡρίπα εἰς κατήριπα* passed upon it. Nor is there anything remarkable in this; for the decided condemnation of the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin by the whole evangelical communion when the Papists, Pighius and Catharinus, advanced it in the Council of Trent, and still later when inculcated by the Socinian and Remonstrant schools, rendered it next to impossible that the sentiment should be accepted by any Augustinian divine without forfeiting all just claims to soundness of doctrine. So that Dr. Hodge is utterly and inexcusably mistaken in his intimation that the early Church is, in any sense of the term, responsible for this monstrous feature of his theory; nor can he sustain the allegation by any reference to legitimate facts. If found at all within her borders, it is only as other results of illegitimate speculation may be found (as, for example, in the case of Szydlovius²), and which it would be the highest degree of injustice to attribute to the Church herself. But let us now proceed to the main point of this section.

We have already seen that the Doctor claims to find the gratuitous imputation of sin in Romans v., and that, moreover, this imputation is analogous to the imputation of the righteousness of the Second Adam to his spiritual seed. This imputation of righteousness is, he informs us, forensic, and not a communication of inherent righteousness (which is true), but inherent righteousness, or, more properly, inward holiness, or regeneration, *is the effect or consequence* of this forensic imputation (which is not true); so that regeneration being the *consequence* of justification, the sinner is forensically justified before inward holiness, or regeneration, is

¹ See instances in the *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 268, 269.

² See in *Danville Review* for 1861, pp. 567-570, some account of this writer and his theological speculations.

imparted to him by the Holy Ghost, in like manner as the posterity of Adam are forensically condemned before God inflicts upon them the penalty of moral corruption. If this be so, therefore, then of course justification is not, and cannot be, by faith; for the unregenerate cannot exercise saving or justifying faith. I refer to this once more, not only to prepare the way for the subjoined considerations respecting eternal justification, but likewise for the purpose of pressing the inquiry, *On what ground does the imputation of righteousness take place?* According to the theory before us, it is not an imputation *to the believer*; for being unregenerate, he is not a believer, and does not become such until after the imputation itself takes place, 'inward holiness being the invariable consequence of justification,' precisely as inherent corruption is the consequence of the imputation to us of Adam's *peccatum alienum*. Thus obvious and undeniable is it that this exegesis and theory alike present the alternative of either admitting the fatal delusion that saving faith is not exercised until after justification, or that it is exercised anterior to regeneration; and in either case the doctrine of our standards (and of all the Confessions of the churches of the Reformation) on this and its correlated truths is, of course, sacrificed.

Let our readers, then, observe, in the *first* place, that the doctrine of eternal justification is an essential feature of the gospel-subverting theory of Antinomianism. We present to them a few facts which will make the truth of this statement sufficiently apparent.

In the "*Declaration of the Congregational Ministers in and about London against Antinomian Errors*," etc.,¹ to which tractate are appended the names with the recommendation of Matthew Mead, George Griffith, John Nesbit, and other eminent divines, and which declaration was made from "the apprehension that the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction and our justification are in danger," and which "in a brotherly way endeavored that they (those doctrines) be explained and owned as commonly held by the Reformed," both at home and on the Continent; they specify *first* "the errors," and then "the rejection" of them. Our space will not allow that we quote the whole catalogue, but amongst the errors are the following:

¹ I quote the Second Edition. (London, 1699.)

"§ 1. That the eternal decree gives such an existence to the *justification* of the *elect* as makes their estate whilst in unbelief *to be the same as when they do believe in all respects, save only as to the manifestation*, and that there is no other *justification* by faith but what is in their consciences."

"§ 11. That by God's laying our sins upon Christ He became every way as sinful as we, and we every way as righteous and holy as He; and that therefore persons may expect to be pardoned whilst they continue in a state of unbelief and impenitence, and that continued repentance and holiness are not, in the nature of the thing nor by the constitution of the gospel, necessary to our being possessed of eternal life." (Pages 7-11.)

These are the first and last in this summary of errors, and to a logical mind the acceptance of the first will prepare the way for the adoption of the whole series; for error, not less than truth, has its system of logical concatenation.

The obvious occasion (though not so stated) of issuing this tractate was the then recent publication of a little work "by R. Davis, Pastor of the Church at Rowell," entitled a "*Vindication of the Doctrine of Justification and Union before Faith*, etc., and the Eternal Justification and Union of the Lord's Chosen People is plainly Stated and Produced." (London, 1698.) And the author endeavors to sustain this detestable heresy by referring to certain speculations of Twisse, Rutherford, and other supralapsarians whom Dr. Owen has so signally refuted in his work on Divine Justice.¹ Mr. Davis appears like a good man, and occasionally argues with considerable ingenuity; and although his propositions generally are in a high degree sophistical, his work is well calculated to mislead the unwary. He defines eternal justification to be, "*God's eternal will and decree not to punish the elect sinner, though he would transgress; and His will not to punish is formally pardon*. . . . 'Tis, I grant you, His decree; but this decree is such an act of pardon *that has its full completeness in itself from eternity before the elect began to have a being*, etc., even as the act of election or reprobation. (*Mr. Rutherford, gr. Pag.*) This act doth no more presuppose the existence of its object than election doth."

"Again, I think *eternal justification* is *THE eternal good pleasure*

¹ Works, Vol. IX., pp. 319, seq. (London, 1826.)

of *His will* that the elect should be completely righteous in the righteousness of another, viz.: His Son JESUS, and this is a complete judicial act, eternal and immanent, as Mr. Rutherford affirms." (Pages 8, 9.)

"3. God will not declare persons righteous but those that are so in some real sense or other, for the judgment of God is according to truth; *therefore the making of persons righteous is as necessary an ingredient unto justification* as the declaring them to be so. And they are made righteous in the sight of justice only by imputation, as before proved. 4. The acts of God's secret will may have the same name with those of His revealed. . . . So His eternal act is called His election, and in like manner His temporary act too. And why not His will to declare sinners righteous upon account of another's righteousness be called His imputation of righteousness, and consequently His justification of them?"

He then, on page 25, pointedly denies that "*faith justifies instrumentally*," which denial is, of course, a just sequence of his doctrine. And if, as Dr. Hodge so peremptorily insists, inward holiness is the invariable consequence of the imputation of righteousness, or justification, this must indeed be so. The author, then referring to a Mr. B., says that, if faith is the instrument, "there would be no avoiding the force of Mr. B.'s argument, viz.: If faith justifies instrumentally, 'tis either as God's instrument or man's; if as God's, then it must follow that 'tis God believes in justifying a sinner; if as man's, that man justifies himself, and not God; both which are horrid blasphemies." But let the above suffice for this wretched outcropping of supralapsarian speculation.

To what extent this doctrine may be regarded as sustained by the affirmation of Dr. Hodge, that inward holiness is consequent upon the imputation of righteousness, is, we think, sufficiently apparent, since there neither is, nor in the nature of things can there be, any real practical difference between maintaining that a soul is justified before he believes—that is, while in a state of unbelief—and maintaining that he is justified from eternity; for in both cases alike the doctrine of justification by faith alone is utterly annulled. And then further, the *principle* itself is frequently taught in his writings, both directly and by implication, as, for example, when, after averring that the ground of our justification, or rather of the imputation of the Redeemer's righteousness, is our union with Christ,

he names this union "the eternal federal union." Our meaning may be perceived by the subjoined passage, which, in its general tone, is not only not exceptionable, but really in conflict with the dogma that inward holiness is consequent upon the imputation of righteousness, and of course in antagonism to his exposition of the analogy in Rom. v.; but in the phraseology "*eternal federal union*" is, nevertheless, extremely incautious in such a connection. He says, "The ground of our justification is our union with Christ, or rather our union with Christ is the ground of that imputation of His righteousness for which we are justified. And that union is three-fold: 1. *The eternal federal union* arising from the gift of God of a people to His Son, whom He represents, and for whom He obeyed and suffered; 2. The inward mystical union arising from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost; and 3. The union by faith. Now, in virtue of *the eternal federal union*, and in accordance with the conditions of the covenant of redemption, God in His own good time sends His Spirit in the hearts of His people, calls forth the exercise of faith (if they be adults), imputes to them the righteousness of Christ, adopts them into His family, and works in them to will and to do according to His own good pleasure. No man, therefore, is justified who is not a living member of Christ's body; but his spiritual life is neither his justifying righteousness nor the ground of his title to the righteousness of Christ."¹

We have stated that the forespecified phrase is incautious, for it presents an idea in connection with the doctrine of justification which, as the preceding extracts show, is fundamental to the Antinomian hypothesis. Nor is it the approved language of the Augustinian theology in such connection. And then, moreover, it is too obvious to require argument that if *real* or *actual union*—an "eternal union"—a non-existing object may be predicated of a mere purpose to grant possession of that object when it shall be brought into existence; then, of course, the justification which is the result of such union may be equally predicated. And this, in fact, is really all that the Antinomians contend for on that point; for if the union, say they, be eternal, so likewise must the justification be which is based thereon. Grant them but the premise that such language is accurate and proper, and their conclusion is

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, pages 766, 767.

inevitable. Of course, then, regeneration must be but a *consequence* of this eternal justification, as it can take effect only in time, and after the subject of it has been created, for a non-entity cannot be regenerated. So true it is that the adoption of one leading principle of an erroneous system must logically tend to the recognition of the whole.

In his Theology, however, Dr. Hodge assumes a still higher and more decided position, of which a single illustration will suffice; though before presenting it we must call attention to an incidental allusion to it which requires a remark. In referring to the Reformed divines who opposed Placæus, he affirms that their strenuous opposition to his doctrine was because "they saw and said that on his principles the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, *antecedent to our sanctification*, could not be defended;"¹ implying, of course, that those theologians *did* defend that doctrine on the ground that the imputation does take place antecedent to our sanctification. Now, if by *sanctification* here he refers to the *progressive work of sanctification* which follows regeneration in the renewed, then the remark is inapplicable to the purpose for which Dr. Hodge has offered it. For there is nothing either expressed or implied in the views of Placæus (unless I greatly err) which in any way conflicted with the doctrine that we are justified anterior to our progressive and perfected sanctification, nor has any such folly ever been attributed to him. But if Dr. Hodge here employs the term as equivalent to *inward holiness* or *regeneration*, in which sense alone it can have any relevancy, then the affirmation is, without qualification, an unfounded misrepresentation of the doctrinal views of the theologians referred to, whose unvarying sentiment was that we are justified by faith, and that this faith is the fruit of the Spirit; *that is, it is the exercise of our already regenerated mind and heart*. They never even vary from this statement, for the fact itself is fundamental to their whole system of doctrine. In what way, then, could they have undertaken, as Dr. Hodge alleges, to defend the theory that the imputation of righteousness is antecedent to our inward holiness or regeneration, when their unvarying doctrine was *that the faith which must always precede that imputation is itself the result of regeneration*? Dr. Hodge, in attribut-

¹ Theology, Vol. II., p. 213.

ing to them the contrary, had simply yielded to the influence of his own dogma, that inward holiness is a consequent of justification. And it is but another illustration of his unaccountable and perpetual misconception of the teaching of the Augustinian divines.

The doctrine itself, however, is plainly asserted by him in the following passage: "It was by the disobedience of one man that all men are constituted sinners, *not only by imputation* (which is true and most important), but also by inherent depravity, as it was by the obedience of one that all are constituted righteous, *not only by imputation* (which is true and vitally important), BUT ALSO BY THE CONSEQUENT RENEWING OF THEIR NATURE *flowing from their reconciliation to God*."¹ Thus the renewal of their nature is made to be *consequent* upon the imputation of righteousness, and to flow from their reconciliation to God, as though they could, as the Antinomians likewise affirm, be reconciled to God before being renewed! And thus we are again brought to the conclusion, that either we are justified *anterior to faith* (and so must surrender the doctrine of justification by faith alone), or that justifying faith may be exercised by the unregenerate, and so renounce the Augustinian doctrine of depravity for the Pelagian scheme.

Such decided reiteration of this dogma, after his attention had been so specifically called to the subject, evinces this to be Dr. Hodge's deliberately formed and cherished view. In fact, to relinquish it would, as stated above, necessitate the abandonment of his exposition of Rom. v. 12-21; and for this, as our readers have doubtless perceived, he is in no way prepared. But instead of here dwelling upon and further discussing eternal justification itself, I shall conclude the section by presenting in brief the delineation and refutation of that doctrine as furnished in an official deliverance of the *Dutch Reformed Synod* in our country, and which by their appointment was drawn up by that truly learned and eminent theologian, the late Dr. John M. Mason, in July, 1798, and adopted in full session.²

In defining justification they say: "This justification is an *act*, and is therefore completed at once. It is necessarily an *act*, be-

¹ See his Theology, Vol. II., p. 249.

² See the Works of John M. Mason, D. D., Vol. III., pp. 317, *seq.* (New York, 1832.)

cause it is a legal sentence; and an act cannot be progressive: this is the property of a work." (Pp. 335, 336.)

"Hence, it is apparent *that personal justification takes place in the moment of believing, and not before*. But as this part of the doctrine of justification has been recently and boldly denied within the bounds of the Synod, they judge it their duty briefly to confirm it, and to bear their testimony against the contrary error."

"It is not righteousness as *impu'ed merely that justifies, but as received also*. On this the Scriptures lay peculiar stress. . . . Now the righteousness of Christ is not mine till I accept it as the Father's gift, which I do in believing. *Before believing, therefore, I have no righteousness to offer to the claims of the law, and consequently neither am nor can be justified*. . . . Therefore, justification cannot take place before believing." (Pp. 337, 338.)

"Justification, therefore, before believing, is impossible. It exhibits a monster which the Bible cannot know—a *justified unbeliever*." (P. 339.)

"However plain and peremptory the Scriptural doctrine on this point, there are not wanting some to corrupt and oppose it by teaching, *not only that justification precedes believing, but that the elect were justified, saved, from eternity*." (P. 341.)

"If, as is alleged, the will to justify is justification, as the will to elect is election, it is certain that the will to create is creation; the will to sanctify, sanctification; the will to save, salvation; so that men were created, sanctified, saved, from eternity." (P. 341.)

"If the elect were justified from eternity, in virtue of their being from eternity in Christ by covenant representation, it must follow, either that they never were in Adam as a head of condemnation, or else that they were condemned in Adam after their justification in Christ." (P. 342.)¹

These few extracts from this truly excellent paper will suffice; and their application to the theory that "inward holiness is a conse-

¹ Vœtius thus refers to the same topic: V. PROB. *An decretum justificationis partem aut momentum aliquod faciat in ipsa justificatione?*

Resp. Neg. Neque enim confundi debeat vocatio, regeneratio, justificatio, adoptio aut justificatio, cum decreto; interna actio cum emanante externa; aut æterna cum temporaria; aut decretum seu voluntas Dei cum executione et re volitâ: quod exemplo decreti executionis, aut decreti salvationis declarari potest; quæ ab ipsa creatione, et ab ipsa salute distinguuntur." *Selectæ Disputationes*, Tom. V., p. 281. (Ultrajecta, 1669.)

quence of justification" is obvious. Nor would it be any reply to allege that Dr. Hodge has only affirmed an abstract principle, while the application is here made to the doctrine in the concrete; for we have not charged the Doctor with asserting it *in thesi* and formally. The point is, he has been led to assert its underlying principle in consequence of his false exegesis of Rom. v. 12-21; and it is this which has, perhaps unconsciously to himself, controlled his mind to allow those recognitions of the doctrine itself to which we have referred, and which, unless recalled or corrected, must continue to operate adversely; for there can be but little practical difference between inculcating a principle and inculcating a doctrine which it logically sustains. And we emphatically repeat, that Dr. Hodge must either abandon his exposition of the analogy, or be regarded as sustaining the fundamental principle of this pestilential heresy.

§ 24. OTHER RESULTS AS AFFECTING STILL FURTHER THE ANALOGY OF FAITH.

It was quite consistent with the "*liberal*" spirit of Socinianism for Mr. T. Belsham, more than half a century ago, to exclaim, "What childish simplicity and ignorance does it betray in some to feign or to feel alarmed at the tendency of those doctrines which are avowed by such men as Lindsey, Priestley, Hartley, and Jebb, and which are represented by them as lying at the foundation of all right views of the divine government, of all rational piety and virtuous practice, and of all rational and substantial consolation!"¹—even though the affirmation seems not very unlike enjoining, impliedly, an implicit faith. But whatever may be thought of Mr. Belsham and his views, we may here say, that the unrestricted prevalence of such a spirit in any evangelical communion may well be regarded as heralding the incoming of that judicial infatuation which is the sure precursor of its apostasy and spiritual death.

There are various other considerations pertaining to the analogy of faith, as affected by this theory and exegesis, and which, though we could not call them up in the preceding sections, are intrinsically of too much importance to be omitted, and to them the present section is appropriated. In fact, they may, to some extent,

¹ Memoirs of Lindsey, p. 394.

be regarded as suggested by the position above assumed by Mr. Belsham; for a like inconsiderateness on the part of such as profess to be friends of evangelical doctrine cannot but evince that they have neither sympathy with nor adequate knowledge of those great principles which have ever imparted to the doctrines of grace their distinguishing efficacy and power in awakening the sinner to a conviction of his lost state, and leading him to accept of mercy through the cross of Christ. We may sometimes, it is true, meet with what is regarded as sincere piety, dissociated with any just appreciation of the doctrines which lie at the foundation of all true consecration to the service of God; but such anomalies can never be pleaded as precedents to justify a disregard for the fundamental truths which lie at the basis of the proffer of salvation through our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Inconsistencies such as these are not to be imitated or commended, but avoided.

Pelagius, personally, had the reputation of being one of the most lovely and devout Christians of his day, and his warm-hearted piety and zeal in the service of Christ very frequently call forth the acknowledgment and laudation of Augustine, even when writing against him. His life was one continuous refutation of his doctrine. The life of Socinus also (though in some of his writings he was so abusive and arrogant), exhibited, in an unusual degree, a meek, humble and prayerful spirit,¹ as did also the lives of his two eminent followers, J. F. Crellius and Dr. Joseph Priestley; and no man of his time was more honored and loved for his social qualities and earnest efforts to do good to his fellow-men than Emanuel Swedenborg. Their excellent dispositions of both mind and heart had, moreover, a marked influence towards

¹ The little work by Socinus, entitled *De Auctoritate Sacre Scripturæ*, contains an able and acute vindication of the gospel against the scepticism of his day, and it is easy to see that both Du Plessis, Mornay and Grotius, have availed themselves of his line of argument. Its first appearance was anonymous, and soon after (in 1588), it was pirated by the Spanish Jesuit, Dom Lopez, and published as his own, but in a manner so bungling that the preface affirms, respecting the natural knowledge of God, what the book itself denies. In 1592 it was issued at Basil, and, after a careful examination, was approved (with the exception of three specified places), by the eminent divines of that city and university. The Unitarians and Rationalists of to-day may find in this little volume their main objections to the gospel not only anticipated by the sceptics of that period, but likewise so disposed of by Socinus as to place their own pretentious assumptions entirely *hors du combat*.

preparing the public for a favorable estimate of their opinions. And the thoughtless, the indiscriminating and the servile, then asserted, as they still do, that certainly a man so good and so learned cannot be the patron of hurtful error, and that if his opinions are not detrimental to his own piety, they surely cannot be to the piety of others. And it has always been, moreover, on such and similar ground, that they whose conscientious convictions have left to them no room for doubt that it was their duty to God and to the souls of men to expose the error and to vindicate the truth, have been by the servile herd denounced as persecutors or defamers of good men, and as troublers of the Church. For as Calvin, in the introduction to his *Institutes*, remarks: "It is the nature and the destiny of the divine word never to operate without exciting the watchfulness and activity of Satan; but this is the truest and the safest sign by which to distinguish it from that which is false. Human inventions are very easily diffused; they ever meet with willing ears and are received by the world with grateful approbation." And hence it has ever been the policy of the great deceiver of souls to lead, if possible, some officially prominent professor of Christianity into the inculcation of ruinous error, that through his name and influence it might make its way amongst the followers of Christ. It is to this fact that the apostle refers when he says that Satan transforms himself into an angel of light. And it is, therefore, the clear and unquestionable duty of those to whom our Lord and Saviour has committed, instrumentally, the welfare of his flock, to consider, in every instance of the kind, not *who* is the patron of any suspicious or unusual form of doctrine, but *what* is the real nature and tendency of the principle itself. For it has always been the allotment of the supporters of essential and saving truth, especially if its practical efficacy, through a growing indifference to its claims, or by some unauthorized speculation, has become, to any extent, seriously impaired, to encounter the cunning craftiness of the great enemy of Christ's kingdom in the malevolent hostility of those whose sympathy with it is such as to allow their employment of all available resources *per fas et per nefas*, to crush and suppress it in the persons of those who would vindicate its claims.¹ His power is great, and his instru-

¹ See Dr. Witherspoon's *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*, Works, Vol. III., pp. 209 seq. (Philadelphia, 1802.)

ments numerous and always unscrupulous, and the “*depths*” of his cunning unfathomable by man. And therefore the intelligent believer will never regard it as safe to discard a principle or doctrine merely because others have disclaimed it, or to accept it simply on the ground that, for the time being, it may be extensively received.

Whatever may be pleaded in extenuation, the fact itself cannot be contemplated without solicitude, that an appointed teacher in one of our theological schools should have set aside the recognized and time-honored exposition of the *locus classicus* of a great fundamental truth—a truth, moreover, which the deadliest assailants of the evangelical system have always and incessantly labored to subvert—and that he has judged it expedient to do this, not on the ground that any newly discovered original manuscripts or various readings of the text required it, or that any alleged improvement in the science of hermeneutics allowed it, but for reasons the validity of which the Calvinistic church has always expressly denied and rejected; and then to adopt the exposition of which those same adversaries have availed themselves during the past three centuries in order to invalidate and subvert that very doctrine. The facts sustaining this representation have been already spread before the reader. But still, and we repeat it (for we would not be misunderstood), it is unquestionable, that even by councils of the Church truth has been repeatedly denounced as error, and her supporters branded as heretics; and that, therefore, there is no just reason to conclude that a man is the patron of heresy because he maintains that which a council may have discarded, or that which alleged heretics may have received, provided he furnish substantial, or at least plausible reasons to evince that the council itself was mistaken, or that the alleged errorists were falsely accused. But for a teacher, without assigning any such reasons, to go back and resuscitate from the charnel-house in which it had long been interred, an exposition which from the very first had been rejected by the Church as subversive of saving truth, and which had been by our adversaries resorted to for the sole purpose of successfully subverting a fundamental doctrine of her theology, and thus to take open ground with those antagonists, and at the same time claim to be defending that very doctrine itself, is certainly a procedure which ought not to be viewed by the

Church with indulgence or indifference, but which demands and should receive, what it has not yet received, a satisfactory eclaireissement. In cases far less important, doctrinally considered, the energies of the Church (since this century commenced) have been aroused to high excitement in order to arrest the progress of some erroneous principle. And though personally we had no great sympathy with the prosecutions thus instituted, and preferred then, and still prefer, to meet such aberrations in open field and in a fair hand-to-hand encounter, untrammelled by the heavy discharges of ecclesiastical ordinance, yet this must not be construed as indifference to the sacred claims of the truth, but simply as illustrative of our conviction as to the imperative duty of vigilance and earnestness on the part of each of God’s appointed watchmen in regard to the faith. If, however, such efforts prove unavailing, and the error is still persisted in, and the errorist refuse to explain, or advantage be taken of position, or numbers, or of both, to suppress the discussion, then let the constitutional provisions be applied, and the Church in her recognized courts be asked for a deliverance.

In the instance before us, had the exegetical element been calmly presented, and reasons offered why the exposition, notwithstanding its paternity and history, was preferred, and the matter there left, the aspect of the case would not have been so really distressing. It would, of course, have been painful to contemplate one of our professors in the attitude of enforcing such an exegesis; but still, all would have conceded to him the prerogative to exercise his own judgment in view of the responsibility thereby incurred. But it did not end here. Not only must the exposition be disinterred, but the denunciation and sarcasm which had been formerly resorted to in the effort to sustain it must likewise be revived and repeated. And then, even beyond all this, and far beyond all that its previous supporters had ever dreamed of claiming on its behalf, all who repudiate or reject it must be accused of fundamental error; of taking sides with the Jews against Paul; and of subverting the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and the whole evangelical system; and all this under the claim of supporting and defending the very doctrine itself against which the exegesis was from the first arrayed.

But passing without remark this proscriptive intolerance, sup-

pose that a military commander, appointed for the defence of a fortress, should move out with his platoons and artillery, and take position with the assailants of that fortress, place their deadly case-shot and canister in the guns which they had pointed against it, and then, after discharging those missiles into its very midst, attempt to plead in explanation that he is defending the citadel, and is friendly to its supporters, how many may we suppose would he be likely to influence by such a plea? Is there any reasonable man who would not be ready to say that he was greatly mistaken? We think not, whatever might be the reasons he should urge to prove that he was really its friend and defender. And we should not hesitate to say, that if he regarded the citadel and its supporters as in the wrong, he ought not even to claim that he was defending it; and if in the right, he surely ought not to treat it in this way. In whatever aspect, therefore, the procedure of Dr. Hodge may be viewed, none can doubt that it imposes upon us (as is suggested in the commencement of my former essay¹) the duty of thoroughly investigating the subject with which the doctrine itself is concerned. I have now endeavored to perform my part towards securing this result by means of the leisure which Providence (through the hostile endeavors of those who have been seeking to suppress this discussion) has afforded me, and cannot doubt that in so employing it I have fulfilled His design in its bestowment; for in connection with the duties of my professorship, or of an extensive pastoral charge, it would have been long indeed ere I could have found time for the adequate preparation of the present work.

The Socinian and Rémonstrant schools, in accordance with their exegesis of the passage before us, wholly denied, as we have seen, the doctrine of our subjective guilt or criminality in the fall; nor is there any point in our theology which they oppose more vehemently than this; and, therefore, with true consistency they denied that the evils which came upon the race in consequence of the first sin were punishments, and maintained them to be purely calamities.

They denied, denounced, and in every way ridiculed the doctrine, universally held by the Augustinian churches, that *we sinned* so as ethically to appropriate subjective guilt and defilement *when Adam sinned*. And Dr. Hodge, in order to sup-

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1861, pages 390, 391.

port his exegesis, denies with equal vehemence the same doctrine, and in like manner pronounces it "*unthinkable*." And basing, as he does, the imputation of Adam's sin merely upon the federal and natural union, and without participation in the first sin, he, along with the school of Socinus, is necessarily, by unavoidable sequence, obliged to regard the consequences of the fall as mere calamities *judicially* inflicted; even as, for example, in the case of a person innocent of the crime for which he is punished by law. Such a person, even though his sufferings are judicially inflicted, is merely involved in calamity, being entirely innocent of subjective ill-desert. So, in like manner, according to this theory, we suffer by a judicial infliction the effects of Adam's *peccatum alienum* only. For "spiritual death," says Dr. Hodge for the thousandth time, "was the penal, and therefore certain, consequence of *our condemnation for the sin of Adam*."¹ And again: "Our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, so far as that sin is concerned, *arises solely from his being our representative, and not from any participation of its moral turpitude*."² Thus the Socinians maintain, with Pelagius, that the sin of Adam injured no one but himself, except as it was made the ground or occasion upon which God judged it proper to inflict upon us the calamities of this life, while Dr. Hodge alleges that "it injured not himself only, but also all descending from him *by ordinary generation*;"³

¹ Theology, II., p. 538. ² Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 171.

³ See Theology, II., p. 192. We here ask: Is the employment of such language another instance of an endeavor to assimilate his theory to the doctrine of the Church by the employment of a phraseology which, when applied to the principles of that theory, is plainly unintelligible? We have already adverted to several instances of the kind, and in relation to this have only to inquire, what can such language possibly mean as thus employed by Dr. Hodge? Why attempt, in this formal style, to restrict the injury of Adam's sin to those "descending from him by ordinary generation"? In what way did that sin, according to this theory, injure those who thus descended from him? Did Adam, by his crime, so defile their nature that the imputation, or sentence of condemnation, finds it corrupted and depraved? No, says Dr. Hodge; this corruption is the *effect* of the imputation itself, which finds their nature free of all subjective ill-desert. So then, the only way in which, according to Dr. Hodge's theory, Adam by his sin can be said to have injured all descending naturally from him, is *through the forensic imputation which God has made of it to them*? And pray, was it not forensically imputed also to Christ? And was He not punished for it? Why, then, on this theory,

but that this injury was effected through their condemnation for his personal sin, God having by a judicial sentence imputed it to them. Both allege that the calamities of life came directly by the Divine appointment, and without any subjective guilt of the race. The Socinians, in this their denial, had direct reference to the Church doctrine that the first sin polluted and depraved *the race through their participation therein*; and this doctrine Dr. Hodge denies as stoutly as they. But yet Socinus plainly affirms that all who are begotten of Adam are exposed (obnoxii) to perpetual death, not, however, because his offence was *really and morally theirs*, but because they are begotten of him who had been sentenced to that penalty; that is, because of their relation to him¹: the occasion for which he does not attempt to explain any farther than to allege that their exposure was not for their own ill-desert, which point they all unite with him in vehemently disclaiming. And this point, as above stated, Dr. Hodge disclaims just as strongly. They maintain that not Adam by his sin, but God by a judicial sentence, brought these calamities upon the race after the fall. This, too, Dr. Hodge maintains. So that the difference between them on this most important issue consists simply in this: Dr. Hodge pronounces the sentence a forensic or juridical imputation of a *peccatum alienum*, and affirms that the evils inflicted are truly penal; while the Socinians admit the sentence to be forensic, though some of them, in designating it, hesitate to employ the term *imputation* lest it should be understood in the Church sense—an imputation of the *culpa participatione*—and prefer to name the consequent evils *calamities forensically resulting to us*, rather than penal inflictions. Dr. Hodge alleges that the ground for the infliction is the guilt of Adam's personal sin forensically imputed to or charged upon his descendants, and that they are thus condemned and punished for it; while the Socinians allege that the evils are indeed judicially inflicted through a forensic sentence of condemnation, but not so much as punishments as results of his disobedience, since if he had obeyed they would

attempt to make any such restriction as this language of our standards clearly implies? They except Christ entirely from the category; but Dr. Hodge's theory takes away the very ground for the exception, and places Christ and the race upon a perfect equality in regard to the matter.

¹ See *De Servatore*, Parte III., Cap. 8, Opp. Socini, Tom. II., p. 207.

never have been inflicted. Such, too, is, as we have seen, the doctrine of the Remonstrants or Arminians. The amount of the difference they may reckon who are able; for my own perception is not sufficiently acute to enable me to discover any practicable distinction between the infliction of evils upon us forensically by a judicial sentence, and their being inflicted by a judicial sentence condemning us to suffer them, we being alike subjectively undeserving of the infliction in either case. And yet Dr. Hodge's exegesis has logically compelled him to assume the position that such is the real amount of that great issue between the Calvinistic and Socinian schools, wherein the doctrine of the real expiation of sin has ever been regarded as so intimately concerned! But to return.

It is obvious, therefore, in both cases, that these inflictions are not merited retributions, but merely calamities, which came upon the posterity simply through the sovereign pleasure of God, which Dr. Hodge, indeed, affirms to be his view,¹ and which he illustrates in various ways; for example: We sinned in Adam, but only putatively, for it is impossible that we should have sinned in him in any other way; and hence the imputation of his sin constituted us sinners, not really, but only putatively or forensically; the effects of which putation are the corruption of our nature, spiritual death, and all the evils we here suffer.² And thus, in one word, the plain logical result of this adoption of the Socinian exegesis is the rejection of the Calvinistic doctrine on the subject, and an acquiescence in theirs. But let us for a moment view this sad and alarming fact in the light of an illustration.

Two men have together witnessed an important and deeply interesting incident which finally becomes the subject of judicial investigation. In delivering their testimony they agree perfectly in all the details as to its origin, nature, extent, and effects, so that their testimony is a unit throughout. As they are intelligent gentlemen, and the judge a little perplexed by certain features of the case, they are requested also to favor the court with their individual views touching the whole affair; whereupon one of them suggests a theory for the purpose of explaining all its phenomena,

¹ See the *Princeton Review* for 1851, page 680, and the *Danville Review* for 1861, pp. 595, *seq.*

² See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 189–196.

and gives to the event itself a specific name. The other, however, says: "I perfectly concur in everything my friend has said touching the origin, nature, extent, and effects of this remarkable occurrence, but cannot agree with him as to the name proper to be applied to it, and should prefer some other designation." In such a case could any but the most drivelling imbecility pretend to say that there was a *toto calo* difference between the views of these persons in relation to the phenomenon? Or any difference at all, except that one had bestowed a name upon the occurrence, and the other had left it unnamed? And is not such substantially the fact in relation to the matter before us? Do not the speculations of Dr. Hodge plainly lead to the conclusion that, in regard to the vital doctrine in question, there is merely a nominal difference between the views entertained thereon by the Calvinistic church and those entertained by her Socinian adversaries? And has not this astounding notion already been so far accepted that any earnest effort to rouse attention to a sense of her impending danger in view of it, is treated by an extensive combination in her midst as an offence deserving the most virulent and vindictive proscription, and treated as an attempt without reason to disturb her peace? and as assailing a doctrine essentially sound? If these things be so, let her look to herself lest otherwise she be called ere long to reap and to mourn over the bitter fruits which her present supineness and slumbering over the matter are permitting to mature.¹

Zuingli, before the time of Socinus, affirmed that original sin was only a calamity inflicted under Providence, and not a crime or fault (*morbum, non peccatum cum culpa conjunctum*), but the entire Protestant world, and he himself subsequently, disclaimed the notion. Somewhat over a century later Placcus fell into substantially the same error; but his doctrine was promptly considered and condemned by the Synod of Charenton, and the Reformed churches universally consigned it to the undisputed possession of the Socinian and Remonstrant schools, who claimed that there neither was nor could be in Adam's offspring any sub-

¹ See a deeply impressive illustration of this truth in pp. 3-7 of Dr. Baird's *Rejoinder to the Princeton Review*, (J. M. Wilson, Philadelphia, 1860,) and in the *True Witness*, March, 10 and 31 (1860), cited on pages 34 and 35 of the *Rejoinder*.

jective guilt calling for the infliction, and that they are adjudged by the alone sovereign pleasure of God to the calamities which befall the race. The case, however, is in nowise altered, either in its rational or moral bearing, by naming these calamities *penal*; for if named penal, it is, as Dr. Hodge alleges, only as the punishment of Adam's personal guilt, and not of our own subjective demerit; and if not called penal, they still are affirmed by both parties to come upon us by a judicial sentence *in consequence* of Adam's personal transgression, and not in view of any participation in the guilt of the first sin. In either case, therefore, they are but calamities inflicted by the sovereign will of God, without reference to subjective demerit or ill-desert. And this view, so directly in antagonism to the received doctrine, we are now required, under pain of the severest denunciation and proscription, to accept as the truth of God. Are we then, and without a struggle to the very death, prepared to recognize such a conception with the inevitable logical sequences and the tremendous revolution which it must inexorably inaugurate in that cherished theology which we have received pure from God's word, and from His witnesses who have preceded us, and which we are bound to transmit as pure to those who shall come after us? And are *we* to concede this while the whole Reformed church, from first to last, has ever contended faithfully against it, and maintained unflinchingly against the learned and mighty array of the Socinian and Arminian (or Remonstrant) phalanxes, as well as against Pighius, Catharinus, and their followers in the Papal school, the righteous imputation of the first sin on account both of our own subjective guilt and the guilt of our representative? The Church herself must determine, and let her do it without unnecessary delay.

In order to a proper finish of this whole branch of the discussion, we shall here, before passing on, present from one of our most thorough and accomplished divines a brief but comprehensive statement of the position sustained by the Church on this whole subject, and as assumed and illustrated in the discussions of the doctrine with her antagonists.

Let it be noted, then, that the earlier theologians generally, in treating the doctrine of original sin, observe a distinction (though they disregard all attempts at mere metaphysical precision of statement) between *inherent* and *imputed sin*, but affirm that

original sin, in the broad sense of the phrase, and as including both, is *verè peccatum*, an expression which, in the connection, and not without reason, has occasioned Dr. Hodge no little perplexity, and the utterance of no small amount of what, if found in others, he would call nonsensical.¹ This statement is, that original sin is, 1, *verè peccatum*; and 2, that it passes (transit) by both *imputation and generation*; thus conjoining the two, that is, inherent and imputed sin, and not separating them, as Placæus on the one hand, and Dr. Hodge on the other, have done, by making either causal of the other. Some, however, prefer the general explanation, that original sin, in the sense of inherent corruption, is a consequence of the imputation of the first sin, which was, as they teach, *immediately* imputed to or charged upon the race for condemnation, understanding and explaining *the first sin*, or *Adam's sin*, to be, not Adam's merely personal sin, but the sin in which both he and all the race mutually participated, thus affirming a basis of subjective desert in the race, as well as in Adam himself.

Our readers may find in Section 13, above, the Church view (as presented by Alting and others), that original sin, both inherent and imputed, is *verè peccatum*. But we now cite in illustration of the accuracy of those representations a portion of his summary of the principal controversies respecting original sin, in the statement of which the position of the Reformed Church on the whole subject is clearly and indubitably brought to view.² They had controversies hereon with the Socinians, Papists, and Innovators, or Arminians. As to the Socinians: "They deny," says he, "that the whole human race sinned in the one Adam (in uno Adamo)," and "that original sin, or the corruption of nature, is propagated by generation from Adam to all men." The Papists assert that "original sin is the very sin of Adam imputed to us—not the pravity (vitium) of nature inhering in us—which is not, however, the opinion of all, but of some." And then, after enumerating the errors of the Papists on the subject, he refers to the "Innovators" as defending, among other errors, the following (which we here present in the original Latin, but shall translate it presently), to-wit: "I. Peccatum Adami non imputari pos-

¹ See Princeton Essays, First Series, pages 177–182.

² *Theologia Eleutica Nova*, loco VIII., pp. 324, 325, and as a further illustration read pages 229, 230.

teris, ac si ejusdem cum ipso culpæ rei essent. II. Peccatum originis [*i. e.* corruptio inhærens] non esse verè aut propriè peccatum, sed tantum primi illius peccati effectum et pœnam."

Such, then, in brief were the errors of these great antagonists of the Church doctrine—Socinian, Papal, and Arminian—on the point in question, *and all of which were, of course, repudiated by the Calvinistic church*: the *first* denying that all the human race really sinned in Adam, and that original sin, or native corruption, is propagated by generation; the *second* asserting that original sin is the personal sin of Adam imputed to his posterity, and which is causal of inherent depravity; while the Innovators defend the errors: I. *That the sin of Adam is not imputed to his posterity as if they were guilty with him of the same fault.* II. *That original sin [inherent corruption] is not truly and properly sin, but only the effect and punishment of his sin.*" So that to maintain that our inherent corruption is the penalty of Adam's sin, and that his sin is not imputed to his posterity on the ground that they were guilty with him of the same offence, is a rejection of the doctrine of the Reformed Church. (See also pages 329, 330.)

Participation in the first sin, therefore, is an essential element in the theology of the Protestant churches of the Reformation. And just here, on this vital and turning point in the system of grace, and precisely where Whitby and Curcellæus and thousands of others have suffered disastrous shipwreck of their faith, Dr. Hodge comes in and unites with the Socinian and Remonstrant schools in denouncing and repudiating the doctrine. But his reasons, both exegetical and philosophical, for doing so we shall in our next and subsequent sections proceed to consider.

§ 25. THE EXEGESIS OF ROMANS V. 12, 18, 19, BY DR. HODGE IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF TRUE HERMENEUTICS, AND WITH THE USUS LOQUENDI OF THE SCRIPTURES.

The verses here specified *represent the whole paragraph (or verses 12–21)*, as is shown in the beginning of our Section 18, and also by the admission of Dr. Hodge, in which we entirely concur, and are here specifically named instead of the paragraph itself, because they here likewise (as in § 18) are the subject of formal critical examination.

The principles of hermeneutics in general might be properly here treated (for the topic should not be passed over without remark), but I shall advert to them very briefly, and only as introductory to the critical examination of the exposition of Dr. Hodge.

The interpretation of the word of God requires less of scientific attainment than of simple integrity and teachableness of spirit; for God, while He conceals Himself from the worldly wise and prudent, reveals Himself to babes. There is a fallacy too generally entertained on the subject even by the multitude of Christians, which is occasioned by the fact that the Scriptures being originally written in Hebrew and Greek, it requires some little learning and somewhat of a critical apparatus to read them so as to thoroughly comprehend their idioms, historical and archæological allusions, and the like. And the idea that, in order to understand the Bible at all, must require considerable learning and scientific attainment—an idea which, as Edwards in the conclusion of his great work on Original Sin observes, has too often been favored for sinister purposes by professed interpreters; when the truth of the matter simply is, that the Scriptures, if correctly and intelligibly translated into the language of any nation or tribe, may, by those of that people who receive them in a teachable and devout spirit, be understood and apprehended in everything necessary to enable such persons to form just conceptions of God, of our lost and ruined condition by sin, and of all the provisions of redeeming love and mercy for our deliverance; or, in a word, such persons in such circumstances will, as regards a capability of understanding and applying everything pertaining to their salvation, stand upon the same plane as the scholar, with all his learned apparatus of grammars, lexicons, etc., for all these place him only in the attitude of understanding the language in which the Divine will was originally conveyed, and which, by hypothesis, is placed intelligibly and faithfully translated in the hands of the unlearned but serious men aforesaid. A knowledge of the sacred languages is, of course, and on many accounts advantageous to the Christian, as enabling him to expose and repel the false glosses of skeptics and other perversions of the word, and is of inestimable service to the clergyman in numberless ways, and especially for explaining the truth and enforcing it upon the mind and heart of his hearers. But when that truth is clearly and fully presented, they alone be-

come responsible for the use they make of it. A moment's reflection will evince that these things are so. For the Scriptures being intended by their author for all who truly desire to learn of Christ, and to know how they may walk in the way of life, if only the learned were capable of understanding them, they must prove inadequate to the necessities of ninety-nine hundredths of those for whom they were designed. And the injunctions to *read, understand, and search the Scriptures* could have to them no available relevancy.

It is further apparent that, as the divine word has emanated from the SOURCE of all holiness and truth, and possesses these characteristics in the highest perfection, so, if we would be able to appreciate and understand it thoroughly, it must be approached by us with a devout and truth-loving spirit. Skeptics, with their usual shallowness, have endeavored to ridicule this idea. But the principle itself is vindicated, not only by true philosophy, but by the clearest verdict of common sense. They who would ridicule it have yet no difficulty in perceiving and acknowledging the absurdity of expecting that one who has neither a taste for nor sympathy with "the concord of sweet sounds," should be an adequate judge of the composesures of Handel, Mozart, Hayden, or Mendelssohn; or that he who delights not in true eloquence should have his soul enkindled by the heart-stirring appeals of a Demosthenes, or Chatham, or Webster. A man who has neither relish nor taste for poetry can form no real conception of the wonderful creations and soul-moving utterances of Homer, Shakespeare, and Milton. All this is readily conceded, and, in the sense above expressed, the same is true in regard to the holy Scriptures. The man of true integrity, and uprightness, and sincerity, will understand, while the soul that is in love with trickery, and craftiness, and overreaching, will learn but little more than that hell is the intended retribution for the perpetrators of such degradation and iniquity.

The Bible, therefore, is a revelation to man—to all men in all conditions; *i. e.*, to the learned and the unlearned, to the wise and simple; and was, of course, designed to be understood by them in all things essential to salvation if willing to be instructed therein; otherwise it could scarcely be called a revelation of the way to eternal life. God appointed men to write it for men.

And while, as we have said, it is addressed to all classes, it is pre-eminently true of those who desire to learn in order to do His will, that "they shall know the doctrine," and that "in His light they shall see light."

Then further: the Divine word is not, as has been fanatically pretended, addressed to us solely through the intellect or intellectual powers; but through the moral nature—conscience and the moral feelings. Dr. Hodge, referring to that instinctive perception which all men naturally possess of the distinction between benevolence and justice, justly remarks that "these intuitive moral judgments are as clear and as trustworthy revelations of the nature of God as can possibly be made. They force conviction in spite of all speculative sophistries. . . . If moral perfection be not in Him what it is in us, then He is to us an unknown something, and we use words without meaning when we speak of Him as holy, just, and good."¹ It is to this same *moral* nature that the Divine word is emphatically responsive, and not merely to the intellectual, as the Rationalist pretends; and in regard to the true meaning of any portion of it bearing upon ethical obligation and the things of salvation, the view seriously and considerably arrived at by the humble though unlettered disciple is far to be preferred to that of the undevout critic, though he be master of all human science and learning.

Another principle which commends itself to the common judgment, and has always been recognized by the Christian Church, is, *that the Bible is its own interpreter*; that is, on everything pertaining to the immediate design of God in declaring His will to men. The Holy Spirit often therein employs terms in a sense peculiar to Himself, and it is in no sense safe, therefore, in every case, to rest an explanation of the meaning of his language upon merely classical usage; and it is always and decidedly wrong to depart from the gospel use (if I may so speak) of the terms he employs (as, *e. g.*, *grace, faith, repentance, salvation*, and the like) in order to place their explanation upon a classical basis. This is not the method for discovering, but for concealing what God has really imparted, and which alone is the true interpretation of His words. It may be named *the analogy of the Divine word, i. e.*,

¹ See his *Theology*, Vol. I., p. 420.

Scriptura interpretes Scripturæ; while the opposite maxim, *Philosophia Scripturæ Sacræ interpretes*, is perniciously false. The former conducts us to the word *as learners*, the latter *as judges*, and is the basis of the accommodation theory respecting which Tittman says: "Whether such interpretation as this is to be tolerated does not need to be discussed. But if the apostles were deceived, and have narrated many things which they believed to be true, still the interpreter is not permitted to doubt respecting their real opinion; nor, on the contrary, when the things they relate appear not to be true, is he allowed so to explain, or rather distort, their words as to give them a greater appearance of the truth. Such license no one could think of employing in regard to profane writers, nor do the laws of just interpretation in any regard tolerate it."¹

It is likewise a recognized canon that the *literal*, or what the old interpreters name the *proper* or *historical sense*, is never to be departed from without a weighty or sufficient reason. And also, finally (for we are unwilling to prolong these remarks), that words are never to be considered and treated *as tropical* which have lost their *original* or proper signification, and are employed no longer in any but a secondary sense, under which category must necessarily be ranked *ἀμαρτία, ἀμαρτωλός, and ἀμαρτάνειν*.²

We advert to these comprehensive but plain and simple principles of Scripture interpretation that readers without classical or academical culture may perceive that the question as to the meaning of the passage under consideration is one upon which they, without incurring the charge of presumption from any really sensible mind, may make up their own mind. Nor is it any reasonable ground of objection to this, that learned men may and have differed as to its meaning; for such an objection would foreclose to them the duty in regard to every other passage in which any doctrine of the evangelical system is taught, since the same may be claimed in re-

¹ See *American Biblical Repository* for 1831, p. 489. (Andover.)

² "Ac primo," says *Ernesti*, "in tropicorum numero non esse habenda verba, quæ propriam significationem amiserunt, aut quæ ita dicuntur de rebus iis, ad quas ab aliis traducta sunt, ut sola de iis dicantur, nec aliud proprium extet atque usurpetur supra demonstratum est." See Dr. Ammon's edition of *Ernesti's Institutio Interpretis*, Parte I., Sect. II., Cap. IV., § 7: and confer Partem I., Sect. I., Cap. II., §§ 1, usque ad 15. (Leipsiæ, 1809.)

lation to all such. The paragraph before us is, notwithstanding its wonderful rhetorical finish and its depth and precision of argument, eminently of a practical character; and, being legitimately translated, any sincere and devout believer may decide for himself as to its actual meaning. We shall lay before our readers the facts in all that pertains to the points of difference between the interpretation of Dr. Hodge and that which the Church has ever regarded as its true sense and signification, and thus they will be abundantly able to draw their own conclusions, and so to make up their own minds intelligently in regard to it.

THE EXPOSITION OF THE PASSAGE.

How, then, does Dr. Hodge's exposition meet and fulfil the conditions of these and other recognized laws of interpretation?

In our Section 18 (to which we again refer our readers) we had occasion to cite the Doctor's exposition of the verses now before us, and in support of which he, in his revised edition, claims that the whole body of commentators concur with him therein—a declaration which Dr. Hodge should have been at once and formally required to make (at least) approximately good by a reference to fact, or decidedly to retract; for he does this in the very face of the fact, (1), that all the approved critics and commentators, from Augustine to the Reformation, and of the churches of the Reformation, both Lutheran and Reformed, and of the ablest of the later evangelical critics, such as Philippi, Meyer, Tholuck, Lange, Alford, Wordsworth, etc., *do not*, in any sense of the term, even countenance that exposition; and (2), that the exposition which he has given is that by which the Socinians, and Remonstrants, and Semi-Pelagians, have ever sought to enervate and abolish the Church doctrine of original sin, and for that purpose introduced and elaborated this very exegesis, and also applied it in order to refute those very commentators whom Dr. Hodge thus claims in his own support, while at the same time he denounces the exposition which recognizes our participation in the first sin (and which truly is the interpretation of the Church from the days of Augustine until now), as mystic and Pantheistic nonsense, "which does not rise to the dignity of a contradiction, and has no meaning at all." (Page 236.) We have already cited this language, and may revert to it

again, for it should be held definitely in view in considering the whole subject.

Dr. Hodge states that the scope of the passage is to illustrate the doctrine of the justification of the sinner on the ground of the righteousness of Christ by a reference to the condemnation of men for the sin of Adam, and that verses 13–17 are a parenthesis—verses 12, 18, 19 containing the whole point of the comparison; that the "*wherefore*" (*διὰ τοῦτο*) in verse 12 is illative, denoting a conclusion from the verses immediately preceding.

As to this criticism in the general (in which Dr. Hodge is supported by good authorities) it may be observed, that the illation of *διὰ τοῦτο* is, perhaps, more restricted to the immediate context than his remarks would indicate. The conception, however, that verses 13–17 are parenthetical (a suggestion which, unless I err, owes its origin to Grotius) is a mere unsustained assumption. The internal evidence seems clearly against it; for a parenthesis of such length, and containing announcements of such weight and importance, would be indeed anomalous. The view of Meyer, therefore, is greatly to be preferred, to-wit: that verse 18 is a recapitulation rather than a resumption. We cite the verses in the common version.

VERSE 12, "WHEREFORE AS BY ONE MAN SIN ENTERED INTO THE WORLD, AND DEATH BY SIN; AND SO DEATH PASSED UPON ALL MEN, FOR THAT ALL HAVE SINNED."

The *apodosis* begins with *like as* (*ὡς περ*), as a comparative statement, and introduces the *second* member of the sentence, the first being in verse 11, "By whom we now *receive* the atonement or reconciliation. Lange (in locum) remarks that *λαμβάνειν*, which simply means *to lay hold of, to apprehend*, "*does not in the New Testament denote a passive reception*, but an ethical, religious, and moral appropriation; for example, John i. 12. And this is here the point of comparison between verses 11 and 12." This view is of long standing, and seems decidedly preferable to any other. And thus the sense of the passage would be, "Therefore, (we received and appropriated the reconciliation through Christ), *like as* we appropriated the sin and death that passed on all men, when by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, inasmuch as all sinned;" *i. e.*, participated with him in that sin. This was the exposition of Piscator (1625), who says: "Hoc versu enun-

ciat protasis similitudinis, qua Christum comparat cum Adamo: eamque tanquam corollarium (ut videtur) deducit à sententia proximè-antecedente, ubi dixit nos per Christum accepisse reconciliationem, quasi dicat. Quum igitur per Christum acceperemus reconciliationem: consequens est Christum similem esse Adamo, per quem Deum offendimus peccantes in illius lumbis." (*In locum.*) It is supported likewise by Cocceius, Elsner, Koppe, Wordsworth, Conybeare and Howson, Alford and Schaff, who says, "The great points of comparison are, (1), Sin and death as a principle and power proceeding from Adam; righteousness and life as a counter-vailing and conquering principle and power proceeding from Christ upon the whole human race; (2), Death passing upon all men by participation in the sin of Adam; life passing upon all men by participation in the righteousness of Christ. But the analogy is not absolute, for (1), the participation in Adam's sin is universal in fact, while the participation in the righteousness of Christ, though this righteousness is equally universal in power and intention, is limited in fact to believers; in other words, all are sinners, but not all are believers; . . . (3), What Christ gained for us is far greater . . . than what was lost in Adam." (*In Lange.*)

LIKE AS BY ONE MAN.—Not "*on account of* one man, as Paul would undoubtedly have said had he held the doctrine of gratuitous imputation." (*Venema.*) Not "*by his guilt*" (*Meyer*), which would not suit the antithesis—Christ; but *by one man*, as the human principle, the historic or efficient cause (he represents the original pair in their unity; for in Genesis Adam is an appellative rather than a proper name—see Gen. i. 27, 28), in the same manner as Christ is the historic or efficient cause of righteousness and life." (*Lange.*) The antithesis demands this. We are not, therefore, to look out of Adam, as Dr. Hodge does, for the efficient cause; that is, we are not to seek it in the pretext that the divine power produced guilt and corruption (penally or otherwise) in the posterity, any more than we should look for an efficient cause outside, or aside from the second Adam, in producing the results of his work. Augustine says: "We say they draw sin originally from (not *per* but *ex*) Adam; that is, that they are implicated in the guilt; and on this account are held exposed to punishment."¹

¹ *Retract. lib., I., cap. 15, cited in Vossii Hist. Pelagian, page 135.*

He said likewise that *habere peccatum et reum peccati* are identical in import.

SIN ENTERED INTO THE WORLD,—a wonderfully pregnant expression! Dr. Hodge explains it to mean, "that on his (Adam's) account, they (all men) were regarded and treated as sinners" (the very thing, as above shown, that *Paul does not say*), and in support of which he adds: "It will hardly be denied that this expression must be understood in the same way with the obviously parallel phrase, 'by one man's disobedience many were made sinners,' in verse 19, and the corresponding one in other portions of the passage." That is, in other words, *ἡ ἀμαρτία* is here guilt—a forensically imputed guilt of a *peccatum alienum* (and not guilt in the sense of subjective demerit or ill-desert), which through the divine efficiency in the exaction of punitive justice became the source of moral corruption in the race—an assumption so utterly at war with the obvious meaning of the word in the text and context, to say nothing of its universal use, that it seems impossible to imagine how it could ever have been entertained at all. If we regard *ἀμαρτία* in its primary sense (as employed in the New Testament), it seems to denote, *not sin considered as an action*, but as the *quality* of an action, or sin generically. In this generic sense it is used here and in the context (vs. 13), "*Sin* was in the world," "*Sin* is not imputed where there is no law;" but in verse 12 it has the article, because reference is made, not to representations of the idea, but to its entire contents. Thus, *ἡ ἀμαρτία* entered into the world, and by *τῆς ἀμαρτίας* death." And in verse 20, "*ἡ ἀμαρτία* hath abounded," and verse 21, "*ἡ ἀμαρτία* hath reigned unto death." Very significant also is the language of chapter vii. 13, *ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀμαρτία ὥσα φανῇ ἀμαρτία*, but *sin that it might appear sin*; *ὥσα γένηται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀμαρτωλὸς ἡ ἀμαρτία*; that *sin might become exceedingly a sinner, or exceeding sinful*. According to which, sin is not *merely* the *quality* of an action, but a principle manifesting itself in the activity of the subject.¹ Nor is it in any of the (nearly 170) instances of its employment in the New Testament used in any such sense as Dr. Hodge has here assumed.

Grotius, in order to give plausibility to the Socinian and Arminian construction of the term, alleges that it denotes *punish-*

¹ See this well and ably illustrated by *Cremer (infra vocem)*, in his *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, aforesaid.

ment by a common Hebrew metonymy, to which Witsius effectually responds, that "Grotius really prevaricates when he thus comments on the passage. He says the metonymy is frequent; but he neither does nor can prove it by a single example, which is certainly bold and rash." "It cannot be explained consistently with divine justice how, without a crime, death should have passed upon Adam's posterity. Prosper reasoned solidly and elegantly against Collator, "Unless, perhaps, it can be said that the punishment, and not the guilt, passed on the posterity of Adam; but to say this is in every respect false. For it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God; as if He would, contrary to His own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. The guilt, therefore, is evident where the punishment is so, and a partaking in punishment shows a partaking in guilt; that human misery is not the appointment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge;"¹ so that Dr. Hodge's exposition of the term, being at direct variance with the word of God, must be set aside as wholly inadmissible.

The expression ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθον, *sin entered into the world*, seems to indicate that it was already a principle elsewhere existing—a living, acting principle, which began not its existence in the *Kosmos*, but entered therein—an idea not unfamiliar to the Jewish mind anterior to Paul. (Wisdom ii. 23, 24, and xiv. 12–14.) And He who brought it, with its invariable accompaniment, death, and so was the cause of its entrance, is on that account denounced by our Saviour as a murderer. And here let the reader put to himself the question: How might this idea comport with a reference of its moral turpitude in us to the divine efficiency through a penal exaction for a *peccatum alienum*? Man is, of course, included with the subjects upon which this entrance of sin and death is made, and included, indeed, as the central object; but *κόσμος* here is not limited to man. It is rather the order of things of which humanity is the centre, and this is the leading idea of the Bible on the subject. A brief reference, however, to the meaning of the term as it was understood in the apostle's day, may be here in place.

Aristotle had defined *Kosmos* as a system (σύστημα) comprising heaven and earth and all things contained therein; but otherwise the order and beautiful arrangement of the universe is named

¹ See his work on the Covenants, Book I., ch. VIII., §§ 33, 34.

κόσμος."¹ Plutarch, though not perhaps with historical accuracy, says: "Pythagoras was the first who named the system of the universe *Kosmos* (τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιωχὴν κόσμον), from the order observable in it."² The same was affirmed by the Latins. Cicero says: "Hunc hac varietate distinctum bene Græci κόσμον, nec luculentum mundum nominaverimus;"³ and as his own definition, says, that "communis quasi Deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque," etc. (De Natura Deor., lib. II., cap. 62.) And Pliny observes, that "quem κόσμον Græci nomine ornamenti appellaverunt, eum et nos à perfecta absolutaque elegantia, mundum."⁴ Compare 1 Pet. iii. 3, and in the LXX., Exod. xxxiii. 5; Isa. xlix. 18, and Jer. iv. 30.

Such was the *κόσμος*—all order, harmony, and perfection, with humanity as its centre—when SIN, with all its defilement, distortion, and baleful antagonisms, entered, producing disorder, rebellion, and death. Did, then, the sin of Adam, a *peccatum alienum* or foreign sin to all but himself, injure only himself directly, and the race and the rest of the universe only incidentally—that is, by a judicial act of the Creator, charging it upon a guiltless offspring, and then cursing them, and destroying His own beautiful world because of a sin with which they had had nothing to do?

But the ἁμαρτία—this principle of ruin, disorder, and spiritual death—must be, in its relation to the race, something more than a mere *negation*, as Dr. Hodge's theory represents it to have been. It was not a mere putative guilt which came upon the race through Adam, but SIN, an active and deathful principle, which the apostle elsewhere portrays as *ruling, reigning, working, defiling, and destroying*. Such is the baleful and terrible power he attributes to it, and of course to assume that it is a merely putative guilt would be to trace directly to God Himself, as their immediate and efficient cause, all these positive and destructive results of its entrance; for, if they accrue in consequence of a purely forensic accusation of putative guilt against the guiltless, and yet, as in the case of infants, sin acquires its defiling, domineering, and destroying power before voluntary agency can possibly commence (which Dr. Hodge affirms most emphatically to be the fact⁵), then these results are

¹ De Mundo, lib. II. ² De Placit. Philos., lib. II., cap. 1.

³ De Univers., cap. 10. ⁴ Nat. Hist., lib. II., cap. 4.

⁵ Theology, Vol. II., pages 189–192, 195, 196.

by inevitable sequence traceable to God as their procuring or efficient cause. But nothing like this can be found in the passage. Adam, by *παράβασις* and *παράπτωμα*—*offence* and *transgression*—(for the apostle applies both terms to his sin), *opened the door*, so to speak, through which the *ἁμαρτία* entering brought death, and which, through imputation and natural generation, became universal, and the procuring cause of all the *παραπτώματα* of his posterity; for as Schaff, with his singularly 'acute power of delineation, remarks, "Paul here carefully distinguishes between *ἁμαρτία* as the *generic* and *παράβασις* and *παράπτωμα* as the *concrete act* of transgression."¹ And then, as above stated, it already existed in another sphere aside from the Kosmos; but now *it entered* (*εἰσῆλθε*) therein with all its baleful train, or, as Luther expresses it, "*Ist durchgedrungen*" *has penetrated or pierced through*, a most apt expression, which Piscator thus illustrates: "Pervasis, quemadmodum lues gregem aliquem pervadit, et singulas oves contagio inficit," (*in locum*); *διῆλθεν*, *ἐφ' ὃ*, both referring to the individual and ethical appropriation of it by the race when all sinned in and with Adam. The expression, therefore, denotes, not a mere tendency to sin and death, which a putation of guilt might be possibly supposed to occasion in the subjectively innocent, but as Augustine expresses it, *the actual propagation of sin*. (See Lange, page 176.) The phrase *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους*—*to all men*—is, therefore, not strictly equivalent to *εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, for the latter includes the former; as De Wette, after Piscator, has expressed it, the former differs from the latter "as the concrete parts from the abstract whole; *διέρχεται* differs from *εἰσέρχεται*, as the going from house to house differs from entering a town."

FOR THAT, OR INASMUCH AS, ALL SINNED.—The rendering *ἐφ' ὃ* by *inasmuch as*, or *forasmuch as*, has the sanction of the highest critical authority, ancient and modern; for it is not so much a causal as a conditioning particle, "and implies that a moral participation of all men in the sin of Adam is the medium or cause of their death, just as faith on our part is the moral condition of our participation in Christ's life. It is unfavorable to the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation. The legal act of imputation is not arbitrary and unconditioned, but rests on a moral ground of an objective reality." (*Schaff in Lange*.)

¹ In Lange, *ad locum*, page 176.

"ALL SINNED," not all *have* sinned. Winer denies that the aorist is ever confounded with the perfect. The second aorist here presents the sinning of all as a historical fact, or a momentary action of the past; whereas the theory of Dr. Hodge inevitably represents the sinning of Adam's posterity as taking place *after* he had perpetrated the *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin; for it represents them as being constituted guilty only by the forensic imputation to them of the guilt which he had contracted by the perpetration of that foreign sin. Of course, then, the imputation could not take place until *after* the sin imputed had been committed. And thus the theory arrays itself directly against the text. And then, still further, it could not in strictness of speech, according to Dr. Hodge's reiterated asseveration, be imputed to them at all, so as to constitute them sinners, or guilty, until they *personally* existed, and consequently none sinned in the first transgression except Adam and Eve. And then, as non-existences cannot have sin judicially charged upon them, it follows, on Dr. Hodge's theory, that a large proportion of the race have not even yet sinned in any possible or conceivable sense. Thus irreconcilable is his theory with the apostolic averment, and with the standards of the Church, *that in the first sin all sinned*. Luther renders the phrase, *Sie sind allzumal sünde*. Meyer (*in locum*) says, "The sinning of each man is presented as a historical fact, whereby the sinful state is brought about." Schaff observes that "the aorist was chosen with reference to the past event of Adam's fall, which was at the same time the fall of the human race represented by him and germinally contained in him." (Compare Romans iii. 23, in which the same phrase occurs.)

Dr. Hodge alleges that "the word translated *have sinned*, may, in strict accordance with usage, be rendered 'have become guilty,' or, regarded and treated as sinners." But how have they been so regarded and treated who not as yet have (according to his constant allegation) in any sense existed? Whitby, however, who construes the term as he does, frankly owns that "we meet not with the word *ἡμαρτον* in this sense elsewhere in the New Testament. While Turretin (who, moreover, without reason, has been claimed by Dr. Hodge as supporting his theory) says: "At verbum *ἡμαρτον* propriè non potest trahi ad habitum peccati, vel corruptionem habituatam et inhærentem, sed propriè peccatum aliquod actuale

notat, idque præteritum, quod non potest aliud esse, quam ipsum Adami peccatum; aliud quippe est peccatorem esse vel nasi, aliud vero reipsa peccare: *qui ergo, cum nondum essent in rerum natura, dicuntur in alio peccasse, censentur procul dubio eo committente peccatum*, et ipsi etiam commisse," etc.¹ That is, in brief, the word refers to actual sin which was committed in Adam, and of which his posterity all were guilty of committing; and hence when they are born it is charged upon them.

In order to sustain the allegation that his construction of the term is "in strict accordance with usage," Dr. Hodge adduces two passages from the Septuagint (which are likewise insisted on for the like purpose by the Socinians and Remonstrants; they are Gen. xliii. 9 (compare xliv. 32) and 1 Kings i. 21.) In the first, the phrase is ἡμαρτηκὼς ἔσομαι, by which Judah, in reference to the return of Benjamin, binds himself to his father under the penalty of perpetual guilt—the guilt of having violated a direct and solemn promise—and says: "If I fail to bring him back to thee, then I shall have transgressed—I shall have broken my covenant with thee. How, then, does this usage of the term establish the idea of a merely putative guilt? Dr. Hodge will not venture to say that there would not have been an incurrance of actual guilt in case of Judah's failure to fulfil this promise. How, then, can this instance be pleaded by him as in point? Of course, neither Judah nor his father would construe the pledge as irrespective of divine providences over which man could have no control; and this being taken into the account, none can without presumption allege that Judah would not have been in every sense of the word *a sinner*, a transgressor, guilty of the breach of a solemn covenant transaction, had he failed to do that which he here pledges himself to his father to perform. Here, then, we have a voluntary assumption of legal responsibility, and real guilt and sin in case of failure,—an instance which Dr. Hodge alleges as illustrative and confirmatory of his assertion *that a liability to the exactions of penal justice may be involuntarily incurred!* No one denies that legal responsibility may be voluntarily assumed; but would any number of instances of such incurrance prove that it may likewise be incurred involuntarily on our part?

In his other instance (1 Kings i. 21), Bathsheba, referring to

¹ Instit. Theologiæ, loco IX., Quæst. IX., § 16.

herself and Solomon, says to David, that if Adonijah succeed in his attempted usurpation of the throne, I and my son shall be ἁμαρτωλοί,—that is, we shall be held and treated as guilty of that of which we shall really be guilty, to-wit, *disaffection to his usurped reign*. Had he succeeded, therefore, and had he thus treated them, would the treatment have been for a merely putative offence, or contrary to their actual character? Could they have been otherwise than disaffected; and would their punishment have been for a merely putative guilt? In no sense whatever. In what way, then, could a thousand such cases prove or illustrate the truth of the allegation that those who are not disaffected with the government of God may be justly treated by Him as if they were? Surely such instances, instead of confirming Dr. Hodge's theory, only add their testimony to prove it to be, what it really is, utterly untenable.

The word ἁμαρτάνειν is, as we have stated, employed in the New Testament more than forty times, and in twenty of these by the apostle. The word, as Schaff justly remarks, "cannot mean *to be*, or *to become sinful* (= ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι, or γίνεσθαι), although this is the necessary result of the first sinful act, *still less to suffer the punishment of sin; but it means real, actual sinning.*" (In Lange.) Witsius likewise declares that "it is very clear *to any not under the power of prejudice* that, when the apostle affirms that *all sinned*, he spake of an act of sinning, or of an actual sin—the very term *to sin* denoting an action. *It is one thing to sin, another to be sinful*, if I may so speak."¹ Meyer, who is justly ranked with the ablest of modern expositors, denounces the exegesis which Dr. Hodge and the Socinians adopt as "sheer grammatical arbitrariness, for ἡμαρτον means *they sinned*, and nothing else." And he explains the clause to mean, "*because all sinned in and with Adam when he sinned.*"

When Paul wrote this epistle neither Jew nor Greek attached to the terms in question any such meaning as Dr. Hodge and the Socinians and Arminians insist upon; and such being the fact, is it to be supposed that the apostle, in announcing a doctrine of such stupendous bearings as that of the gratuitous imputation of sin (which Dr. Hodge claims to be here announced), would do it by employing terms in a sense wholly unknown to those to whom he wrote, and at the same time expecting to be understood by them?

¹ Economy of the Covenants, Book I., Chap. VIII., § 31.

He is not writing prophecy, but plain dogmatic, and of course designed his words to be understood, and their meaning appreciated and applied for edification. And then, moreover, although *ἀμαρτάνειν* is never employed in a passive sense, and never in a single instance has the sense of *putative* sinning, Dr. Hodge claims that in the passage before us it is employed in both these senses, and, as appears from his Revised Commentary, becomes the more imperious and proscriptive in proportion as his lack of all rational support is made to appear. In the context (verse 14) the word is used where such a sense is confessedly impossible; and in chapter iii. 23, as above remarked, the same clause is used, where he is obliged to explain it of *actual* sinning. But the allegation, seriously made by him, that theologians of every grade and class of doctrine,—Calvinists, Arminians, Lutherans, and Rationalists,—favor his interpretation, should not have been made; for the impression it conveys is extremely erroneous, and it is calculated only to mislead. For though it is true that Socinians, Arminians, and semi-Pelagians, with some modern Rationalists, have adopted it, the ground of this, as they are obliged to confess, was not grammatical or philological, but the unworthy and fallacious ground of doctrinal predilection or sympathy,—they having assumed that the doctrine of original sin, as entertained by the Church, was absurd and nonsensical, adopted this exegesis to justify them in its rejection, while the Church divines, both Calvinist and Lutheran, as we have shown, discarded and refuted it from the first. It had been in part suggested by several of the Greek fathers (of no weight, however, in the scale of thorough criticism, and who did not receive the doctrine of original sin); but it attained its full development or elaboration through the Socinian or Remonstrant schools, who, being aware that it could not be sustained on the principles of true hermeneutics, endeavored to carry their point by sarcasm and ferocious denunciation. As regards the Calvinistic and Lutheran churches, Dr. Hodge has not been able to adduce any divine of eminence who has accepted his theory with its exegesis, though occasionally, perhaps, a supralapsarian might be found whose *doctrinal* principles would not forbid it, though averse to risk the credit of his critical reputation on its adoption. Macknight has been claimed in its support; but his latitudinarian or Rationalistic proclivities threw him entirely out of sympathy with the received

doctrine of original sin. Storr and Flatt have been likewise claimed; but their confessedly arbitrary principles of hermeneutics would render their authority of but little weight, if this were even the fact. But it is not the fact, as their exposition of the passage evinces. They say: "For this transgression [of Adam and Eve] produced a disorder (*ἀταξία*), and this gave rise to a sinful disposition of their whole nature, which became itself a foundation of other transgressions. Moreover, *this sinful disposition* (*ἡ ἀμαρτία*, Rom. v. 12) *was propagated by this one individual Adam* (to whom also it is peculiarly attributed) *over the whole human family, and through the instrumentality of this sinful disposition* (*διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας*) *death has been entailed on the whole race of man*. It was in this way (*οὕτως*, or *διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας*) that death, which would not have befallen man in a state of innocence, was extended to the whole human family, *because, on account of* (*ἐφ' ᾧ*) *the sinful propensity which is common to all, all are treated as sinful creatures, and subjected to the penalty of the violated law.*"¹

Edwards, in refuting the exegesis which Dr. Taylor had adopted from the Socinians and Remonstrants (see our Sections 19 and 21, above) says: "The doctrine of original sin is not only here taught, but most plainly, explicitly, and abundantly taught. This doctrine is asserted, expressly or impliedly, in almost every verse, and in some of the verses several times. It is fully implied in that first expression in the 12th verse—*by one man sin entered into the world*. The passage implies that sin became *universal* in the world, as the apostle had largely shown it was, not merely (which would be a trifling observation) that the one man, who was made first, sinned first, before other men sinned; or, that it did not so happen that many began to sin just together at the same moment. The latter part of the verse, *and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that* (or, if you will, *unto which*) *all have sinned*, shows that, in the eye of the Judge of the world, in Adam's first sin *all sinned, not only in some sort, but all sinned so as to be exposed to that death and final destruction which is the proper wages of sin.*"

Then, on the following page, after citing verse 20, he says: "These words plainly show that the OFFENCE *spoken of so often*,

¹ Biblical Theology, B. III., § 55. Translated by Dr. S. S. Schumaker. (1836.)

the offence of one man, became the sin of all. For when he says, the law entered that the offence might abound, his meaning cannot be that the offence of Adam, merely as his personally, should abound, but as it exists in its derived guilt, corrupt influence, and evil fruits, in the sin of mankind in general, even as a tree in its roots and branches." And then, adverting to Dr. Taylor's effort to divert the passage from its plain meaning, that "*we all sinned so as to be exposed to death and final destruction*," he thus continues: "What further confirms the certainty of the *proof* of original sin, which this place affords, is this, that the utmost art cannot pervert it to another sense. What a variety of the most artful methods have been used by the enemies of this doctrine, to wrest and darken this paragraph of holy writ, which stands so much in their way, as it were to force the Bible to speak a language agreeable to their mind! How have expressions been strained, words and phrases racked! What strange figures of speech have been invented, and with violent hands thrust into the apostle's mouth, and then with a bold countenance and magisterial airs are obtruded upon the world as from him! But blessed be God, we have his words as he delivered them, and the rest of the same epistle, and his other writings to compare with them, by which his meaning stands in too strong and glaring a light to be hid by any of the artificial mists which they labor to throw upon it."¹ The whole of this last paragraph is very much after the style and manner in which, from the very beginning, the divines of the Reformation refer to this Socinian exegesis.

Neither the earlier nor the later divines of the Calvinistic and Lutheran churches, therefore, evince the slightest sympathy with this effort (though Dr. Hodge would revive it!) by a lame and impotent exegesis to divest the passage of its literal and historic significance. And if we enquire into the position occupied by the recent critics and commentators, both German and English, on the subject, we find no one of note who does not repudiate the exposition as undeserving even of serious criticism. Tittman, De Wette, Tholuck, Stuart, Haldane, Philippi, Meyer, Lange, Schaff, Alford, Wordsworth, and others, all reject it as unauthorized and arbitrary; and yet, with the *usus loquendi* of the divine word, as well as all human authorities, earlier and later (who are of any

¹ See Edward's Works, Vol. II., pp. 509-571.

weight as exegetes), against him, and though on his own part unable in any conceivable way to justify his attempted criticism, Dr. Hodge becomes only the more positive, and more and more denunciatory of those who discard his utterly unfounded assumptions.

If the issue were a trivial one, not seriously affecting the interests of either our doctrinal or ethical principles, all this might be borne with a good-natured smile. But it is an essentially different affair when Dr. Hodge scruples not to claim in the most direct and pointed manner, and to reiterate that the issue which he raises is fundamental to Protestant theology, and at the same time assails and denounces as guilty of fundamental heresy those who refuse to acquiesce in these his departures from the recognized faith of the Church; and when, moreover, the moral perfections of God and His dealings with His accountable creatures are all, as we shall fully show in the sequel, vitally implicated therein, and of course the truth pertaining to salvation. In such circumstances it is impossible to contemplate the matter without emotions to which it would be painful to give expression. But we repeat most emphatically, that the whole claim of Dr. Hodge that this his exegesis is sustained by the usage of the word of God, and that it is favored by the recognized commentators of the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches, is to be set aside as utterly unfounded and fallacious.

Tittman, in his tractate, already referred to, says: "Paul then, in Rom. v. 12, *seq.*, compares the misery which was consequent upon sin with the blessings of salvation which by divine arrangement Christ bestows upon man. From the first man, the author of the first sin, misery and death came upon all, so that from one sin sin and death began their reign, *inasmuch as all*, each in his own way, *sinned*." Alford says: "Observe how entirely this assertion of the apostle (all sinned) contradicts the Pelagian or individualistic view of men, that each is a separate creation from God, existing solely on his own exclusive responsibility, and affirms the Augustinian or Realistic view, that all are evolved by God's appointment from an original stock, and, though individually responsible, are generally involved in the corruption and condemnation of their original." So too speaks Wordsworth: "Observe the aorist tense ἥμαρτον—they *all sinned*—that is, at a *particular time*. And when was that? Doubtless at the fall. All men sinned in Adam's sin. All fell in his fall." So also Webster and Wilkin-

son: "All sinned virtually when Adam sinned, because in him their nature became sinful." And Schaff: "We hold that all men sinned in Adam, not indeed personally by conscious actual transgression (which Augustine never said or meant), but virtually or potentially; in other words, that Adam fell, not as an individual simply, but as the real representative head of the human race, *and that his fall vitiated human nature itself*, and prospectively his whole posterity. . . . The human race is not a sandheap, but an organic unity; and only on the ground of such a vital unity, as distinct from a mechanical or merely federal unity, can we understand and defend the doctrine of original sin, the imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness. Without an actual communion of life imputation is an arbitrary legal arrangement." (*In Lange*, page 179.)

VERSE 18. THEREFORE AS BY THE OFFENCE OF ONE JUDGMENT CAME UPON ALL MEN TO CONDEMNATION; EVEN SO BY THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF ONE THE FREE GIFT CAME UPON ALL MEN UNTO JUSTIFICATION OF LIFE.

The main point to be considered in this verse, as relates to the inquiry before us, is the gender of *ἑνός*, which qualifies both *παπατοῦματος* and *δικαιώματος*; that is, whether it should be read the *offence of one*, or *the one offence*. Dr. Hodge, as though there could be no doubt on the subject, assumes that *ἑνός* is masculine in both cases. And (though obliged to take it as neuter in verse 16) proceeds to apply it in support of his theory, to the effect *that it was for the one offence of the one man* that judgment came upon all men, and not for the one offence wherein all participated or sinned. This method of assuming and then applying a questionable point when the preponderation of evidence obviously, and as admitted by the best expositors, militates against the tenability of the assumption, can scarcely be regarded as the proper method of interpreting the word of God. The Augustinian divines, both the earlier and the later, have never been thus positive. Turretin, for example, referring to the passage, gives as the sense of it: "As by *one sin* guilt comes upon all for condemnation, so by *one righteousness* grace comes upon all for justification of life."¹ And Tittman, says: "No one, I apprehend, can be so wanting in pro-

¹ Instit. Theol. Loc., IX., Quæst. IX., § 16.

per regard to divine justice and holiness as to suppose that all men are made sinners *merely by the offence of Adam, and without any blame of their own*; i. e., no one can reasonably look upon all men as sinners in the judgment of God, merely because of Adam's offence, or as rendered miserable, not on account of their own sin, but because Adam once sinned."¹ While the most eminent critics of our own day, as Meyer, Schaff, Rothe, Ewald, Alford, and Wordsworth, regard *ἑνός* as neuter = one fall, one offence, one righteousness.² And Stuart affirms that the article before *ἑνός* would be indispensable if it meant the one man."³

Lange, indeed, translates it: "Therefore, as through the fall of one," etc., making it masculine; but on which, with convincing force Schaff remarks, that "the antithesis *εἰς πάντας*, and the analogy of verses 12, 15, 17, 19, where *τοῦ ἑνός* is masculine, are in favor of Lange's view, which is also that of the translators of the English version; but the absence of the article before *ἑνός* is almost conclusive against it; for in all the eight cases of this section where it is indisputably masculine it has uniformly the article . . . except in verse 12, where it is connected with a noun (*δι' ἑνός ἀνθρώπου*), and therefore unnecessary, while in verse 16, where *ἐξ ἑνός* must be neuter, in opposition to *πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων*, it is, as here, without the article. The apostle, therefore, is quite careful and consistent. The objection that the comparison is between Adam and Christ, rather than between the fall of one and the righteousness of another, does not hold, for it is clearly a comparison of both persons and effects." It may be remarked, however, that in its theological or doctrinal aspect merely, the question is one of little importance comparatively; since all must admit that if *ἑνός* be interpreted as masculine, the expression "*by the offence of one*" can refer only to the *ἐξ ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον* of verse 12; i. e., *the offence of the one in whom all sinned, or in whose offence we all participated*.

VERSE 19. FOR AS BY ONE MAN'S DISOBEDIENCE MANY WERE MADE SINNERS, SO BY THE OBEDIENCE OF ONE SHALL MANY BE MADE RIGHTEOUS.

In remarking on this verse, Dr. Hodge observes that Paul be-

¹ American Biblical Repository, Vol. VIII., *ubi supra*.

² American edition of Lange on Romans, *in locum*.

³ American Biblical Repository. Vol. VIII., pp. 73-75.

gins it with *for*: "We are treated as sinners for the offence of Adam, for we are regarded as sinners on his account," and in his usual peremptory style insists that such is the meaning of the phrase, *αμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν*, were constituted sinners, and especially on the ground that the antithetic clause means to be regarded and treated as righteous. As the points of the antithesis, however, are, on the one hand, the exhibition of God's penal justice, and on the other the exhibition of his gratuitous mercy, there can be no more ground for the inference of Dr. Hodge—that as mercy is extended gratuitously, therefore condemnation is likewise gratuitous—than there is for the inference that, because the exercise of penal justice is on account of subjective ill-desert, therefore the exercise of mercy (or the bestowment of justification) has respect also to subjective desert; the one inference being quite as valid as the other, and both alike false and without the slightest foundation. Schaff, therefore, truly says: "The analogy of forensic justification is not to the point, for the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to the impenitent sinner, but only on the subjective condition of faith, by which Christ is apprehended and made our own. Justification presupposes regeneration, or an action of the Holy Spirit, by which He creates repentance of our sins and trust in Jesus Christ, and makes us one with Him. By "being in Christ" is meant not merely a nominal, putative, or constructive relation, but a real, substantial union; so also our "being in Adam," by which the other relation is illustrated, is real and vital. *This analogy, therefore, leads to the opposite conclusion, that moral participation, either potential or personal, or both, must be the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin.*" (In *Lange*, page 194.)

The apostle, in unfolding his analogy, had no occasion (as we have shown) to make any direct reference to the *mode* in which sin and righteousness are or may be communicated. Turretin, in allusion to the passage, and to this very point, places the meaning of the apostle in its true light. He says: "Because the scope of the apostle, which is to be carefully kept in view (*unicè respiciendus*), does not extend to it (the mode), but aims only to lay open the foundation of the mutual participation (communio) of the guilt to death, and of the right to life, from our union with the first and second Adam *as to the thing, albeit the mode is diverse on ac-*

count of the diversity of the subject;"¹ which exposition, as we have shown, is sustained by the whole Reformed church, and which, being admitted, demolishes at a stroke Dr. Hodge's criticism on verses 12, 18, 19, and along therewith every shred and vestige of his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin; for this alleged support being gone, it has not in the whole Bible even a shadow to stand upon. But instead of expatiating here, I shall proceed to place before the reader the results (as they bear upon this point) which have been carefully arrived at by the ablest critics of the age; and by turning to Section 17, above, he will see how the question has been from the first viewed by the Augustinian Church.

Lange says, in relation to the passage, that "it is only through the gospel that this ideal judgment is brought to pass, by which all men are presented and exposed as condemned sinners in consequence of their connection with the sin of Adam. (See John xvi. 8, 9; compare Ps. li. 5, 6.) We are authorized by the language in maintaining that *καθίσταται* possesses here the full idea of *setting down, exhibiting, making to appear as what one is*," and he accordingly translates the clause, "*set forth, made to appear* (in their real character) *as sinners.*"² Meyer says: "According to verse 12 they were, through Adam's disobedience, *actually placed in the category of sinners, because they sinned in and with Adam in his fall.*" Even Philippi, a rigid Lutheran, somewhat of the Quenstedt type, sustains the same view, and so of a multitude of other eminent critics not necessary to mention, who, though they differ on other points in the exposition, concur in wholly rejecting the Socinian exegesis as unauthorized, De Wette himself denouncing it as "*false.*"

The word *καθίστημι* is, as Schaff observes, "employed twenty-two times in the New Testament; three times only in Paul (twice

¹ Loco. XVI., Quæst. II., § 19. See also our § 17, above.

² Cremer, in his recent valuable Lexicon of New Testament Greek, calls in question rather harshly this exposition of *καθίσταται*, on the ground that the word strictly taken denotes an actual appointment or setting down in a definite place. But in what respect does being set down in a defined or appropriate place *as sinners* really or practically differ from being made to *appear as sinners*? If assigned to their place as such, there certainly can be no question that they are made to appear as such.

here and once in Titus i. 5). In sixteen of these cases (including Titus i. 5) it clearly refers to official *appointment*; in one it means to accompany (Acts xvii. 15); in the remaining five, viz., Rom. v. 19 (twice), Jas. iii. 6 and iv. 4, and 2 Pet. i. 8, it is *to constitute, to render*. So it is taken in this verse by nearly all the recent commentators." And then (in a note) "Philippi doubts the meaning *reddere, facere*, in the New Testament, and insists upon the fundamental (1), *to set down, sistere, constituere, hinstellen, einsetzen*, and translates, *In die Kategorie von Sündern gesetzt worden*. But also in this case the setting down or the imputation must be based on the fact that they really are sinners, and so it is taken by Philippi." Then, after referring to the Greek metonymic interpretation as claimed and developed by the Socinians and Arminians, and adopted by Dr. Hodge, he adds: "The phrase, then, can be taken only in the real sense, like *ἡμαρτον* in verse 12. It means, they were made sinners, either by a virtual participation in the fall of Adam, or by actual practice, by repeating, as it were, the fall of Adam in their sinful conduct. Both interpretations are perfectly grammatical, and do not exclude each other. Even if the verb under consideration in the passive could be made out to mean *to be exhibited, to appear*, . . . it always presupposes actual being; they were made to appear in their true character as sinners, or what they really were. (Compare Lange above.) This is very different from, they were regarded and treated as sinners without being such. The metonymic interpretation confounds the effect with the cause, or reverses the proper order that death follows sin. We are *regarded and treated* as sinners because we *are* sinners in fact and by practice. So, on the other hand, *δικαιοὶ κατασταθήσονται* is more than the declaratory *δικαιωθήσονται*, and means that by Christ's merits we shall be actually made righteous, and appear as such before His judgment-seat." Pareus presents the same thought: "*Shall be constituted righteous* signifies much more than *they shall be justified*; for to be justified is to be absolved from condemnation by imputed righteousness, but to be constituted just is to be sanctified by habitual righteousness; that is, it includes at the same time the benefit of justification and sanctification." Alford says: "*Be made righteous*, not by imputation merely, any more than in the other case; but 'shall be made really and actually righteous as completely as the others were made really and actually sinners.'

When we say that man has no righteousness of *his own*, we speak of him out of Christ; but *in Christ*, and united to Him, he is *made righteous*, not by a fiction or *imputation only* of Christ's righteousness, but by a real and living spiritual union with a righteous head, as a righteous member, righteous *by means of*, as an effect of, the righteousness of that head, but not merely righteous by the transference of the righteousness of that head; just as, in his natural state, he is united to a sinful head as a sinful member, sinful by means of, as an effect of, the sinfulness of that head, but not by *transference* of the sinfulness of that head."

The same exposition, substantially, is presented by Luther, Calvin, and others too numerous to mention; nor shall we attempt to offer a single remark touching the incomparable superiority, justness, and scriptural propriety of such an interpretation to that which the Socinian school offers as the mind of the apostle. That matter is left to the deliberate and serious judgment of our readers.

We have already adverted to the fact that Chrysostom, and others of the Greek church who did not receive the doctrine of original sin, started the metonymic or figurative interpretation,—though it should be borne in mind, however, that he himself does not place the metonymy in the *verb*, as the Socinian exposition does, but in the noun *ἁμαρτωλοί*, which he would make to signify *obnoxious to punishment and condemned to death*. The conception thus initiated (and not entirely lost sight of by several of the scholastics) was called up by Erasmus, and then elaborated and matured by Socinus and his school, to give countenance and efficacy to their envenomed assault upon the doctrine of original sin as held and defended by the Church, and was for the same purpose then adopted by the Remonstrants and the later Semi-Pelagians, as Whitby and Dr. John Taylor; and now Dr. Hodge, following in their wake, insists, in a style the most peremptory, upon taking the verb here, as also *ἡμαρτον* in verse 12, in the same putative and merely forensic sense, though utterly unsupported in his attempt.

And then further. Experienced hunters generally will calculate beforehand what to do with the game they are endeavoring to capture should fortune be so kind as to place it at their disposal. But Dr. Hodge, who has had a most persevering chase after his game, seems never to have thought of this. He has captured for himself the metonymic interpretation, but seems at an utter loss

what to do with the prize. He offers it to the Church, but she, having no use for it, declines the overture; for it seems wholly impossible on his theory to clothe that interpretation with terms which convey an intelligible idea. To say that the judgment unto condemnation came upon the race because they were sinners, is good sense and intelligible to all. But what conceivable meaning does it, or can it, convey to affirm, as Dr. Hodge does, that the judgment unto condemnation came upon them because they were regarded and treated as sinners? For *when* were they, or *when* had they been, so regarded and treated? *Before* this judgment came upon them? By no means, says Dr. Hodge; they were not guilty then, but guiltless; and they were regarded and treated as sinners by the judgment unto condemnation coming upon them; that is, in other words, they were guiltless before the judgment came upon them, and it came upon them because they were regarded and treated as sinners by the judgment coming upon them. If the language, in consistency with the theory in question, can be made to bear any other probable construction, I shall sincerely regret it has escaped me. But if not, I have only to ask, whether any man, not blinded by prejudice for a theory, can really suppose that the apostle would have advanced a statement so utterly "*unthinkable*" as this?

RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION.

In view of the examination of this exegesis we are presented with the following results:

A tremendous announcement is affirmed to be made in the divine word, to the effect *that God imputes sin gratuitously to the posterity of Adam!*—an announcement the purport of which, despite all attempted salvos, reverses alike the settled convictions and the spontaneous utterances of our moral nature in relation to the goodness, and equity, and justice of "the Judge of all the earth." The proof of the allegation is demanded, and we are thereupon referred to the analogy instituted in this passage (Rom. v. 12–21), and to an assumed *inference* deduced by Dr. Hodge from a little corner of that analogy; an analogy which sets forth in such a way as is best calculated to win man's grateful admiration and heartfelt appreciation, God's infinite mercy and goodness to our ruined and helpless race. To expect such a disclosure at all, *in such a*

connection, would seem, *à priori*, quite out of the range of all probability, since to allege that God condemns the guiltless, and without their own will or agency involves them in hopeless guilt and moral pollution, and consequent misery, is surely to bring forward a fearful offset to the doctrine of goodness and grace and mercy. But still, if the disclosure be really there, it must be reverentially received, although we might perhaps have not unreasonably supposed that *such a doctrine*, and fraught with such results to our moral convictions, and to the whole science of ethics and theology, would not have been left by the Holy Spirit to depend upon a mere *inference*, even if that inference were logically deducible, but would be made the subject of at least *one* express dogmatic announcement. A thorough examination of the proffered passage, however, demonstrates that this asserted inference has really nothing to sustain or even countenance it, but is, on the contrary, an unfounded and arbitrary assumption, and that it has always been so regarded by the Church. And not only so, but that the basis from which it is attempted to be deduced is not really an interpretation of the language employed by the apostle, but an attempt to force upon his words a meaning foreign to, and at direct variance with, the *usus loquendi* of the inspired writers; that is, *that none of the terms on which the interpretation is claimed to be based are employed in any such sense in the sacred Scriptures*; and, moreover, that the Church herself has never attached any such meaning to those terms. These results, amongst others, have been clearly reached by this examination, and both they and the ground of them are before our readers.

Dr. Hodge, moreover, had affirmed that those who reject his inference aforesaid, and refuse to accept the theory he would base thereon, reject a doctrine fundamental to the Protestant theology; and he has directly inculcated along with this that his exegesis, and the theory based thereon, exhibit the doctrine entertained by the whole Church, and are, moreover, sustained by the great body of her commentators and critics. A careful and thorough examination, however, has demonstrated that this is in no sense the fact; but, on the contrary, that the great body of approved expositors and divines, both Calvinist and Lutheran, have not only never received or endorsed his theory, but have repudiated and refuted it as logically subversive of the whole system of grace. And further,

that this exegesis is admitted by no eminent expositor of the present time, all of whom regard as arbitrary criticism the attempts which have at any time been made to give it countenance.

Then, moreover, and in view of all this, Dr. Hodge reissues his Commentary in a "*Revised Edition*." But instead of assaying therein to grapple with these facts, or in any way to meet the weighty issues they present to him in view of his peremptory asseverations, he merely reiterates his assumptions, and with increased peremptoriness denounces the results of those laborious investigations, and treats the doctrine of our participation in the first sin (which those investigations had shown to be indubitably the doctrine of the Church and of the passage in question), as unworthy of serious attention, and speaks of it as mystic and Pantheistic nonsense, which does not rise to the dignity of a contradiction, and has no meaning at all; and in view of it, and of the aforesaid recognition of it by the Church, affirms that "it is a monstrous evil to make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men," (page 236); thus calling up and reiterating, in order to sustain his exegesis and the issues he had raised by his most inaccurate representations, the very denunciation and sarcasm which the Socinians had employed for the like purpose.

In the meanwhile, and soon after the appearance of my former essay in the *Danville Review*, the announcement was heralded that Dr. Hodge was preparing his theological lectures for publication. Expectation was thereupon aroused, and the discussion of the subject suspended, and the Church herself kept in waiting during a long series of years in order to receive his deliberate and matured solution of the very issues which he himself had raised. But when some ten years elapse and the volumes appear, they are found to contain a mere bald and unsupported repetition of his previous assumptions, without any attempted solution of the questions which had been raised by his departure from the recognized faith of the Church. Not one conception differing from his previous assumptions; no explanation or retraction; while he at the same time reiterates his most offensive allegations, charging that those who accede not to his baseless assumptions reject the doctrine of imputation, and are in fundamental error; that is, in other words (for it all amounts to this), that they who reject the exegesis which the

Socinians and Semi-Pelagians elaborated for the plain purpose of destroying the doctrine of original sin, and who will not concede that the exegesis which the Church insisted on in reply thereto is absurd and nonsensical, do not really entertain the doctrine of the Church, but err fundamentally in regard to it, and are in a fair way to reject the imputation of Christ's righteousness for justification; and all this while at the same time his whole theory is based upon an unfounded assumption, at variance with all the perfections of the divine nature, and is condemned alike by the inspired word and by the teaching of the Church of God. The facts by which these statements are established are before the reader, and let him determine whether they are not adequately sustained.

While I would earnestly endeavor to avoid any expression of unkindness in view of these most unwarrantable assaults and accusations of heresy, fealty to the truth will not permit me to say less than that, if the theology and scholarship of the Presbyterian Church are willing to accept of all this, let there be no complaint of the forfeiture of her prestige, which in that case becomes inevitable!

We now return to the theological discussion.

There are many important topics still remaining which call for consideration in connection with our theme, as *e. g.*, his doctrine of sin and guilt; his definition of punishment; his doctrine of the justice of God, etc., etc.; each of which we had intended to consider in its relation to his theory; for they are all, in the sense in which the Church has always understood them, seriously affected by that theory; but our volume already is as large as we had intended it should be, and we shall therefore confine our attention to those topics only which are most manifestly related to the argument as hitherto pursued.

§ 26. THE RELATION WHICH REASON SUSTAINS TO THE ISSUE IN QUESTION.

Since Dr. Hodge has repeatedly affirmed that the doctrine of our participation in the first sin is impossible and nonsensical, and that if received would make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men (see § 8, above), a brief inquiry into the relation which reason and philosophy do sustain to the issue will be here in place, not only as of high importance

intrinsically considered, but as developing still further the logical affinities of the scheme we are examining, and of the positions which the Doctor is compelled to assume in its support. We therefore appropriate the present and the succeeding section to the inquiry.

I employ the term *reason* here in the popular sense in which it is usually employed in the like connection, and not in that of the *impersonal, universal* and *absolute*, so expatiated upon by the French philosophers, who allege it to be also divine—a light which is not ours, but is a revelation from God, etc. And I refer to it as existing in and manifested by the *individual*; for whatever perfection may be claimed for it in the abstract, about which there is a vast amount of unmeaning and pointless speculation, no mere man since the fall has ever evinced, except in theory, that he was the possessor of any such transcendent or immaculate attribute. We would therefore guard our readers against the confusion so often apparent in treating the subject, and through which claimants for the perfectability and absoluteness of reason are not unfrequently induced to infer that their own individual reason must be also of this nature, and its dicta consequently of like character. Reason in itself can only be right and perfect; but as blinded and enfeebled by depravity and sin, it is invariably imperfect and prone to fallacy.¹

When it is proposed, therefore, to inquire into the relation which reason sustains to the issue before us, it is not, of course, meant what relation is sustained thereto by that absolute, universal and perfect reason asserted by Cousin and others; for such inquiry here would be profitless, if not absurd; but what relation to the issue is sustained by that natural light—or, if you please, *power*—by which, in our exercise of the understanding unaided by revelation, we distinguish truth from its antagonisms? Or, in the language of Sir William Hamilton, to “our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagina-

¹ Vœtius observes very strikingly, that “Ratio humana propriè dicta considerari potest. I., *vel* in indeâ, seu objectivè, et abstractè; *vel* concrete, seu subjectivè, et ratione certi status, scilicet, ante lapsum et dotata imagine Dei; in lapsu, ut corrupta; in gratiâ, ut liberata, quamvis imperfectè; in gloriâ, ut perfectè collustrata lumine gloriæ.” *Selectæ Disputationes*, Tom. I., p. 2. (Ultrajecti, 1648.)

tion, and memory; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including 1, Conception; 2, Judgment; 3, Reasoning; 4, Intelligence, *νοῦς*.”¹

It will be proper just here to restate the issue involved in our discussion, that so the province of reason in its relation thereto may be readily apprehended.

Should we affirm that the posterity of Adam sinned by personally and actually eating of the forbidden tree, we should affirm what the inspired text does not teach, and what the Church neither asserts nor believes. But when we affirm *that they sinned when he sinned*, and so participated in his guilt, and with him were constituted sinners, we affirm only that which the passage before us avers. We are content with the announcement (without any attempted philosophical refinement), that they sinned in such a sense as to constitute them *veritable sinners*—*ἁμαρτωλοί*; and so as to bring them righteously under the *κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα*, or punitive justice of God. Dr. Hodge, on the other hand, claims with the Socinians, that this statement is contrary to reason, impossible and absurd, and that, therefore, as God does not require that we believe anything absurd, the passage neither teaches, nor was intended to teach, any such doctrine. *So stands the case.*

The points of argument are, 1, *In the use of terms*; for on both sides it is agreed to say that all the race sinned in Adam, and were thereupon constituted sinners. The disagreement, however, is *as to the signification attached to those terms*;² Dr. Hodge affirming that the sinning in Adam was only forensic or putative, and that the race were constituted sinners only forensically or putatively, though regarded and treated as actually such, while the Church affirms that the sinning was real and actual, and that posterity were thereby constituted sinners, not only putatively, but really and veritably.

2. Both alike also agree that the posterity of Adam did not in the fall sin in their individual personality. But the conclusions from this admitted fact are very wide apart, Dr. Hodge maintaining that, if they did not sin in their individual personality, they could not have sinned at all; and we, on the contrary, affirming that, though they sinned not in their proper personality, they nevertheless did so sin, virtually or originally, as to appropriate

¹ Reid's Works, Note A., Section 5. ² See our Section 3, above.

ethically the guilt and moral corruption which were contracted by our progenitors in the fall.

Let it be therefore noted by the reader, that in the reference which Dr. Hodge would make to reason and common sense, reason is not called to determine whether the posterity of Adam sinned in *their proper personality when he sinned*, for there is no issue on that point; but whether in their case there could exist such community or spontaneity in the ethical appropriation of this guilt and moral corruption as to constitute them participants therein, and, on that ground, subjectively deserving of a participation of the punishment it incurred? This is the question. And whether it is one on which reason is competent to utter a determination will appear presently. For if she is not thus competent, then it is no very striking evidence of being under her guidance to insist on submitting it to such adjudication, or to appeal to her sentence as in any sense decisive. A very proper query, however, is here suggested which should not be overlooked, as it furnishes a really adequate ground on which reason may at least contemplate, if not approximate the issue, to-wit: Whether an acceptance of the affirmative of this proposition (that is, that we truly sinned in the first sin), can be as inconsistent with true reason and common sense as it is to believe with Dr. Hodge that a good, truthful, and righteous God would first charge pure and innocent beings with having committed a sin which they never did commit, and then judicially inflict upon them, as a punishment of that sin, the tremendous penalty of moral corruption and spiritual death?—a sin, too, with which they not only had no connection, but which to them was, in every sense of the term, a *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin?—that is, in other words, whether, from the knowledge we have of the character of God as derived from both His word and works, such a conception can really be regarded in any other light than as nonsensical, and as not ascending to the dignity of a contradiction? This query, moreover, may be regarded as a truly legitimate topic for her adjudication, inasmuch as there is not in all the divine word the faintest utterance attributing any such character to the Most High.

So stands the question; and in view of it Dr. Hodge's position is, that to affirm that the divine word announces any such participation, or spontaneity in the ethical appropriation of guilt, on the

part of the posterity of Adam in the first sin, is to affirm that it teaches what is ridiculous and impossible; while, on the contrary, we affirm that the announcement of *the fact* in the inspired record, and in terms which admit of no other signification, is all that is needed to justify its reception as true, and that we therefore accept it as a fact. And then, furthermore, there are strong presumptions (though we need them not in support of our position) against this assumption of Dr. Hodge, and which may be regarded as confirmatory and illustrative of the truth he thus rejects: 1, In the fact that this announcement, accepted as an explanatory principle, furnishes the only intelligible basis on which to explicate the doctrine of original sin consistently with the justice and goodness of God. 2, That we cannot, in the present stage of our being, expect to comprehend all that pertains to the original unity of the race as created in *קִדְמָה*, or as evolved in the almost infinitude of its distinct personalities. And 3, In the fact that we find a perfect unity, as well as distinct personality, in the divine nature, after whose image and likeness man was created, and that without it the whole doctrine of redemption is admitted to be both incomprehensible and impossible, and that therefore, until reason can claim to know all that may pertain to the distinct personality of the race in the relation it sustains to its original unity, and *vice versa*, she would venture absurdly beyond her appropriate sphere by alleging anything dogmatically on the subject, especially when her allegation is in plain conflict with a divine averment. It is not *HER* voice, therefore, which presumes to allege that such an announcement, literally taken, is ridiculous and impossible. Weak through human imperfection, and liable to err as she may be, she has never from her legitimate domain uttered any such *dictum*. And she herself is fully aware that out of that domain her dogmatic utterances are entitled to no regard; and consequently for Dr. Hodge to asseverate such a statement on the assumed basis of reason or common sense is to assert it on a basis which sound reason not only does not claim, but which she peremptorily disclaims. So stands the case. And now let us view the subject in the light of an illustration.

The Protestant church, in discussing with Socinus and his school the doctrines of revealed religion, laid down broadly, and from the very outset, the principle that the announcements of the

Scriptures are to be received as facts admitted on the testimony of God, and that those averments are to be fearlessly followed, lead where they may. And moreover, that the belief of its declarations must not be made to depend upon our ability to explain, or even to understand, the *modus* of the facts announced; but must be based upon the divine testimony alone. In other words, that any clearly ascertained declaration of the inspired word is to be received as veritable truth, independent of all considerations derived from our philosophy or so-called intuitions, or anything else. Such was their position. And since their time the principle has been endorsed by the whole evangelical Church. And the following statement may be taken as presenting that view, in contrast to the rationalizing proclivities of the present time:

"In the statement of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity," says the late Robert Hall, "there are two extremes to be avoided. The one is that of pusillanimously shrinking from their bold originality, and attempting to recommend them to the acceptance of proud and worldly-minded men by the artifices of palliation and disguise, of which in our opinion the Bishop of Lincoln has given an egregious specimen in his late work.¹ The other extreme is that of stating them in a metaphysical form, *mixing doubtful deductions with plain assertions, thereby encumbering them with needless refinements*. We should neither be ashamed of the dictates of the Spirit, nor 'add to His words lest we be reproved.' They will always appear with the most advantage, and carry the most conviction, when they are exhibited in their native simplicity, without being mixed with heterogeneous matter, or with positions of doubtful authority. In our apprehension, the true way of contemplating the peculiar doctrines of Christianity is to consider them *as facts delivered on the authority of the Supreme Being*, not to be proved by reason, since their truth does not result from any perceptible relations in our ideas; but they owe their existence entirely to the will and counsel of the Almighty Potentate. On this account we never consider it safe to rest their truth on a philosophical basis, nor imagine it is possible to add to their evidence by an elaborate train of reasoning. *Let the fair grammatical import of Scripture language be investigated, and whatever propositions are by an easy and natural interpretation de-*

¹ Entitled "A Refutation of Calvinism."

ducible from thence, let them be received as the dictates of infinite wisdom, whatever aspect they bear and whatever difficulties they present. Repugnant to reason they never can be, because they spring from the author of it; but superior to reason, whose limits they will infinitely surpass, we must expect to find them, since they are a communication of such matters of fact, respecting the spiritual and eternal world, as need not have been communicated if the knowledge of them could have been acquired from any other quarter."¹

The followers of Socinus, however, have always taken the ground that this principle should be received only under decided restrictions. Astorodus and Smalcus boldly advanced the position that, "*sola ratione dijudicari possibilitatem et impossibilitatem articulorum fidei, non esse credenda quæ menti impossibilia videntur, summam religionem esse rationem.*" The same is asserted in the *Racovian Catechism* (pp. 37, 55, 56), and they applied it to the doctrine of the Trinity, the person and offices of Christ Jesus, and other doctrines which they wished to have a pretext for rejecting.² And D'Aubigne (in his *Authority of God*), after adverting to a similar and increasing predilection at the present time, adverts as follows to the original controversy and its results: "I dread this subjective tendency of the times. I dread it, convinced that it cannot fail to have the same development, and the same consequences, that it had in the sixteenth century. You have remarked the sad progression of this opinion. Chatillon simply taught the doctrine which substitutes the authority of the individual spirit for the authority of divine scripture. But every seed bears its fruit. This doctrine, soon after professed by Socinus and Servetus, first overthrew all the doctrines of faith; then, interpreted by Coppin, Pocquet, Gruet, and the Libertines, overthrew all the precepts of morality. It thus brought forth great heresies and frightful irregularities. The progression is terrible, but inevitable. . . . *The foundation of Christian dogma and Christian morality is involved in these opinions.*"³

The like effort has been attempted in our own country to reject this same principle unless accompanied with the aforesaid restric-

¹ Works of Rev. Robert Hall, Vol. II., p. 309. (New York, 1832.)

² See the first of the *Selectæ Disputationes* of Voetius, under the title "*De Ratione humana in Rebus fidei.*"

³ Cited in Pearson on Infidelity, p. 226.

tion. Take for example the case of the late Dr. William Ellery Channing, who employs the following language in the endeavor to justify a rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity: "The Bible treats of subjects on which we receive ideas from other sources besides itself, such subjects as the nature, passions, relations, and duties of man, *and it expects us to restrain and modify its language by the known truths which observation and experience furnish on these topics.* In other words, we believe that God never contradicts in revelation what He teaches in His works of providence. *And we therefore distrust every interpretation which, after deliberate attention, seems repugnant to any established truth.*" And he adds: "Without these principles of interpretation, we frankly acknowledge that we cannot defend the divine authority of the Scriptures."¹

He then, in the pages which follow, proceeds to apply these principles, and says: "We object to the doctrine of the Trinity, that it subverts the unity of God. . . . Here, then, we have three intelligent agents possessed of different consciousnesses, different wills, etc. . . . It is a difference of properties, and acts, and consciousness, which leads us to the belief of different intelligent beings. And if this must fail our whole knowledge fails." (Pp. 8, 9.) "We complain of the doctrine of the Trinity, that, not satisfied with making God three beings, it makes Jesus Christ two beings, and thus introduces infinite confusion into our conceptions of His character. This corruption of Christianity, *alike repugnant to common sense and the general strain of Scripture, is a remarkable proof of the power of a false philosophy in disfiguring the simple truth of Jesus.*" (P. 11.)

Dr. Hodge, as we have seen, having advanced the same principle in the effort to defend his exposition of Romans v. 12-21, makes the very same application of it against the received doctrine—that all so sinned in Adam as to become veritable sinners. And in a passage already quoted, and so like the foregoing from Dr. Channing that it might be taken for a continuation, he says, "It is a monstrous evil to make the Bible contradict the common sense and common consciousness of men."²

¹ Sermon on 1 Thess. v. 24, pp. 4-7.

² Revised Commentary on Romans, page 200. See also *Princeton Repertory* for 1860, pages 356-358.

If, then, this language, in the application here made of it, means anything, that is, if it has any relevancy to the point to which it is addressed, it clearly conveys the idea that an *à priori* conception of the so-called reason or common sense may, in a given instance, determine that revelation has not taught what its language, grammatically interpreted, does affirm; or, in other words, that reason and common sense may determine *à priori*, and independently of the divine word, that a given statement of doctrine or fact therein announced cannot be true, and therefore can really form no part of a divine revelation, since on this ground Dr. Hodge asseverates that the statement that we veritably sinned in Adam is nonsensical (and revelation, of course, can teach nothing nonsensical), *and on this ground affirms that the Bible does not so allege.* On the same ground, likewise, the Socinians affirm that the doctrines of the two natures in Christ, and of the Trinity, are nonsensical, and cannot, of course, therefore, constitute any part of a revelation from God. Such, then, is the plain import of the language, and thus (should we accept the principle) we are brought squarely upon the Rationalistic platform, *that reason is competent to determine à priori what may or may not constitute the subject-matter of revelation,* and consequently what we may or may not believe in regard to its announcements.¹

Now, it is on this very ground that the Socinians affirm that the Bible does not teach the doctrine of the Trinity; the hypostatical union; the doctrine of satisfaction for sin; our participation in the first sin; and other correlated doctrines. They claim that it is perfectly monstrous to make the Scriptures speak on these subjects what common sense and common consciousness regard as absurd and nonsensical. But as the whole subject, in its existing relation to our Church, demands a more extended illustration of the effects of the adoption of the principle, we shall cite several other equally pertinent instances.

The truly learned Emlyn, for example, in his *Reply to Leslie*, sums up as follows the aim of his whole effort in this direction—he says: "I assure you (I) am actuated herein by no passion except it be a passionate desire of seeing our holy Christian religion rescued from the burdens of contradictions."² His method of

¹ See, in the *American Biblical Repository* for 1831, page 111, *seq.*, the very able exposé by Professor Hahn of this principle as affirmed by the Rationalists.

² Tracts by Thomas Emlyn, page 231. (London, 1719.)

rescuing it he had already detailed, and it is as follows: He peremptorily insists on being furnished with an express definition of *Trinity* from those who accept the doctrine, and finding all attempt fraught with absurdity, he refuses to accept the plain declarations of the Scriptures on the subject, because, when literally taken, they (as he says) teach absurdities; whereas revelation itself can teach no absurdities. The following is an extract: "However, will this sort of Trinity, like the three operations of man's mind, accord with the Scripture Trinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit, who have such distinct parts and agencies assigned 'em as cannot be so much as shadowed by our three faculties? You grant the *Father* was not incarnate, but the *Son*. Can the understanding be *incarnate*, and *sent*, and *humbled*, etc., and not the *will*? Are not the three faculties always in the same human mind, which is incarnate without division? Do you teach us that the divine nature is incarnate without its understanding or Father faculty? No," etc. (Pages 201, 202.) Thus, in exact accord with the method pursued by Dr. Hodge in demanding a definite statement as to *how* the race sinned in Adam, Mr. Emlyn demands a definition of the Trinity and incarnation, and bases his attempted refutation of the doctrine itself upon the vain endeavors of reason to define that which God has communicated merely as an explanatory principle.¹

Emlyn himself was an Arian. But as another representative man (so far as this principle is concerned), and who was a Socinian, we may cite Dr. Morgan, who is equally well known to English ecclesiology in the beginning of the last century. In page

¹ "Nothing is more certain than that Christianity is a system which is at present but partially developed, in condescension probably to our very limited faculties, which are incapable of comprehending it in its full extent." (*Robert Hall*, Vol. I., page 279.) Berkley also says: "Is it at all absurd or unsuitable to the notion we have of God or man to suppose that God may reveal with a reserve upon certain remote and sublime subjects, content to give us hints and glimpses, rather than views? May we not also suppose, from the reason of things and the analogy of nature, that some points, which might otherwise have been more clearly explained, were left obscure merely to encourage our diligence and modesty? Two virtues which, if it might not seem disrespectful to such great men, I would recommend to the minute philosophers." (See *Minute Philosopher*, Dialogue VI., pages 226, 227. London, 1752.)

14 of the preface to the revised edition of his Tracts,¹ he says: "This, then, I think, must be clear and certain, that no doctrines can be reasonably received as coming from God, or be capable of any confirmation by miracles, *that are either* absurd, inconsistent, contradictory in themselves, hurtful, etc. . . . And that, whatever pretences or appearances of divine authority may be vouchsafed for such doctrines, either the original revelation itself must have been a forgery, *or else the sense in which they are thus understood cannot be the true sense.*" Then, in the work itself, he says: "And from hence it is plain that nothing can be true as a matter of faith that is inconsistent with or repugnant to any clear, established principle of reason, since to affirm this must necessarily destroy the nature and foundation of truth," etc. (Pp. 155, 156.) Again: "No man can receive anything as a revelation from God, or be influenced by the future prospects of religion, or the sanctions of eternal life and death, but by acting in conformity to this natural, immutable law of nature." (P. 159.)

Now, the very principle which Dr. Hodge has applied to justify his rejection of the doctrine of participation underlies and sustains the whole of this ratiocination; and, granting that principle, these inferences follow as inexorably as death. But let us accompany Dr. Morgan a little farther. After affirming the above, and more of like import, he proceeds to apply the principle so as to divest the Scriptures of the doctrine of the Trinity, the deity of Jesus, and His expiation of sin, etc. The following is an instance of such application; and the argument, according to the principle affirmed by Dr. Hodge, is perfectly unanswerable. He says: "All that the *Socinians* say is, that the supreme God and a human soul cannot be the same intelligent being, agent, or person; and therefore that they cannot, with any truth or consistency, be joined together under one common name, as if they were the same I, the same He, or the same intelligent agent or personal self. And really, *sir*, methinks it is a little hard that men should be damned because they will not talk the grossest nonsense and renounce the very first principles of reason." (P. 239.)

Dr. Priestley took the same position, which, in his case and that of his followers, was ably exposed by the late Dr. Samuel Miller, of Princeton Seminary, in his *Letters on Unitarianism*. But we

¹ Collection of Tracts, by T. Morgan, M. D. (London, 1726.)

pass this, and conclude these illustrative extracts with the following passages from a large volume of Unitarian tracts, published in Philadelphia,¹ and in which the writer, after referring to the doctrines of the Trinity, satisfaction, justification by faith, etc., proceeds in the following strain: "Yet all these doctrines, you think, are warranted by the word of God. And do you really think, *sir*, that the said word can warrant such doctrines as these? I think myself well authorized to declare them *absurd, impossible, impious, and therefore false*. . . . And as I esteem the revelation which God has given us in the Scriptures to be an invaluable treasure, I am very sorry to see it so sadly perverted as to be made to countenance opinions which are a reproach to religion." (Pp. 117, 118.) The whole, however, is of a piece; and we could adduce hundreds of similar instances from the same school; and if reason, therefore, is competent to declare that a fair, grammatical interpretation of God's own teaching may announce absurdities, then these men have only carried forward to its legitimate sequences the "*strength*" of the principle now applied by Dr. Hodge to the received doctrine of original sin. But if such *is not* the province of reason, then he, in denouncing that doctrine, and in thus endeavoring to substitute in lieu of it his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, has affirmed a principle which at once brings those who adopt it into logical association and sympathy with this whole school of antagonists to evangelical truth or the doctrines of grace; for if the principle will sustain his assault, it will also, in like manner, fully sustain theirs.

The antagonism of this so-called principle of interpretation (as affirmed in the foregoing extracts) to the true and recognized principles of Scripture hermeneutics has been adverted to in § 25, and may be at once perceived by the following canon, as presented by Ernesti,² and which I give in the translation of the late Professor Stuart:³ "We must not hastily conclude any sentiment of the Scriptures to be unreasonable. The meaning which, according to grammatical principles, should be assigned to any word of Scripture, is not to be rejected, then, on account of reasons

¹ In the year 1810. The publication is anonymous.

² Instit. Interpret., Parte I., Sect I., Cap. I., § 21, p. 31. (Ammon's Edition, 1809.)

³ Elements of Interpretation, translated by Moses Stuart, § 36.

derived from things or previously conceived opinions; for in this way interpretation would become uncertain. In books merely human, if reason and the nature of the subject are repugnant to the apparent sense of the words, we conclude there must have been either a fault in the writer or an error in the copyist. *In the Scriptures, if any sentiment does not agree with our opinions, we must remember the imbecility of human reason and human faculties; we must seek for conciliation, and not attempt a correction of the passage without good authority.* It is wonderful that in this matter more reverence should be paid to mere human productions than to the sacred books.

"In ancient authors, when any difficulty occurs, we seek for correction or conciliation, as if they must be rendered *ἀναμαρτῆτοι, faultless*; but occasion is often taken of carping at the writers of the Scriptures, or of perverting their meaning or the doctrines which they teach." This rule is perpetually violated by the Socinian exegesis of Romans v. 12-21, which Dr. Hodge has so fully adopted.

When an intelligent trinitarian is asked, "What is the specific nature of that distinction in the Godhead which you designate by the term person?" he answers frankly, "I am unable to say. My belief of the fact that there is a distinction does not depend upon my ability to explain the nature of the distinction itself." And this reply is every way reasonable and sufficient. We likewise make the same rejoinder when asked to explain how, or in what way the posterity of Adam so sinned in the first sin as to become, in the true and proper sense of the term, *sinners*?—*ἀμαρτωλοί*—"We do not know. Our faith is in no way concerned with the *mode*, but simply with the fact announced." And this reply is by parity of reason equally sufficient.

It is not a difficult matter to perplex the common mind by denouncing as unintelligible or "*unthinkable*" a proposition the subject of which is merely indefinable.¹ Unitarians have frequently done the like in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the person of Christ; and Dr. Hodge also has not scrupled to do the like in relation to the issue before us. But whatever applause such efforts may elicit on the score of adroitness, it can hardly be regarded as in keeping with the earnest and sincere desire that

¹ See the Supplement at the end of this section.

truth may be brought to light. Even the conscientious barrister, in addressing a jury on a subject of vital interest, will shun the unworthy procedure.

Professor Stuart in his Reply to Dr. Channing, adverting to the principle embodied in the foregoing quotations from that eminent Unitarian, unfolds its pernicious tendency as follows: "In rejecting any doctrine which the language of Scripture plainly teaches, common sense must cast off the divine authority of the Bible. To receive the Bible as a revelation from God, and yet decide *à priori* what the Scriptures can and what they cannot contain, and then to make the language bend until it conform with our decision, cannot surely be a proper part to be acted by any sincere lover of truth and sober investigation. . . . In regard to the impossibility that Christ should possess two natures, and the absurdity of such a supposition, I have not much to say. If the Scriptures are the word of God, and do contain the doctrine in question, it is neither impossible nor absurd. Most certainly, if it be a fact that Christ possesses two natures, it is a fact with which natural religion has no concern, at least of which it has no satisfactory knowledge. It can therefore decide neither for nor against it. It is purely a doctrine of revelation, and to Scripture only can we look for evidences of it. If the doctrine be palpably absurd and contradictory to reason, and yet is found in the Bible, then we must reject the claims of the Bible to inspiration and truth. But if the laws of interpretation do not permit us to avoid the conclusion that it is found there, we cannot with any consistency admit that the Scriptures are of divine authority and yet reject the doctrine."¹ The application of this whole paragraph to the issue before us is too obvious to require remark. And the observations apply at the present time with redoubled force to the questions involved in that issue, when such strenuous efforts are everywhere being made to have the Church discard the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, and when such multitudes of professing Christians seem to be only waiting a plausible pretext to set them entirely aside as the rule of faith and practice. And we can truly say to those who pursue such a course, what Augustine (in lib. 17, Cont. Faustum, cap. 3), says to the Manichees: "*Undique tergiversatio vestra confunditur.*"

¹ Letter II., see his *Miscellanies*, pp. 48, 49.

*Aperte dicite vos non credere evangelio; namqui in evangelio quòd vultis creditis; quod vultis non creditis, vobis potius quam evangelio creditis."*¹

The question at issue, therefore, is not one that can be brought into the province of reason for adjudication any more than the question as to the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity itself. And I repeat, that the distinction and unity in the latter case, though wholly undefinable by man, underlies, as an explanatory principle, the whole doctrine of redemption, which cannot be even conceived as possible without it, and is the basis of all those precious disclosures of the divine character in view of which the proffers of grace and salvation are made to perishing men; while in the other case, as an explanatory principle, it underlies, and is the very basis of the whole doctrine of original sin, as understood and taught from the beginning, and on which alone it becomes really explicable and reconcilable with the divine perfections; and the denial of which is fraught with the logical and inevitable impeachment of the justice and goodness of God, while at the same time, it mars the entire harmony of His moral perfections, as well as the whole doctrine of human accountability.

The practical aspect, however, in which the subject has become of absorbing interest to our communion, is, that though Dr. Hodge himself may continue to occupy his present standpoint without following up the noxious principle to its logical and practical sequences, she can have no guarantee to assure her that some of her youth who have accepted it from his inculcations may not carry it fully forward to the practical realization of those results. A principle apparently harmless in its nature was suggested to the mind of Semler while listening to his teacher, Baumgarten, and by him was thus carried forward; and in the result brought with wide and baleful sweep the whole deluge of Rationalism upon the churches and universities of Germany. A like incautious utterance of the venerated Doddridge, in the hearing of the then youthful Priestley, led him ultimately to renounce his Calvinistic views, and resulted in endowing Unitarianism with new life and vigor, and in extending its blighting influence through England and Scotland, as well as to many parts of our own land. In the latter instance it is true that Dr. Ashworth, by judicious treatment, might

¹ Cited in *Selectæ Disputationes Vætii*, Tom. I., p. 5.

have hindered the development of the fatal germ; but in both instances, after the poison had begun to spread, any earnest effort to place the evangelical churches upon their guard, in that day of Rationalistic proclivities and shallow theologizing, would have encountered prejudice and proscription at the hand of those who "have men's persons in admiration because of advantage," not dissimilar to that which was called forth in consequence of the effort made through the *Danville Review* to awaken attention to the perilous aberrations of Dr. Hodge.

The plea that, elsewhere in his Theology, and in relation to another doctrine, the Doctor has found it necessary, and so deemed it expedient, to assert the very principle which he here so unceremoniously discards, is of no avail, so far as avoiding or neutralizing the aforesaid evil consequences is concerned. What he would hope to gain by such a course must be left to others to imagine. But an assertion of the principle, in connection with some other doctrine of our system, is no more a retraction of its opposite in connection with the doctrine before us, than the assertion of its opposite in the present connection is a retraction of it in the other connection; for both are directly affirmed, and neither the one nor the other is in any way retracted or modified. Can it be supposed by any, therefore, who lay claim to reason and intelligence, that a man, especially in the work of instructing those who are to teach others the truth relating to salvation, may properly pursue a course like this, and inculcate in ethics and religion principles mutually subversive of each other? Is such a procedure in relation to vital and fundamental truth to be extenuated or justified on any ground whatever? And then, moreover, in such inculcations one or the other position must, of course, be expected to become the practical or controlling one with those upon whom they are inculcated, for both cannot be; and the one bedecked with the tawdry and meretricious attire of falsehood is, upon first appearance, always more likely than the true to captivate the young and ardent. Dr. Hodge could not, for example, inculcate the doctrine of the Trinity upon the principle on which he assails and denounces the doctrine of our participation in the first sin; for to employ it in that connection (though fully as applicable there as it is in relation to the doctrine of participation) would, as he could not but know, compel him to reject that doctrine also. He could not

hope to carry his assault upon the doctrine of participation, and so sustain his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin on this ground, and therefore in this connection he adopts and employs the principle he was obliged to discard when treating on the Trinity. And he has, moreover, along with the principle itself, introduced into the sacred enclosure of our cherished doctrine the exegesis and vapid denunciation and sarcasm of the Socinian school. If the principle, however, be valid, it is of course valid alike in both cases; and to treat it as both true and false, according as expediency may require, and as Dr. Hodge has attempted, is not only to trifle with a most serious subject, but to pursue a course which, if not arrested, must sooner or later result in a surrender of the whole truth in relation thereto into the hands of her foes.

SUPPLEMENTAL TO SECTION TWENTY-SIX.

"Unthinkable Propositions."

From the reference which Dr. Hodge makes to the language of Baur in relation to "*unthinkable*" propositions, as referred to repeatedly in this work, and from his adoption of the language itself, as well as to sustain his own charge that the doctrine of our participation in the first sin (*i. e.*, sinning when Adam sinned) is an unthinkable proposition, we have concluded to add a few words to this section, in the form of a note, touching the subject.

The Church exposition of the phrase, "the guilt of Adam's first sin" (*i. e.*, as imputed to his posterity), is, as we have seen, *culpa participatione*—guilt by participation. And this, which was always her doctrine, and which is affirmed by every Calvinistic or Augustinian theologian whom she regards as representative, has awakened from the first the envenomed hostility of the Pelagian and Socinian schools, and now of Baur (and his followers), who, in view of it, exclaims with ineffable contempt, "What is an act of a non-existing will, an act to which the nature of sin is attributed, although it lies entirely outside of the individual consciousness? Can any meaning be attached to such a representation?" And he pronounces the whole "*unthinkable*,"—*i. e.*, that of which we can form no intelligible conception.¹ He is, however, in this, only repeating after Socinus and his school, who sought to destroy

¹ Dr. Hodge fully endorses him in this. See Theol., Vol. II., pp. 178, 179, 216, 223, 224, 244.

the doctrine of our participation in the first sin; that so, by making this sin of the posterity of Adam merely putative, and not real, they might prepare the way for abolishing the doctrine of a *real satisfaction* through Christ; for they well knew that a merely putative sin could be expiated by a merely putative satisfaction, which, as already remarked, any holy or unfallen creature might accomplish; and hence the necessity that our adorable Redeemer should be truly God is at once exploded, and along therewith the doctrine of the Trinity and its correlated truths. And thus, too, Baur treats the conception, though entertained and affirmed by every representative divine of the Church from Augustine until now, and who, though fully aware of all the alleged grounds on which he and his followers denounce it, yet, *una voce*, affirm the subjective guilt of the race, through participation, as the ground of the imputation to it of the first sin. They regard this as a fundamental feature of Augustinian doctrine.

The Church, as we have already stated, never claimed to understand *how* we sinned when Adam sinned, but simply accepts the divine averment that "*all sinned*" (Rom. v. 12, 18, 19), as an *explanatory principle*, akin to other equally inexplicable announcements of truth from the Holy Spirit; *e. g.*, that of the two natures in Christ, and the tri-unity of personality in the Godhead. But Pelagians, Socinians, and now Baur and his followers, have discovered that the announcement is unintelligible and nonsensical. They pronounce it to be such on what they style purely scientific principles; and as Baur has directed the whole force of his learning and ratiocination in support of this allegation, we shall proceed to consider his argument.

From the course of his speculation, and of those who follow him therein, we learn that not only must the sense or meaning of a proposition be clear in order to its being intelligently received (in which, of course, all concur with them), but that the subject-matter, if we may so speak, must be such as is not only not contradictory in and of itself, but such as we can form some intelligent conception of, since otherwise, say they, it is impossible to assent to it. Now, we shall not stop here to press Dr. Hodge, and those other *professors* of orthodox doctrine who have adopted the speculation of Baur, with the necessity which such a speculation lays them under to reject likewise many others of the announcements of reve-

lation in the application to which this principle has ever been wholly discarded by all evangelical churches; but shall consider the question simply as to the alleged correctness of the principle itself.

The basis of Baur's ratiocination is, that words must stand for precise ideas, so that when properly or definitely employed, that is, as signs of actual ideas, they must express a definite and intelligible meaning; for, if not thus used, they convey no meaning, and are therefore employed without meaning, or nonsensically.

For example, you resolve a proposition into its elements, or the terms by which it is expressed, examine the words, and ascertain what ideas they convey; and if, as united in the proposition, they express an "unthinkable" announcement, that is, combine to express somewhat of which we can form no clearly intelligible conception, then, of course, that proposition conveys no meaning to the mind, and is necessarily "unthinkable," or nonsensical. The words subserve no purpose whatever, so far as concerns the conveyance of knowledge, which consists in the perception of the connection or disagreement between ideas. But such a proposition conveys no idea, and how, then, are we to compare its announcement with actual ideas? And then, further, a man cannot assent to such a proposition, for he knows not what to assent to, there being, in fact, nothing to which he can yield assent. Such seems to be the logical process by which the aforesaid conclusion is reached; and though neither Baur nor Dr. Hodge has drawn it out syllogistically, or into formal argumentative statement, they unite in applying it to the subject-matter in hand as follows: To say that a man's "non-existing will" committed sin thousands of years before the man himself personally existed is a proposition of this character, and simply nonsensical; for it predicates coetaneous existence and non-existence of one and the same object; that is, it affirms that the object exists, and that at the same time it does not exist, which is simply to assert that the man acted before he could act, and existed before he could have existed. You can therefore yield no assent to such a proposition, and of course cannot believe it.¹

¹ Pascal has well said: "The notion of original sin is foolishness to men, but such we allow it to be. We should not, therefore, condemn the want of reasonableness in this doctrine, for it is not assumed to be within the province of reason. At the same time this very foolishness is wiser than all the wisdom

But passing the sheer folly (to which reference has already been made in this section) of attempting to apply such ratiocination to the direct disclosures and affirmations of Divine revelation, whose Author can neither lie nor deceive, we ask, Is such a conception of human language the true one? If it be, then certainly Baur and Dr. Hodge have, in thousands of instances, set it at naught; and we think it demonstrably certain that no man who has ever employed language intelligibly has *practically* so regarded it, whatever his theory might be. The principle that words may be significant, even when they do not stand for abstract ideas, is a principle which, ages ago, has been so thoroughly settled by science herself, that no well-informed mind would, upon adequate reflection, even think of calling it in question; and it is conceded to be a puerile absurdity to pretend that even every substantive name clearly exhibits to the mind a separate and precise idea. But we have no space for generalizing, and will therefore come at once to particulars in their direct relation to the matter before us.¹

Take, for example, out of a thousand words which might be specified, the term *number*. Every person employs it, and claims, moreover, to employ it intelligibly. But take the term itself, and separate its meaning from the signs, words, or things numbered, and what conception does it convey to the mind? To conceive it is utterly out of the question, and impossible; and it is as "unthinkable" as Baur and Dr. Hodge would have the proposition to be which they united to condemn. You can form no abstract conception of it whatever; and yet, of what incalculable use and advantage are the numerical names? What would trade, commerce, or, in a word, human intercourse be, without those *unthinkable* terms, or their equivalents? Yet, according to the ratiocination referred to, a proposition which should contain the word *number* could not possibly be understood or believed, because you can attach no definite or distinct conception to that term, and are compelled to view it as inseparably associated with the often incongruous objects enumerated. These two things, therefore, are

of men: 'The foolishness of God is wiser than men.'" *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 220. (Boston, 1849.)

¹ Our readers may find in the works of Bishop Berkeley, and especially in his *Minute Philosopher*, this whole subject canvassed with great force and clearness.

demonstrably true: 1, That to obtain a simple, precise, abstract concept of *number* is impossible; and 2, That the *term*, as an explanatory principle, is of indispensable necessity to human intercourse.

But take another equally common term, the word *force*.¹ Like *number*, it may be defined as "*that which*," but the definition stops short of conveying any definite abstract concept whatever. It is "*that which* produces motion and other perceptible effects," and of course is distinct from those effects, unless we would regard cause and effect as identical. What, then, is that *something*, as to its own precise idea? The question is unanswerable, for to form any such conception is simply impossible. And yet for how many speculations, subtle reasonings, profound arguments, in mental, moral, and physical science, is it an explanatory principle, or an admitted or necessary first truth? We have the *vis inertia*, *vis mortua*, *vis viva*, *vis impressa*, *impetus*, *momentum*, *gravity*, *reaction*, and the like. And then, moreover, what earnest and subtle controversies have arisen amongst the really learned about the true meaning or definition of these terms, though in no instance could the controvertist claim to possess a definite or abstract idea of what he would signify by the term *force* itself. Were these *savans*, then, acting foolishly, and talking nonsensically, as they must have been agreeably to Baur's application of his principle? Or were they acting rationally? And, on the contrary, would not he be acting irrationally who, on such grounds, should impute folly to them? We have, likewise, erudite treatises on the *Proportion of Forces*; that is, on the proportion of things which are wholly indefinable! A proposition which, according to Baur, must be really "*unthinkable*" until we can form a clear concept of what forces really are. And then, still further, we have propositions relating to force which are of very great practical use; as, for example, that a body with conjunct forces describes the diagonal of a parallelogram in the same time that it would the sides with the separate forces. And by considering the inexplicable doctrine of force, how many useful inventions in mechanics have been suggested? And thus, as an explanatory principle, the term is of incalculable use, though in none of its

¹ See in the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* for January, 1875, an article touching the use and application of this term.

multitudinous usages does the term ever convey a clear abstract idea of the thing itself.

But surely it is needless to dwell further upon a point in the elucidation and establishment of which all science could be appealed to. The very basis of Baur's ratiocination is therefore as preposterously absurd as he would represent the proposition to be that we participated in the first sin, or sinned when Adam sinned; and of course the argument he would erect upon it becomes ridiculous as insisted on by him; and since, moreover, it is simply absurd to claim that it is impossible to assent to the truth of a statement or proposition unless we are able to frame in the mind definite or even intelligible ideas of all its terms—an allegation equally in conflict with science and common sense.

These things being so, it is too obvious to require proof, that since a single term may thus serve as an explanatory principle, though it be impossible to form an abstract concept of its meaning, a statement of fact clearly announced by divine revelation may be employed in the same manner and for a like purpose, though the fact itself so far transcend our intellection as to be even *unthinkable*; i. e., a fact as to the mode of which we can form no abstract conception; as, for example, the announcement of the fact of a tri-personality in the divine unity, and of the two natures in the person of Christ, and that all sinned and became veritable sinners when Adam sinned, together with a score of other averments which, lying clearly beyond the range of our intellection in the present stage of our being, God has imparted to us as facts. All that is needed in order to their intelligent reception by us, is to be authoritatively apprized by the Fountain of all Truth and Wisdom, who cannot err, that the statement announced is a fact, in order fully to warrant our employment and application of it in the elucidation of other statements which would be otherwise inexplicable. Such an employment of such a fact is perfectly legitimate, and in strict accord with scientific usage, of which the single illustration may suffice which we have in Section VIII. presented in relation to Sir Isaac Newton, and his discovery of gravitation.

And then, in regard to the explanatory principle itself, given by the Holy Spirit in the announcement that we all sinned when Adam sinned, a volume could be easily occupied in evincing how

immense is its importance in explaining the ground of the divine treatment of our race, the evils and disorders of earth, the divine interposition on our behalf; and in freeing the divine character from all imputation of the authorship of sin. But we cannot here dwell upon this subject.

The *πρωτον ψεδδος* of the aforesaid false method of treating the matter lies in regarding the intellect as the receptive faculty for divine truth, to the exclusion of the moral nature. And hence the explanatory principles that our blessed Lord possesses in one person a human and a divine nature, and that in the divine unity there is a tri-personality, have met the like reception with the aforesaid. These truths, while sound reason receives them on the sure and certain ground that God can teach nothing false or impossible, are pre-eminently adapted to the moral nature, whose inner consciousness realizes their truthfulness and efficacy; while the mere intellect, in its clumsy efforts to seize and subject them to analysis or scrutiny, that is, to precise, definite, and abstract conceptions, finds them wholly to elude its grasp. It is in this deep and sanctifying and saving sense that these divine mysteries have ever been potentially and practically realized in all their saving efficacy by multitudes of the poor, the uneducated, and the illiterate of Christ's flock, with whom so many of the highest and brightest examples of the divine power of religion have appeared; a subject on the general bearing of which Pascal thus remarks: "Those whom we see to be Christians without the inspection of the prophecies and other evidences *are found equally good judges of the religion itself as others who have this knowledge. They judge by the heart as others do by the understanding. God Himself has inclined their hearts to believe, and hence they are effectively persuaded.*"

The student of ecclesiastical history will not need to be reminded that the word *person* was introduced into the ancient symbols and creeds simply as an explanatory principle. It was not that, for example, the Nicene fathers professed to have any distinct conception whatever of the import of the term in its application to the trifold distinction in the Godhead. They never pretended to any such absurdity, and their aim was to give expression to the disagreement of the Church with the errors of those who deny that there is any real distinction in the divine nature, and

who affirm the sentiments attributed to Sabellius, that Father, Son, and Spirit are merely the names of the different methods which God had adopted to reveal himself to man. In order to discard fully and effectually all such notions, they employed the word *person* to evince that, in the view of the Church, the distinction was not merely nominal, but *real*, though inexplicable, and thus it has ever been employed by the Church. And it is as unreasonable to require of us a clear, abstract definition of the term in this connection, as it would be to demand of science herself such a definition of *number* and *force* as a necessary prerequisite to the reception of her utterances.

We find in the divine word that both faith and unbelief are predicated of the *heart*, and not of the intellect alone. And man being a moral, not less than an intellectual being, it is as contrary to true science as it is to true religion to predicate of this knowledge that it can consist only of precise, abstract intellectual conceptions. A broad field lies open here for remark and illustration, but we cannot now enter it. But of those who assume this position we ask directly, Is it the abstract ideas of *force* and *number* that are the foundation of true science? or is it the concrete ideas with their adjuncts? Every one understands the latter, but no man has ever comprehended the former. Is it then fatuity, or is it intellectual fanaticism, to insist upon precise, abstract, intellectual conceptions as essential to religious belief, or faith in the unseen and invisible, which have been announced to man by God Himself; when true science herself spurns the very notion of such a thing as degrading to her position, even in relation to her very foundation itself, and to her simplest elements, and when both alike require our assent to and belief of that which we are wholly unable to explain, and the *modus* of which we cannot, without folly, even pretend to comprehend? But we proceed to our next section.

§ 27. THE ISSUE IN QUESTION DOES NOT DEMAND, AND NEITHER WILL IT ADMIT OF, SOLUTION, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ANY OF OUR RECOGNIZED PHILOSOPHIES.

If philosophy be, as is alleged, the science of causes and principles, it is, of course, obvious that she must possess (if not *an exact knowledge of, or acquaintance with*, the principles themselves)

the *material* from which such knowledge may be elicited in relation to any and every topic on which she would either form or utter a determination; for without this her attempts at the development or explication of either causes or principles will arrive at no result which can prove to be either practically available or entitled to serious regard. If true to herself, indeed, she can no more consent to assume the preposterous attitude of attempting by mere assumption to *create* her material than would the natural sciences themselves. She has been not inappropriately defined to be the exercise of the reason to solve the higher problems of which the human mind can form a real conception; or, more happily, the investigation of the principles upon which knowledge and being rests, so far as those principles are ascertainable. But if she would really deserve her name, Philosophy, the domain of her investigations must be limited by the never-to-be-forgotten queries: *How* and *what* do we *really know*? for beyond the limit thus suggested she cannot venture, if she would be entitled to serious regard. Ferrier has somewhere well said: "Philosophy is the attainment of truth by the way of reason,"—a definition which may serve to determine, not only her appropriate sphere, but the limitation of her domain.

We have no intention to plunge into the chaotic ocean of philosophical metaphysics, but design in this section mainly to follow up to the results above suggested the train of thought entered upon in our last. But *first* and foremost it is proper just here to ask that Dr. Hodge explain the ground of his perpetually repeated assertion, that the doctrine under discussion is absurd and inconsistent with common sense. Whose "common sense" does he refer to? for the term is relative, and we are aware that that which is assumed by those whose theological belief is regulated by their predilections (as with the Socinian and Rationalist schools) may be pleaded; but does he refer to that? We, in our previous sections, have shown that the doctrine of which he presumes thus to speak has been unambiguously and reverentially taught, and defended also as eminently rational; and as the undoubted truth of God, by the vast majority of the learned and gifted and godly who have been numbered with the Redeemer's followers ever since Augustine gave to it a full dogmatic or formulated expression, and likewise by the great mass of the Church at large. In what light,

then, may we regard the position assumed by one of our theological teachers, who requires that the Church, on his merest *dictum*, should admit that the truth thus received and regarded as sacred by God's own heritage from the beginning, is such an absurdity, and so contrary to common sense that it does not rise to the dignity of a contradiction, and has no meaning at all, but is mere Pantheistic nonsense and impossible? It might be well for him to state whose "common sense" he refers to in support of these allegations, for that of the Church must clearly be left out of the category. Nor can he produce a particle of alleged proof to warrant the monstrous and offensive utterance, except what these truly great and illustrious men have considered and fairly refuted ten thousand times.

That the question, Whether we so sinned in Adam, by participating in his sin as thereby to become veritable sinners, neither requires nor will admit of solution by the appliances of mere human philosophy is obvious, (1), Because the fact itself of our having so sinned is given as an explanatory principle in an inspired and direct announcement of pure revelation, and the Holy Spirit does not rest the basis for the reception of His disclosures upon any such solution; and (2), Because the nature of the fact disclosed lies wholly beyond the domain and even the reach of the appliances of any human philosophy, as much so as if the question were the truth of the hypostatical union itself. To which it may be added, that the awkward and abortive attempts of the past fifteen centuries to render such a solution furnish practical exemplification of the truth announced in the heading of this section. And as to the fact or doctrine itself, therefore, we receive it, while we abjure all endeavors at explanation. Dr. Hodge denies the doctrine, but the denial is not based upon any attempted argument, aside from a claim (futile, as we shall see) to understand that which is in its nature incomprehensible. The Church holds that we all sinned in Adam, not only forensically (for his sin is charged against us as participants), but virtually and potentially; that is, in such a sense that agreeably to the invariable meaning of *ἁμαρτάνειν* and *ἁμαρτωλός* we became really sinners. We affirm that the Holy Spirit, who never teaches absurdities or impossibilities, teaches this as plainly as language can give it utterance, while, on the contrary, He never in any way, either by implication or otherwise,

does teach the direct imputation of a *peccatum alienum* to the unfallen offspring of Adam, all of which, however, is discarded by Dr. Hodge (as above stated) as nonsensical and absurd; and this, not upon any authoritative utterance of the inspired word, but upon his own *à priori* assumptions, and thus would, if he were able, cede to philosophy a realm which she has no right even to enter, much less to occupy; for she knows nothing on the subject, and therefore can utter no valid determination in regard to it.¹

My great aim in this treatise, as the reader may have observed, is to let the Church hear the utterances of her great and gifted sons rather than my own, on the leading topics introduced; and I here cite a few remarks from the late learned and truly eloquent Dr. James Gray, who, in referring to attempted philosophical solutions of the facts which come to us only through pure revelation, says: "Satan hates nothing so much as the gospel—the *pure, simple doctrine of faith*—because it is the destruction of his kingdom, the wisdom of God for the salvation of men. His policy, therefore, as a politician of awful and tremendous powers of calculation, is to render men dissatisfied with pure gospel truth. We know the devil by his children, for the works of their father they will do; and we know that whenever they are pressed on the subject of duty, they demur and demand a reason. It is the grand effort of Satan, and of his sons, when a duty is enjoined, to start a problem! and, if possible, an insolvable problem! and, while people are puzzling their brains about the solution, life ebbs away, and the sinner dies in his sins."

"The philosophical question which he has started on the subject now before us is this: 'What is the *principle of identification* be-

¹ The serious inquirer will be gratified with the following passages from Vœtius (the great antagonist of Des Cartes and his philosophy), who, referring to the efforts of the Socinian schools to explode the sacred mysteries of our religion, says: "Ante omnia notari volumus, distinguendum esse inter τὸ εἶναι illorum mysteriorum et τὸ διότι. Certe τὸ εἶναι liquido constat et probatur ex sacris literis, sed τὸ διότι et τὸ πῶς [Ionic for πῶς] (id est, *quomodo*) mens nostra penetrare eam nequeat, nec Deus in hac vita revelare voluerit, utque quiescendum est in docta ignorantia et altitudine veritatis occultæ." *Οὐ φθάνω*, inquit Nazianzenus (Orat. IV., De Sancto Baptismo, sub finem), τὸ ἐν νοῦναι καὶ τοῖς τρεῖσι περιλήγομαι. *Οὐ φθάνω* τα τρία διελεῖν, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐν ἀναφέρομαι. Male ergo faciunt adversarii, qui ex τῷ ἀκαταλήπτῳ τοῦ διότι seu ejus quod Deus non revelavit convertuntur in accusationem τοῦ εἶναι quod Deus revelavit, tanquam ἀδυνάτου et ἀποποιῶν." (Selectæ Disputationes, Tomo I., p. 434.)

tween Adam and his posterity in the law of works? And what is *the principle of identification* between Christ and believers?' That the sentence of death falls upon the human family as one body corporate in law, and that justification is pronounced upon Jesus, and all true believers, as one body corporate in law, is sufficiently apparent from the Scriptures; and the problem which has been suggested is this, What is the principle of identification?

"I have ascribed this philosophical problem to the invention of the devil, because it bears the triple brand with which he marks all his inventions: 1, If the problem was solved, the solution could be applied to no useful purpose whatever. 2, It is incapable of being solved. 3, In seeking its solution we are in infinite danger of falling into some error and denying some revealed truth. . . . Solomon certainly exerted his utmost powers of mind to solve this, among some other moral problems, and he tells us that 'this only had he found, that God made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions;' and if he was modest enough to rest satisfied with a naked fact, without explanation or theory, we may do so too: and perhaps those who resemble him most will be the first to imitate his discretion. But the great evil of speculating on the present subject is this, that perhaps no man has ever attempted to pursue his inquiries beyond the mere fact without falling into error; and there is ground to fear that no man ever will attempt it without injury to truth. When you get *ultra flammantia mœnia mundi*, all is conjecture and hypothesis, and there is infinity to one that the conjecture and hypothesis will be wrong."¹

We cite these remarks as expressing truly what the real province of mere human philosophy is in relation to the topic before us: that is, she cannot, without manifest impropriety, attempt to have anything to do with it, the whole question being entirely aside from and beyond her sphere. And a very few remarks will serve to evince what have been the actual results of her attempting such solution in the past.

As to philosophical Realism and Nominalism, they have made no progress towards approximating such solution; and the problem, so far as they are concerned, remains just as it stood when they first began, and, during the past centuries, prosecuted their stu-

¹ See *The Mediatorial Reign of the Son of God*, pp. 181-184, by Rev. James Gray, D. D. (Baltimore, 1821.)

pendous efforts in that direction; and we dismiss them without remark. Each has, doubtless, a portion of the truth on the subject (though neither will admit this in respect to the other); and when they mutually and seriously concede this, the number of the points in antithesis will be so greatly lessened, and the remainder so modified, as to justify us in believing that the strife will soon be brought to a close; and this, not by solving the problem, but by discovering that it is really insolvable.

The endeavors to arrive at a solution through the philosophical theory of substantial identification of the race with Adam, and of believers with Christ, have only evinced that theory to be a mere offspring of the imagination; nor has it, moreover, ever been either approved or even countenanced by the Church, nor by a sufficient number of the thoughtful within her pale to entitle it to historic notice or criticism. But even if the theory were based upon probability, and the allegation were susceptible of demonstration that in our physical structures we actually possess particles of the body of Adam, this could furnish no evidence to prove that his sin should be charged to our account. So that, even granting the theory thus far, it can have no claim to be brought forward in this inquiry. The logical sequence of the assumption is, that as the race is only Adam evolved, so the elect are only Christ evolved. Its incipience seems to owe its origin to a serious effort of some serious mind to give formulated utterance to that profound conviction of the human consciousness that the distinction of personality or individuality in the race does not conflict with its actual unity, and *vice versa* (on which we shall have a word to offer in the sequel); but as a theory its full paternity may be directly traced to the theological school of Alexandria, by which it was brought forth in the abortive attempt to unite Christian theology with the Greek philosophy.

The theory of the *moral* identity of the race with Adam, as presented by Staffer, and to some extent favored by Edwards, is likewise a merely philosophical speculation, and can plead no support, either direct or by implication, from the Scriptures; nor has it in any way ever been recognized by the Church. This theory, moreover, fails equally with the foregoing to furnish any substantial ground for explaining that which the Church has ever regarded as inexplicable. The problem as to the transmission of sin, or the

mode of our participation in the first sin, resists all such efforts at solution.

As relates to the philosophical *theories* of creationism and traducianism, they have ever found their utmost extremities of solution to fail before the simplest inquiries, often propounded, but never receiving an answer which, in consistency with the theories themselves, could sustain a moment's serious scrutiny. However the claims of either may stand related to the actual truth itself, it is quite obvious that the whole truth on the subject is not in possession of either, though there certainly is truth on both sides of the great issue;¹ and though *as theories*, they assuredly have furnished no proof of having attained to it. Solomon, as above remarked, had applied all his powers to the investigation of the great problem itself, but acknowledged that he was unable to proceed beyond the mere facts of revelation, and that the *why*, and the *how*, and the *wherefore* had entirely baffled his scrutiny. "Lo, *this only* have I found," says he, "that God made *man* upright; and *they have sought out* many inventions," or, literally, *devices*. *Inventions* or *devices* being the antithesis of uprightness, of course mean *evil devices*; and the reference is to that departure from uprightness, of which all became guilty in the fall. The result of his investigations, therefore, is that mankind themselves, and not God, are the sole authors of their sin and wretchedness, *and that this is to be accepted simply as a fact*.

The theory of Dr. Hodge, however, propounds the following solution: The inherent depravity and consequent misery of the race are the penal consequences of Adam's personal transgression, his posterity themselves being without subjective ill-desert until that *peccatum alienum* had been imputed to them; and that they could not have sinned with our first parents in the first sin, he would demonstrate as follows: "Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says that he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says;"² which is, as our readers have

¹ See on this point page 1116, of Vol. I., of the *Selectæ Disputationes* of Vœtius.

² *Princeton Review* for 1860, page 357, (more fully cited in our § 5, above) See also Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, Vol. II., pages 216-225.

seen, only a reproduction of the so-called philosophical speculations brought *usque ad nauseam* against the same doctrine by the Socinian and Remonstrant schools.¹

This, then, is the solution, and it is unquestionably as clear and conclusive when levelled against an announcement of divine revelation as the forecited reasoning of Dr. Morgan is in relation to the hypostatical union: "God and a human soul cannot be the same intelligent being, agent, or person; and therefore cannot with any truth or consistency be joined together under one common name, as if they were the same I, the same he, or the same intelligent agent or personal self." Or as that of Dr. Channing against the doctrine of the Trinity: "We object to the doctrine of the Trinity that it subverts the unity of God. . . . Here, then, we have three intelligent agents, possessed of different consciousnesses, different wills, etc. . . . It is a difference of properties, and acts, and consciousness, which leads us to the belief of different intelligent beings, and if these must fail, our whole knowledge fails."

Is this, then, (we ask) a legitimate attainment and determination of philosophy in her own proper domain? and is it a legitimate application of principles which she recognizes as her own approved dicta? Or, on the contrary, is she not here obtruding herself into a sphere which is not hers?—the sacred sphere of truth which has been divinely communicated to the race because unascertainable by us in any other way—and so stultifying herself by uttering a dogmatism upon what may or may not be believed of its announcements? If the latter, she is self-condemned, and entitled to no regard, and these her utterances are to be despised as the ambitious mutterings of presumption and ignorance. But if the former, then it is obvious that if either utterance is to be regarded as valid, there is no possible escape from admitting the validity of them all. In each of the two latter instances, the solution is just as clear, and the ground upon which it is based just as tenable, and consequently, the conclusion just as legitimate as in the preceding by Dr. Hodge—the principle on which the solution is based being in each instance the same. And hence, therefore, while it appears that we did not really sin in Adam, as the thing is impossible (whatever God may in His word allege to the con-

¹ See Sections 19, 20, and 21, above.

trary), it is equally certain that there cannot be both a human and a divine nature in the person of Christ, and that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be received as true except on grounds which are subversive of the whole foundation of actual knowledge. So that, if philosophy may be admitted to furnish the basis on which to determine what revelation may or may not communicate, these doctrines cannot be intelligently accepted, but must be discarded as absurd. If not, then the principle itself is false and pernicious in every instance of its application where the point involved is, as it is in each of these cases, one of pure revelation, and so, of course, lying entirely beyond the proper domain of any merely human philosophy whatever.

There would be indeed a contradiction if, for example, we might suppose that, in respect to the nature of God, the statement could possibly be that He is *THREE in the same sense in which He is ONE*; for as this would necessarily bring the announcement within the proper range of our conceded knowledge and understanding, the belief of it would be as impossible as that of the proposition that a circle and a triangle are of one and the same form. But such is not the fact. And so, too, in the first of these instances: it would be a contradiction if the proposition affirmed that we *personally* sinned anterior to our personal existence; for this would bring within the limits of our intellection the subject-matter (so to speak) of the whole proposition, and, *mutatis mutandis*, Dr. Hodge's ratiocination would be conclusive. Or if the proposition affirmed that sin could be predicated only of a state of developed personality, and that, notwithstanding we did veritably sin in and with Adam, this would be either self-contradictory, and therefore incredible and false, or it would necessitate the doctrine of our preëxistence. But the proposition does not so affirm; and therefore to attempt to argue as though the statement did involve either of these, is to argue invidiously and fallaciously. And yet this is the perpetually repeated argument of Dr. Hodge against the doctrine that we really sinned in Adam, as the others are of the Unitarian school against the doctrine of the Trinity and of the two natures in the person of Christ.

But let us attend to a farther exhibition of Dr. Hodge's philosophy, accompanied by an assault, in the way of antithesis, upon the doctrine he opposes. He says: "When God, by the almighty

power of His Spirit, quickens the spiritually dead, the holiness thus originated is none the less holiness. It is not essential to our moral character that it should be our own work. The graces of the Spirit, although due to the divine energy, constitute the moral and religious character of the believer. In like manner the depraved nature which we inherit from Adam constitutes our moral character, although it did not originate in any act of our own. . . . But it is to darken counsel by words without knowledge, and even without meaning, to assert that *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed. The Bible solution of the difficulty is infinitely better than this. Our depraved nature is the penal consequence of Adam's sin, not of ours; just as our holiness is the gracious gift for Christ's righteousness, and not something self-originated or self-deserved."¹

Let us then, for the argument's sake, admit Dr. Hodge's philosophy in this its two-fold application. And we are willing, moreover, to concede that which he assumes, to-wit: that if the application be valid in the one case here referred to, it is valid also in both. He affirms what is certainly true: that the graces of the Spirit in the christian believer are due to the divine energy, and constitute his regenerated or religious character, in like manner as the depraved nature inherited from our first parents constituted our moral character. I ask, then, Do the graces of the Spirit constitute *our* religious character anterior to and apart from our own self-accepted or ethical appropriation of those graces? They do not, it is true, causally originate with us; *but do they become ours irrespective of this self-appropriation?* No! in no sense of the terms. And then as to the originating of holiness, to which the former part of the extract adverts, when does that holiness become ours? Surely Dr. Hodge will not allege that it is *anterior* to our appropriation of it, which would be absurd. Nor is it *after* our appropriation, as the Pelagians dream. And yet we are not, and cannot be, holy until this actual self-appropriation takes place; and this is coetaneously with the renewing operation of the Holy Spirit. Dr. Hodge will scarcely venture to deny our affirmation in relation to either of these cases; that is, in reference both to the origin of holiness (that it does not become ours irrespective of our appropriation of it), and of the graces of the Spirit (that they

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 359.

do not become ours apart from the like appropriation). And these things being so, the inevitable conclusion from Dr. Hodge's own philosophy and logic is, *that the guilt of Adam does not become ours irrespective of the like ethical appropriation*. The gifts of the Spirit being free and gratuitous, our acceptance and appropriation of them, through His renewing grace, are in no sense of the term meritorious any otherwise than the act of a perishing beggar in accepting a proffered alms. But our self-appropriation of a depraved nature, being a plain departure from God, clothes us with depravity and sin, and brings us *deservedly* under the Divine condemnation. So far as the argument is concerned, there is not in either case any occasion to claim that the *gifts* or the *depravity* are *self-originated*, since in both cases alike they are *self-appropriated* before they can become truly ours, which, in respect to sin (we having been previously innocent), renders it as truly ours as if it were self-originated, and in respect to righteousness, our appropriation of it, through the infinite grace and mercy of God, constitutes it as fully ours as if it were self-originated. There is no middle ground between this doctrine and the theory that we are not moral agents, and are not responsible in view of the overtures to us of eternal life. So that both the logic and the argument of Dr. Hodge really confirm the doctrine which he is endeavoring to overthrow by his philosophy.

And then further, and as we have stated above, the Doctor cannot here even philosophize, or unfold his theory in its true relations to this whole subject, without involving himself, even on its most vital points, in humiliating and hopeless contradiction. In itself considered, however, this is of no great account, and, as we must refer to it in another connection, our reference here will be brief. Our readers have seen, from the last two of our quotations from his writings, how imperiously he has denounced and attempted to ridicule the doctrine of our having apostatized in Adam. And yet in the same volume (p. 765), in his Reply to the *Rejoinder* of Dr. Baird, he claims that *the withdrawal of the Holy Spirit from the posterity of Adam* (on account of his sin) *is simultaneous with the rise of their moral corruption*; that is, the Holy Spirit (which, according to his theory, the posterity could never in any way have previously possessed) is withdrawn from them. And then again, under the pressure of an opposing argument, he says:

"If God judicially withhold spiritual life from APOSTATE MEN, they are dead. THEY COME INTO BEING *in darkness and death*. We do not think Dr. Baird has much ground for the charge of heresy on this point" (*ibid.*). Thus affirming that God withholds His Spirit *from an apostate race before that race could have apostatized at all* (according to his theory), that is, *before it came personally into being*, though he had just been alleging in the most proscriptive style that "apostasy being an act of self-determination, *it can be predicated only of persons*; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all." Thus vague and utterly indeterminate are his conceptions of those great fundamental points respecting which he is so arrogant and peremptory.

In order to give color to his attempt to treat the doctrine of our participation in the first sin as a merely philosophical question, Dr. Hodge, as we have shown, has sought to identify it with philosophical Realism, and then to assail it under that mask. In all his earlier lucubrations this is apparent, and in his Theology the same misstatements are reiterated *en masse*.¹ The whole procedure is, however, so unfair and unscholarly, in view especially of our full demonstration to the contrary, that it can mislead no candid and competent mind. But we shall not stop here to dwell upon it, and in concluding the section shall present a brief historical statement in relation to the connection of the doctrine of participation with philosophical speculation in the churches of the Reformation.

During the earlier period of the Reformation, the Protestant divines, though remarkably clear and accurate in the delineation of the doctrine of original sin and justification by faith alone, and of the other salient doctrines of Protestantism, made no attempt to refine upon the Scripture announcements respecting our union with the first and second Adam, or to trace out through the aid of philosophy the principle of our possible identification with either, or on any such ground to explain the relation which our sin and corrupt nature bear to the one, or our righteousness and sanctification to the other; but simply received and inculcated the whole revealed truth on these subjects, without assaying either to establish or defend it by philosophical speculation. The Nominalistic

¹ See Vol. II., pp. 190-192, 216, 220-227.

principle had been applied in its most offensive form to the doctrine of original sin by Pighius and Catharinus, and asserted even to the extent of representing Adam's merely personal sin, through a forensic imputation, as causal of the moral corruption and misery of the race, and thus carrying forward the previously asserted notion of the Arminians, and then of Ocham (the founder of Nominalism), and others of the scholastics, that original sin is "*reatus alieni peccati sine aliquo vitio hærente in nobis*," i. e., as the ground of its imputation to us. These persons did not deny, but on the contrary emphatically affirmed that moral corruption was the punishment or penal consequence of the imputation of this *reatus alieni peccati*; but by original sin they meant *peccatum originaus* simply, that is, the sin which thus, as its procuring cause, originated the moral corruption of the race; and they affirmed that that sin was Adam's personal sin alone, in the sense that his posterity did not participate therein, but whose moral corruption and misery resulted from it alone as a *peccatum alienum*. This notion, as will appear in the sequel, the Protestant divines to a man opposed and rejected; not, however, by verging to the opposite standpoint of philosophical Realism, but by maintaining alike that Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity on account of their participation therein, and that they were subjectively guilty on that account. In other words, they adopted not the Realistic philosophy, or rather I should say philosophical Realism, but the Realism of Augustine, whose views should never be regarded as identical with the speculations of the later schools of Realists. He was a Realist in the sense of maintaining that we really and actually sinned in Adam, and that his sin was imputed to us as participants; but not in the sense of adopting (as the later Realists did) the dicta of a mere human philosophy as sufficient to explain either the *modus* of this our sinning in Adam, or the principle of our asserted moral identity with the first and second Adam.

When, still later in the progress of the Reformation, Nominalism had secured a foothold in the Protestant church, a philosophical Realism was adopted in antagonism by some, though neither side even then ventured upon a departure from the doctrine which hitherto the Church had unhesitatingly recognized, *that all men were in Adam in such a sense as to constitute the first sin a racial sin and them as veritable sinners, by sinning in and falling with*

him in that transgression; and both alike perpetually recognize and cite the universally approved formula, *Primum persona inficit naturam, sed post natura inficit personam*; for neither side could assume the ground previously occupied by Ocham, and still later by Pighius and Catharinus in the Council of Trent (the very ground now occupied by Dr. Hodge), without arraying themselves in direct antagonism to the protest and disclaimer of the whole Protestant church. Nor did they aim in any way, therefore, to change or modify the formula itself, but referred to its announcements as universally conceded facts. The philosophical Realists found their principle of identification in an assumed substantial identity of Adam and his seed, and the Nominalists in a federal relation, which latter idea Cloppenburg (1652), and finally Cocceius (1669), elaborated into what has been *par eminence* named *the federal system*. The former were by this philosophy induced to give undue prominence to the natural relation, and the latter to the normal; both, however, still adhering to the aforesaid sheet-anchor, that the race became subjectively guilty by participation in the criminality of Adam, and was thus brought under *the judgment unto condemnation*. And so careful was the latter school not to depart from this doctrine that even the framers of the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* (1675)—a symbol which, incredible as it may seem, Dr. Hodge has actually claimed repeatedly in support of his theory—have, in their offset to the errors of Placæus, given it a full expression. As, for example, they say: "We hold, therefore, that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity by the secret and just judgment of God, because the apostle testifies that all sinned in Adam: 'by the disobedience of one many were constituted sinners,' and that 'in him all die.' And neither does the reason appear by what means hereditary corruption as spiritual death could come upon the whole world, *unless some offence of the same human race had preceded, bringing the guilt of that death* (mortis illius reatum), *since God, the most righteous judge of the whole earth, can punish none but the faulty* (nonnisi sontem puriat). In a two-fold way, therefore, after sin (or the fall), man, by nature, and thenceforth from his origin (or conception), before he had in himself committed any actual sin, is exposed to the divine indignation and curse; first, indeed, on account of the transgression and disobedience *which he committed in the loins of Adam*; then on account

of the consequent hereditary corruption inherent in his conception, by which his whole nature is depraved and spiritually dead; therefore, indeed, as rightly stated, original sin is two-fold, to-wit: imputed and hereditary inherent."¹

The writings of the main authors of this formula (Heidegger and Turretin) contain the same announcements, as our readers may perceive by consulting the extracts from them in our preceding sections. And even De Moor, a century later, cites them as representing the orthodox doctrine, and in a very carefully discriminated distinction drawn by him between the orthodox doctrine and that of Placæus, he expressly says that our theologians everywhere declare that the comparison instituted by Paul between Adam and Christ teaches that Adam was the representative head of his whole natural posterity, *in whom the whole nature sinning* the whole race may be accounted to have sinned. So that the first sin may be regarded as the sin of us all, *IN WHICH ADAM HIMSELF, AND WE IN HIM, contracted the guilt of death, which guilt was transmitted to all his posterity by imputation*, according to Rom. v. So that whatever evil may redound to or inhere in them, does not precede, but follow this guilt which rests upon them, as, on the contrary, no spiritual or saving good is conferred upon the elect except in view of the merits of the second Adam, which are likewise imputed to them. And he adds: that *in Adam his posterity contracted the guilt of death and the curse through the imputed fault (culpa) of his first sin*; that is, it being charged upon them as theirs, or as a sin in which they participated. This, in brief, is his statement,² while from the very first of his entrance upon his professorship he had deeply lamented that the doctrine of *our common guilt in Adam and consequent corruption* was so proscribed; *i. e.*, by the Pelagian and Socinian schools, and the rationalistic tendencies of the age, thus evincing what his own views were. He says: "*Utinam nec communis omnium reatus in Adamo, cum hujus fundamentis firmissimis, nec secuta hinc corruptio nativa, cum hujus sequilis omnibus, ipso etiam Pædo-Baptismo, vel proseribantur prorsus, vel per cavillas et extenuationes varias tandem evanescant.*"³ When he was inaugurated,

¹ See Niemeyer's *Collectio Confess.*, p. 733. (Leipsic, 1840.)

² *Perpet. Comment.* in Marck, Tom. III., pp. 264, 265.

³ See in *ibid.* Tom. V., p. 622, his Oration at Leyden, May 29, 1719.

Marck, and F. Fabricius, and Wesselius, and Van Honert were professors in the University, all of whom subscribed the oration as expressing their doctrinal views, and all of whom consequently held *that native corruption flows from the common guilt of all in Adam*, and not merely from the imputation of Adam's personal guilt. And this was the highest form in which the federal doctrine was recognized by the Church of God, until Dr. Hodge (at a period when our grand old theology had well nigh ceased to be studied in our Church), by his unparalleled failure to comprehend the meaning of the term *imputation* as employed by the Augustinian divines, has been inculcating as the doctrine of the Church the dogma of the gratuitous imputation of sin—a mere philosophical figment which can be found in no church synod, nor in the writings of any really eminent and approved divine, except as referred to by them when refuting and discarding it as a pestilential heresy.

And then further. The philosophical Realistic view, which Dr. Baird, in his *Elohim Revealed*, has presented with marked ability, has never been considered by the Church herself as a heresy, though Dr. Hodge, in his review of that work, and since, has pertinaciously insisted on affixing to it the odious brand, denouncing it as a fundamental error, and wholly subversive of the Protestant theology. This attempt, however, is entirely *sui generis*, and has nothing to authorize it in the Protestant Church (which has never so regarded it, as the reader may perceive from our previous quotations), while, on the contrary, she has always repudiated as fundamentally subversive of all her principles the theory and exegesis of Dr. Hodge. We neither have, nor ever have had, a particle of sympathy with Dr. Baird's attempts at philosophical speculation on the subject; but yet, in every point of view, they are incomparably less objectionable than the scheme of Dr. Hodge, for this *is* fundamentally at variance with the word of God and the theology of the Church, as is testified *una voce* by the great body of her representative divines.

A similar endeavor, though destitute alike of discrimination and fundamental investigation, has been attempted at another of our theological seminaries, to render *Creationism* a test of Calvinistic soundness, and *Traducianism* a heresy, though it cannot here be expatiated upon. But it is by methods such as these that the

manly and liberal spirit of our communion is to be frittered away, so as to be made to square with the narrow conceptions of souls adapted to no higher pursuit than that of heresy hunting. A very little acquaintance with the theology of the Church would have made apparent to such persons that traducianism has ever been an open question in our communion, and, in fact, in the Church herself, ever since the days of Augustine.¹ But when the fact is taken into consideration that this attempt is made from a standpoint of actual and fundamental departure from the recognized theology of the Church, and that the advocates of errors which are balefully pernicious and gospel-subverting are thus endeavoring to convict of heresy others simply because they indulge in a species of philosophical speculation, which has always been allowable in the Calvinistic communion, the contemplation would be as painful as it really is ludicrous if the puerile effort were such as could possibly enkindle the slightest spark of apprehension.

§ 28. THE BASIS FOR THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S FIRST SIN, AS AFFIRMED BY THIS THEORY, CONSIDERED. THE POSITION OF TURRETTIN.

The discussion of our theme would be quite incomplete unless it included a fair presentation as well as a just consideration of the topic announced in the heading of this section, and, moreover, without a thorough examination of Dr. Hodge's principle of representation so closely associated therewith, and to which we shall invite attention in our next section.

The professor affirms that the imputation of the first sin of Adam to his posterity proceeds upon the basis of the relation which he sustains to them as their natural and moral head; at the same time, however, he claims that this relation can in no way so connect them with Adam as to render them subjectively guilty of

that sin; and hence, as they cannot be partakers of his crime in virtue of that relation, they are, on the ground of it, regarded and treated as only forensically guilty, and that through a gratuitous imputation to them of his *peccatum alienum*. The Augustinian church, on the contrary, has always considered the relation not only as essential to the right apprehension of the doctrine of original sin, but as illustrating and establishing the fact that the first sin was common alike to both Adam and his posterity,—a *culpa participatione*. But this essential feature of the doctrine is, as we have seen, both denied and denounced by Dr. Hodge as nonsensical, so that in his theory the relation does not connect the posterity morally with the guilt of the first sin, but putatively only, and yet is made the basis for connecting them, not with a *putative*, but *real* and *literal* condemnation and punishment. Thus this covenant relation was established solely through the mere sovereignty of the divine will, human agency being in no way concerned with its formation, and then solely by the divine will was constituted the aforesaid basis for this imputation and condemnation; and the requirements of punitive justice in the matter are, consequently, not in virtue of any subjective ill-deserving on the part of the posterity, but only as it has pleased the Divine Ruler in the exercise of His sovereign pleasure to charge guilt, and then to visit it with condemnation and punishment; and yet in his Theology, and in all his writings on the subject, Dr. Hodge affirms that *justice*, on the ground of the relation itself, demands this imputation, or “judgment unto condemnation;” and that this sentence, together with its inevitable sequence of moral corruption and spiritual death, was therefore required on that ground *as a satisfaction to justice in order to sustain the demands of the law*. All this seems truly difficult of conciliation, or even of apprehension, and is, perhaps, scarcely deserving of criticism. But in scanning it closely I have been led to suppose (though I do not remember that he has ever given to the thought an expression) that the Doctor's idea might be, that if the whole race could have existed personally and simultaneously with Adam, its father, they, in consideration of the natural relation subsisting between them, would, beyond all peradventure, have willingly consented that he should represent them in any covenant arrangement which might be divinely appointed, which being, of course, known to the divine

¹ We cite in illustration a few references: see, for example, the fragments of Augustine's letter to Optatus, in Gallandus' edition of the Fathers, Tom. VII., pages 587, 588, and compare with Epist. II., § 10, page 585; also his *Enchiridion*, Capp. 46 and 47. See also Zanchius, Tom. IV., pages 48–51, and Keckerman Theol., pages 256–258; Altingius, Theol. Enclit., pages 332, seq.; Maresius' Exegesis, Confess. Belgic., Art. 15; Vætiæ, Selectæ Disputationes, Tom. I., pages 796, and seq., also page 1094 usque ad 1115; or consult Hooker's Works, Vol. I., pages 212, seq., and Delitzsch, Biblic. Psychology, Part II., § VII.; also Baird's Elohîm Revealed, Chapter XI.

mind, it would not be inconsistent with justice and equity to proceed upon a basis which the posterity would have cheerfully accepted had opportunity allowed.

This certainly carries an air of plausibility; and though in the absence of his endorsement I would not attribute it to Dr. Hodge, yet it has occurred to mind as the only possible ground on which he might claim, as he does, that divine justice (that is, provided he employs the term with any approximation to its true sense) demanded the punishment of those who were innocent, and who, as he constantly affirms, had never in any way incurred a liability to its exactions. It may be in place, therefore, to offer here a brief criticism touching the question.

If, then, for the sake of the argument, we should admit the explanation, it is worthy of inquiry whether such an assent formally yielded by the race would not so far have rendered them responsible for the acts of their progenitor (unless disclaimed by them) as to involve them in his guilt should he violate the covenant? Such assent would certainly furnish a basis for the imputation to them of his representative acts. Or, would Dr. Hodge maintain that even in such a case a *gratuitous* imputation of his transgression would be necessary to constitute them guilty, in virtue of the natural relation? Surely not, for this would be too plainly preposterous. On the contrary, would not that relation itself, *in virtue of their consent that their father should represent them*, constitute a moral basis on which to treat them as partakers with him in guilt without any gratuitous imputation? Certainly it would, and no imputation could render it more so. The ground for the imputation in such a case, therefore, would not be the mere *natural relation* which the posterity sustained to Adam, but the assent which, in virtue of that relation, they had given that he should act as their representative, which assent would be, moreover, the basis whereon was constituted this moral or federal relation.

It can hardly be out of place, in treating the topic, to adduce an illustration from the so-called *Scientia Media*, and I shall pursue it a little farther.

Could, therefore, the posterity of Adam all have been personally alive at the time, then, their assent to his appointment as their representative, and their consequent incurrence of responsibility for his acts, would have been necessary in order so to con-

stitute them partakers of his guilt as to justify their participation with him in its punishment. Dr. Hodge must either admit this, or accept one of the following dilemmas, neither of which he will acknowledge, to-wit: That in such a case God could, irrespective of their choice or willingness, have justly constituted them, not only putatively, but morally responsible for the acts of their father, or that the natural relation alone would suffice to justify the imputation.¹ If, then, in such a case, their own assent would have been necessary in order to constitute them sinners; that is, partakers of his criminality, the only reason why it is not now necessary must be (if this hypothesis be recognized), that God, knowing that they would have given their assent, treats them accordingly; that is, as though they had given it *ipso facto* and really. The case being so, therefore it follows that their consent, had they then personally existed, would have rendered them partakers of Adam's guilt, and so have justified their condemnation as participants therein. And inasmuch as God now treats them in accordance with what He knows they would have done, so He now treats them as guilty; not on the ground of a gratuitous imputation, but on the ground that they would have been really criminal had they personally existed when Adam fell. And the conclusion would follow that they actually are treated thus because their subjective guilt was foreseen, and on account of that foreseen subjective guilt. Should then the foregoing conception be the idea of Dr. Hodge, what becomes of his doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin? or of an imputation based merely upon the natural and federal relation without regard to participation? The whole would be evaporated by the mere attempt to subject the conception to analysis.

I do not adduce this illustration because I have any sympathy with the view which Seiler, Kern, and others have advanced, that it would be legitimate for God to treat His creatures *at the commencement of their existence* in accordance with His knowledge of what they will become in the course of it; for if this could be justly done it is plain that He could even then consign them to perdition whom He foresaw would, if their probation continued,

¹ In Section 4 above, we have shown that Dr. Hodge, by the steps of his own argument, has been really driven to assume this ground, but we here refer to a deliberate assumption of it.

reject the overtures of salvation, which would be in effect to treat them as if they really had possessed and abused that very probation which He had denied to them.¹ But to return.

Now, in precisely the same sense in which Dr. Hodge alleges that we could not sin and fall in our first parents except putatively we could not of course acquiesce except putatively in their appointment as a federal head; so that in no sense of the word were we participants in the covenant transaction except putatively, though we all *really* fell through its violation, and suffered the *real*, and not merely putative, consequences of that violation; for no one will pretend that those consequences come under the category of the putative or fictitious. Now, as we were not personally partakers in the covenant transaction, on what principle can the federal relation be made (as Dr. Hodge affirms that it is²) the ground for bringing upon us "the judgment unto condemnation" for a personal sin of Adam? God Himself established the relation between Adam and his offspring, they being no more concerned therewith, according to Dr. Hodge, than they were in participating in his sin. God, according to this theory, by a mere act of His sovereignty, established it, and then, by virtue of this His own act (they being subjectively free of all guilt and criminality), He imputes to them the personal sin of Adam, with all its baleful consequences. Thus Dr. Hodge bases the whole of this fearful procedure upon the mere will and pleasure of God, and all his remarks about the natural and federal relation amounts only to this: *That without any reference to the subjective character or agency of the creature, God first prepared a basis upon which to treat him as a transgressor, and then treated him as such upon the basis thus provided.* Such is the ground for the imputation of sin presented by this theory. So that not the moral nature of God, but His

¹ The following passage from Zanchius is in point here, though the sentiment therein cited from Augustine is perhaps too strongly expressed, as may appear by comparing it with Gen. xviii. 17-19; 2 Chron. vi. 7-9, and other statements of the word of God: "Pelagiani dicebant infantes prædestinatos ad vitam, propter opera bona quæ fecissent, si vixissent. Haec nempe prævisa à Deo. Sed Augustinus, 'Nemo vel punitur, vel præmium accipit pro iis, vel bonis, vel malis operibus, quæ nunquam egit, sed acturus erat.' *De Prædest.* cap. 12." Zanchius, *De natura Dei*, lib. V., cap. 2; *Quæst.* III., p. 530.

² See Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 187, and *Review* for 1860, p. 340, 368.

WILL, originates and directs the whole procedure, and justice, as such, has no more concern in this condemnation of the creature than it had with providing the basis upon which he is condemned. In our former essay we called Dr. Hodge's attention to this point, but in his *Theology*, and doubtless for satisfactory reasons, he deemed it inexpedient to undertake its examination. But we must now consider the subject of this section from a more practical point of view, and one which bears more directly upon the Doctor's rejection and denunciation of the doctrine of participation.

It is not only admitted, but repeatedly and emphatically affirmed, by Dr. Hodge "*that the race of man participates in the evil consequences of the fall of our first parents*,"¹ and that they participate therein from the very beginning of their existence. Why, then, so peremptorily refuse to allow with the Church herself that they participate also in his subjective ill-desert, "the procuring cause of all these evils"? Let us glance at this a moment in the light of the Doctor's affirmations. He alleges of the race that they are "born in sin; that they come into the world the children of wrath;"² are "born in a state of guilt and pollution;"³ that "guilt attaches to the innate corruptions of nature;"⁴ that "habitual or indwelling sin is not voluntary in the sense of being designed or intended, or in the sense of being under the power of the will;"⁵ that "the existence of sin in the heart, the presence of evil dispositions, without regard to their origin, is unavoidably attended with a sense of pollution and guilt;"⁶ "that guilt, in the comprehensive sense of the word, and pollution, enter into the nature of sin, or are inseparable from it, is not only revealed in our own consciousness, but is everywhere assumed in the Scripture;"⁷ and that "men universally, under the circumstances of their being in this world, are sinful, and exposed to innumerable evils. Many of these, and that in many instances the most appalling, come upon the children of men in early infancy anterior to any possible transgression of their own."⁸

In view of this impressive delineation of our actual state by nature, the inquiry, which at this point of the argument mainly

¹ *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 192. ² *Ibid.* p. 191. ³ *Ibid.* p. 191.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 190. ⁵ *Ibid.* p. 190. ⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 189, 190,

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 189. ⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 195, 196.

concerns us, is, *Whence do these fearful evils proceed?*—for we are not at liberty here to lose sight of the fact that though the Socinians and Remonstrants do not specifically enumerate moral pollution *anterior to our birth* amongst these evils, as Dr. Hodge does, they yet concur with him that all the evils of, or incident to, our fallen state (whatever may be the names *we* bestow upon them) originate from the sovereign will of God on account of the personal sin of Adam; while he admits that the moral pollution which is ours anterior to and at our birth does not originate in or through any agency of our own. Herein, therefore, is a substantial agreement. Paul, however, and the Augustinian church have always averred, as we have abundantly shown in our previous sections, that these evils come upon the race because we all sinned by participating with our first parents in the first sin. Dr. Hodge alleges that we did not and could not really sin in the first sin, and that these evils are the penalty, not of *our own sin*, but of a *peccatum alienum*—the personal sin of Adam; and that because of this his personal sin God brought upon an innocent race, as the punishment of that sin, all these terrible calamities; for, according to his theory, they come upon us for a sin of which we are as guiltless as the unfallen angels themselves. And hence they can be *penal* to us in no proper sense of the term, but only so far as unavoidable evils, which we have not by any agency or action of our own brought upon ourselves, might be thus designated; that is, in other words, they are calamities, and calamities alone. And therefore to name them the exactions of retributive justice or penal inflictions, in connection with an avowal of the principles of this theory, is, as it seems to us, not merely to trifle with the meaning of the terms, but preposterous in a high degree. Such, then, is his doctrine as to the ground for the gratuitous imputation of sin; and herein consists the for ever irreconcilable and fundamental difference between the doctrine of original sin as he has taught it and that doctrine as entertained and taught by the Church, which affirms our guilty complicity or participation in the first sin as the penally-procuring cause of all the evils we endure.

But, passing all this, we return to the question that since Dr. Hodge affirms that these tremendous evils have come upon the race, and that they are penal, why not include in our participation

of such baleful effects of our first parents' transgression *a participation likewise with them in their guilt* as the ground of this its imputation?—the avowed doctrine of the Church ever since its formulation by Augustine. And why not frankly employ the language of the Reformation on the subject, and say with Beza, for example, who, when speaking on the same point, says: "Adam sinned knowing and understanding what he did; but his infant posterity from the moment of their birth are truly guilty of sin, but of that only by which they sinned as contained in Adam, whence their allotment is that they are born corrupt and guilty."¹ Why could not Dr. Hodge thus speak (for thus the Church has always spoken), and not base this great fact of our native depravity on the figment of the gratuitous imputation of a foreign sin? Paul also (and in the plain and literal sense of his words, as we have seen) teaches such participation as a historical fact. And though Dr. Hodge, against all recognized authority and against the *usus loquendi* of the Scripture itself, would attach a figurative sense to the terms, why should he, against the united testimony of the Church, regard an exegesis so hostile and yet so unsupported, and persist in refusing to admit this criminal participation (*culpa participatione*) into the category of baleful evils which we and our first parents have brought upon us by the first sin? What is the principle which lies at the basis of this pertinacious refusal?—illustrated, as it is, not only by a simple rejection of the doctrine referred to, but by his sarcasm, and denunciation of those who do receive it.

Can it be, then, that the reason for this course is his inability to comprehend *how* the posterity of Adam should have participated with him in the fall? But would this be a sufficient reason, or a criterion *for faith*? If so, what becomes of the personal union of the two natures in Christ? and of the doctrine of the Trinity? not to speak of the many other facts of revelation wherein he affirms his belief, and yet is obliged to confess his inability to comprehend them? If he insists that the one should be rejected because undefinable, in the present fragmentary state of human knowledge, a rejection of the others must, of course, follow on the same ground. And then, further, the Holy Spirit has nowhere given in support of either the Trinity or hypostatical union

¹ Annotations in Nov. Test. (on Rom. v. 14, p. 37, col. 1), anno 1589.

a plainer or more direct announcement than He has of the doctrine in question, both in the Old Testament (Eccles. vii. 29), and in the New (Rom. v. 12-19). And moreover, as we have already stated, the great body of the most learned, able, and godly men in the Church have always believed and taught the doctrine, without pretending to be able either to explain or comprehend it; and Dr. Hodge can allege nothing as a ground on which it ought to be disclaimed and rejected, or to justify his unmeasured but foolish denunciation of it, which was not as fully and as thoroughly known to those eminent and holy men as it could possibly be to himself.¹ For what reason, therefore, should he so persistently refuse to admit that, since the race participated in all the forementioned evils of the fall, it may not likewise, in some one of the ways wherein he has affirmed that guilt, and even sin, may exist in us without reference to our voluntary agency, have even participated in the sin and guilt of the fall itself? What should hinder this, even on the ground which he professes to occupy? And why, then, with such foolish imperiousness, reject it as the real basis for the imputation, seeing the doctrine itself is an essential article of that theology which he has been employed to teach? Augustine, as we have stated, received and taught it; and not only so, but it has been reverentially received as God's own truth by the great body of the learned and good who have accepted and defended the gospel and its doctrines since his day. Can then, the ground on which Dr. Hodge refuses to include a participation of guilt in the category of those evils, whatever may be the ground he pleads, be, in any sense, regarded as sufficient to warrant his denunciation of those who do thus include it as acting irrationally and nonsensically? and as substituting the whole scheme of salvation itself? For he frequently does thus accuse and denounce

¹ It is true that the fact that one or even many persons have accepted a principle or doctrine is not to be regarded as a criterion for others, or as a sufficient reason why they should follow the example. Such a procedure would degrade the moral and intellectual nature given us by our Creator. Nor is this the point presented in the text. But when a man undertakes to denounce and ridicule a principle which has been reverentially received as a sacred truth by multitudes who are at the least his equals in learning and intelligence, and is unable to render a solitary reason for so doing which was not as fully known to them as to himself, it is always in place to remind such a person of the nature of the position which he has assumed.

them; and during his long-continued professorship has been instructing his pupils to reject the doctrine, though previous to his appointment it had always been entertained by the Church. A few of the facts sustaining this representation have been brought before the reader. The contemplation of them in such a connection is indeed painful; but an interest incomparably higher and more momentous than anything earthly demands that without further hesitation the Church have the opportunity to lay them to heart.

Instead, however, of expatiating further on this point it will be proper to attend to an explanation proffered by Dr. Hodge, whereby he would, if possible, relieve his position as to the general issue itself. Referring to the doctrine of original sin as held by the Reformers, he says: "They therefore made original sin in its wide sense to include two sins, original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*. The latter they regarded as the penal consequence of the former."¹ This remark is accurate *if restricted to the later divines of the Reformation*, and if by *imputed sin* is to be understood not a merely putative or forensic guilt—a meaning they *never* attached to the phrase—but what they themselves understood by it, to-wit: *The first sin as participated in by both Adam and his posterity, and therefore charged upon them as participants*. But the Doctor immediately proceeds to represent this first sin as *the sin of Adam alone*, and so places upon their language a meaning which, for any one to represent them as intending to convey, they would have charged as an unmitigated calumny. He continues thus: "On the ground of the *personal sin* of Adam as the representative of the race, God withholds from men His favor. . . . This depravity being truly and properly of the nature of sin *subjects those infected with it to the penalty of sin*."

Thus the whole statement and argument of Dr. Hodge defining the basis for the imputation of sin, so far as it claims to be in

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 342. The remark, however, is inaccurate so far as the *confessions* of those churches are concerned. For, as we have shown (in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1875, page 313), those confessions draw no line of demarcation between original sin *imputed* and original sin *inherent*; nor has the terminology of *immediate* and *antecedent imputation* any expression in our theology anterior to the latter part of the seventeenth century. *Later divines* did, however, treat the subject as Dr. Hodge has suggested.

accord with Calvinistic theology, rests upon a sheer and most astonishing misapprehension of some of the plainest expressions of that theology; for the Reformers invariably teach that original sin imputed is our own sin in Adam, as well as his personal sin, both being imputed as a common sin to condemnation. And in making their language on this subject apply to Adam's sin alone, he presents them as teaching a doctrine which they not only rejected and refuted, but literally abhorred (as being the distinguishing tenet of Pighius and Catharinus, and of the Socinian and Remonstrant schools in their assault upon original sin), to-wit: *that the posterity of Adam are condemned and punished for his personal sin alone, and irrespective of any subjective ill-desert in themselves.*

The old divines all speak of corruption, depravity, etc., as the *punishment* of "the first sin," of "Adam's sin," of "the fall," etc., but *never* as the punishment of a *peccatum alienum*, or Adam's personal sin alone. By this punishment they mean that these and all the other evils and calamities of this life come upon us in consequence of our violation of law, and are therefore *penal*, and not merely the natural results, or mere consequences of what some other person or persons had done. They regard them as the penalty of our sin in and fall with our first parents, just as our standards represent them to be. And none of these divines ever say what Dr. Hodge always says, that sin was imputed to Adam's natural posterity solely on account of their natural and federal union with Adam, and irrespective of their participation in his sin and fall. This is his basis for imputation, but it is not theirs. They maintain that the union referred to evinces our participation in his sin, and that we are accounted and treated as sinners because we sinned when he sinned, participated in his sin, or sinned and fell with him in his first transgression. And they moreover directly taught, as Chamier, for example, has expressed it, that sinning in Adam is a very different thing from being made sinners by Adam; *i. e.*, by a forensic imputation to us of his personal transgression as maintained by the Socinians; a statement which Turretin also cites as expressing the Calvinistic doctrine.¹ But Dr. Hodge's theory not only confuses, but totally obliterates this distinction, and he affirms that these things are not different, but

¹ See Instit. Theol., loco IX., Quæst. 9, § 44.

one and the same in Calvinistic theology,¹ and yet claims to hold and teach the very doctrine of original sin which these eminent divines taught and defended. They could not maintain the doctrine of divine justice and deny this principle, and hence their constant affirmation of it in every form as we have shown from their writings. But Dr. Hodge claims to hold the church doctrine of divine justice, and yet denies and even denounces this their fundamental position touching the point.

It is true that, especially in his late work, he has repeatedly declared that, in virtue of the relation, natural and federal, of Adam to the race, his sin is the *common sin* of the race; but in so doing he employs the language of Calvinistic theology in a sense peculiar to himself and to its avowed antagonists, and to convey an idea which it never conveys in this connexion as employed by the Church and her leading divines. He adopts it, therefore, as actually employed by her opposers in their rejection of her received doctrine; that is, to convey the idea *that the personal sin of Adam became common by being imputed to his posterity, and was not imputed because it was common*;² but the Church uses the terms to convey the doctrine *that the first sin was common alike to Adam and his posterity, and was therefore imputed as a sin common to both him and them.* Imputed, because it was common; and thus in her theology, the basis which is assigned as the ground for the imputation leaves the divine justice unassailable, while on Dr. Hodge's theory it stands hopelessly impeached. She places her declaration of the fact upon the divine averment, and, without attempting to philosophize in order to explain it, believes the announcement, and refers, as she should do, to Him to make clear, and to justify that which He has communicated as an explanatory principle.

As the eminent theologian, Turretin, has been peremptorily claimed by Dr. Hodge in support of his theory in regard to the basis for the imputation of the first sin, and as we, in our former essay,

¹ See for example his Theology, Vol. II., pp. 202-231.

² See in § 21, No. 1, under the heading of *Curcellæus*, an instance of this in which the Arminian, in reply to Maresius' affirmation that the first sin was a common sin, says: "*It was not common except through that imputation about which we are disputing,*" and ridicules him for making "that community of sin which in the order of nature follows imputation the ground of the imputation itself." This is *ipsissima verba* the doctrine inculcated by Dr. Hodge.

were, through reliance on the inaccurate statements of the Doctor, led unintentionally to do him injustice, we shall, in concluding the section, ask attention for a moment to a correction of the error.

Turretin, to some extent at least, adopts what is technically called *the federal view*, but decidedly repudiates both the exegesis which Dr. Hodge has attempted of Rom. v. 12-19, and likewise his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin. The antecedent imputation for which Turretin contended was placed by him distinctly upon an objective and moral basis; as, for example, when in approximating a specific discussion of the subject, he, in passing, remarks that "it cannot be said of original sin that it precedes (antecedit) all use of the will and of liberty, and that although it is in the will *subjectively*, it is yet not from it originally."¹ And then on the following page, and in disputing against the theory of Placæus, he asserts the imputation of the *peccatum habituale*, and adds: "They with whom we here contend either deny absolutely imputation or concede only that which is mediate (*i. e.*, of the *peccatum habituale*), but we, with the orthodox, affirm both, and that imputation is to be granted, and that it is immediate and antecedent." In other words, we, with the orthodox, affirm both the *mediate* and *immediate* imputation against those opposers who affirm but one; and we, moreover, affirm that there is an imputation antecedent and immediate which Placæus and his followers have so pointedly denied. Such is the obvious sense of the passage.

He moreover affirms the natural and federal relation to be *the ground of a participated criminality or ill-desert*. After remarking that they who deny the imputation of sin are, by the same course of argument, led to deny the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, as with the Pelagians, Socinians and Arminians, he adds (and as the passage is very important we give it in his own words): "Nec obstat quod imputatio justitiæ Christi sit ex gratia, *imputatio vero peccati ex justitia*, possit autem gratia tribuere alteri id quod ei non debetur *justitia non possit*, quia gratia dat beneficium immerenti, *justitia pœnam non irrogat nisi merenti*. Nam in imputatione peccati Adæ, *justitia Dei non irrogat pœnam immerenti, sed merenti, si non merito proprio et personali, at participato et communi, quod funditur in communione naturali et*

¹ Instit. Theol., loco IX., Quæst. 1, § 4, p. 437.

fœderali quæ nobis cum Adamo intercedit." Thus he affirms, as strongly as language can express it, that while grace may bestow upon one that to which he has no claim, *justice cannot inflict punishment except upon him who deserves it*; for in the imputation of Adam's sin God does not inflict retribution upon the innocent or undeserving, but upon him who does deserve it, which is an utter denial of the gratuitous imputation of sin. And in direct antagonism to Dr. Hodge, he does not base the imputation upon the natural and federal headship, *but bases upon that headship the participated and common guilt which constitutes subjective ill-desert, and on which ill-desert the imputation or judgment unto condemnation proceeds*, which is universally the received doctrine of the Calvinistic church.

Turretin, then, in illustrating his views, adverts to the tithing of Levi by Melchisedek through Abraham (Heb. vii. 9), and on which he thus reasons: "Ita multo magis censi possunt in Adamo peccasse ejus posterius, utpote qui in eo essent ut rami in radice, massa in primitiis, et membra in capite. Non quod fundamentum imputationis in illo facto quæretur, quod in multis differt ab ea; sed tantum ut à simili per analogiam illustretur. Nec verba quæ addit apostolus, *ὡς ἐπὶ σινεῖν*, rem tropicam et figuratam innuunt, qua si Levi figurate tantum non propriè, in Abrahamo diceretur decimatus quod est contra mentem apostoli," etc., (§ 25). Dr. Hodge affirms this to be Realistic doctrine (and if so, Turretin was a Realist); for adverting to the views of Augustine, he says that sometimes "he seems to adopt *the Realistic doctrine* that all men were in Adam, and that his sin was their sin, being an act of generic humanity. *As Levi was in the loins of Abraham and was tithed in him*, so we were in the loins of Adam and sinned in him."² Then again says Turretin: "In the propagation of sin the *accidens* does not pass from subject to subject, because the immediate subject of sin is not the person, *but human nature vitiated by actual transgression of the person*, which being communicated to posterity this inherent corruption is also communicated in it; as, therefore, in Adam the person has infected the nature, so in his posterity the nature infects the person. Ut ergo in Adamo persona infecit naturam; ita in posteris natura infecit personam."³

¹ Loco IX., Quæst. IX., Section 24. ² See his Theology, Vol. II., page 163.

³ Loco IX., Quæst. X., Section 22.

And we now ask the reader, Can any thing be in more direct antagonism to the scheme of Dr. Hodge than this whole representation? We have not room for other citations, but would refer our readers to Locus IX., Quæst. IX., §§ 28, 30, 33, &c.

§ 29. THE REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE AS ASSERTED BY DR. HODGE.

It might be on several accounts timely to furnish in this immediate connection a thorough discussion of both personal and representative responsibility as illustrating the representative principle in general, but our limits forbid the attempt. And the aim of our present section will therefore be to ascertain what is the principle itself as asserted by Dr. Hodge, and to develop the application he makes of it in his endeavor to support the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, and in this way we shall be able to compare it with the principle as entertained and taught by the Augustinian church. Important as it is, and necessarily must be to his whole theological theory, we cannot recollect that he has any where presented it in a formal definition, and we shall aim to arrive at a just conception of his actual view by tracing out his use and application of the principle itself, and by his attempted discriminations in regard to it.

It is strange, indeed, that any serious mind who understands the meaning of the terms should question the existence of social or representative responsibility while professing to allow the existence of that which is strictly personal; for jurisprudence, ethics, and the word of God alike all teach that we are placed under this twofold responsibility,¹ while speculation in every age has been greatly engaged in efforts to ascertain the limits of each, and in so attempting has not unfrequently merged the personal into the representative, and *vice versa*, the representative into the personal. And, indeed, it might be said that herein lies the *nucleus* of the great discussion between Augustine and his Pelagian antagonists; and of that between the Reformers and Remonstrants; and of that between Placæus and the Synod of Charenton; as likewise that of the existing discussion respecting the gratuitous imputation of sin. Not that we would intimate that the propositions litigated by the contending parties in these discussions were the same, or even uni-

¹ See Dr. Gray's *Mediatorial Reign*, Chapter VI.

form, but that the debates in the main grew out of the different conceptions entertained on the subject to which we refer.

1. In illustration of the design of this section we remark, *first*, that Dr. Hodge so ascribes the representative character to Adam alone as to exclude or ignore Eve logically and ethically in relation to the transmission of original sin.

Eve, in her connection with the fall, and so far as concerns the transmission of inherent corruption to her posterity, is clearly brought forward in the theology of the Reformation as sustaining a most important relation, but in this regard is practically ignored by Dr. Hodge throughout his theological system. This could not have been unintentional, since his theory makes the guilt of the fall to descend to the race, not through *generation*, but by a forensic imputation alone, according to his adopted canon: *neque per corpus, neque per animam sed per culpam; i. e., imputationem*, as he explains it. Whether this has induced such a total ignoring of Eve, our readers must decide for themselves. The facts are these: In presenting a statement of the fall, the Doctor very properly cites the Confession of Faith, Chapter VI., and also the account presented in Genesis third; but in speaking of the covenant, which is generally supposed to have been made "with our first parents *and their seed*," as the second covenant was made *with the second Adam and his seed*,¹ Eve is entirely ignored, and Adam alone declared to be the representative from whom our guilt is derived;² and in treating upon the imputation of the first sin he makes it be Adam's personal guilt alone, and never lapses into the use of those expressions so familiar to our theologians; *e. g.*, "The sin of Adam and Eve," "the sin of our first parents," etc.; but throughout his work it is the guilt or sin of Adam alone;³ and whether designed or not, the effect is to ignore the universally received doctrine of the Reformed church, *that original sin is derived to us through generation*. Note, for example, the statement in Turretin, loco IX., Quæst. 12, §§ 1-5.

Bellarmin, with whose views on imputation as expressed in *De Amissione Gratiæ et Statu Peccati* (lib. V., cap. 17), Dr. Hodge appears to concur,⁴ attempts the same thing, and in lib. IV. cap. 3,

¹ Larger Catechism, Question 31.

² Theology, Vol. II., pp. 121, 196, 197, *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, and especially page 225.

⁴ See Princeton Essays, First Series, pages 181, 193.

of that work, says: "*Non ab Eva, sed à solo Adamo peccatum originale trahi*," (original sin is not to be derived from Eve, but from Adam alone); a statement at once and decidedly discarded by the Reformed church as unauthorized and contrary to the truth. Maresius, for instance, takes it severely to task, and in his *Exposition of the Belgic Confession*¹ remarks, that "Since both parents concur actively for the production of offspring, it is inevitable that they must likewise concur for the propagation of sin, *ad peccati propagationem*. . . . Bellarmin is deservedly censurable for making his general assertion as though no evil is derived to us from Eve, and therefore from our mothers; for as to what the Scripture mentions of *one man* and of *Adam* in whom all sinned and died (Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22), it does not exclude, but rather includes, Eve, because she is to be reckoned in her husband as her head, . . . and because husband and wife are one in the propagation of offspring. But far more perilous is that which Bellarmin in the same place affirms, that 'we were in Adam as *in principio activo*, not in Eve, since the mother furnishes *non virtutem activam sed materiam tantum ad prolem generandam*.'" This last particular, however, perilous as it is both to ethics and theology, is but a fair logical sequence from the former.

The aim of Bellarmin was to rid the doctrine of original sin of the "incumbrance" (so annoying to the mere nominalist) of the transmission of sin by generation. The imputed guilt of Adam's first sin, says he, may be thus transmitted, *but not moral corruption, since moral corruption is the effect or consequence of the imputation of that guilt*. And if he could thus make it appear that we derive from Adam alone what we suffer through the fall,—that is, that the evils of life come upon us through his personal sin alone,—there would be no difficulty in the way of showing that original sin must, according to the aforesaid canon of Dr. Hodge, descend neither by the body nor the soul, but through a forensic imputation alone. But Eve, though represented by Adam as the proper head, was not confounded with him, as Dr. Hodge's theory logically represents her to be.

She sinned in her own person, and likewise participated with him in his offence, and was punished for that sin. And the self same punishment denounced against her for her sin (Gen. iii. 16.)

¹ Exegesis Confess. Belgic., Art. XV., §§ 12, 13, p. 228. (Groningw, 1652.)

descends to, and is inherited by, her daughters. God reckoned with her for her sin; charged it upon her (and all this though she was included in Adam as her federal head); and does not in any way refer to Adam's personal sin as the ground for this punishment. In fact, she was dealt with *first*, being, as the apostle remarks, "first in the transgression."¹ The theory of Dr. Hodge equally merges the sin and responsibility of the others whom Adam represented (that is, his posterity) in that of their father. But the same apostle assures us that *they* sinned as well as he, and are punished for their sin. But no theologian can thus ignore Eve in the matter of the fall, and of the transmission of original sin, without setting aside our standards, as well as our representative divines.²

So far as my recollection serves, Dr. Hodge, in his Theology, admits nothing in support of the doctrine that sin is transmitted by generation; but the eminent and approved theologians of the Calvinistic church, in treating upon original sin, fail not to bring the fact into prominence fully and frequently.

Thus, therefore, the representative principle, *as understood and inculcated by Dr. Hodge*, has no more concern with the concurrence or voluntary acquiescence of Eve in the covenant, or in the fall (though Adam was her representative), than it has with the voluntary concurrence of their posterity. Such acquiescence of the represented in any form is not an element which enters into the constitution of covenant representation, according to this conception, and hence the consequence must logically follow, that concurrence on the part of the represented in such transaction is not essential in order to render them responsible for the acts of the representative. And thus the concept of undisputed right or prerogative, which is conceded by all to the sovereign will and pleasure of God as the only Lawgiver, together with the reciprocal obligation of undisputed obedience on the part of the creature arising out of this right of rule or dominion, becomes in effect

¹ See an interesting discussion of this point in *Opera. Anton. Wallaci*, Tom. I., pp. 216, 217. (Lugduni Batavorum, 1643.)

² See, for example, *Confession of Faith*, Chap. VI., §§ 2-5; *Turretin ubi supra*; *Keckerman's Theologia*, page 253; *Synopsis Purioris Theologie*, page 147, § 40; Ursinus' *Explicatio Catechismi Heidelbergensis*, Quæst. 7. And likewise the repeated allusions to the doctrine occurring in the citations in Part II. of this work.

transferred to and confounded with that of His entrance through condescension upon a covenant transaction, thus constituting them identical, or a mere distinction without a difference, and this too at the very point where the terms of designation themselves have been carefully and discriminatingly chosen with the view of making apparent the existence of an appreciable and practical difference between them. But we cannot here discuss the topic. The principle, however, which is embodied, so to speak, in this conclusion has been repeatedly affirmed by Dr. Hodge, even in the extracts on our preceding pages; and reasoning therefrom it is not difficult to determine what are the views he entertains in relation to the main point in question.

2. Our *second* illustration is derived from the fact that the *representative principle*, as affirmed and applied by Dr. Hodge, logically attributes the origin of sin in Adam's posterity to the *divine efficiency*.

Should the presentation of this thesis be regarded as a deviation from the strict line of our discussion, our readers will please bear in mind that our design therein is merely to follow out briefly the foregoing argument by the inquiry, *whether, on such principles of racial representation, it is within the range of possibility to avoid charging upon our blessed and holy Creator the authorship of the sinful state existing in the posterity of Adam?* For if not, then that principle of representation, and the theory erected thereon, cannot be regarded otherwise than as false and pernicious. Instead, however, of treating the question abstractly, we shall briefly consider the facts as presented by Dr. Hodge himself.

In discoursing upon the doctrine of sin the Doctor, as already suggested, remarks that, "according to the Bible and the dictates of conscience, there is a sinfulness as well as sins; there is such a thing as character as distinguished from the transient acts by which it is revealed—that is, a sinful state—abiding, inherent, immanent forms of evil, which are truly and properly of the nature of sin. All sin, therefore, is not an agency, activity, or act; it may be, and is, also a condition or state of the mind. This distinction between habitual and actual sin has been recognized and admitted in the Church from the beginning."¹

All this is certainly true; and it was just this "sinful state"

¹ See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pages 187–192.

which, agreeably to the teaching of the Church, existed in Adam previous to his formal act of violating the precept in Gen. ii. 17, and which also induced that violation. The perpetration of the act did not of course produce his sinful state; but the reverse is the fact—this state of sinfulness induced both Eve and himself to the act. So also in regard to his offspring. A forensic imputation of the formal act could not of itself produce this state in them,¹ unless along with the imputation of the act the sinful state itself should have been imparted; for to make the forensic imputation of a *peccatum alienum* produce a *moral status*, which status alone could have produced the sinful act itself, would be a truly marvelous conception, whether viewed from an ethical or philosophical standpoint, and a complete reversion of natural order; and then, moreover, neither in legal nor political jurisprudence is the act of a representative ever charged upon his constituents in order to produce within them an approval of that act, and if charged, it is because they are regarded as having already approved it. In political representation, it is true, that some may be made to suffer the consequences of an act of the representative without having either chosen him to act for them or approved of his act itself; but his act is never charged as constituting them guilty without such participation. It simply imputes to them by a sentence of condemnation or disapproval the guilt which was already theirs; any condemnation or suffering aside from this is to them merely an unincurred and unavoidable calamity.

The Church herself has always viewed this matter as it is here stated; and when she teaches that the imputation of the first sin antecedes that sinful state of the posterity which becomes manifest on the attainment of full personality, it is not a juridical or forensic imputation of the mere *act* of Adam that she means, but also the charging upon them of a real participation in the sinful state which produced that act; a state in which the whole offspring, with their parents, participated, and which, together with the act of disobedience which it produced, was charged upon or imputed to Adam, and to Eve, and to all. Such is the Augustinian doctrine, which teaches likewise that this corruption is transmitted by ordinary generation. But let us contemplate a little further the statement of Dr. Hodge.

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1862, pages 566, 567.

Whence then, according to his theory, did that sinful state originate which confessedly exists in all the posterity of Adam? The merely putative charge or forensic imputation of the act, or even of the sinful state which induced the act (were such a thing conceivable, they being subjectively free of any guilt or corruption), never of itself could have originated the sinful state within them. Nor is it of the slightest importance to the argument here whether the sinful state be named *positive* or *privative*, so long as it is conceded to be "an estate of sin and misery." Whence, then, did it originate? Adam, had he even so desired, could never, without their concurrence, have inflicted such a condition upon his seed, and neither could the devil. It must have had an efficient cause; but Adam, as Dr. Hodge affirms, was not that cause; and he, moreover, affirms most directly that they themselves never causally produced it, and that it is found existing in them anterior, not only to all intellectual and moral action, but anterior also to all capability for such action. Neither Adam, therefore, nor the devil, nor the posterity themselves, could have originated it in such circumstances; and yet it exists, and is fearfully and tremendously operative, and of course must have had a procuring cause to which its origin is traceable. On the theory of Dr. Hodge, therefore, there *is* and there *can be* but one solution of the inquiry: *Its origin or efficient production is traceable to the divine efficiency alone!* If this be a legitimate conclusion, as it certainly seems to be, nothing more is needed to demonstrate that this theory should be at once and for ever discarded by all who profess the Christian name, and that it is wholly out of sympathy with, and directly antagonistic to, the expressed teaching of the word of God and the recognized theology of the Church. To retain such a conception is to retain, under the mask of honoring Him, a standing calumny upon His great and all-glorious name and character. But we must again advert to this aspect of the theory, and therefore pass it for the present.

3. Our *third* and last point is the persistent endeavor of Dr. Hodge to identify his principle of representation with the recognized theology of the Church. We select this as the concluding illustration of the general thesis of the present section, as in this, his endeavor, the real character of his principle of representation is brought to view more fully than in his other discussions.

In order to prepare the way to represent his theory at large as identical with the approved theology of the Church, Dr. Hodge makes and reiterates broadly the assertion that the Reformers soon found that they could not hold in its integrity the doctrine of the gratuitous justification of the sinner by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, until they had adopted the doctrine of the gratuitous condemnation of the offspring of Adam on account of his merely personal sin, or *peccatum alienum*; ¹ and thus they are held forth as *ex necessitate rei* adopting the dogma of the *gratuitous imputation of sin*; which remarkable information is thus communicated in order that all may be made to understand the importance of the dogma which was so indispensable to the right adjustment of the doctrine of justification by faith alone, as well as the obligation we are under to accept the dogma itself, and what it affirms in respect to representation, as the accredited doctrine of the Calvinistic church.

Such a statement—and one relating, as this does, to a doctrine fundamental to our theology (justification by faith alone)—should never have been ventured upon except in view of a clearly specified historic basis of conceded authority, or a citation of indisputable facts to sustain it, neither of which does Dr. Hodge in any way attempt to furnish. It is in full harmony with the unceasing efforts of Papists, and others of the enemies of the doctrines of grace, to bring into disrepute the theology of the Reformation as partizan, or as imperfectly developed; and it is, to say the least, most humiliating to find such a recognition of those efforts emanating from a theological school of our own, and no less painful to characterize it as the facts in the case and the importance of the subject imperatively require. *This asseveration of Dr. Hodge is not true*, let him explain it as he may. It is purely a fiction of his own imagination, not only having nothing of fact to sustain it, but with all the facts establishing the direct contrary. The exigencies of his theory have led him in this, as in a hundred other instances, into the strangest and most unaccountable misconceptions and perversions of our theology, which are both inexcusable and incapable even of extenuation. Let but the intelligent reader ask himself, Can it be that Luther (for instance), who, after

¹ See Princeton Essays, First Series, pp. 174–177, and *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 339–341, 368–374, 763, 764.

thoroughly considering it, had so utterly condemned this gratuitous imputation scheme now advocated by Dr. Hodge (when Erasmus had endeavored to revive it), declaring that, though it was flattering to reason, its principles were full of impiety and blasphemy,¹ and whose affirmation that the doctrine of justification by faith alone is the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*, has become a household word to the Church, and whose views on the subject never varied, could not hold that glorious doctrine in its integrity without so essentially changing his ground as to return to and adopt the flagrant error which he thus, and in the last few months of his life, disclaims and explodes? And that Calvin also, who had adverted to, and in the strongest manner condemned, the same error when asserted by Pighius and Catharinus (whose advocacy of it in the Council of Trent in his day had made it familiar to the Protestant world), could not hold the doctrine of justification "in its integrity" without thus essentially changing his ground (which he never varied), and acquiescing in the error he had condemned? And that Bucer, Whittaker, Ursinus, Pareus and Gomar, and so on down to the illustrious Turretin, and the myriads who in their day and since have taught and defended it, without even dreaming of any necessity for Dr. Hodge's theory, or exegesis, or principle of representation, did not or could not hold that doctrine "in its integrity?" and that the ground they occupied so successfully and with such irresistible might against Papists, Pelagians and others, had to be varied or departed from in order that this truth might be maintained in its integrity? Such an allegation is unspeakably unjust and ungrateful, not only to that noble portion of God's sacramental host, but to the Church herself, which they were His chief agents in establishing, and for whose welfare they prayed and suffered and toiled unceasingly, until the great Shepherd received them to His celestial fold.

It is nevertheless true, indeed, as the remark itself evinces, that Dr. Hodge himself has found it needful to depart from their doctrine on this great subject in order to maintain his theory of imputation; for he could not peruse their writings and fail to discern that they not only entertained no such dogma as the gratuitous imputation of sin and the so-called principle of representation

¹ "Abblandiuntur hæc rationi, sed sunt plena impietatis et blasphemie." (Comment. on Genesis ii. 17.)

therein involved, but that they regarded and denounced that whole theory as a pestilential heresy, and totally subversive of the evangelical system of grace. But nevertheless, *as though it were really an admitted fact*, he speaks of the inconsistency and confusion of the Protestant theology during the sixteenth century, and of the "one-sided views" which were therein presented.¹ And he does this, moreover, in the very face of those transcendently important admissions of the advanced or later criticism, which condemn the assertion as unfounded and unscholarly. *Winer*, for instance, whose sound judgment and discretion as an interpreter of the Scripture *usus loquendi* no true scholar will think of impeaching, has, with Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Lange, Schaff, Delitzsch, and their eminent and truly erudite co-laborers, affirmed that "*the controversies among interpreters have ordinarily led back to the admission that the old Protestant views of the meaning of the sacred text are the correct views.*"² The remark has reference to the fundamental doctrines of the Protestant theology, as inculcated by the old theologians who achieved the Reformation, and as distinguished from the antagonistic doctrines of the Papal and Socinian schools; and amongst the doctrines thus developed and supported by the Protestants, and assailed by their antagonists, the doctrine of justification by faith alone was that which pre-eminently developed the Reformation. *And it is of this doctrine mainly, and as formulated by Luther and Calvin and their co-peers, that Dr. Hodge is speaking in the forecited remarks.* Let there, then, be no evading of the issue herein involved. Dr. Hodge should be required either to make good his allegations by reference to fact (which he never can do), or promptly to retract them. It is not necessary to claim on behalf of the theology of the early Reformers that it is uniformly and on all points systematically

¹ See, for example, the *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 338, 339.

² Cited by Tholuck (in his Lectures, in *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1844) from the *Leips. Literatur Zeitung*, No. 44. Schaff also (in his *Principle of Protestantism*, pp. 134, 135), after presenting very strongly the same thought, adds: "The scientific study of language itself, by its own inward development, and without any regard to Christianity, has led to the immensely important result that the Church (orthodox Protestantism in particular) has understood the Bible in substance correctly, and must be allowed, therefore, to have all right against Rationalism at the bar of science, if only the assumption of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures be securely established."

precise and scientifically complete. As regards topics of minor interest we find occasionally almost as great a variety of stand-points as our theologians now assume, and on them they differed as orthodox divines differ still. They unite, however, in attributing to the creature, and not to God, the origination of sin or *moral* evil, and in rejecting the dogma of the gratuitous imputation of sin. And in regard to the creature's *responsibility* for the existence of moral evil, and as to the doctrines of justification, regeneration, and sanctification, the duty of the sinner to accept at once (*sine hæsitazione*, as Ursinus expresses it) the overtures of salvation through the gospel,—or, in other words, *the whole system of the doctrines of grace*,—their views were in uniform consistency with the teaching of the word of God, as much so, at least, as the views of evangelical divines are now or ever have been; and it is inexpressibly improper and out of place for any reputed Calvinist to disparage their presentation of the great system of divine truth.

It is well worthy of note in the connection, as indicating the hand of God's watchful providence in guarding the interests of His blood-purchased flock, that simultaneously with the publication of the forecited and unbecoming article of Dr. Hodge disparaging the theology and founders of the Reformation, Principal Cunningham, of Edinburgh, issued in the *Foreign Evangelical Review* (for April, 1860) his admirable article on the *Leaders of the Reformation*,¹ from which our readers will doubtless be gratified to peruse the following extracts, and to compare them with the forecited deliverances of Dr. Hodge: "The highest honor," says Principal Cunningham, "of the Reformers, or rather the principal gift which God gave them, viewed as public teachers who have exerted an influence upon the state of religious opinion and practice in the world, was that, in point of fact, they did derive from the word of God the *truths* or *true doctrines* which are there set forth, and that they brought them out, and expounded and enforced them in such a way as led, through God's blessing, to their being extensively received and applied. Christian theology, in some of its most important articles, had for a long period been grossly corrupted in the church of Rome, which then comprehended the largest portion of Christendom. The Lord was pleased

¹ Subsequently republished as Essay I. in the volume of his works entitled *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*.

through the instrumentality of the Reformers to expose these corruptions, to bring out prominently before the world the true doctrines of His word. The Lord did this by His Spirit at the era of the Reformation, and he employed in doing it the instrumentality of the Reformers. He guided them not only to the adoption of the right method, the use of the appropriate means for detecting error and discovering divine truth, but, what was of primary and paramount importance, He guided them to a right judgment—that is, right in the main and with respect to all fundamental points—as to what particular doctrines were true or false according to the standard of His written word" (p. 6). "And we think it can be proved, not only that this theology was sound and scriptural as compared with what had previously prevailed in the church of Rome, *but that the deviations which Protestants since then have made from it have been in the main retrogressions from truth to error*. The Reformers, with respect to all points in which they were substantially of one mind, may be regarded as being upon the whole entitled to more respect and deference than any other body of men who could be specified or marked out at any period in the history of the Church" (p. 7).

Dr. Cunningham then (on p. 9) administers to Dr. Tulloch the following rebuke for advancing sentiments touching this matter which are strikingly similar to those of Dr. Hodge. He says: "Dr. Tulloch, we fear, has come to a different conclusion upon this important question, and has plainly enough given the world to understand that, in his judgment, the theology of the Reformation, though a creditable and useful thing in the sixteenth century, and a great improvement on the state of matters in the church of Rome, has now become antiquated and obsolete, and quite unsuitable to the enlightenment which characterizes this age." And on page 18 he adds: "A combination seems to exist at present for the purpose of undermining and exploding the theology of the Reformation, without meeting it fairly and openly in the field of argument."

There are few things in this whole discussion the contemplation of which has been a source of deeper mortification than the efforts of Dr. Hodge to disparage, and so to lessen or neutralize, the esteem which the Church so justly entertains for the noble and incomparable theology of the purest ages of the Reformation, and thus

to encourage and even justify the ambitious efforts of those illiterate and half-learned sciolists in our own and other communions, who, in their abortive efforts to impress the public with an exalted sense of their theological attainments, profess to have advanced beyond the earlier and still recognized theology of the Church, without in any way endeavoring to ascertain, except through incompetent second hands, what that theology really is.¹ We would commend to such a careful perusal of the "*Conclusion*" of President Edward's Reply to Dr. John Taylor on Original Sin. But it is indeed an inexpressibly saddening thought that Dr. Hodge should have permitted himself to inculcate upon a large portion of the ministry of our Church and of its missionaries such sentiments in regard to that theology. If his own theory could not be sustained except by the disparagement of so precious a legacy, he might well have concluded it to be utterly unworthy of the regard or confidence of the Church. And well am I persuaded that few, if any, of our divines who are thoroughly conversant with the rich and precious treasures bequeathed us by the great and good men referred to, can entertain the slightest sympathy with such a procedure.

This persistent endeavor, therefore, to hew out through the cherished doctrines of the Church an avenue for introducing the gratuitous imputation of sin, with its principle of so-called covenant representation, into that sacred enclosure, cannot be admitted or recognized. The venerable Dr. C. C. Cuyler, in his opening sermon before the Synod of York (Pa.), in October, 1835, has well observed that "the creeds of the Reformers do not need revising, and if they did, the men are probably not living to whom the task could be committed with safety." And as regards all the great and distinguishing features of their work there is ground for the suggestion, not that we would speak slightly of either the profound erudition or ability of the noble body of the truly learned in this and in other lands, whose attainments and whose

¹ This state of things, to a considerable extent, may be traced to the humiliating fact that the theology of the Reformation is, at the present time, rarely studied by our graduates of Princeton and Allegheny Seminaries, and of course but little alarm has been awakened by Dr. Hodge's treatment of imputation and original sin, or even by his adoption, in so flagrant a manner as he has done, the Socinian exegesis of Rom. v. 12-19. In fact, it would not be desirable that that theology should be studied, if his statements on original sin are to be accepted as true.

zeal for Christ and His truth now adorn His Church in its various branches, but the labor of formulating those doctrinal symbols was assigned by Him to the Reformers themselves as their special duty; and to them He therefore imparted those spiritual gifts which were pre-eminently required for its needed performance; nor can the higher form of life which, since their day, the Church, with all its drawbacks, has been steadily approximating, be realized in antagonisms to and reversions of those teachings; but only in a fuller development of their true spirit and life-giving energy in leading the Church herself still nearer to God.

This train of reflection may be appropriately brought to a close by the following elegant tribute from the pen of Dr. Gray, to whom we have already referred: "It is now too late to call in question whether the glorious Reformation, in which God said, Let there be light, and there was light; and intellect burst her chains; and religion poured her light; and science burst forth into birth; and tyranny shrunk back; and the spirit of liberty waved her flag and cried, To arms, MY SONS, to arms!—when Europe was regenerated to become the regenerator of the world. It is too late to inquire whether this was the work of God! Can I believe that the Melancthons, and the Luthers, and the Morells, and the Calvins, and the Jewells, and the Owens, and twenty others whom I could name, and a thousand of others of whom I have never heard, *did not understand the gospel?* In reading their works I have often paused, and palpitated, and asked, What has become of this race of noble blood? Were they all monks? Have they no sons at all? In this age scarcely can be found a man who holds a lamp that can show us how to step over a gutter; those held lamps that shed light over half a world. How were they so great? Surely God poured on them His Spirit in no ordinary measure; surely they studied the holy word; surely they prayed for the spirit of illumination when they studied. I find them expressing for each other a manly esteem, and I see them interchanging side-long glances of love, in a way that lovers only can see; but I have not found a single puff at each other in all I have read of them. Indeed, they were made of too weighty metal to be puffed up by the breath of mortal man. *And am I to be told that these men did not understand the gospel?* . . . I do not say that they were always right. God left so much human

frailty in them to warn us to depend not on them, but on His own Spirit and word.¹ In some instances I think them wrong, and then with timid step I take a different way. But never have I told, and never shall I tell the public, that I learned the way to truth by my father's errors. *No, ye heroes, if ever I name your names save for praise, may my own name rot.*"²

What, then, must be the nature of that conception of Protestant theology which could allow itself even to suppose that Calvin (and along with him his co-laborers in the Reformation), repudiated "a principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system in the form in which it is presented in the Bible,"³ when he taught so directly and emphatically against Pighius and Catharinus that "we are condemned for the sin of Adam [that is, "the judgment unto condemnation" passes upon us], not by imputation alone, *as if the punishment of a foreign sin were exacted of us, but we bear its punishment because we also are guilty of the sin so far as our nature vitiated in him is bound under the guilt of iniquity before God.*"⁴ This, as we have abundantly shown, is the doctrine of the Reformation; and it is in direct denial of Dr. Hodge's whole theory of representation and of the gratuitous imputation of sin, Calvin affirming that our condemnation for Adam's sin is not through the imputation alone of that sin, as though God exacted of us the punishment of a foreign sin, or *peccatum alienum*, while Dr. Hodge affirms that it is alone for a *peccatum alienum*—"the one sin of the one man." Calvin affirming that its ground was also our subjective guilt, we being guilty of the sin; and Dr. Hodge affirming that to admit any degree whatever of subjective ill-desert on the part of the posterity as the ground for the imputation, must vitiate the doctrine of justification by the imputed righteousness of Christ. And then, moreover, in instances without number he affirms likewise that "spiritual death was the penal and therefore certain condemna-

¹ "Their doctrine I believe to be always right; when they chanced to slip in a bit of philosophy, a system, it was wrong."

² *The Fiend of the Reformation Detected*, pp. 90, 91, cited in Dr. E. S. Ely's *Theological Review* for 1818, pp. 202, 203. (Philadelphia.)

³ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, page 341.

⁴ Commentary on Romans v. 17. See Dr. Hodge's misconception of this passage in *Princeton Essays*, First Series, pp. 174, 175.

tion for the sin of Adam"¹—"all are condemned for the sin of the one."² Such, therefore, are the results of those efforts to identify this theory with the theology of the Augustinian church.

To conclude, Dr. Hodge's concept of covenant representation will necessarily come up for specific notice and consideration in our next section, in relation to the covenant itself, and therefore need not now be further dwelt upon. And it is sufficient here to remark that his theory compels him to regard that so-called *representation* as simply coercive, and so to confound it with mere law as to abolish the obvious distinction between the two, and really to incorporate therewith the notion of both Catharinus and Crellius; thus rendering the whole so-named covenant transaction a merely arbitrary or sovereign determination of the divine mind to constitute the trial of Adam the trial of the race, without regard to the posterity as a party therein. But this, as we shall see presently, neither is nor ever has been the recognized doctrine of the Calvinistic or Augustinian church.

§ 30. THE THEORY AND THE CHURCH DOGMATIC.

The theological positions of the Reformed or Calvinistic church which, to a considerable extent, have been elicited in our preceding sections we have now considered, so far as relates to their assumed identity with the more salient features and claims of Dr. Hodge's theory. But before concluding the discussion, it will be proper to lay before our readers that theory in the direct dogmatic contrast which it assumes to the doctrinal and ethical teachings of the Church. In the present section we shall treat the subject mainly in its historic aspect, and in the following or concluding section shall show what are its logical relations to our ethics and practical theology; or, in other words, the revolution which its adoption must necessarily effectuate therein.

Augustine taught that the *cause* or origin of Adam's sin is not to be looked for out of himself. He was free, and freely sinned. This with Augustine is a primary fact, and it is never lost sight of or set aside by the advocacy of principles through which it may, by logical implication, be either subverted or enervated. His second primary fact in relation to the matter is that this sin of Adam was participated in by his descendants, and in such a sense

¹ See *Theology*, Vol. II., page 538.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I., page 27.

as to involve their spontaneity or ethical appropriation of its culpability or guilt; so that, in the transgression which he *in actu* perpetrated, they likewise sinned, and so sinned as to incur deservedly the judgment unto condemnation which came upon all; and that thus all the consequences which finally overtook Adam extended also to them,—and extended, let it be observed, not *for*, or *on account of* his sin considered as a *peccatum alienum* (as Pelagius named it, but which name was promptly disclaimed by Augustine), but because they participated with Adam therein. The fact of their participation and consequent guilt he everywhere affirms. The *mode* of that participation he nowhere attempts to explain (as the philosophical Realists have since essayed to do), further than to allege that the first sin was not a *peccatum alienum* to the posterity of Adam, and consequently could not become *subjectively* theirs by any forensic or gratuitous imputation. Their participation was real, and their guilt was real and not fictitious, or merely putative; *i. e.*, it was not produced by forensic imputation of a sin which their own ethical appropriation had not so constituted theirs as to render them *subjectively* guilty. And therefore the imputation or condemnatory judgment was as justly inflicted upon them as upon himself. These, though not exactly his words, are his sentiments, on which light is cast by his well-known remark (already cited), *peccatum "antiquum, quo nihil est ad predicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius."*

Thus, from first to last, was our subjective guilt not only clearly affirmed by Augustine, and the justice and holiness of God in the matter carefully guarded from implication, but the true representative principle as subsequently taught by the churches of the Reformation carefully preserved, though not formally defined or formulated. His doctrine as fairly presented is, that Adam stood personally not for himself alone, but also for his posterity. His *act* was not their act, but the guilt of acquiescing therein was a common guilt; as in the case of a political representative now, who, acting from the known wish of his constituents, perpetrates an act of treason. The *act* is not theirs, but the guilt is by participation. So in the case of Adam and his race. His sin was not imputed to or charged upon them as a *peccatum alienum* to constitute them guilty, but as a *peccatum commune*, of which they with him were already guilty. Their sin was not that of formal

perpetration, but of participation through acquiescence or concurrence. But this whole subject-matter of representation and participation in the Adamic sin, as taught in our theology, cannot be fully understood or appreciated unless viewed in connection with the doctrine of the covenant as entertained by the Augustinian church—a point to which we shall invite attention presently.

Such, then, was the Augustinian doctrine of representation, and such the form in which it was subsequently presented by our Church. Cocceius, as already stated, engrafted upon it the conception of a *formal contract*¹ between God and our first parents. But the transaction is not to be viewed as a bargain or contract, but simply in the light of an *agreement*; that is, God in His infinite condescension freely and voluntarily appointed that the race, by means of a specific test, limited in its duration, should be enabled to secure, beyond fall or forfeit, full confirmation in holiness (instead of having probation run coeval with existence)—a test, moreover, which all moral agents must render before they can be accepted or approved as obedient. Hence it has been named *the covenant of works*, as made with our first parents while in a state of integrity, and therein differs from the Sinaitic dispensation, which relates to the race in their fallen condition. It consisted, therefore, simply of a deed of promised blessings, with the particular mode or terms of their conveyance, and of course an acquiescence in these proffers of infinite condescension and goodness on the part of those to whom they are made. The difference between such an arrangement or appointment, and a mere legal enactment is sufficiently obvious. But on the part of Cocceius and his followers the conception became so elaborated as in a great degree to exclude from the covenant the human element or agency, as relating to the posterity themselves, and to give undue prominence to the conception of the whole as merely a legal enactment, requiring that the race should undergo probation in Adam alone; though, in expression at least, they distinctly retained the principle of spontaneity and appropriation in relation to original sin. And the doctrine of immediate and antecedent imputation,

¹ See a masterly discussion of the scheme of Cocceius in Van Mastricht's Theology (who presents its leading points), lib. VI., cap. VI., § 29, pp. 715-718, and lib. VIII., cap. I., §§ 34, usque ad 39, pp. 887-891, and cap. II., §§ 50-54, pp. 932-936, and cap. III., § 44, page 1074.

as held by those divines, has now been by Dr. Hodge, through an inconceivable miscomprehension of the terms, merged into that of a *gratuitous* imputation, by which the ethical appropriation of the first sin is removed from the creature as its source, and transferred, or left to be traceable to the divine efficiency alone.

There can be no rational ground for doubt that the Augustinian or Calvinistic church has ever taught that the sin of Adam is *rightfully* imputed to his posterity, and that guilt and depravity came *upon them* just as they did upon him; and, moreover, that their guilt is one and simple, to-wit: *the guilt of the original apostasy*, and that it is imputed, therefore, because it is theirs, not indeed as personally contracted, but morally and legally theirs. The question then occurs, Does this imputation take place, and is this guilt thus accounted theirs, simply because God established a covenant relation between Adam and his posterity in order to constitute them responsible for his acts in virtue of such representation? or is it accounted theirs because it is really and truly theirs in virtue of their actual participation with their covenant head in the fall? The view of the Church on this question is, we think, clearly settled by the abundant testimony adduced on the preceding pages, to the effect that the sin is theirs because of their participation therein. It is not necessary to discuss here the inquiry, whether God, in the exercise of His sovereignty, may not constitute one person liable for the sins of another with which he has had no real connection; for the Church has ever held, as Charnock has truly expressed it, that "God cannot pollute any undefiled creature by virtue of that sovereign power which He has to do what He will with it, because such an act would be contrary to the foundation and right of His dominion."¹ He regards and treats the posterity as sinners, therefore, not by virtue of any sovereign power He may have to do so, but because they participated in the first transgression, and sinned when Adam sinned.

We repeat, therefore, emphatically, that the doctrine plainly announced by Augustine on this subject, and which has always been entertained and defended by the Calvinistic church, affirms, 1, The natural and moral (or federal) headship of Adam; 2, That the threatening in Gen. ii. 17, included, not only the loss of original righteousness, but spiritual and eternal death; 3, That in the

¹ Discourse X., on the Attributes.

threatening both Adam and his naturally-begotten posterity were all comprehended; 4, And consequently, *that all the evils which his posterity suffer result from the first transgression*. Thus far Pighius and Catharinus, and other advocates of the gratuitous imputation of sin, concur in *statement* with Augustine; but at this point they diverge vitally and fundamentally from *the doctrine* he taught, they claiming that "the first transgression" was Adam's personal sin alone, which, being gratuitously imputed to the race when guiltless of subjective ill-desert, was the procuring cause of all the evils we suffer; whilst Augustine and the Reformed church teach that the first transgression was not Adam's personal sin alone, but our sin also in and with him, and which, being imputed, produced all those appalling evils, *since in that transgression they all sinned, not putatively, but originally and potentially*, and thus were constituted ἀμαρτωλοί—*really sinners*. In other words, by participating in that offence they became culpable, so that his sin and their sin in and with him was imputed to them all; and that hence from this common and universal sin originated the inherent hereditary corruption in which we all are born.

Such is the Church view. She has never denied, but, on the contrary, has always pronounced it a heresy to deny that the very sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity. But her doctrine is, and ever has been, that this sin is imputed to us, not simply because of Adam's guilt therein, but because we ourselves participated with Adam therein, and that therefore it is charged upon us as well as upon him, and that we with him are thereby constituted sinners. It was imputed to him and to Eve because they were guilty alike of its formal perpetration; and was not imputed to Eve merely because Adam had committed it (though he was her representative), but because she had participated therein. And in like manner it was imputed to the rest of the race, not merely because their father was guilty of its perpetration, but because they were guilty by participation when "all sinned;" that is, there was a moral and objective ground in his case, and in the case of Eve, and in the case also of their posterity, for regarding and treating them as sinners.

The imputation, therefore, was not that of a *peccatum alienum*, or *gratuitous* in either case. It was direct or immediate to Adam and Eve, but not antecedent to their personal transgression. With

their posterity, however, who sinned in and with them, it was both *immediate* and *antecedent*, for they were not yet in possession of actual personality, or, as Augustine expresses it, *of the forms of life and being which thereafter they should possess*.¹ Nor has the Church ever confounded *immediate* and *antecedent imputation*. Dr. Hodge, however, has repudiated the doctrine thus presented by affirming that in the first offence the posterity of Adam contracted no subjective guilt or ill-desert, and that all the evils they suffer are penal inflictions on account of Adam's merely personal sin—a sin which, as he affirms, is purely a foreign sin, or *peccatum alienum*.

The persistence with which the Doctor endeavors to fasten upon the standards of our Church this notion or principle of compulsory guilt and representation is marvellous; and it is apparent in all his writings, though, as we have shown, he has really nothing to sustain him therein. Nor is this all; for with equal absence of proof he claims that the same notion is supported by Augustine in the early Church;² and that the Papal church entertains it,³ and likewise the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches,⁴ notwithstanding their lamentable forgetfulness and oversight in the framing of their Confessions, for, important and fundamental as he deems it, he is obliged to confess that not one of those symbols contains it.⁵ And his mind is so partial to the hypothesis (as parents often are to their offspring) that he can see its image in everything, and theology is, in fact, of little account without it;⁶ and he seems ready on this hypothesis to solve all her weightier problems, as the musician mentioned in the Tusculan Questions, to whom music was everything, the soul itself being only certain notes of the gamut, etc. Lord Verulam refers to this fascination of an endeared hypothesis, which, being heartily accepted (especially if its elaboration has cost some pains), will diffuse its ideas through everything with which we are or would be conversant. Dr. Hammond found Gnostics everywhere referred to in the New Testament, and shapes his interpretations accordingly; and Malebranche mentions a la-

¹ De Civitate Dei, lib. XIII., cap. 14.

² Theology, Vol. II., pp. 157–164. ³ Ibid., p. 180.

⁴ Ibid., p. 194, and *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 338–342.

⁵ Theology, Vol. II., pp. 228–231.

⁶ Princeton Essays, First Series, pp. 132, 133, and *Review* for 1860, p. 341.

borious scholar who, having prepared some learned volumes on the cross, could at last discover crosses in everything, and finally received their existence in the circular shape of coins. Even Des Cartes, after long pondering on and defending his elemental hypothesis, could at length solve all the phenomena in the physical (if not in the mental and moral) universe on the principle of “matter and motion.” And Dr. Hodge, in like manner, finds his theory everywhere in theology, and of course, therefore, it must exist in our doctrinal symbols. For example, in the Princeton Essays¹ he cites and comments on a passage in the *Larger Catechism* (Question 22) as follows: “‘The COVENANT being made with Adam as a public person, not for him only, but for his posterity, all mankind descended [descending] from him by ordinary generation sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression.’ If English be any longer English, this means that it was our representative—as a public person we sinned *in* him—in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract. Let it be noted that this is the *only* union here mentioned. The bond arising from our *natural relation* to him, as our common parent, is not even referred to. *It is neglected because of its secondary importance*, representation being the main ground of imputation; so that when representation ceases, imputation ceases, although the natural bond continues.”²

In this doctrinal statement from our standards the spontaneity and self-appropriation of the posterity in the first sin are carefully recognized. “*All mankind* sinned in him and fell with him,”—words which, in the language of the Westminster divines, cannot be made to mean that they sinned *after he had sinned*; or *that, being innocent of sin, they had sin charged upon them*. But in Dr. Hodge's exposition, as here presented, that idea has no place. In any instance of representation wherein the representative, acting from or in accordance with the known will of his constituents, perpetrates a crime, it is perfectly germane to say, ‘*They acted concurrently*,’ ‘*they transgressed with him*.’ But in a case wherein they neither had, nor could have had, any agreement with him in his act, and in which there could have been no possible concurrence with him until subsequent to his act, which not until then was charged upon them, and that not as being guilty of perpetration,

¹ First Series, p. 187.

² Compare this with his Theology, Vol. II., pp. 198–201.

or even of any acquiescence therein, but as wholly innocent of any ethical connection with it, it is clearly an abuse of language to pretend to describe this subsequent charge or accusation by affirming *that they sinned or rebelled together with him!* Now such is the language of the symbol in this very passage—*there was a conjoint sinning and falling*; which cannot, I repeat it, be construed, without violence, to mean that *they* did not sin and fall until *after* he had sinned and fallen. And yet this is the conception which Dr. Hodge insists is not only reconcilable with, but actually and necessarily (“if English be any longer English”) taught in the language here cited, and in other similar passages of our standards! His theory excludes the conjoint acquiescence of the race with their head, and their ethical appropriation of his sin, which is the doctrine actually taught by the Assembly. And then, further, as regards his allegation that *the natural relation is not even mentioned or referred to* in the passage, though the constituency itself *is therein not only plainly named and defined* as sustaining the natural relation to their covenant head, and though our blessed Redeemer is therein expressly excluded from that constituency on the ground that He did not sustain the natural relation to Adam in the sense of descending from him by ordinary generation (a phrase which refers solely to Him), our readers must decide for themselves whether such a criticism does not furnish an insight into the ground of many of the Doctor’s unaccountable and fatal misapprehensions of the meaning of our standards and of the leading Calvinistic divines.

As to the Calvinistic doctrine of the covenant, therefore, to the consideration of which we would now return, the transaction has been presented in two different aspects. One, as in the foregoing and other passages from Dr. Hodge, as a merely legal enactment, a command or law enjoined under the wholly inappropriate name of covenant or contract, in which the mere will or sovereignty of God appoints and regulates and disposes of everything. The other presents the aspect (which we have already mentioned) of *agreement or treaty*, wherein the agency of both parties alike is recognized and regarded, and man is left to the freedom of his own will, God retaining (of course) His sovereign right to command or enjoin, but at the same time leaving, as we have already said, the moral agency of the creature—that is, his accountable

nature—unimpaired and uncontrolled by that mere sovereignty, and fully responsible for its procedure in regard to the whole transaction; and, moreover, that the proceeding assumed this form rather than that of mere sovereign disposal (which God unquestionably possessed the prerogative to exercise) solely from his infinite condescension to the creatures of His hand. Now, Dr. Hodge accepts the former of these views, which is the basis of his theory, and the latter is the one held and inculcated by the Church.

To predicate, as has been repeatedly attempted, the accuracy of the former of these views, upon the mere ground of the uncontrollable sovereignty of God; that is, to maintain that, because He is thus sovereign, therefore such must have been the character of this transaction, is to deduce a wholly unsupported and unwarrantable conclusion. It is in no sense true that, because He possesses the right so to appoint and order the affair, He therefore did not or could not, in condescension to the creature, employ the form of a covenant, and the argument is worthless. And then, such a transaction being mere law, and not covenant in the proper sense (as we have said), it is precisely this representation which identifies the theory of Dr. Hodge with that of the Armenians (in the fifth century), and of Ocham, and Catharinus, Crellius, Taylor, of Norwich, Curcellæus, Whitby and others, which the Church always and with one voice has condemned. So far as they have given expression to the idea of a covenant transaction, they all alike agree that the *pactum* was made with Adam alone *for* himself *and* offspring; while they utterly repudiate the Augustinian view; that is, they all deny that it was made with Adam’s posterity, except *putatively*; *i. e.*, in the same sense as that in which they sinned when he sinned. And this is simply to attribute the production of sin, as it exists in the posterity, to the efficient agency of God; for you cannot attribute the sin and misery of the race to a merely putative sin as its cause, without rendering this conclusion inevitable.

The Church, therefore, has always represented the transaction as truly a covenant, an agreement or treaty between God on the one hand, and Adam and his seed on the other, and not as a mere law; and not made with Adam only *for* his seed, but *with* him *and* *with* them. How the moral responsibility of the seed was

directly or really preserved, as in the case of Adam and Eve, was not set aside, or (so to speak) overridden, the Church has never pretended to know, any more than to know how their agency was associated with his in the violation of that covenant when *all sinned*. But the fact of such violation being divinely announced, the other fact becomes a certainty, THAT THEY PARTICIPATED WITH HIM IN THE COVENANT TRANSACTION. Both facts are alike incomprehensible to the reason. But the divine testimony cannot be set aside on that account.

The point in issue, therefore, is the doctrine of participation as related to both the covenant and its transgression. In other words, were the posterity (as well as Adam) a party in the covenant? And to deny this is, as we have said, hopelessly to abandon the Calvinistic doctrine and to take sides with its foes. Since the time of Cocceius there has been a good deal of verging in this direction by sundry divines, and a proportionable misstatement of the Calvinistic system; for this is a controlling feature of that system. But even those who assumed the highest ground in our theology of representing the covenant as made with Adam, never lose sight of this great truth; as, for example, when Witsius, "On the Covenants," remarks: "But there is another relation, in which he was considered as the *head and representative of mankind*, both *federal and natural*. So that God said to Adam, as once to the Israelites (Deut. xxix. 14, 15), *neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but also with him that is not here with us this day*. The whole history of the first man proves that he is not to be looked upon as an individual person, but that the whole human nature is considered as in him."¹

Dr. Hodge, in affirming that the covenant was made with Adam only, simply persists, as in many other instances (some of which we have already noticed), in taking what is merely a *part* of the recognized statement of our theology for the whole, as Adam's posterity had then no developed or *personal* existence, the covenant was made *formally* and *personally* with him alone. But this is only a part of the statement of our theology on the subject; for it everywhere recognizes that, though made *formally* for them, it was made *really* with them as with him; and to ignore this constantly asserted fact is simply to misrepresent the doctrine of

¹ See Book I., chapter 2, § 14, pages 62, 63.

our Church; and yet Dr. Hodge must do this, or else abandon his theory. For when our theologians allege that it was made with Adam and for his seed, they, as we have shown, never mean to exclude the fact that it was at the same time made with his seed, and that they were a party as well as he. Dr. Hodge's conception is, moreover, contrary to all the analogies of the word of God on the subject. The covenant was made with Adam and all his naturally begotten posterity; and in the term itself, and from the analogy of all other covenants which God has made with men, it is never with them as single individuals only, *but with the head and members, the trunk and its branches*. Thus was it with Noah and his family (Gen. vi. 18), Abraham and his seed (Gen. xvii. 7, 8), David and his posterity (2 Sam. vii. 16, and Ps. 89), Christ and His seed (Gen. iii. 15; Rom. v. 12; Ps. 89). And why should all this have been unless because He had in the same way covenanted with Adam and all his posterity?—the second Adam only excepted, who, if the race had retained its integrity, need not have assumed our nature as a Redeemer; but yet, in view of our foreseen fall and sin, was appointed to be the Head and Principal of the second confederation.¹

Van Mastricht, in treating the subject,² says, "It is asked, 2, Whether the covenant of works was constituted *in Adam* with the whole human race, Christ only excepted? The Pelagians and Socinians, that they may be able the more effectually to throw off *original* corruption and retain an unimpaired *free will*, deny that this covenant was constituted *in Adam with the whole human race*. They do not acknowledge, or at least frankly acknowledge, that an actual *covenant of works* should be admitted. They own, indeed, that the whole human race was reckoned *in Adam*, and also that they sinned in him (*i. e.*, putatively); but they do not admit that God *contracted with all*, or that they sinned by violating the contract; or if He did even contract, that He did at least promise to Adam (if he should obey), and to all his posterity, eternal life. The Reformed affirm that the covenant of works in Adam was constituted with the whole human race, Christ only excepted, as well in relation to the promise of life if Adam should persist in obedience, as to the threatening of death should he disobey."

¹ See Van Mastricht's Theol., lib. III., cap. 12, § 10, p. 147.

² Ibid. § 24, page 421.

Essenius, in his admirable *Compend*, is very full and satisfactory to the same purport.¹ He says: "But, described more fully, the first covenant is that which God so established *with Adam, and likewise with the whole human race*, which was reckoned in him as head," etc. (§ 115). And in § 117: "As to the order of the human race, *Adam* was the first and universal father of all men, as Eve was their mother. (Gen. iii. 20; confer Acts xvii. 26.) But Adam was also the beginning of the woman, and her head. (Gen. ii. 21, 22, 23; Eph. v. 23.) So all their posterity were virtually in Adam as the first cause of this race (*tanquam causa prima istius generis*); which is a *natural* (physical) consideration. But to this is to be added another, a *political and federal constitution*, as all the posterity were reckoned in Adam," etc.

Altingius, also, after adverting to the views of Socinus, and citing Ostorodus, says, "From all which it appears more clear than the sun at noonday, that they deny both parts of original sin; for, 1, *They deny the transgression of the posterity of Adam in his loins*; 2, *They deny that the corruption of nature followed from thence, and is propagated with nature itself to all universally (Christ only excepted) by carnal generation.*" "*They who, through the disobedience of Adam, are constituted sinners participated in his transgressions.*"²

Zanchius lays down the following proposition: "That original sin, in which all men are implicated, *is not so much a foreign sin as the sin of every man; nor was it so much the proper sin of Adam as it was the common sin of all.*"³ Again, on page 37, "When, therefore, the apostle says that all sinned in Adam when he, disobeying, partook of the forbidden fruit, he signifies that then all men also who were in his loins sinned with him."

We need not continue these citations, for with one voice the Augustinian theologians have always maintained that the posterity were no less a party in the covenant than Adam himself; that it was constituted with them not less than with him, and not simply with him for them; and hence that its violation was as really theirs as it was his, and as justly imputed to them as to himself—imputed to them, therefore, as *their own sin*, and not as the merely

¹ *Compend. Dog. Theologiæ*, cap. IX., §§ 115–117. (Utrecht, 1682.)

² *Heidelberg-Scriptor.*, pp. 452, 453.

³ *Tom. IV.*, page 53, Thesis IV.

personal sin of Adam—a *peccatum alienum*. The whole of which representation is set aside and ignored by the theory of Dr. Hodge.

In explaining the analogy in Rom. v. 12–21, we remarked that the exposition put upon the language of Paul by Dr. Hodge has nothing to sustain it in either our approved theology or exegesis; and in § 17, in which we present the analyses of the passage by the theologians of the Church, the reader has seen that they wholly discard Dr. Hodge's fundamental position, on which his whole theory is based, to-wit: *that the modes of justification and condemnation form an integral part of the comparison*. This, of course, is therefore a full rejection of his whole theory and exegesis. But it is proper here to state that several later divines, as Marek and De Moor, think that the modes are compared so far as the *fact* of an imputation in both cases is concerned, but at the same time are very careful to state that the *imputations themselves are not to be compared*; for there would be danger to the truth from such a procedure in regard to both branches of the comparison; that is, it should not be strained, on the one hand, so as to enervate the doctrine of justification by faith alone, nor, on the other, the doctrine that the first sin was the common sin of the race, and that the posterity of Adam were already corrupt and sinful when his sin was imputed to them. In other words, that the comparison of the modes pertains simply to the fact *that both sin and righteousness are imputed*, and is not to be pressed so as to teach, on the one hand, that because the posterity of Adam *subjectively deserved* the imputation of his sin, the spiritual seed of Christ therefore *subjectively deserve* the imputation of His righteousness; or, on the other hand, that because Christ's righteousness is imputed gratuitously, the sin of Adam was gratuitously imputed to a subjectively innocent offspring, as was then asserted by the Socinians and Remonstrants. And as thus qualified and guarded, the statement that the modes may be referred to in the analogy, even if admitted, is, as is evident, wholly subversive of the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin; and yet this is as far as any of the Church theologians have departed from the early view.

It is, therefore, a wholly illogical assumption that, simply because Adam was appointed the moral head of the race, or posterity, *their depravity* is in any sense of the term the penal consequence of his

personal sin. Even in his own case depravity was not the punishment of his act of transgression. The penalty was not, "In the day thou eatest thou shalt become depraved," since he could not have eaten until he was depraved; and why, then, should the moral corruption of his seed be regarded as the *punishment* of that act? They participated with him in his sin, and in the depravity which prompted it, and so with him brought themselves under condemnation; and his *sin* (not the *act* merely) was charged upon them. But his being their representative, or federal head, in no way proves that in his posterity depravity wears the aspect of a direct penal infliction more than in himself. They, as he, became depraved by their participation in the first sin, which thereupon was imputed to them. So that the whole idea of a representation which ignores the spontaneity of the race, and so overrides it as to compel a guiltiness in them without regard to their conjoint action with their head, and their own ethical appropriation of his guilt, must be discarded as foreign to our theology, and as charging upon God the efficient production of sin in the race, and consequently as being not only unsupported by His word, but as at variance therewith in every particular.

That the whole theory, from its first broaching, was not only totally unrecognized by the Church, but pointedly condemned, is clearly apparent from the citations of her testimony on our previous pages; but in a thorough exhibit of the topic it is desirable that this statement should be sustained by historical detail of the facts, and we shall endeavor briefly so to present it in the remaining part of this section.

Pelagius and his immediate followers were unquestionably the authors of the doctrine, or rather of the principles upon which it is based; for they did not give to it a formulated expression. We need not cite them, however, for they are sufficiently brought to view incidentally in the course of this treatise. But we find the concept, that sin may be gratuitously imputed to the guiltless, inculcated at quite an early period in the Armenian church. Zanchius, when treating upon the false views which have been inculcated on original sin, charges it as one of the three leading errors which they entertained. His words are: "In sententia itaque Armeniorum tres sunt errores: 1, Nullam reipsa in homines derivari peccatum ab Adamo, ut et Pelagius dicebat. 2, Omnes

tamen damnationi æternæ obnoxious teneri *propter alienum peccatum*. Adæ scilicet, omnium hominum parentis, nisi per Christum liberentur."¹ In the view, then, of this truly great and representative divine—the intimate friend and correspondent of Calvin, Hyperius, Bullinger, Melancthon, Bucer, and Ursinus—it was a grievous error to hold that the posterity of Adam, unless they should be redeemed by Christ, would have been exposed to eternal death on account of a *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin of their parent. In the Latin church, however, the error does not make its appearance until much later. P. Lombard (1164) refers, without naming them, to some who taught it. He says: "Quidam enim (scolastici doctores) putant *originale peccatum esse reatum pænæ pro peccato primi hominis*, id est, debitum, vel obnoxietatem quâ obnoxii et addicti sumus pænæ temporali et æternæ pro primi hominis actuali peccato, quia pro illo, ut aiunt, omnibus debetur pænæ æterna, nisi per gratiam liberentur."² This is precisely a reiteration of the error of the Armenians referred to above. And when Scotus (1308), by his bold and unambiguous assertion that "morality is founded on will," had fairly laid the foundation for that superstructure (which had never thoroughly been done before), his disciple Ockham, or Ockham (1347), the founder of the revived sect of the Nominalists, gave to it a full and formal expression, and defined original sin, as imputed to the posterity of Adam, to be "the guilt of a foreign sin without any inherent demerit of our own,"—"reatus *alieni peccati* sine aliquo vitio hærente in nobis,"—*i. e.*, as the ground or basis of its imputation. Chemnitz also, in referring to the scholastics, says: "There are those who think that original sin is neither privation nor any positive depravity, *but only guilt on account of the fall of Adam, without any inherent ill-desert of our own*,—sed tantum reatum propter lapsum Adæ sine pravitate aliqua hærente in nobis,"³—thus making the moral pollution of our nature and all the calamities of life result from a *peccatum alienum* alone: all of which representations evince that such a conception is exceptional, and in conflict with what the Church has ever regarded as the Augustinian doctrine. And when Erasmus, with his strong predilections for Pelagianism,

¹ Opp. Tom. IV., pp. 34, 35.

² Lib. II., Distinct. 30, p. 211. (Paris, 1846.)

³ Examen Conc. Tridentini. Parte I., p. 97. (Frankfort, 1578.)

adopted the same view (and our readers must excuse the reiteration of this instance, for it is most important in the present connection), Luther thus adverts to it: "And it seems that in our own day, also, there are those who are deceived by this argument; for they so speak of original sin (*i. e.*, inherent corruption) *as if it were no fault of ours, but only punishment* (*ac si non culpa sed tantum poena*), as Erasmus somewhere argues, in express terms, "that original sin is a punishment inflicted on our first parents, *which we their posterity are compelled to suffer on account of another's crime, without any demerit of our own* (*propter alienam culpam, sine nostro merito*), as an illegitimate child is obliged to endure the shame arising, not from his own fault, but from that of his mother; *for how could he have sinned who as yet did not exist?*" THESE THINGS MAY BE FLATTERING TO REASON; BUT THEY ARE FULL OF IMPIETY AND BLASPHEMY"! And further on he adds: "*Satan makes a mighty effort that he may nullify original sin; and this would be to deny the passion and resurrection of Christ.*"

Pighius and Catharinus (who both were subsequently members of the Council of Trent) taught at this time the same view, though Dr. Hodge has made a futile effort to distinguish between his own doctrine of representation and imputation and that taught by those men, which was rejected and denounced by the Reformers as a denial of the doctrine of original sin; but on this point our readers can, from the facts we shall adduce, easily judge for themselves. Pighius, in 1542, in a work in which Chemnitz, in his *Examen* (page 97), gives an analysis, had clearly asserted the doctrine in question, and maintained that the actual transgression of Adam is transmitted and propagated to his posterity only by guilt and punishment (*reatu tantum et poena*), without any corruption and depravity inhering in them, and that they, on account of the sin of Adam, are now guilty, because they have been constituted exiles from the kingdom of heaven, are subjected to the dominion of death, exposed (*obnoxii*) to eternal condemnation, and are involved in all the miseries of human nature, even as servants are born of other servants (who, by their own fault, have forfeited their freedom), not through their personal or proper desert, but by that of their parents; and as children born out of wedlock suffer the shame of their mother, without any inherent fault of their own." This doctrine of Pighius, which was simply a restatement of that of Erasmus,

and of the scholastic doctors above referred to, was, as Chemnitz remarks, approved and accepted by Catharinus, and presented by him before the Council of Trent (during the discussion of the doctrine of original sin), in two orations, containing the following clear statements: "He maintained," says Polano, "that it is necessary to distinguish sin from the punishment; *that concupiscence and the privation of righteousness is the punishment of sin*; and that therefore it is necessary that the sin should be another thing." He added, that "that which was not a sin in Adam it is impossible should be a sin in us; but neither of these two were a sin in Adam, because neither privation of righteousness nor concupiscence were his actions; therefore, neither are they in us; *and if they were the effects of sin in him, of necessity they must be in others also* (*sin verò in eo peccati fuerint effectus, in aliis itidem esse*). By which reason it cannot be said that sin is the enmity of God against the sinner, nor the sinner's enmity against God, *seeing they are things which follow sin and come after it.*" He *oppugned likewise the transmission of sin through generation*, saying, "that as, if Adam had not sinned, righteousness would have been transferred, not by virtue of generation, *but only by the will of God* (*non virtute generationis, sed solâ Dei voluntate*), *so it is fit to find another method for the transfusion of sin.*" And he explained his opinion in this form, "That as God made a covenant with Abraham and all his posterity when He made him father of the faithful, so when He gave original righteousness to Adam and all mankind, He made him such an obligation *in the name of all to keep it for himself and them, observing the commandments, which because he transgressed he lost it as well for others as for himself* (*eo [mandato] autem violato justitiam eam tam aliis quam sibi amisit*), *and incurred the punishment alike for them*; the which, as they are derived to every one, *so the very transgression of Adam belonged to every one—to him as the cause, to others in virtue of the covenant* (*illius tanquam causæ, aliorum, virtute pactionis*); *so that the action of Adam is actual sin in him, and imputed to others it constitutes* (*constituat*) *original sin, because in him sinning the whole human race sinned.*" Catharinus based his opinion chiefly on the ground that, in the true and proper sense, sin is nothing else than a voluntary act; but there was *no voluntary act except the transgression of Adam imputed to all*. And what Paul says,

that all have sinned in Adam, cannot be otherwise understood *than that all had committed the same sin with him*. He alleged, for example, that Paul says to the Hebrews, that Levi paid tithes to Melchisedek, when he had paid them in his great grandfather, Abraham, *by which reason it must be said, that the posterity violated the commandment of God when Adam did it, and that they were sinners in him*, as in him they received righteousness. And so there is no need to recur to concupiscence (libidinem) which infects the flesh, from which the soul is vitiated by the infection; for it can scarcely be understood how a spirit receives a corporeal infection; because if sin were a spiritual blemish in the soul, it could not first be in the flesh; and if it be corporeal in the flesh it can produce no effect in the spirit. That the soul, therefore, because it is joined to an infected body, doth receive spiritual infection, is an inconceivable transcendencey." He proved the covenant of God with Adam by a place in the prophet Hosea, and by another in Ecclesiasticus, and by many places in St. Augustine. That the sin of every one is the act only of the transgression of Adam (*i. e.* by a forensic imputation), he proved by St. Paul, where he saith that by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners; and because in the Church it has ever been understood that sin itself is nothing but a voluntary action against the law, of which kind there was none but that of Adam; and because St. Paul says that death entered by original sin, whereas death entered in no other way than by actual transgression." Then, for his Achillean dart, he adduced the fact that, though Eve did ~~not~~ eat the apple before Adam, yet she knew not that she was naked, nor that she had incurred the punishment, but only after he had sinned. *Therefore Adam's sin, as it was not his alone, but pertained to Eve also, so it was of all his posterity.*" Then, in his second speech, he "in like manner maintained that the covenant was made *with Adam alone*, and that every one hath sin by imputation of that of Adam, so that the intermediate parents have nothing to do therewith."¹

Now this theory, thus expounded and set forth in the Council in 1546, was repudiated by the divines of the Reformation *to a man*,

¹ We cite the *Historia Conc. Tridentini*, by P. S. Polano, lib. II., pp. 192, 193 (Frankfort, 1621), and have generally followed Brent's translation, pp. 175, 176.

as subversive of the whole system of grace. Nor can one prominent theologian, either Lutheran or Calvinist, be named amongst them after this utterance, who (in referring to original sin) has not directly adverted to and condemned it as presented either by Catharinus or Pighius. The Socinians, however, who became a sect in Poland during the latter part of that century, adopted and defended it with great zeal and learning, with a view to destroy the doctrine of our participation in the first sin, and, as we have shown in a previous section, elaborated in its support the exegesis of Rom. v. 12-21, which has now been adopted also by Dr. Hodge for the same purpose, who, having repudiated the doctrine of participation, affirms that in the first offence the posterity of Adam contracted no subjective guilt or ill-desert, and that all the evils they suffer are penal inflictions on account of Adam's merely personal sin—a sin which, as he affirms, is to them purely a foreign sin, or *peccatum alienum*.

The reply of Dominico Soto to the foregoing speculation of Catharinus we shall cite presently. But in referring to these views of Catharinus, the historian remarks, that the Bishops in the Council, of whom but few knew anything of theology, being either lawyers or learned men of the court, were confounded with this method of treating the subject, and among so many opinions knew not what to think of the essence of original sin; but "that of Catharinus was best understood because it was expressed by a political conceit of a bargain made by one *for his posterity*, which being transgressed, they were all undoubtedly bound; and many of the Council favored it."

Such, then, was the theory and exegesis of Catharinus and Pighius, which, though approved by several Papal divines of the day who had adopted the principles of Ockham, was steadily opposed and rejected by the great body of the Latin church (as expressed subsequent to the Council), and by the entire body of the Protestant church, whose divines to a man disclaimed and denounced it as a denial of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin.

Pighius was more frequently referred to as inculcating the theory than Catharinus, because his book (to which we have referred) was more extensively known than the speeches of the latter in the Council. And Chemnitz, after thoroughly discussing the subject and exposing the ruinous tendency of the speculation

(as the Council refused to condemn it), places on record as his own testimony the following impressive declaration: "FOR THE PERPETUAL REMEMBRANCE OF THE THING, therefore, be it known to the whole Christian world, that the profane notion (I will give it no harsher name) of Pighius was neither forbidden nor condemned in the Tridentine decree; *but that it was left with other profane reasonings of the scholastics concerning original sin as a mere matter of opinion!*" (Examen, p. 98, col. 1.) And this judgment of Chemnitz was, as we have said, supported by the whole Reformed church, who pronounced the error (though it is precisely the theory of Dr. Hodge) to be a denial of the Church doctrine of original sin, and a direct repudiation of native depravity as a constituent of that sin. But how was it a denial of depravity? *Simply because it makes the imputation of Adam's personal sin (without reference to our own desert or participation therein), the procuring cause by penal infliction of all the sin and evils which have come upon his posterity;* which is precisely what is done by the theory of Dr. Hodge. For, as has been abundantly shown, the doctrine of the Protestant church was that the posterity of Adam are condemned, not only for his sin, which was imputed to them, but for their own participation therein. Catharinus and Pighius were justly charged with denying the doctrine, because they maintained that the race was originally condemned for Adam's merely personal sin, and that inherent depravity was not the ground but the penal consequence of that condemnation; and if it were the consequence of that condemnation, of course it could not be a ground of it, as the divines of the Reformation universally affirmed it to be. If, then, those Papal divines deny (as the Reformers affirm that they do deny) the doctrine of original sin, by denying that "the judgment unto condemnation" came upon the race subjectively, or for its own inherent sin, and not for the sin of Adam alone, then, in their judgment, Dr. Hodge must be regarded as denying the same.

But let us consider just at this point a few of the statements of the Reformed divines in which, like Chemnitz, they directly allude to it.

Calvin, in a passage translated on a previous page, but of which the original also should be given to the reader, says: "Non per solam imputationem damnatur, ac si alieni peccati exigetur à

nobis poena; sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus, quia et culpæ sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum."

Turretin, referring to Catharinus, says that "he placed the whole nature of original sin in imputation alone, acknowledging no inherent corruption;¹ that is, as a ground for the imputation. This the *sola imputatio*, to which Calvin refers above; but the statement, unqualified and unexplained, that Catharinus and Pighius "acknowledge no inherent corruption" calls for a remark in passing.

True it is that their whole doctrine respecting inherent corruption (labe inhærente) is extremely vague and preposterous, and they speak of it as lust, concupiscence, and the like; but it is at the same time true that they do not deny, but assert, that our nature is fallen and degraded from its pristine integrity, as may be seen by their views above cited. And further, that this fallen condition is the penal result of the imputation of Adam's sin. They deny that native concupiscence is voluntary, or a transgression of the law, and therefore that it is sin in the proper sense, and affirm likewise that it is taken away in baptism; but that our nature is degraded, and that this degradation is a punishment for the foreign sin of Adam, they constantly affirm. Dr. Hodge calls this state of degradation *sin*, or sinfulness, though he denies that it is voluntary on our part, and affirms, as they do, that it is a penal infliction on account of the *peccatum alienum*. Both alike, therefore, deny that it is a ground for the original imputation or sentence of condemnation.

Those Papal divines, therefore, teaching, as they did, that all men are guilty in the sight of God for the sin of the first man, and that original sin is a foreign guilt, or *peccatum alienum*, and not properly the corruption of our nature,² denied, consequently, that concupiscence, either in adults or infants, or either before or after baptism, is sin, except by putation, and claim that it springs from or arises out of the composition and temperature of parts of the human body, and likewise that the want of original righteousness, either in infants or adults, is sin, for the same reason, and also because there is no law of God requiring us to possess that original

¹ Loco IX., cap. 9, § 41, Tom. I., page 567.

² See Henry's Life of Calvin, Vol. I., p. 507. (New York, 1851.)

righteousness which Adam possessed. But though they thus quibble about calling these things *sin*, they affirm them to be *punishments inflicted on us* for the *peccatum alienum of Adam*; and that they, properly speaking, are not vices, but conditions of our fallen humanity resulting from Adam's personal sin. And hence that this alone is original sin, to-wit: *that the actual transgression of Adam is by guilt and punishment alone transmitted and propagated to his posterity, without any inherent depravity of theirs*; and that they, on account of the sin of Adam, are now guilty, inasmuch as they have been made exiles from the kingdom of heaven, are subject to the kingdom of death, exposed to eternal damnation, and involved in all the miseries of our nature, and suffer the shame of this condition, as a son born out of wedlock suffers the infamy of his mother. And thus they freely admit that these fearful changes have come upon us, but deny that we brought them upon ourselves; and affirm that they are penal inflictions for the sin of Adam alone.

Dr. Hodge admits the same fearful changes, and in like manner denies that we brought them upon ourselves, and affirms also that they are inflicted as the penalty for the same sin; but this privation of rectitude, etc., though involuntary on our part, he calls *sin*; while Catharinus and Pighius contend that, because they are involuntary, they are not sin, since sin is the transgression of law, and that the race had not transgressed when these calamities originally came upon it. They admit, therefore, with Dr. Hodge, the fallen condition of our nature, only they do not name the inordinate manifestations of it—*e. g.* in infancy—sin, as he does, and hence they do not acknowledge the name “inherent corruption” as thus applied; but they do acknowledge the facts as actually existing which Dr. Hodge calls sin, and trace their origin to the same source that he does. Both alike reject the great fundamental truth that we participated in the first sin, and such are the results of that rejection.¹ But we proceed with the argument.

¹ It is an interesting fact that Pighius, who in 1542 issued the work cited on a previous page, and which was replied to by Calvin in his *De Libero Arbitrio*, in 1543, was, by reading the works of Calvin in order to refute them, subsequently converted to Protestantism. He was, for his mathematical and theological attainments, very eminent, and held in high esteem by Popes Hadrian VI., Clement VII., and Paul III. He was Archdeacon of St. John's church at Utrecht.

In our former essay we presented a citation from Whittaker, wherein he, in as direct and pointed a manner as Chemnitz himself, condemns this view of Catharinus and Pighius as a base and nefarious heresy.¹ In his *Prælectiones de Sacramentis*, in which he replies *in extenso* to Bellarmin on the sacraments, he adverts to the same topic,² and after referring to the sin of Adam and its effects upon the race, he denounces Pighius, “*ut ausus sit dicere peccatum originale non esse culpam, sed tantum poenam peccati, et tamen fatetur dici peccatum*,” that is, *that he should dare to say that original sin (or inherent corruption) is not a fault, but only the punishment of sin, and yet should acknowledge that it is called sin*,”³ “as Andradius, of whom we have already spoken; that is, that it is not truly and properly sin, but fictitiously, as he applies to it the name *sin*. These things accrue from too great a license in evading the Scriptures. *Unless, therefore, we would perpetually err, we should speak with the Scriptures, and call sin what they call sin*,” that is, we should not confound sin with the punishment of sin, for sin is truly and properly ours; but the punishment of sin is from God. And again: “I do not say that these evils (*i. e.* life's calamities) are inflicted in all cases as punishment; *but certainly they should not be inflicted on any one unless sin existed in him*. Therefore I conclude thus: that all the calamities of life, and all kinds of death, ARE PRODUCED FROM INHERENT SIN (*sic igitur concludo, Omnes hujus vitæ calamitates, et omnia mortis genera ex peccato inhærente nascuntur*).” And now let our readers observe that these remarks are pointed directly against the view above cited from Pighius and Catharinus; and let them, moreover, ask themselves, whether human language can exhibit a more direct antagonism than is therein presented to the affirmation of Dr. Hodge, so often cited on the preceding pages, that all the calamities of life, together with spiritual death, are the penalty of a *peccatum alienum*; that is, THAT THEY ARE NOT PRODUCED FROM INHERENT SIN?

Whittaker then, after remarking that infants die, and therefore

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1862, page 265.

² See *Quæst. IV.*, cap. III., pp. 271–274. (Frankfort, 1624.)

³ So Dr. Hodge very properly, as above stated, calls inherent corruption *sin*, but affirms that it is only the *punishment* of Adam's personal sin charged upon us.

must have inherent sin (in illis verè peccatum), and that Christ, in whom was no sin, yet died, because (1), He willingly submitted to death; and (2), because our sins were imputed to Him, adds: "*But we, BECAUSE SIN EXISTS WITHIN US, ARE EXPOSED TO DISEASE AND DEATH, AND TO ALL THE CALAMITIES OF LIFE.*" Thus the doctrine that an imputed *peccatum alienum* is the procuring cause, through penal infliction, of those evils, is thoroughly exploded and rejected as a pestilential heresy.

We present likewise the testimony of another representative divine on the subject. Sohnius, the successor of Ursinus in Heidelberg, was a cotemporary of Whittaker, and fully his equal in ability and learning, and assails in like manner, and with irresistible effect, the same perversion of the doctrine. His tract on original sin (from which the following, as well as most of our previous citations from him, are taken) is substantially presented in translation by the late Dr. Archibald Alexander, of Princeton Seminary, and published in the Princeton Biblical Repertory of 1830, and subsequently re-published as Essay V. in the first series of the Princeton Essays, and on introducing it Dr. Alexander says: "But our object in bringing forward this work is not so much for the sake of its explanations and arguments, in all of which we do not concur, as to furnish the inquisitive reader *with a full view of the opinions of Protestants on this point in the period immediately succeeding the Reformation. And no one acquainted with ecclesiastical history will suppose that the doctrines here inculcated were peculiar to this author; the very same are found in the works of every Protestant writer of credit in that age.*" (Page 116.) Let, then, our readers note what are those doctrines while they peruse the following passages.

"It is again alleged," says Sohnius, "that punishments are not sins, but those defects and irregular inclinations which belong to human nature are the punishment of the sin of the first man, and cannot be of the nature of sin. But here, too, there is an application of a political maxim to a subject to which it does not belong; for it is a fact clearly established in the divine government, that the privation of the divine image and favor is both a sin and punishment, but in different respects. In respect to God inflicting it, as a punishment; for He, in just judgment, may deprive His creatures of His grace; but in regard to man, this privation is a sin

WHICH BY HIS OWN FAULT HE HAS BROUGHT UPON HIMSELF AND ADMITTED INTO HIS OWN SOUL." (Pp. 118, 119.)

"On this text (Rom. v. 12), it is worthy of remark, that it is not only asserted that the punishment of death has passed upon all men, but the reason is added, namely, 'because all have sinned;' so that the fault and punishment, the guilt and pollution, are by the apostle joined together." (Page 122.)

In referring to the objection of Pighius, that there is nothing of sin propagated by natural generation, nor any inherent sin in man at his birth, except the guilt only of another's sin imputed, and that original sin consists not in any inherent corruption, "*but solely in our subjection to the punishment of the first sin, that is, in contracted guilt without anything of depravity in our nature,*" thus excluding all participation in the first sin, Sohnius says: "It is a sufficient refutation of this doctrine that it is nowhere found in the Scriptures." And then, referring to the attempt of Pighius to prove it from Rom. v. 12-18, he continues: "In all these texts, says Pighius, *the apostle attaches condemnation to the sin of Adam, and nothing else.* To which it may be replied, that when the apostle declares that 'sin entered into the world,' he does not mean merely that Adam had become a sinner, but that it had come upon all his descendants, that is, upon all men in the world; for he does not say in this place that guilt had entered, but that sin had entered into the world. And this is not left to be inferred, etc. . . . Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death and condemnation by the sin of one, it is a just inference that they are all partakers of his sin, and are born in a state of moral pollution. In the 19th verse it is said, 'By the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners.' Now, to be constituted sinners includes the idea, not only of being made subject to the penalty, but partaking of the nature of sin; for they who are entirely free from the stain of sin cannot with propriety be called sinners." (P. 123.)

"And finally, the Catholic church has ever held an opinion contrary to the one which is now opposed. Augustine, in his second book against Pelagius and Celestius, expresses most explicitly what we maintain: 'Whosoever,' says he, 'contends that human nature, in any age, does not need the second Adam as a physician, on the ground that it has not been vitiated in the first Adam, does not fall into error which may be held without injury to the rule

of faith; but, by that very rule by which we are constituted Christians, is convicted of being an enemy to the grace of God." (Page 125.)

Sohnius is cited also by Rivetus in his "Testimonies" as follows: "Again: 'all are dead by the offence of one man;' therefore his offence was the offence of all, *but theirs by participation and imputation*; otherwise they could not be said to be dead by the offence of one, but by many offences. . . . In one respect it was the sin of Adam, and was not original sin, but actual, *originating*,—that is, giving origin to the original sin of his posterity; in another respect it was the sin of his posterity, who were in his loins, *so that in mass they committed the same sin, and* HENCE IT IS IMPUTED TO THEM ALL. . . . Bellarmine's first proposition is, 'that the transgression of Adam, which is the transgression of the whole human race, is original sin, if by sin he meant an action.' This is correct, if it only be added, *If sin be taken for an action, not of Adam alone, but of his posterity, who, in mass, sinned in Adam; for thus this action was ours, pertaining in the first place to our original sin.*"

These few examples, concurred in by the entire Church, may serve as specimens of the argument by which the divines of the Reformation rebutted the efforts to support the pernicious theory that we are accounted and treated as sinners, and punished because of "the one sin of the one man," and that this (and not our participation in the first sin) is why we are in a fallen and degraded condition, morally polluted, and exposed to all the evils which ~~penally affect~~ our common humanity. In this decided manner do they disclaim and reject that doctrine, and on the contrary affirm that we suffer life's evils because of our inherent sin—our actual participation in the sin and fall of our first parents. And now, alongside of the statements above cited from the Papal divines, as well as the passages we have in this section cited from Luther, Calvin, Chemnitz, Zanchius, Whittaker, and Sohnius, let our readers place the following passages from Dr. Hodge. Speaking of the analogy in Rom. v., he says: "This parallel is destroyed, *if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation.*"¹ "There is a causal

¹ See Theology, Vol. II., pp. 212, 213.

relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity."¹ "The loss of original righteousness, and death spiritual and temporal, under which they *commence their existence*, are the penalty of Adam's first sin."² "The sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible: it was the ground of their actual condemnation."³ "His sin was not our sin. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a *peccatum alienum*; and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences."⁴ Does it require any words to show that the doctrine thus expressed is the very doctrine asserted by the aforesaid Papal divines, which the Reformers refuted and rejected as an utter abandonment of the doctrine of original sin? And is it not perfectly apparent, therefore, that the above cited antagonists of the Church doctrine,—that is, the Armenians, Ockham, Erasmus, Pighius, Catharinus, and Crellius—concur with Dr. Hodge, and he with them, on the leading points of this theory? That is, that they all alike concur in affirming (1), that the first sin was the sin of the first man only, and not of the race; (2), that it was charged upon his posterity gratuitously, *i. e.*, without any subjective demerit of their own; and (3), that, through this imputation, that one sin of the one man became the procuring cause of all the evils which have come upon the race? Certainly these things are undeniably so; and it is equally undeniable that the Church has always repudiated the scheme as a pestiferous heresy.

Dr. Hodge, aware that the Reformers rejected utterly the doctrine of Catharinus, endeavors to discriminate between that doctrine and his own theory, on the alleged ground that Catharinus makes "original sin to consist solely in the imputation of Adam's sin,"⁵ which notion he claims to repudiate. But we have just explained fully the sense in which Catharinus made original sin to consist solely in imputation, which evinces that there is no ground whatever for this attempted discrimination of Dr. Hodge. And it may, moreover, be clearly perceived also by the extracts presented above from his orations before the Tridentine Council, and in which, with much more emphasis and in more varied forms of

¹ See Theology, Vol. II., p. 215.

² Ibid., p. 296.

³ Ibid., pp. 551, 552.

⁴ Ibid., p. 225.

⁵ Ibid., p. 180.

expression than are employed for the purpose of delineating his own views by Dr. Hodge, *he repeatedly affirms that all men sinned in and fell with Adam in the first transgression*; but, like Dr. Hodge, he explains this sinning as putative. He made original sin to consist solely in imputation, therefore, by making the forensic imputation of Adam's *peccatum alienum* alone causal of the moral pollution and ruined condition of the race; denying its participation in the first sin, and alleging that our depraved nature, or, as he names it, *concupiscence*, is the punishment for Adam's personal sin alone. And wherein does this representation differ from the expressed views of Dr. Hodge? We would do the Doctor no injustice; but if words have a meaning his attempted discrimination is vain. The language of Catharinus expresses precisely the theory of Dr. Hodge—the theory which the Reformers and the Church in every age have united to refute and to condemn.

On the same page the Doctor says: "It is also to be observed, that all parties in the Roman church, *before and after the Council of Trent*, however much they differed on other points, united in teaching the imputation of Adam's sin; *i. e.*, that for that sin the sentence of condemnation passed upon all men." By which statement he, of course, means that they taught the doctrine of imputation which he is defending, and not the doctrine which he rejects as false; for if this be not his meaning, his language must necessarily mislead, and could have no relevancy to his argument. In other words, they did not inculcate the doctrine which he opposes, to-wit: *that we virtually sinned in Adam and participated in the guilt of his first transgression*; but did teach that we sinned only putatively, and that it was Adam's personal sin alone, and not our sin in him or participation in his fault, which brought condemnation and death upon the race. If, then, this be the Doctor's meaning, it must be pronounced an unmitigated perversion of fact. Pelagianism has repeatedly made fearful inroads upon the Roman church;¹ but she herself has never, at any period or under any circumstances, either received or asserted the doctrine received and asserted by Dr. Hodge of the gratuitous imputation of sin. The views of Catharinus and Pighius, and of those who coincided therewith in the Council, were subsequently, as we have stated,

¹ See Bradwardin's Preface to his *De Causa Dei*. (London, 1618.)

repudiated as decidedly by the great body of the Papal divines as by the Reformers themselves. Even Bellarmin, with all his Nominalistic proclivities, strongly disclaimed and rejected them.

It ought to be further stated here, in order to complete the foregoing narrative, that after Catharinus had spoken as narrated above, Dominico Soto arose in response, and in opposing his views, said: That the habitual quality remaining in Adam after his first sin, *and not merely the guilt of that sin* (as Catharinus has affirmed) *passed into his posterity, and is transferred as their own into each one of them*. And that man is called a sinner, not only when he transgresses actually, but afterwards also; *not in regard to the punishment or other consequences of sin*, but in regard to the prevailing transgression itself; which view he very strongly urged as the doctrine of the church, and on which account (as the historian remarks) *he was suspected by some of the Council as favoring the heresy of Luther on the subject*. And thus the gratuitous imputationists then essayed to charge with heresy those who maintained the true doctrine of the Church, precisely as Dr. Hodge has attempted now. But let us briefly advert to this "heresy of Luther."

The Council of Trent was convoked by Paul III., in 1545; and during the previous year Luther had issued from the press the first volume of his Commentary on Genesis, from which edition we have, in Section 13, B., No. 1, above (to which we refer the reader), quoted a passage containing his views on original sin; and (in another part of this § 30, likewise,) a passage adverting to the manner in which that doctrine was then assailed, and in which he repels the assault of Erasmus, *who had advanced against it the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin*, concerning which he says: "These things may be flattering to reason, but they are full of impiety and blasphemy!"¹ And these passages cited therefrom, so strikingly accord with those just presented also from Calvin, Chemnitz, Zanchius, Sohnius, and Whittaker, as of themselves to preclude the very supposition of serious doubt as to the views of the Reformers on this subject from the first. "The heresy of Luther" was, therefore, a pointed antagonism to the views of Catharinus and Pighius, and consequently to the theory

¹ Luther in Genesis ii. 16, 17, page 31, col. 1. (Wittenberg, 1544.) The reader will find in the former part of this section a translation of the whole passage.

of Dr. Hodge. And that the forecited extracts from Luther were among the passages referred to as identifying the views of Soto (as opposed to those of Catharinus) with "the heresy of Luther" will hardly be questioned.

From the manner in which the Church has ever regarded the views of the Armenians (above cited), and as subsequently expressed by the scholastic doctors referred to by Peter Lombard, and asserted likewise by Ockham, all of which has been plainly set before the reader, it would seem scarcely necessary to advert to the subject further. But we shall, in conclusion, briefly offer an instance or more of the representative theologians anterior to the Council of Trent.

Anselm (1109) taught that the state of Adam's posterity (they being deprived of original righteousness) was a sinful state; and averred with Augustine that we inherit this condition, not only because Adam sinned, but because we sinned in Adam. In his *De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Peccato*, Cap. VI., for example, he says: "Sicut in Adamo omnes peccavimus quum ille peccavit;" that is, "as in Adam we all sinned *when* he sinned;" and not *after* he had sinned, as would be the fact if our sinning consisted merely in having his personal sin forensically charged to our account. And in Cap. 20: "Natura subsistit in personis, et personæ non sunt sine natura, fecit natura personas infantium peccatrices." And in Cap. 23: "Quapropter cum damnatur infans pro peccato originali; damnatur non pro peccato Adæ sed pro suo."¹ Such was the Christian doctrine of his day. Nearly two centuries later Aquinas likewise taught the doctrine of participation. He remarks that the Catholic doctrine is, that the first sin of the first man originally passes to posterity, on account of which even children soon after their birth are baptized—*tanquam ab aliquo infectione culpæ abluendi*," and that all who are born from Adam may be regarded as one man, possessed of the same nature, partakers alike of its corruption and condemnation. In illustration of which he employs such language as the following: "Et simul cum natura naturæ infectio. Et hoc enim fit iste qui nascitur consors culpæ primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo sortitur per quamdam generativam motionem." "Ad tertiam dicendum

¹ In my copy of the *Opuscula* of Anselm (anno 1490) the quotations by Dr. Hodge are not to be found according to his references.

quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione pertinente ad solam personam."¹ He thus taught that we all really and not putatively sinned in Adam; and as a result lost, along with him, original righteousness, which left us, with him, in a corrupt and sinful state. They clearly teach our participation in the first sin. And they are representative theologians of the Latin church in the interval between the time of Augustine and the Reformation. They neither entertain nor express a particle of sympathy with the views attributed to them by Dr. Hodge.

Thus impossible does it appear, from any view that can be taken, whether theological, exegetical, or historical, to avoid the conclusion that Dr. Hodge's theory is an essential and fatal departure from the recognized theology of the Church; and I conclude the section with the remark that the sooner the Church shall require the issue to be joined, in view of the actual facts in the case, the better will it be for herself and for all who are therein concerned. Our next section will conclude the argument.

§ 31. THE THEORY AND ITS ETHICAL RELATIONS.

Dr. Hodge, as we have seen, has repeatedly affirmed of the doctrine, which it is the design of this treatise to re-state and defend, that it is fundamentally erroneous and subversive of the whole system of evangelical truth; and that ethically it does not rise to the dignity of a contradiction, has no meaning at all, but is mere Pantheistic nonsense and impossible. He is, however, as sparing of proffered proof in support of the unscrupulous allegations as he has shown himself to be of discrimination in his endeavor to set forth what he assumes to be the true doctrine of the Church. But nevertheless, we entirely concur with the Doctor's averment that the two systems are in fundamental antagonism; and we further maintain that it is only through logical inconsistency that his work on theology retains the features it still does of the system of grace. We have seen how the influence of this theory has already led him into a modification of the important terms *guilt*, *imputation*, *justice*, and the like; and this movement is bound to proceed. Nor can we doubt that should his scheme be accepted, in lieu of her doctrine, by the Church, those features are destined soon to wither

¹ *Summæ*, Prim. Secund., Q. 82. (Paris, 1845.)

and perish in the iron grasp of the rigid and inexorable logic which must be applied to them when some competent master of the theme, untrammelled by a sense of religious restraint or obligation, shall adopt and carry forward to their legitimate sequences this theory and its principles.

The late Dr. Archibald Alexander, in the conclusion of his article cited in a previous section, has truly said: "There has never yet been an instance in the history of the Church, of the rejection of any doctrine of the gospel where the opposers of the truth have been contented to stop at the first step of departure from sound doctrine. If they who first adopt and propagate an error are sometimes restrained by habit, and by a lurking respect for the opinions of the wise and good, as also by a fear of incurring the censure of heresy, from going the full length which their principles require, yet those who follow them in their error will not be kept back by such considerations. Indeed, the principles of self-defence require that men who undertake to defend their opinions by argument should endeavor to be consistent with themselves; *and thus it commonly happens that what was originally a single error, soon draws after it the whole system of which it is a part.* On this account it is incumbent on the friends of truth to oppose error in its commencement, and to endeavor to point out the consequences likely to result from its adoption; *and to us it appears that nothing is better calculated to show what will be the effect of a particular error than to trace its former progress by the lights of ecclesiastical history.*"¹

We have seen that the dogma which teaches that God may exhibit His punitive justice against his rational creatures without regard to their subjective character, and even as gratuitously as He extends His promised mercy to the penitent, can derive no support from Romans v.; and if not taught therein, it confessedly has no existence in the word of God. And such being the fact, therefore, it will not be illegitimate for us to consider and discuss the principle itself (as we purpose to do in the present section) in the light of its consequents, whether doctrinal or ethical. We have seen, moreover, that it is nowhere to be found (except as condemned) in the doctrinal symbols of any branch of the church of Christ; nor is it either named, or even referred to, in any of

those which Dr. Hodge has cited (though they all recognize the subjective ill-desert of the race anterior to the imputation of the first sin); nor have we ever met with the writings of any recognized divine of the Calvinistic communion whose statements touching that theory and exegesis approximate in any degree the Doctor's claim on its behalf. Occasionally, a supralapsarian of the Protestant church, who had adopted to some extent the scholastic philosophy aforesaid, may, perhaps, have sympathized therewith; but even this must be gathered rather *inferentially* from their writings than from any declarative declaration; and the inference, moreover, they undoubtedly would have disclaimed. The theory, therefore, is, as we have abundantly shown, without authority, either from the word of God or from the recognized theology of the Church, and may with strict propriety be criticized on the ground of its consequents.

The lack of direct exegetical support from the Bible, or of historical recognition in the approved theology, might not of themselves, perhaps, constitute a sufficient refutation of the theory if the principle on which it rests could possibly be regarded as indifferent; or if it could pertain only to some issue not fundamental, or not seriously affecting the vital interests of ethics and religion. But this theory now, through Dr. Hodge, demands to be recognized as the doctrine of the Church, although, at the same time, and by inevitable logical sequence, it claims, as above shown, to revolutionize essentially the universal and abiding conception of the Church (and, indeed, of the moral nature of man) respecting Divine justice, and of every correlated doctrine of revelation; and to announce as the truth of God a principle which, when considered in the abstract, is not only thus astounding to both the moral and intellectual conception, but which, in its logical concrete, opens the floodgates to practical errors of a nature the most pernicious, by furnishing a basis upon which, with a high degree of plausibility, they can put forth and enforce their claims,—errors, too, as we shall see, of the most opposite and conflicting character, when viewed aside from the principle which gives them countenance. We trust that our readers are not already weary of the discussion, and that, in view of the condition into which our theology has been brought by the unaccountable misapprehensions of Dr. Hodge, we hope they will patiently hear us to the conclusion

¹ Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 127.

of the section. The series of propositions or theses to be brought before them, in the somewhat unique mode of discussion which will characterize the present section, call for a most serious consideration; and though we cannot pretend to exhaust the topics themselves, or to say even a tithe of what might be said in relation to each, we feel that our work ought not to be concluded until they shall have been, at least briefly, brought to the attention of our readers, in both the logical and ethical connection which they sustain to the theory of Dr. Hodge, and which during half a century he has been more or less directly inculcating upon our Church and its ministry. It is not difficult to surmise, in view of the forecited remarks of Dr. Alexander, what must probably be the ultimate end of such inculcations; and we cannot do less than request that our readers will give to the whole section an earnest consideration. We adverted briefly to this first point in our former essay,¹ and shall now still further pursue the train of remark therein suggested.

I. We shall, in this our first sub-section, produce a few instances of this mutual heterogeneity, for the theory furnishes ground upon which, as it seems to us, either or all of the following (with many other equally pernicious and heterogeneous notions) may be maintained:

1. Does it not, then, in the first place, plainly imply *that a portion of mankind were created to be damned?* Let us see.

If we admit Dr. Hodge's standpoint of compulsory representation, denying that the covenant was made *with* both Adam and his seed, and also his doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin, which is logically a corollary therefrom, let our readers ask themselves whether there is any available method by which to avoid the conclusion that a large portion of the race were created to be eternally damned. The argument seems plain, and is brief, and I reproduce it substantially from my former essay.²

It would be gratifying to know how Dr. Hodge would avoid the necessity for acknowledging the doctrine which the principle referred to has been regarded as logically involving, to-wit: that God created a large portion of mankind expressly to be damned; for if his views necessarily lead to this conclusion, he is bound in

¹ See *Danville Review* for 1861, pp. 565-610.

² See *Ibid.* for 1862, pp. 76, 77.

all candor to discard them, or frankly to admit the unavoidable sequence; and if they do not, he certainly should explain how the inference may be avoided. The imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity is affirmed by the Doctor to be solely "from without," and he claims that they are as innocent of subjective ill-desert as a ground for the imputation, as the believer is of personal merit as a ground for the imputation of the righteousness of Christ; that is, they do not deserve subjectively the condemnation they suffer on account of the *peccatum alienum* of Adam any more than the elect deserve subjectively the justification they receive on account of the obedience of Christ. And Dr. Hodge claims, moreover, that to deny this is to invalidate the whole doctrine of salvation through the free grace of God. Now, the Doctor fully affirms the truth of the doctrine of divine predestination, and from these principles it therefore follows, (1), in respect to those who are saved from the aforesaid condemnation of the race, that God always purposed to rescue them therefrom; and (2), in regard to those who perish therein, that it was always His purpose to leave them thus to perish. And as the imputation of both guilt and righteousness is without subjective desert in either case, and depends solely on the divine will in both cases, it follows, according to this doctrine, that it was God's eternal purpose that the reprobate should perish, without reference to their subjective desert, as it was His eternal purpose that the elect should be saved without any regard to their personal desert; and hence a recognition of this scheme involves, unavoidably, the conclusion (always indignantly denied by the Church), that as God of His mere will and pleasure created the elect with the eternal purpose of saving them without regard to their subjective desert, so He created the reprobate with the eternal purpose of consigning them, of His mere will and pleasure, without regard to their subjective desert, to endless perdition. And thus our theology must now be logically burdened with this offensive and loathsome excrescence, or the theory which involves or gives existence to it must still be promptly disclaimed, as it ever has been.

2. Does not this same principle justify likewise *the theory of restorationism?* Let our readers judge. For in strange contrariety to the foregoing, and as evincive of the heterogeneous nature of the principle itself, the Restorationists, by assuming it (as they

do), may successfully maintain against any or all who may likewise acknowledge that principle, their own position, that all mankind will be ultimately restored to the favor of God? The same is also true as respects the theory of the later Universalists.

Let those in our communion, for example, who accept Dr. Hodge's principle of compulsory representation, that is, *representation without covenant with the represented*, try their hand at the following argument of the Restorationists, for which that principle supplies the basis, to-wit: a *merely forensic* imputation of guilt can neither impart nor produce subjective character or desert,¹ and can therefore furnish no real ground for treating its object as an actual sinner; and much less can it furnish real ground for rendering him sinful, that is, for imparting to him, penally or otherwise, a sinful and corrupted nature. Whence, then, is the commencement of that "sinful state" which, as Dr. Hodge concedes, exists in our nature anterior to any self-appropriation of it by us, and even to the exercise of any agency of ours? A mere juridical accusation or imputation, as is conceded, does not and cannot impart it. The child that is just born, as Dr. Hodge affirms, has not by any agency of his own contracted or brought it upon himself, and yet it exists in him, and exists anterior to all exercise of moral agency. It is an *effect*, therefore, and consequently must have an adequate procuring cause. But Dr. Hodge affirms likewise that that cause is not in the infant himself, but is "from without," as it of course must be if he has in no way participated in its production. Now, neither the devil nor all his angels are able to produce it in the infant anterior to the exercise of its own moral agency; and whence then does it proceed? On the principle affirmed by Dr. Hodge, therefore, it is either an effect without a cause, or it is traceable to the immediate divine efficiency. But God is universally recognized as a being of infinite goodness and beneficence, whose "tender mercies are over all his works;" He could, of course, take no pleasure in continuing for ever a state of unhappiness and misery in His creatures, which He alone, without their fault or agency, has brought upon them; and therefore, since He has thus by His own efficient operation, and without any

¹ Dr. Hodge affirms this in the most decided manner, and cites Turretin and Owen in support of it. Owen says, "To be *alienae culpae reus* MAKES NO MAN A SINNER." See Princeton Essays, First Series, pp. 179, 180.

agency or concurrence of ours, brought us out of a state of innocence and into a helpless condition of sin and misery, it is certain, beyond all peradventure, that His design therein is perfectly compatible with infinite goodness to those whom, for wise and holy purposes, He has thus subjected to unmerited calamity; and consequently not only compatible with, but actually requiring their ultimate restoration to the state or condition of innocence and consequent happiness of which He has thus deprived them. It is infinitely certain, therefore, that as He has brought us into an estate of sin and misery without any regard to our own agency or subjective desert, He will recover us therefrom without regard to our own agency or desert.

Is there any reply to this argument if the premise be granted? I see none. And if there be none, it will follow, likewise, as we shall presently see, that repentance has no place, and that impenitence is no crime.

3. *Willingness to be damned for the glory of God.*

Does not the principle furnish, likewise, a basis for the so-called Hopkinsian standpoint, that we ought to be willing to be damned for the glory of God?¹

I do not find that Dr. Hopkins has advanced this sentiment in any such style as has been charged upon him.² But be this as it may, others have advanced it; nor could any one by whom it really is entertained desire a better foundation on which to rear the superstructure of the building than that which is afforded by the principle in question. The argument is plain, and the logical result appears to be inevitable. The following may serve for illustration:

God, *for his own glory*, and without their subjective desert or agency, brought upon the posterity of Adam spiritual death and consequent misery. And as He has for His own glory brought the sinless creature into this condition by forensically imputing to him a *peccatum alienum*, and then treating him as a sinner, and as it is the unquestionable duty of all creatures to submit implicitly to the will of their Creator, so they ought not only to be willing to have sin thus imputed to them, but should be willing

¹ See *The Contrast*, by Dr. E. S. Ely, Chapter XI., note D. (New York, 1811.)

² See Whelpley's *Triangle*, page 100, seq. (New York, 1832.)

also to endure or abide in that condition into which He has for such a purpose introduced them. But as that condition must, unless God in His goodness should see proper to prevent it, ultimate in eternal damnation, so he should be willing to abide therein for the glory of God; and he would deserve to be damned if he were not thus willing.

From these and similar considerations we are inclined to suppose that if the Westminster Assembly had entertained Dr. Hodge's doctrine, there would have been considerable additions to, as well as essential modifications of our doctrinal symbols.

4. *Sin and the greatest good.*

Since they who adopt the principle under discussion are certainly at liberty to apply it in support of their views, and, as we have shown in our previous essay, men of the most opposite opinions do really thus apply it, it will not appear strange to our readers that the principle should furnish likewise a very broad basis for that pretended *philosophical* notion which some philosophizing theologians have, in their folly, attempted to engraft upon Christian theology—that *God has introduced sin into the universe as a means for accomplishing the greatest good.*

Dr. Hodge's theory, however, does not regard God as the author of *Adam's sin*. It merely teaches that that sin injured no one but Adam himself, except as it was charged upon them as a *peccatum alienum*; that is, through a forensic imputation—of which imputation, however, God is the sole origin and author. But the Church theology has always affirmed against the Pelagians, that it injured the race, not only by being charged upon them, but that it was so charged or imputed because they had participated therein, and that it consequently descended to us from our first parents through propagation (*per traducem*).¹ The question then

¹ Celestius was the first who wrote against the propagation of sin by generation, and issued his work *Contra Traducem Peccanti* even before Pelagius had published his notes on Romans, and in his Confession of Faith he says: "A sin propagated by generation (*peccatum ex traduce*) is wholly contrary to the Catholic faith." And Pelagius, in Rom. vii. 8, says: "They are insane who teach that the sin of Adam comes on us by propagation, (*per traducem*)."
Augustine, in reply, says: "That Adam's sin has been propagated among all men, and will always be propagated. The race are propagated by generation, bringing original sin with them, since the vice propagates the vice," &c., and cites Romans v. 12 in proof. And that "it is even a *necessary sin*;"

recurs, Why did God impute to the posterity this *peccatum alienum* (as Dr. Hodge affirms it to be), and thus make the guilt of it to exist where, according to this scheme, it had not existed?—for that He did so is, according to Dr. Hodge, not to be called in question. And here the aforesaid argument of the Universalist applies with irresistible force; His design therein could not have been to make His innocent creatures ultimately miserable, but must have been one of pure benevolence. They had transgressed no law, and therefore it could not have been required in order to sustain law. And since it was, therefore, a matter of His mere will and pleasure, He need not, and consequently would not, have introduced it except out of regard to the ultimate weal of the creature. It was purely of His sovereign will, and could have been demanded by no necessity of His nature. Neither justice nor law required it, as neither had been infringed by those to whom the imputation was made. And since, therefore, it was of His own mere pleasure, it must have been prompted by infinite goodness, with the view of obtaining, *not for Himself*,—for there could be no increase of His felicity,—but for His creatures, a greater increase of happiness than otherwise could be secured to them. For since it could not possibly have been from a design to make any of them ultimately unhappy that He thus, of His mere pleasure, brought evil upon them (for it would be shameless blasphemy to predicate such a supposition of a God of infinite justice, goodness, and love), and since it could not have been His design therein that they should remain in their original sinless condition,—for sin being imputed and punished by a penal infliction of moral corruption, must, as a consequence, displace them from that happy state,—the whole procedure can only resolve itself into an intention on His part to bring them into ultimate possession of a still higher degree of happiness than they originally possessed or could otherwise attain. The design, therefore, of imputing a *peccatum alienum* to the creature was to secure to it the greatest possible good; and consequently, He will, without fail, accomplish that design in every instance. Such is the argument, and in view of the theory thus suggesting it, Dr. John Taylor, in his work on

that is, the race having sinned in the first man, must continue to be sinful, unless redeemed. See the quotations in Wiggers, chapters 5 and 6.

original sin (as already stated), takes the ground *that sin is a positive good*.

There are, besides the foregoing, errors, and not a few, to which this principle extends a kindly sympathy and support, *for being in utter antagonism to the character and truth of God it holds a common logical sympathy with all antagonisms thereto*. But these may suffice to illustrate how baleful are the clogs and impediments which the introduction of this pestiferous notion into our theology must throw in the way of the extension and triumph of the truth; clogs and impediments, moreover, which not only possess no redeeming feature, but which they who introduce are powerless to remove, and which they, therefore, in their helpless imbecility will be obliged to bequeath as an inheritance and heirloom of annoyance and vexation to the Church until the principle itself shall be utterly renounced. But we proceed to our next subsection.

II. *Does not this error likewise tend by logical necessity to subvert the Christian conception of God's love toward His creatures, and of His desire to be loved by them?*

Dr. Hodge represents the Most High as of His mere will and pleasure establishing between Adam and his posterity a certain relation called *a natural and federal relation*, and then as constituting that relation the sole basis on which to regard and treat the posterity as real sinners, and so to inflict upon them the retributions of His punitive justice. For example, he says: "Adam's offence, as something *out of ourselves*, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence," "To deny this, *and to assert our own subjective character as the ground of the sentence*, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument." "*The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, or the reason why the penalty of his sin has come upon all his posterity, according to the doctrine above stated, is the union between us and Adam.*"¹

Place now in juxtaposition with this representation God's own words by the prophet: "For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God, wherefore turn yourselves and

¹ See Theology, Vol. II., pp. 191-196, 551, 552, and *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 341, 345, 346, 763, 764.

live ye;" or of our blessed Saviour, "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life;" or these of Peter, "The Lord is not slack concerning His promise, as some men count slackness, but is longsuffering to usward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance;"¹ and on comparing them with these statements of Dr. Hodge, is there any way of avoiding one of the two following conclusions: (1), That either the theory referred to is an unmitigated calumny on the character of God; or (2), That He of His own mere will and pleasure, and without regard to their own agency or subjective desert, has penally placed the posterity of Adam in a condition of hopeless depravity and spiritual death, and then made the stupendous sacrifice—a sacrifice the most stupendous that even the eternal Jehovah could make—to deliver a portion of them from the inexpressibly dreadful condition into which He had thus of His mere will and pleasure plunged the whole? I repeat it as an inevitable conclusion from the premise, that the theory must either be wholly discarded as a calumny upon God, or this most intolerable representation be accepted as legitimate. But I will not attempt to expatiate upon a concept of such a character. The argument is before the reader, and if the theory can be retained, and the latter conclusion avoided as illegitimate, let it be shown. If not, then it surely is needless to insist that such a scheme is not the gospel, that it is no part of the doctrine of the Calvinistic church, and that it is wholly irreconcilable with any adequate conception of the true nature of sin, and of redeeming love.

It is indeed true that the *sinful* or fallen creature can never, by personal character and works, expiate his transgressions or satisfy the requirements of justice. He has by his sin placed this beyond his power, so that if saved it must be by sovereign mercy alone. But is this also true in relation to the unfallen or *sinless* creature as this theory represents; that is, that God may pronounce him unjust, and make a purely foreign sin the ground of his condemnation, and of defiling his pure and sinless nature by a penal infliction of moral corruption? And is it furthermore true of our first parents themselves (as this would seem to intimate) that they, in their state of integrity, could not have certainly secured God's

¹ See Ezekiel xviii. 32; John iii. 16, and 2 Peter iii. 9.

approval and favor?¹ If so, to what purpose was the law given, if they could not obey it, and thus beyond question secure His favor and acceptance? Otherwise the conclusion seems unavoidable, that it was given in order to be violated! But a thought so perfectly fiendish can surely be entertained by no Christian. Why, then, agreeably to this scheme was the law imparted? and on what ground, moreover, did the unfallen angels obtain eternal blessedness? For they were under the same law with our first parents, requiring them to love God with all the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and their fellow creature as themselves. But if the principle does not apply to the sinless, Dr. Hodge's theory is confessedly false; for he claims that it applies to the posterity of Adam, while they were, as he affirms, totally without sin or subjective ill-desert. If, however, it does apply to the sinless, then in what sense can it be affirmed that God loves His creatures, and does not desire their death, and is pleased with their service and devotion? And on what *ground* is that love to be expressed, or even conceived of as existing? He can treat His avowed enemies no otherwise than this theory represents Him as treating the posterity of Adam while yet innocent. And on what ground, then, does He require that we exercise towards Him obedience and love, if the principle be true; that is, if He may of His mere sovereign will constitute a basis (call it *covenant*, or what you please,) upon which He can thus treat them as enemies, and then, without their having in any way incurred His displeasure, visit them with punitive vengeance?

The whole family of God, and with no dissenting voice, have always joyfully acknowledged that He is to be loved, and blessed, and adored; or, in other words, worshipped with praise and thanksgiving on account of His works and ways. Is it conceivable, then, that it should be a ground for thanksgiving and praise that any who are innocent (and consequently of His own family) should be, without reference to their own agency or demerit, pronounced unjust, and condemned to a penal infliction of moral corruption and spiritual death? Is it conceivable that to the angelic hosts, for example, it should be a ground for gratitude and praise that He,

¹ This, let it be borne in mind, is a conception that is not only favored by Dr. Hodge's theory, but by that of the supralapsarians also, and in fact by all whose theological speculations really NECESSITATE the fall.

of His mere will and without regard to any agency or subjective desert of ours, brought sin and spiritual death upon us, and then left unnumbered multitudes of the race to perish in untold and eternal misery? Can any serious intelligent mind, without infinite confusion, attempt to conjoin these ideas so as to constitute thereon a basis for thanksgiving and praise? The question is not in regard to the just and righteous punishment of the wicked and incorrigible, but in regard to those who confessedly were in every respect subjectively innocent of all disobedience or sin. And we ask again, can the two ideas be intelligently conjoined? True, the Divine command of itself would constitute an all-sufficient ground for rendering praise and thanksgiving, even if unaccompanied with the reasons for the injunction. But in the matter before us our gracious and compassionate God has condescended to announce the reasons for the requirement. And those reasons are not that He, of His own will and pleasure, brought the posterity of Adam into an estate of misery and death, and then delivered a portion therefrom; but that we brought ourselves into this condition, and must have perished therein, helplessly and for ever, had not His infinite love and compassion interposed by a proffered deliverance. And hence the adoring gratitude and thanksgiving of the saints on earth, and the majestic choruses which reverberate through the courts of heaven.

When Mandeville, a century and a half ago, published his "*Fable of the Bees*," and sought thereby to turn Christianity into ridicule, on the assumed ground that it represents God as first bringing, by an invincible necessity, sin and misery upon mankind, and then as sending His Son to suffer and die a most painful and ignominious death in order to deliver therefrom a portion of them,¹ the whole Church regarded the statement as a vile and shameless caricature; and amongst the replies he received from Christian divines, there were none who did not denounce the representation as a calumny upon both the word and character of God. And it was, moreover, freely conceded that if the Bible had contained

¹ It is half a century since I perused his argument, and, as I have had no opportunity to read it since, I can speak of it only from recollection. From numerous allusions to it which I have seen in other works, however, I feel assured that I may rely on the accuracy of the recollection as not unjust to Mandeville.

such a representation of sin and redemption it could not be regarded as proceeding from God as its author. His argument, in the main, assumed to be ethical and political; but one great aim undoubtedly was to sweep Christianity out of existence, and such were the means by which he hoped to effect his purpose. But now we are informed that this, after all, is substantially the recognized faith of the Calvinistic church, and that God of His mere sovereign pleasure first provided a basis upon which He might inflict moral corruption and spiritual death upon the sinless posterity of Adam, and then by inflicting it placed holiness and happiness for ever beyond the reach of all, except where He should see proper to interpose and rescue therefrom a certain portion through the sufferings and death of His dear Son; and a large portion of the clergymen of our Church have been taught to regard this as Calvinistic theology. Should, then, a future Mandeville arise, and refer to Dr. Hodge's theology on this point as representing the acknowledged doctrine of our communion, and then cite him as saying, "As he (Adam) sinned, his posterity came into the world in a state of sin and condemnation; they are by nature the children of wrath; the evils which they suffer are not arbitrary impositions, nor simply the natural consequences of his apostasy, but judicial inflictions; the loss of original righteousness, and death, spiritual and temporal, under which they commence their existence, are the penalty of Adam's first sin,"¹—employing the phrase *Adam's first sin* as the Church does not employ it (see section 14 above), to signify a mere *peccatum alienum*; and cite him as also saying that "spiritual death was the penal, and therefore certain, consequence of our condemnation for the sin of Adam;"² and that "the sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible: it was the ground of their actual condemnation;"³ and cite also his denunciation and ridicule of the idea that the race could have participated in the first sin, or could have had any subjective guilt or ill-desert; and thereupon make a new application of the *Fable*, referring to the former concessions that, if the Scriptures really sustain such a representation, the scheme of redemption, and consequently Christianity, could not be referred to a divine origin—on what ground could this new assault be met and repulsed by our Church? Is it to be supposed that she would admit the repre-

¹ Theology, Vol. II., p. 96.² Ibid., p. 539.³ Ibid., pp. 551, 552.

sentation, and undertake to defend it? Or, if she should, can it be supposed for a moment that the Christian Church at large would sustain such an effort? We think not. And we are, moreover, assured that there is no ground on which it could be repelled, except that which should now be by our whole community promptly assumed, to-wit: that the statement is a mere caricature of our doctrine, and is false; and that the Church, so far from ever having recognized such a dogma, has, on the contrary, always from the beginning disclaimed and branded it as false.

III. *The ground for worshipping God.*

Does not this principle in like manner enervate and tend to abolish the true Christian conception as to the ground or reason for divine worship? The thought, though briefly alluded to above, requires a more specific consideration.

The sentiment so current with certain theologians of the supralapsarian school, that God is to be worshipped solely on the ground of His infinite perfections, as though adoration constituted the whole of religious worship, appears to be radically defective, and not in accord with His own clearly announced requirement. They suppose that, to be influenced therein by any regard to our own happiness as a result, or as the reward, is so to introduce the element of self-love, or even of self-seeking, as to degrade and render unacceptable the whole of the proffered sacrifice. But this false inference is from an attempted refinement which the Scriptures nowhere countenance; for not to insist, for example, on the specifications in the Lord's prayer, and that a regard to our own happiness is perfectly compatible with the sincerest service of God, (who requires that in our approaches to Him we believe that He is the rewarder of all who diligently seek Him), and that, moreover, He Himself, by His threatenings against sin, not less than by His promises to His faithful servants, constantly presents to them this consideration, the conception, absolutely considered, is as erroneous as it is unfounded. The Church has always worshipped God, not merely on the ground of His natural and moral perfections, *but also on that of the relation which He sustains to His creatures*. Venema, in referring to the topic, has well said: "His glory consists, not only in His possessing the perfections of the divine essence, but chiefly in His having those which have reference to His rational creatures—such as goodness and mercy.

If, therefore, He be glorious in respect to the kindness which He bestows upon us, and if He is to be worshipped as a God of goodness, it necessarily follows, that He is to be worshipped with a view to our own happiness, which is the noblest exercise and the brightest manifestation of His love. Scripture is very clear on this point. God requires to be worshipped 'as the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.' (Heb. xi. 6.) 'I am,' He said to Abraham, 'thy exceeding great reward.' (Gen. xv. 1.) 'I said not unto the seed of Jacob, seek ye Me in vain.' (Isa. xlix. 19.) 'In the keeping of God's judgments there is great reward.'" (Ps. cxix. 11.)¹

Place now alongside of this clear scriptural representation the following passage, already cited, in which Dr. Hodge states the fundamental principle of his theory not only directly, but antithetically, by means of the antagonisms which he condemns. He says: "But the case is very different when we are told we must believe this doctrine (*i. e.*, Dr. Baird's affirmation of the voluntary apostasy of Adam's offspring previous to the original imputation), because otherwise God would be unjust, or when it is asserted in support of this theory, *that the judgments of God must be founded on the personal merits of those whom they affect*, that it is a denial of His moral nature, and even atheistic to say, *that He can pronounce the just unjust and the unjust just*, and when, still further, it is asserted that community in a propagated nature involves all those to whom that nature belongs in the criminality and pollution of their progenitor. *Then we say the whole gospel is destroyed, and every scriptural ground of salvation of sinners is removed.*"²

Such are his statements. And now let the points on which there could be no dispute be separated from this enumeration (for they have no title to be included in a statement of actual issues.) They are, (1), "Personal merits," as pertaining to believers in Jesus; (2), "Pronouncing the unjust just," as pertaining to the justification of the ungodly through Jesus; and (3), A pronouncing the just unjust as pertaining to our surety; neither of which, as Dr. Hodge certainly knew, was involved in the issue between

him and Dr. Baird, there being a perfect and entire agreement upon each of these points. Their introduction into the argument was therefore uncalled for, and could serve only to perplex the question. And being omitted, we have here the broad avowal, (1), That the judgments of God *are not* founded on the personal merits of those whom they affect; (2), That He *can* pronounce the just unjust; and (3), That character and works *are not* the only legitimate ground of judgment. This, of course, is only an exposition of the dogma of gratuitous imputation in some of its numerous and repulsive aspects. And, as thus explained, let our readers consider it in its obvious relations to the service of God, and determine for themselves whether there is a single enjoined duty which is not enervated by such a representation of the divine character. If He may, of His own sovereign prerogative, and without regard to character or subjective desert, constitute a basis on which to pronounce the innocent guilty and then treat them accordingly, how may His worshippers be assured that even the highest degree of true consecration to His service will meet His acceptance, or secure their felicity? Such a conception places the divine character entirely apart from His moral nature, and renders it solely dependent upon His will; and thus the whole relation of goodness and mercy which God sustains to His creatures, and in view of which, not less than on the ground of His infinite perfections, He is to be worshipped and adored, is so far implicated by the theory that it becomes practically problematical as to its exhibition, not only towards the repenting sinner, but even towards His own acknowledged children.

IV. *Does not this principle in like manner also logically subvert the whole Christian conception of the divine justice and holiness?* We think it does. But let us consider the matter.

The Church view of divine justice, and its relation to sin or moral evil, have been presented in our Section 10, above. The definition of the term, as offered by Dr. Hodge, having been shaped by the exigencies of his theory, is radically defective, and we had designed to make it and its correlations the subject of a separate section; but regard to our limits has compelled us to omit this, with other matters of interest to the general theme. Still, however, if that point had been treated by us it could only be referred to here, for it is the fundamental principle of his theory that is

¹ Institutes of Theology, Vol. I., pp. 23, 24. (Andover, Mass. 1853.)

² Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 763, 764.

now before us, and not the inquiry whether his definition of divine justice is admissible.

There is no point in the recognized theology of the Church more clearly apparent from the very first, and in the entire development of that theology, than her earnest, rigid, unwavering, and zealous determination to exclude, utterly from the divine causality, and to affirm as appertaining to the creature alone the real and entire authorship or origination of sin. She has ever felt and affirmed that any tampering with the boundary which, on the one hand, excludes all causal divine efficiency in its production, and on the other limits its authorship solely to the creature, must in the result enervate and practically abolish all ground for repentance, and tend likewise to deprive our blessed Redeemer of the glory due to His love as exhibited in the redemption of our race; for how should a rational creature repent of being in a condition into which, and aside from his own agency or ill-desert, a God of infinite wisdom, holiness, and goodness had introduced him? And how should glory redound to God merely from delivering a portion of our race out of a condition of helpless ruin and misery, into which, and while unstained by sin, His sovereign pleasure had efficiently consigned the whole? The doctrine of Pelagius was rejected because it excluded our participation in the first sin; that is, in the procuring causes which entailed upon the race an inheritance of ruin and misery antecedent to their asserted "imitation of the first transgression."¹ And in later times the supralapsarian scheme was discountenanced and rejected by the Church because it did, by clear imputation (though its supporters disclaimed the inference), introduce the divine causality into the production of the sin and fall of our first parents, and thus tended necessarily to re-

¹ It should be borne in mind, however, that subsequent to the Synod of Diospolis Pelagius condemned the proposition of his disciple Caelestius, *that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not his posterity*, and affirmed that Adam did injure his posterity, inasmuch as he gave them the first example of sin; and as is further apparent from the fact that new-born infants are so far in a different condition from that of Adam before his transgression *that they cannot now perform what is commanded, though he could*, and cannot yet use that free, intelligent will without which no command could be given to Adam. *Dr. Hodge's theory will admit of no injury done to posterity except through a forensic imputation.* (See the quotations and references in Chapter V. of Wigger's *Augustinism and Pelagianism*.)

lieve the conscience of the sinner from a sense of responsibility for his corruption and misery, and proportionally to lessen the adoring gratitude due to God for redeeming grace. And for precisely the same reason she has always discarded the theory that the imputation of Adam's personal guilt (the *peccatum alienum*) to his posterity is the sole procuring cause of their ruin and spiritual death; and, on the contrary, has unflinchingly maintained, against all the assaults, cavils, and sneers of the Pelagian and Socinian schools, the existence in the offspring of Adam themselves of a just moral basis for the imputation of his sin to them, as recognized by the fact that they were implicated therein, and so became partakers of his guilt and criminality.¹ Her constant disclaimer of all such errors was, that surely the *reconciliation* and *forgiveness* proffered to the race through redemption, presupposes the existence of a state or condition in reference to all, into which He who offers this boon has not causally, and irrespective of their own agency and desert, introduced them; a state of alienation from the sole source of light, for which the race alone is responsible. And certainly this is so. Why the bare attempt to conceive, as a concrete fact, the contrary idea must utterly confuse and confound every conception in regard to what His word makes known of His wisdom, and justice, and holiness; for how could it be conceived, in consistency with those perfections, that He (while we were free from sin and subjective ill-desert) should efficiently place us in a state of alienation, which must inevitably result in our moral corruption and enmity to Him, and then, after providing a redemption therefrom through the stupendous sacrifice of His own dear Son, insist on our accepting the deliverance, and inflict an increase of actual misery upon those who still prefer to continue in the estate into which He had previously placed them? Can the moral and rational nature with which man is endowed acquiesce in a representation like this without a hopeless subversion of all its native convictions or conceptions of equity and holiness as pertaining to the divine

¹ Augustine could always say, and even in respect to our physical condition, that man is "corrupted by his own vice," or "by the vice by which he voluntarily fell, (vitio quo voluntate prolapsus est.)"—De Pec. Mer. II., 4.) And in his *De Civitate*, "Because, according to the greatness of the guilt, the condemnation changed nature into a worse, so that what had been inflicted penally upon the first transgressors followed naturally to them born afterwards (etiam naturaliter sequeretur in nascentibus ceteris)". (Lib. XIII., cap. 3.)

character? or, at least, without as hopelessly disturbing and disordering them, as it would our intellectual faculties, by being required, under the penalty of eternal damnation, to assent to the proposition as a truth, that the three angles of any triangle are equal to the six angles of a hexagon? Can any analogy of such a procedure be found within the whole compass of either the word or the works of God? Has any analogous event ever occurred under the rule of earth's despots which has failed to elicit from the moral convictions of mankind the most decided and unmeasured condemnation? And is it therefore strange that the Church of God has always disclaimed a principle which, fairly interpreted and logically applied, involves such a conception of the Father of mercies, and of His work of redeeming love?—a work the contemplation of which calls forth perpetually the admiring and adoring praises of all the hosts of heaven. Can it be imagined, moreover, that the praises which those pre-eminent and glorious intelligences pour forth in seven-fold hallelujahs before the throne, are inspired by the conception that the great Creator of all things first introduced causally and efficiently His innocent and dependent creatures into an inevitable and helpless condition of sin and misery, and then delivered a portion of them out of it, and left the remainder to abide therein for ever? No! and a thousand times no! The angelic hosts well know that our race is truly, and not fictitiously, guilty of self-ruin and self-alienation from the fountain of all life and goodness. They know that it was not a putative, but real and actual guilt on the part of the creature, that is the ground of that alienation, from which the stupendous mercy of God could alone have brought deliverance. And it is in view of this delivering love that those choral symphonies awaken, which can find their full utterance only in the idioms of heaven. The contrary conception, therefore, would not only hopelessly subvert the Christian view of the justice and holiness of God, but the view entertained by all the glorious array who dwell amid the splendors which are perpetually radiating from the eternal throne.

V. *Is not the principle referred to destructive also of human accountability?* Let us see.

The Scriptures in every form of expression directly affirm our accountability to God for all our thoughts, words and actions; and assure us that "every one of us must give account of himself to

God;" and that at the day of final account we shall "receive according to the deeds done in the body." The whole representation proceeds upon a moral basis, the validity of which is everywhere recognized by the human conscience, (2 Cor. iv. 3.) Nor is anything more obvious than the fact that, could we trace to something "out of ourselves," and beyond our avoidance and control, the causal origin of that moral *status* which leads us perpetually and inevitably to sin,—that is, could we trace to the divine efficiency, irrespective of our independent appropriation of it as a disturbing, polluting influence,—the whole sense of our responsibility for sin, and, consequently, of our accountability for evil actions and habits, would be so modified as to be substantially destroyed. Do not our intuitions and the settled convictions of our moral nature assure us, and do not the practical judgments of all men acquiesce in the assurance, that if, without our agency, we have been efficiently placed in this evil condition, from which we, of ourselves, have no escape, and in which we must inevitably continue to sin, we are not responsible for being in that condition? And much less are we responsible if it were God who, in His wise and holy providence, has effectually placed us therein? If such, then, are really the facts in the case, may not the inquirer reason thus with himself, and say: It must follow that no announcement that I am responsible for being in this evil condition (*i. e.*, under guilt and in a state of unavoidable sin) can induce a conscious recognition of it as a practical truth, since, if God brought me efficiently into it, I am in no sense responsible for being therein. Surely I am not to suppose that He, a good and righteous God, would ever consent to employ that fiendish power which would efficiently place me helplessly in such a condition, and then hold me responsible for being therein,—impute to me a guilt wholly foreign from me, and so leave me under conditions wherein I can do nothing but become more and more vile, and then, in displeasure, abandon me to the unavoidable and interminable consequences of an inherent corruption thus judicially inflicted! For though they tell me that I am offered deliverance therefrom if I repent—of what is it that I am to repent? And what is the basis for repentance?

"God, by charging to my account a *peccatum alienum*, has brought this guilt, with its consequences, upon me, when, as Dr.

Hodge assures me, I had no guilt of my own. Hence the origin of the "so-called evil" must be traced to Him and not to me. And, consequently, it cannot really be *evil* after all, since evil cannot dwell with Him. I find the pure, innocent nature with which He originally endowed me infected with this thing called "moral evil;" and infected thus by the sovereign pleasure of God alone, irrespective of my own will or agency; and how, then, am I to look upon myself as damnable, either on that account or for having acted agreeably thereto? My moral nature, my intuitions, all assure me that I cannot be justly responsible in such a case. And I know that God is as just as He is good. And these intuitions are as definite and as strong as any asserted evidence of the divinity of a revelation, which, they tell me, declares that I am responsible, and that as such I must give account for being in this condition."

Thus this doctrine, if entertained and allowed what appears to be its legitimate scope and influence, must tend necessarily to neutralize all those convictions of our moral nature which awaken within us the assurance that we are guilty for being in a condition of alienation from God. And if the doctrine itself is admitted, on what ground can such ratiocination as the aforesaid be contravened? or, at least, so far enervated as to lead the conscience to recognize our responsibility for being, through God's own efficient operation, in an unavoidably evil and sinful state? If there be any such ground, without the abandonment of the premise affirmed by Dr. Hodge, let it be produced. But if there be no such ground, then it is confessedly apparent that this theory destroys the whole basis of moral accountability, and is, therefore, essentially and eternally antagonistic to the truth of God.

VI. *Is it not equally apparent, on the same ground, that this theory must likewise abolish every practicable basis for the exercise of repentance of sin towards God?* Let us see. The thought, though suggested above, requires to be particularly considered.

One or more modern divines of Germany, in treating of free will, have returned substantially to the position of Seneca and others (noticed in our former essay), who deny its real and *ab initio* existence, on the ground that God would not have bestowed upon the creature a power so injurious to them as such a bestowment must necessarily prove. And they endeavor to reconcile a

consciousness of guilt and enjoined repentance with the notion that evil itself and all things else are necessarily ordered. To what extent such a conception is likewise involved in the theory of Dr. Hodge, we leave it with our readers to determine. But the attempt to reconcile the conception itself with the duty of repentance, as required by God in His word and recognized by our own moral nature, must be regarded as simply preposterous.

"How," asks the inquirer, "am I to repent of that which a God of infinite goodness, and whilst I was in a state of innocence, has ordered on my account by imputing to me a *peccatum alienum*? If He has ordered it, how should He require of me repentance? If He has not ordered it, why teach me that He has?"

"And then further: If He, in His infinite goodness, and of His mere sovereign will and pleasure, has efficiently placed me in a condition in which I inevitably both suffer and do evil, on what ground should I be thereat distressed? Would it not be impiety in me to be anxiously concerned about a condition into which He has brought me, without any ill-desert or voluntary agency of my own? Am I to call in question His ineffable love and goodness? Is not the *velle quod vult Deus* the very highest attainment of the Christian life? Can I doubt, then, that it is my duty to keep quiet as God thus leads me on?—rejoicing in and yielding to every requirement of good, but looking upon the past without reproach and without repentance, as having been ordered by a good and holy God? Such is the argument. And the principle being admitted that God gratuitously imputed a *peccatum alienum* to the sinless creature, what ground remains upon which that argument can be set aside? None that is at all available. And thus, not only is the necessity for repentance hopelessly enervated, but the actual need of regeneration, and of redemption through Jesus, is set aside.

But further. A merely forensic imputation of sin cannot produce a conviction or consciousness of personal guilt, and without such consciousness or conviction any genuine or evangelical repentance for the sin charged is clearly out of the question. But, says Dr. Hodge, we are not required to repent of the *peccatum alienum* of Adam which is imputed to us, for such repentance is impossible. Very well. But of what, then, are we to repent? Are we to repent of its penalty?—the moral corruption or spirit-

ual death penally inflicted on account of that forensically imputed sin? and which, as he likewise affirms, takes full effect upon us before the commencement of our moral agency? Are we to repent of this? If so, on what ground? Surely, to repent of the latter is as far beyond the range of possibility as to repent of the former. For how can a man repent on account of having been innocently punished? And if it be alike impossible to repent of these, where, or on what ground, shall repentance begin? Is it of our thoughts, words, and actions?—all of which are impure and unholy, as proceeding from this “sinful state”? If so, on what foundation is to be based our repentance for their sinfulness? Are they not *unavoidably* sinful? Dr. Hodge affirms that they are. And on what conceivable ground, therefore, can repentance be exercised in relation to them? It is plainly impossible. And if their expiation be demanded of us, we can view the requirement only as a calamity beyond our control. And this, of course, destroys all rational foundation for either contrition or repentance.

True, it is not necessary, in order to a basis for legitimate repentance, that one should be conscious of guilt at the time, or in the process of contracting it; for, as Müller has truly remarked, “the existence of guilt is not at all dependent upon its being recognized in the conscience of the sinful individual.”¹ How many, for example, allow themselves to be governed by motives of self-seeking, and never even imagine that they have sinned in so doing until conscience is subsequently awakened by the Spirit of God? But there is a vast difference between this and the case before mentioned; for, in the latter, ignorance or inattention may have led into the error; but in the former there is, according to Dr. Hodge, directly revealed, and, of course, positive knowledge, that the sin forensically charged upon me, and under which accusation I have unavoidably become corrupt, is a *peccatum alienum* in every sense of the term, and in no sense my own. In such a case, therefore, it is in the very nature of things impossible that any arousing of a man’s conscience should induce him to regard such a sin and its inevitable results as his own, or as that which he should acknowledge as his own, or of which he should repent. In fact, the more his conscience should become awakened and enlightened to understand God’s truth, the more clearly must he, accord-

¹ See Christian Doctrine of Sin, Vol. I., p. 223.

ing to this theory, perceive that it is not his own. What, then, becomes of the doctrine and duty of repentance? For how should he repent of that which he could in no sense avoid? A thousand forensic accusations against a man could not make him feel remorse, or self-reproach, or compunction for a crime of which he was in no way guilty. He might experience regret and mortification on account of such charges; but to feel compunction for an accusation which is false, and to repent of a crime thus charged, is clearly out of the question.

How, then, on Dr. Hodge’s theory, does the matter stand in relation to forensically imputed sin? He maintains that our repentance of the *peccatum alienum* is an impossibility,¹ (as of course it is); and that we have not brought its guilt upon ourselves, and can have no consciousness of having brought it upon ourselves. He affirms, moreover, that we are punished for it, and that that punishment is itself moral pollution or spiritual death. Now, if all this be so, it follows that, while we may sadly deplore such a state of things as pertaining to ourselves and the race, we can regard it only in the light of calamity. The punishment of the forensically imputed sin, says Dr. Hodge, corrupts and pollutes our nature even before voluntary agency commences, and leaves us no possible choice but to sin. And what is this but an awful and unavoidable calamity? And thus this theory practically ignores criminality in our native depravity or corruption by making it the punishment for a sin which is in no sense our own.

In every way, therefore, that the subject can be viewed, this theory necessarily annuls a sense of responsibility for sin, and, consequently, destroys the basis for all true repentance. For, according to the scheme, what is there to be repented of? Tell the sinner that God penally and efficiently brought him out of his original condition of innocence into his present depraved and ruined condition merely as the punishment of another’s sin, and of what is he to repent? But, on the contrary, assure him *that this imputed sin is his own; that God declares it to be so; and that he himself, and not God, is its author; and that the same is true of all his sin.* Assure him of this, and even though his conscience may fail to accuse him, on the ground of self-conscious

¹ See Princeton Essays, First Series, page 137.

perpetration, either of the original transgression or of ten thousand subsequent sins, and though he may be wholly unable to retrace in his own consciousness the basis or ground of the conviction, there yet is left, on the ground of the Divine assurance that he is the sole author of his sin and of its consequences, a true basis for repentance. And an awakened conscience never fails to verify the Divine representation. Analogous illustrations are innumerable; as, for example, with men who, when in a state of intoxication, had perpetrated crimes, and are, on adequate evidence, convinced of their guilt, though they have no recollection of having contracted it. Yet, in virtue of the evidence which has both convicted and convinced them, conscience, though unable to trace out and verify the fact by its own knowledge or recollection, becomes aroused, and awakens compunction and remorse, and the accused exercise the deepest repentance on account of it,—wishing to undo the crime, and earnestly seeking forgiveness. The case is a plain one, nor is there any need to call upon philosophy to furnish the solution. In virtue of the evidence adduced, conviction awakens, and remorse is felt and repentance exercised in reference to a crime of which the perpetrator has no recollection. How much more, then, may he feel and recognize his guilt and criminality as the author of his own sad and evil condition when God Himself furnishes the testimony against him!

But now, for a moment, let us suppose that the persons referred to in the illustration had been arrested and imprisoned for the alleged offence. Could they, in view of any efforts which might be made to fasten the crime upon them, possibly feel remorse for it, and exercise repentance, and seek forgiveness, if they were assured on sufficient grounds that the crime of another had been forensically imputed to them, and that in consequence of that accusation they, by some cruel deception practised upon them, but without their knowledge or concurrence therein, had been made drunk, and that during the insanity induced by that drunkenness had perpetrated the offence charged upon them? Would there exist here any possible ground for remorse or repentance on account of it?

And then, finally: If God should condemn or punish a creature for not repenting of that condition in which He, by a mere act of sovereign prerogative, had efficaciously placed him, *He would*, as

Dr. Julius Müller justly remarks, *condemn His own work*; which it were infamous blasphemy even to suppose! Nor can it in anywise relieve the case to suppose even fifty, or any number of intervening links of transition between the one and the other, if no one of them is invested with an independent causality; for in that case they all depend upon God as the first cause. For Him to thrust a guiltless creature out of favor, and then, through the infliction of a penal sentence clothe him efficiently with guilt and pollution, could it in any way take the causality of that guilt and pollution out of His hands for Him to endow that creature in the highest degree with all the faculties which, in other circumstances, constitute voluntary agency and moral obligation? He has efficiently placed His innocent creature in a condition wherein he can do nothing but sin, and to condemn him for sinning, or for not repenting of the condition in which he finds himself thus placed, would therefore be to condemn His own work, agreeably to the universally conceded maxim: *Causa causæ, est etiam causa causati*. And, consequently, as the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin legitimately and fairly involves this conclusion, that theory is false, and can constitute no part of the theology of the Calvinistic church.

VII. Another interesting and most important inquiry is, *Does not this same theory constitute redemption a work of justice instead of grace and mercy?* Let us examine this.

Dr. John Taylor, in his aforesaid assault upon the doctrine of original sin, assumes (as we have seen) the position taken by Dr. Hodge in relation to the non-participation of the posterity in Adam's guilt. He, moreover, says: "The threatening, Gen. ii. 16, 17, *Thou shalt surely die*, is addressed to Adam personally, and therefore the *assembly of divines*, sensible that nothing can be concluded from thence with regard to Adam's posterity, direct us to gather the full sense of it from Rom. v. 12-20, and 1 Cor. xv. 22. But from these passages we cannot gather that *all mankind sinned in Adam* (if we understand *sinned* as distinguished from *suffering*; and so the assembly of divines here understand it); for the apostle strongly argues, that it was *the offence of one*; i. e., of Adam alone, considered apart from all other men, which brought death into the world. Consequently to say *all mankind sinned in Adam*, is not only to say what the apostle doth not say,

but to say what he expressly contradicts. For had *all mankind* sinned in *Adam* when he sinned, then that offence would not have been *the offence of ONE*, but of *MILLIONS*."¹

Edwards, in his remarks on the general subject, and amongst other things which apply equally to the theory of Dr. Hodge, says: "He (Dr. T.) often calls this condemnation a *judicial act*, and a *sentence of condemnation*. But according to his scheme, it is a judicial sentence of condemnation passed upon them who are perfectly innocent—and viewed by the judge, even in passing the condemnatory scheme, as having no guilt of sin, or any fault at all chargeable upon them—and a *judicial proceeding passing sentence arbitrarily*, without any law or rule, of right before established; for there was no preceding law threatening death, that he or any one else pretended to have been established, but only this, *In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die*. And concerning this he insists that there is not a word said in it of Adam's posterity."² But in adverting to the features of the scheme immediately before us, Edwards, on the previous page, shows that it involves the consequence stated in the title of this sub-section of our argument, and says: "But it follows from his doctrine, that there is no *grace at all* in this benefit (*i. e.*, of redemption through Christ), and it is no more than a mere act of *justice*, being only a removing of what mankind suffer, being *innocent*. Death, as it commonly comes on mankind, and even our infants (as has been observed), is an extreme positive calamity, to bring which on the perfectly *innocent*, unremedied, and without anything to countervail it, we are sufficiently taught, is not consistent with the *righteousness of the Judge of all the earth*. What *grace*, therefore, worthy of being so celebrated, would there be in affording remedy and relief, after there had been brought on innocent mankind that which is (as Dr. T. himself represents) the dreadful and universal destruction of their nature, being a striking demonstration how infinitely hateful sin is to God! What *grace*, in delivering from such shocking ruin, them who did not deserve the least calamity." This is certainly conclusive. And these questions being as pertinent to the theory of Dr. Hodge as to that of Dr. Taylor, can leave little or no doubt as to their identity. And our readers may therefore determine for themselves whether Dr. Hodge has gone

¹ Original Sin, pp. 94, 95. ² Edwards' Works, Vol. II., p. 483.

over to Dr. Taylor, or whether Edwards was wrong in opposing him.

If guilt, with its penal consequences, is to be regarded as imposed upon the posterity of Adam, not on account of their subjective demerit, but simply in the exercise of God's sovereign pleasure, then certainly it is not only conceivable, but apparent, on principles of equity and righteousness, that justice should interpose for its removal; but that there should be, in the proper sense of those terms, *grace* and *mercy* in such interposition, is as absurd a supposition as that a man who having, without reason, cast another into a pool of water, wherein he must perish if unassisted, would justly lay the sufferer under obligation to his kindness and humanity by helping him out. Justice would demand it, and his performance of the requirement could be in no sense regarded as an act of grace or unmerited kindness, though his neglect to do it would indeed be a heinous crime. And if, then, our redemption through Christ be, as the word of God everywhere declares, a work of grace and mercy, contrary to our actual deserving, and to which we had no claim nor title whatever, then nothing can be clearer than that our own subjective demerit has brought us into the condition of forfeiture of the divine favor. "The divine judgment necessarily presupposes the existence of a causality of relative independency, otherwise it could produce nothing which was an object of divine judgment."¹ And such is the view of redeeming love and mercy which is realized by every sincere penitent, and the view which the Church in every age has entertained.

If, then, what Dr. Hodge affirms could be admitted, that guilt, with its accompanying misery and death, has come upon the race for a *peccatum alienum*, with which they are in no way morally or subjectively connected, or, in other words, through the sovereign pleasure of God alone, for the accomplishment of some wise and holy purpose, nothing can be clearer than that He who has the highest regard for the real welfare of those who transgress not his requirements, would, when that purpose has been accomplished, deliver them from the infliction, and that, agreeably to His own word and perfections, it would be unjust not to deliver them; and if so, the redemption of our race is purely a work of

¹ Müller, *ut supra*, Vol. I., page 261.

justice, and not of mercy. But inasmuch as such a conception (as stated above) reverses the whole doctrine of the Scriptures on the subject, it is, and necessarily must be, false. In such a case forgiveness could have no relevancy, for there could be nothing to forgive; and to speak of God as pardoning His innocent creatures for having inflicted upon them a calamity would be unmeaning and absurd. And then, as to expiation through our blessed Redeemer, what has He expiated according to this theory? Man was simply in the condition in which the Creator had efficiently placed him, and what expiation could be required for his deliverance? It were not expiation that in such a case would be needed for deliverance, but power exercised according to the principles of justice. The very fact, therefore, that an expiatory atoning sacrifice was required in order that the race might be reclaimed from its ruined condition and restored to its lost innocence, evinces that God had not, either penally or otherwise, brought the guiltless posterity of Adam (as Dr. Hodge claims them to be) into a condition of misery and spiritual death, and consequently that the dogma of the gratuitous imputation of sin is not only false, but a baseless calumny upon the holy and righteous character of our great and glorious Creator.

VIII. But, not to dwell upon the many other particulars which suggest themselves in the connection, we shall conclude the discussion with the following inquiry, which, though in part anticipated already, needs to be thoroughly considered, to-wit: *Does not this theory constitute God the author of sin as it exists in the posterity of Adam?*

Dr. Hodge alleges that the sin of our first parents, as respects its criminality and the injury thereby done to human nature, was confined to themselves alone, and produced the existing evil effects upon the race only through the sovereign will of God imputing it to us as a *peccatum alienum*.

The charge that God is the efficient author of the sin of Adam, and consequently of that of the race, has often been brought against the doctrine of the Reformed church by ignorance or malevolence, or both, but has always been successfully repelled by those who truly held her theology. The supralapsarians did give reason for the charge, and never could, while retaining their theory, free themselves from the imputation logically; while the

Socinians and Remonstrants, etc., who held the gratuitous or merely forensic imputation of the first sin to the race, deemed it useless to deny the accusation; while some of them, therefore, met it by insisting that sin was not really an evil, but an actual good, others, who could not accept this, denied their position. *Let us, then, note how Dr. Hodge himself would repel it*, and at the same time retain his theory. And we shall consider the question from several of those salient points of view from which the whole field may be easily surveyed. They are, 1, *Human personality*; 2, *The original sentence*; 3, *The transmission of sin*; 4, *The demands of justice*; and 5, *The origin of sin in the posterity of Adam*.

1. *Human Personality.*

The relation of this topic to the subject of our discussion is most intimate, and, though briefly touched upon in a previous section, a fuller consideration of it is here required before concluding the work; for so much is said and insisted thereon by Dr. Hodge, in the effort to give plausibility to his theory, that it would be unpardonable to conclude the discussion without showing that his attempted issues with the Church doctrine on this point originate in an imperfect, and consequently inaccurate, conception of the subject. And his object seems to be to show, from this point, that the Church doctrine, not less than his own scheme, must be liable to the charge; and so to silence the impugnors of his theory on the subject of the Divine efficiency in the production of sin. He has made his views of it the basis of considerable ratiocination against, as well as denunciation of, the Church doctrine of *our* guilt in the first sin; and it will be in place, therefore, to show, if but briefly, that there is no ground for this, and that, unlike his theory, that doctrine in no sense involves the necessity for attributing to the Divine efficiency, either penally or otherwise, the causal production of moral evil as existing in the posterity of Adam.

Personality has been defined as "individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground."¹ And the constituent elements of what might, in the absence of a more fitting expression, be termed a *full or developed personality*, are self-consciousness and

¹ Coleridge. Notes on English Divines, Vol. I., p. 43.

self-determination; *self* in the former conditioning the latter; for the latter could have no relation to personality in development unless it were a self-conscious determination. Can, then, personality itself exist under any other conditions? That is, can it exist really in a state or condition of incomplete development? or are self-consciousness and self-determination alike and absolutely essential to its existence in every condition in which it is possible for such existence to be truly predicated? Dr. Hodge affirms that they are, and attempts to treat with derision the concept that it could possibly be otherwise; and yet, in a multitude of instances, teaches, by the clearest implication, the exact contrary (as we shall show in the course of the argument), and seems to suppose that every characteristic tendency and potentiality of personality must be at all times efficaciously active in order that its existence may be known or verified. Is this, then, really so? Certainly the definitions above cited do not require it, nor is it sustained by true philosophy. But let us view this his assumption in the light of a few conceded facts.

Infants, from the beginning of their existence, have been always and everywhere indisputably ranked in the category of *persons*; and the same is true of individuals whose moral and intellectual powers have failed into hopeless idiocy; so that wilfully to deprive either of life is, by both human and divine law, accounted *murder* in the strict sense of the word; and it is now too late, therefore, to eject them from the category, in order to subserve the exigencies of any philosophical theory; for the character is recognized as theirs in law, in ethics, and in the word of God, and the universal consciousness or intuition of mankind justifies and demands the recognition. Is, then, the conceded personality of the newly-born infant, or of the individual when lapsed into idiocy, a full or developed personality? Does either human or divine law, or ethics, or theology, or human consciousness regard it as such? There is, beyond reasonable question, an existing personality, as conceded in the recognition referred to. But however that may stand in its secret and to us unknown relation to the Giver of life and being, it is in the relation which its subject sustains to his fellow creatures here, and to this whole mundane manifested life and accountability, universally regarded by mankind as irresponsible. It is, therefore, personality in a state of incomplete exhi-

bition or development, as the man is but the fuller development of the infant, albeit there may be no such consciousness of existence as in the subsequent and full development, will be necessarily recognized as having existed; for latent powers and capacities are perfectly consistent with existing personality; and as Butler remarks, "We find it to be a general law of nature that creatures *endowed with the capacities of virtue and religion* should be placed in a condition of being in which they are altogether without the use of them for a considerable length of their duration, as in infancy and childhood."¹ The personality, therefore, may be latent and undeveloped, as regards any present manifested existence as a creature of time. In the infant the latency is anterior to such development; in the lapsed idiot (as in the alleged instances of Marlborough and Swift) its latency is subsequent thereto, though the personality,—that is, "the individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground,"—remains. The facts, therefore, are indisputable, and only *as facts* do we adduce them. The attempted evasion of their force, by assuming that personality is merely forensic, expresses no tangible conception, and is too trivial to be entitled to serious treatment.

The facts and considerations here referred to, together with innumerable others which can be adduced, and which bear with equal point and directness upon the question, may serve to suggest that the assumption of positive knowledge in relation to all the possible conditions in which human personality may be by the Creator recognized as actually existing, is seriously at fault.² They who, like Dr. Hodge, would claim a degree of such knowledge sufficient to entitle them to speak thereon with an imperious dogmatism, do not know what they presumptuously assume to know. Nor should they, on the ground of any such assumption, venture, as they do, to ring the changes on "impossibility," "absurdity," and the like, in regard to what are plainly the averments of revelation, until they can furnish some evidence of having penetrated beyond the merely phenomenal sufficiently to enable them to speak intelligently of that which no one in this life can attain

¹ Analogy, Part I., Chapter I.

² In note B. (Appendix) our readers will find this whole topic extensively treated in connection with that unity and distinct personality as pertaining to the race.

to a knowledge of except through supernatural sources. Dr. Julius Müller has most earnestly endeavored to pierce beyond the veil, but neither his exalted genius nor sincere piety could suffice to guard the effort from sanctioning a principle which, if allowed and carried forward, would inevitably unsettle many of the great truths of revelation in the minds of those who should accept the speculation. The fact announced by God as an explanatory principle, that we all *really* sinned in the fall of our first parents, *should be accepted and treated as a fact*, leaving it with God in His own way and time to evince the truth of the declaration, and leaving it, moreover, to those who refuse His testimony, either on this or any other of the facts of revelation, to denounce and treat them as absurd and impossible, as rendering men infidels, and the like. We have nothing to do with that matter. It is between themselves and the Judge of all the earth, who in the end will fully justify the confidence with which the humble believer relies on the averments of His word. Dr. Hodge will not venture to deny that a sinful state, which is not dependent on our formal personal action, is consciously ours, even from the first dawn of reason, for he repeatedly affirms the fact, and affirms likewise that this sinful state was really ours *before our personal or moral agency could possibly have appropriated it*; that is, that it was ours anterior to the development of our actual personality, and finds no difficulty in the way of such affirmation, though on his scheme, and according to his conception of personality, it associates *sin* and a *sinful state* with *non-existing personality*, which, in every view that can be taken of it, is a monstrous conception. But he shrinks not from its utterance; and because he is unable to understand how we could have participated in the first sin, so as to bring ourselves into this fearful condition of bondage and spiritual death, assumes the liberty to ridicule the doctrine of such participation, though, as we have fully shown, the Church, whose theology he is appointed to teach, has ever held and taught that a sinful nature was ethically appropriated by us when our first parents sinned; and that hence man, when he becomes consciously a moral or personal agent, or is possessed of self-conscious determination, finds himself already inherently corrupt and alienated from God; and this, in fact, is the ground of that formula, universal in the theology of the Reformation, but so distasteful to Dr. Hodge,

natura corrumpit personam.¹ Imbecility may represent this as materializing; but imbecility alone could be capable of such folly. Facts, whether in the word or works of God, are not theories.

A confirmed habit is commonly designated "a second *nature*." It may not be constantly in exercise; *i. e.*, always developing itself in action, but it still exists, and is, so to speak, seated in the constitution of our nature. Its basis, and how it thus lives and abides, we know nothing about. But we have learned its existence from its manifested effects. Thus, too, with the *peccatum habituale* of the Church theology, as existing in our nature anterior to a fully manifested personality. Luther, in relation to it, employs the strong terms *peccatum substantiale*, *peccatum essenziale*, not meaning that it is, as Flacius dreamed,² a part of our substance or nature, but that it exists as a disordered constitutional characteristic in our nature anterior to and apart from any mere existence in our conscious volition and action, which disordered condition is in no way, either penally or otherwise, the causal production of God as imparting it to a sinless creature, but a state for the existence of which the creature alone is responsible, both as to its origin and manifestation in himself, and for the guilt attached to both. And

¹ The whole formula is, *Persona corrumpit naturam, natura corrumpit personam*, which was employed in treating on original sin, anterior to the Reformation, by Anselm, Aquinas, and others. By the first clause they designated the *peccatum originis originans*; and by the second the *peccatum originis originatum*; so that the sense of the full formula is, *Natura à primis personis corrupta corrumpit ceteris personis*. The constant use of this formula by the churches of the Reformation evinces how entirely foreign from their theology is Dr. Hodge's theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin. In later ages even the supralapsarians do not venture to ignore it (except such extremists as Szydlovius) in stating the doctrine of original sin; as *e. g.* Polanus thus applies it, "*Primum persona infecit naturam, sed post natura infecit personam*. Peccatum Adami naturæ ipsius peccatum fuit, cæterum peccata personali sunt," etc. (Syntag. Theol., lib. 6, cap. 3, and compare Dr. Hodge's Theology, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, and Vol. II., pp. 212, 213, 215, 225.) Tilenus thus employs it, "*Ex primo peccato quo persona corrumpit naturam, fuit alter distinctio*," etc. (Syntag. Disput., 56, § 1.) Turretin likewise, in a passage we have cited in § 28, says, "*Ut ergo in Adamo persona infecit naturam; ita in posteris natura infecit personam*." (Loc. 9. Quæst. 10, § 22.) It is cited and explained by Müller (Doct. of Sin, Vol. II., pp. 344-349), and also, amongst others, by Schaff, in Lange on Romans, page 192.

² See Clavis S. Script., part. Alt.; Tract. VII., pp. 766-792, and the subjoined *Examen* by Musæus. (Frankfort and Leipsic, 1719.)

when Pelagius charged Augustine with teaching that original sin was a natural sin, *peccatum naturale* and *malum naturale*, Augustine disclaimed the expression, and employed to designate it his own phrase, *peccatum originale*, "because by it the idea of God being the author of sin is removed." He employed it also as synonymous with *hereditarium vitium* (Epist. 194, c. 6), and *originale vitium* (Epist. 157, c. 3).

Luther does not hesitate to call this sin (*i. e.*, the *peccatum substantiale*) *personal sin*, though, as he at the same time teaches, it exists anterior to and apart from its existence in the *conscious volition*. In other words, it had been *self-appropriated prior to the action of our developed or manifested personality*, which is literally the teaching of the apostle in Romans v. 12, 19, and Ephesians ii. 3; and we repeat, that the mode or method of such appropriation must baffle our efforts at solution, and that we must rest satisfied with the revealed announcement until we can better understand the co-existing unity and distinction of personality in our common humanity.

Such, then, is the Church view; and thus she has ever triumphantly vindicated herself from the calumnious charge that her doctrine, either directly or by implication, ascribed to God the efficient production of sin as it exists in the world.

Sin is regarded in her theology as existing in a two-fold manner or form; *i. e.*, as a constitutional tendency of the inward life (*peccatum habituale*); or, in act (*peccatum actuale*). In the former sense it is never found in the classical use of *ἀμαρτία*; but the Holy Spirit has clearly imparted this sense in the New Testament usage; for example, in Rom. vii., where the term is employed to signify a power indwelling and working in our fallen nature. (See especially vs. 8-11.) Paul, in this chapter, declares that the *ἀμαρτία* before the coming of the law (that is, into his awakened moral nature or conscience) *was dead* = latent, destitute of vitality or demonstrative power; and that when the commandment did come it assumed its power and slew him. *Now sin is, beyond all question, always and inevitably associated with personality, and cannot possibly exist dissociated therefrom, whether it be the act itself, or the tendency to the act.* Nor can any Augustinian question that it truly exists in the latent or undeveloped personality of infants and idiots, as aforesaid. For either infants, in whom Dr.

Hodge affirms that it is found existing anterior to the exercise of moral agency, are really *persons* in the true sense of the term, or sin in them exists dissociated from personality. And the conclusion, therefore, from these facts, as affecting the speculations of Dr. Hodge on the point now before us, is too obvious to require to be dwelt upon. Indeed, if we had no other declaration of his than that contained in the following passage, it would be all that is necessary. He says: "The Bible teaches us the solution of this difficulty. It reveals to us *the principle of representation on the ground of which the penalty of Adam's sin comes upon his posterity* as the reward of Christ's righteousness comes upon His people. In the one case the penalty brings subjective sinfulness, and in the other the reward brings subjective holiness."¹

In this same chapter (the 7th) of Romans, moreover, we find the apostle describing the *ἀμαρτία* as *dwelling* in him in a latent manner even after it had assumed its power;—*ἀμαρτία ἐν ἐμοὶ οἰκοῦσα*; and as *νόμος ἀμαρτίας*. And yet this antagonism to God and holiness, *which can only exist at all in association with actually existing personality*, may, notwithstanding (as Dr. Hodge's theory compels him to assume), exist in an undeveloped, latent manner *before its ethical appropriation by the subject in whom it inheres*; that is, it exists as a "sinful state" in its subject before his *conscious* moral agency or personality begins to exist, and so secretly, moreover, as to defy all human effort at analysis. So that the legitimate consequence of this opinion, therefore, is, that it must either exist *apart from personality*,—which would be a monstrous conception, and at once associate its advocate with Flacius and his followers,—or, that it exists *in connection with actual, though still latent, personality*, and as sustaining a relation to the law of God and to the first sin which He affirms to be real, and not putative, but which, for sufficient reasons, He, as yet, has merely affirmed, and not fully explained. And for Dr. Hodge to take this ground would be to renounce formally his whole theory and exegesis, and to recall all his objurgations on the subject of personality.

The application of all this to the question as to the Divine authorship of sin is sufficiently apparent, and requires to be only briefly touched upon. The Church, as already stated, by accepting the forenamed explanatory principle, and on that ground de-

¹ Theology, Vol. II., page 114.

fending the doctrine, relieves the divine character from any imputation of originating sin as existing in the race, and makes man alone responsible both for its origin and continued existence. But gratuitous imputation, by teaching the penal production of sin in a then sinless and impersonal race, allows no possible alternative but to attribute its origin to God. For in what condition does this imputation of guilt to the guiltless creature place him in his relation to the Creator? God created him, of course, to live and act. If he should not act, he would frustrate this design, and so sin; and if he act at all, the conditions of his being are such that (as Dr. Hodge is obliged to affirm) he inevitably sins. But he *must* live and think and act,—the very necessities of his nature requiring it; and if he act at all he sins.¹ What relation, then, do these sinful acts sustain to the will and purpose of God? Can the consequence, in any way conceivable, be avoided, that such being the inexorable demands of the creature's condition, he is, by acting, only fulfilling the will of his Creator? Is the conclusion avoidable? If not, then this theory of Dr. Hodge, notwithstanding all his declamation and assumptions respecting individual personality, does inevitably charge upon God the authorship of sin as existing in the posterity of Adam; and, therefore, that theory can constitute neither part nor parcel of the Augustinian doctrine.

2. The original sentence on our first parents.

The inculcations of Dr. Hodge respecting the original sentence condemning our first parents lead to a similar conclusion.

The sentence of condemnation, *i. e.*, the *ἡμίνα εἰς κατὰκριμα* (Rom. v. 16), pronounced upon the race after the fall was not, as appears from Genesis iii., the sentence of full and absolute condemnation threatened in Genesis ii. 17. The sentence threatened in this latter passage was, in the absolute sense of it, suspended through the intervention of the Mediator; and the sentence actually pronounced was, through His interposition, fraught with *mercy* and *salvation*, which, of course, could form no part of a threatening.

¹ Augustine admits that the condition of the posterity of Adam is such that they *inevitably* sin. But the difference between his doctrine and the theory of Dr. Hodge is: Augustine teaches that in the first fall the race all sinned, and so put it out of their power ever to do otherwise; while Dr. Hodge affirms that this necessity to sin came upon the race as a *peccatum alienum*. The one, therefore, traces it to the creature as the cause, the other to the direct efficiency of the Creator.

Dr. Hodge, however, affirms on the subject, that "they (Adam's posterity), no less obviously, are born into the world destitute of original righteousness, and subject to spiritual death. *The full penalty, therefore, threatened against Adam has been inflicted upon them. It was death, with the promise of redemption.*"¹

It is difficult to imagine what meaning the author intended to convey by this declaration. I have supposed, however, that he may mean that the penalty, not as threatened, but only as inflicted, was death, with the promise of redemption; for it can hardly be supposed that he considers the *promise* of redemption as part of the original threatening. And yet, as his theory represents God as efficiently placing the race in a condition of inherent corruption and spiritual death, only one of two things logically remained to Dr. Hodge in his attempted explication of the matter before us: (1), either to acknowledge frankly that the sin and perdition of those who perish is to be ascribed solely to His purpose and efficient operation, and so admit Him to be really the author of sin; or (2), to represent the Holy and Righteous One, who cannot look upon sin with the least allowance, as saying substantially to His creatures that "If you choose to disobey My commands, you need not suffer the consequence." The caricature presented of the Divine nature by modern Universalism is really unexceptionable when compared with this! And Dr. Hodge, moreover, has no reason for asserting that "the full penalty originally threatened was inflicted upon the posterity of Adam," which is the Socinian view, and has always been rejected by the Church. Dr. Breckinridge, however, with a far clearer and more thorough insight into the whole transaction, says: "Then came the commencement of the execution of this sentence of God. *It is, so to speak, an interlocutory sentence extending from the fall till the final judgment*, where the complete result of the whole penalty of transgression will be made fully manifest. . . . Terrible as this sentence is, let it be comprehended clearly that it is not the full, the final sentence of the great day; that the complete penalty denounced by God upon transgression is stayed both as to its utterance and execution."²

¹ See his *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 197; and Index Volume to Princeton Review, pp. 11, seq.

² See *Theology Objectively Considered*, pp. 496, 497.

Before the sentence (restricted thus as to its full effect in the execution) had been pronounced, the race, through its progenitors, Adam and Eve, had been brought into the condition which rendered necessary the redemption promised in Gen. iii. 15. But Dr. Hodge's theory necessarily refers this previous condition of the race (that is, previous to the sentence pronounced in Genesis iii., though subsequent to the fall) to an act of God bringing upon it this guilt and corruption on account of Adam's sin. So that, if this theory be true, there must have been a previous *ἡμάρτια εἰς κατά-ἡμάρτια*,—that is, there must have been a judicial sentence anterior to the sentence pronounced in Genesis iii., and one which imputed to them the *peccatum alienum* of Adam; because the sentence in Genesis iii. finds them *already* ruined, death-stricken, and in perishing need of a saviour; and into which condition, as Dr. Hodge constantly avers, they had been brought only by an antecedent or gratuitous imputation of Adam's sin, and, of course, antecedent to the sentence in Genesis iii., *which was pronounced upon them as already guilty*. Now, if no such anterior sentence may be supposed, then, of course, they were not constituted guilty and depraved by any sentence charging upon them the *peccatum alienum* of Adam; and consequently, the theory of gratuitous imputation is plainly false and contrary to fact. For the sentence in Genesis iii. is a sentence pronounced in view of *their already existing depravity*, and not a sentence constituting them depraved, or in which Adam's guilt is forensically charged to them in order to punish them with moral corruption on account of it. Nothing is plainer. But if, on the contrary, such a previous sentence is to be supposed, then no alternative remains but to admit that, by a previous forensic judgment unto condemnation, God first brought the sinless posterity of Adam under the curse; that is, efficiently placed them in a condition needing redemption, and then (in Gen. iii.) sentenced them to death for being in that condition, and finally provided for them a Redeemer, who should, at a mighty sacrifice, deliver a part of them from that condition! And thus we are brought again to the conclusion that Dr. Hodge's theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin must be either totally abandoned, or this intolerable representation of our good and gracious God must be admitted, and He must be charged with being the efficient author of sin as existing in the posterity of Adam.

3. *The transmission of sin.*

The same conclusion is logically demonstrable by Dr. Hodge's views of the transmission of sin.

Dr. Hodge, in attempting to defend his scheme of gratuitous imputation, and in reply to Dr. Baird, after observing that sin, or moral corruption, cannot exist in the *body* as such, *cites, as the doctrine of the Church*, the supralapsarian canon (always rejected by the Church), that sin is transmitted neither by the body, nor soul, but by guilt;¹ that is, by imputation alone. He likewise explicitly denies that the soul is, in any sense, sinful when first created and united to the body, and his explanation of the transmission of sin is: "It is not a material infection of the blood, it is not a substance either corporeal or spiritual, *to be transmitted by physical laws, but it is a punitive infliction*. It is the consequence of the withdrawal of the fellowship and favor of God from the descendants of Adam *as the judicial consequence of his apostasy*;"² and that, previous to this judicial consequence overtaking his descendants, they are entirely free from guilt and subjective ill-desert; but that, as the penalty of this, his apostasy, the soul is created destitute of righteousness and true holiness; *i. e.*, of the supernatural gifts possessed by our first parents.

¹ *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 367 and 362, and *Danville Review* for 1861, p. 569.

² So far as concerns the transmission of sin, this language has the Pelagian rather than the Augustinian ring. Augustine, in every form of expression, has asserted that Adam's sin has passed to all his descendants by propagation (*per traducem*), and in proof cites Rom. v. 12. It was on this account that Julian nick-named him *Traducianus*. And Pelagius asserts absolutely that there is no sin which passes by generation from Adam to his posterity, that such propagation is not to be admitted, and that to maintain it is insanity. He denied also that souls are begotten *per traducem*, and affirmed that every soul is created immediately by God. Wiggers, in chapter 19, states the main position of each of the systems as follows:

"*Aug.*—By Adam's sin, in whom all men jointly sinned together, sin and the other positive punishments of Adam's sin came into the world. By it human nature has been both physically and morally corrupted. Every man brings into the world with him a nature already so corrupt that he can do nothing but sin. The propagation of this quality of his nature is by concupiscence.

"*Pelga.*—By his transgression, Adam injured only himself, not his posterity. *In respect to his moral nature, every man is born in precisely the same condition* in which Adam was created. There is, therefore, no original sin." Translated by Emerson, (Andover and New York, 1840.)

Now we do not propose to imitate these endeavors at philosophizing on the subject; but the question here occurs: Whether a moral agent thus destitute of righteousness and holiness can be in a state of innocence? Dr. Hodge is logically obliged to take the affirmative here, so far as the posterity of Adam are concerned; for his doctrine is that they could have had no subjective guilt or ill-desert as the ground of the imputation or judgment unto condemnation which came upon them for Adam's sin.¹ And if they had none, they, of course, were innocent, and not only innocent, but righteous, though created without Adam's supernatural gifts. For the Church has always taught that, in a moral or accountable agent, it is the same thing to be innocent as to be righteous; or, as Edwards, in his reply to Dr. John Taylor, has expressed it: "In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can be no more any medium between sin and righteousness, or between being right and wrong in a moral sense, than there can be between being straight and being crooked in a natural sense."² And in fact, if they were not the same, then, according to Dr. Hodge's doctrine, God must create the soul in a state not only of *putative* guilt—for the guilt of *a want of original righteousness, or of conformity to the law*, is more than a merely forensic or putative guilt; our standards pronounce it *sin*—but in a state of moral pollution; for without holiness it is unholy, and without righteousness unrighteous. To affirm, then, that the soul is created sinless, when such are the admitted conditions of its moral *status*, is simply to utter a self-contradiction. But if, on the other hand, it be really created in such a state; *i. e.*, destitute of righteousness and holiness, to whom is to be attributed its *then* existing want of conformity to law? Not, of course, to the creature itself, but to Him alone who gave it existence in this condition. Now, Dr. Hodge admits what is certainly undeniable, that if God could be supposed to create a sinful being, He would be the author of sin; and this the Church has always affirmed. Whence, then, *according to his theory*, proceeds this clearly implied sin and unholiness of a creature whom he constantly affirms

¹ See, for instance, his Commentary on Romans v. 12-19.

² Works, Vol. II., 411. See also Ursinus' Explication of the Heidelberg Catechism, *Quæst.* 60, p. 336, and Melancthon's *Loci Communes*, pp. 29, 30.

to be antecedent to the original imputation, sinless, and without any ill-desert whatever?—an affirmation, moreover, which he is most rigorously compelled to insist on, or else to abandon both his theory and his exegesis of Rom. v. 12-21.

The point is certainly a vital one in the connection, and let us therefore analyze his statements a little more closely.

And (1), Are we to understand him, therefore, as teaching that God creates the soul in a morally defiled state, and then unites it to the body? Dr. Hodge most emphatically answers, No! (2), Does He, then, create it in an undefiled state—that is, in a sinless or guiltless condition? As there can be no medium, this must of course be so, and Dr. Hodge affirms that it is so. And this being so, it is in point to ask, (3), *When* is the punishment or original imputation (which Dr. Hodge alleges to be the penalty of the *peccatum alienum*) visited upon the innocent offspring of Adam? Dr. Hodge does *not* say. Nor is this at all surprising, for, as we shall see, he is unable to allege any point of time at which the penal visitation might be supposed to take effect, without involving himself and his theory and exegesis in hopeless and inextricable confusion and contradiction. But let us proceed, (4), Is, then, the soul, on account of the imputed *peccatum alienum, created forensically guilty*? If so, when can the actual imputation of Adam's guilt be supposed to take place? It cannot take place *after* the soul's creation, of course; for if so, it would be exempt from that guilt *when* created, and could not be created under guilt and as forensically guilty; and such a statement must, therefore, be given up as self-contradictory. (5), Is, then, the imputation coetaneous with the creation of the soul? For if so, it is still, of course, created under guilt; but in that case where are we to look for that innocence of which Dr. Hodge speaks, and upon which the guilt of "the one sin of the one man" comes by imputation? For it is necessary that, anterior to the imputation, the posterity should be innocent, or Dr. Hodge's whole theory and exegesis are swept helplessly by the board. But if the ground be taken that both imputation and creation are instantaneous and synchronous, then the one does not *follow* the other, and so there would be no innocence upon which to charge guilt, and God would be represented as creating a moral agent already guilty, and exposed thereby to the penalty of the law. But this would be confessedly to make him

the author of sin, and therefore is not allowable. (6), If, then, the imputation of this foreign sin cannot take place either *after* or *during* the soul's creation, *does it take effect before* it comes into being?—a view which Dr. Hodge sometimes seems disposed to maintain, as in his discussion with Dr. Baird, where he says, "*If God judicially withhold spiritual life FROM APOSTATE MEN they are dead. THEY COME INTO BEING in darkness and death. We do not think Dr. Baird has much ground for the charge of heresy on this point.*"¹ But if the imputation and their apostasy occur before "they come into being," where is their exemption from all ill-desert anterior to the imputation, on which Dr. Hodge so emphatically insists, and on which rests the whole fabric of his theory and exegesis? And if *a creature before his creation* (if the Hibernicism may be allowed) has apostasy and guilt justly laid to his charge, then he begins his existence as already guilty and condemned, and of course no after-imputation can constitute him guilty; for God creates him such, and would therefore be the author of sin. So this must be rejected as inadmissible. And we might add, that if the posterity of Adam, before they come into being, are apostate, and may in any way have guilt and condemnation justly rest upon them, they might also, perhaps, in some way have really participated in the first sin; but we pass this. Our scrutiny, therefore, of the Doctor's dogmatic on the subject conducts us inevitably to the conclusion, that this imputation of a *peccatum alienum* to Adam's posterity cannot take place either *before*, or *during*, or *after* their creation—the *circumstances of the case actually rendering it impossible*. And this being so, we think a man might, without any great degree of presumption, conclude *that such an imputation really does not take place at all*.

I have presented this careful analysis of Dr. Hodge's statements in order to show that a strict scrutiny of his theory leaves no conceivable alternative except either to admit a basis of subjective ill-desert in the creature as a moral ground for the imputation of the Adamic sin, or to ascribe to the Creator alone the source and origin of sin as it exists in the race. The rejection of the doctrine of our subjective demerit as the ground for the judgment unto condemnation leaves no alternative but to attribute the efficient production of our sinful state to the sovereign will of God.

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, page 765.

Dr. Hodge rejects that doctrine; his whole theory is based upon that rejection; and he repeats it in all his endeavors to sustain that theory. No disclaimer, therefore, denying that God is the author of sin, can avail any thing in the face of a theory, and a whole line of attempted ratiocination, which, while they affirm that sin does actually exist in the race, yet equally affirm that it does not causally proceed from the race, but from a divine penal infliction upon the sinless. I add a single remark.

After Abelard, in the course of his philosophical speculations, had adopted the principle that our *personal* consent is necessary to constitute sin, he found that he could no longer speak of sin in the proper sense as pertaining to the new-born infant; and yet he was not willing, as Pelagius had done, to deny the existence of original sin. He therefore, as the Socinians and Remonstrants since have done, took the word *sin* in a two-fold sense, to-wit: in the sense of voluntary perpetration, and likewise in the sense of punishment. "Infants," says he, "have no part in the former, but only in the latter."¹ And so, likewise, Dr. Hodge, in the endeavor to defend his theory by disapproving the doctrine that all the race really sinned in Adam, is compelled to make the same division in regard to sin, and to apply the term to new-born infants in the same manner. They have "inherent sin," says he (and so said Abelard), but it is only a punishment for Adam's personal sin! They have a sinful nature, says he, but that sinful nature is only the penalty of the *peccatum alienum* of Adam, and not the result of their having sinned in Adam or participated with him in his sin. And thus is the Church doctrine sacrificed and abandoned through speculations so unworthy and unwarrantable.

4. Our next salient point from which to survey the scheme, is *the demands of justice*.

Dr. Hodge's attempted explanation of the demands of divine justice can in no way relieve his theory from charging upon God the direct authorship of sin as existing in the posterity of Adam. He hopes, however, to save it by representing the infliction of the punishment for a *peccatum alienum* upon the race as a penal infliction,—an infliction demanded by justice, all of which he is perpetually repeating. And yet he never attempts to show *why* or *on what ground* the inflictions are to be regarded as *penal*, or how justice could require them of those who have never offended.

¹ See Hagenbach's *History of Doctrines*, § 117, Note 3.

Let us, then, consider this attempt to save the theory from presenting God as the author of sin.

In order to prevent misapprehension, however, I offer at this point a brief remark. *Merit*, in the strict theological sense,—i. e., *meritum è condigno*,¹—is never in the word of God attributed to fallen creatures, even after they have been renewed and sanctified, though *demerit* is, or ill-desert. The language of our Saviour is, “Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all these things which are commanded you, say we are unprofitable (*ἀχρηστοί*) servants; we have done that which was our duty to do.” (Luke xvii. 9, 10.) He by no means intimates that a blessed reward does not await His faithful servants, for He had promised it in chapter xii. 31, but simply states the fact that whatever reward they receive is of grace alone, and not to be demanded on the score of right.

The Old Testament has no term which even responds to such an idea. The nearest is חסד, which means *favor, kindness, love, zeal*, etc., but not *merit*. And in the New Testament ἀγαθοποία is any good deed simply as distinguished from evil, and not as meritorious in the sight of God. The terms ἀξία and ἀξιώτης have reference to dignity or excellence, not merit; ὀφείλημα refers simply to debt or indebtedness; while περιποίησις is acquisition, vindication; and the verb περιποιέσθαι, as employed therein, approximate the idea only apparently, but in no way even imply it. The spirit is “the earnest of our inheritance until the redemption of the *acquisition* (περιποίησεως).” (Eph. i. 14.) “God has not appointed us to wrath, but περιποίησιν σωτηρίας, *to the acquisition* (or obtainment) *of salvation*.” (1 Thess. v. 9; see also Acts xx. 28.) In no sense, therefore, can we of ourselves merit the favor of God, inasmuch as we already have forfeited it through sin; though we may (and by impenitence *must*) *deserve* His wrath. Even the sinless creature can never do more than its simple duty; yet as long as its sinlessness continues it is entitled to the continuance of that favor (Rom. iv. 4), so far as regards support, protection, and exemption from all penal evil, and cannot deserve God’s displeasure, or to be treated as a transgressor or an enemy.

¹ “Merit,” says Dr. Owen, “is such an adjunct of obedience, as whereby the reward is reckoned, not of grace, but of debt.”

On what ground, then, is it conceivable that a righteous or innocent creature (that is, righteous according to law) may, while remaining such, be brought under the penal inflictions of justice or law? As it has no ill-desert, justice can have no exaction to satisfy against it; the law requires only continued obedience, and, of course, punishment inflicted in such a case cannot be for the support of either law or justice, for neither has been infringed. What Dr. Hodge offers, therefore, in attempting to commend his theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, to-wit: that “punishment is evil or suffering inflicted in support of law,” and that “to inflict it for the attainment of some righteous and desirable end may be not only just, but benevolent; is not the support of the divine law such an end?”¹—is of no avail, and can have no relevancy in any such connection; nor can it in any way relieve his theory, until he shall show on what ground justice could possibly demand such infliction against those who had never in any way violated its requirements; for the divine law, instead of being *supported*, would, on the contrary, be plainly dishonored by inflicting what it confessedly does not claim the prerogative to inflict—that is, punishment upon those who have not transgressed its requirements. And Dr. Hodge, moreover, contradicts his assertion that *justice is conceived in punishing ill-desert*,² for in the instance before us there is confessedly no ill-desert; and his theory demands that he deny emphatically that there should be any. And consequently neither justice nor law can, in such a case, be supported by either a forensic sentence of condemnation, or by the actual infliction of punishment.

If, then, evil cannot be penally inflicted on the confessedly innocent creature through *the demands* of either justice or law, in what way or upon what ground does Dr. Hodge’s scheme of the gratuitous imputation of sin bring it upon the race whom he so emphatically affirms to be subjectively innocent? It can scarcely be necessary to press the point; for the principle of Dr. Hodge being granted, it is obviously impossible to avoid the conclusion that his theory makes (as Rutherford expresses it) “*the punitive justice of God a free act of His will*,” that is, its whole exercise in regard to the creature depends on the mere will of God, without reference to either justice or law. The posterity is not sub-

¹ Theology, Vol. II., pp. 204, 205.

² Ibid. Vol. I., p. 140.

jectively guilty, says Dr. Hodge, and of course neither justice nor law has been in any way infringed by them; and yet they are, by a condemnatory sentence, punished, and brought into a state of depravity, spiritual death, and of enmity to God, simply because God, of His mere will and pleasure, sees proper to inflict the fearful penalty! On what ground, then, can it be rationally denied (if these things are allowed) that God alone is the efficient or procuring cause of sin in the posterity of Adam? The infliction is not through the essential rectitude of the divine nature in punishing transgression, for those who are thus punished have committed no offence—a fact not only affirmed (as such), but insisted on in its fullest and widest sense by Dr. Hodge. And hence, therefore, either God is the sole origin and author of this their depraved and polluted state, or this theory is, without qualification, false, and an atrocious and unmitigated calumny upon His adorable perfections.

This essential attribute—which is so natural to the great and glorious Author of our being, that, sin being supposed to exist, He cannot be regarded otherwise than as opposing it, or, in other words, as punishing it—is thus transformed into mere option on his part, or *into a mere act of the will*, the very conception of it which Socinus and his school labored most assiduously to establish. “If,” says he, “*we could only get rid of this justice, that human figment of Christ’s satisfaction would be thoroughly exploded and vanish.*”¹ His conclusion was logical and legitimate; and yet we here find, in a professedly orthodox system of doctrine, this wished-for work fully and unblushingly accomplished to his hand! And the demonstration is impregnable, or the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin is a calumny upon God.

Dr. John Owen, in refuting the insane speculations of Rutherford on this subject, takes occasion to advert to the fact, that his view of the justice of God is the same as that of the Socinian school (and in proof cites all their leading writers),² and then expatiates on the point before us as follows: “But to me these arguments are altogether astonishing, viz., ‘that sin-punishing justice should be natural to God, and yet that God, sin being supposed

¹ See his *De Servatore*, Lib. III., Cap. I.

² Socinus, Crellius, Volkel, Slichtingius, etc. See *Works of Owen*, Vol. IX., p. 356.

to exist, *may either exercise it or not exercise it.*’ They may also say, and with as much propriety, that truth is natural to God, but that, upon a supposition that He were to converse with men, He might use it or not; or that omnipotence is natural to God, but upon a supposition that He was inclined to do any work without Himself, that it were free to him to act *omnipotently or not*; or, finally, that sin-punishing justice is among the primary causes of the death of Christ, and that Christ was set forth as a propitiation to declare His righteousness, and yet that that justice required not the punishment of sin. If it should require it, how is it possible that it should not necessarily require it, since God would be unjust if He should not inflict punishment? Or farther, they might as well assert that God willed that justice should be satisfied by so many and so great sufferings of His Son Christ, when that justice required no such thing; *nay more, that, setting aside the free act of the Divine will, sin and no sin are the same thing with God, and that man’s mortality hath not followed chiefly as the consequence of sin, but of the will of God.* These and such like difficulties . . . fill me with confusion and astonishment.”

That God could, in any way or on any account, hate the sinless or innocent, is certainly an inconceivable and impossible supposition; for as well might it be said that he could hate holiness and righteousness. But, if this be so, how is it to be conceived that He, by a mere act of His sovereign will, should turn the sinless or innocent into His enemies if He did not hate them? He could not do it from *love* to them, of course; nor from justice and equity towards them; for they had infringed neither. Nor from any necessity of sacrificing the eternal welfare of some in order to promote the welfare of others; for such necessity, and consequent imperfection, cannot possibly attach to His rule or dominion. Nor could it arise from indifference to the welfare of His sinless offspring; for this would at once impeach His moral perfections. On what ground, then, is it conceivable that this fearful procedure should occur? *The only answer is, that it does not occur at all, and therefore needs not to be accounted for, and that the theory which requires that it should occur is, from its whole inception, a falsehood, and, as above affirmed, is without qualification an unmitigated calumny upon the Divine character, and should be so regarded and treated by all to whom that character is dear.* But

we have not room to expatiate on the point, nor is it necessary. If, however, our readers would see *in extenso* how such notions fare when brought into antagonism with the truth of God, let them peruse Chapters VI-XIV of Owen's little work on Divine Justice, above referred to—a treatise to which no Socinian or supralapsarian has ever ventured to respond.

It is a clear and everywhere apparent doctrine of the Scriptures, sustained also by human consciousness, that no accountable creature can righteously be made to incur the penal inflictions of Divine justice whose conscience (if undefiled) will not witness for God against himself, and induce him, self-convicted, to say, "*I have justly deserved this infliction.*" He has only to know (what will be fully known in the future stages of our being) the actual ground on which God regards and treats him as guilty, in order to recognize in his own moral consciousness that his treatment is in just accordance with his actual deserts. In fact, the principle here referred to is the very basis of the appeal in the prayer of Abraham: "That be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked; *and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from Thee. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?*" And the basis also of the Divine averment that the doctrine that our whole race is justly exposed to eternal wrath, and are in need of a Saviour, *commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God*; and, moreover, that the effect of the Divine proclamation, that men are the authors of their own temporal and eternal ruin, will be "*that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world be [confessedly] guilty before God.*"¹ Such are not only the direct or implied utterances of revelation in a thousand instances, but they are also intuitively recognized as true by man's moral nature; and anything which would disturb this conviction, or so pervert it as to render it dubious and consequently inefficacious in its utterances, by unauthorized endeavors to modify the accepted definitions of *sin, guilt, justice, punishment*, and the like, in order to save from merited rejection an unfounded theory and unwarrantable exegesis, is but "a sowing of the wind," and furnishes, moreover, a mournfully instructive example of the effects which may accrue from any endeavor to mingle even an apparently trivial dictum of a false

¹ See Gen. xviii. 25; 2 Cor. iv. 2; and Rom. iii. 21.

philosophy with the revealed truth of God. And Dr. Hodge's attempted explication of the demands of Divine justice, therefore, cannot relieve his theory from the clear implication of attributing to God the authorship of sin in the race, and therefore cannot rescue it from being deservedly disclaimed and repudiated as in direct and offensive antagonism to the gospel itself and to the whole system of Augustinian theology.

5. *The origin of sin in the posterity of Adam.*

We have incidentally and in passing repeatedly alluded to this topic, but it requires in the connection a special consideration, and we shall conclude this protracted section with the following argument:

As regards sin and its manifestation in this mundane sphere, we have the direct evidence of consciousness that it is not only *in us* ("the sin that dwelleth in me"), but *from us* as its responsible cause and origin, and this has ever been recognized as the teaching of the word of God. The conception expressed in the afore-said explanatory principle is announced, not in the Scriptures only, but has always been evident as a truth disclosed to the consciousness of the Church, or at least therein clearly recognized. And though in itself that principle be inexplicable, it nevertheless is found always accepted, substantially expressed, and practically applied in her explication or development and defence of the doctrine of original sin, as is clearly manifest by the citations we have presented from her great and gifted sons. The unity of nature and distinction of personality in man as a race, though a great and essential truth, is not, however, disclosed merely as a fact or abstract truth, but always in connection with its concrete relation to sin and the fall, and as the principle for explaining our lost condition, as well as the judicial dealings of God with the race, in like manner as in that of the unity and triunity of the divine nature, which, so far as my observation has led, is never announced abstractly as a fact, but in connection with its relation to creation and redemption. The principle in itself is in neither case explained, but simply announced, and given in both instances as the divinely declared basis for understanding that which it is necessary we should understand, in order that the truth announced in those connections might be adequately brought home to our intellectual and moral nature. They are principles, therefore, which

in both cases elude the severest efforts of our intellectual powers to subject to analysis, or even to grasp, but require to be received with a docile, child-like faith on the testimony of God, and so to be truly and practically recognized in our inner life and consciousness.

The theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, on the contrary, symbolizes closely with a notion of Plato and some of his school, that evil is something which happens to man *from without*, and in the procuring of which to ourselves the will has no agency; as in the case of the posterity of Adam the will could have had nothing to do with bringing upon them *from without* (as Dr. Hodge expresses it¹) the gratuitous imputation of his sin; all of which seems quite in harmony with that superficial world-morality which always regards sin as coming more from without than from within. And as is the fact with mathematical science (as has been often remarked), the sphere of whose truths is so low that they stand not opposed to doubt, but to absurdity alone, and the development of which depends in no sense upon the moral status of the investigator. So this superficial morality finds its sphere in the reason and intellect, and peremptorily persists in the fanatical endeavor to test even the most sacred truths pertaining to the inner or spiritual life, and to our intercourse with God, and our relations to Him, all by that same alembic.² But the highest and most powerful objects of our knowledge are those which vanish from the spirit in proportion to its withdrawal into its natural self-satisfied reason, and will receive nothing which cannot be demonstrated to it; those are they which can only be appropriated by a *living act*, and can only be retained by the ever-repeated elevation of the spirit above itself. Divine truths, says Pascal, reach the spirit through the heart. One must love divine things in order to know them.³

¹ "So in the case of Adam and his offence, as *something out of ourselves*, a *peccatum alienum* is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence." See *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 339, 340, 341; and *Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, and Vol. II., pp. 191, 192, 538, 551, 552.

² Marheineke defined "*intellectual faith*" as "a faith which believes that it thinks, and thinks that it believes; but is equally unable to do either." See Kurtz's *Church History*, Vol. II., p. 353.

³ See Müller on *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Vol. I. pp. 188, 189. The same grand thought is likewise powerfully presented by Dr. Owen, in *Preface to Divine Justice*, Works, Vol. IX., pp. 325, 326.

The Scripture doctrine, therefore, has no sympathy with this intellectual fanaticism. And as one of the innumerable instances to the contrary, the expression of David in Psalm 51 may be named, in which he admits the sinfulness of his nature from his conception: "It is not that he might extenuate his fault, or reprehend the offences of his father and mother, but rather that he might exaggerate the crime which he had recently perpetrated, that he says, 'Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.'"¹ He had, in verse 4, acknowledged the greatness of his crime against God and his neighbor, and then, as an aggravation, refers to the fact that he was shapen in *iniquity* (not *guilt*, for *πίη* has no such sense in itself, except as sin is connected with *guilt*); and so confesses that to himself, and not to God, is to be attributed the evil of his nature, and recognizes that the iniquity in which he was shapen was his own. The correlate to this is Eph. ii. 3, in which the apostle affirms, that according to our innate, native, *constitutional character*, we are the objects of God's punitive justice—"children of wrath." The character is, therefore, our own originally, and of course not made so, either directly or indirectly, by anything coming upon us from without; *i. e.*, by any merely forensic imputation. And yet this great and profound truth is now rejected with scorn by gratuitous imputationists, because it refuses a response to the shallow attempts of what is posterously termed a *rational analysis*.

If, however, sin or spiritual death is to be regarded as coming upon us *from without*, or as something "out of ourselves;" that is, as the penalty of a gratuitously imputed or foreign sin, then, of course, to trace its source or origin to ourselves is simply impossible, as much so as it would be to trace to the traveller at the foot of the Alps the origin and formation of the avalanche which has overwhelmed him. And it is, therefore, either left without a producing cause, or its origin must be referred to the Divine efficiency. Now, as we have seen, Dr. Hodge's theory does affirm that sin comes upon the posterity of Adam solely *from without*, and makes their moral pollution the penalty of a *peccatum alienum*, and alleges, moreover, directly and positively, that the posterity did not in any way bring the judgment of condemnation upon themselves. But there must, of course, have been a ground for

¹ Polanus, in *Syntag. Theologiæ Christianæ*, page 1078, (1624.)

this judgment, with its consequent and inevitable production of their sinful state—a ground which must be traceable either to their own agency or to the Divine efficiency. But, as Dr. Hodge affirms, that it is in no possible or conceivable way traceable to their own agency, and that they had done nothing to bring it upon them, there is consequently no avoiding the conclusion on these principles that it must be traced to the Divine will or agency alone; and thus, by this monstrous perversion of the truth of God, the author of holiness becomes the author of “enmity against God,” and the *peccati ultor* the *auctor peccati*.

Dr. Hodge would escape this consequence, and still retain his theory; but that this is beyond the range of possibility has been, we think, fully shown. Let us, however, advert to these attempts. In replying to Dr. Baird he says: “The *πρωτον φεῦδος* of such speculations is, that moral principles or dispositions owe their character to their origin, and not to their nature. It is assumed that innate, hereditary depravity cannot have the nature of sin in us unless it be self-originated; hence some assume that we existed in a former state. . . . Others assume that humanity is a person, or that personality can be predicated of human nature as a generic life. . . . Others, again, as Dr. Baird, distancing all competitors, insist that *we* performed the act of self-depravation thousands of years before we existed. All these are not only gratuitous, but impossible assumptions, to account for the admitted fact that innate corruption is truly sin, which they say it cannot be unless it have an origin in an act of their own. Things are, however, what they are, no matter how they originated. If a man is black, he is black, whether he was born so or made himself so. If he is good, he is good; if bad, he is bad, whether he is the one or the other by birth or self-determination.” “So all these false theories assume that inherent corruption cannot have the nature of sin unless self-originated.” To account for this fact [that we are born in sin and are by nature the children of wrath], to reconcile it with the justice and goodness of God may be as difficult as to account for the origin of evil.” “The Bible solution of the difficulty is infinitely better than this [Dr. Baird’s]. *Our depraved nature is the penal consequence of Adam’s sin, not of ours.*” This is the substance of the lengthy paragraph touching the matter.¹

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 388, 389.

The question before us pertains not to the *nature* of inherent corruption, but to responsibility for its actual existence. It is not whether inherent corruption be sin, but (1), whether a moral agent, in whom such corruption exists, can be righteously held accountable for its existence within him if it can be in no way traceable to himself; and (2), whether inherent sin is to be traced to a human or a Divine origin, seeing there can really be no middle ground in regard to it. The former of these inquiries we have disposed of in the earlier part of this section; and in respect, to the above cited remarks of Dr. Hodge upon the latter it is sufficient here to say, that it is true “things are what they are, no matter how they originated;” but if God create a man “black,” God, and not the man, is the author of that blackness; and as sin, according to the reiterated averment of Dr. Hodge, does exist in the posterity of Adam anterior to their moral accountability, and yet (as he likewise affirms) did not and could not originate with them, no alternative is left to him but to ascribe its existence to God as its author. We ask not that the Doctor explain why the race is born in sin; but it is one thing not to be able to explain this, and quite another thing to attribute, as he by his theory does, logically and directly, the origin of sin itself to the Divine efficiency.

He affirms that sin, or “a sinful state” (which he denominates both sin and punishment), exists in man anterior to both intellectual and moral action; and affirms likewise that the guilt of Adam’s sin is imputed to Adam’s posterity; and that though moral corruption is the penal consequence of this imputation, the race is not thereby made inherently sinful, but that the imputation affects simply their deprivation of the supernatural gifts possessed by Adam in his original state. This is, in substance, the explanation, on which, however, we shall offer no further criticism. But granting the representation, we ask, whence originates the sinful nature which, as he declares, each individual possesses anterior to all voluntary agency, *i. e.*, in infancy? It is a state of moral corruption, and the individual has not yet acted *so as to appropriate it ethically, or to bring it upon himself as the consequence of being deprived of those supernatural gifts*. Who, then, is the procuring cause of this moral, but involuntary corruption? It is the merest evasive trifling to answer by saying, “If he is corrupt,

he is corrupt, no matter how he became so." This might, perhaps, be allowed, if given by a writer as a reason for ignoring the whole subject of inquiry; but it is not proper when, as in this instance, he, being unwilling to encounter his own conclusion, or the conclusion to which his argument had led, offers the remark as a reason for ignoring further inquiry, after having, by clear logical implication, charged the authorship of sin upon the Divine efficiency! And we again, therefore, press the question, Who is the procuring cause of the creature's involuntary but inevitable corruption? Not he himself, of course. A merely forensic imputation of Adam's guilt could not produce it in him prior to the exercise of his voluntary agency, or self-appropriation of that guilt in some way. This is conceded. But as yet he has not appropriated it in any way (as Dr. Hodge alleges), being wholly incapable of either intellectual or moral action. So that in no conceivable sense does he bring upon himself this moral pollution; and Adam's guilt, or sin, being purely a *peccatum alienum*, could not, of itself, have produced it; and yet it not only exists, but holds a controlling power in the subject in whom it does exist, as, *e. g.*, in infants. Whence, then, is it? Dr. Hodge's explanation, therefore, does not relieve his theory; and we are brought back to the legitimate conclusion, that *that theory necessarily refers our sin to God as its origin and author.*

The Doctor makes likewise a formal effort in his recent work to escape this conclusion. It is as follows: "The doctrine of original sin [that is, the doctrine as he maintains it] attributes no efficiency to God in the production of evil. *It merely supposes that He judicially abandons our apostate race, and withdraws from the descendants of Adam the manifestation of His favor and love, which are the life of the soul.*"¹

In scanning the force and relevancy of this statement, in its relations both to the theory and the question directly before us, it is in point to ask, Whether what is here alleged by Dr. Hodge is, or really can be, all that is conveyed by his perpetually repeated affirmations, that spiritual death, moral corruption, and all the calamities of life, are *penal inflictions* upon the race for the personal sin of Adam? God *merely* withdraws "the manifestations of His favor and love;" and in this, even before our voluntary agency

commences, consists the imputation, the "judgment unto condemnation," and the positive penal infliction of spiritual death. Are, then, these calamities (as Dr. Hodge here asserts them to be) merely the result or consequence of a judicial abandonment, or of withholding the divine favor and love?—while he constantly names them judicial *inflictions*! If they are merely the result of such abandonment, how, without the divine efficiency, can those results reach and take hold upon the sinless and (as yet) *involuntary race*?—(for such Dr. Hodge asserts them to be)—for before the race begins to evince intelligence (as he constantly affirms) those results are found in full and abiding operation. If only the results of a judicial abandonment of the sinless, how (we ask for the fiftieth time, perhaps) are those results brought to take effect upon the race, since, according to Dr. Hodge, the race does not and cannot bring them upon itself? They are inflicted, therefore, but by whom? Neither Adam nor the devil could thus inflict them. But Dr. Hodge insists that they are *judicial inflictions*.¹ And if they are, is it not an abuse of language to endeavor to represent such a doctrine as "*merely* supposing that He judicially abandons our apostate race, and withholds from the descendants of Adam the manifestations of His favor and love?" Can such inflictions, positive, direct, and tremendous as they are, be, in any sense, *the mere result* of withholding the divine favor and love from those who had not, as Dr. Hodge declares, entered upon their intellectual and moral being (*i. e.* responsibility)? How could such mere withholding affect them thus fearfully when they, according to his unvarying representations, could no more realize, intelligently or morally, either the incoming or indwelling of inherent corruption than could so many stocks or stones? In what way can the employment of such language be justified in the connection? For to admit that this *withholding* affected them *efficiently* before moral agency commences, would be not only to concede a preposterous self-contradiction, but the admission would at once render the conclusion inevitable, that God is indeed the procuring or efficient

¹ "The evils which they suffer are not arbitrary impositions, nor simply the natural consequences of his apostasy, but judicial inflictions. The loss of original righteousness, and death, spiritual and temporal, *under which they commence their existence*, are the penalty of Adam's first sin." (Theology, Vol. II., page 196.)

¹ Theology, Vol. II., page 253.

cause of our sinful state; for if these sins and calamities are brought upon us by a positive or direct divine infliction, from no ill-desert of ours, and before moral agency commences, God is alone the efficient author of that state in which the confessedly sinless creature finds itself thus placed. So that this attempted exculpation can in no way relieve the theory of this obvious consequent, and from the righteous charge of being in vital antagonism to the truth of God.

And then, again, says Dr. Hodge, in this attempted explication: It is the judicial abandonment of "*an apostate race*;" and this he affirms in the very face of his exegesis of Romans v., wherein he alleges that to admit any *subjective ill-desert in us* as the ground of the original imputation and abandonment, would involve the necessity of admitting subjective desert as the ground of imputing to us the righteousness of Christ for justification. We have already, in a previous section, exposed the fallacy of this assumption, and in all sober thought, What is to be made of such attempted ratiocination? But passing it, we may well, in view of his remark, ask, If the apostasy of the race were, as he states, the reason for this abandonment, when did these subjectively sinless beings apostatize, seeing they "came into existence" under the imputation and its consequent curse? and how, moreover, are they *innocent or sinless when judicially abandoned*, and yet *apostate* when their actual existence commences? For if apostate, and if abandoned because of that apostasy, it follows that they *then* had subjective guilt or ill-desert; and if they had no such demerit they were not apostate when abandoned, and therefore could not have been abandoned for their apostasy. But passing this also, the direct point is: *How were they brought into a state of apostasy, who, before their moral agency commenced, were, as Dr. Hodge affirms, in "a sinful state?"* And we again press the pertinent inquiry, *Who brought them into that condition?* Not they themselves, of course, and Dr. Hodge everywhere denies that they did. The theory, therefore, leaves no alternative possible, but to refer the apostasy to God as its efficient source and origin. And then, still further, this theory, as stated already, affirms their apostasy to be the effect of the gratuitous imputation of a *peccatum alienum*, and that they are sinless anterior to that imputation, and likewise that this imputation and its penal consequences are the direct

judicial act of God Himself. How, then, with the slightest degree of truthfulness, can He be likewise represented as abandoning them *because* they are apostate? It may be of use to pursue this a little further.

Dr. Hodge, as we have shown, has a lengthy argument, in which he labors to prove that, "apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all." And he adds: "If any man says that he believes this, then we think he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says."¹ Such is his argument on the point. And yet in the foregoing endeavor to exculpate his theory from the charge of making God the author of sin, he represents the abandonment and sinful condition of the race as *the effect of this same apostasy* which his theory affirms to have occurred *after* we had possessed an original state of innocence from which we apostatized, and yet that it occurred *previous to our entrance upon that "sinful state" which attaches to us, not only in infancy, but before we are persons at all, or had "come into existence."* So that, while we were in a state of innocence, God abandoned us, by imputing to us a foreign sin, and in consequence of that abandonment we apostatized, and that yet He abandoned us in consequence of that very apostasy, which abandonment and apostasy brought us into a sinful condition before we were "persons at all," or had "come into existence!" We offer nothing on such an exposition and inculcation of a fundamental doctrine, but submit it to our readers, and only add that the whole procedure presents a practical concession of Dr. Hodge, that his theory cannot be maintained without referring sin to God as its author, otherwise he would not, for the time being, have thus abandoned it, and involved himself in such inextricable confusion and absurdity in endeavoring to escape that charge.

Such, then, are the results of this labored effort at exculpation. But as he has summoned the late Dr. F. C. Bauer, of Tübingen, to aid him in the extremity, I offer a word thereon in conclusion. In another connection we have adverted to the use he has attempted to make of this writer; but here refer to it in order to show that, even should that use be allowed, Dr. Hodge's theory in

¹ See *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 356, 357, and also our Section 5, above.

relation to the matter before us could gain nothing by the admission.

In assailing the doctrine of our participation in the first sin, Dr. Hodge says: "Sins, of which we know nothing, which were committed by us before we were born, which cannot be brought home to the conscience as our sins, *can never be the righteous ground of punishment, any more than the acts of an idiot.*"¹ And he makes this allegation at the same time that he affirms that a *peccatum alienum*, which was committed before any of the posterity were born, and which cannot possibly be brought home to the conscience as our own sin, is nevertheless the righteous ground of our condemnation and punishment. But this only *en passant*. Then, on a later page, and in reference to the same, he says: "The assumption that we acted thousands of years before we were born, so as to be personally responsible for such act, is a monstrous assumption. It is, as Bauer says, an unthinkable proposition; that is, one to which no intelligible meaning can be attached."² He had previously cited Bauer, in a similar connection, as saying: "What is an act of a non-existing will, an act to which the nature of sin is attached, although it lies entirely outside of the individual consciousness? Does it not destroy the idea of guilt and sin that it is imputed only because it is transmitted by ordinary generation."³ Dr. Hodge cites this as against Bellarmin's remarks on the transmission of original sin; but the point aimed at is the Church doctrine of our participation in the guilt of the fall, and the transmission of sin by generation, and the animus in citing it is plain; for Dr. Hodge expresses his full concurrence and approval by the words, "To this Bauer properly remarks," and so endorses the assault of this bitter foe to the Church doctrine, who also denied and ridiculed the idea of a personal God!

We have fully shown that this style of ratiocination is without force when applied to the disclosures of Divine revelation, and that it can possess none whatever which may not, with equal truth and propriety, be claimed on behalf of the forecited arguments of Socinus, Morgan, Channing, Emlyn, and others against the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the two natures in the person of our blessed Lord.⁴ But should it all, for the sake of the argu-

¹ Theology II., p. 216. ² *Ibid.* p. 244. ³ *Ibid.* pp. 178, 179.

⁴ See Sections 26 and 27, above.

ment, be even admitted, what relief could such a speculation furnish Dr. Hodge's theory against the fearful and just impeachment of making God the author of sin? Admitting that the proposition, affirming our participation in the first sin, is as "unthinkable" as he alleges it to be, would that concession in any way relieve his theory? It could not. So, granting Dr. Hodge all the aid that Bauer can render, his theory must continue to labor justly and righteously under the fatal charge, which throws it (together with its supporters) out of all just sympathy with the Augustinian theology, and of the inspired word. IT ATTRIBUTES SIN, AS EXISTING IN THE POSTERITY OF ADAM, TO THE EFFICIENT PRODUCTIVE AGENCY OF A HOLY AND RIGHTEOUS GOD!

§ 32. THE CONCLUSION OF THE WORK.

Our argument and its issues are now before the reader; and though there are other topics of no trivial interest to the theme at large, and which, at the outset, we had designed to treat (but which the increasing size of the volume has compelled us to omit), nothing has been omitted which is really essential to a thorough comprehension of the question, so far, at least, as concerns the relation which the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin sustains to the Augustinian doctrine of original sin and its immediate correlates. I have propounded no theory, but aimed solely to present and defend the recognized doctrine of the Church, and to make the discussion one of facts and principles, as indeed it should be. The task, indeed, might have been greatly lessened by confining the discussion solely to some of the leading issues; but my design throughout has been to place in possession of the Church the materials necessary to an intelligent decision of the question as to what is the Augustinian doctrine of imputation and original sin; for there can be little doubt that to the determination of the question itself, and in this form of it, (rather than to any attempted revision or improvement of its hermeneutics,) the energies of the Church will be chiefly directed in the mighty conflict which is already being inaugurated between Faith and the Protean forms of modern unbelief. The labor thus imposed was much more arduous, but cheerfully undergone. And it will be abundantly recompensed if the result shall be that they who already have been inculcating the new doctrine (*i. e.*, *new* in our midst) and Socinian exegesis,

be required to meet fairly the facts in the case, and either to show that those facts are false, or falsely alleged, or inapplicable, or to recede from their attempt to incorporate such pernicious errors with the received doctrine of the Calvinistic church. But, as regards all the leading facts in the case, I claim, from my knowledge of the subject, to be fairly entitled to speak as I have spoken—plainly and decidedly, yet leaving the intelligent reader to decide, from the facts themselves as presented, whether such claim be entitled to candid and scholarly consideration.

As to the tone and spirit of the work, I may be permitted to remark also, in passing, that in regard both to what I have said, as well as to the manner of saying it, I have been, so far as my motives were ascertainable, actuated solely by the desire, through an earnest vindication of essential truth, to subserve the interests and well-being of the Church of God, and have throughout endeavored to express myself with all the consideration and kindness which are compatible with fidelity to His cause. If, however, I have in any instance failed in the endeavor, it will be to me a source of real regret. In encountering the magisterial peremptoriness and denunciation, and attempts at sarcasm of Dr. Hodge, and which were pointed directly against the positions sought to be elucidated and defended in my former essay, expressions may have escaped me not sufficiently guarded to prevent misconstruction.¹ But I am not aware that any such have occurred, and trust there are none. The subject at the present time, and in its direct relation to our Church, is one of insurpassable interest, especially in view of Dr. Hodge's recent reiteration, not only of his assault upon the views of his brethren, but of his own theory and exegesis of Romans v. 12–21. Nor does it evince either intelligence or discretion on the part of any to attempt to represent the theme as a mere metaphysical subtlety, or a reproduction and discussion of "dead issues," and the like. Such and similar representations have been made in every age for the purpose of paving the way for the insidious introduction of pernicious errors into the fold of Christ, when the supporters of those errors deemed it expedient to avoid, if possible, the investigation of the issues which their own course of procedure had called into being. TRUTH, however,

¹ Habet quendam aculeum contumelia, quem pati prudentes ac viri boni difficillimè possunt.—*Cicero*.

is always essentially fearless, and always scorns to descend to any such purblind, degraded, and contemptible manœuvring.

The presentation of the claims of this subject to the consideration of the Church, as exhibited in the *Theology* of Dr. Breckinridge, and in the *Elohim Revealed* of Dr. Baird, and, still later, in the thorough and masterly exegesis of Dr. Schaff, viewed also in connection with the constantly repeated asseverations of Dr. Hodge, that the issue between those views and his own is fundamental to the Protestant theology,¹ all evince, in a way not to be mistaken, the transcendent importance of the subject itself, and also that the Church owes it to God and herself, and to the souls of perishing men, to utter a prompt and decided deliverance in regard to it. Dr. Hodge, in his recent work, has made no open attempt to meet the issue as presented by Drs. Schaff and Breckinridge, nor as presented in the *Danville Review*, though our Church, and all the churches in our land which accept the Augustinian theology, had great reason to expect that he would at least endeavor to sustain his utterances against the very serious exceptions which his previous allegations had challenged. But he therein has merely reiterated the statements and arguments of his earlier representations, which have been not only thoroughly refuted, but which, from their first appearance, and by not a few of the learned and intelligent in our communion, regarded as unauthorized and erroneous. But to expect that mere reiteration like this should settle such a discussion, is certainly without precedent outside the Vatican.

We have, in the Preface, alluded to the fact that earnest and good men, in our communion during some years past, have expressed the apprehension that our Church is approximating an apostasy from the truth as held by her martyrs and confessors at the beginning. Neither facts nor doctrines are specified in illustration (so far as memory now serves me); but the impression seems to have been disclosed to their inner consciousness, and to be widening and deepening, though in the general, they seem unable to analyze it intellectually, or to trace it clearly to its source. My own convictions in relation to that matter are expressed in

¹ In the *Princeton Review* for 1870, pp. 239–262, an attempt is made to qualify these statements, so far as Dr. Schaff is concerned. But we may learn from Dr. Hodge's *Theology* since issued (and as cited on our previous pages), the real value of any such intimation.

the present work, the aim of which is to free the great cardinal doctrine of original sin (as always entertained by the Church), from the unfounded odium which Dr. Hodge's theory must (if accepted) so causelessly bring upon it by his wholly unauthorized statements and speculations. But the error of a gratuitous imputation of sin, if logically carried forward, can really leave no leading doctrine of the system of grace unmodified to a serious extent and impaired. Dr. Hodge does not seem to have traced it to its inevitable sequences, and is, apparently, so far unaware of them as to have presented views of a number of other doctrines (as we have illustrated by an example or more), which can as little comport with his theory itself as that theory could consist with the subjective criminality of the race as the ground of the imputation of the Adamic sin. But the history of error in every age will sustain the remark, that this theory being fully adopted and logically conducted to its legitimate results or sequences by those who, unrestrained by the fear of God, may possess what ability and learning are requisite to render that adoption consistent throughout, cannot fail so to modify as to subvert all the essential doctrines of the system.

In this connection, and as a further illustration of the existing importance of giving immediate attention to the subject, it will be in point to offer an additional fact or two. In our sections 18-22, we have shown that the exegesis of Rom. v. 12, 18, 19, as insisted on by Dr. Hodge, had been adopted by the Socinians and others in order to subvert the Church doctrine of original sin. The fact is unquestionable, and certainly it is both portentous and alarming, that already this exegesis, on the ground simply that it is taught by Dr. Hodge, has, even without rebuke, been constituted a test of orthodoxy in our Church. Dr. Baird, in his "*Rejoinder to the Princeton Review*,"¹ furnishes an instance which assuredly is entitled to profound consideration. Upon his application to one of our Presbyteries for admission to membership (having a certificate of dismission in good standing from a sister Presbytery), he was, in the course of the consequent examination, asked: "What relation do we sustain to the sin of Adam?" Dr. Baird answered: "We sinned in him and fell with him," and the examination then proceeds as follows:

¹ Published by Joseph M. Wilson, Philadelphia, (1860.)

"*Question.* Do you mean anything more than that we are regarded and treated *as though* we had sinned in Adam? *Ans.* I mean that we *sinned* in him, and are therefore so treated. *Q.* But how did we sin in him? *A.* We were in him *seminally*, as our root and cause, and, as members, were intrinsically involved in a true and proper responsibility for the action of our head. *Q.* How is this parallel with gratuitous justification? *A.* In the first place, the parallel fails, by the whole extent of the difference between law and grace. . . . *Q.* But Dr. Hodge teaches that we did not really sin in Adam, but are only so regarded and treated. *A.* I am aware such is his opinion, but I do not so understand the Bible nor our constitution. This avowal, continues Dr. Baird, was the signal for a storm of denunciation against the examinee, in which he was stigmatized with almost every name of heresy which is most obnoxious to the Reformed churches." (Pp. 3, 4.)

Such a fact is painfully admonitory; for thus was this exegesis, which, as we have so fully shown, had been elaborated and employed by the Socinian school for the very purpose of subverting a vital doctrine of our theology—an exegesis which has always been directly refuted and emphatically discarded by the Church, made the touchstone of orthodoxy in relation to that very doctrine; and an able and learned divine subjected to the accusation of fundamental error because he discarded it, and concurred decidedly with the Church in its repudiation. Under what category, then, are they to be ranked who, in view of this and similar facts, not only contend that there is no ground for alarm or apprehension, and still persist in endeavoring to suppress all further discussion of the subject? Are they mere drivellers, whose degrading servility has been "holding men's persons in admiration because of advantage," until both heart and intellect have become besotted? Or are they not rather enemies in disguise, who are seeking the subversion of the doctrines of the Church we love?

The ten years consumed by Dr. Hodge in preparing for the press the lectures which, during so long a professorship, he had been delivering to his classes might have been prolonged until doubled or quadrupled, and yet have been vainly spent in the endeavor to discover in the recognized theology of the Reformation a recognition of the theory and exegesis which he has been inculcating as Calvinistic upon our Church and ministry. A careful,

long-continued, and sufficient investigation of the facts renders imperative the duty of affirming the statement in this unequivocal and decided manner. Dr. Hodge has not been able to discover any tangible authority for such a procedure, or for his accusation of heresy against the supporters of the doctrine he has impugned. He obviously, at the outset, expected to discover such recognition; but his publication itself evinces the result of his protracted investigation. And in none of the symbols of doctrine which he cites¹ has he been able to discover even the shadow of such a scheme, nor has he been able to specify even one truly representative divine of the Church who in any way has sanctioned that theory and exegesis.

In my former essay I adduced, in chronological sequence from Zwingle to the late Archibald Alexander, the testimony of a large number (including the supralapsarians) of the ablest theologians of the Church; and Dr. Hodge is well aware that that aggregation of testimonies made no slight impression upon many who had been induced by his representations to suppose that the gratuitous imputation of sin was indeed a doctrine of Calvinism;² though others did not scruple to denounce both essay and author as need-

¹ He cites them in Latin, but *why* is not explained. See the citations and his summary of their teaching, in *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 228-231.

² Even the late Principal Cunningham was misled by these same representations of Dr. Hodge; as also by his egregious misconception of the design of Rivetus in preparing his admirable tractate entitled "*Testimonies on Imputation*." Principal C. accepts and repeats *en masse* those misconceptions, and then, in respect to that part of the work of Rivetus which was translated and published by Dr. Hodge (see *Princeton Essays*, First Series, pages 195-217), naively remarks, that there are some of his testimonies "which can scarcely be regarded as sufficiently precise and definite to contradict Placcæus' position." (See his "*Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*," page 380.) My former essay carefully pointed out the error of Dr. Hodge which Principal Cunningham (in his article of July, 1861,) thus incautiously endorsed. It originated in the most unheard assumption of Dr. Hodge that Rivetus prepared this treatise in defence of the *gratuitous* imputation of sin!—a doctrine which that illustrious theologian not only discarded, but utterly abhorred as the very corner-stone of Socinianism. (See *Danville Review* for 1862, pages 517-541.) But when it is considered that his tractate is a defence of the *Church doctrine*, which teaches that the Adamic guilt in the first sin, and our own guilt by participation therein, were imputed to us for condemnation (which Placcæus denied), every testimony which he adduces is exactly in point. Our readers may consult the views of Rivetus as expressed by himself by referring to Section 9, No. 11, and Section 12, A. No. 5, and Section 17, B., No. 5, of the present work.

lessly troubling the Church. To such a depth of degradation had their servility descended, that although they knew that the late Dr. Breckinridge (to say nothing of others), had, in his "*Theology Objectively Considered*," clearly and cogently exposed the same grievous error, they were willing that Dr. Hodge's theory, whatever might be its character, and however baleful the consequences of its introduction into the Church theology, should continue therein unchallenged, rather than its supporters should be required to explain and defend the positions which he has so boldly and boastingly ventured to assume! "Many" (says Matthew Henry, most truly, on John vii. 13,) "*have aimed to suppress the truth under the color of silencing disputes about it.*" But can anything be more criminal than thus to encourage and so perpetuate a fatal and soul-destroying error by attempting to suppress the efforts required for its exposure? Should these persons, however, say, "We do not admit it to be error," let them remember that this will not excuse them; for if they could claim a sufficient degree of intelligence to have enabled them to investigate the subject thoroughly, and had so investigated it, even this would in no way warrant the course they have pursued in relation to Dr. Breckinridge and myself. And then further: Did Arius and Socinus and their partizans admit that they were in error? And what would have been the result to the Church had a similar procedure been pursued in relation to them? But, most of all, *was God's truth ever afraid of the light?* Does it require or ask the aid of darkness, chicanery, and calumny? But so far as the *effects* or consequences are concerned, it alters not the case whether such persons admit the existence of error or not. An old divine somewhat quaintly remarks, that let the physician administer opiates and cordials to his patients when cathartics are required, and it need surprise no one to see the undertaker at his door.

It would be in place here to adduce, as another fact in illustration of the necessity for prompt and decided action, the unkind *personal* ill treatment (referred to in the Preface) which my former essay elicited, and the proscription of both myself and Dr. Breckinridge simply on account of our opposition to what we could not but regard as the pernicious and fatal errors of Dr. Hodge on this great subject; and last, not least, the persistent efforts which are still (to the disgrace of the Presbyterian name)

made to prevent the defence of ourselves against the unmerited accusations of Dr. Hodge, that we were advocating principles utterly subversive of the doctrines of our Church, and who now, as it appears, would even deprive the writer of the sacred right of self-defence against his accusations. But I repeat, that I am unwilling to allow anything which might be construed as merely personal to mingle with the discussion. True, it may be pleaded that, with far less of such provocation, and in matters of far less intrinsic interest to the Church, Dr. John Owen has done the like,¹ as have many other great and good men in similar circumstances. And then the events referred to in my own case evince a fixed determination that, whether right or wrong, the theology of Dr. Hodge must be forced upon the Church, with all its grievous departures from our recognized theology, and hence would seem to require exposure. But well knowing that these matters need not be brought forward on my own account—for my labors and reputation are in the keeping of the Church, under its great and exalted Head—I feel no anxiety on that score. Our great and glorious Shepherd well knows how to protect those who love Him.

And finally, how long may we as a church expect to maintain our integrity, and serve God acceptably, with such a spirit actively at work in our midst to secure its unhallowed ends, and with the aforesaid principles of doctrine and exegesis inculcated upon our candidates for the ministry? Let none entertain the delusion that, because appearances may not as yet indicate a falling away, there is no danger. Apostasy is rarely the growth of a day or year. The germs may lie in the soil long ere the stalk appears;

¹ Dr. Owen was most persistently villified and calumniated by those who were jealous of his abilities and erudition, and though one of the meekest of men, he, in the preface to his treatise *On Divine Justice*, refers to the authors of those assaults as follows: "For even all know with what vain arrogance, malice, party spirit, and eager lust of attacking the labors of others, the minds of many are corrupted and infected. Not only, then, was it necessary that I should anticipate and digest in my mind the contempt and scoffings which these bantering, saucy, dull-witted, self-sufficient despisers of others, or any of such a contemptible race, whose greatest pleasure it is to disparage all kinds of exertions, however praiseworthy, might pour out against me; but I likewise foresaw that I should have to contend with the soured tempers and prejudiced opinions of others, . . . and who, thinking themselves to be the men, and that wisdom was born and will die with them, look down with contempt upon all who differ from them." (Works, Vol. IX., p. 330.)

but the longer they thus lie, the deeper and deadlier will the root imbed itself in that soil. Then comes the stalk, and then in full development the destroying tare. In fact, apostasy is always thorough and irreclaimable in proportion to the slowness and silence of its growth and maturing. And the principles against which we have here sought to place the Church upon her guard have a well-defined history, nor have they ever been really adopted by any portion of the professed followers of Christ without ultimate in still more grievous and fatal departures from essential truth. And as the integrity of the Church as a depository of sacred truth, to which she has been so faithful in the past, must be preserved, what remains but that, in the kindest and most considerate manner, consistent with firmness of purpose and fidelity to her exalted Head, she take due and timely action in the premises. Dr. Hodge, after an allowance of so many years to review and reconsider the whole subject, has been fully and most kindly heard; and now it is left to the Church to utter her voice, and, in language which cannot be misunderstood, to say, whether the doctrine he has now repeated and affirmed, on the issue in question, is indeed her doctrine, or whether, *as we, in view of the facts in the case, do most solemnly aver it to be*, a fundamental and fatal departure therefrom. Those now on the stage of life and action are invested with the responsibility of giving utterance to this decision, and must meet that responsibility, either by approving or disapproving the doctrine and exegesis referred to; for a failure to disapprove will, of course, be construed into a tacit approval, especially when hereafter viewed in connection with the indiscriminating laudations which incompetency has been uttering over his recent work; and thus their power for good or for evil must be perpetuated to those into whose hands must soon devolve the interests and the welfare of the Church we love.

If, then, the facts appertaining to the great theme before us be as herein represented, I need only add, that with the preparation of this work the determination of the issue ceases longer to be a special concern of mine. I have felt irresistibly called upon by the voice of Providence to make it a special concernment, and have therefore done all I could in order to prepare the way of the Church for such determination, though, at the same time (and the reader will permit me to say it), my spirit has been a thousand

times deeply saddened, as the thought has occurred of the heart-felt anguish which cannot but fill the souls of God's dear children, if brought to the conclusion that they have been so sadly misled in this matter, as they must have been if the things pertaining to it are as here presented. But that labor is now finished; and in view of all the facts in the case, as herein so fully brought forward, the whole matter now is, and henceforth must be, between the Church herself and Him whose sentence ere long will irrevocably evince whether they to whom her welfare is instrumentally intrusted have been faithful to the hallowed interests committed to their charge.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

Referred to on page 4.

Dr. Buchanan's misapprehension in regard to "legal fiction," his disagreement with the views of Dr. Hodge on gratuitous imputation, and his own errors touching the active obedience of Christ.

There ought, however, as it appears to us, to be some recognition here of what seem to be obvious allusions to Dr. Breckinridge's theology, and to my former essay by the justly celebrated and excellent Dr. James Buchanan, of Scotland.¹ He, indeed, names neither, but the allusions cannot well be mistaken, and are made in a style which may indicate either that the author (under the Princeton influence) could not deign to dignify those productions by a direct and open reference to them, or that, without giving ostensible ground for a rejoinder, he would make the impression that the specifications to which he adverts are grievous errors, and that he had refuted them. A critical eye, moreover, must, as it would seem, perceive that these remarks are not so much the legitimate outgrowth of his argument, as in apparent response to some unannounced expression of a desire that he would lend the influence of his great and honored name to discountenance that which he has here excepted against. The tone and language, for example, of pp. 334-338, seem very like a stepping aside from the line of his discussion to fire a platoon or two at those who speak of the *gratuitous imputation of sin* as a *theory*,

¹ See *The Doctrine of Justification*, by James Buchanan, D. D., published by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, (1867.) Since this note was prepared, Dr. B. has been called to his heavenly rest. The tone of some of the remarks, in view of that event, has been softened, but the truth rigidly demands that the discussion of the principles involved in the statements of that excellent man should not on that account be withheld.

and who employ for the purpose of designating it, the phrase *legal fiction*.

As to the former, a more thorough acquaintance with the theology of the Reformation would have taught Dr. Buchanan that it is rather late to except against the use of the term *theory* in designating the dogma referred to. For it has always been so regarded by the churches of the Reformation, since Pighius and Catharinus presented the theory (in the Tridentine Council) as an exposition of the doctrine of original sin. To designate any Scripture announcement by such an appellation would be highly indecorous and improper. But this alleged doctrine is not such, and the Reformers never regarded it as such, but have always condemned and denounced it as an unsupported and pernicious theory; and those who adopt it have no right to demand that such application of this term should be now disused.

As to *legal fiction* (*fictio juris*), Dr. Buchanan seems to have obtained a very indistinct conception of the meaning of the phrase in theological usage, and as employed by Breckinridge and myself. And without once attempting to meet the issue as to the propriety (or the contrary) of its use and application in this instance, he occupies several pages in dilating upon sundry evils and their opposites which may result from legal fiction (as though any one ever questioned these facts), and in stating what things may be so denominated. The point, however, which, either before or after indulging in this train of remarks, Dr. B. should have met (that is, since he deemed it expedient to introduce the topic), had been clearly stated by Dr. Breckinridge as follows: "It is infinitely certain that God would never make a legal fiction a pretext to punish as sinners dependent and helpless creatures who were actually innocent:"¹ a remark directed against the new doctrine (that is, new in Calvinistic theology) of the gratuitous imputation of sin, and in defence of the doctrine universally received by the Church. And if Dr. Buchanan had been at the pains to examine, he would have ascertained that all the distinguished representative divines to whom Dr. Hodge had referred as sustaining his theory and its exegesis of Rom. v. 12–21, *really repudiate both*, and recognize a moral and objective basis for the imputation

¹ *The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered*, pp. 498, 499. (Carter & Brothers, N. Y., 1858.)

of the first sin of Adam to his posterity. This doctrine Dr. Buchanan is certainly at liberty, along with Dr. Hodge, to reject and denounce, should he see proper to do so.¹ But it is fundamental to the Augustinian theology, which never loses sight of the moral and objective ground of the imputation, the rejection of which is eminently perilous to the whole system of grace, as we have shown, especially in Sections 30 and 31 of this work; and they, therefore, who reject it must not claim to stand upon the platform of the Reformation doctrine. Nor can the prerogative be conceded to any member of our communion, first to reject this, her approved doctrine, and then to charge error and heresy on others for persisting to maintain it. The whole question is one purely of fact, and to the facts in the case the appeal should be made.

Since Dr. Buchanan, therefore, has thus assailed those who occupy the position referred to, our fair and candid readers will not deem it indecorous if we avail ourselves of the occasion he has furnished to remind that worthy and excellent person that he should have been more careful in examining the subject of his

¹ I ought to remark here that though Dr. Buchanan thus seems to accept Dr. Hodge's doctrine, he, in explaining his own views, clearly appears to regard it as seriously erroneous. For example, he says: "It (the doctrine of Placæus; i. e., of mediate imputation) affirms the imputation of *personal guilt* arising from *inherent depravity* or actual transgression, and in this respect it teaches a solemn and momentous truth. For the direct imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin is not exclusive of the additional charge of *personal guilt* in the case of every individual of his race (i. e., infants and all), and it is of the utmost practical consequence that this fact should be distinctly received." (P. 279.) And again, on pp. 281–2: "A similar perversion may be, and has been made of the doctrine of original sin, AS IF WE SUFFERED ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF ADAM'S GUILT, and not also on account of our personal depravity and disobedience. . . . There can scarcely be a greater or more dangerous error than to suppose that the guilt of Adam's first sin is the only guilt with which we are chargeable, or that it is [chargeable] exclusive of the personal guilt of individuals. . . . But the doctrine of Scripture, while it affirms the direct imputation of the guilt of Adam's first transgression to his posterity, and of that *only*, for he was their representative *with reference merely to the one precept of the covenant*—affirms also the transmission of hereditary depravity arising from the loss of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature by sin." This certainly settles the question, as it is the direct opposite of making our inherent depravity the penal consequence of a mere *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin.

animadversions, and not have taken for granted that they are in the wrong who resist the attempted identification of this theory and exegesis with our Church doctrine. Nowhere can that theory with its exegesis be found in connection with Calvinistic theology, as presented in its doctrinal symbols and by its approved divines, from the days of Calvin and Knox until the existing effort of Dr. Hodge to incorporate them therewith. Nor can Dr. Buchanan adduce a single instance to the contrary in any of the great representative divines to whom both he and Dr. Hodge have so incautiously undertaken to appeal. And, in all kindness, I would remark, that this issue is not to be determined by putting on orthodox airs, and assuming a spirit of denunciation, but simply by a reference to fact. There is an admitted and fundamental antagonism between the theological system comprising the theory and exegesis of Dr. Hodge and the system which he assails. In the general, Calvin, Molinaeus (or Du Moulin), Rivetus, F. Turretin, and Owen are referred to. Can Dr. Buchanan show, then, in any way that will justify such reference, that this theory, with the exegesis of Romans v. by which Dr. Hodge would support it, was received by any of these illustrious divines? *We affirm directly that he cannot, and that they all rejected it*; and that Dr. Hodge is the sole author of its claim to identification with our theology; and that the Church has hitherto, and in the most decided and emphatic manner, always discarded it as a pestiferous heresy, and that, therefore, Dr. Buchanan ought not to have united with Dr. Hodge in his most uncalled for and most unkind accusations against brethren who had investigated the facts, and who propose to resist any fundamental change in the cherished doctrine of our communion, unless adequate proof be adduced that such change is beyond serious question warranted by the word of God.

And then further (and we offer the remark from no unkindness to that excellent man), Dr. Buchanan should have made himself more familiar with his subject before venturing to utter any such sentence of condemnation. We offer this, not in the captious, ill-natured spirit of fault-finding, but simply because he, having lent his influence and honored name to strike down his brethren, who in the fear of God are endeavoring to rescue His Church from an impending and fearful apostasy of doctrine, it becomes a necessity that the real weight of that authority, in its actual and concrete

relations to the Reformed theology, should be duly understood and appreciated. We shall, however, in illustration confine our remarks to specifications whose topics have a manifest and intrinsic relation to the general subject of our work. But his treatise lacks fundamental investigation in regard even to the doctrine of justification itself as inculcated in the times of the fathers, and of the scholastics, and likewise at the era of the Reformation, though we design not to expatiate upon all these particulars. Such a history as his purports to be should, in this day, be the result of primary investigation, if its aim be to impart information that may be accepted and referred to as reliable.

For example: As to Molinaeus (Du Moulin) "*assisting to prepare the canons of the Synod of Dort*" (see page 174), Dr. Buchanan certainly knows that the French churches were not represented in that Synod. Molinaeus and Rivetus were appointed as delegates from those churches, but after they had started on their journey to Dort were recalled by a peremptory order of the French king, and forbidden to proceed. Molinaeus, some time before the assembling of the Synod, had prepared a paper in the form of a confession of faith, a portion of which was subsequently laid before that body and read at its one hundred and forty-third session, held on April 29th (new style), 1619, ten days previous to its final adjournment. No man then living was held in higher repute by the Synod than Molinaeus; but as he was obliged by the king to return to his pastoral charge in Paris during the whole time of the sessions of that body, it is calculated to make an erroneous impression to affirm without qualification that "*Molinaeus assisted in preparing the canons*, and they were afterwards received without objection by the Church which he adorned." He had written to James I. (as stated by Dudley Carlton, in his letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, January 24, 1618,) on the subject of a general confession for all the Reformed churches, to be composed by this Synod, and seeking a mutual toleration between the Calvinist and Lutheran communions; and it was by the command of James that the specimen above referred to was sent privately to several members of the Synod. And this was about the amount of assistance which he rendered.

And then, moreover, what reliability can there be upon statements wherein announcements like the following are found? "Til-

enus, Professor at Sedan, introduced also the views of Arminius on some of the five points;" that is, previous to the year 1613. (See pp. 175, 463). The remark, whether designedly or not, has an indirect bearing on the general subject before us; but it is impossible to characterize adequately its inaccuracy, and that of the other statements relating to the matter; and they are the more astonishing, as a very slight inspection of the original authorities would have made the inaccuracy manifest. If the facts were of sufficient importance to be adverted to at all, they certainly should have been represented accurately.

About the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Marshall de Broillon invited Tilenus to Sedan, for the purpose of imparting reputation to that seat of learning; and while performing his duties there as professor of theology, he wrote very pointedly against the errors of Arminius and his followers. Some years later, and while the Synod of Dort was in session, he published, at Geneva, his completed and most admirable system of theology,¹ and which, ever since his day, has been regarded and cited by our divines as one of the very best and ablest summaries of Calvinistic doctrine. And as a merited rebuke of the flippancy with which persons who ought to be better informed on the subject refer to the views of this eminent divine, it will suffice to remark that Rivetus, in 1646, cites this very work in his catalogue of Testimonies on Imputation (against Placæus), and that Wendeline, in 1633, employs it as one of the most approved sources of his own most able system; and (omitting many others) that even Vœtius, who had been a member of the Synod of Dort, places it next to Calvin's Institutes, when prescribing the reading of the younger theologians. For example, in the preface to the first volume of his *Selectæ Disputationes* (Utrecht, 1648), he says: "Quibus postea provectiores et jam concionibus formandis vacantes, de nostro consilio, adjungunt lectionem *Syntagmatis Tileni et Institutionum Calvinii*, posterioris etiam in ministerio ad annos aliquot continuandam." And he, moreover, places the study of these two works *after* the perusal of the works of Gormar, the Synopsis Purioris Theologiæ, Maccovius, Ames, Cluto, Ursinus and Pareus, as giving the finish to their theological reading. And such

¹ It consists of three parts, only the first two of which had been previously published in the year 1606.

has ever been the exalted esteem entertained for the work by our leading divines. Late in the year 1619, either with or without reason, Tilenus felt himself aggrieved, and resigned his professorship, and subsequently became identified with the Arminian party. And in 1620 Camero held a discussion with him at L'Isle on the *co-operation of grace with the human will*.¹ But even then he did not deviate so seriously or fundamentally from his former faith as they have done who have abandoned the Augustinian doctrine of original sin for the aforesaid theory of gratuitous imputation, which has always been as decidedly rejected by the Calvinistic church as any of the views which Tilenus now favored.

Then, further, and in the same connection (see p. 463), Dr. Buchanan informs us that "Tilenus was answered" (that is, in regard to *those views of Arminius* which he had introduced(!)) "by P. Du Moulin, in the Euodatio of the five points, in 1613;" that is, six years before he issued the aforesaid and completed edition of his highly prized system of Calvinistic theology! Now, every accurate student of the ecclesiology of these times knows that the dispute between these eminent men *had reference alone to the effects of the hypostatical union*, and had no other relation to Calvinistic theology. The theme, it is true, is extensive, but let the following facts be taken into the account: James I. of England, who held them both in high esteem, requested that they would adjust their dispute; and it was adjusted through the intervention of the National Synod of Tonniens (in 1614), *each one retaining his own views, and each acknowledging the other as orthodox*. And hence it has happened that the work prepared in reply to Tilenus by Molinæus (and of which the manuscript still exists) never has been published.

The efforts of Dr. Buchanan to brand Tilenus as an Arminian at this time, are based upon the conceded fact that he coincided with Piscator (of Herborn) in his view of the active obedience of Christ (a view which Arminius himself strongly opposed!), and betray a still more surprising want of acquaintance with the doctrine of justification as exhibited in the Reformed theology, and the representation of which he ought never (in such a treatise as

¹ See *Amica Collatis*, etc., in *Opera Cameronis*, pp. 606-708 (Geneva, 1642), and also the approval of it by the Leyden divines, in page 709, and also by Wallæus in his *Opp*. Tom. II., page 256.

his purports to be) to have taken at second hand. There are few topics in the older theology which have been by certain writers in our own day more inadequately treated, and in concluding this note we shall offer a few remarks in relation to its historical aspect.

The distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ, in the matter of our justification before God, was first suggested by George Karg (or Parsimonius), a theologian of *Onoldin*, or *Von Anspach*, in his thesis written in 1563, and which he subsequently (in 1570) submitted to the College of Professors at Wittenburg. The distinction, however, during those years seems to have awakened considerable interest in the schools of Germany, and, though there appears to have been no public discussion of the subject, theologians of course expressed their views in regard to it; and Piscator himself is said to have obtained from Ursinus, in 1566, the views which he subsequently inculcated touching the imputation of the active obedience. When Ursinus wrote the Catechism (in 1562) the distinction was as yet unknown; but during the period when he was delivering his expository lectures (1563–1583) it came quite generally into vogue; and hence it happens that, though the Catechism itself (though written by Ursinus) does not recognize the distinction as thus made, his exposition, in which he agrees with Piscator, does. (See ad Quæst. 56 and 60.) The College of Professors at Wittenburg, however, to whom Karg, in the year 1570, had submitted the thesis, replied not to his arguments, but enjoined that he should continue in the doctrine of his preceptors; and as Walch (*Comment. de Obedientia Christi Activa*) says, he readily yielded, and not only returned to his *meus recta veraque sententia*, but even *solemni formulâ errorem, quem antea foverat condemnaret*.

It will be observed that the objection made by these theologians was not to a theoretical distinction between obedience by *acting* and obedience by *suffering*, which has been always acknowledged; but it was against the application of that distinction, by endeavoring to make it concrete or practical in its relation to justification, and which none of the divines of the Reformation had ever before attempted, and which, moreover, the Scriptures nowhere recognize. Hence it is not surprising that in the whole Church, Lutheran and Calvinist, no open exception was taken to the decision pronounced in

the case of Karg by the Wittenburg faculty. But when, some seven years later, the *Formula Concordia* introduced the distinction in its concrete form, the active obedience became *directly*, and, as it were, *causally* associated with the believer's title to heaven, and the *passive obedience* with his deliverance from the curse; and the matter soon excited the keenest controversy—the Lutheran church in general accepting the distinction in this form, and the Calvinists, *as a body*, rejecting it. And it was directly condemned by the Synod of Gap, in 1603, and by that of Rochelle in 1607, and by the Synod of Dort in 1618–1619. Nor is it anywhere recognized in the Westminster symbols of doctrine.

It had now, however, become a necessity that our theologians should, in their theological explications, take the matter under consideration; and Piscator promptly took ground against the position assumed by the supporters of the *Formula of Concord*. And while he says, “*Hæc duæ (ut ita loquor) obedientiæ Jesu Christi accuratissime distinguendæ sunt, quippe diversæ*,” he maintained that the active obedience or personal holiness of Christ was essential to the performance of His mediatorial offices; and that it was His passive obedience or sufferings which effected our redemption, and through or on account of which we are justified; and that, as the remission of sins was through the redemption thus achieved, and implied a reception into the Divine favor, there was no necessity for inventing any other ground of our acceptance than the atoning death of Christ. And in this view he was sustained by Ursinus, Pareus, Camero, Tilenus, Wendelinus, and a host of others;¹ while Gomarus opposed him herein, and sustained the aforesaid position of the supporters of the *Formula*, who assumed that the *passive* obedience only delivered from the curse, and that the *active* imparted the title to heavenly felicity. The controversy led to this speculative refinement, which many of our own theologians have since accepted, though, as we have seen, the divine word does not recognize it, nor even the theology of the Church until the period referred to. Arminius was opposed to making the distinction at all, and consequently rejected the views of both Piscator and Gomar.

Piscator, who was originally a Lutheran, and had been obliged to fly from Strasburg and to resign his professorship there on ac-

¹ See the American Biblical Repository for October, 1838, article VII.

count of his Calvinistic proclivities, took the lead in this controversy against the supporters of the *Formula*, and made great efforts to disseminate his views; and the subject was thereupon, as above stated, finally brought before the French National Synod of Gap, in 1603, which, after due deliberation, directed that "letters shall be writ to Master Piscator to entreat him not to trouble the Church with his new-fangled notions," which was accordingly done. It was again called up at the Synod of Rochelle (1607), in whose records we have the following notice: "Whereas *Dr. John Piscator*, Professor in the University of Herborn, by his letters of answer to those sent him from the Synod of Gap, doth give us an account of his doctrine in the point of justification, as that it is only wrought out by Christ's death and passion, and not by His life and active obedience, *this Synod, in no wise approving the dividing causes so nearly conjoined in this great effort of divine grace*, and judging those arguments produced by him for the defence of his cause weak and invalid, doth order that all the pastors in the respective churches of this kingdom do wholly conform themselves in their teaching to that form of sound words which hath been hitherto taught among us, and is contained in the Holy Scriptures, to-wit: That the whole obedience of Christ, both in His life and death, is imputed to us for the full remission of our sins and acceptance to eternal life; and, in short, that this, being but one and the selfsame obedience, is our entire and perfect justification." And, in the same connection, reiterates, "That we are justified before God by the imputation of that obedience of our Lord Jesus which He yielded unto God His Father in His life and death;" and they, moreover, assure "the most illustrious Lord John, Earl of Nassau," (in which Herborn is situated,) "that no person shall be suffered to exasperate *Dr. Piscator* by any public writings; and also, that if any one hath heretofore done it, he had no commission for so doing from us," etc.¹

The letter of the Synod of Gap to Piscator, together with his reply, were published in 1604, and may be found in Nos. 67 and 68 of the *Epistolæ Præstantium ac Eruditorum Virorum*, pp. 121-125, (Amsterdam, 1704), or his letter itself as summarily given in *De Moor*, Vol. III., p. 960.²

¹ See Quick's Synodicon.

² Mosheim remarks (Cent. 17, § II.) that in the Synod of the Isle of France

Pareus, who was but a youth of seventeen when Karg started the distinction, and who carefully examined the whole affair from its incipience, wrote (in 1598) a little work in four chapters, (which neither Bauer nor Waleh appear to have read,) entitled *De Justitia Christi activa et passiva*, in which he treats the subject very ably, but greatly laments that the distinction had ever been accepted in treating the doctrine of justification. A brief extract or two will be here in place. He says: "Haec questio secum traxit aliam de *forma justificationis nostræ*, sitne remissio peccatorum tota an dimidia nostra justificatio. Et quantum recordari possum haec controversia circa annum 64, primum inter Marchiacos quosdam Theologos agitati cœpta est: deinde anno 70 interventu Academiae Witembergensis utcumque sopita, vel potius suppressa. Prius vero Ecclesiis Evangelicis ignota fuit neque in scriptis Lutheri, Melanthonis, Zwinglii, Calvini, Martyris, Musculi, Hyperii, aliorumque hujus seculi Theologorum quicquam istius, quod sciam, disceptatum legitur: sed recepta fuit omnium consensu simplex illa scripturæ doctrina, nos morte Christi justificari cum propter eam habeamus remissionem peccatorum," (Cap. I.) Then, in Cap. II., after adverting to the Patristic view, and citing Augustine and Ambrose, he says: "Nec addo plures. Possem quoque affere consensum Lutheri, Melanthonis, Zwinglii, Œcolampadii, Hyperii, Ursini, Oleviani, etc., à quorum doctrina de justificatione latum unguem non discedo." The distinction, therefore, in its concrete form,—that is, as an attempt to apply the speculative distinction in elucidation of the doctrine of justification, whether in the way that Piscator did, in denying that the active obedience is imputed (along with the passive), or as Gomar, and many theologians since have done, in assigning a specific part in our justification and salvation to the active obedience as such,—has nothing to sustain or even countenance it in the theology of the Reformation. Though, at the same time, it is true that, when the adherents to the *Formula Concordiæ* did insist on making the distinction concrete in the matter of justification, nearly all the leading Calvinists of the time, as Ursinus, Pareus, Tilenus, etc., took the opposite ground,—that the active obedience pertained to

in 1615, the views of Piscator on this subject were pronounced free from error. But he should have stated that this was not a national, but only a provincial synod.

the necessary qualifications of our adorable Redeemer for fulfilling the offices of His Mediatorship.

Such, then, is the ground on which Dr. Buchanan and others have attempted to charge the views of Piscator on this subject as Arminian, and as furnishing them occasion also for assailing Til- enus as an Arminian, as early as 1606. The subject need not be dwelt upon, however; but it will not be out of place in the connection to advert to the high regard in which Piscator was every where held by his Calvinistic cotemporaries, as an offset to such remarks as those of Drs. Hodge and Buchanan in relation to him. Omitting, however, the encomiums of Owen and Twisse, and a score of others, a single allusion to the Synod of Dort will be sufficient for our purpose.

In the session of December 29, 1618, Episcopius, having adverted in a tone of sarcasm to certain representative divines of the Church in his address to the Synod, was requested to state explicitly to whom he alluded, but refused, whereupon Bogerman (the president), addressing him, said: "If you will not name them we will. You have referred to those venerated and illustrious luminaries of the Church (the memory of whom is blessed)—Zwinglius, Bucer, Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Perkins."¹ The Synod all silently concurred in this estimate. And if the aforesaid representation, that Piscator's views favored Arminianism, is to be accepted, we have the edifying spectacle of a synod of the ablest divines of the age, and which had been convened expressly to place the Church on its guard against Arminian errors, concurring with its president (one of the most stern and rigid impugn- ers of Arminianism that ever lived) to hold up, as one of the great luminaries of the Church, a man whose doctrine really involved those errors, and was favorable to their promotion!

The foregoing facts will enable the reader to appreciate Dr. Buchanan's remarks on pp. 170–173 (of his work), respecting the actual position of Arminius (and on this entire question); and also the third paragraph of p. 175, in which the great body of the

¹ "Si vos non vultis eos nominare, nos faciemus. Nominastis venerando illos viros, et clarissima ecclesiæ lumina, quorum memoria in benedictione est, D. Zwinlium, D. Bucerum, D. Calvinum, D. Bezam, D. Zanchium, D. Piscatorem, D. Perkinsium." (Vide Epistolæ, etc., *ut supra*, No. 316). Piscator died in 1625.

Calvinistic church, during the first century of the Reformation, is constructively presented *as leaving a door open for the believer's personal obedience as the ground of his future hope*, inasmuch as while it ascribed the remission of sins to the passive obedience of Christ, it excluded the imputation of his active, *as the ground of our title to eternal life*, for no such doctrine as is here asserted, *i. e.*, that the active obedience is the ground of our title to eternal life, is ever found in the Reformed theology (as above shown) until many years after the death of Calvin. It is nowhere taught in the early confessions, nor by the Synods of Gap, Dort or Westminster. There is, indeed, a plain ground for the abstract distinction itself; but, as above stated, there is no ground therein for any such division or *practical application of the distinction* as is here attempted, and as Dr. Shedd has repeated in his History of Doctrines (Vol. II. p. 341), and which Dr. Hodge has cited and very justly disapproved. (Theology, Vol. III., p. 149; see also pp. 142, 143, 150). Dr. Hodge himself, however, has done Piscator the injustice of adopting from Bauer his statements regarding him, and even his quotations. (See Bauer's *Die Lehre von der Versöhnung*, pp. 352.)

The position of Piscator in this matter, even should we allow that his mind in the controversy may have been stimulated by the remembrance of his former ill treatment at Strasburg, ought not to be viewed as simply aggressive. It was, if not wholly, yet mainly defensive as against the innovation attempted by the *Formula* and its supporters. In explaining what he regarded as the real doctrine of the Reformation he, however, erred by admitting and applying the distinction as practical in the matter of the sinner's justification; but there is no ground whatever for attributing to him (as Bauer dreams) *a design to modify the Church doctrine of satisfaction*. Bauer conceived that this doctrine might undergo some modification from Piscator's standpoint, and thereupon attributes to him the intention of effecting that object; but he has not been able to adduce from the writings of that eminent theologian anything to justify such an intimation. Dr. Hodge has likewise erred by adopting, from this same writer, his own representations regarding Piscator's views and intentions; and then (in Theology, Vol. III., pp. 182–185) he represents the views of Piscator as a departure from those of the Reformation, on the ground that he

denied that the active obedience is imputed for justification, and represents the French Synod as condemning his doctrine in this regard. But (1), the divines of the Reformation neither affirmed nor denied that the active obedience was imputed, but simply maintained, without any recognition of the distinction itself between the active and passive obedience, *that Christ's whole obedience was imputed*; and Piscator's views, as above shown, were the views of such men as Ursinus, Pareus, Tilenus, etc. And (2), as to the French Synod, they *did* condemn this view; *but on what ground?* By adverting to our foregoing references to its action, and the citations defining its own position in the matter, the reader will be able to answer this question. Dr. Hodge intimates that the Synod held that the active obedience *is* imputed; but this makes an utterly erroneous impression, for they denounce the view simply on the ground that it attempts a practical or concrete severance between the active and passive obedience—a severance which they wholly repudiated; and the decision, therefore, equally involved a condemnation of the doctrine advanced by Dr. Gomar and the supporters of the *Formula*, and as subsequently insisted on by many others of our later theologians, and even by Dr. Hodge himself. In the National Synod of Privas (1612) the following language is employed in declaring their doctrine: "Our justification consisteth, not only in the forgiveness of sins, *but also in the imputation of His active righteousness*." This language, however, was regarded by the National Synod of Tonniens (1614) as departing from the Church doctrine, and in their deliverance on the subject they return to the original representation. They say: "The form of doctrine which ought to be received and taught in the churches of this kingdom, according to the Scriptures, is, that man cannot be justified but by Jesus Christ our Saviour, who, being incarnate, was obedient to His Father from the first moment of His birth unto the last of His ignominious death upon the cross, *having most perfectly, both in His life and death, fulfilled the whole law given unto men*, and that particular commandment imposed upon Him by His Father, of suffering and giving His soul a ransom for many; *by which perfect obedience we are justified*, because it is counted ours by the grace of God, and apprehended by that faith which He gives unto us."

A very clear statement of the question respecting the active and

passive obedience may be found in the works of Wallæus, Tom. II., pp. 368, 369, and 420. Turretin, in Loco XIV., Quæst. 13, gives an admirable view of the whole subject. See especially § 12, "Quia scriptura nunquam obedientiam Christi ita videtur distinguere in partes," etc. De Moor, Vol. III., cap. 20, §§ 17, 18, is quite full and satisfactory. See also Dr. H. B. Smith's edition of Hagenbach, Vol. II., § 268, p. 358; and Principal Cunningham's *Reformers*, etc., pp. 404, 405.

Another serious misstatement of Dr. Buchanan, and one for which he is indebted to Dr. Hodge, is the assertion on pages 279, 498, that Stapfer followed Placæus in his views of mediate imputation; but as we have considered this in the body of our work, it is unnecessary to dwell upon it here, or upon many others equally unaccountable. And they are, moreover, set off by not a few of lesser importance, as, *e. g.*, "The HOPKINSIAN theology, which sprung up in America early in the last century" (p. 190). Dr. Hopkins was born in 1721, and died in 1803. His theology—the theology of the sect—was first published in 1793. Again: "Dr. (!) H. W. Beecher" is announced as the author of the *Conflict of Ages*, and "B. V., pp. 362–516," of that work are referred to (p. 495). There is on the same page, however, the following paragraph, to which we fully subscribe, though not in the sense intended by the venerable author, who has therein unwittingly expressed what we regard as singularly true: "*On the new views which have sprung up in America on the imputation of Adam's guilt*, see Dr. Boardman on 'Original Sin,' and three papers on 'Imputation,' in the Princeton Theological Essays." Though we never have found leisure to read the whole of the first named of these works, yet we doubt not that it accepts and would defend *the new view* as fully as do the Essays themselves.

NOTE B.

(Referred to in § 8, page 64, and repeatedly in other parts of the work.)

MAN CREATED IN THE IMAGE AND ACCORDING TO THE LIKENESS OF THE TRIUNE GOD.

The allusions to this topic in the text as referred to above, and the question therein suggested as to the meaning of Gen. i. 26, 27, could not be treated *in extenso* in the body of the work, nor with

the degree of fulness which its relation to the argument requires, and we therefore devote the following note to its consideration. And as introductory I here repeat the question, Who can say that the emphatic announcement that man was “made *in* the image, according to the likeness of God,” may not find its true solution in the very principle of unity and plurality (*i. e. of plurality in unity*) expressed in the aforesaid explanatory principle, to the consideration of which we are so constantly led by the argument, and which was communicated to the inner consciousness of the Church from the very beginning of her existence, as all her declarations on the subject before us evince, but which in its very nature seems as inexplicable by us in the present stage of our being as is the same distinction in the divine nature? But if the two, *i. e.* the fact and the principle, do stand thus related, it is not needful that we understand the *modus* itself in order to justify our application of the facts in the solution and illustration of those grand disclosures of divine revelation to which they are so eminently adapted. We purpose, therefore, to examine briefly the various interpretations which have been offered of this passage, as preliminary to the application which, we think, may be fairly made of it in relation to the topic in question. In full the passage is as follows: “AND GOD SAID, LET US MAKE MAN IN OUR IMAGE, AFTER OUR LIKENESS; AND LET THEM HAVE DOMINION OVER THE FISH OF THE SEA, AND OVER THE FOWL OF THE AIR, AND OVER THE CATTLE, AND OVER ALL THE EARTH, AND OVER EVERY CREEPING THING THAT CREEPETH UPON THE EARTH. SO GOD CREATED MAN IN HIS OWN IMAGE, IN THE IMAGE OF GOD CREATED HE HIM; MALE AND FEMALE CREATED HE THEM.” And our first remark is, that—

I. *The plurals* us and our *are not here plurals of intensity.*

God, in the execution of His eternal purpose, having completed the work of creation as assigned to the first five days and part of the sixth (as recorded in Gen i. 1–25), now, as Zanchius observes, represents Himself in this attitude, “Thus far we have made heaven and earth and all their creatures, now let us make man in our own image, according to our likeness.” The literal rendering of the Hebrew נִצְּחָה (*kal future*), is *faciemus, we will make*; which I mention, not as objecting to our authorized version, which expresses the thought in our tongue with equal consonance to the Hebrew conception as would the literal rendering, but that the un-

learned reader may have the exact shade of thought as presented in the original.

It is of course God Himself who says, “Let us make man,” etc., and not Moses who says it for Him. And our first point of inquiry here is in relation to the plural forms contained in the passage itself; *i. e.*, Do they come under the category of what grammarians term the *pluralis excellentiæ* and *majestaticus*?

Until comparatively a recent date there had been amongst evangelical expositors no question on this point, for the Church has always regarded the plural forms here as referring to the personal distinctions in the Godhead. And the earlier deviations from this view owe their origin, not to any application of the recognized principles of grammatical interpretation, but to theological sympathy. For example, those of Sabellian and Rationalist proclivities have developed a *pluralis majestaticus* here, in order to set aside the recognition which the passage affords of a distinction of personality in the Godhead; but the Jews and Arians, while they deny such distinction, do not, however, in this instance generally apply the rule, for the former mostly hold that God here addresses His “house of judgment” (בֵּית דִּין); and the latter, Christ, as the chief of all His creatures. Some recent evangelical expositors (as the late Professor Stuart) accepted the *pluralis majestaticus*, though at the same time conceding that the modern usage, *i. e.*, subsequent to the captivity, cannot determine the *usus loquendi* of the Hebrews. But both the Sabellian and Unitarian expositors all fail to reconcile the manifest incongruity of supposing that God, as a single hypostasis, in *speaking to Himself* would employ this plural at all, or that, having in this instance employed it, He should afterwards use the singular, as they admit is done in repeated instances.

Now the plural is expressly used in designating God as the Creator of men. See the Hebrew of Eccles. xii. 1, “Thy *Creators*,” Job xxxv. 10, “My *makers*,” Isa. liv. 5, “For thy *makers* are thy *husbands*.” See also Malachi i. 6, “If I be a master (*masters*), where is my fear?” and Prov. ix. 10, “The fear of Jehovah is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the *holy ones* (קִדְּשִׁים) is understanding.” In the Hebrew parallelism it is obvious that *holy ones* is exegetical of Jehovah. (See note in Junius and Tremellius.) Compare likewise chapter xxx. 3. And then, further,

to each of the persons of the Godhead the creation of man is distinctly and directly ascribed. See, for example, Ps. c. 3; John i. 3, and Job xxxiii. 4, which facts are abundantly sufficient to show that the attempted application of the *pluralis majestaticus* here is wholly arbitrary, and that on this point the faith of the universal Church is to be respected; for that the Old Testament does not recognize the doctrine of the Trinity is simply false, and entitled to no consideration.

The few following passages (out of many) will evince the unanimity of the early Christian Church in their view that these words should be regarded as recognizing the distinction of persons in the Godhead; and we adduce them not as authoritative in questions of exegesis, but as testimony affirming what were the views of the Church on this subject in her purest days; for it was uniform from the time of the apostles until the middle of the fourth century, and of course, is therefore entitled to deference and respectful attention.

Barnabas says: "And for this the Lord consented to suffer for our sake, though He was Lord of the world, to whom He (the Father) said on the day before the completion of the world (*constitutionem sæculi*), *Let us make man after (or for, ad) our image and likeness.*" (Epist. cap. 5.)

Hermes: "The Son of God was indeed more ancient than any creature, so that He was present with His Father in the council for forming the creature." (Lib. III., Similit. 9, § 12.)

Theophilus, of Antioch: "He directed these words, *Let us make man*, to none other except His Word and His own Wisdom." (Ad Antol., lib. II.)

Irenæus: "His Word and Wisdom, His Son and Spirit, are always present with Him, to whom also He spake, saying, *Let us make man,*" etc. (Lib. IV., cap. 37, and lib. V., cap. 15.) "Man was fashioned after the image and likeness of the uncreated God, the Father willing His creation, the Son ministering and forming him, the Holy Spirit nourishing and increasing him." (Lib. IV., cap. 75.)

Tertullian: "Nay, because His Son is ever present with Him, the second person, His Word, and the third, the Spirit in the Word, therefore He spake in the plural, *Let us make man in our image.*" (Adversus Praxeam, cap. 12.)

Novation: "Who does not acknowledge the Son to be the second person after the Father, when he reads that it was said by the Father to the Son, *Let us make man.*" (De Trinit. §§ 21, 25.)

Origen: "To Him also spake He (the Father), *Let us make man after our image.*" (Contra Celsum, lib. I.)

Athanasius: "Who is this that God here converses with? To whom are these notifications and determinations of His pleasure directed? Not to any of the creatures already made, much less to those things which were not yet created, but undoubtedly to some person, who was then present with the Father, with whom He communicated His counsels, and whose agency He employed in their accomplishment. And who could this be unless His eternal Word? With whom can we conceive that the Father should hold this conference, except with His Son, the divine Logos, that Wisdom of God, then present with Him and acting with Him, in the creation of the world, and who was in the beginning with God, and was God? and who says of Himself, *When He prepared the heavens I was there,*" etc. (Hom. 9, in Genesis.)

Augustine (De Civitate Dei, lib. 16, cap. 6) says: "Had God only said, *Let us make man*, it might, perhaps, be pretended, as the Jews say, that He spoke to the angels, and employed them in forming the body of man and other creatures; but inasmuch as it immediately follows, *after our image*, it is profane (*nefas*) to believe that man was made after the image of angels, or that the image of angels and of God is the same." (See also De Trinitate, lib. 10, cap. 10, and lib. 14, cap. 11.)

Ambrose: "God would not speak thus to His servants, because it is not to be thought that servants were partakers with their Lord in His works of creation, or the works with their author; and supposing it were admitted that the work was common to both God and angels, *yet the image was not common.*" (Epist. 38, ad Horont., and also lib. VI., Hexam. cap. 9.)

Epiphanius (Hæres. 23, n. 2) says: "This is the language of God to His Word, and Only Begotten, AS ALL THE FAITHFUL BELIEVE." And again: "Adam was formed by the hand of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." (Ibid. p. 44, n. 4.) The statement of this father as to the universality of the patristical belief on the subject, is fully sustained by the second council of Sirmium (anno 351), referred to by Hilary in his book *De*

Synodis, by which it was affirmed that, "If any say that the Father did not speak to the Son, when He said, *Let us make man*, but that He spake to Himself, let him be accursed." (The whole creed may be found in Socrates, lib. II., cap. 30).

In the following centuries, and during the middle ages, the same view was entertained by the Church, as we find represented by Paschasius, Damascenus, Lombard, and Aquinas, and others; and in the era of the Reformation by Luther, Calvin, and their cotemporaries. Zanchius, referring to this interpretation, says: "*Hic est verus et simplex sensus horum verborum. Proinde hinc meritò colligunt Patres omnes, et doctissimi quique nostri seculi homines, tum pluralitatem personarum in Deo propter verbum Faciamus, et propter nomen nostram; tum unitatem essentiae propter verbum singulare Dixit ac creavit, et propter nomen etiam singulare imaginem ac similitudinem.*" (De Hom. Creat., lib. I., cap. 1; Opp. Tom. III., p. 483.)

This learned testimony, as to the views of the early Church, and of the divines of the Reformation, fully sustains the foregoing representation; and we add to it the following of the equally profound and learned Dr. Waterland, who, in referring to Gen. i. 26, 27, affirms that this text, *Let us make man*, has been understood of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, or, at least, of Father and Son, by the whole stream of Christian writers down from the times of the apostles. (See *Eight Sermons*, page 69.)

The *pluralis excellentiæ*, moreover, has nothing to sustain its attempted application to this passage, and has always been most decidedly repudiated. Luther, for example, after remarking that "We are made after the image of those makers who said, *LET US MAKE*, and that those makers are the three distinct persons in the one divine essence, and that we are made after the image of these three persons," proceeds to denounce as ridiculous the notion of certain Jews who say, "*Deum sequi principum consuetudinem qui reverentiæ causa de se in plurali numero loquuntur.*" (Comment in Gen. i. 26). And Tayler Lewis, after referring to the efforts to set aside the Church interpretation, truly remarks, that "Of all these views the *pluralis majesticus* has the least support. It is foreign to the *usus loquendi* of the earliest language; it is degrading instead of honoring to Deity, and Aben Ezra shows that the few seeming examples brought from the Hebrew Scrip-

tures, such as Numbers xxii. 6; Dan. ii. 36, do not bear it out—the latter, moreover, being an Aramaic mode of speech." (In Lange, p. 173.) And then further: If the words in Gen. i. 26, were really uttered by God (whom the Jews and Rationalists represent as without distinction of personality), then it is simply a senile absurdity to pretend that He would employ a *pluralis majesticus* in speaking to Himself. Or if, as is now gratuitously pretended, Moses himself is the real author of the words, and only attributes them to God for dramatic effect, then, if the unfounded and impertinent suggestion was admitted, it would be well for the dealers in presumption to explain the source of Moses' knowledge—that it was the custom of kings and rulers to speak in this style. We find not the least trace of it in his writings when speaking of Melchisedek, Abimelech, Pharaoh, Balak (for Numbers xxii. 6 is merely *communicative*, and therefore comes not under the category), and others. The judges and kings of Israel all employ the singular number, and even Solomon in all his glory never dreams of employing such a plural. Gen. xi. 7, and Isa. vi. 8, clearly refer to the distinction in the divine nature; and therefore bear not on the point. While Gen. xxix. 27; 2 Sam. xvi. 20, and xxiv. 14, and 1 Kings xii. 9, and Job xviii. 2, 3, and Canticles i. 4, are all *communicative*, or *common* to the speaker and his friends, and therefore have been very absurdly adduced as illustrations of such a plural; and the modern instances of such usage are of no weight in determining the question. And then still further, as Lange has remarked on the text before us, "It must be noted that the plural is carried into the word *בצלמנו* (*in our image*), etc. This appears to go beyond the *pluralis majesticus*, and to point to the germinal view of a distinction in the Divine personality, in favor of which is the distinction of Elohim and Ruah Elohim, or that of God and His Wisdom, as this distinction is made (Prov. viii.) with reference to the creation." But we need pursue this no farther; for there is not the shadow of any ground that is at all tenable on which to rest the allegation that *us* and *our* are here to be regarded as a *pluralis excellentiæ*, or *majesticus*.

II. WHOM DID GOD ADDRESS IN THESE WORDS: *LET US MAKE MAN IN OUR OWN IMAGE, AFTER OUR LIKENESS*, etc.

The immediate object of the creative power now to be exercised is *אדם*, *man*. And God does not here say, *Let man be made*, as

He had said, *Let there be light; let there be luminaries in heaven.* Nor does He order the elements to produce him, as He had commanded the earth to bring forth vegetation; and the waters, fishes and fowls; and the land, cattle and creeping things. But as in council, or consultation, He says, *Now we will make, or Let us make man.*

Vatablus here very properly says: "But in this place *man* (אדם) is not a proper name, but the name of a species. And the singular is used for the plural, for the plural verb is immediately added, 'Let them rule,' that is, not only let Adam and Eve rule, but the race or species. And so in Gen. v. 2, 'He called their name Adam.' And in Numbers xxxi. 35: 'And the souls of men (אדם) (from or of women, or, as the Vulgate, of the female sex) who had not carnally known man,' etc.—a usage which evinces why the Targum, in Isa. xlv. 13, explains אדם by אִמָּה, which denotes women, or the female sex.

Now, as the words, *Let us make man*, etc., cannot, with any just reason, be regarded as a *pluralis majestaticus*, and as some who admit this reject the Church view (as above given), and affirm that God addresses either one or another class of His creatures, and as this view has lately found an able and truly learned defender amongst the evangelical divines of Germany, it will be in place here to consider it before proceeding with our argument. We refer to Delitzsch,¹ who strongly asserts the possibility that the Jewish tradition is founded in fact which states that God here addresses his angels, or, as the Jews name it, His *House of Judgment*. They differ, however, in their views of the matter; for Aben Ezra held that the souls of all men were created on the first day, and that God now consulted them; while Menasseh ben Israel supposed that he here spake to the elements, though if the words *Let us make man* imply anything, they clearly suppose a capacity for consultation on the part of those addressed. But the general view of the Jews is that which is affirmed by Delitzsch, and in the *Targum of Jonathan* (or *Palestine*) is thus expressed: "And the Lord said to the angels who ministered before Him, who

¹ We have not access to his commentary on Genesis, but refer to his *Biblical Psychology*, as translated by Wallis (Edinburgh, 1866). See Part II., § 7, pp. 134–136. All our subsequent references to his views are to this deeply learned and most valuable work.

had been created on the second day of the creation of the world, *Let us make man in our image, in our likeness,*" etc.

The manner in which the Church from the first has regarded this conception ought not to be overlooked, though we would base no argument thereon. Irenæus, adverting to this notion of the Jews, and as adopted by certain heretics, says: "Angels neither created nor formed us, nor was it in their power to make the image of God; the Logos alone could do this, and no powers distinct from the Father of all things. Nor did God want their assistance in making the things which he had determined to create, because His Word and His Wisdom, the Son and the Holy Ghost, are ever with Him, by whom and with whom He made all things, freely and of His own accord; to whom also he spake in these words: *Let us make man in our image and likeness.*" (Lib. IV., cap. 37.)

Luther, in reference to the like attempts to evade this clear recognition of the plurality of personality in the Godhead, by representing Him as now calling into council the angels, elements, etc., says: "But (1), I ask, why did he not also do this before, and in relation to His other creative acts? (2), How can the creation of man pertain to angels? (3), He does not name angels, but simply says *Us*. It is spoken, therefore, concerning Makers and Creators; and this certainly cannot be said of angels. (4), This also is certain, that in no mode can it be said that we are created after the image of angels. (5), And why have we here, *Let us make* in the plural, and HE MADE in the singular, unless that Moses might thereby clearly and strongly signify to us that even in the Godhead and creative essence itself there is an indivisible (inseparable) and eternal plurality? Nor can the gates of hell deprive us of this."

But admitting the claim of the Jews that the Hebrew words may include either of the foregoing,—i. e., either human souls, or the elements, or angels,—the result of their argument would be that God here calls upon whichever class may be supposed to co-operate in making or creating an image of Himself; for, beyond all question, the words themselves do presuppose efficiency on the part of those to whom they are addressed. And further, that man must have been created in the image and according to the likeness of these human souls, elements, or angels, or at least that he is

created after their image as truly as after that of God; and consequently that they (whichever He addresses) had been already created in His image; a conception which, setting aside its transparent absurdity, must render nugatory the whole force of the expression in verse 26, which clearly and irresistibly implies that no creature as yet existing had been made in that image and likeness. Delitzsch is obliged to concede this even in regard to the angels whom he supposes to be addressed (p. 79); and in support of it claims *ex rei necessitate*, that angels must have been created in the image of God. Augustine supposed that in a certain sense they possessed that image, though he emphatically denies that the image is the same as that of God: "Nefas est credere, ad imagines Angelorum hominem factum, aut eandem esse imaginem Angelorum et Dei." (*De Civit.*, lib. 16, cap. 6.) Basil likewise supposed them to possess the image of God (*Hom.* 10), and the same view was entertained by Polanus in the Reformed church (*Syntag. Theol.* page 883), and by others in our day. And as the point is important in its relation to the question before us, we shall examine it briefly.

It is a clear and undisputed fact, that the Scriptures never allege, in regard to any of the works or creatures of God, except man, that they were created in the image of God. And as Delitzsch has presented the learning and strength of the argument by which the opposite view (so far as regards angels) is attempted to be sustained, we shall examine his statements in defence of the position.

He admits (page 78) that the Scriptures directly assert of man only that he was so created, but affirms that they say it "indirectly of angels." His ground for this is, (1), They are called sons of God, Gen. vi. 2; Ps. xxix. 1, and lxxxix. 6; Job i. 6, and xxxviii. 7; but it is characteristic of a son to be the likeness of Him who begat Him." And in a note he adds: "Scripture in asserting that the angels are sons of God, declares at the same time that they are in the likeness of God, for that which is begotten always resembles him which begat. (Compare e. g., 1 John iii. 6.)" (P. 79.) That is to say, they were begotten, and not simply created (unless he would regard begetting and creating as the same); and if begotten they are the image of Him who begat. This, however (and I make the remark with real pain), is hardly scholarly; for without any attempt at proof, it assumes as the

very basis of his argument, that בְּנֵי (vot) in this instance must express the specific relation to which he alludes; in other words, that sonship here is a natural relation (resulting from begetting), as distinguished from the relation constituted by creation, adoption, and the like, all of which relations the term is employed to signify. Such a premise certainly demands a logical establishment before it can, with any fairness or even show of reason, be urged as the basis of an important conclusion. For let the reader observe that the same Hebrew term is employed in the Old Testament in the sense of παῖς, puer, juvenis, and the like, as in Cant. ii. 3; Prov. x. 5, and is likewise attributed to the subjects of a king, 2 Kings xvi. 7; and is constantly used to express relations like the following: "Sons of the prophets," (1 Kings xx. 35, and 2 Kings ii. 3, 5, 7), and that relation which persons, who are born or reside in any given place or province, sustain to that locality, Ps. cxlix. 2; Ezek. xxiii. 15, 17, or that sustained by Moses to the daughter of Pharaoh, Exod. ii. 10 (also Acts vii. 21, and Heb. xi. 24); and so, too, we have, "Son of my sorrow," "Son of my right-hand," etc. And in the New Testament we find a like extensive usage of υἱός. Thus υἱὸς Θεοῦ (בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים) is applied to the peacemakers, Matt. v. 9 (see also verse 43, and Heb. xii. 5-8, and Rev. xxi. 7); and then we have, "Sons of the kingdom," Matt. viii. 12 and xiii. 38; "Sons of the bridechamber," Matt. ix. 15; Mark ii. 19; "Sons of the devil," Matt. xiii. 38; "Sons of thunder," Mark iii. 17, "And ye shall be the sons (of υἱός) of the Highest," Luke xvi. 8 (see also chap. xx. 24, and John xii. 36); "Sons of God, being the sons of the resurrection," Luke xx. 31; "Sons of the prophets," Acts iii. 25; "they who are of faith are sons of Abraham," Gal. iii. 7, and iv. 6, 7; "Sons of the light and of the day," 1 Thess. v. 5. These few instances illustrating the extensive usage or application of the term may suffice.

Now, with such facts before us, it certainly may with reason be asked, On what principle Delitzsch assumes to fix the nature of the relationship pertaining to angels, so as to justify his claim that they are so "begotten" of God as to partake of His image or likeness? By what process has he determined that the relation is, in this sense, natural, instead of resulting from creation, adoption (in view of the fall of those who sinned), or of residence? The word is employed in all these, and in various other connections;

and should any one claim, in virtue of the aforesaid applications of it, that the pupils of the prophets resembled their teachers, or the subjects their king, or the natives their country, all would see that the inference had no just foundation. But it may be replied, that in these instances, there was no *begetting*, which is true, and therefore it is likewise true, that the mere application of the term does not, of itself, imply the existence of any such relationship. To justify his inference, therefore, Delitzsch must show that, distinct from creation, or residence, or adoption, the angels were *begotten* of God. His argument requires this; for, if they are sons merely by creation, or adoption, or residence, then, as these necessarily produce no such likeness to God as he claims for the angels, his conclusion is a mere nullity.

In order to sustain his position, he is obliged also to claim that "*it is possible*" that God, when He said, Let us make man in our image according to our likeness, "uses the plural number to comprehend the angels with Himself," and thence he draws the inference that "man must therefore have been created after the image of God, and of those who already, *by creation, bore the image of God*," which seems to imply that, in regard to intelligent creatures, creating and begetting alike produce the divine image, which, of course, cannot be seriously entertained; but, passing this, he makes no effort to explain how, or in what way, the angels could have united with God in this creative act, or why they should have been so addressed by Him if they did not or were not to unite therein. And the conception, so utterly unsustained, and therefore inadmissible, he then makes the basis of the inference, that "If man be created after the image of God *and of the angels*, it follows that the image of God in man refers primarily to His invisible nature;" and still further on in his argument he employs the same assumption as a basis to reason from.

As to the *possibility* of the truth of this Jewish tradition, our readers must determine for themselves. We have no room to treat it *in extenso*, and our aim here is to present the Bible view and the recognized views of the Church, and offer a few remarks to evince the inconclusiveness of Delitzsch's conclusions. Augustine, Polanus and others, who held that angels possess the *moral* or *ethical* image of God, never entertained the thought that the Creator addressed them in Gen. i. 26. Luther, whom we have

already cited, adds in the same connection the following, directly on this point: "Sed sumus facti ad illorum Factorum imaginem, qui dicunt, FACIAMUS. *Hi factores sunt tres distinctæ personæ in una divina essentia*, HARUM TRIUM PERSONARUM, NOS SUMUS IMAGO, SICUT POST AUDIEMUS" (i. e., in verse 27). Calvin also says: "Ac omnino ridiculi sunt Judæi, dum fingunt Deum cum terra vel angelis communicasse sermonem; terra scilicet optima consiliaria erat. *Minimam vero tam præclari operis partem angelis adscribere, abominandam sacrilegium est*. Nos vero ad imaginem terræ vel angelorum creatos esse ubi reperiunt? Annon Moses statim omnes creaturas diserte excludit, quum refert, ad imaginem Dei creatum fuisse Adam? Alii qui sibi acutiores videntur, his insulsi, Deum principum more de se in numero plurali loquuntur dicunt. Quasi vero ea barbaries quæ a paucis sæculis invaluit, jam tunc regnaret in mundo. Sed bene habet quod canina eorum improbitas cum tanto stupore conjuncta est, ut stultitiam suam pueris prodant. Christiani igitur apposite plures subesse in Deo personas ex hoc testimonio contendunt," etc. (*In locum.*)

I add in illustration also the remarks of the very learned exegete *Drusus*, who, in reply to the Jewish notion that God, in verse 26, addresses His *house of judgment*, says, "Quænam domus judicii ejus, si non Filius et Spiritus Sanctus? Nam angeli esse non possunt, quoniam et ipsi inter creaturas. Quomodo enim deliberaret de creando homine cum iis qui ipsi creati fuerunt? Nam creatores eos appellare prorsus *ἀθεόλογον* est. Creatores autem sunt si unâ cum Deo fecerunt hominem." (*Critici Sac. Tom. I.*) And thus, as all these citations testify, the Church has ever regarded the expression *let us make* as undoubtedly implying the possession of creative power by those to whom God thus speaks; a fact which Delitzsch has not attempted either to set aside or account for, but which he certainly owes to his exalted reputation as an accomplished scholar fairly to meet and dispose of in its relation to his argument. Again: In his *Notæ Majores*, *Drusus*, after quoting "*Let us make man*," and referring to Gen. xi. 7, "*Let us go down*," etc., and to Gen. ii. 18, "*I will make thee a helpmeet*," etc., adds, "*Ita modo singulariter, modo pluraliter loquitur*." (*Ibid. Tom. VIII., page 18.*)

Upon the whole, then, as regards God taking counsel with the angels (as the Targum of Jonathan supposes), the expression "*let*

us make," נָפַץ, *faciemus*, can leave no reasonable ground to doubt that whoever is included in this *we* or *us* actually took part in this creative act: a statement the truth of which has never been in any way weakened or impaired by the efforts of adverse criticism; and to say, therefore, that angels are therein included, and yet are not to be supposed to take such part, is simply to utter a contradiction. And if God did here address them, then (as the very language implies efficiency and co-operation on the part of those addressed) the angels assisted in this creative act; for no sufficient reason can be given why they should be thus addressed if they were not to co-operate. If they did so co-operate, then of course we bear their image. But this is not the only inference, and Delitzsch cannot stop here if he would; for they thus become our creators *along with God*, whom, along with Him, we are enjoined to reverence as such (Eccles. xii. 1), and where this would lead no words are needed to evince. But it is an inadmissible absurdity to suppose that the angels, or any creatures, however exalted in the scale of being, should have been invited to aid or co-operate with the Creator in producing the image and likeness of the eternal and incomprehensible Jehovah! (See in the Greek Matt. xi. 27, and John i. 18.) And it may be that the native lineaments of that image, as enstamped upon man by creation (that is, the unity and distinction of personality), is still in a great measure incomprehensible, even to the angels themselves, in this image of the Triune God.

And then, on the other hand, if we are to suppose that God here merely communicates to angels His purpose to create man, and does not invite them to co-operate, then the *we* or *us*, if it limits the creative act, *limits also the likeness* (verse 27), and the conclusion of Delitzsch, that man was created in the image of angels, is bereft of the support he would claim for it. And then, moreover, it is an inconceivable incongruity thus to intermingle the divine and angelic image as constituting the divine likeness; for, as already stated, angels are nowhere, either directly or by implication, said to be created in the image of God. The text itself has no trace of angels, and the places cited by Delitzsch prove nothing to the purpose. They merely name angels the sons of God; but, as we have shown, no such inference can be drawn from the mere use or application of that term.

It is a consideration of force also, that angels, as Delitzsch affirms, were created anterior to man; and the expression, *we will make man in our image after our likeness*, clearly intimates that no creature previously had been made in that image; *i. e.*, the angels having been created as separate existences, or distinct dis-united personalities alone; but man was now to be created in a form different from any other creature as yet called into being. If, then, the proper personality of Adam and Eve are to be presumed to exhaust the meaning of this creative purpose, wherein were they created in any respect different from angels? This cannot be; and hence the image of the Triune God, in which they were created, imports more than this, and can find its realization (as it seems to me) only in the fact that they were created with both a unity and distinction of personality, and as a distinct adumbration of the unity and distinction existing in the Godhead; and hence the Church has ever taught that the man—אָדָם—was created, not in the image of either person of the Godhead, but as an image of the Triune God. True, she has failed in the effort to determine specifically what that image consisted in; but, as a reference to our previous and succeeding citations will show, it is, and ever has been, her assured and settled conviction that the image in which the race was created was that of the Triune God. And hence she has ever affirmed and reiterated the doctrine expressed by Augustine on this subject (De Civit. Dei, lib. 16, cap. 6), part of which we have quoted above.

Delitzsch's reasoning is, therefore, wholly at fault from the fact that angels are nowhere, either directly or by implication, said to possess God's image in any such sense as that in which this image is attributed to man, as Theodoret insists, who maintains that it exists not in angels, but in man alone. Polanus and others, who claim that it exists also in angels, attribute to the phrase *image and likeness* solely an ethical significance, which, as we shall see, does not comprehend its full scriptural import, as even Delitzsch himself emphatically affirms. For the angels, though possessed of knowledge, righteousness and holiness, and though they may thus be said, in a certain sense, to bear a resemblance to their Creator, are never said to possess His image. And the contrary supposition has no exegetical basis, but merely a supposed theological necessity. And this, moreover, is both confirmed and illus-

trated by the fact that the devils, or fallen angels, are never said *to have lost the Divine image*, though they have lost all those features of moral resemblance, while man is said to retain it still, even though fallen and utterly depraved by sin. (Gen. ix. 6; 1 Cor. xi. 7; James iii. 9.)

Angels rejoiced over the completed creation (Job xxxviii. 7), and, of course, were created anterior to man. And in the creation of man (as adverted to in Gen. i. 26, 27) there was, as we have said, a clear intimation that no creature previously called into being possessed God's image in the true and lofty sense, either in the creation of earthly or heavenly things. Hence, as regards this image, there was something peculiar in its relation or application to man,—something which was not characteristic of angels or of any other creature. They may have possessed moral perfections (as many of earth's creatures also do possess natural qualities, as, *e. g.*, sight, hearing, instinct) in a higher degree than man, and yet were not created in the image of God. What, then, is that resemblance? It cannot be solely ethical, and therefore must be based in their nature itself. The angels do not possess this primary and controlling feature of it, whatever that feature may be, *but it is declared to be the characteristic of our race as created.*

Angels are called the sons of God, and Adam is named a son of God, (Luke iii. 38); but yet, nowhere in the divine word is it left to be *inferred* from this fact that man was created in the image of God. In connection with certain precepts, it is expressly and repeatedly stated that he was so created, and is nowhere left to be inferred. It is, for example, announced to be a fearful crime to *slay* or to *curse* him, because God created him in His own image, according to His likeness. And if creation may constitute sonship, as in the case of the angels and of Adam, it does not *therefore* necessarily constitute us His offspring (in the sense Delitzsch would have it),—*i. e.*, in the sense of imparting to us this image and likeness. Paul's affirmation in Acts xvii. 29, that we are "*the offspring of God*,"—*γενέας τοῦ Θεοῦ*,—cannot mean that we are merely *His creatures*, for all things are such. And in illustration of his argument, it may be remarked that, in Daniel v. 4–23, the prophet does not mean that Belshazzar and the Chaldeans worshipped gods *represented* by material forms of *gold, silver, brass*, etc., but gods consisting of such materials,—gods of

gold, silver, etc. So Paul's reasoning here evinces that such was the fact with the Athenians, otherwise his argument that *like begets like* would have no relevancy. "Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device," (vs. 29.) Now *γένος* is *progenies*, and thence *familia, gens, natio*. The first is the sense here employed by Paul. (See also Acts iv. 6, 26; and vii. 13, 19; and xiii. 26; and xviii. 2; and Rev. xxii. 16.) And this term, though thus directly applied to men even after the fall, *is never applied to angels*. Though, if Delitzsch's inference be just, *that, being sons of God, they must be in the likeness of God*, we should expect to find it as commonly applied to them as to men.

I conclude this part of the discussion with a reference to the inference of Delitzsch from his forecited argument, that "If man be created after the image of God and of the angels, *it follows that the image of God in man refers primarily to His invisible nature.*" We admit that the image is to be referred mainly to His invisible nature; for God, in whose image he was created, is a spirit (John iv. 24)—an expression which, though found but once in the scriptures (for that in 2 Cor. iii. 17, is not to be confounded with it), is amply sufficient to establish the truth announced. The term *God*, here, is not to be understood hypostatically for either the Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit exclusively, but for the Godhead—the Divine nature or *Esse*, possessed alike by each. This nature is spirit; and though angels are spirits, and thus far may, so to speak, resemble either personality or hypostasis of the Godhead, it cannot be thence inferred that they possess the likeness of the Elohim or Godhead, who created man in His own Triune image after His likeness. The fact that they are spirits, therefore, proves nothing to the purpose, simply because they were created as separate or distinct personalities, while man (*הָאָדָם*) was created with such a unity and distinction that when Adam sinned all sinned, and not putatively, but really. He was created *as man*, and yet *as men*, with a co-existing oneness and plurality wholly unlike the angels, and yet in the image and likeness of God.

Dr. Thornwell, who, previous to the appearance of my former essay, had entertained the same view with Dr. Hodge on this subject, has in his lectures (which we had not seen till the spring of

1878) abandoned it utterly, and adopts the view presented in that essay, and in the following emphatic terms affirms the generic unity of man.¹ He says: "On these grounds I am free to confess that I cannot escape from the doctrine, however mysterious, of a generic unity in man as the true basis of the representative economy in the covenant of works. The human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes an organic whole, with a common life springing from a common ground. There is an unity in the whole species; there is a point in which all the individuals meet, and through which they are all modified and conditioned." "There is in man what we may call a common nature. That common nature is not a mere generalization of logic, but a substantive reality. It is the ground of all individual existence and conditions—the type of its development. The parental relation expresses, but does not constitute it; propagates, but does not create it. In birth there is the manifestation of the individual from a nature-basis which existed before. Birth, consequently, does not absolutely begin, but only individualizes humanity. As, then, descent from Adam is the exponent of a potential existence in him, as it is the revelation of a fact in relation to the nature which is individualized in a given case, it constitutes lawful and just ground for federal representation. God can deal with the natural as a covenant head, because the natural proceeds upon an union which justifies the moral."

"But it may be asked, Do you mean to say that each individual will actually expressed itself in the prevarication of Adam—that each man actually ate of the forbidden fruit? As individuals, certainly not; as individuals, none of us then existed. In our separate and distinct capacity, his sin was no more ours than our sins are his. But as the race, which was then realized in him, as it is now realized in all its individuals, his act was ours. How the individual is related to the genus, how the genus contains it, and how the individual is evolved from it, are questions which I am utterly unable to solve; *but their mystery is no prejudice to their truth*. Our moral convictions demand that we should predicate such an unity of mankind; and though a great mystery itself, it

¹ See Lecture XIII. on Theology, Works, Vol. I., pp. 349–351. And also the numbers of the *Danville Review* for September and December, 1861, and for March, 1862.

seems to clear up other mysteries which are pitch darkness without it."

"If this account of the representative principle should be rejected, we can only fall back upon the testimony of Scripture, and treat it as an ultimate fact in the moral government of God, until a satisfactory explanation can be given. We must accept it as we accept other first principles, and patiently wait until the difficulties connected with it are dissipated by further light. It does explain hereditary sin and hereditary guilt; it does unlock the mystery of God's dealings with the race; it does meet all the requirements of conscience in reference to our own moral state and condition. All that it leaves unsolved is the question of its own righteousness. Every other theory is obliged to deny native depravity, and to contradict at once the explicit teachings of Scripture and the articulate enunciations of conscience."

III. THE TRUE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHRASE "IMAGE AND LIKENESS."

But we proceed to consider the language itself of Gen. i. 26, 27 in reference to this image. And the following very judicious remarks of the profound orientalist, Dr. Kennicott, may serve to introduce the point.

He says: "God being about to create man, is introduced as saying, *Let us make man in our image after our likeness*, in consequence of which the historian tells us, *so God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him*. It is evident, then, that God created man in His own image; this is mentioned thrice by way of emphasis, and to prevent, if possible, all possibility of misconstruction. Now, what God did was certainly what He proposed to do: God creating man in His own image; *that is, in the image of the Godhead, and therefore God proposed to create him in the image of the Godhead*. But if God proposed to create him in the image of the Godhead, the proposal must have been made to the Godhead, because the words are, *Let us make man in our image*. And if the proposal is here made by God to the Godhead, it is absurd to suppose it made to the same person that makes it, and consequently reasonable to think it made to the other two persons in unity with the Godhead." (*Two Dissertations, etc.*, pp. 29, 30.)

In the phrase *בצלמנו כדמותנו* *in our image according to our like-*

ness, interpreters find great reason to differ on the question whether צֶלֶם and דְּמוּת (*image* and *likeness*) should be distinguished as differing in their import, or whether they together constitute a *hendiadis* or a *pluralis intensivus*. The question is not unimportant, and we shall present a brief view of what has been advanced in the endeavor to render a solution.

Bernard strongly asserts the distinction. I cite him, not as an exegete, but as presenting the view entertained, not only anterior to his day (as *e. g.*, by Basil, *Homil.*, 10; Hexam. Jerome, in Ezek. xxviii. 12; Chrysostom, *Homil.*, 9, in Gen., and Augustine, *Damascenus*, and others), but as current in his own time. He says: "Imago siquidem in Gehenna uri poterit, non exuri, ardere, sed non delere. Similitudo non sit, sed aut manet in bono, aut si peccaverit anima mutatur miserabiliter in mentis insipientibus similita." (*Serm.* 1, *De Anima*.)

Zanchius very strongly supports the same view. He says: "Although many great men, ancient and modern, maintain that there is no difference here between *image* and *likeness*; I cannot but think otherwise, and that the word *image* is to be referred to the substance of the soul of man, but *likeness* to the qualities and gifts and various virtues whereby man was made to possess a resemblance to God." (*De Creat. Hom.*, lib. I, cap. 1, Tom. III., p. 486.) He cites Augustine and P. Martyr, in support of this view, which he maintains very forcibly, giving a very plausible construction to the passages in the Old and New Testaments which have been brought against it.

Calvin rejects this view, though he admits that interpreters generally accept it, and distinguish *image* from *likeness*; and that for the most part they hold that *image* is *in the substance*, and *likeness in the accidents*. Under the former is to be regarded the *nature* which God bestowed upon man; and under the latter His gratuitous gifts. (*In locum*.)

Vatablus takes the same view, and says: "Vocibus imaginis et similitudinis sive simulacri ejusdem significationis. Maximam similitudinem significat, *q. d.*, nobis simillimos, ut quantum fieri poterit accedant ad naturam nostram." (*In locum*.)

Lapide, however, maintains that *image* and *likeness* is a *hendiadis*; and he adds: "As if it were said, *To the image and likeness*, that is, *to the image of the likeness*, as in Wisdom ii. 24,—

that is, *like to*, or *very like to* the image," (*in loc.*),—which he attempts to sustain by a reference to Genesis v. 1, and ix. 6; and adds: "The Hebrew for image is צֶלֶם, which signifies the shadow or adumbration of a thing. For the root צל signifies to cast a shadow, from which צל signifies *shadow*, and צֶלֶם *shadowy image*."—(*Ibid.*)

Grotius, too, makes it a *hendiadis*. (*In loc.*) But the expression is not *image and likeness*, which might, indeed, justify such a criticism, but our *image according to* our likeness, which is unfavorable to a *hendiadis*.

Piscator and Stuart adopt the *pluralis intensivus*. But we need pursue this no farther, and shall offer only a brief remark or two on the point.

As to a *plural intensive* in such a connection, it certainly, to say the least, must, in all candor, be conceded to be a somewhat incongruous conception to suppose that God, *when speaking to Himself*, should intensify his expressions by repetition. The argument from Genesis v. 1 is of no force; for though it is true that *likeness* only is therein specified, it is obvious that this is by *synecdoche*; for that *image* is understood is clear from verse 3, where both terms are employed, and this, too, in a formal historic statement, in which a merely rhetorical plural can hardly be regarded as in place, though a *hendiadis* might be. So, too, in chapters i. 27, and ix. 6, *image* alone is repeated; and in James iii. 9, where ἐμοίωσι is employed in a similar manner, and includes also the whole race.

It ought, perhaps, to be noted in the connection that in Genesis v. 1, ב, and not כ (as in Genesis i. 26), is used before דְּמוּת, or *likeness*, while in verse 3 the two prepositions are interchanged, and the position of the words themselves reversed: "And Adam begat a son in his own likeness, according to his image." But in Genesis i. 26, Jerome translates כ by *ad*,—*ad imaginem nostram*,—though the Hebrew literally is "*in* our image," the radical meaning of כ being *in*, and not *to*. The LXX. render it κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμῶν,—*according to our image*; all of which would seem to intimate that they must have read *Cuph* for *Beth*, unless we should accede to what seems to be an unsustained or arbitrary criticism of Gesenius, who, in *Thesaurus*, p. 173, col. 2, under the thirteenth meaning of כ, renders the clause in Genesis i. 26, *ad imaginem nostram, secundum similitudinem nostram*. Onkelos,

as we have shown, has it "*in our image*;" and so likewise the Targum of Jonathan; and Rabbi Solomon, author of the Targum of Jerusalem, who renders the phrase *in our type*, making *בְּצֶלְמֵנוּ* type; while Moses Gerundensis renders it *in our form*.

But even admitting, as Knobel, Delitzsch and others claim, that *image* and *likeness*, as well as the particles *בְּ* and *כְּ*, may be interchangeably employed, yet still the double designation (*image* and *likeness*), as Lange has with great force remarked, does not serve merely to give a stronger emphasis to the thought, *since in that case the stronger expression, בְּצֶלְמֵנוּ, should come last*, it being the shadow, outline, or copy, and therefore the *image*, while *כְּצֶלְמֵנוּ* is the resemblance or comparison. And while *בְּ* expresses the near presence of an object, as *in*, or *within*, *close to*, or *in it*, whether in a friendly or hostile sense, *near by*, etc., *כְּ* expresses the relation of similarity or likeness, *i. e.*, *as*, *in some degree*, *like as*, *instead of*, etc. So that *in our image* means after the principle or norm of our image; but *as our likeness* means, so that it be our likeness. (Page 173.) This judicious criticism places the whole enquiry on its true ground. And we further invite the especial attention of our readers to the note appended by Tayler Lewis, who, after remarking that the manner in which the two words are used would warrant the interpretation that in man as created after this higher idea, the *צֶלֶם* (*image*) is the *מִין* (*species*), adds: "*This is most important in respect to the question, In what consists the unity of the human race? Oneness of physical origin and physical life (מִין) undoubtedly belongs to the idea of species, but in a much higher sense is this unity conserved by the בְּצֶלְמֵנוּ, the higher species, the one spiritual humanity in all men*,"—a thought which, though thus suggested by these terms in their application to the first Adam, receives a most impressive elucidation not less than confirmation from the relation sustained by the second Adam to all His spiritual offspring. It would be impossible to follow out the thought fully in the brief compass of this note. But it will not be needed by the intelligent believer, who has duly considered that Christ, who is the image of the invisible God (Col. i.), the express image of His person (Heb. i.), is our Head, the beginning of the new creation (Rev. iii. 14), who is the Life of all His covenanted seed, who are included in Him as "members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones," and who in Him become partakers

of the Divine nature, are created anew in Him, and the life which they live they live by Him. They are, therefore, spiritually one with Him. And yet in that oneness there is no confounding together, or merging of their distinct spiritual personality with either that of each other or with that of their Head; for He is the vine and they are the branches, who can possess no life unless by abiding in the vine. The attempt to subject this transcendently precious and glorious truth to a cold intellectual analysis, when the moral nature is that with which it is pre-eminently concerned, would be folly. It has ever been realized in its truth and power in the rich experience of the children of God; and to them it ever has proved, and to such through all the coming centuries it ever will prove, the source of their brightest hopes and their purest joys.

IV. WHAT IS THE IMAGE AND LIKENESS?

We now come to the main point of this whole discussion: What is the image and likeness referred to in Gen. i. 26, 27, and elsewhere in the Scriptures? And taking the whole subject into consideration, we may remark that the fact is certainly a most impressive one, that on the question, *What are the points of resemblance which Moses, or rather God (whose language Moses repeats), intended here to indicate as constituting this image and likeness?* expositors have never been able even to approximate an agreement, being wholly unable to fix upon any basis for predication. The reader will bear with me while I endeavor briefly to place the facts before him, which, on several accounts, will be preferable to a mere statement of the result of the investigation. Many of our previous citations will likewise bear equally upon this point, but they need not be here reproduced, as the reader can easily refer to them.

The fact of this remarkable disagreement is fully acknowledged by Gregory of Nyssa, in his *De Opificio Hominis*, a tractate devoted to a consideration of the subject. Theodoret (Quæst. XX. in Genesin) confesses himself unable to determine in what the image consisted, while Epiphanius (Hæres. 30) comes to the conclusion that the matter cannot be determined. Such are the results to which a consideration of the discussions of the subject in their own day and anterior thereto had led these learned and eminent men., and the disagreement since has been equally as great, and is not less at the present time.

As to the Jewish interpreters, Philo placed the image in the *νοῦς*, or *rational soul*, in which he has been followed by some eminent Jews and Christians. But the Jews include in the meaning of the *image*, (1), The immortality of the body (see Wisdom ii. 23, 24); (2), Dominion over the earth (Wisdom ix. 2, 3; Sirach xvii. 3, 4). Thus, too, the Targum of Onkelos, 'And the Lord said, Let us make man (אֲדָמָא) in our image *as* our likeness; *and they shall have dominion*," etc.; (3), The moral state (Wisdom ix. 3).

Tertullian (*Adversus Marcian* II., 5, 6) placed it in the innate powers and faculties of the human soul, especially in the freedom of choice between good and evil.

Origen (*Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, III., 6), Gregory of Nyssa and Leo the Great approximate this view of Tertullian in the general, and regard the image of God as principally consisting in the rectitude and freedom of the will, and in the due subordination of the inferior powers of the soul to the superior. To which Leo, however, and many others add the immortality of the body.

Nazianzen places it in the mental and moral capacities of the soul. Ambrose in its possession of liberty, *liberum arbitrium*. Basil and Chrysostom in its power and dominion over all animals. Augustine chiefly in the incorporeality and indivisibility of the soul; and he adopts Aristotle's division of its mental powers (memory, will, and understanding) as presenting a likeness to the Trinity, in which man was created. The representations of these eminent men, however, are not always self-consistent; but on this we need not dwell.

Epiphanius blames Origen for teaching that Adam through the fall lost the image of God, which, says he, the Bible nowhere affirms. He knows and believes "*quod in cunctis hominibus imago Dei permaneat*." (Epist. ad Joan. in Opp. Hieronymi, Tom. I.) Augustine also at first took the ground that the image of God was destroyed in the fall. (De Genes., lib. VI., cap. 27.) But in his *Retractions* (lib. II., cap. 24) he recalls this, and opposes Origen; but says, that while the view is to be rejected that in Adam, after he sinned, nothing remained of the image of God; yet it is true that that image had become so deformed through sin that it needed a renewal.

Damascenus, after Augustine, adopts Aristotle's enumeration of the mental powers, and placed the divine image in the endow-

ment of *intellect*, *will*, and *memory*, and sought therein to recognize the likeness of the Trinity.

Many of the Greek fathers regard the τὸ νοερὸν καὶ ἀνθρώπινον, *the self-conscious and free nature of man*, or his individual personality, as the image of God, in which sense it of course could not be forfeited by the fall. And this conception, inadequate as it is (for no individual personality can be an image of the tripersonality of God), has been adopted by many later writers; but, as Delitzsch (pp. 85–87) has well remarked in relation to this view, that "personality is only the unity of consciousness, which comprehends the entire condition of being in likeness of God, and which is appropriate to it. *But this entire condition is a created representation of the entire absolute life of the TRIUNE GOD*, and not merely of the Logos." "Everywhere Scripture says only that man was created after the image of the Elohim, or of the Godhead." "*It is the entire living fulness of the Triune Godhead which is reflected in man*, and this reflection is at once physical and moral, and by sin it is not only morally, but also physically corrupted." *And that the true nature of God is represented in man Augustine emphatically affirms.* (De Civ. Dei, lib. II., and De Trinit., lib. X.) And the conception has ever been a common one in the Church, but the attempt to find the resemblance in the mental powers, or moral qualities alone, etc., has invariably been fruitful of confusion and error.

Most of the Greek and Latin fathers distinguish between *image* and *similitude*, meaning by the *image* the original constitution, the innate powers and faculties of the soul; but by the *similitude*, they understand the actual resemblance to God which is acquired by the exercise of these powers.

The Schoolmen are, if possible, still more at variance than the earlier writers; and our modern critics and theologians agree no better than the ancients. In regard to the Schoolmen, some of them, after Philo, place the image in the rational soul; others, in man's dominion over the inferior creatures,—which view was adopted also by Socinus and his followers, as well as by many Arminians.

Lombard (Sentent., lib. II., Dist. 16, litt. D.) and Aquinas (Sum. Part I., Quæst. 93, Art. 1) affirm, however, that *image* should be referred to nature, and *likeness* to gifts—which view also Bellarmin

sustains (De Grat. Primi Hominis, cap. 2). It is, however, strongly rejected by Lapidé (in locum), and many others of the leading Papal divines.

The Lutheran divines, from Col. iii. 10, and Eph. iv. 24, affirm that the likeness of God is utterly lost through sin. *Gerhard*, in his *Locis*, and *Calovius*, in the *Synopsis* contrav., deny that the image of God subsists in *iis quæ ad essentiam animæ pertinent et quæ etiam post lapsum naturaliter ei insunt*; and though there are great differences amongst them on the question as to what constitutes the image itself, they seem fully to concur with Gerhard in his emphatic affirmation, that man was created an image of the Trinity. (Loci Theol. Tom. IV., loc. IX., § 6.)

The Calvinistic divines differ in regard to both.

The views of *Zwingle* are given in his German works (Vol. I., p. 56), in which he denies that the likeness to God can be in our bodies, as thence it must follow that God is a compound, and that hence it does follow that we are fashioned after the image of God in our minds or souls. And referring to Augustine, who, as above stated, adopted Aristotle's division of the mental powers as an image of the Trinity, *Zwingle* says: "We find in ourselves that the image of God is much more cognate with some things than with those three powers;" . . . "that is, there are other parts of us in which the image of God may be discerned." (See Dr. Henry B. Smith's edition of Hagenbach, Vol. II., p. 253.)

Hyperius, in 1 Cor. xi. 7, places the image in man's superior excellence to other creatures: "Appellat (Paulus) autem virum imaginem et gloriam Dei propter excellentiam, quæ præditus est vir, ob id, quod primus et summa potestate, quæ proximus est Deo, sit conditus, Deo in omnibus quàm maximè similis, magis quam ulla alia creatura, nullum habens præter Deum superiorem; ideo quam homo dicitur in scripturis ad imaginem Dei creatus." See also on Col. iii. 10 (p. 141), where he rejects the opinion of Augustine and Damascenus, who find the likeness in Aristotle's classification of the *memory*, *intellect* and *will*, and affirms that it consists in *righteousness*, *holiness* and *truth*.

Calvin holds that the image is blotted out by sin—"imago illa deleta est per peccatum," and that Christ therefore restores it. (See on Gen. i. 26, Eph. iv. 24, and Col. iii. 10). In his Institutes, however, he would harmonize the corporeal and spiritual, by

representing the former as the foil to the latter. (Lib. I., cap. 15, §§ 3 and 4). He, too, agrees with *Zwingle* in rejecting Augustine's view of the three powers, understanding, will and memory, as an image of the Trinity. (§ 8.)

Polanus, after remarking that the soul and body as a compound cannot be the image of God, as God consists not of matter and spirit, but the soul alone and the gifts pertaining to it, though it shines in the body, and in the whole person of man, and adds: "Quocirca subjectum et sedes imaginis Dei est proprie anima hominis; etiamsi effecta ac documenta imaginis Dei etiam in corpore hominis, veluti in animæ instrumento ac per consequens in toto homine se proferant ac refulgeant." (*Syntag.*, p. 1049.)

Pareus, in Jas. iii. 9, says: "*Hominiibus ad Dei imaginem factis*. Hoc docet maledictionem quæ sit hominibus, redundare in Deum non minus quam contumacia imaginis, Regis facta in regem redundat." And in reply to the remark that the image is now abolished by sin, which, says he, the Socinians deny [for they place it simply in dominion], he remarks that it is indeed *blotted out in great measure* (deletam esse magno in parte), so far as righteousness, holiness, and rectitude are concerned, and which are restored by Christ; but that there are clear remains of it in the minds and hearts of men. And on Gen. ix. 6, he remarks: "The fifth reason for the prohibition of murder is derived from the dignity of man. The image of God cannot be destroyed with impunity, because if the image of God be violated, God is wronged. But man was made in the image of God; therefore he cannot with impunity be slain. They, therefore, who are not deterred from murder on account of natural bands, or the fear of punishment, should be deterred by reverence, lest they violate the image of God." And he adds, that certain lineaments of the original image still remain in mankind.

Piscator, on Gen. i. 26, says: "Posita autem est (imago illa Dei), vel potius fuit (nam per lapsum bona ex parte amissa est), partim in hominis substantia, atque imprimis in anima, et in partibus ejus essentialibus, potentiis ac viribus: partim in certis qualitibus, certaque dignitate, honore et gloria quibus ornatus fuit homo. . . . Atque adeo sicut personæ in Deo tres sunt; ita in hominis anima tres sunt potentiæ, videlicet, intellectiva, sensitiva, et vegetativa." (P. 15, col. 1.) Then in Gen. ix. 6, he says: "*Quoniam ad imaginem Dei*, etc. Quum per homicidium violetur im-

ago Dei ad quam homo est cāditus: duo hinc colliguntur: unum, quod reliquiae imaginis Dei in homine ad hoc supersint: alterum quod imago Dei ad corpus quoque hominis pertineat, tanquam animae scilicet nativum instrumentum arctissima necessitudine cum illa devinctum." In Eph. iv., 24, and Col. iii. 10, he makes the image to relate to knowledge and the will.

Turretin affirms that men since the fall possess the divine image. (Vol. I. p. 414.)

Lapide maintains the present existence of this image in man, and cites *Chrysostom* in his support: "*Ad imaginem*, etc., *q. d.*, Si non movet te natura communis, moveat saltem imago mea: homo enim est imago mea vide erga ne cum occidendo, coelestis regis vivam imaginem demoliaris;" and adds: "So that thou dost an injury not so much to man as to God." (In Gen. ix. 6.) He likewise refers to *Jerome*, *Chrysostom*, *Basil*, *Eucherus*, *Augustine*, *Damascenus*, and *Bernard*, as holding that *image* pertains to nature and *similitude* to the virtues, and remarks, that on this ground the similitude, and not the image of God, perished in man through sin." But he places it in the understanding of man, and concurs with *Augustine* (*De Trinit.*, lib. X., cap. 10, and lib. XIV., cap. 11), in the attempt to trace therein the likeness to the Godhead or Trinity.

We cite, in conclusion, a few of the later expositors.

Whitby, on James iii. 9, says: "*After the similitude of God*. From this 9th verse it appears that man lost not the image of God in the fall." He holds that it consists, primarily, in dominion.

Bengel, on Col. iii. 10, says that "the image (in the new man) results from regeneration," which of course, infers that it was purely moral. And on Jas. iii. 9, says: "Amissimus Dei similitudinem."

Bloomfield, on Eph. iv. 24, renders *κατὰ θεόν* "in conformity to the will of God." But if (as, after many others, he suggests, that) "holding in delegation from God the government of all creatures," (Gen. i. 26-27, Ps. vii. 4-6, Wisdom ix. 2), constitutes man the *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*, as a viceroy is called, *εἰκὼν τοῦ βασιλέως*, being the king's type or representative (see on 1 Cor. xi. 7), then Nero, who in this precise sense was called "the minister of God," and Nebuchadnezzar, who was God's "servant" in the same sense, possessed his image truly, as originally created; while those they ruled and

oppressed had it not, which is, of course, inadmissible. But it should be stated that *ὁμοία* here (1 Cor. xi. 7) about which there has been much dispute, appears to be used, as by the LXX. in Numbers xii. 8, *ὁμοία κυρίου*, the *similitude of the Lord*, and likewise in Ps. xvii. 15, *ὁμοία σου*, thy likeness. And this meaning, moreover, would apply to both instances of its use in this verse, to wit: man the *similitude* of God, and woman the *similitude* of man. And so, along with the accompanying word, *εἰκὼν*, the sense would be, *that man is the image and similitude of God*.

Wordsworth here explains *εἰκὼν*, not corporeally, but intellectually, and especially by reason of "*dominion over the creatures*;" and on Col. iii. 10, explains it as "God's *intellectual, rational, moral, and spiritual* likeness." And then, on James iii. 9, says: "From this sentence it is clear that though the image of God in man was marred by the fall, it was not destroyed. See also Gen. ix. 6, where murder is forbidden after the flood, on the ground that man was made in the image of God, and the divine image defaced in Adam has been restored in Christ." (Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 24.)

Lange, on Gen. ix. 6, asserts the present existence of God's image in man: "*For in the image of God*, etc. This is the reason for the command against murder. In man there is assailed the image of God, the personality, that which constitutes the very aim of his existence, although the image itself is inviolable."

REMARKS ON THE FOREGOING.

Such, then, is the condition in which this inquiry and its results are found existing in theology and biblical literature. And from the latter portion of these quotations it is evident that the great and marked advance in exegetical knowledge, with its approved appliances for unfolding the meaning of the sacred text, has brought the question as to what constitutes the Divine image and likeness no nearer a satisfactory solution than it was fifteen centuries ago; but it should be borne in mind, however, that there is a universal concurrence on various points of the inquiry, on which we shall remark presently, and amongst them the following, which claims special attention, to-wit: *that man was created after the image, according to the likeness of the Triune God, and not after that of either personal hypostasis*. Occasionally, it is

true, we meet with some one who seems to know all about the constituency of the image and likeness, and who can, without the slightest hesitation or difficulty, inform us which of these cited opinions is correct, as the young man (Vincentius Victor) did in regard to the question of *creationism* and *traducianism*; who, disapproving of Augustine's hesitation to come to a decision thereon, very decidedly embraced creationism; but whom Augustine strongly rebuked for his youthful indiscretion, in pretending thus to settle that question without even a due appreciation of its actual state. But we refer, not to such instances, but to the prevailing views of the Church.

It certainly cannot be doubted, in view of the frequent references to the subject by inspired teachers in both the Old and New Testaments, that the subject is one of real and intrinsic importance, or that the divine word must contain within itself the sources or elements for a full solution of the question; and if so, that hitherto we have failed in the effort rightly to apprehend those teachings. The *fault* of theologians and interpreters in the matter, however, is not, as Knapp asserts (Theology, p. 168), that they have *overlooked the different meanings* in which the phrase *image and likeness of God* is employed in the Bible, but it obviously is, that they have assumed that there might be radically different meanings attached to the words, even in that connection in which God Himself directly employs them in Gen. i. 26, 27. And hence they have, in failing to recognize the fact so justly affirmed by Delitzsch, that "*Scripture knows but one likeness to God in man, which is at once moral and physical, and which cannot be lost morally without being at the same time physically ruined,*" failed also to agree on any sense in which it is employed in all the other passages.

After the doctrinal discussion with the Socinians and Remonstrants had been fully inaugurated, they who held that the image of God in man was ethical only, and in no sense natural, found it expedient, in order to retain their view, to affirm that the whole image of God was obliterated by the fall. And hence, as this could not very well be made to comport with such declarations as are contained in Gen. ix. 6; 1 Cor. xi. 7, and James iii. 9, it was deemed important to concede a two-fold usage (that is, a *wider* and *narrower* sense) of the term itself. The very learned

Voetius has gone laboriously into this topic,¹ without, however, relieving his own position, which had been strongly excepted against, that "the *image* was wholly obliterated by the fall." Delitzsch forcibly remarks (p. 85), that "It is this distinction of a divine likeness in a broader (physical) meaning which cannot be lost, and a divine likeness in a narrower (ethical) meaning which has been lost by the fall, which is subject to the charge of an unmodified dualism that has been felt even by our dogmatists themselves." But in order that this phase of the subject may fully appear in the connection, we shall here cite a brief passage in illustration, only premising that the necessity felt and recognized in the circumstances for such a two-fold definition, should certainly have wrought the conviction, either that the difference between the *צלם* and the *דמות* had not been properly appreciated, or, admitting the *plural intensive*, that the conception of the *צלם* had been wholly at fault.

"The word *divine image*," says Voetius (ubi supra), "is by our theologians taken sometimes in a *broad*, and sometimes in a *strict*, sense. In the former it denotes all those things which not only *formally* (as I may say) constitute the image of God, but even those which fundamentally and presuppositionally pertain to it, and which may be found enumerated by Ursinus (on Catech. Quest. 7), Polanus (Syntagma, lib. V., cap. 34), and ordinarily by our writers on the Common Places. But accepted in the latter sense it embraces and signifies rectitude, righteousness, holiness, and perfect conformity with the law of God. So the apostle describes it (Eph. iv. 24), and our Catechism (Quest. 6); and the commentaries for the most part on Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10, take notice that the image of God is by synecdoche called wisdom and righteousness. (See Gommar on Col. iii). Piscator and Rollock, on Eph. iv. 24, even without a synecdoche place the image of God in *wisdom* and *righteousness*. They very properly call the image of God, so understood, the same as *habits* and *gifts* (*habitus et dona*) (see Wendelinus, Bucan, Polanus, in Locis Com.), and say that it is the same as original righteousness." He then goes on to specify also the various views of our theologians; and as the references may be of service to those who may further desire to investigate the subject, we cite the chief of them: *Tilenus*, Syntag., Part I., Disput. 32; *Danæus*,

¹ Selectæ Disputationes, Tom. V., pp. 595 seq.

Part III., Isagog., cap. 6; *Beza* and *Fayus*, Disput., 20, § 7; *Leydey Synopsis*, Disput., 13, § 42; *Festus Hommius*, on the Catechism, Quest. 6; *Forbes*, Lib. V., Instruct. 13; *Calvin*, Instit., lib. I., cap. 15, § 4.

SUMMARY AND RESULT.

That the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity was unknown to the ancient people of God, and is unrevealed in the Old Testament scriptures, is a statement not only with nothing to sustain it, but one which is at variance with all the facts in the case.

God designed, by the creation of man, to produce, for the manifestation of His own glory, the image or likeness of Himself. That He could create such an image or likeness no one will doubt, and that He did create it His word fully affirms. This image, moreover, was according to the likeness of the *Godhead*, and not after either individual hypostasis of the Godhead. The subject, though inexpressibly awful, and not to be approached by a spirit of mere speculative inquiry, may yet be properly contemplated in those aspects of it in which it is in the Bible presented to our attention and consideration as of the highest practical interest in its relation to other great truths of revelation, and only in this aspect do we venture to advert to it at all.

It is, therefore, an obvious truth, that in regard to the Divine nature individuality of hypostasis is not, in itself, identical with Godhead, any more than *one and three as such* are identical; and consequently, that one distinct individuality cannot, in its purely personal capacity, constitute an image or likeness of three individualities, either as an unity or as co-existing personalities, will hardly be questioned; and that therefore no one of the divine hypostases, *in itself* and *as such*, either is, or can be truly a likeness of the Trinity as such, is equally obvious; and consequently, that to be created in the likeness simply of either, could not be equivalent to being created in the likeness of the Triune Godhead; and hence, when Christ is named the εἰκὼν of the invisible God (Col. i. 15), and the express image of His person, χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως (Heb. i. 3), it is, in both instances, the Father, and not the Tri-Unity or Godhead, that is specifically referred to.

The same reasons evince that the possession of immortality or dominion, or of any ethical qualities or properties of a merely per-

sonal or individual existence, cannot constitute him, simply as such, an image of the Triune God, and that the most that such properties could effect in that direction would be to constitute a resemblance or likeness between him and *one* of the divine hypostases, contemplated not in its unity with the others, but in its distinct individuality.

Now, *the Adam* (אָדָם), *the species*, or race, was really created in the likeness of the Godhead, and not in that of either hypostasis *as such*; that is, it was created with a co-existing unity and distinction of individuality or personality. So that in its unity it was the image or likeness of the divine unity, and in its distinction of individuality it was an image of the distinction of the divine Trinity; that is, in the image or likeness itself, as in the original or Godhead itself there was a co-existing unity and distinction. Nor is it necessary to suppose that the existence of this distinction in the image or likeness must involve a full and developed personality on the part of those of the race not yet brought into manifested being, for the fact of its *actual existence* as a distinction is all that the argument requires—a distinction which recognizes the fact of the statement *that all sinned when Adam sinned*. Our unity in Adam did not ignore or deprive us of our *individual* responsibility, either as participants in this sin or in the punishment which it incurred. And whatever degree of actual existence this fact may involve we know not; nor is it necessary we should know in order either to believe the truth thus affirmed, or to employ it as an explanatory principle.

Thus was man created in the divine image and likeness, that is, with a co-existing unity and distinction in his nature; and it is worthy of note that this conclusion is both reached and based upon principles admitted by the Church in every age, though not recognized in their mutual connection or logical concatenation, because no effort was made at combination; and further, that it is really in no way invalidated by those divergent and clashing views which in every age have marked the discussion of the subject, as noted above. So that in their contentions and divergency of views from each other, they, in general, mutually concede, and even affirm, every principle that is required for establishing the conclusion we announce in regard to what constitutes the image or likeness of God in man. And we shall show presently that those

selfsame disputes and differences have recognized as true the very points which constitute the basis of this whole representation.

It can be no objection that the idea of such co-existing unity and plurality is inconceivable, unless we would repudiate the doctrine of the Trinity itself; for it is confessedly so in the original, and why then may it not be so in the likeness? But it is not as a matter to be intellectually *comprehended* that its importance consists, but as a *principle*, or first truth, *to be applied*; for in both alike, that is, in the original and likeness, it constitutes a first-truth or explanatory principle (as we have shown), and is to be employed as such for elucidating and understanding the scheme of mercy and salvation, and of God's dealings with the race of man. Nor is it necessary in either case that the understanding or the reason should comprehend the principle itself in order to its legitimate and intelligent application.

Let us, then, proceed to consider the points which, while they stand (as we have said) unaffected by all this variation of views, bear directly upon the question we have raised, and which it is the object of this note to consider. It is conceded, therefore, to be the doctrine of the Word and Church,

1. *That the term "image or likeness of God," as employed in Gen. i. 26, 27, denotes a resemblance to God that is real, and not merely rhetorical.* And though the terms may imply specific ethical qualities, and so evince that those qualities were associated with the image or likeness originally (Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10), it is equally plain that the image itself includes far more than these, and that they were then simply its adornments; for 1 Cor. xi. 7 cannot, without manifest violence to grammatical and rhetorical propriety, be otherwise explained. And it is clear, moreover, from Gen. vi. 9, and James iii. 9, in which men, since the fall, and without reference to their *moral* state, are represented as still possessed of that image; and it is doing clear violence to the language to say that this is to be regarded as merely retrospective. The reason given why the murderer should be put to death is not that he had abused a piece of clay *which once had the royal image stamped upon it, though now utterly defaced*, but because he had defaced the royal image itself as existing therein. And hence, too, as the apostle affirms (James iii. 9), the cursing of man is so

great a crime. It is a cursing of the actually existing image of God, and not of a something wherein it had once been.

This has ever been the recognized sense of these words, except in instances where the exigences of some theory have demanded that their obvious testimony should be set aside; and the representation may receive both illustration and confirmation from passages like the following: "If any man defile the temple of God (the body), him will God destroy;" and "Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost," etc. (1 Cor. iii. 17, and vi. 19.) The former of these passages reads: *εἰ τις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φθείρει, φθερεῖ τὸν θεόν ὁ θεός*, and taken in connection with the preceding verse, the sense is: "Ye yourselves know that your body is the temple of God; if any one destroys that temple God will destroy him." The application of the fact stated is made by the apostle in both passages primarily to the believer, but the fact itself is susceptible also of wider application; for God claims the bodies of *all* as His rightful temple, or the dwelling place for His moral perfections; and the allusion in the former passage (verse 17), in reference to His destroying those who destroy His temple, seems to be directly to Gen. ix. 6. The body, therefore, is still the rightful temple of God, though sin and Satan have made it a den of thieves. It is still His dwelling place, though, as regards the unregenerate, He has been compelled to forsake it. But in no sense does He resign His right to it, while man continues in the new probationary state which He has through the Mediator assigned him. This seems to be the apostolic teaching, and on it is predicated the denounced vengeance of God against him who destroys that temple; and this, not because it *had once been* His temple and rightful dwelling, but because it still is, and because, so far from having abandoned it even in the case of the unregenerate, He is seeking, through the gospel, a re-entrance upon His possession. So long, therefore, as He thus seeks to regain possession He claims it as His own; for He aims at no usurpation. And in like manner man still retains the image of God in which he was originally created, although its moral adornments have been so greatly blurred and obliterated by the fall.

2. We have seen likewise that *it is the unvaried doctrine of the Church, that the image and likeness of God in which man was created, is not the image of either person of the Godhead severally*

considered, but of the Godhead itself in its unity and tri-personality. The reader, by recurring to our citations, will perceive how clearly and fully this has been stated and affirmed, both in ancient and modern times, by the eminent critics and divines of the Church. And I here add, as expressing succinctly and clearly the church view, the statement of the truly learned and profound exegete, Cornelius à Lapide, who says: "Imago haec non est verbum divinum, sive Filius, qui est imago Patris, uti aliqui apud Lipoman. explicant, sed est ipsa essentia divina, ipseque Deus unus et trinus, ad hujus enim imaginem conditus est homo."—(In loc.)

3. Further, that not Adam only as an individual, but the race or species, was created therein. For, as we have seen, and as has always been fully recognized, אָדָם is the name, not of the first man only, or principally (for he is first thus specifically designated in Gen. iii. 17), but of the species; and that, therefore, the race was created in the image according to the likeness of the Triune God. The fact is divinely stated, and has ever been affirmed universally by the Church, and is, therefore, undeniable. How to explain the fact itself we know not; and in our present stage of being it seems as impossible to comprehend or understand it as existing in humanity, as it is to understand and explain the co-existing unity and distinction of personality in the original; that is, in the divine nature itself.

4. That the race, though fallen, still retain this image, though its ethical adornments, or lineaments, as above stated, have been defaced by the fall, and therefore that this image did not consist merely in ethical properties and perfections, which sin could obliterate; but existed in humanity itself, as created by God, and adorned by Him with those gifts or perfections.

5. As has been shown, the Church has, from the first, recognized the fact that the likeness or image in which man was created was that of the Triune God; and the assertion that he was created in the likeness of the Logos, or Son, has always been promptly rejected on this ground, that it was the Triune God who created him in His own image, after His likeness. And yet, though this is so fully affirmed from the first, and by the ablest critics and divines, as the undoubted teaching of the Word, and the doctrine of the Church, even they themselves, in applying this

great truth, have attributed to אָדָם as created in the likeness of God, an image or likeness which is in no sense a likeness of God as the Elohim or Triune Jehovah; but, on the contrary, one that is simply hypostatical—that is, one which pertains alike and equally to each of the persons of the Godhead as individuals, or personalities. As, for example, with Augustine, Damascenus, and Hyperius and others, who, while they concede and affirm that the likeness, to be true, must be that of the Godhead itself, and while they earnestly endeavor to meet this requirement by showing, by a trifold enumeration of qualities, that man was really so created, assign qualities or characteristics which pertain alike to either of the Divine hypostases, and not to the Godhead as to its entirety. Thus Augustine and Damascenus find the Triune image in "man's understanding, will, and memory." Zwingli rejects this, and finds it in other personal qualities, better adapted to express that likeness. Hyperius, too, rejects it, and finds the true Triune image in "righteousness, holiness, and truth." And so on through the whole catalogue of expositors. And thus a triune likeness is provided. But it is a likeness not of the Trinity of the word of God, or of the Church, but of the Trinity of Sabellius. They are distinctions which pertain to each single hypostasis as such, and therefore as much to one of the hypostases as to another; while the image actually demanded in the case is that of the Godhead as such—an image or likeness wherein the Three and the One are alike represented—that is, the Unity and distinction of personality; for without this there would be no image of God as the Triune Jehovah. The same may be said (as already remarked) of all attempts to construe the image as only moral or ethical; or, as consisting in dominion, immortality, &c. For these are not an image of the Godhead in seipso, though they be of each one of the persons individually. But the Scripture statements, and also the recognized consciousness of the Church, demand that the image should be that of the Godhead as such, and not of a single hypostasis; or consist of that only which is common alike to each hypostasis, as is the fact with all of these representations. For if this be denied, then the clearly announced doctrine of the Church on the subject from the very beginning must be abandoned—to wit: that the Adam, the race, was not created in the image or likeness of either the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit, but in the likeness

of the Godhead itself. Their own decided and universal teaching requires this; nor does it amount to any rational objection against the truth on which we insist, that they themselves differed, or failed in their efforts to make the true application of it. Such, then, is precisely the image of which we speak. It is not hypothetical, nor merely ethical, but *natural*—the *Unity and Distinction of Personality as existing in the Godhead*. The Fall has greatly impaired its ethical lineaments, or adornments, but the image itself necessarily remains.

A careful consideration of Col. iii. 10 will show that it in no way really conflicts with this representation; for the passage does not affirm that the divine image, as originally created, is reconstructed. The whole argument of the apostle forbids such a conclusion; but that its ethical adornments are revived—"the new man is ἀνακαινούμενον, *being renewed*," (note the present), *i. e., daily, "in knowledge, according to the image of him who created him."* It is, of course, not God's knowledge which is here referred to, but the knowledge of God which was lost through the fall. And that the whole conception here is purely ethical, and the renewal itself inseparably associated with the human will or agency, is plain from the whole passage: "Ye have put off the old man with his deeds, and have put on the new man, which is *being renewed*," etc. Now God alone could create the image (Gen. i. 26, 27), and no mere creature, in any proper sense of the term, recreate or reproduce it, and hence it is of course, the ethical lineaments of the original image, or those which have reference to our own moral agency, which are here referred to, and which are put on through the grace of Him "who worketh in us to will and to do of his good pleasure. The collateral passage (Eph. iv. 21, 32), makes all this perfectly plain: "That ye put off the old man, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and that ye put on the new man, which, *after God*,¹ is created in righteousness and true holiness." And in the following verses the apostle shows how this is to be accomplished, to wit: by daily and constant efforts to mortify our sinful lusts, and to follow Christ. In other words, the fall alienated us from God. Regeneration through the mighty power of His Spirit re-

¹ Bloomfield here renders *κατὰ θεόν* "in conformity to the will of God," and Delitzsch admits that it "might mean *in a divine manner*." (The old notion that the phrase is an ellipsis, seems destitute of all foundation.)

stores us from this alienation; and progressive sanctification, in which we are to co-operate with his grace and Spirit (*and it is of this, and not of the act of regeneration, that he is speaking in both these passages*), restores, step by step, these ethical lineaments of our original image, which sin has defaced, to wit: righteousness and true holiness (as in Eph. iv. 24), which constitute that saving, or practical knowledge of God (as it is named in Colossians iii. 9), in which we are daily to advance.

No creature, it is true, can represent God as the eternal, omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent Jehovah. But if the image of God in man in its *natural* lineaments (as distinguished from the merely ethical, that is, if it be a representation of the Trinity), consist of the aforesaid unity and distinction in the אֱלֹהִים, on the ground of which all the race sinned in the first sin, then we possessed that image, not only in its ethical adornments, but naturally, and in a sense in which it could by no means pertain to angels, as they were all simultaneously created in possession of their full individual personality. So that the sinning of any one or more of them did not involve the sinning of others, while, on the contrary, the sinning of the Adam (אָדָם), was really and truly the sinning of the race. (Rom. v. 12.) And if it would appear that the apostle, in these words, had reference to the expression of the same fact, as developed with equal clearness and force by Solomon, in Eccles. 7. 29, and who, in referring to the original creation of man and to his fall, says (as the words literally rendered convey the fact): "Only see! this have I found, that God made man upright, and they have sought out many inventions." He calls attention to the fact, not to speculate upon it, but simply as a fact of transcendent interest to man. God created אָדָם, which is undoubtedly generic—*mankind*—(they were all included in the Adam), *upright*, which included free agency and responsibility for their actions; and *they*—the Adam—*have sought out many inventions, or devices. When?* Why, of course at the time of the fall, *when all sinned*, as Paul asserts. We have here the same remarkable interchange of the singular and plural forms as in Rom. v. 12. And the sense is, they *all*, at the time referred to, departed from the state of uprightness in which God had created them. Paul says *they sinned*, and Solomon, that they sought out *many devices*, that is, evil, sinful devices, for the term is in antithesis to

upright. As *הָאָדָם*, therefore, they were all created *upright*; and as *הָאָדָם* they all departed (in the fall) from that uprightness: an idea wholly at variance and irreconcilable with the notion that, the first individual of the race having sinned, his sin was, by a legal fiction, charged upon his innocent posterity, and punished as their own.

Such is the co-existing unity and distinction of individuality in this case, and thus does it shadow forth the unity and distinction of personality co-existing in the Godhead, in whose image man was created. The ground, therefore, for a reasonable denial that the Divine image, in which man was created, includes as the great point of resemblance that of co-existing plurality and unity, seems quite too narrow for occupancy, since the voice of the Scriptures, and of the whole Church, is *that man was created in the image, after the likeness of the Triune God*. Nor is, we repeat it, the incomprehensibility of the fact any ground for rational exception against it, nor against any truth taught with equal plainness, both directly and by implication, in the Scriptures. "The highest attainment of reason," says Pascal, "is to know that there is an infinity of knowledge beyond its limits. It must be sadly weak if it has not discovered this." "Nothing is more consistent with reason than the disavowal of it in matters of faith, and nothing more contrary to reason than the denial of it in matters which are not of faith. To exclude reason, or to take no other guide, are equally dangerous extremes." (Thoughts, Part II., Chapter 6.) And the Church, if she would regain her lost power over the souls of men, must return to this simple doctrine of faith in all that God has taught.

Finally: Mankind, as Schaff remarks, is not a sandheap, but an organic unity. (See in Lange on *Romans* v. 12–19.) There is a unity and there is a distinction, dependent not simply on a succession of manifested existences, but as originally created. It pertained to *הָאָדָם*—*in seipso*—as originally formed, and of course to the racial existence. And there is certainly an innate, though undefined, consciousness of it in our moral nature (and recognized by conscience itself),—a consciousness deeper than any merely logical inference or intellectual conviction; and which finds repeated expression, not only in the Scriptures, but more or less in all literature; as, for example, in the line of *Terence*,—

"Homo Sum; humani nihil à me alienum puto," (*Heaut.* I., 1, 25.)

and which was likewise recognized by the Roman people in the vehement applause with which that utterance was greeted. Marcus Antoninus repeatedly adverts to and recognizes the existence of this consciousness, as, *e. g.*, in lib. II., § 1; lib. IV., §§ 1, 14; and in many other places. Berkeley, too, in his *Minute Philosopher*, pp. 43, 44. And Pascal thus adverts to the same: "Without this divine communication (that human nature is depraved and fallen from God), *what could men do but feed their pride on the inward impression of their former greatness*, or abjectly sink under the consciousness of their present infirmity?" (Thoughts, p. 221.) And even Voltaire, in his *Philosophical Dictionary* (Vol. I., p. 17, Article *Atheism*), who, when speaking of the Athenians applauding Aristophanes and putting Socrates to death, has the following remark: "Such a people, and whose bad government could countenance such scandalous licentiousness, *well deserved what has happened to them—to be brought under subjection to the Romans*, AND TO BE AT PRESENT SLAVES TO THE TURKS." Plutarch, too, adverts to the fact of the existence of this universal consciousness of the oneness of humanity; and in his life of Lysurgus, says that when that lawgiver's institutions were completed, he brought *the Spartans to promise* (as he was about commencing his journey to Delphi) to keep them inviolate till his return. They cheerfully acquiesced, and he departed, but never returned. But in consequence of the promise, Sparta recognized on her part a moral obligation to keep this promise, and during the period of five hundred years kept it sacred and inviolate. Personally or individually, those who survived the first generation (or those who personally covenanted with Lysurgus) had not promised, and had had no hand in accepting the covenant-obligation, and yet there was that in their moral nature which forbade the violation of the obligation, and led them to respect it during the long period referred to.

They represent, moreover, the gods as recognizing this connection. As in Virgil, (*Æn.* 1, 39–41):

"Unius ob noxam et furias Ajacis Oilei."

And Horace, likewise, (in *Epist.* II., lib. 1, verse 14):

"Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi."

The same considerations are, in innumerable places, brought to

view in the word of God, and acknowledged as true and acted upon. Out of the many instances a single one will suffice. In 2 Kings xvii. 7–15, where the children of Israel are reproached with their ingratitude to God: “The children of Israel had sinned against the Lord their *God who had brought THEM OUT OF THE LAND OF EGYPT, from under the hand of Pharaoh,*” etc. Now, how could it be said that these children of Israel had been brought out of Egypt, when their personal existence did not commence till more than 700 years after that event? And yet they are here reproached with *ingratitude* for not remembering this *their* deliverance. We advert to these merely as specimens of the tens of thousands of like instances everywhere to be met with. We cannot expatiate upon them, nor is it necessary; and in the same connection we may ask, Whence is to be traced that sense of sin, or alienation from God and holiness, which we realize so soon as we arrive at a consciousness of moral agency?—a fact of profound interest in its application to this subject, and one the existence of which all serious and reflecting minds admit, and one which can neither be accounted for nor explained by any *ab extra* imputation, or charge of a foreign sin.

This consciousness of a community of interest has, therefore, a basis in nature herself; that is, it has a natural, and not, as with the angels, a merely ethical foundation, and seems to be in every way recognized by the race, as in government, jurisprudence, ethics, etc. It is likewise the basis of many of the most impressive teachings of the Bible; as, *e. g.*, it is recognized by the whole of the second table of the decalogue, and by the parable of the good Samaritan—the priest and Levite violating, and the Samaritan recognizing this consciousness of a common humanity and of its claims. So that, besides the merely social and natural relationships, there is a universal, which declares that we all are, in real interest, ONE—all being “of one blood” (Acts xvii. 26), and all being “*neighbors*” to one another.

For a man to live solely for himself; that is, to consider himself as one whose welfare and happiness are to be sought without regard to that of others, is, and ever has been, treated by the race as a crime against humanity; and hence the odiousness of the character of the miser, the supplanter, the calumniator, the envious, etc.; and that the duty of so regarding ourselves as parts of

the whole, as to recognize practically the obligation to promote the common welfare as we have opportunity, was obvious in our original ethical constitution, is clear from the fact that it becomes manifestly the characteristic of every truly regenerated soul; for such are partakers of the spirit of Christ Jesus, in and through whose whole life on earth this was so gloriously conspicuous.

It cannot be, even by Socinians and Arminians, denied that man is so far fallen from his original state as to be unable, except through the divine mercy, to secure eternal life or happiness, or even to avoid eternal death. All, together with our first parents, are brought into this condition by the first sin; for we find that mutual dependence is so the great law of our nature, as created by God, that the virtue and the vice, joys and sorrows, happiness and misery of the race, are intertwined in one inextricable web, and in a way which has no analogy amongst the works of God, a consideration which should surely have its due weight in viewing the subject before us. There is a basis upon which this order of things rests—and what is it? The co-existing unity and distinction of personality in our common humanity does explain it; that is, *the fact* that all sinned when Adam sinned, and so concurred with him in bringing this condition upon all. To ascribe it to God, either directly or indirectly, is blasphemous; and this is done by making inherent corruption a *positive* penal infliction for a *peccatum alienum*. But the view before us, that the corruption of nature came upon Adam immediately on the fall, and comes on all his posterity *as sinning in him, and falling with him*, not putatively, but really, charges God with no such implication; for, since the covenant was originally made with all, and was, in the fall, violated by all, justice and equity alike demand that all should be held and treated as guilty of that violation.

I do not claim that all the preceding facts, and the like considerations, can find their solution only as a practical recognition of the doctrine above stated. But it cannot be doubted that they all do recognize an *unity* of actual interest which is in harmony with personal and individual interest in all that is noble and desirable, and that this universal consciousness must have an adequate basis. And further: that the basis we have suggested would fully explain or account for its existence in the universal consciousness, sadly as it has been blighted and broken by sin and selfishness.

Delitzsch has a striking passage, which I will cite here before concluding, though not to employ its argument, as he does, to prove the theory of traducianism;¹ but simply as presenting an important psychological fact, as recognized by human consciousness, and which, in this aspect of it, has a direct bearing upon the point before us. He says: "There subsists between all men and the first created pair who became sinful, according to the teaching of Scripture, confirmed by substantial self-knowledge and the measure of experience, a close connection, in virtue of which every individual regards the beginning of the human race *as his own beginning*; so that not only the sin of the race is his sin, but also the transgression of Adam is his transgression, and thus also his guilt. Thus it cannot be otherwise than that the spiritual-bodily origin of humanity is one which, by virtue of the creative foundation and the maintaining providential coöperation of God, continues itself out of itself; and thus the spirit of the individual comes into existence by an immediate appointment of God on each occasion, just as little as does his body. It has been, indeed, remarked in the Roman Catholic interest, sophistically enough, that the transmission, by inheritance, of Adam's sin, can only be spoken of on the hypothesis of creationism, since the divinely created spirit which enters into the moral faculty derived from Adam receives at the same time with it the sin inherent in it. But the meaning

¹ I would here frankly state, in explanation of the silence observed on this subject throughout the present work, that my own mind is not fully settled on the question of traducianism and creationism. I find in both some of what are certainly the elements of divinely revealed truth, and feel assured, therefore, that our mode of stating the question fails to present the issue actually involved, and that a deeper study of the divine word may yet develop the true principle on which those apparently conflicting elements of truth (as the subject is now viewed) will be found reconcilable—that is, if the subject intrinsically does lie within the range of our present ability of logical and metaphysical definition, or even conception. *Creationism*—that is, the theory as now insisted on—evidently owes its origin to the philosophy of Aristotle, who, when treating of and asserting the pre-existence of souls, says that "the soul is from without, and is truly divine." (τὸν νοῦν μόνον θάρσεν ἐπιστάναι καὶ θεῶν εἶναι μόνον. *Generat. Animal.*, lib. II., cap. 3.) Pelagius and his followers resort to this philosophy in order to prove that sin cannot descend by natural generation. And some of our existing writers on theology who have adopted it seem quite inclined to concur with them in this conclusion.

and substance of inherited sin is rather this—that man, as soon as he attains to personal thought, and to self-knowledge, finds everything that he, the I, the person, has in himself—i. e., the entire circumference of his spiritual-bodily natural condition permeated with sin. It is not only the corporeity of man, but the totality of his whole nature absorbed in the σάρξ, in and with which sin is transmitted, so that in the sinful disposition of the entire being of the individual anticipates his actual self-conscious and self-determining life; or, in other words, is prior to the commencement of his personal life. But if it be supposed that the spirit of the individual is at every time created by God, there follows therefrom the consequences, contrary to Scripture and experience, that the human spirit stands independently, without any actual relation to original sin; that it is, God Himself who concludes the human spirit under the consequences of it; that there is only a sinful determination of the bodily nature involved in the enclosing of the so-called natural-psyche, but not an inherited sin comprehending man's whole personality, and certainly not an inherited guilt; that substantially every begetting is a new commencement of human history: for, since freedom belongs to the essence of the spirit, and God cannot imprint upon it the impotency of unfreedom without becoming Himself the originator of evil, it cannot continue to be an absolute necessity for it to subject itself slavishly to the sinful σάρξ of Adam; and there could at least be no question of an imputability of inherited sinfulness, so long as the spirit had not in this position consented, and the image of God in it had not been extinguished." (Pp. 134–136.)

It were, indeed, not difficult by admitted analogies to illustrate and enforce the doctrine we have hereon advanced, but in treating the question we have thought best to avoid all mere metaphysical speculation. It were easy, for example, to have shown that during the past centuries many of the Church divines have taught that the Father is the πηγαία θεότητος, or *Fons Deitatis*, from whom the Son, by generation, and the Spirit, by procession, have received, not their *essence*, of course, but the personality; as, for instance, Turretin says: "Ita Persona differre dicetur ab Essentia, non *realiter*, id est *essentialiter*, ut res et res, sed *modaliter*, ut *modus*, à *re*." (Loc. III., Quæst. 27, § III.) And again, in § XVII.: "Sic Patri tribuitur ἀγεννησία, Filio γέννησις, Spiritui

Sancto ἐκπόρευσις.” They dō not confound personality with essence, which is a numeric unity, though there are relations therein which distinguish the persons; and though in the divine essence itself there was the existing distinction, yet the personality of the Son and Spirit were derived from the Father, as Turretin, in the section last cited remarks: “Sic Filius dicitur esse à Patre per generationem, non ratione *Essentiæ*, et *absolute* qua Deus, sed ratione *Personæ*, et reduplicative qua Filius, Spiritus Sanctus est à Patre et Filio per spirationem, quia generatio et spiratio est communicativa *Essentiæ* ad terminum *Personalitatis*.” But, as I can find in the word nothing to sustain any such speculations, I have avoided them, though, as the reader may see, they might have been plausibly alleged in support of the views I have presented in regard to the divine image in man. I may add, however, that it is common with the Church theologians, in replying to the objection, “that as the Sonship implies derivation and posteriority on the part of the Son, and priority on the part of the Father, therefore Christ is not eternal;” to say that sonship amongst men may be but a distant and obscure adumbration of the relation existing in the Godhead, which may be as much above it as the infinite mind is above the finite grovelling mind of men. And why, then, may not the oneness and plurality in humanity, brought to view in Ecces. vii. 29; Rom. v. 12, and in a multitude of other places, be in like manner a shadowing forth of the divine likeness in this regard? Such a conception is not contrary to the Scriptures; and, as we have shown, it has ever been the concurrent utterance of the Church, that man was created in the image, according to the likeness of the Triune God.

Such, in brief synopsis (for it were easy to extend the discussion through a volume), is the view and the reasons for entertaining it, which have occurred in contemplating this great and profound subject. Yet, though my mind rests satisfied that the view is in harmony with the word of God, and not in conflict with our Church theology, I do not forget that (so far as my knowledge extends) the question has not been previously presented or discussed in any such form as it here assumes. But as I lay no claim to the attribute which a recent council has bestowed upon *Pro Nono*, I hope that none will charge me with claiming it. I have not allowed myself to be deterred from prosecuting the in-

quiry by any such considerations, nor from the applications which, in all such or similar cases, persons whom I care not to characterize, always stand ready to make of them for awakening prejudice and unkindly feeling; for my object is simply to propound the subject for consideration, under the assurance that should it be regarded as the teaching of the Scriptures, its reception, while it can effect no injury, cannot but be in an important degree subsidiary to the true development and right appreciation of the teachings of inspiration respecting the great cardinal truth which it is the aim of the present work to illustrate and defend.

NOTE C.

Referred to above.

PRINCIPAL CUNNINGHAM AND HIS ACCEPTANCE OF DR. HODGE'S THEORY.

We devote the following remarks on imputation and original sin to a consideration of the position occupied by the late Principal Cunningham (of Scotland) in relation thereto, and whose great and illuminated mind was led into serious error by assuming that Dr. Hodge's representations on the subject are reliable. In one of his essays he evinces his acceptance of these representations *en masse*, and takes for granted the undoubted accuracy of all that Dr. Hodge has claimed on this subject, and thus he has been led sadly astray.¹ As his works are deservedly popular, and have been republished and extensively circulated, it would hardly be proper in a treatise like the present to omit a specific reference to the facts in the case.

We commence our remarks with a reference to page 179 (of his *Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*), where, in de-

¹ Principal Cunningham attempts no proof of the accuracy of his statements touching this matter, but merely accepts them on the authority of Dr. Hodge. For example, in a note on page 394, he says, “There is a great deal of important matter, both argumentative and historical, on various departments of this controversy in a very valuable series of articles on original sin and the doctrine of imputation contained in the first series of the Princeton Essays.” On page 380, likewise, he indorses Dr. Hodge's egregious perversion of the work of Rivetus (referred to above), and which he represents as having been written in defence of gratuitous imputation—a doctrine which Rivetus never entertained, but always opposed as an egregious heresy. (See also *Danville Review*, Vol. II., pp. 517-541.)

fending the expression of Calvin (*horribile decretum fateor*), Principal Cunningham says, "He is treating only of the implication of the human race *in the penal consequences of Adam's first sin*," etc., employing this strange phrase as equivalent to the expression, "*Adam's merely personal sin*," and so representing Calvin as a teacher of *gratuitous imputation*, though in the very context and in the two subsequent sections such language as the following occurs, showing in what sense his statement is to be understood when he says, "Iterum quæro, unde factum est, ut tot gentes, unâ cum liberis eorum infantibus æternæ morti involveret lapsus Adæ absque remedio, nisi quia Deo ita visum est? Hic obmutescere oportet tam dicaces alioqui linguas. Decretum quidem horribile, fateor," etc. (lib. III., cap. 23, § 7, p. 151); for he says, "Sic enim prædestinatio nihil aliud est quam divinæ justitiæ, occultæ quidem, sed inculpatæ, dispensatio; quia non indignos fuisse certum est, qui in eam sortem prædestinatione subeunt, æque certum est. *Ad hoc, sic ex Dei prædestinatione pendet eorum perditio, ut causa et materia in ipsis reperiatur.*" (Page 152, § 8.) And a few lines further: "Cadit igitur homo, Dei providentia sic ordinante; *sed suo vitio cadit.*" (§ 8.) And then a few lines still further on: "*Quare in corrupta potius humani generis natura evidentem damnationis causam, quæ nobis propinquior est, contemplemur, quam absconditam ac penitus incomprehensibilem inquiremus in Dei prædestinatione.*" (See also § 9.) Principal Cunningham should, therefore, have said that Calvin is "treating only of the implication of the race in the penal consequences of the first sin," for that sin was not less ours than Adam's. And the order of topics, as treated in § 9 of this work, evinces the utter fallacy of his representation, as it does of that of Dr. Hodge, as we have very fully evinced in that section.

Principal Cunningham, on page 374, reiterates all the misstatements and unaccountable blunders of Dr. Hodge in delineating the doctrine, and in every instance confounding *Adam's personal sin* with *the first sin*, in which *all* sinned (see our § 14, above); and in like manner represents the covenant as made *with Adam alone*, and *for* his seed, and thus the Church is represented as teaching that all the evils we suffer flow to us from the forensic imputation of Adam's personal sin. He appears wholly oblivious of the fact that the Church has ever taught on this point that the

first sin was *our sin*, as well as Adam's, by a mutual participation; and that in that sin we as truly violated the covenant as did our first parents themselves; and that hence its imputation to us is fraught with all the fearful consequences which result therefrom; and he is oblivious, too, of the fact *that she never taught the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin*, for he does not hesitate to style this gratuitous imputation scheme "*the generally received doctrine*" of the direct and proper imputation of Adam's sin." (Page 375.) In fact, in this single paragraph he so designates it no less than six times.

In the same paragraph, moreover, he confounds this notion of imputation (just as Dr. Hodge has done) with the Church doctrine of "immediate and antecedent imputation," and so prepares the way, as did Dr. Hodge, for all the immense confusion which follows.

On page 376, he represents Beza emphatically as an example of those who taught it. He says: "Beza brought out this doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity more fully and precisely than it had been before. He expounded and developed it more fully than any preceding theologian—both as directly and in itself an element in the guilt or *reatus* of the condition into which the human race fell through Adam's transgression, and as the cause, ground, or explanation of the actual moral depravity attaching to all men as they come into the world," when, as we have fully shown, no man more distinctly than Beza alleges *our own guilt in the first sin as the ground of its imputation to us*; and then, moreover, he constantly represents the guilt of the fall as *propagated by nature*, and the *obedience of Christ as imputed through grace*; as, *e. g.*, on Rom. v. 12, "*Sed reatus ille demum ex Adami transgressione in omnes homines propagatos; cui obedientia alterius Adami opponitur per gratiam credentibus imputata;*" and on verse 15: "In versiculo verò 16, *vim utriusque id est lapsus Adami propagati per naturam, et Christi obedientiæ per gratiam imputatæ, comparari.*"¹ Beza is, therefore, directly opposed to the doctrine attributed to him by Principal Cunningham.

On pages 377, 378, speaking of Catharinus and Pighius, he says: "They denied the transmission of an actually corrupt or depraved moral nature from Adam to his descendants." But in § 30

¹ Beza, in Nov. Test. (edition by Henry Stephens, 1589.)

we have sufficiently remarked on this, as asserted by Dr. Hodge. Those papal divines held simply the doctrine of a *gratuitous imputation* of Adam's *peccatum alienum*, and held, just as Dr. Hodge does, that sin was transmitted *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*; that is, that it was propagated or transmitted, not by generation, but by guilt, which being imputed, brought upon them the ruins of the fall.

It is painful to witness how Principal Cunningham's implicit reliance on Dr. Hodge's unauthorized statements has led him utterly astray in this whole matter.

Further, on page 381, he justifies the notion, just as Dr. Hodge has done, that God can constitute a *personal* and *private*, or foreign sin, a *common* and *general* sin. And so justifies, just as Dr. Hodge has done, the error of Crellius, Slichtingius, and the Remonstrants, and of Dr. Taylor of Norwich, (that the first sin is become common by being imputed, and was not common, and *therefore* imputed, and) that God can constitute a *personal* and *private* sin a *common* and *general* sin, which is, as regards Augustinian theology, a grievous error, as we have shown in the preceding work. (See also Turretin, loc. 9, Quæst. 9, §§ 27–35.) And he speaks also in the same connection of the “moral depravity which came upon men (at the fall) as a consequence in the way of penal infliction through the withdrawal of divine grace,”—and this, though they begin existence as sinners, and this depravity exists before moral agency commences. And he repeats that this is held generally by Calvinistic divines.

On page 382, he charges Placæus with maintaining that God, in mere sovereignty, established a constitution for the trial of the race in Adam. His words are: “It is also very manifest that this doctrine [of Placæus] does not give, or attempt or profess to give, any account of the origin, or any explanation of the cause, of the moral depravity of man, and the universality of actual transgression proceeding from it. Nay, it precludes any attempt to explain it, however partially, *except this, that God, in mere sovereignty, established a constitution, in virtue of which it was provided, and did actually result, that all men should have transmitted to them the same depraved moral nature which Adam brought upon himself by his first sin.* And there certainly can be nothing which more directly and immediately than this resolves

at once the sin and misery of the human race into the purpose and the agency of God.” But we ask again: Is not this very scheme, as thus defined, the doctrine of gratuitous imputation? Beyond all question it is! and in no way can it be shown that the theory of Dr. Hodge differs therefrom.

On page 384, he copies and indorses all the misrepresentations which Dr. Hodge has so indiscriminately made respecting the views and position occupied by President Edwards, though a very slight investigation would have evinced their utter inaccuracy, as we have shown in the body of our work.

On pages 371–394 of his work, he himself makes the whole covenant transaction in Eden a resolution on the part of God to constitute the trial of Adam personally the trial of the race. To this passage, which is too long to be here appended in full, the reader is referred.